25. Juli 2017

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Herat: Tadschiken, die zwischen 2009 und 2012 für die Taliban kämpften, Anzahl

Das Long War Journal (LWJ), eine US-amerikanische Nachrichtenwebsite, die nach eigenen Angaben über den „globalen Krieg gegen den Terrorismus“ berichtet, erwähnt in einem Beitrag vom Oktober 2009, dass ein hochrangiger Kommandant der Aufständischen mit Verbindungen zur radikalen Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin und zu den Taliban, Ghulam Yahya Akbari, sowie zwölf seiner Männer bei einem Angriff von amerikanischen und afghanischen Streitkräften im Distrikt Gozara in der Provinz Herat getötet worden sei. Laut eigenen Angaben in einem Interview mit Al-Jazeera habe Akbari mehr als 600 Kämpfer unter seinem Kommando gehabt. Akbari, der auch als „tadschikischer Taliban“ bekannt gewesen sei, habe angegeben, kein Taliban zu sein und habe seine Gruppe „Mudschahidin von Herat“ genannt. Er habe aber dieselben Ziele gehabt wie die Taliban:

„A key Taliban commander in the western province of Herat was killed during a raid, according to a senior Afghan general. Afghan and US forces are thought to have killed Ghulam Yahya Akbari, a senior insurgent leader with ties to the radical Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and the Taliban. Akbari, who claims to have hundreds of fighters at his disposal, is thought to be behind the surge in attacks in Herat over the past year. ‘The operation supported by NATO’s helicopter gunships launched in Gozara district at 10:00 p.m. local time Thursday and continued until 02:00 a.m. Friday as a result Taliban commander Ghulam Yahya Akbari along with his 12 armed men were killed,’ General Jalandar Shah Behnam told Xinhua.

The US military confirmed the raid in Goraza but did not indicate if Akbari was killed during the attack. The US military said the operation was aimed at an ‘insurgent leader’ who ‘is known to be responsible for conducting roadside bomb attacks against International Security Assistance Force and Afghan forces in the area and kidnapping Afghan civilians.’

[…] In February 2009, the US military targeted Akbari during a ‘precision strike’ on his compound in Goraza. Akbari was not confirmed killed during the strike. […] Akbari, who is also known as the ‘Tajik Taliban,’ served as the mayor of the city of Herat before the Taliban took control in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban, he was appointed the province’s minister of public works. He was relieved of his position in 2008 and took up arms against the government shortly afterward. Akbari maintains his base of operations in the Gozara district, an area which has been considered outside of the government’s control. In an interview with Al Jazeera he claimed to have run more than 20 bases in the region and boasted of having more than 600 fighters under his command. He claimed he is not Taliban and called his group the Mujahideen of Herat. But Akbari also said he shares the same goals as the Taliban and frequently allows Arab fighters to pass from Iran through the areas under his control. He also runs the areas under his control using the same harsh version of sharia, or Islamic law, that is used by the Taliban.” (LWJ, 9. Oktober 2009)

Die in Abu Dhabi ansässige Zeitung The National, die zu den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten und zum Nahen Osten berichtet, porträtiert Ghulam Yahya in einem Beitrag vom Februar 2009 und erwähnt ebenfalls, dass er im Gegensatz zur Mehrheit der Aufständischen, die Paschtunen seien, ethnischer Tadschike sei. Ortsansässige hätten die Anzahl von Männern unter Yahyas Kommando mit 500 beziffert. Viele würden behaupten, dass er unabhängig agiere, aber manche würden glauben, er habe nun direkte Verbindungen zu den Taliban. Der stellvertretende Polizeikommandant der Provinz Herat habe die hohe Zahl von Anhängern zurückgewiesen und die Zahl von Männern unter Yahyas Kommando mit 30 bis 50 beziffert:

„A former member of the US-backed Afghan government is now an insurgent commander in the western province of Herat. Ghulam Yahya seems to rule a vast mountainous area here, with his men launching regular attacks on the police and imposing fundamentalist Islamic law by amputating the limbs of criminals. While visibly concerned that talking to a foreign journalist would put their lives at risk, local residents said they supported his stance.

[…] Mr Wasir said the government had no control outside the confines of its offices. ‘Sometimes if there are no police or soldiers around he comes right into the centre of the area,’ he said. ‘We even heard that during Eid he came to Siwoshan's main mosque and prayed there.’ Mr Yahya fought Soviet occupation as a member of Jamiat-e-Islami, which went on to resist Taliban rule. Unlike the majority of insurgents now, he is an ethnic Tajik and not a Pashtun. However, his tactics seem to bear some similarities to those of the main rebel groups. According to residents, he has established his own justice system. Along with amputating the limbs of thieves, he also reportedly blackens the faces of captured criminals and parades them on donkeys through villages.

