

THE ANSO REPORT

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YOU NEED TO KNOW

- Continued overall high levels of incidents
- Significant number of NGO incidents this period
- Numerous NGO casualties also reported this period

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COUNTRY SUMMARY

While May concluded with the reporting of extraordinary levels of conflict related activity (surpassing the previous peak recorded in August 2010), the opening period for June indicates a continuation of this momentum, reporting similarly high levels of incidents (see p. 7). This periods figures also reveal that despite security force efforts at interdiction and disruption of AOG networks (both manpower and supply related) through the winter and into early 2011, armed opposition elements are far from being a spent force, and in fact appear more than capable of continuing their efforts unabated. Early June generally serves as a reliable indicator for pending levels of violence and marks a stage in the steady upwards trend leading into the later summer months, though this may be affected by the early onset of Ramadan this year (August).

As the conflict has never been defined by large scale, conclusive engagements, the state of the conflict is generally viewed through the standard tactics utilised by the parties to the conflict. Comparative graphs by tactic indicate that close range, direct attacks (i.e. SAF & RPG) remain a key

component of the opposition campaign plan (as indicated by the graphs on p. 10) and serve as one of the key tactics driving present growth. Suicide attack levels remain relatively steady, and the use of indirect fire methods continue to be a regular feature of the conflict landscape.

From a strategic perspective, there is little significant month to month change in the geographic distribution of incidents, though periodic 'hills and valleys' do occur in various areas, the result of both intentional planning and forced circumstance on both sides. This period Logar, Paktya and Herat marked significant monthly volume increases for AOG attributed events, and following periodic fluctuations in an otherwise meteoric rise, AOG activity levels in Helmand are once again on the upswing.

While this period accounted for 6 IMF, 22 ANA, and 110 ANP killed in action, and despite the overall increase in incident volumes, casualty rates for security forces (with the exception of the ANP) are trending below those noted last year. At this time (and

inclusive of this period) the IMF and ANA are averaging 30% of the last years total, though the ANP remain the most affected at 45%.

Along with the considerable conflict volumes reported, the 13 NGO direct incidents recorded this period well exceed all monthly volumes previously recorded this year (see graph p. 12) While the incidents were varied, both in regards to attributing actor and type, there were elements that reflect the broader trends in 2011. The majority of incidents continue to occur in the North (Balkh & Badakhshan) and East (Nangarhar & Kunar) while Ghor alone accounts for 67% of the total in the WR (see graph p. 27). The demining sector continues to be consistently affected, accounting for 30% of the NGO incidents reported this period. While there were numerous NGO staff casualties this period, the overall rate remains well below those recorded in 2010. Including this period, there have been 11 fatalities and 14 wounded (all national staff) thus far in comparison to the 37 fatalities and 45 wounded in total last year.


CENTRAL REGION

KABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	0

Besides the usual criminality, a part of urban life which typically affects the residential neighborhoods (in this cycle mainly Karte Naw & the Company Area), Kabul City remained calm. The majority of significant events were authored by ANSF and pertained to the ongoing Operation Omeid 8, a concerted ANSF-IMF effort aimed at disrupting AOG networks in the rural districts around Kabul. Of note, the operation has been linked up to similar efforts in the northern districts of Logar, emphasizing the strategic importance of the southern access to Kabul City via Paktya & Logar and Wardak. While police operations maintained a constant ratio of 80% of all incidents recorded, AOG activity remained limited to IED detonations in Chahar Asyab & Musayi, and a typical SAF attack against an IMF-contracted fuel tanker in Tangi Abreshum of Surobi.

Police operations were visible mainly in parts of Paghman (Arghandi, Khushkaki, Parmankhel, Qalai Baki), Deh Sabz (Tarakhel, Bakhtiaran, Khoja Gar, Qalai Zarin) and Bagرامي (Deh Yaqub, Yakhdara, Karizakhunda). While the searches in Paghman and Deh Sabz resulted in a limited number of arrests and cache discoveries, the operation in Yakhdara yielded a significant seizure of homemade explosives (over 800 kg) and blasting caps (300) as well as the arrest of two AOG members running the store. The strategic location of Bagرامي, positioned along the Jalalabad Road and within an easily accessible distance from major residential areas in PD 8 and 7, dictates that the district continues to be explored as a staging area for sporadic AOG strikes in Kabul City though direct AOG-initiated escalations in this part of the province have been minimal (11 AOG-authored



attacks since 2006, out of which 10 were stand-off IEDs or indirect fire).

The current operations have so far circumvented Surobi, which nevertheless remains the main hub for direct AOG escalations, typically SAF and RPG strikes against IMF-contracted fuel tankers, seconded by ambushes against the security forces. The data related to such attacks on the Deh Sabz, Surobi and Qarghayi sections of the Highway this year suggest that the attacks remain well-targeted (collateral casualties are rare), with an average staging time of 1045hrs, though the most significant portion of attacks (45%) are staged before 0930 hrs. The Tangi Abreshum – Surkhakan section appears as the area of choice, while the frequency rarely exceeds 1 attack a week.

GRAPH INFORMATION:

The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the **15th of June 2011**. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data.


LOGAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	2

The conflict volumes doubled during this cycle, with the June record of AOG-initiated attacks already surpassing the volumes accumulated during four weeks in May. Attesting to this uptick, AOG also authored two incidents which affected two demining NGOs. In a mere replication of the AOG raid on a demining camp in Zarghun Shahr on 28 May (which resulted in the seizure of VHF equipment from the deminers, although the AOG did not seem to reject the NGO programming and did not harm any staff), the same local NGO was targeted in its main base in the evening of 9 June in Dadokhel (Puli Alam). This time, a group of at least eight gunmen handcuffed the NGO guards, and took away an assortment of materiel including a number of VHF handsets, GPS locators, binoculars and digital cameras. The AOG team leader reportedly incited the NGO staff to take distance from GOA and ‘foreigners-sponsored’ initiatives, yet his group left the camp without expressing any other concerns, leaving all staff unharmed. The deed was different for a staff member of another demining NGO, employed on a project in Nangarhar, who was spending his leave in his home in Sajawand (Baraki Barak). While visiting the bazaar on 3 June, the deminer was kidnapped by four armed AOG members driving two motorbikes. Four days later, his dead body was discovered beheaded and dumped in the vicinity of the bazaar. The community confirmed that the

victim did not have any outstanding feuds in the area. However, the victim’s employment was commonly shared knowledge, and likely the factor which called the AOG attention. The exemplary killing would indicate that the AOG associated the employee either with a security force, or with ‘spying’ for the government, an accusation often used to legitimize the killings for the mere sake of putting pressure on the communities.

Indeed, AOG intimidation efforts continued unabated in other areas of the province, getting ever closer to the strategic communications and the main population centers, including the capital. The northern section of the highway in Puli Alam also witnessed several cases of illegal checkpoints and abductions. It is assumed that AOG intentionally plant IEDs on the highway, anticipating their discoveries and the consequent road closures by the security forces, while the AOG units remain deployed in the villages adjacent to the main road in order to scrutinize the passengers taking detours along the secondary roads. Such a situation led to the abduction of 11 occupants of a flying coach taking detour via Kamal Khel – Nasir Baloot Area on 6 June. Among the latter, five were off-duty ANP officers (wearing civilian clothes), three passengers were employed with the Governor’s office and the remaining passengers were shopkeepers from Puli Alam. The



ANP members and the GOA staff were found executed in the area the next day. Moreover, this section of the highway, in particular Niyazi, Qalai Ali Khan and Qalai Juma Khan, was the scene of AOG ambushes on security forces and checkpoints, recorded less typically also across the district border in Muhammad Agha. 6 IEDs detonated (mainly against security targets) and an additional four devices were neutralized by the security forces, further illustrating the evident AOG focus on challenging the IMF-ANSF control of the main road network. Besides the entry avenues from the East, the Baraki Barak – Saydabad link seems to be of pivotal importance for AOG coordination in the region, including the reliance of Baraki Barak IEA networks on logistical chains established along the highway in Wardak.

Further, the distribution of AOG-incidents overlapped with the target areas of numerous ANSF-IMF operations, staged in Baraki Barak & Charkh, as well as in Muhammad Agha and Azra. NGOs based in Logar emphasized the immediate consequences of such operations for the civilian population, such as reduced access to district centers and by extension to health services, frequent arrests for the purpose of investigation with the custody stretching over several days, and the extremely unpopular and feared night raids. The perceived heavy-handed approach of the security forces towards the communities, and its adverse effect on the acceptance of the IMF in particular, were quite frequent comments shared among the NGO community in the province.

KAPISA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

The incident volumes in Kapisa remained low (though marking a slight increase) with a dozen of escalations reported, including several IMF-ANSF operations in Tagab and Nejrab, followed by 7 AOG-initiated attacks.

