15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zur Bestrafung von Wehrdienstverweigerung

Landinformation: Ryssland. Bestraffning vid värnpliktsvägran (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum neuen System für die Übermittlung von Einberufungen zum Militär

Landinformation: Ryssland. Nytt system för delgivning av militära kallelser m.m. (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

17. Februar 2023 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Anfragebeantwortung zur Russischen Föderation: Politische Opposition und Wehrdienst (1. November 2022 bis 16. Februar 2023)

Russian Federation; Major developments in the Russian Federation in relation to political opposition and military service [Q37-2023] (Anfragebeantwortung, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum Wehrdienst (Überblick zu russischen Streitkräften; Vertragssoldaten; Reserve; Tragweite der Teilmobilmachung; rechtlicher Rahmen des Mobilisierungsbefehls und Umsetzung; russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine; Einberufung und Rekrutierung in Tschetschenien; Wehrdienstentziehung, Fahnenflucht und Befehlsverweigerung; Verstöße gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht durch russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine)

The Russian Federation – Military service (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | DIS – Danish Immigration Service (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zu Entwicklungen bezüglich Wehrdienst seit Juli 2022 (neue Gesetze; Teilmobilmachung; Einberufung; Vertragssoldaten; Rekrutierung für private Sicherheitsunternehmen; Wehrdienstverweigerung (aus Gewissensgründen); Deserteure; Rekrutierungsmethoden)

Russia; An update on military service since July 2022 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

2026 | Bertelsmann Stiftung (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Länderbericht zu politischer Partizipation; Rechtsstaatlichkeit; Stabilität demokratischer Institutionen; sozioökonomischer Entwicklung; Wirtschaft; Privateigentum; etc. (Berichtszeitraum Februar 2023 - Jänner 2025)

BTI 2026 Country Report - Russia (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)

• Following the 2022 mobilization, the state has shifted to a more systematic approach of contract-based military recruitment to wage the war against Ukraine. Regular recruitment campaigns and ever-increasing salary offers have become common, particularly targeting economically disadvantaged regions. […] The state has also introduced stricter controls on movement for men of military age and enhanced digital surveillance of potential recruits. Following the June 2023 Wagner rebellion and the subsequent killing of its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the landscape of private military companies has shifted significantly. […] Within Russia, unrest has grown in ethnic republics, particularly in response to military mobilization policies that disproportionately affect minority regions. […] The state attributes this drop to increased social payments – such as 1 million ruble bonuses for military recruits and expanded child benefits – alongside a 15% wage surge in defense-related sectors. […] Independent voices such as the remnants of the Soldiers’ Mothers Committee instead faced severe repression: their attempts to organize protests in late 2024 against the deployment of conscripts to Kursk – following Ukraine’s incursion – were met with arrests and fines under tightened “discrediting the army” laws.

22. März 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Russia may be resorting to deploying mobilized personnel as Russian forces continue to incur heavy losses on the battlefield while struggling to recruit enough new volunteers to replace its losses.[2] Voloshyn added that the Russian military command plans to reorganize its 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into a naval infantry division, which would be the tenth new maneuver division that

21. März 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• The spokesperson of a Ukrainian mechanized brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have reduced basic training for personnel conducting ground assaults from one month to one week – likely to accelerate the deployment of new recruits to the frontline to compensate for heavy casualties in costly assaults.[11] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed

20. März 2026 | BBC News (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Artikel über Propaganda und patriotische Aktivitäten in der Schule

Russia's school propaganda was highlighted by Oscar-winning film - but does it work? (Medienbericht, Englisch)

• In another, a class is warned that the enemy will try to recruit from their communities and spread propaganda to defeat them from within. The patriotic education lessons are known is Russian as "Conversations about Important Things". Maia, a 14-year-old from St Petersburg, complains they are very boring. "No one is participating in the discussion.

20. März 2026 | OHCHR – UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Autor)

Russische Föderation, Ukraine

Bericht zu Vertreibung und Deportation aus russisch besetzten Gebieten der Ukraine (24. Februar 2022 - 31. Dezember 2025) (gesetzlicher Rahmen; Vorgehen aufgrund von Nationalität, politischer Meinung und mit der Ukraine verbundener kultureller Identität; Hindernisse bei einer Rückkehr; weitere Themen)

Forced Displacement from the Territopry of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation: Forcible Transfer and Deportation, Barriers to Return, and the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• In interviews with OHCHR, particularly in the months prior to the initial 1 July 2024 deadline for obtaining Russian citizenship, many people leaving the occupied territory told OHCHR that the threat of deportation was one of their main reasons for leaving.37 Conscription 37. […] conscription campaigns in occupied territory, and adopted measures to pressure people to join the Russian armed forces.40 While no official statistics have been published, documents suggest that thousands of residents of occupied territory have been unlawfully conscripted into the Russian armed forces.41 38. […] Fear of conscription and ensuing deployment against their own country’s armed forces compelled many Ukrainian men and boys to flee occupied territory to Government-controlled territory. For example, a 21-year-old man from Zaporizhzhia region told OHCHR that he was forced to obtain a Russian passport in 2023 to be able to move around. […] Russian border guards also frequently denied entry to Ukrainians who had relatives in the Ukrainian armed forces or past Ukrainian military service. Many were also issued long-term entry bans ranging from 20 to 50 years. 60. […] ” – An 18-year-old man who fled occupation to escape conscription describing what a guard at a Ukrainian Embassy in a third country said to him in January 2025. 69.