[…] Locals put the number of men under Mr Yahya's command at about 500. Armed predominantly with Kalashnikovs, they often move around in Toyota pickup trucks. A man who gave his name only as Ismatullah said: ‘When the government removed him from his position he got upset and went to the mountains. Then lots of people from his village and his friends joined him. Others came from different villages and provinces and they also joined him.’ Many claim he is acting independently, but some believe he does now have direct ties with the Taliban. Whatever the truth, it is obvious he inspires both fear and respect among the population. […]

Another local rebel commander and former government official goes by the name of Malim Majid. He was the head of Herat airport before the Taliban came to power and, with between 50 and 100 of his own fighters, is now an ally of Mr Yahya, though the two militias do occasionally clash. […] Col Delawar Shah Delawar, the deputy police commander of Herat province, dismissed the significance of Mr Yahya's following, saying he had only 30 or 50 men in his ranks.’” (The National, 17. Februar 2009)

In einem Beitrag des Long War Journal (LWJ) vom August 2010 wird der Name von Ghulam Yahya Akbaris Nachfolger mit Samihullah angegeben, jedoch ohne Erwähnung der ethnischen Zugehörigkeit des Nachfolgers. Es wird auch erwähnt, dass Akbari eng mit der iranischen Quds Force zusammengearbeitet und Al-Qaida unterstützt habe. Auch sein Nachfolger würde die Durchreise von Al-Qaida-Kämpfern vom Iran nach Afghanistan ermöglichen:

„Ghlam Yahya Akbari is yet another Taliban commander who has worked closely with the Qods Force. He served as a commander in Herat province. Akbari, who was known as the ‘Tajik Taliban,’ claimed to operate more than 20 bases in Herat and boasted of having more than 600 fighters under his command. He facilitated the movement of foreign fighters, or al Qaeda, from Iran into Afghanistan, and helped them transit to the battlefields in Helmand and Kandahar. Akbari was killed in a special operations raid in Herat in October 2009. Samihullah, Akbari’s replacement, has even closer ties to al Qaeda and continues to facilitate the movement of al Qaeda fighters from Iran into Afghanistan.” (LWJ, 21. August 2010)

Das Wall Street Journal (WSJ) beschreibt in einem Artikel vom September 2009 den ethnischen Tadschiken Ghulam Yahya als den vielleicht prominentesten nicht-paschtunischen afghanischen Aufständischen, der mit den Taliban zusammenarbeite. Die persischsprachigen Tadschiken, die mehr als ein Viertel der afghanischen Bevölkerung ausmachen, würden traditionell einer weniger rigiden Form des Islam folgen. Nicht-paschtunische Aufständische wie Yahya seien in Nord- und West-Afghanistan neben ihren früheren Feinden, den Taliban, aus dem Boden geschossen, nachdem die Frustration wegen des langsamen Wiederaufbaus, verbreiteter Korruption und der Taktiken afghanischer und ausländischer Soldaten gestiegen sei. Die gemeinsame Feindschaft zur westlichen Präsenz in Afghanistan habe Yahyas Allianz mit den Taliban gestärkt:

„An ethnic Tajik, Mr. Yahya is perhaps the most prominent non-Pashtun Afghan insurgent chieftain working with the Taliban. It isn't a natural union: When the Taliban conquered Herat in 1995, Mr. Yahya, then the city's mayor, had to flee to exile in Iran. He later took part in the anti-Taliban militias that fought the radical Islamist movement. After the Taliban regime's demise in 2001, Mr. Yahya returned to Herat to supervise public works in the provincial administration. It's only in the last year or so that Mr. Yahya, who fell out with Kabul, joined his former enemies.

[…] Persian-speaking Tajiks, more than one-quarter of Afghanistan's population, have traditionally followed a less rigid form of Islam, as did the Turkic Uzbek minority. But now, as frustration is mounting with the slow rebuilding, endemic corruption, and the tactics of Afghan and foreign soldiers, non-Pashtun militants like Mr. Yahya have sprouted up alongside their former Taliban enemies in northern and western Afghanistan. Unlike in the south and east, security here is maintained not by the U.S. military but by European allies like Italy, Germany and Spain that place much tighter restrictions on their soldiers' involvement in combat.

[…] Initially, Mr. Yahya shied away from attacking Afghan troops or the Italian-led international forces in the area. But, last year, as he gave up hopes of rejoining the government, he repeatedly fired rockets at coalition bases and United Nations offices. He also launched lucrative kidnapping operations, holding anyone associated with foreign reconstruction efforts for ransom. An Indian contractor for international forces, seized by Mr. Yahya's men on the Herat airport road, died in captivity earlier this year.

