15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zur Bestrafung von Wehrdienstverweigerung

Landinformation: Ryssland. Bestraffning vid värnpliktsvägran (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum neuen System für die Übermittlung von Einberufungen zum Militär

Landinformation: Ryssland. Nytt system för delgivning av militära kallelser m.m. (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

17. Februar 2023 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Anfragebeantwortung zur Russischen Föderation: Politische Opposition und Wehrdienst (1. November 2022 bis 16. Februar 2023)

Russian Federation; Major developments in the Russian Federation in relation to political opposition and military service [Q37-2023] (Anfragebeantwortung, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum Wehrdienst (Überblick zu russischen Streitkräften; Vertragssoldaten; Reserve; Tragweite der Teilmobilmachung; rechtlicher Rahmen des Mobilisierungsbefehls und Umsetzung; russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine; Einberufung und Rekrutierung in Tschetschenien; Wehrdienstentziehung, Fahnenflucht und Befehlsverweigerung; Verstöße gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht durch russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine)

The Russian Federation – Military service (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | DIS – Danish Immigration Service (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zu Entwicklungen bezüglich Wehrdienst seit Juli 2022 (neue Gesetze; Teilmobilmachung; Einberufung; Vertragssoldaten; Rekrutierung für private Sicherheitsunternehmen; Wehrdienstverweigerung (aus Gewissensgründen); Deserteure; Rekrutierungsmethoden)

Russia; An update on military service since July 2022 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

28. Juli 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• ” failure on the frontline or in Russian recruitment efforts may trigger a mobilization and that some security officials are advocating for full or partial martial law to prevent civil unrest in the event of mobilization. […] Russian officials appear to be debating the implementation of mobilization in the fall, but Putin has likely not yet made a final decision. The Kremlin is setting conditions to facilitate a mobilization, should Putin choose to do so in the future, however. […] , martial law, and wartime.[13] The Kremlin has been streamlining the bureaucracy associated with mobilization since 2025, with Putin signing a law in November 2025 changing the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle in place of the previous semi-annual cycles, thereby significantly expanding the rate at which Russia could call up and process a larger volume […] of conscripts and reservists.[14] ISW continues to assess that mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin that is contingent on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and the integrity of the Kremlin, and that it remains unclear whether or how Putin will decide to implement mobilization.[15] == Key Takeaways == * Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President […] * Kremlin officials are reportedly considering a wide range of options to support a potential mobilization in the future, as Putin likely continues to weigh his options. * Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and industrial infrastructure from July 27 to 28. * Russian forces launched 131 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 27 to 28.

27. Juli 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 27, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Putin responded that the sailor’s story is a great example of a mobilized serviceman finding their calling during this war.[3] Putin likely highlighted the sailor’s story as an example of a mobilized servicemember who has achieved professional fulfillment through military service while embracing his duty to defend the Russian state. […] The Russian MoD notably attempted to survey and coerce Russian mobilized servicemen to switch to contract service in mid 2025, likely in an attempt to retain these forces in the event of demobilization.[4] ISW has previously observed reports of Russian military authorities incentivizing and coercing mobilized servicemembers into signing Russian MoD contracts.[5] The Kremlin likely continues to

25. Juli 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Zelensky stated on July 24 that Ukraine has intelligence that the Kremlin is preparing for a “significant” wave of involuntary reserve call-ups in Fall 2026, but did not specify if this formal mobilization would consist of a large call-up or rolling-call ups.[6] Russia has been setting conditions to conduct rolling partial reserve call-ups since at least October 2025 and recently passed bills […] expanding the pool of recruitable Russians convicted of crimes and setting conditions to suppress civil unrest resulting from mobilization.[7] Russia is holding elections for its State Duma (parliament) in mid-September 2026, and Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely wait until after these elections to announce a new wave of mobilization, which will be very unpopular amongst a Russian

23. Juli 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Ukrainian ports on July 22 after Ukrainian shipowners independently suspended port calls due to heightened risks of Russian strikes.[60] == Significant Activity in Belarus == ==== Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks ==== Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree for the Belarusian annual fall conscription […] cycle on July 23.Lukashenko signed a decree on July 23 to conscript Belarusian reservists into military service between September and November 2026.[61] This activity is consistent with the usual Belarusian spring conscription cycle and is not an inflection in Belarusian military activity.[62] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information

22. Juli 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Analyse der militärischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Entwicklungen des Tages

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2026 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization. […] stated on July 22 that the July 22 bill will expand the number of Russians eligible for military service and facilitate Russian recruitment efforts for the war in Ukraine in 2026.[9] Russia’s militarized internal security force, Rosgvardia, published proposed amendments on July 21 to expand its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified “dangers” during mobilization […] declare martial law in Russia in anticipation of civil unrest as mobilization remains highly unpopular within Russian society. […] Mobilization remains a very personal decision for Putin and is ultimately contingent on Putin’s personal perception of the battlefield situation and the Kremlin’s stability, and it remains unclear whether Putin will make such a decision in the near future or what his mobilization announcement would look like. […] * The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for potential mobilization and is preparing for possible civil unrest in Russia resulting from mobilization. * Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to downplay Russia’s economic problems despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis and broader Russian economic decline.