Mahmudi Raqi remains a peripheral district when it comes to AOG presence. Nevertheless, the provincial capital experienced a lethal SVBIED strike, most likely directed at the DAC. On 15 June, two passengers in a Toyota Corolla approached a temporary ANP checkpoint on the access road towards the DAC. Seeing the ANP determined to check the vehicle, the couple triggered the device, killing 2 ANP and 5 civilians on the spot in addition to a combined 8 individuals injured, incl. 2 ANP. The checkpoint had actually been established to reinforce the DAC perimeter in the anticipation of a high-profile visit to the Governor’s Office. The incident marked the first use of the SVBIED tactic in Kapisa since the 30 March strike in Tatar Khel (Tagab), when a single attacker detonated his vehicle against an IMF-ANSF patrol, and a previous strike against IMF in Puli Sayat (29 May 2009). Of note, the three attacks combined caused in minimum 20 civilian casualties, making the SVBIED a particularly lethal threat for the population. Yet, suicide attacks remain a rare occurrence, and one which requires a considerable mobilization of resources on the AOG side. Earlier this cycle, Mahmudi Raqi also witnessed an ineffective two-fold IDF strike against the DAC, a TTP more effectively and frequently used against IMF installations in the neighbouring Parwan. Otherwise,

NGOs continued to enjoy safe access into the western/northern districts.

Well in line with the established patterns, Tagab bore the brunt of violent escalations during this cycle, due in particular to several joint ANSF-IMF operations to which the AOG responded with the usual harassing close-range attacks (3 such strikes recorded in Nawrooz Khel, Omar Khal, Shah Kot). In Nijrab, two pressure-plate IEDs detonated against security patrols (ANP & IMF) in Shukhi and Qalai Shir, while an additional device was neutralized in Shir Khel (Tagab). Overall, NGOs reported a ‘safer-than-usual’ access along the main communications in Nijrab & Tagab, merely reflecting a down-scale in police operations which were often the main triggers for AOG attacks earlier this year. In counter-point, NGOs noticed a continued influx of AOG fighters into Tagab, portraying the district as a hotly contested territory in spite of the low number of actual clashes. Local communities also observed a transition on the side of IMF-ANSF efforts. Following the period of clearing operations of scale, the majority of current IMF-ANSF operations appear as targeted tactical strikes, which often capitalize on an element of surprise. The scheme for financial incentives paid out by IMF for information on AOG movements (and specifically on the IED deployment) is likely an important factor in the overall strategy, which however brings the conflict stakes inside the communities. Even more stringent communal aspects have been observed in the current aggressive roll-out of the



Afghan Local Police program. While the IMF-GOA target the approved tashkil of 300 ALP men at arms for each of the two districts (Tagab & Nijrab), the AOG commanders scrutinize the communities for any association with the program, ready to retaliate where necessary. In the morning of 10 June, a group of 9 ALP recruits were ambushed on the road in Anaar Juy-Shahkot (Tagab), while returning from an ALP-organizational session in the DAC. Two recruits were left injured on the spot, whereas the remaining seven were abducted by the AOG.

A brief look into ANSO statistics reveals that since the beginning of May, each two-week cycle has marked in average double the amount of AOG-initiated attacks compared to the levels recorded during the January-April periods. The current trends for May – June remain in line with the seasonal patterns and the volumes recorded in 2010. A cumulated 60 AOG-initiated incidents were recorded between January and mid-June, both in 2010 and 2011. The 2010 incident volumes reached saturation in May, and remained steady throughout the summer. It is yet to be seen whether the ALP roll-out, the ambition on the IMF side to prepare the ground for the handover of security control to ANSF, as well as the AOG encroachment in the province will not escalate the conflict further, making for an eventual departure from the seasonal patterns of 2010. The geographical proximity to Surobi, which will likely see military operations of scale in the summer, and to Laghman, a province undergoing a targeted AOG campaign in the anticipation of the security transition this year, constitute additional conflict vectors to observe for the upcoming season.

WARDAK


An uneasy peace among the Kuchi nomads, the local Hazara communities and the security forces buffering the two sides has been reported from the western districts of Wardak and the adjacent areas in Ghazni and on a positive note. While no escalations have erupted so far, the stakes were further raised with an additional influx of Kuchi families (currently an approximate two hundred households are prepositioned in camps in Behsud 1 & 2 and Daymirdad) and a modest though organized attempt at the formation of Hazara militias. These are aimed at establishing checkpoints to monitor the Kuchi settlements (several dozens of militia men mobilized) while there is a hesitant stance of GOA authorities involved in multi-track negotiations (an effort which is increasingly seen by the parties involved as a wait-out strategy rather than a proactive move towards a negotiated resolution). Despite the tensions, the armed elements on both sides have so far demonstrated restraint, and the scope for a peaceful accommodation of interests is still in play.

For the rest, the conflict ramifications in Wardak maintained the high incident volumes recorded during the previous cycle, encompassing the full spectrum of AOG tactics and intimidation efforts. This was countered by IMF and ANSF deployments at staging areas along the strategic communications. While Saydabad hosted the usual

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

50% of all security incidents, the spill-over effect marked in Chaki Wardak since the early May has also been maintained, partly due to AOG networks using the district for attacks along the highway in Saydabad. In Maidan Shahr, the ANSF carried out a localized poppy eradication (Kote Ashru). More importantly, the provincial capital witnessed an IED strike at the entrance of the Kabul Bank branch office on 5 June. Whereas the blast killed two security guards employed by the bank, the IED was likely part of the generic targeting of GOA and 'foreign' installations in the city. The use of a time-delay mechanism to trigger the device was suggested by the authorities, linking up the incident to the series of IEDs targeting the music shops/carts in early March of this year.

Throughout the province, AOG maintained the tempo of an aggressive intimidation campaign, specifically targeting IMF contractors and local employees/members of security forces. On 1 June in Onkhai (Saydabad), AOG encircled the house of a local resident employed as security guard in the Dashti Towp ANP Training Center. His son resisted and killed one of the attackers before the ANP repelled the attackers. In another such attempt in Shashgaw (Saydabad) one week later, AOG attempted to abduct an ANA member from his residence, which they set on fire when an ANA QRF unit stormed the location killing three



and arresting an additional three attackers. The Dashti Towp ANP Training Center also hosted an inauguration ceremony, attended by top GOA and IMF officials on 15 June. Shortly after the end of the event, a single projectile (reports differ whether a rocket or a mortar) impacted in the vicinity of the center. The AOG elements were far more successful in harassing the IMF-supply convoys on the highway, with Salar area alone marking four close-range and IED strikes. The ALP initiative came to the fore as a target of AOG operations in the Worsek Area of Nirkh, where an IED detonated against an ALP foot patrol, killing one and injuring an additional member on 2 June. In total 5 IED detonations against the security forces were reported from the main roads in Jalrez, Nirkh, Maidan Shahr and Saydabad, whereas 3 additional devices were discovered and neutralized in Nirkh and Saydabad. The highway in the latter district remained the center of IED activity, as confirmed with an additional arrest of two AOG members in possession of IED components in Onkhai, and a more significant discovery of an IED manufacturing and storage facility in a madrassa in Musakhel.

For the upcoming season, NGOs may expect further increase in military activity along the main route network in Saydabad, Nirkh, Maidan Shahr and Jalrez in particular. AOG effectives & resources concentrated along the Highway in Saydabad will likely continue to shape the environment in the adjacent areas of Ghazni and Logar.

BAMYAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The killing of Mr. Ahmad Jawad Zohak, the head of Bamyan Provincial Council in the Ghorband Valley (following his abduction by an AOG force on 3 June) marked the single most significant AOG-initiated incident in the province since 2001. The murder has shattered the community, inspired fears and anger over the GOA's approach to AOG, and highlighted the uneasy access into the province from Kabul. However, the province itself remains one of the most permissive NGO operational environments.

The killing fits into this year's pattern of AOG targeting GOA VIPs, announced as a part of Operation Badr, and was rendered possible by an unhindered AOG expansion in the side-valleys of Ghorband. The AOG strike also revealed 'a meticulous military plan' and 'brought the combat where it matters', to paraphrase other key aspects of the Operation Badr's statement. The timing of the incident is particularly compelling, as the murder happened right prior to the transition. Deconstructing the local interpretation of the killing brings one to appreciate the murdered politician as a leading personality inside Hizbi Wahdat, namely when it came to opposing

the current course of the reconciliation process. In the view which Mr. Zohak represented, the reconciliation policy embodied in the APRP and the Peace Council initiatives is judged too permissive towards the AOG, and too uncertain when it comes to safeguards for the security and rights of the Hazara community achieved with the regime change in 2001. A perspective which is strongly echoed in Bamyan, where the prospects of IEA return to shared or independent rule evoke the atrocities committed by Taliban militias against the civilian population.

Besides the strict political and historical considerations, the killing also inspired frustration and fear among the community over GOA's current inability to secure the roads leading to Bamyan. At times, local leaders in Bamyan and Yakowlang were putting blame on the Pashtun communities in the Ghandak Valley (Shibar), in particular when rumors hit the bazaar that the AOG responsible for the abduction had requested the release of Mullah Burhan, a prominent Taliban leader from Ghandak, in exchange for Mr. Zuhak. In concrete terms,



however, the commotion that the killing inspired has not translated into any tangible security developments, including the timid response of the ANSF-IMF. In the last days of this reporting period, ANSF, likely acting under considerable political pressure, conducted a series of arrests and search operations in Do Ab Mikhzarin (Kahmard) and Ghandak (Shibar), areas locally associated with sporadic AOG presence. In Ghorband, the killing and the repeated signs of AOG entrenchment in Qemchak inspired yet another one-time IMF-ANA incursion.