Shared hostility to Western presence in Afghanistan cemented Mr. Yahya's alliance with the Pashtun Taliban. In an interview with Qatar's al Jazeera satellite TV network, Mr. Yahya boasted he has hosted Arab jihadis. Mr. Khan, the water and power minister, said Mr. Yahya turned to the Taliban because "everyone naturally needs support.” (WSJ, 2. September 2009)

In einem vom Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) im Juli 2010 veröffentlichten Bericht schreibt Antonio Giustozzi, zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung des Berichts Research Fellow am Crisis States Research Centre an der London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), dass die Taliban, was ihre Zusammensetzung angehe, weiterhin eine größtenteils paschtunische Bewegung seien, sie aber begonnen hätten, bedeutende Fortschritte beim Vordringen in andere ethnische Gruppen zu machen. Laut Giustozzi gebe es zunehmend Belege dafür, dass an der Taliban-Basis kleinere Gruppen ideologisch zugeneigter Usbeken, Turkmenen und Tadschiken rekrutiert würden. Obwohl selbst im Norden Afghanistans der Großteil des Aufstandes weiterhin paschtunisch geprägt sei, dürfe dieser aufkommende Trend nicht unterschätzt werden:

„Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other organizations, and the relationship between them is far from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be underestimated.” (CIGI, Juli 2010, S. 2)

Weiters schreibt Giustozzi im Bericht des CIGI, dass die Taliban in den vergangenen Jahren unter anderem Verbindungen zu tadschikischen Kommandanten in mehreren Distrikten der Provinz Herat, darunter Gozara, aufgebaut hätten. Einer von ihnen, der ehemalige Taliban-Gegner und Bürgermeister von Herat, Ghulam Yahya Akbari, sei zum führenden Akteur geworden und habe in den Nachbardistrikten seines Heimatgebietes Gozara bis 2009 sein eigenes Netzwerk errichtet. Es habe den Anschein, dass die Rekrutierung von radikalisierten oder unzufriedenen Jugendlichen in Herat in kleinem Ausmaß erfolgt sei. Der Großteil der Mitglieder in Ghulam Yahyas Gruppe seien entweder seine Anhänger aus seinem eigenen Dorf Shiawshan und dessen Umkreis oder Jamiati-Kommandanten, die noch immer Verbindungen zum in der Provinz einflussreichen Ismail Khan hätten. Die Tötung Akbaris bei einer ISAF-Operation im Oktober 2009 habe eine Störung der Taliban-Aktivitäten in dem Gebiet bewirkt, und einige seiner Anhänger seien wieder zur Regierung übergelaufen. Zum Berichtszeitpunkt sei es noch zu früh, Aussagen darüber zu treffen, ob die Taliban ihren Einfluss in Gozara wiedererlangen würden:

„For a while it seemed that the Taliban were striking their greatest successes among non-Pashtuns in Herat province. Apart from having infiltrated a number of Pashtun communities, mostly in Shindand district, the Taliban gradually established a connection with a number of disgruntled Tajik former Jamiati commanders in Enjil, Guzara, Pashtun Zarghun and Obeh. Among them, the former mayor of Herat city and adversary of the Taliban, Ghulam Yahya Abkari ‘Shiawshan,’ emerged as the leading player. Apart from attracting the largest number of armed men, by 2009 he was forming his own network in the districts neighbouring his home area of Guzara, earning the loyalty of local commanders. Indeed, to date, the Taliban infiltration of these areas remains the main example of success in mobilizing Tajiks to their side. As in the northeast, direct recruitment of radicalized or disgruntled youth appears to have happened on a modest scale in Herat. The majority of the members of Ghulam Yahya’s group were either his clients from his own village of Shiawshan and the surrounding area, or other Jamiati commanders still linked to the provincial strongman Ismail Khan. The group also seemed to include, however, a minority of genuine Taliban sympathizers, either former Taliban or fresh recruits.

[…] In October 2009, Ghulam Yahya Akbari was killed in an ISAF operation in one of his bases, alongside several of his men and three foreign ‘volunteers’ (two Arabs and an Iranian). The killing certainly disrupted Taliban operations in the area; a number of his men, particularly former Jamiatis, defected back to the government. His son inherited local support (Ghulam Yahya was popular in his own area and his funeral attracted a crowd of thousands), while the wing of the group with the strongest Taliban leanings fell under the control of one of his lieutenants, who was reputedly close to the Arabs. The death of Ghulam Yahya also had negative repercussions for the Taliban in other areas of the province, essentially wherever Ghulam Yahya had managed to establish his influence and patronage. One example concerns a commander in Pashtun Zarghun, who started negotiations with the government for his surrender and then gave himself up in exchange for a promise of amnesty and reconciliation. […] At the time of writing it was too early to say whether the Taliban would recover their influence in Guzara and in other Tajik areas of Herat.” (CIGI, Juli 2010, S. 7-8)

