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Considered synonyms: combat, combat service, combat services, deserters, deserteur, deserteure, desertions, draft, drafts, einberufung, einberufung, einberufungen, einberufungen, fahnenflucht, heeresdienst, heeresdienst, heeresdienste, heeresdienste, kriegsdienst, kriegsdienst, kriegsdienste, kriegsdienste, military draft, military drafts, military service, military services, militärdienst, militärdienst, militärdienste, militärdienste, mobilisations, mobilisierung, mobilisierungen, mobilizations, mobilmachung, mobilmachungen, präsenzdiener, präsenzdiener, präsenzdienerin, präsenzdienerin, präsenzdienerinnen, präsenzdiener·in, präsenzdiener·in, präsenzdiener·innen, präsenzdienst, präsenzdienst, präsenzdienste, präsenzdienste, rekrut, rekruten, rekruten, rekrutin, rekrutin, rekrutinnen, rekrut·in, rekrut·in, rekrut·innen, services, waffendienst, waffendienst, waffendienste, waffendienste, wehrdienst, wehrdienst, wehrpflicht, wehrpflicht, wehrpflichtige, wehrpflichtige, wehrpflichtiger, wehrpflichtiger, wehrpflichtige·r, wehrpflichtige·r
28 July 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Author)
Russian Federation
Analysis of military and security-related developments of the day
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2026 (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- ” failure on the
frontline or in Russian recruitment efforts may trigger a mobilization and that
some security officials are advocating for full or partial martial law to
prevent civil unrest in the event of mobilization. […] Russian officials appear to
be debating the implementation of mobilization in the fall, but Putin has
likely not yet made a final decision. The Kremlin is setting conditions to
facilitate a mobilization, should Putin choose to do so in the future, however. […] , martial law, and wartime.[13] The Kremlin has been
streamlining the bureaucracy associated with mobilization since 2025, with
Putin signing a law in November 2025 changing the Russian military conscription
administrative process to a year-round cycle in place of the previous
semi-annual cycles, thereby significantly expanding the rate at which Russia
could call up and process a larger volume […] of conscripts and reservists.[14] ISW
continues to assess that mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin
that is contingent on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and
the integrity of the Kremlin, and that it remains unclear whether or how Putin
will decide to implement mobilization.[15]
== Key Takeaways ==
* Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President […] * Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to
support a potential mobilization in the future, as Putin likely continues to
weigh his options.
* Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian
logistics and industrial infrastructure from July 27 to 28.
* Russian forces launched 131 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 27 to
28.
27 July 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Author)
Russian Federation
Analysis of military and security-related developments of the day
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2026 (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- Putin responded that the sailor’s story is a
great example of a mobilized serviceman finding their calling during this
war.[3] Putin likely highlighted the sailor’s story as an example of a
mobilized servicemember who has achieved professional fulfillment through
military service while embracing his duty to defend the Russian state. […] The
Russian MoD notably attempted to survey and coerce Russian mobilized servicemen
to switch to contract service in mid 2025, likely in an attempt to retain these
forces in the event of demobilization.[4] ISW has previously observed reports
of Russian military authorities incentivizing and coercing mobilized
servicemembers into signing Russian MoD contracts.[5] The Kremlin likely
continues to
25 July 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Author)
Russian Federation
Analysis of military and security-related developments of the day
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2026 (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- Zelensky
stated on July 24 that Ukraine has intelligence that the Kremlin is preparing
for a “significant” wave of involuntary reserve call-ups in Fall 2026, but did
not specify if this formal mobilization would consist of a large call-up or
rolling-call ups.[6] Russia has been setting conditions to conduct rolling
partial reserve call-ups since at least October 2025 and recently passed bills […] expanding the pool of recruitable Russians convicted of crimes and setting
conditions to suppress civil unrest resulting from mobilization.[7] Russia is
holding elections for its State Duma (parliament) in mid-September 2026, and
Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely wait until after these elections
to announce a new wave of mobilization, which will be very unpopular amongst a
Russian
23 July 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Author)
Russian Federation
Analysis of military and security-related developments of the day
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2026 (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- Ukrainian ports on July 22 after Ukrainian
shipowners independently suspended port calls due to heightened risks of
Russian strikes.[60]
== Significant Activity in Belarus ==
==== Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further
integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks ====
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree for the Belarusian
annual fall conscription […] cycle on July 23.Lukashenko signed a decree on July 23
to conscript Belarusian reservists into military service between September and
November 2026.[61] This activity is consistent with the usual Belarusian spring
conscription cycle and is not an inflection in Belarusian military activity.[62]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information
22 July 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Author)
Russian Federation
Analysis of military and security-related developments of the day
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2026 (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and
is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization. […] stated on July 22 that the July 22 bill will expand the number
of Russians eligible for military service and facilitate Russian recruitment
efforts for the war in Ukraine in 2026.[9] Russia’s militarized internal
security force, Rosgvardia, published proposed amendments on July 21 to expand
its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified
“dangers” during mobilization […] declare martial law
in Russia in anticipation of civil unrest as mobilization remains highly
unpopular within Russian society. […] Mobilization remains a very personal decision
for Putin and is ultimately contingent on Putin’s personal perception of the
battlefield situation and the Kremlin’s stability, and it remains unclear
whether Putin will make such a decision in the near future or what his
mobilization announcement would look like. […] * The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and
is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization.
* Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to downplay Russia’s economic
problems despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis and broader Russian economic
decline.
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