Almost lost in the attention which the above incident received, on 8 June, reports came in of two simultaneous cases of a mysterious intoxication of female students during the morning classes in two schools in Waras (DAC, Shahbed) and Panjab (DAC, Kajmazar). In total, over 50 girls (8 in Waras and 48 in Panjab) sought medical treatment with symptoms indicating intoxication, although the authorities have not determined the origin of the disease, and the community has so far remained silent as to the elucidation of the incident. It is noteworthy that both districts remain virtually devoid of AOG structure and neither is there any legacy of concerted attacks against girls' education.

PANJSHIR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Whereas political and criminal violence remains rare in Panjshir, unrelated to the main conflict vectors between the GOA/IMF and AOG, an escalation of significance occurred during this cycle in Khenj. During a hike in Safid Sher - Dehi Muquni (Khenj), a group including a senior Italian police officer stationed with the embassy in Kabul and another female expatriate, encountered a local young man transporting supplies on a donkey in the opposite direction. Under circumstances which remain unclear, some sort of a physical contact occurred between the villager and the expatriate female. The posture of the villager was identified as a threat by the police officer, who consequently fired two shots from his handgun, impacting the young man in his leg and his mid-


section. Shortly afterwards, a relative of the villager arrived to the scene, and shot the Italian officer dead with his AK-47. ANP performed a series of arrests for the purpose of investigation while the Afghan victim received treatment for serious injuries to his internal organs. In light of the information currently available, the incident did not result from any pre-mediated criminal or political intent on the side of the villagers, putting in question the judgement made by the expatriate officer and his consequent decision to use his handgun. While such an escalation undoubtedly affects the acceptance of foreigners' presence in the community, NGOs have not sensed significant changes in their operational environment in the district. Local perceptions

harden when it comes to the stereotype picture of 'armed foreigners', a mental image inspiring negative connotations in the eyes of many among the local community.

Another unusual incident was registered on the main road in Astana (Rukha) on 2 June, when a driver in transit to his home in Dara died following the ignition of an explosive substance inside his vehicle.

The focus on security transition on the side of the authorities, incl. IMF assurances about the planned presence of the PRT beyond the departure of the IMF 'security' element, raised attention this cycle. According to IMF views presented at a media conference in Kabul, the transition process will not mean the withdrawal of the PRTs from Panjshir and Bamyán. Rather, the 'reconstruction' component of the IMF strategy for Panjshir will undergo a similar transition with 'ANSF developing capacity and taking lead in reconstruction activities as security transition process begins'. Needless to say, this message raised more question marks than answers, and is yet to be experienced and assessed on the ground.

Country Level AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006-2011




PARWAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

A series of dramatic AOG-initiated events in the Ghorband Valley dominated the security reporting from Parwan during this cycle. In addition, three IDF cases in Chaharikar (IMF base), Jabalussaraj and Sayed Khel (the DACs), and two AOG figures joining the reconciliation process upon negotiations brokered by local elders in Bagram complemented the picture.

The morning of 3 June saw a force of two dozen AOG come down on the main Bamyān – Parwan Road in Siyagerd, anticipating the transit of the head of Bamyān Provincial Council thru the area. The force abducted the politician, and engaged the ANP in several clashes around the DAC. Attempting to counter the abduction, the District Deputy Chief of ANP was killed. The AOG withdrew towards the Qemchak and Wazgher Valleys, taking along another kidnapped ANP. Although ANA and IMF engaged in a minor search operation, the efforts were soon halted, reportedly to give way to a negotiation process. Four days later, the politician had been found dead alongside the ANP, their bodies covering a three-fold IED trap. The ease with which the AOG move across the upper side-valleys north of the main

road was illustrated a week later, when the AOG force reappeared in Qemchak, mentoring the community on how to run boys’ and girls’ education (beards and hats for the former, no education beyond the third grade for the latter) and mounting a road checkpoint in Abe Bala in the morning of the next day. The move provoked a more robust response on the side of IMF-ANA, both forces moving overland and by air into the valley, and engaging the AOG at least on one occasion. Of note, the ANP force was left behind, recovering from the attacks and understaffed beyond the point of being able to meaningfully contribute to the effort. In the mean time, AOG sent an additional message of force to the ANP in Shinwari in the form of a 2,5 hour IDF and SAF harassing attack in the night of 9 June, while the IED deployment, a stable feature of AOG package in the previous cycles, reappeared close to the Shinwari DAC in Dahane Estama on 14 June. This set of events created a discrepancy between the demonstrated AOG capacity to crack down on several sections of the Bamyān – Parwan Road, especially if the benefit is the interception of a high-profile target/asset, and quite the



pointless response by ANSF-IMF forces, which are not able or willing to deploy troops into the area on a permanent basis. This allows local AOG to retreat towards their safe heavens anytime a one-time hit operation comes any near, without necessarily losing positions as they return back into the ‘cleared’ areas immediately after the withdrawal of the security force.

As of yet, there is no conclusive indication that NGO access, incl. the safe passage between Bamyān – Parwan, would be significantly changed in the short to mid-term. However, the aggressive AOG expansion and their success in carrying out such a bold spectacular attack caution against underestimating the threats of further AOG interest in exploring the access route to Bamyān. Meanwhile, the recent AOG messages communicated to the community in Qemchak, including the deliberations on the education of girls, collide with the current services provided by the NGOs. If the AOG tendencies at regulating the social order in the communities grow in strength, NGOs in Ghorband will soon face the need to reconfirm the level of community acceptance for the educational components of their programming.

NORTHERN REGION

BALKH


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	6
This Report Period	2

Balkh continues to produce progressively more active reporting cycles, with 29 security incidents reported this period, a number that almost matches Kunduz—the regional focal point for conflict in the North. Amongst these 29 were 2 NGO related incidents which included the armed robbery of an NGO vehicle in Kishindih, and the killing of an NGO doctor’s assistant in Sholgara. But also of importance to the NGO community, Chimtal and Chahar Bolak combined for 11 incidents as Operation Ebtekar 2 commenced (with the mandate to clear the main road west of Mazar), strong inter-Jamiat commander tensions led to violence in Khulm District, the ANP were attacked by AOGs during the daytime in Dawlatabad, and a small explosion occurred in PD#2 of Mazar-e Sharif City.

In Kishindih, NGO national staff members were roughed up and robbed of their cash and belongings when their vehicle was stopped along with 3 other vehicles at an illegal checkpoint on the Kishindih – Dara-I Suf Payin road. The Kishindih – Dara-I Suf Payin road connects southern Balkh to Samangan via areas that have often been under the fairly heavy influence of AOGs. Evidence of an AOG presence in Kishindih has been sporadic, with only 8 incidents recorded in the district, but reports from the district suggest a stronger presence than incident reporting denotes. It is also worthwhile to note that a disproportionate 4 of the 8 incidents in Kishindih have involved NGOs, with 2 of these 4

attacks occurring on the same day in February 21st. The district has been mostly quiet since those 2 incidents, despite reports that AOGs are active in exercising influence over some of the local community, as well as regularly using it as a transit point to move east and west across the region. The district, and specifically this road, is crucial to AOGs as it links the strongholds in the Tri-Provincial area to Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar via Dara-I Suf Payin. The fact that this is a well travelled AOG route means that as the summer picks up, it is likely that the AOG presence, and the potential for security incidents, will increase along with it.

In Sholgara, a district which has seen increasing insecurity this year, a doctor’s assistant from an NGO run clinic in the Kochek area was killed on June 3rd when someone entered his residence in the middle of the night, strangled his wife, and stabbed him to death. At this time, there is no evidence to suggest that this was anything other than a personal conflict, or that his death had anything to do with his work, and as such, it offers little shift to the existing security paradigm. Perhaps of more importance to the security assessment of the district, the District Chief of Police’s vehicle came under extended SAF/RPG fire along the main Sholgara – Mazar road on the evening of the 12th. Although conflicting reports still exist as to the extent of the fight and the number of actors involved, all sources agree that it was a full assault rather than



harassing fire or a shoot-and-retreat.

Elsewhere in the province, in Khulm, an influential Jamiat leader was killed—allegedly by another Jamiat leader—and his supporters threatened to destabilize the quiet district with revenge oriented violence. The GOA—which had strong ties with all of the Jamiat community involved—was able to keep the situation under control, but how this shift in the balance of power will affect the district remains to be seen.