Antonio Giustozzi und der Journalist Christoph Reuter schreiben in einem im Mai 2011 veröffentlichten Beitrag für das Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), einer unabhängigen, gemeinnützigen Forschungsorganisation mit Hauptsitz in Kabul, dass die Taliban ihre Reihen für Nicht-Paschtunen geöffnet hätten und es geschafft hätten, Zellen in usbekischen und tadschikischen Gebieten zu betreiben. Ab 2009 gebe es Beweise für die Rekrutierung einer bedeutenden Anzahl von Usbeken und Turkmenen und einer kleineren Anzahl von Tadschiken durch die Taliban. Die Tadschiken seien bisher weniger an der Aufstandsbewegung beteiligt gewesen, zumindest was die Rekrutierung auf unterster Ebene angeht:

„At the same time, the Taleban opened their ranks for non-Pashtuns and managed to form cells in Uzbek and Tajik areas. From 2009 onwards, the evidence that the Taleban were recruiting significant numbers of Uzbeks and Turkmen and smaller numbers of Tajiks was overwhelming. As of spring 2010, ethnically mixed groups of insurgents were reported, but as exceptions rather than the rule, in the Greater North. The Taleban leadership in Pakistan has started to appoint non-Pashtuns as local commanders in an effort to systematically install deputy district governors and district-level military chiefs all over the north. This helped them gain strength beyond the ‘Pashtun pockets’. While Taleban recruitment among Pashtuns in the north often attracts elders and non-clerical elements, the clerical presence seems to be much stronger among Uzbeks and Turkmen. Tajiks (apart from Aimaqs) have so far been less involved in the insurgency, at least in terms of grassroots recruitment, perhaps because Tajik strongmen enjoy a greater Islamic legitimacy than Uzbek strongmen (linked to the secular Jombesh). In some areas, the Taleban also have used social fault lines – for example, among the Pashtuns of Baghlan, they drew the lower strata of society towards the insurgency.” (Giustozzi/ Reuter, 5. Mai 2011, S. 2)

Distrikt Shindand: Anzahl der Tadschiken, Präsenz und Interesse der Taliban

Fabrizio Foschini vom Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) schreibt in einem Artikel vom Juli 2013, dass die Aufständischen in der Provinz Herat früher mit Ausnahme des Distrikts Shindand eine sehr kleine Bedrohung dargestellt hätten. Herat sei immer schon eine persisch-sprachige Stadt gewesen und die Mehrheit der Bewohner seien sunnitische oder schiitische Farsiwans („Persischsprachige“), wobei sich die sunnitische Mehrheit unter ihnen heutzutage eher als Tadschiken identifiziere. Die Provinz beherberge aber eine paschtunische Minderheit, und das nicht nur in manchen abgelegenen Distrikten, wo sie, wie beispielsweise im Distrikt Shindand, auch die lokale Mehrheit bilden würden:

„Stability did not increase in the last three years, however, although this was hardly the single-handed fault of anybody. The insurgents, previously a very low threat in Herat (with the exception of Shindand district), staged a comeback in the field and in the people’s minds, thanks to a few spectacular attacks against ISAF and the UN in the city and to the recruitment pool of disgruntled ex-mujahedin, jobless youth and criminal networks in the remoter districts of this vast province.

[…] Herat is of course a Persian-speaking city since time immemorial and its people are in their majority either Sunni or Shia Farsiwans (the Sunni majority among them is more likely to identify as Tajik nowadays). However, the province hosts a consistent Pashtun minority, not only in some outlying districts (where they can also be in the majority, like in Shindand or Adraskan) but among the city elites as well.” (Foschini, 24. Juli 2013)

In einem Beitrag vom April 2016 von Foschini wird Shindand als einziger Distrikt Herats mit einer überwältigenden paschtunischen Bevölkerungsmehrheit bezeichnet. Die Bewohner Shindands hätten das Taliban-Regime bis 2001 unterstützt und danach Vergeltung gefürchtet. Der frühere Gouverneur Ismail Khan (ein ethnischer Tadschike, Anmerkung ACCORD) habe nach der Eroberung von Herat aus der Hand der Taliban im November 2001 auch den Distrikt Shindand angegriffen. Die Kräfte, die zuvor die Taliban unterstützt hätten, hätten sich in das Gebiet von Zerkuh südlich des Distriktzentrums zurückgezogen. Ismail Khan selbst stamme aus Shindand, obwohl der Distrikt nie eine Machtbasis für ihn dargestellt habe. Dieser bevölkerungsreiche, aber abgelegene Distrikt sei interessanterweise der Geburtsort vieler wichtiger politischer Führer, sowohl unter den Farsiwans (Tadschiken) als auch unter den Paschtunen:

