15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zur Bestrafung von Wehrdienstverweigerung

Landinformation: Ryssland. Bestraffning vid värnpliktsvägran (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum neuen System für die Übermittlung von Einberufungen zum Militär

Landinformation: Ryssland. Nytt system för delgivning av militära kallelser m.m. (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

17. Februar 2023 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Anfragebeantwortung zur Russischen Föderation: Politische Opposition und Wehrdienst (1. November 2022 bis 16. Februar 2023)

Russian Federation; Major developments in the Russian Federation in relation to political opposition and military service [Q37-2023] (Anfragebeantwortung, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum Wehrdienst (Überblick zu russischen Streitkräften; Vertragssoldaten; Reserve; Tragweite der Teilmobilmachung; rechtlicher Rahmen des Mobilisierungsbefehls und Umsetzung; russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine; Einberufung und Rekrutierung in Tschetschenien; Wehrdienstentziehung, Fahnenflucht und Befehlsverweigerung; Verstöße gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht durch russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine)

The Russian Federation – Military service (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | DIS – Danish Immigration Service (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zu Entwicklungen bezüglich Wehrdienst seit Juli 2022 (neue Gesetze; Teilmobilmachung; Einberufung; Vertragssoldaten; Rekrutierung für private Sicherheitsunternehmen; Wehrdienstverweigerung (aus Gewissensgründen); Deserteure; Rekrutierungsmethoden)

Russia; An update on military service since July 2022 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

30. Oktober 2025 | Jamestown Foundation (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Artikel zu den Auswirkungen des Ukraine-Kriegs auf die Polizeistruktur im Land

War Against Ukraine Leaving Russian Police State Without Enough Police; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 146 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• The growing shortage of police officers has led some Russians to take matters into their own hands, forcing the police to lower hiring standards and prompting stations to recruit personnel from abroad (Govorit Nemoskva [https://nemoskva.net/2025/06/19/prihodite-hot-kto-nibud-mvd-hochet-snizit-trebovaniya-dlya-priema-na-sluzhbu-na-fone-katastroficheskogo-deficzita-kadrov/] , June 19; Natsionalniy

30. Oktober 2025 | Jamestown Foundation (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Artikel über das Kosaken-Kadettenkorps und seine Rolle in der nationalen Jugendpolitik und militärischen Indoktrination

Cossack Cadet Corps Expanding in Russia; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue: 146 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• The program, initiated from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s office, encourages the exchange of ideas and techniques between teachers and mentors, and recruits people into the “personnel reserve of youth policy.” […] Many extremist and militant groups use sport to recruit youth and keep them engaged with the organization, and sport also has the advantage of being excellent preparation for the military. Cossack Cadets Corps organizations have also been recipients of grant funding in areas of the country most closely associated with the Cossacks.

29. Oktober 2025 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2025 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Putin visited a military hospital on October 29 and spoke with a wounded Russian servicemember about the “continuity of the tradition of service in Russia.”[32] The soldier and Putin reminisced about uncovering stories about their ancestors’ military service in archives. […] The Kremlin has long claimed that it is fighting the West and that foreign actors are trying to conduct sabotage within Russia —claims that Kremlin officials repeated today and in recent days.[33] The Kremlin’s claims are callbacks to the Soviet Union’s rhetorical justifications for enormous military mobilization during the Cold War as the answer to being “surrounded by enemies” as well as to […] The Kremlin may plan to intensify repression ahead of possible involuntary mobilization. […] and economic mobilization. […] * Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian State Duma deputies are using imperial Russian and Soviet ideologies to call for Russian society to unite against alleged internal and external threats — likely to set conditions for further repressions and intensified involuntary mobilization for the war against Ukraine or a future war against NATO.

28. Oktober 2025 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2025 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) baselessly claimed on October 28 that France is preparing a military contingent of 2,000 servicemen to send to Ukraine.[17] The SVR specifically claimed that these forces are part of the French Foreign Legion, which Russian milbloggers have previously claimed are operating in Ukraine — part of the Kremlin’s concerted effort to justify claims that Russia […] The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.[27]Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” is Russia’s higher-readiness active reserve in which Russian citizens sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on a voluntary basis to serve […] The October 28 bill differs from the Russian MoD’s October 13 draft amendment that requests permission for the Russian military to use members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” in expeditionary deployments outside of Russia without an official Kremlin declaration of mobilization or state of war, which the State Duma has not approved as of this report.[30] It is unclear if the Kremlin will […] * The Kremlin is resurrecting Soviet-era narratives of Russia’s perpetual victimhood in the face of perceived external aggression in a dual attempt to justify Russia’s future aggression against both Europe and the Asia-Pacific and the longer-term mobilization of Russian society. […] * Russian officials also appear to be setting conditions to justify further militarization and full-scale mobilization of Russian society. * The Russian State Duma approved a bill on October 28 allowing Russian authorities to recruit members of Russia’s “human mobilization reserve” to protect Russian critical facilities and infrastructure.

27. Oktober 2025 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2025 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 26 and 27.[74][75] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka reported on October 27 that Russian forces are constantly rotating personnel to replace losses and are attacking in fireteams of two to three with penal recruits