Chimtal and Chahar Bolak remained the epicentre of manifested insecurity in the province as a new military operation to clear the main road from Mazar to Fayzabad (Jawzjan) began, with the 2 districts accounting for more than 1/3rd of the reported incidents between them. However, a SAF/RPG attack in the middle of the day on an ANP patrol in Dawlatabad was equally important, as it displayed a physical example of the rarely manifested AOG presence that has begun to turn up in anecdotal reports in the northern district, as NGOs and the media posture that Dawlatabad is seeing an increase in AOG activity. The ANP were returning from setting up a checkpoint in response to internal reports that an armed group had moved into Hashim Abad, Khairabad, and Zadian villages to intimidate and tax the villagers. It is worth noting that Hashim Abad was the site of the last incident to occur in Dawlatabad before this, when an IED was discovered and subsequently defused on May 30th. Although there have only been 10 incidents recorded in the district this year, there seems to be an AOG presence there which is not yet conducting operations, but may be actively seeking to extend its influence throughout the district.

KUNDUZ


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

Although the overall volume of security reporting remained consistent in Kunduz this cycle, an exceptionally high percentage of the insecurity (15 of 30 incidents) involved IEDs. Most notable amongst these, a BBIED attack was carried out at a Mosque in Kunduz City at 0945 hrs on June 10th, targeting some of the top ranking security officials in the province.

The increase in IED related AOG attacks has been noted quite often since increased IMF operations began, which significantly deteriorated the physical presence of AOGs in the province. However, IED attacks in Kunduz and Takhar have bridged the gap effectively. 4 large scale IED attacks took place over the first quarter of the year, between February 10th and March 14th,



targeting GOA structures that drew civilians towards the GOA (an ANA recruitment center and a census center with a large group outside waiting to sign up to become militia members) and GOA officials. The most recent large scale BBIED in the Northeast prior to this one was the May 28th attack that killed General Daoud in Takhar. Although this took place in Takhar, not Kunduz, the AOGs operating in the 2 provinces are often linked.

The June 10th attack was another attempt at a high profile target. Multiple sources suggest that a civilian hosting a BBIED walked up to the Mosque where a service for General Daoud was being attended by the Provincial Chief of Police and the Commander of the Kunduz Quick Reaction



Force (QRF). ANP at the location identified and moved to intercept the individual, who detonated his BBIED before he could enter the mosque, killing 4 ANP, and injuring 14 others (9 ANP and 5 civilians). Both of the above high profile security chiefs were inside the mosque and remained physically unaffected by the attack.

It is widely understood that Kunduz remains the primary AOG objective in the North. While the ability of AOGs to carry out physical attacks is deteriorated due to the ongoing military operations, their ability to carry out IED attacks remains strong. With the summer here, it is likely the IED attacks such as these will continue and even increase.



FARYAB


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	0

Pashtun Kot (6) and Dawlatabad (7) recorded the most security incidents in Faryab this reporting period, despite the ongoing conflict in Ghormach which has bled into Qaysar and Almar Districts, with open source reports suggesting that as many as 12,000 IDPs have fled into the District Administrative Centers of all 3. In Pashtun Kot, a national INGO staff member was abducted in Ming Darakht Village on June 5th and released on June 15th after the intervention of elders. Elsewhere in the district (Jar Qala Village), an IO member was warned to provide an AOG with 2 motorcycles or face severe consequences. Ming Darakht in particular is known to have a strong AOG presence, and as discussed in the previous reporting period, anecdotal reports suggest that the entire district is seeing a general increase of AOG members and activities. However, until this period, that increase had not necessarily registered a corresponding trend in security reporting. A second abduction took place in Pashtun Kot in the Sar-e Awz area, where 4 telecommunications workers were abducted on the 8th, with 3 released immediately but 1 remaining in custody until his

release from Kohistan District on the 10th.

Although Qaysar and Almar remain significantly unstable due to large scale military operations ongoing in both districts and in Ghormach, it was the Andkhoy – Maymana road which registered the other significant boost in security reporting this period, with 7 incidents in Dawalatabad that included 2 day time attacks on convoys, 2 IED discoveries and seizures, and the detonation of an IED in Jar Qala Village (not the same Jar Qala mentioned above) which killed 2 teenage boys. Of particular note was an incident along the main road on the 13th when an AOG established a large illegal checkpoint (over 15 motorcycles) and shot and killed a civilian while in the process of fleeing the ANP. Reports suggest that they captured and tortured the civilian, whom they claimed worked for NDS, before killing him with a message that other GOA employees would share a similar fate.

An increase in attacks and IED seizures in areas along the main road should be expected over the coming weeks, with the ongoing Operation Wahdat 2 tasked with



“clearing” the Andkhoy – Maymana road. The IMF led operation presents a target rich environment for AOGs who are likely to decrease their physical presence over this time while they increase asymmetric attacks (such as IEDs) against IMF and ANSF. To the south of Dawlatabad, Qaramqol District also saw a noteworthy incident when an education finance officer was shot while distributing the salaries of teachers on the 11th. However, unlike the killing on the highway, this is assessed as likely a personal vendetta since the individual did not have strong political affiliations and the shooter did not rob him of the education money he was distributing.


In all, Faryab saw a significant 24 security incidents this reporting period, however, in the contested south-western districts, only 1 incident occurred in Qaysar, when on the 1st an AOG ambushed 2 vehicles in Daobi Village which had been contracted by IMF, burning 1 of them and killing 1 driver while injuring the other. Despite this relative lull in the southwest, reports suggest that conflicts in the Ghormach/Qaysar/Almar districts are not likely to subside anytime in the near future, and the potential for insecurity there remains high.

TAKHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

No less than 5 gatherings occurred in Taloqan to mourn the death of General Daoud (or petition the lack of arrests following his death) over the course of this reporting period. Takhar is the home province of the deceased General, as well as the location where he was killed in a dramatic IED attack that occurred at the end of the previous reporting cycle. Paramount to the political situation in Takhar, there remains no clear replacement for the General, but the effect of his death is being felt in the relationships between competing arbakis within (and outside of) the province. General Daoud was known for—amongst other things—his presence and ability to keep the arbakis in Takhar and throughout the North in control. The formation of ALPs (vetted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and IMF) and arbakis (local unofficial pro-government militias) has been key to IMF strategy, but has come under widespread criticism for a

perceived lack of proper vetting and/or accountability. With General Daoud’s passing, accountability becomes that much further removed. The actualization of these concerns came to fruition during a dispute between 2 Jamiat commanders in Farkhar this reporting period. When the dispute saw extended violence, the ANP were forced to dispatch to the house of 1 of the commanders whom had allegedly claimed personal involvement in the death of General Daoud. While the incident escalated to the point where multiple ANP vehicles were dispatched to the commander’s house, it ultimately subsided without reaching any significant climax, however it brings the question of whom will take over the General’s position, and will that person be able to control the various competing powerbrokers, arbakis and ALPs to the forefront. As an aside to this, on the 8th of June, 5 ANP were charged for being complicit



in the May 28th attack that killed the General. It is worth noting that there are often a number of initial arrests conducted after high profile security incidents such as this one that do not necessarily pan out.

As in Badakhshan, the drug harvest is likely to play a significant role in security in Takhar, which is also heavily involved in drug trafficking. The province saw a total of 20 security incidents (11 of these in Taloqan) this reporting period. The number includes the 5 peaceful gatherings. Amongst these, in 2 separate incidents IEDs were found along the main Takhar-Kunduz road in Taloqan district, and an arrest was made in Baharak of an individual in possession of weapons and IED making materials. IED incidents have picked up significantly in Kunduz, and has often been mentioned here, the security paradigm in Kunduz directly influences that in Takhar.

Monthly NGO Incidents (Combined AOG/ACG)




BAGHLAN

A relatively sustained lull in AOG initiated attacks was broken by an IED strike on an ANP vehicle in the City Center of Puli Khumri on May 31st, the last day of the previous reporting period. Prior to this explosion there had not been an AOG initiated incident since April 27th, and 11 of the other 14 incidents that took place during May had been initiated by IMF or GOA security forces. However, early June has shown signs that the lull is passing. 2 IED attacks took place this reporting period, 1 on June 2nd and the other on June 7th, suggesting that like the rest of the country, AOG initiated conflict is on the rise in Baghlan Province.

On the 2nd, an IED detonated on an IMF vehicle in Anarkhil Village in Baghlani Jadid at 1100 hours, injuring 4 soldiers and killing 1,

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

and on the 7th an RCIED detonated on a pro-government militia vehicle in Dand-e Ghuri area of Puli Khumri, injuring 4 pro-government militia members. In the latter event, a secondary device was found as well. Baghlani Jadid and Burkha make up the majority of northern Baghlan, and along with Puli Khumri, have historically been the focal point of AOG activity in the province. While the continuation of Operation Nowruz activities in the form of IMF and ANSF strikes in the area are likely to continue to keep AOG activities below the levels which they had previously risen too, it also appears that claims that the AOG presence in the province had mostly disappeared are exaggerated, and that the lull in attacks is likely to last only as long



as the surge in military operations.

Amongst the other 6 security incidents recorded this period (for a relatively low total of 8) the surrender of 50 AOG members in Dahana-I Ghuri sticks out due to the large physical number. The ALPs and arbakis of Baghlan, due to their political affiliations and well known repeated changes of allegiance between AOGs and GOA, have been the subject of many reports. Like elsewhere in the region, external actors have accused arbakis and ALPs in Baghlan of doing more to destabilize the province than stabilize it, but this is a dynamic that will continue to be monitored here and throughout the North.