„Shindand residents found themselves in an odd situation at the fall of the Taleban in November 2001. As the only district of Herat with an overwhelming Pashtun majority, they had ended up supporting the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ­– the Taleban regime – during its contested conquest of Herat in 1995 and its subsequent tenure there, and they had reasons to fear reprisals. As soon as it was clear that the Taleban would abandon Herat city, powerbrokers in Shindand made a move to prevent them from using their area as a last stand against Ismail Khan’s troops’ push from the North. Only a few of the Shindandi leaders who had held important ranks within the Taleban regime fled; the rest organised into a local shura and braced themselves for what was to be expected: retaliation for their support of the Taleban.

A few days after he captured Herat on 12 November 2001, Ismail Khan attacked Shindand. The forces that had organised as a local council withdrew to the Zerkuh area immediately to the south of the district centre, a valley thickly dotted with villages where a significant portion of Shindand’s population resides. […]

[Fußnote 1:] Ismail Khan himself hails originally from Shindand district, although the district never constituted a power base for him, and in fact was often outside of his grip. Strikingly, this populous but peripheral district is the birthplace of many important political leaders, both among the local Farsiwans (now mostly referred to as Tajiks) and the Pashtuns, for example Alauddin Khan, late deputy of Ismail Khan and one of Herat’s most respected mujahedin, and Humayun Azizi, former minister and current governor of Kandahar.” (Foschini, 20. April 2016)

Foschini schreibt weiter, dass Amanullah, der militärische Führer in Zerkuh zur Zeit des Falls der Taliban-Herrschaft, zwar keine offizielle Position bekommen habe, aber in Shindand höchst einflussreich geblieben sei. Er habe Einfluss auf die Ernennung mehrerer Distrikt-Gouverneure gehabt und gute Beziehungen sowohl zur afghanischen Regierung und deren ausländischen Unterstützern als auch zu den Taliban gepflegt. 2006 sei er in einer lokalen Blutfehde getötet worden. Danach seien die Führungsposten des Distrikts Shindand nach und nach in die Hände von Amanullahs Feinden gerutscht. Nach einem US-Luftangriff im April 2007, bei dem zwei Brüder Amanullahs getötet wurden, hätten die früheren Verbindungen der Familie Amanullahs zu den Taliban die Oberhand gewonnen. Amanullahs Sohn, Raz Muhammad, auch bekannt als Jawed Nangialay, habe sich offiziell den Taliban angeschlossen. In den folgenden Monaten habe es weitere Luftangriffe in Shindand mit vielen zivilen Opfern gegeben. Insbesondere Zerkuh, dessen traditionelle Elite zum Großteil der Regierung feindlich gesonnen und auf der Flucht war, habe eine deutliche Radikalisierung erlebt und sei zu einer Hochburg der Aufstandsbewegung geworden. Amanullahs Sohn Nangialay sei zum bekanntesten Taliban-Kommandanten des Distrikts geworden und viele von Amanullahs früheren Sub-Kommandanten hätten sich den Taliban angeschlossen. Die afghanischen Streitkräfte hätten es nicht geschafft, das Tal unter ihrer Kontrolle zu halten. Ab 2009 habe die Regierung begonnen, sich auf lokale Milizen zu stützen, die später unter dem Banner der Afghanischen Lokalpolizei (ALP) agiert hätten. Die Einrichtung der ALP in Zerkuh habe einerseits zu einem Rückgang der regierungsfeindlichen Aktivitäten durch opportunistischere bewaffnete Gruppen geführt (von denen sich viele der ALP angeschlossen hätten), aber auch zu einem Graben zwischen den Sicherheitskräften des Distrikts. Es sei kontinuierlich zu einzelnen Attentaten und Vergeltungsschlägen gekommen, die die lokalen Spannungen zwischen den im Tal lebenden Gemeinschaften aufrecht erhalten hätten (acht Unterstämme der Nurzai, sowie Barakzai und Tadschiken). Die Taliban hätten die ALP gezielt angegriffen, und bis Ende 2014 seien die meisten der noch lebenden ALP-Kommandanten nach Herat versetzt worden. Die Taliban hätten ihren Druck auf das Distriktzentrum von Shindand zunehmend verstärkt. In dieser Phase sei Nangialay nach Zerkuh zurückgekehrt und habe sich dauerhaft niedergelassen. Der Artikel erwähnt auch die strategische Lage von Shindand für alle Taliban-Operationen im Nordwesten sowie einen niederrangigen Talibankommandanten aus der kleinen tadschikischen Gemeinschaft in Zerkuh:

