15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zur Bestrafung von Wehrdienstverweigerung

Landinformation: Ryssland. Bestraffning vid värnpliktsvägran (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

15. Mai 2023 | Migrationsverket – Schwedische Einwanderungsbehörde (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum neuen System für die Übermittlung von Einberufungen zum Militär

Landinformation: Ryssland. Nytt system för delgivning av militära kallelser m.m. (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Schwedisch)

17. Februar 2023 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Anfragebeantwortung zur Russischen Föderation: Politische Opposition und Wehrdienst (1. November 2022 bis 16. Februar 2023)

Russian Federation; Major developments in the Russian Federation in relation to political opposition and military service [Q37-2023] (Anfragebeantwortung, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | EUAA – European Union Agency for Asylum (ehemals: European Asylum Support Office, EASO) (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zum Wehrdienst (Überblick zu russischen Streitkräften; Vertragssoldaten; Reserve; Tragweite der Teilmobilmachung; rechtlicher Rahmen des Mobilisierungsbefehls und Umsetzung; russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine; Einberufung und Rekrutierung in Tschetschenien; Wehrdienstentziehung, Fahnenflucht und Befehlsverweigerung; Verstöße gegen das humanitäre Völkerrecht durch russische militärische Kräfte in der Ukraine)

The Russian Federation – Military service (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

Dezember 2022 | DIS – Danish Immigration Service (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zu Entwicklungen bezüglich Wehrdienst seit Juli 2022 (neue Gesetze; Teilmobilmachung; Einberufung; Vertragssoldaten; Rekrutierung für private Sicherheitsunternehmen; Wehrdienstverweigerung (aus Gewissensgründen); Deserteure; Rekrutierungsmethoden)

Russia; An update on military service since July 2022 (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

7. Juni 2026 | Universität Bremen - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bulletin zu politischen, wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Entwicklungen (transnationale Verbindungen von Russlands Rechter; Militärblogger·innen und die Förderung militaristischer Ideologie; Auswirkungen des Krieges auf die Bevölkerungspolitik)

Russian Analytical Digest Nr. 343 (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)

• Indeed, one of the most com- mon criticisms advanced by milbloggers such as Iurii Podoliaka concerns the elite’s lack of integrity, particu- larly their evasion of military service even as they advo- cate the continuation of the war. Russia’s political and bureaucratic elite is frequently portrayed as parasitic, self-serving, and detached from ordinary citizens. […] This expecta- tion was consistent with a literature that highlights the decline of mass conscription, particularly in the West (Lachmann 2013), as well as the impact of low fertil- ity and population aging, which drastically increase the human and social costs of waging war (Haas 2025). […] In the “moral conservative” camp, Father Fyodor Lukya- nov, head of the ROC’s Commission for the Protec- tion of Family, Motherhood and Childhood, called for a “demographic mobilization” a few days after Putin declared the “partial” military mobilization in Sep- tember 2022 (RIA Novosti 2022). […] “Mercenary, Citizen, Victim: The Rise and Fall of Conscription.” In Nationalism and War, edited by John A. Hall and Siniša Malešević, 44–70. New York: Cambridge University Press. • Laruelle, Marlene. 2025. Ideology and Meaning-Making under the Putin Regime. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer- sity Press. • Leykin, Inna. 2025. Caring Like a State. The Politics of Russia’s Demographic Crisis.

6. Juni 2026 | Universität Bremen - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bulletin zu politischen, wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Entwicklungen (Russlands extreme Rechte und der Krieg; christliche Rechte nach 2022; Isborskii-Klub, eine intellektuelle, nationalistische Plattform, nach 2022)

Russian Analytical Digest Nr. 342 (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)

• In particular, members of the Izborskii Club, led by the economist Sergei Glaz’ev, have long called for a paradigmatic shift in economic policy— one that remains only partially realized despite Russia’s turn toward a mobilization economy and military Keynes- ianism since 2022. […] It resonates with both domestic and inter- national audiences and can serve as a powerful tool for popular mobilization in support of a common cause. The justice narrative promoted by the Izborskii Club is not confined to justifying the war.