JAWZJAN


Fayzabad continued to be the unlikely focal point for insecurity in Jawzjan following the recently completed Operation Wahdat's clear phase operations in the Tri-Provincial Area (including Qush Tepa and Darzab Districts). In all, Jawzjan witnessed a relatively moderate 10 security incidents this reporting period, with 4 in Fayzabad and a combined 5 in the Tri-Provincial area (3 in Qush Tepa and 2 in Darzab).

In Fayzabad, AOG operations ran the full spectrum of activities including an attack on a convoy, an attack on an ANP checkpoint, an IED discovery, and the killing of a civilian who was accused of spying for the GOA. Although mixed reports continue to surface about the extent of AOG infiltration into Fayzabad, as well as its' origins (whether the AOGs

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

acting there are primarily home grown, from Chahar Bolak and Chimtal, or from the Tri-Provincial Area), the district is now showing a significant level of sustained insecurity, and the main road through it is beginning to be grouped in with its' insecure neighbours to the east (Chahar Bolak and Chimtal in Balkh). However, unlike its' neighbours, even with this increased insecurity, NGOs across the board have reported having no significant access issues within the district despite noting this increase of AOG presence and activities.

Security incidents in the Tri-Provincial Area were primarily comprised of AOG attacks on pro-government militia checkpoints and units (which made up 4 of the 5 incidents, with the 5th being an



attack on the ANP). ALPs and arbakis in the Tri-Provincial area have been a point of contention since the beginning of the year, and appear likely to continue to be, largely due to the fact that both draw from the same population. AOGs seek to gain recruits and community acceptance in order to support them with numbers, and to house and hide them, while arbakis and ALPs are made of civilian communities who have actively decided to support the GOA, and turn to them for support and protection. The targeting of ALPs and arbakis by AOGs is likely to sustain, and increase over the summer, as AOGs seek to maintain their influence in their home communities, especially in strongholds such as the Tri-Provincial area.

SAMANGAN


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Although only 7 incidents occurred in Samangan this reporting period, with 4 occurring in Aybak District, this volume actually represents a notable spike in incident reporting for the quietest province in the North. Although a rare IED detonation occurred along the main road between Puli Khumri and Aybak on the 1st, it was the visual presence of a new armed group in the eastern areas of Dara-I Suf Payin that gathered the most attention in the province.

Multiple reports noted the presence of this new AOG, with numbers estimated between 30 and 100. Dara-I Suf Payin has been under the strong influence of AOGs since before 2011 began. In the beginning of this year, most estimates suggested that between 2-3 groups were operating there, while as the year progressed, 1 of these groups surrendered to the GOA, while another group firmed up its infrastructure and took solid control over much of the district. The arrival of this new group

poses a number of questions for the district, and reports suggest that the GOA is taking their presence seriously. While there are conflicting reports regarding their origin, reliable sources are suggesting that this group started with a small home-grown population, which has since been joined by an unknown number of foreign elements. If the above assessment is accurate and the groups origins are local, the chances that they will stay (if allowed) are likely. Further assessment (and time) will be required to understand the impact (if any) this group may have. So far, the existing AOGs in Dara-I Suf Payin have not hindered NGO access much, however, new groups often seek to make strong first impressions as they attempt to intimidate their host populations and demonstrate a mastery of their territory.

The IED explosion along the main road which occurred on the 1st was also a significant incident for Aybak. This occurred in



Aybak District, but just south of Aybak City along the main road en route to Baghlan, and for the sake of security assessment, should probably be grouped with the new round of IED detonations that took place in Baghlan this reporting period after a considerable lull. The RCIED was made out of an artillery shell that detonated just after a VIP convoy passed at 1900 hours in the Kotal Akham area, suggesting a faulty trigger detonator. The use of RCIEDs vs the use of VOIEDs (victim operated IEDs such as pressure plate) remains an important trend to follow for NGOs and civilians alike. While reports about RCIEDs remain more common, if VOIEDs begin to surface, it would mean an increased potential for accidental triggers from “wrong time, wrong place” detonations. Outside of this incident, at 1400 on the 6th, ACGs robbed passengers from 2 cars in Qaria Tai Khonak Village, along the Aybak-Tai Khonak Road in Aybak as well, creating for a rather full reporting period for otherwise quiet Samangan.


SAR-E PUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1

Sar-e Pul saw a moderate number of security incidents this reporting period, but of those that occurred, some were notable to the security paradigm for NGOs operating there. Of primary concern, 2 parked NGO vehicles took small arms fire at Zaka Village when an AOG of 2 motorcycles—quickly followed by an additional 5 motorcycles—barring armed men approached the village during a villager/NGO meeting on June 6th. Zaka, which has been the site of a number of prior incidents, lies directly along the main Shibirghan - Sar-e Pul road. The villagers apparently received a warning from one of their lookouts that the motorcycles were approaching, and hid the NGO staff while one of the villagers grabbed an AK-47 and opened fire on the 2 approaching motorcycles, likely firing warning shots. The individuals—believed to be members of an AOG—fired back, and the villager with the AK-47 was killed during the fire fight while another villager took up his weapon and continued to shoot. The AOG grew to 7 motorcycles and eventually overtook the opposition, then searching the area for the NGO staff members (and not finding them), before leaving as ANA re-enforcements arrived on site. During their departure, they were able to

abduct two villagers.

In assessing this incident, it is necessary to understand whether the NGO was being actively targeted because of their presence, or mistaken for another entity. The NGO was using silver unmarked vehicles which could have easily been mistaken for government vehicles, and thus far all abductions along this road this year have been well targeted strikes, ie: a businessman and then a number of GOA employees. Negotiations between the village elders and individuals representing the AOG eventually took place, and both villagers were released. Whether this is a case of the AOG (or a nearby village associated with that AOG) not wanting to widen a gap with the community, or whether they mistakenly thought that they were targeting GOA officials and later learned that it was an NGO, is unclear at this time. At present it appears that this likely involved villagers competing for resources or inter-village grievances. What is clear is that the Shibirghan – Sar-e Pul road continues to witness the most manifested insecurity in the North, with its’ 10 illegal checkpoint taking place at the end of the last reporting period (but not reported until this reporting period) in the Hawzi Haji



Mohammad Omar area at 1800 on May 31st.

Also of note to NGOs operating in the province, an explosion was heard in Sar-e Pul City on the evening of the 13th when an unknown individual threw a grenade at an IMF patrol, injuring 2 (including the translator). Although this does not represent a notable shift in the security paradigm, it remains an outlier in a city that has seen only 4 incidents (including this one) within its borders this year. The only other incident within the city this year that resulted in physical damages occurred relatively recently, on April 23rd, when RPG/SAF was shot towards District 2 resulting in an hour long fire fight between AOG and ANP. Although such incidents within Sar-e Pul City are extremely rare, anecdotal reports continue to surface that GOA control around the district is shrinking to just outside the city walls. In all, Sar-e Pul saw 13 incidents this reporting period, with 7 in Sar-e Pul District and 4 in Sayyad, including a conflict between pro-government militia members and AOGs in the Pista Mazar area on June 11th that was destabilizing enough that the villagers in the area moved to relocate. Sayyad, like the other districts in the Tri-Provincial area, has seen a strong reaction by AOGs to arbakis and ALPs whom they feel infringe upon their target population.

BADAKHSHAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	5
This Report Period	0


The drug harvest has arrived, and it is likely that no North Region province’s security will be as directly affected by this as Badakhshan. Sharing northern and eastern borders with Tajikistan, Badakhshan is home to large numbers of drug producers and trafficking routes, which are the source of much of the province’s political importance and insecurity. As the harvesting season comes into bloom, Badakhshan has also witnessed an increased number of military operations to destroy extensive plots of drug crops throughout the province (most notably this period in Argo). Not surprisingly, local populations have not responded kindly to the Afghan Government’s efforts to reduce their most lucrative crop, and the onset of operations combined with the harvest and increased use of trafficking routes have caused a seasonal shift in the security paradigm.

Nowhere did this create a more noticeable effect this period than just outside Fayzabad City. After 3 different ANSF missions into neighboring Argo District, destroying hundreds of hectares of drug crops, ACGs baring the financial liability of those losses registered their malcontent by

conducting a late night attack on an ANP checkpoint just up the hill from Fayzabad City at Kohi Jalghar Area on the 2nd. The attack was conducted with SAF and RPGs, and could be seen by the residents from the city approximately 2 kilometers away.

As the GOA deals with the ACGs (and other power brokers) who control the drug trade over the next month, it is likely that there will be an increase in criminal activity. One of the areas this is likely to become increasingly volatile is the area around Sufian Village in Warduj, along the main Baharak – Ishkashim road, a road often used by traffickers to get to the Tajik border before circling the province to the north. Anecdotal reports have surfaced that armed men have been seen along this road—potentially laying mines—and that the area around Sufian in particular has a history of insecurity.