„Although Amanullah [the military leader in Zerkuh at the time of the fall of the Taleban] was not given any official position, he remained highly influential in Shindand. He had a hand in the appointments of successive district governors and enjoyed good relations with the Afghan government and its foreign supporters, as well as the Taleban, who, in the meantime, had started to reorganise and mobilise. In 2006, however, he was killed in a local blood feud. As often in contemporary Afghanistan, there can be several different motives for a political killing, given the numerous actors and competition involved. […] Finally, there was also the long-standing vendetta with Amanullah’s arch-enemy, Ismail Khan, by then a minister in Kabul but never disconnected from the politics of his province of origin.

Whether it was provincial or national powerbrokers, who patronised local appointments, the district leadership posts in Shindand gradually slipped into the hands of Amanullah’s enemies. When in April 2007 a US airstrike killed two of his brothers, along with a number of other civilians, the family’s former ties to the Taleban took over. Raz Muhammad, aka Jawed Nangialay, Amanullah’s son, brought the closest relatives to Quetta and officially joined the Taleban. In the following months, Shindand was the stage of more airstrikes that ended in massive civilian casualties. Zerkuh, in particular, with most of its traditional elite antagonised by the government and on the run, underwent a significant radicalisation and became a bastion of the insurgency. Despite being based mostly in Pakistan, in subsequent years Amanullah’s son, Nangialay, would become the most renowned Taleban commander in the district. Many of Amanullah’s former sub-commanders joined the Taleban as well, either for ideological reasons or for opportunity.

The ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] were unable to keep the valley under tight control, despite the presence of US army outposts. From 2009 onwards the government started to rely on militias recruited among the local armed groups, first as part of the Local Defense Initiative (LDI) and then under the banner of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Shindand’s ALP, one of the first in the country, was established almost exclusively in Zerkuh, which accounted for most of the 325 ALP slots allocated to the district. On one hand, the establishment of the ALP managed to decrease anti-government activities of the more opportunistic armed groups. Indeed, many militiamen formerly affiliated with Amanullah and Nangialay, often with links to the Taleban, were recruited into it. One of Nangialay’s cousins, Haji Amir Muhammed, a former Hezb-e Islami commander who had previously been cooperating with the US Special Forces, became an ALP officer. […]

The establishment of the ALP thus created a rift within the district’s security forces, with splits and often conflicting loyalties between the Afghan National Police and the ALP or among the latter’s ranks. This state of affairs resulted in a steady trickle of assassinations and retaliations, with abuses often carried out against civilians. This stood in the way of a normalisation of life and society in Zerkuh and kept local tensions alive among the different communities inhabiting the valley (as many as eight Nurzai sub-tribes, plus some Barakzais and Tajiks). Anti-government propaganda continued to find fertile ground among the population, and the more ideological Taleban groups soon started to target the ALP with a deadly campaign of attacks on check posts and the assassination of commanders. By late 2014, most of the ALP commanders that were still alive had relocated to Herat and their militiamen had either defected or been cowed into inaction. The Taleban were increasingly putting pressure on Shindand district centre. It is at this stage that, in late 2014 or early 2015, Nangialay decided to move back to Zerkuh and to reside there permanently, even bringing back his family from Pakistan.

[…] It seems plausible that since late-2015, Nangialay had started to try to fit into his father’s shoes, that is: to keep one foot in the Taleban camp, in particular in the faction allowing him more room for manoeuvre in his relations with the state, and one foot in the (local) government. Given his charisma, family renown, and the strategic location of Shindand for all Taleban operations in the north-west, the pro-Mansur Taleban faction could not tolerate such a state of affairs in view of their announced spring offensive.

[Fußnote 3:] There are, of course, other additional layers of conflict brought up by local analysts, which connect the recent developments to the political landscape of Herat and involve other players as well. The past connection between a lesser Taleban commander from Zerkuh’s small Tajik community living in the Emarat area, Kamran, who sides with Mullah Samad, and the former amir of Herat Ismail Khan was mentioned as a sign of the continuing enmity of the latter towards Amanullah’s family and the role he could be playing in Shindand’s conflict.” (Foschini, 20. April 2016)