4. Juni 2026 | RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Russisches Militär schickt schwerverletzte Soldat·innen angesichts des Personalmangels zurück an die Front

'No Way Out': Russia Sends Badly Wounded Men Back Into Battle In Ukraine (Medienbericht, Englisch)

• Later he was declared a deserter and spent six months fighting for a formal discharge. One day, abruptly, he was detained and his phone confiscated, and his family has not heard from him since. "He simply won't survive a month" in the combat zone, Dmitry said. "It's beyond belief." Podgrushny's case is not far from unique, said Igor, a rights activist. […] Unlikely." == Manpower And Mobilization == Russian President Vladimir Putin's government has taken numerous steps to maintain troops numbers amid the massive casualties:nearly 500,000 killed [https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-casualties-british-intelligence/33766873.html] since the start of the full-scale invasion, according to a British intelligence estimate in late May. […] The military has aggressively recruited prison inmates, intoxicated [https://www.rferl.org/a/drunk-sign-here-russia-recruits-intoxicated-men-as-military-manpower-crisis-peaks/33722376.html] men, andthe homeless [https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-war-homeless-recruiting-casualties/33096675.html] , and has promised high pay and bonuses for soldiers and the families of fighters who are killed. […] Last month, Putin signed a decree relieving new recruits of up to 10 million rubles ($137,000) in debt. So far, he has avoided ordering amass call-up [https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-recruitment-war-ukraine-mercenaries/33476077.html] since a wide-scale mobilization he decreed in September 2022 prompted hundreds of thousands of Russians to flee the country.

4. Juni 2026 | CoE-PACE – Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly (Autor)

Ägypten, Aserbaidschan, Belarus, China, Iran, Russische Föderation, Türkei, Tadschikistan, Turkmenistan

Bericht zu transnationaler Unterdrückung (Schikanierung; Androhung von Gewalt; Einschränkungen der Mobilität; Einsatz legitimer Maßnahmen zur Bestrafung von Dissens; weitere Themen)

Fighting back against transnational repression [Doc. 16421] (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• Attempts to recruit diaspora members as informants are made through threats to their families in China or promises of economic benefits if they co-operate. Activists receive intimidating phone calls, often at unusual hours, along with messages showing images of injured people to scare them into ceasing their criticism of the Chinese Government. […] During the same period, Kazakh authorities approved the extradition of several high-profile figures, including anti-war activist Yulia Yemelyanova and military deserter Semyon Bazhukov, often while their asylum applications or legal appeals were still technically pending. […] These incidents seemed to mark an end to Kazakhstan’s status as a relatively safe haven for those fleeing mobilisation and political persecution, as the government has begun prioritising its bilateral security obligations over international human rights norms.

4. Juni 2026 | Jamestown Foundation (Autor)

Russische Föderation

Bericht zu politischer und militärischer Lage vor dem Hintergrund des Krieges in der Ukraine und der Möglichkeit eines Regimewechsels (potentielle Bedrohung für das Regime; Personalengpässe im Militär; ukrainische Langstrecken-Drohnen und tiefgreifende Operationen; russische Wirtschaft; weitere Themen)

Special Report: A Perfect Storm – Russia Losing Its War Against Ukraine May Lead to Regime Change (Spezieller Bericht oder Analyse, Englisch)

• The Kremlin has attempted to covertly re-start conscription in numerous ways to continue its war against Ukraine. Russia has gradually removed many categories from the list of grounds for disqualifying a person from participating in the war (TASS, June 29, 2025; 4 9). […] Military Defeat Putin initiated a “partial mobilization” in the fall of 2022 in response to failed Russian offensives in Kyiv and Kharkiv (see EDM, September 22, 2022). […] Between 2024 and 2025, the yearly number of Russian deserters doubled to 70,000. There has been a 30 percent increase in the number of Russian troops using the opportunity offered by Ukraine’s program to encourage desertion or avoid military service (Telegram/@agentstvonews, September 28, 2025). Moscow is also drawing on 20,000 troops from strategic reserves for its war against Ukraine. […] In March, former pro-Kremlin 6 priority targets into the conscription process. In March, Governor Pavel Malkov of Russia’s Ryazan oblast signed a decree requiring businesses with 150–300 employees to provide two employees to sign up for mobilization, businesses with 300–500 employees to send three employees, and businesses with over 500 employees to send five employees. […] A closed meeting of students at the Kuban State Agrarian University to recruit for the war failed when it was hacked by a Ukrainian soldier pretending to be a Russian drone operator. After dropping his pretense, he said, “I’m actually a serviceman—just not Russian, but Ukrainian.