Closer to the main body of Badakhshan Province, a new round of attacks surfaced in Baharak District, which had quietly simmered down a bit prior to this. 2 attacks took place this period, 1 a relatively common RPG attack on the DAC late on the evening of the 1st, and a



slightly more substantial attack when an IED that was placed under a parked mini-bus detonated on the 7th, destroying the bus and damaging 4 nearby vehicles. Although 3 suspects were arrested in conjunction with the latter event, like elsewhere in the province, it is likely that crime in Baharak, a district seriously involved in the drug trade, will continue to increase during the harvest season. Already this year, Baharak has been the primary source of manifested insecurity in the province.

Of the other 12 incidents that took place (15 in all), most notable was the clash between 2 AOGs in Darayim—one of the few districts in Badakhshan known to host a strong AOG presence—which occurred on June 7th in the Pirgani Area when 1 AOG objected to another’s attempt to reconcile with the GOA. The clash injured 1 AOG member before subsiding, and the AOG—which consisted of 40 members including 2 commanders—was able to surrender to the GOA. Clashes such as these are common as arbakis and ALPs make up natural competitors to AOGs, not only because they fall on opposite sides of the conflict, but because they draw from the same populations for the support necessary to sustain them.

NOTICE: Contact details for all ANSO staff is located on the last page of this report.

WESTERN REGION

HERAT

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	4
This Report Period	1


During this reporting period, AOG activity was notable again in the northern and eastern districts, as well as in Shindand District in the south where it concentrated on IED deployment in the Zirkoh area. Herat Province also recorded an NGO incident from the western part of the Herat - Obe Main Road in Obe on 9 June when an AOG attacked a convoy of four commercial trucks in Turkabad Area. The convoy was transporting items belonging to an INGO to Ghor Province. This part of the road has already seen a notable AOG activity during the previous reporting periods, a trend that is expected to continue.

After the attacks in Herat City on 30 May, the city itself remained quiet though there was an increase in ANSF/IMF operations. Until the 2nd of June the operations were focused on the city itself and then subsequently moved onto the districts of Injil and Guzara.

Injil district also saw IED related incidents targeting ANSF in rather unusual areas such as Karizak, Darghara and Shaydaee. Whereas the IEDs in Karizak and Darghara represent efforts to challenge and intimidate ANSF in the vicinity of Herat City, the ones in Shaydaee appear more related to disagreements over land rights between former ANA-personnel and IDPs in the area. In this regard, a group of former ANA members also expressed their disapproval of what they perceive as an usurpation of their land by IDPs at the Governor's Office in

Herat City on 12th of June. In Karukh, the usual AOG/ACG activities on the eastern part of the main road to Qala-I-Naw started with an armed robbery in Khaja Charshanbi, followed by an AOG attack against a fuel tanker convoy in Ghorombow. Further incidents on this part of the road – particularly east of Amalik Area – are to be expected. Similarly, in Pashtun Zarghun District, AOG activity continued with an ambush on an ANP convoy in Sayed Abad and an illegal checkpoint on the main road to the DAC in Pashakan area. As well, the killing of two civilians by AOG close to Langar Area of Obe was recorded. These civilians were reportedly working on reconciliation matters in the area and already established contact with an interested AOG prior, though whether they were killed by the group they were in contact with or another AOG opposing the APRP remains unclear so far.

The district, which saw the most significant developments during this period, was Chishti Sharif, where power struggles between local commanders, as well as with the GoA, reached a new height this year. On 12th of June, AOGs under the command of a prominent local commander ambushed an ANP convoy in Dahana Shir Khwaj Area. As a result, the ANA launched an operation in the area, which was reportedly supported by two other local commanders. One day later,



the local AOG commander, who attacked ANP on the 12th, was killed by an IED outside a mosque in Zala Village of Chesht Area while on 14th of June, ten supporters of the killed AOG commander joined the government. However, this series of events did not prove to be the end of AOG activities as on the same day an AT mine hit an ANP vehicle on the main road to the DAC in Tagab Ghaza Area and AOG ambushed ANSF/IMF – also on the main road to Chishti Sharif's DAC but on the Obe side. These hostilities are expected to continue for the next reporting period.

The northern districts of Gulran and Kushk both hosted direct fire attacks against their DACs starting at around 2300 hrs. Whereas the fighting in Gulran lasted for around four hours and was the second recorded attack against the DAC, the attack in Kushk was the first and reportedly ended after 20 minutes. Of note, after the attack in Kushk AOGs reportedly escaped in the direction of Gulran and an IED was discovered on the main road to Gulran the next morning, probably emplaced to cover the AOGs retreat. In both districts AOG activity has been on the rise this year and will likely continue to expand. However, it remains to be seen if this will also include a push to the usually quieter south in Kushk or, if the intention behind the latest attack was limited to a show of force in the district centre, whether the activities will continue to concentrate on the northern areas in Kushk.

FARAH


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Farah Province saw notably less IED related incidents during this reporting period while direct fire attacks by AOGs and armed clashes between AOGs and ANSF prevailed. 70% of the direct fire attacks and clashes were recorded in Bala Buluk. Of note, the number of incidents in Pusht Rod, which had been the hotspot during previous reporting periods, decreased significantly. AOG - ANSF/IMF hostilities clearly concentrated on Bala Buluk, where the focus was again on Shiwan and, to a lesser extent, also on the Farah Rod area.

Shiwan saw an armed clash as well as a direct fire attack against an ANP CP on 6th of June. On 7th of June, ANSF/IMF launched an

operation, which lasted for several days and reportedly resulted in the arrest of around 24 AOG members. However, AOG activity continued with two direct fire attacks against ANSF on the 9th of June and an IDF attack against an ANSF CP on 13th. Further and intensified fighting in the Shiwan, but also in Bala Buluk District in general, should be expected in the coming weeks.

In regard to civilians, on 5 June AOG abducted a local civilian in Shahnawaz Khan Village of Khaki Safed. Although hostilities between AOG and ANSF/IMF clearly shifted from Pusht Rod and Khaki Safed to Bala Buluk during this reporting period, it is



likely that AOG activity in all these districts will continue at similar levels during the upcoming summer months. It is also worth noting that the recruitment process for ALP in Khaki Safed has reportedly started, marking the second district after Pusht Rod where ALP will be institutionalized.

The western districts of Farah Province remained calm again during this reporting period – although in Anar Dara an IED detonated while being defused by ANP – and the shift of AOG activity to the west in April/May seems to have been only temporary.


BADGHIS

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

During this reporting period, Qadis saw for the first time more incidents than Murghab, which seems very much linked to tensions triggered by AOGs joining the GoA and their subsequent return to their areas as ALP. Incidents were concentrated in Ghal Charkh and Khair Khana areas, with each accounting for 25% of all incidents in the district. Of note, in both areas hostilities between AOG and ALP were recorded while a further 23 AOG members joining the APRP from Ghal Charkh, Kariz Haji Nazar and Badrawak areas. Armed clashes between these former and present AOGs occurred, demonstrating the increasing efforts of AOG to disrupt the reconciliation process. Tensions in this regard became very obvious on 7th of June in Ghal Charkh Area, when one AOG attacked

another, as one of the groups had intended to join the government.

In regards to Murghab, the district saw mainly IED discoveries (75%), which indicate that AOG have switched to less offensive tactics during the last two weeks. Most affected was again the Murghab – Murichaq Main Road and to a lesser extend the main road to the DAC. Worth noting is that in Murghab and Qadis Districts, incidents including Afghan Local Police were recorded in areas of ANSF/IMF operations. On 8th of June, ANSF/IMF conducted an operation targeting AOGs in the Paniak area of Murghab District with four AOG members, one IMF soldier and one ANA soldier being killed as a result. In addition, two ANA soldiers and two ALP members were wounded.



The wounding of the ALP members demonstrates that the ALP are at times used in offensive operations, although their formal mandate bounds the members to a purely defensive role. Furthermore, on 11th of June AOG and ALP clashed in Khair Khana, where at the same time a significant ANSF/IMF operation took place (including an airstrike) and resulted in a high number of killed and injured AOG members. However, in this case it is unclear (but not unlikely) if ALP were taking part in the operation. Whether such cases remain isolated and bound to specific circumstances, or if they will become a more routine procedure in ANSF/IMF operations, remains to be seen.

GHOR


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	8
This Report Period	3

Ghor’s southern districts saw one direct NGO incident in Pasaband and another indirect case in Taywara, while a third incident was reported from Du Layna. In Pasaband, the abduction of a former or non-permanent INGO staff member on 31st of May ended with a public execution on the 4th of June in the AOG hotspot Kakuri Village. So far, it is still unclear why negotiations failed, though the AOG had requested a prisoner exchange (a request that was denied) and why the abductee was singled out in the first place. The most likely explanation is that he was considered suitable candidate for a prisoner exchange as his brother holds a high position with ANSF in Kabul and it is possible his link (however tenuous) with an INGO further heightened his profile.