In einem Beitrag für das Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) vom Juli 2015 erwähnt Fabrizio Foschini, dass der Distrikt Shindand hauptsächlich von Paschtunen besiedelt sei und eine von den Sowjets errichtete Luftwaffenbasis beherberge, die von den USA reaktiviert worden sei. Dies habe dem Ort für viele Jahre eine gewisse strategische Bedeutung verliehen. Mittlerweile sei die ausländische Präsenz kaum mehr vorhanden und die Basis würde für die Ausbildung afghanischer Piloten verwendet. Die Sicherheitslage in der Provinz Herat habe sich gegenüber einigen Jahren zuvor insgesamt verschlechtert, dennoch sei der Distrikt Shindand Schauplatz von rund einem Drittel aller sicherheitsrelevanten Vorfälle in der Provinz. Der Einfluss der Regierung beschränke sich nach Angaben Ortsansässiger lediglich auf das Distriktzentrum, die Luftwaffenbasis und die unmittelbare Umgebung der wenigen Armeestützpunkte in dem weitläufigen Distrikt. Eine Serie von Angriffen von Aufständischen im Mai 2015 könnte auch mit der Rückkehr des prominentesten Taliban-Kommandanten im Distrikt Shindand, Nangialay, Amanullahs Sohn, zusammenhängen, der laut Angaben Ortsansässiger sogar erklärt haben soll, „die schwarze Flagge“ des Islamischen Staates (IS) zu hissen, falls die Taliban einem Friedensabkommen zustimmen sollten. Viele BewohnerInnen von Shindand seien nach Herat gezogen. Beamte, Lehrer, gebildete oder wohlhabende Menschen hätten es zunehmend schwierig und gefährlich gefunden, im Distrikt zu leben. Bewaffnete hätten begonnen, gezielt gegen jeden, der hervorsticht, mit Entführungsdrohungen oder Gaunereien vorzugehen:

„Until a few years ago, when leaving the embattled south in a northwesterly direction to the city-oasis of Herat (then relatively peaceful), one district always presented a lot of security problems: Shindand. This vast district is largely inhabited by Pashtuns who came to be at odds with Ismail Khan, the self-declared ‘Amir of the West,’ when he was in power in Herat, and who eventually found a connection to the Taleban. For many years, the military airbase built there by the Soviets and reactivated by the US, mainly with Iran in mind, lent to the place an air of strategic importance. Today, foreign presence has almost vanished, the airbase is mainly used as a training facility for Afghan pilots, and the security situation in other areas of Herat, including areas close to the city, has deteriorated, too. Shindand, though, still contributes a major proportion of the province’s security incidents – around one-third of the total, according to one organisation monitoring the situation across the country. In recent weeks, the district Taleban have consistently been attacking its central areas.

As early as 2006–07, Shindand has been one of the laboratories for the employment of local militias by foreign contractors linked to the US military. Those militias experimented with how to use the US military potential to set up and have their enemies killed under the label of Taleban. The deeds of Mr. Black and Mr. White, as the local US contractors had aptly been named after the quarrelling gangsters of Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs, revealed a new, dirtier side of the Afghan conflict to the public when a Senate inquiry was published. Their commanders basically killed each other for greed over the security contracts, while at the same time being supportive of the local Taleban.

Nowadays, locals report that the government’s writ extends only to the district centre and the area around the airbase, plus the immediate surroundings of the few army posts in this vast district. […] The recent spate of attacks by insurgents, who apparently tried to storm the district centre, may be connected to the homecoming of Shindand’s most prominent local Taleban commander. Nangialay – son of slain Amanullah Khan who used to withstand Ismail Khan’s power –reportedly returned from Quetta for the first time in many years last March. Even before the attacks in May, he made it known that he was not planning to lay down arms. In fact, according to locals he even declared himself ‘ready to raise the black flag’ of Daesh (Islamic State) in case the Taleban leadership opted for a peace deal. With this statement, he is reflecting the stance of many mid-level insurgent commanders who had joined the insurgency because of family or political grievances rather than ideology and who now see the opportunity to seek another organisation’s patronage and continue their opposition towards the government.

The ALP project in the home area of Taleban commander Nangialay – Zirkuh, also home to most of the militant and armed groups of the province – has recently been falling apart. Mentored by US forces until the end of 2014, the once 350-strong district ALP was all concentrated in Zirkuh, with its recruitment base split between men with a connection to the family of Nangialay and to other communities. However, no connection was strong enough to preserve them from a war of attrition waged by the Taleban with frequent attacks and targeted killings. It eventually wore them out. According to locals interviewed, the ALP leaders fled to Herat city, and their militia is now ‘dead and gone.’

Many more residents of Shindand took the road to Herat never to come back. Whoever was ‘an administrator, a teacher, a civil servant or an educated or well-off person,’ as one such professional from Shindand recalled, found it increasingly difficult and dangerous to live in the district. Militants started to target everybody who stood out with kidnapping threats or simply by enforcing a racket. People would get phone calls with threats and requests for money, until everybody with assets had been forced to pay or leave.