It is also worth mentioning in this regard that on 8th of June ANSF conducted an operation in Zartaly Village (approx. 30 km south-east of Chaghcharan City) targeting an AOG commander from Charsada

District, reportedly on his way from Pasaband to Charsada. The AOG commander escaped and no arrest was reported with unconfirmed reports indicating that the commander had recently returned from Helmand and was responsible for the public execution of the abductee. In addition, anecdotal reports suggest that this commander may attempt to conduct attacks while on his way back to Charsada, but this will very much depend on his actual capacity to do so as well as on the level of local support he may depend on. It would appear that he was reportedly forced to go back to Pasaband due to the operation and it is not unlikely that ANSF will again launch operations if he tries to come in the vicinity of Chaghcharan City again.

In Taywara, four shepherds were kidnapped in Quchi Area on the main road while transporting a consignment of sheep to the district centre which were ordered



by an NGO. The shepherds were released unharmed on 4th of June but the AOG kept the livestock. Generally, the security situation along the main road between Pasaband and Taywara reportedly remains concerning due to AOG presence and further AOG activity along the road needs to be expected.

The third NGO related incident took place in Siya Khak Area of Shahrak on the main road to Du Layna District. On 10th of June, unknown armed men on motorbikes stopped a private vehicle, whose driver was on his way to Chaghcharan City to sign a contract with an NGO. The armed men searched the vehicle and physically assaulted the driver, but released him and the vehicle afterwards. In addition, unconfirmed reports indicate that at present a small but mobile AOG is present in Du Layna. However, it is worth noting that AOG related incidents directly or indirectly affecting NGOs in Shahrak were mainly concentrated on infrequent armed robberies of truck convoys.

Western Region RSA Departure:

Rachel Adam will be concluding her employment with ANSO as of the 26th of June 2011. We would like to take this opportunity to thank her for the excellent work performed during her time as the West RSA. Her keen work ethic and active engagement with the community served as assets to both ANSO and the community as a whole. We wish her the best of luck in her future endeavors. Please note that a replacement RSA has been engaged and once their start date has been confirmed we will announce it accordingly.

EASTERN REGION


NANGARHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	9
This Report Period	2

Similar to the previous PRP, a series of NGO related incidents continued in Nangarhar Province. On 7th June in Khogyani District, Pirakhel area, a locally hired NGO employee working on an NSP project was shot and injured on his way to the NGO's office. Following this incident the NGO asked their employees to close the office and to stay in their houses for the remainder of the day. Yet, another employee was targeted by gunmen as he was walking in the DAC Area though fortunately the injuries of both NGO staff members were not life-threatening. It should be noted that this double shooting occurred a week after a local malik, and head of the district's NSP Council, was killed in Patiri Area of Chaparhar District. Whereas this earlier killing can be seen as being linked with the developing AOG campaign of targeting influential local elders across the Eastern Region, there is the possibility that the aforementioned NGO incidents are related to this trend. While it doesn't appear that there is any

specific intent on the part of AOG to target NSP (assessed as such at present) the sheer size and scope of the program suggests that the likelihood of NGOs implementing portions of this program incurring incidents is a statistical inevitability.

With 28 AOG initiated incidents, AOG remained very active throughout the province, with this reporting period noting five AOG initiated direct attacks, targeting ANP/ANBP CPs in Nazyan, Khogyani nad Lal Pur and ANP personnel in Kuz Kunar. IED emplacement continued apace across the province with at least 31 IED incidents, of which 13 devices detonated. These in particular affected Bihsud, Khogyani and Achin districts. Of note in Shinwar District, an IED detonated inside a local music/DVD shop, injuring one civilian. On the 4th of June in Jalalabad City, an IED detonated in Zone 1, in the vicinity of the ANBP CP, injuring one civilian and one ANBP servicemen. Apart from the said incident the situation



within the city this reporting period was relatively quiet, however on 2 June a threat report indicating that a number of BBIED operatives had entered parks located in Zone 1 led ANSF to launch a large search operation in the area that ended without reported results. Another significant incident occurred in Bihsud District, also on 2nd June, when an IED planted under a bridge detonated in Walyati Area of Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway causing damage to the structure. Dur Baba District came to the fore on 9 June with an attack carried out by a group of unknown armed men that broke into a house where a groom and his relatives were preparing for a wedding. The gunmen shot and killed 9 of the wedding participants, including the groom, and seriously injured 6 others, all men. The groom and his family were close relatives of the Dur Baba District Governor reputed for being an important opponent to the AOGs operating across the border and into the district.


KUNAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	7
This Report Period	1

Kunar Province continued to experience a decrease in the overall number of security incidents, the process that had already been observed in the last period. The number of AOG initiated incidents has sharply declined from 54 to 36. In addition, in the last fortnight the province saw another NGO direct incident. On 11 June, a group of 13 persons, including 10 NGO national staff involved in vocational training, were travelling on the main road from Asadabad in a rented vehicle when they were stopped in Saagy Area by around 10 AOG members. The group abducted 8 NGO staff while the driver, 2 students who were travelling in the vehicle, as well as 2 NGO staff who identified themselves as students were released. The next day another 5 NGO staff were released due to the intervention of local elders; however the remaining 3 persons

are still being kept in captivity. The incident marks the first NGO incident in Asadabad District this year, however, it should be noted that a record of NGO abductions exists already in Kunar, more precisely in Manogai, which has recorded 2 previous instances of temporary abductions of NGO staff members. In these incidents it appears that the NGOs acceptance level plays a major role in the safe and rapid release of the abductees.

In the last two weeks, the districts of Asadabad, Nurgal, Shirkanay, Wata Pur and Khas Kunar experienced the majority of AOG initiated incidents. However, a notable event occurred on 4th June in Lahore Daag area of Marawara District, where a female BBIED detonated her device in close proximity to ANP elements, who were escorting IMF in the area, wounding 3 ANP officials.



The incident marked the second suicide attack in the Marawara-Sirkanay area in the past 3 weeks, after the SVBIED against a stationary IMF convoy in Sirkanay on May 28th. However, the extremely rare involvement of a female operative separates this incident from the usual patterns. As usual in Kunar, the AOG tactic of choice was related to direct attacks and was focused on Asadabad (4), Wata Pur (4), Nurgal (3) and Sirkanay (3). Noteworthy, several ANSF/IMF-AOG engagements resulted in civilian casualties. For instance in Chawkay, following an AOG attack on a military base, IMF conducted an air strike, killing a female child. In Shegal District, 3 civilians were injured when their vehicle was hit by a rocket during the cross fire during an AOG attack on an ANA convoy.


NURISTAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

Following the take-over of Do Ab District by ANSF/IMF from AOG, Nuristan province has once again returned to a precarious calm with only five incidents being reported from the province during the present period. Nonetheless, the lack of reporting is linked to inaccessibility and isolation of the province rather than to the real picture of the security environment. In the last fortnight AOGs manifested themselves once again in Do Ab District where they carried out two IDF assaults targeting the DAC. On 3rd June, three rockets were fired towards the DAC but did not involve reported

casualties. The second rocket attack was more deadly as a single rocket killed an ANP officer and wounded another one. One instance of AOG direct attack was reported from Wama District as an ANP check post came under fire in Kordar Village on 4th June.

Whereas the military situation concerning Do Ab District has reached a sort of status quo, at least temporarily, numerous questions in regard to the IMF bombing involving multiple civilian and 'friendly forces' casualties continues to arise among civil society in both Nuristan and beyond its borders.



In addition, requests have been expressed demanding to open an inquiry in order to investigate this issue.


While past periods have been more volatile than the present, and Nuristan has entered a period of calm, the AOG presence remains significant and more contesting of areas can be expected. This will concern in particular Bargi Matal, where on 15th June, a night time AOG attack on the DAC was reported.

KHOST

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	3
This Report Period	1

The security situation in Khost Province continued to be volatile and challenging for NGO operations with the overall level of security incidents on the increase. On 14th June in Ghoshah Village of Tani District, unknown armed individuals attacked with SAF a team of NGO deminers clearing the area. The attack slightly damaged one NGO vehicle, but caused no casualties. Shortly afterwards, members of the local community engaged the attackers in a brief fire fight and caused them to flee the area. This represents the second NGO direct incident in the district this year and, at the same time, the second incident involving NGO demining staff. The previous escalation occurred on 11th May in Eqbal Village of Tani District, where 21 demining personnel were abducted. Although it is too early to point out the exact motivation for the attack, it should be noted that despite their humanitarian agenda, demining NGOs may be perceived by AOGs as a threat to their own military effort. In

addition, for the second consecutive reporting period, Khost City experienced a high-profile incident. Following the 5-hour long engagement between AOG and security forces during a complex attack on the joint Traffic Police/ANP QRF (Quick Response Force) compound reported in the previous cycle, this period on 11th June, a BBIED attacker detonated himself against the ANP QRF commander's vehicle. As a result, the QRF commander, two ANP guards and one child, who happened to walk by, were killed. In addition, five ANP guards and 16 locals, including one female, were wounded. Of note, another suicide bomber was reported in Sabari District, where on the same day a BBIED attacker prematurely detonated close to a joint IMF/ANSF foot patrol, wounding one IMF soldier and one local translator. Apart from this spectacular attack it should be noted that in Khost City IED deployment remains the main threat for the local population. In



the last fortnight, six IED strikes were reported in the city injuring a total of one ANA, seven ANP and six civilians.