The government seems now to be taking steps to devote more attention to Shindand. At the beginning of June, the government announced the decision to split the district into several administrative units, to better control and allocate more resources to the area. Whether the move has been sparked by the need to counter the recently renewed activism of the local insurgents or by long-standing complaints by locals over Shindand’s considerable size and population is unclear. The decision, although criticised as ethnically biased by newspapers like Mandegar (article in the issue of 3 June 2015), will undoubtedly go down well with locals and might even prove beneficial on the security side – provided further militia-oriented security shortcuts are avoided. At any rate, the previous stasis was described as “doomed” by locals interviewed by AAN, so any change is probably welcome at this stage.” (Foschini, 3. Juli 2015)

Die folgenden Quellen erwähnen sicherheitsrelevante Vorfälle im Distrikt Shindand in den Jahren 2010 und 2011:

Laut einem Bericht des Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) von Anfang August 2010 zur Sicherheitslage (Berichtszeitraum: 16.-31. Juli) hätten sich Aktivitäten bewaffneter Oppositionsgruppen in der Provinz Herat auf die Distrikte Shindand, Adraskan und Guzara konzentriert:

„AOG related activities in Herat province focused on Shindand, Adraskan and Guzara districts during this reporting period, according to the incidents recorded.” (ANSO, 2. August 2010, S. 10)

Auch betreffend die erste Junihälfte 2011 erwähnt ANSO den Distrikt Shindand als Ort von Aktivitäten Aufständischer:

„During this reporting period, AOG activity was notable again in the northern and eastern districts, as well as in Shindand District in the south where it concentrated on IED deployment in the Zirkoh area.” (ANSO, 17. Juni 2011, S. 17)

Im Jahresbericht zu 2011 berichtet die United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), dass es im Distrikt Shindand in Herat Beschwerden gegeben habe, wonach lokale Polizeieinheiten Aufständischen geholfen hätten, unkonventionelle Spreng- und Brandvorrichtungen zu transportieren:

„UNAMA observed instances in which the lack of effective command has led to breakdowns in the cohesiveness of ALP [Afghan Local Police] forces, particularly those comprised of former Anti-Government Elements or illegally armed groups recently demobilized and reconciled through the APRP [Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program] or DIAG [Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups] processes. In some areas, local residents alleged that ALP members maintained close contacts with Anti-Government Elements and at times, assisted them or even switched their allegiances. [Fußnote 88: In Shindand district of Herat province, UNAMA received complaints of local ALP assisting Anti Government Elements in transporting improvised explosive devices (IEDs).]” (UNAMA, Februar 2012, S. 35)

[Passage entfernt]

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 25. Juli 2017)

·      ANSO – Afghanistan NGO Safety Office: The ANSO Report 16-31 July 2010, 2. August 2010 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1281011311_the-anso-report-16-31

·      ANSO - Afghanistan NGO Safety Office: Bi-Weekly Data Report; 1 - 15 June 2011, 17. Juni 2011 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1309429797_the-anso-report-1-15-june-2011.pdf

·      CIGI - Centre for International Governance Innovation: The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns (Autor: Giustozzi, Antonio). In: Afghanistan Papers Nr. 5, Juli 2010
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_paper_5.pdf

·      Foschini, Fabrizio: Back to Stopgap Appointments? The story behind the replacement of Herat’s governor, 24. Juli 2013 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net) 
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/258018/370357_en.html

·      Foschini, Fabrizio: Classics of Conflict (1): Reviewing some of Afghanistan’s most notorious hotspots, 3. Juli 2015 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/307600/431268_en.html

·      Foschini, Fabrizio: Under the Mountain: A pre-emptive Taleban spring offensive in Shindand, 20. April 2016 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/325368/451647_en.html

·      Giustozzi, Antonio / Reuter, Christoph: The Insurgents of the Afghan North, 5. Mai 2011 (veröffentlicht von AAN)
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/AAN-2011-Northern-Insurgents.pdf

·      LWJ - Long War Journal: Senior insurgent leader reported killed in Western Afghanistan, 9. Oktober 2009
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/senior_insurgent_lea.php

·      LWJ - Long War Journal: Taliban commander linked to Iran, al Qaeda targeted in western Afghanistan, 21. August 2010
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/taliban_commander_li_2.php

·      The National: Brutal insurgent rules the mountains, 17. Februar 2009
https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/brutal-insurgent-rules-the-mountains-1.492538

·      UNAMA - UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Annual Report 2011; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Februar 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1328540271_unama-poc-2011-report-final-feb-2012.pdf

·      WSJ – Wall Street Journal: Warlord's Defection Shows Afghan Risk, 2. September 2009
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125183668667977283