Regarding the province as a whole, besides Khost City, AOGs were particularly active in Sabar and Tere Zayi. Although the AOG tactic of choice remains IED emplacement with at least 31 incidents (both detonations and discoveries), the diversification of AOG TTPs continued as well with 11 direct attacks and 15 IDF. IDF intended targets include ANSF/IMF facilities and personnel as well as DACs with Nadir Shah Kot, Sabari and Bak administrative centres being attacked.

Lastly ANSF/IMF conducted at least 18 documented operations/arrests, with Sabari District experiencing the large majority of them. Besides weapons and ammunitions seizures and arrests of suspected combatants, an air strike was also reported, targeting AOG while they were planting an IED on a sub-road in the area of Nooray village, killing two.

LAGHMAN


AOG demonstrations of force in the provincial center, the proximity of the northern districts to Nuristan where the majority of incidents were concentrated, and sporadic AOG and ACG movements along the highway in Qarghayi characterized this cycle in Laghman.

NGOs noticed a bold AOG effort at mainstreaming the communication with the constituency by instituting official phone numbers for the sanctioned spokespersons of the ‘Mujahideen of Laghman’, seemingly in reaction to a number of ‘fake’ personifications of AOG authority by local criminal elements. This was communicated thru a nightletter campaign, with posters attached to several mosques in the DAC area. In a more concrete military action, which yet remained mainly inaccurate, hence symbolic in purpose, two incidences of harassing fire against security installations were reported from the DAC area on two consecutive evenings (on 6 and 7 June, the former incident being a three-fold IDF against an IMF base, and the

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

latter a 15-min combined SAF and IDF attack against an NDS premise). Perhaps in the most significant attack in the district, AOG attacked a road construction site in Kafirgalai with SAF and heavy weapons for 20 minutes. Although, the attack did not result in any reported casualties. In Rod Gar Danjawa, a set of 5 IEDs completed the AOG campaign of fear in the provincial capital, which matters as the deadline for the security transition approaches.

Nevertheless, the majority of AOG initiated strikes were confined to the Alingar and Alishing districts, where the level of combat operations in the previous cycles often included IMF air-strikes and lethal close-range clashes on a regular basis. An IMF multiple air-strike against AOG positions in the Nuralam Valley of Alingar was recorded this period, marking basically the only operation of scale (yet, the information remained scarce as to the impact of the action). Otherwise, AOG remained timid and concentrated their efforts on brief and direct engagements; again, achieving hardly more than



the harassment of the security forces (3 such attacks concentrated across the span of one week, but did not result in any casualties or damage). In counter-point, Kanda area in Alingar witnessed two IED blasts against IMF convoys, with one of them turning against civilian by-passers, killing four and injuring one.

In the southern tier of the province, Qarghayi District, the interests of armed players naturally converge on the Qarghayi section of the Kabul – Jalalabad Highway. In the late evening of 6 June, the husband of a Nangarhar parliamentarian was killed by unidentified gunmen while transiting thru the Surkhakan junction, his body recovered and identified by ANP in the morning hours of the next day. While the motives of the attack are yet to be elucidated, the incident nevertheless serves as a caution against NGO travelling late night on the highway (for more data on the Surobi – Qarghayi portion of the highway, refer to the Kabul section of the report).

PAKTYA


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	2
This Report Period	1

The events in Paktya sustained the trend of recent attacks against demining NGOs, more particularly the robbery of communication equipment (a development also recorded in the neighboring Logar during the previous two cycles). In the Zaho area of Gardez, the members of an NGO demining team were relieved of their mobile phones and VHF handsets on June 1, while the same NGO saw their VHF handsets and other equipment stolen by AOG in Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam districts on two separate occasions shortly before and after this incident (and an additional escalation caught this NGO in Khost on June 14). This string of incidents points to the fact that the NGO had been meticulously tracked in the field, although none of the robberies included any harm caused to the NGO personnel, or an explicit negative stance of the AOG towards their programming.

Paktya province returned to an upwards trends in AOG escalations, with the levels recorded over this cycle already matching the amount of AOG-initiated incidents for the two previous cycles combined. AOG maintained the momentum, outnumbering the police operations and IMF strikes by 2:1 with the most significant activity related to IED deployment, close-range attacks and orchestrated abductions of community elders.

The provincial capital, Gardez City, witnessed the highest

absolute number of incidents equally shared between police operations (incl. IED interception) and the AOG activity. The latter was dominated by 4 IED detonations (two premature ones), 4 IDF attacks – another traditional component of the conflict dynamics in the city - 2 abductions and a close-range attack against a PSC. The restive Zurmat followed with a similar AOG portfolio which included 4 IED detonations, the most significant being a pressure-device detonating against a party of civilians that ultimately killed two students and injured an additional 6 passengers (Mamozai, 12 June). The IEDs were paired by 4 close-range engagements of the security forces, and a beheading of a former bodyguard of a district administrator (the body of the victim was recovered on 7 June in Sahak). Sayed Karam and Ahmadabad jointly equaled the amount of AOG incidents in the capital, with the former district including this cycle’s attempt at a spectacular attack, a failed plan to breach the DAC by a suicide attacker equipped with a BBIED on 15 June. Though the attacker was spotted and shot by the guards, the BBIED detonated killing one ANP and a civilian. According to ANSO data, the attack marked the second suicide mission in Paktya this year, with the first one occurring on 14th April in Jaji District (the attack was carried out in the vicinity of Jaji DAC) with two 2 BBIED operatives targeting the Afghan



Local Police (ALP) recruitment and training buildings located nearby. The 2011 record so far lags behind the 2010 statistics, with 6 suicide attacks reported respectively from Gardez (4), Dand Wa Patan (1) and Jaji (1). In Ahmedabad, two abductions including a high-profile case in Waro Kala have been recorded, alongside with 3 IED related incidents. One of the IED strikes, Salam Khel on 4 June, hit an ANA vehicle and was followed by SAF from a close range. The attack subsequently sparked a local vendetta, with the Salam Khel community (siding with the ANA) putting blame for the attack on a neighbouring Kuchi tribe. The Salam Khels actually raided the Kuchi settlement later on in the afternoon, leaving behind two Kuchis killed (and two tents burned). Shwak joined the category of essentially kinetic districts with 6 close-range attacks aimed at the security forces, and a case of a local tribe (Suri Khel), clashing with passing AOGs. Following the escalation on 14 June, a part of the tribe relocated from the area.

NGOs may expect similar dynamic developments to continue into the summer months. While the NGO-incident patterns in the Loya Paktya & Logar region currently pertains mainly to the perusal of demining NGOs by AOGs, targeted kidnappings of elders – often NGO beneficiaries, the omnipresent IED placement and the recurrent escalations along the main routes incl. IMF-ANSF clearing operations will likely continue to challenge all sectors of NGO programming in Paktya.


SOUTHERN REGION

KANDAHAR

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

During the present reporting cycle, the security environment in Kandahar Province, was marked by a surge in the number of targeted killings as well as by prevailing IED/RCIED deployment. At least 13 cases of assassinations were recorded across the province, with the vast majority of them taking place in Kandahar City. Besides serving political goals, the tactic, usually featuring gangs moving around on motorcycles and approaching the target in transit, is also often explored by criminal groups. On 4th June AOG targeted a tribal elder in the Bazaar area of Spin Boldak while in Kandahar City; the victims included ANSF and GOA personnel as well as locals associated with the IMF presence. In District 2 of Kandahar City another tribal elder was shot and killed on 2nd June.

IED/RCIED emplacement remains another AOG tactic of choice, also frequently used in targeted attacks. On 3rd June, two explosions took place inside the Kandahar University Compound. The first device, a motorcycle-mounted RCIED, killed the secretary of the Kandahar COP as well as a KU student. A secondary device, another RCIED rigged on a motorcycle, detonated shortly afterwards, killing one ANP and injuring an additional five KU students. Of note, IED attacks resulted in a significant number of casualties. Besides three ANP killed and further seven ANP and four IMF wounded in separate IED blasts, numerous civilians were also caught up in the strikes. For instance on 2nd June in District 4 of Kandahar City, three civilians were wounded as a



motorcycle-mounted RCIED detonated when an ANP vehicle was passing by. In a single occurrence of a day-time IDF in District 10 of Kandahar City, an additional four civilians were wounded. However, the most significant incident in regard to civilian casualties occurred in Arghandab District, Dilawor Village, when a roadside IED hit a private vehicle, killing 15 civilians including eight children, four women and three men.

On the ANSF/IMF side, documented operations marked an upwards trend with at least 27 cases, concentrated in Panjwayi and Kandahar City. In the latter area, 33 suspected AOG members were detained throughout two separate operations.

ACRONYMS:

Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms.

URUZGAN

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0


In Uruzgan the geographical distribution of incidents remained consistent with the previous cycle. Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud accounted for the bulk of incidents yet statistics show that in the past two weeks, AOGs were particularly active in Tirin Kot District which witnessed a significant level of direct attacks that this period outnumbered IED related incidents.

Although the majority of the direct attacks recorded in Tirin Kot remained limited to short engagements with security forces and did not involve casualties, there were several exceptions. For instance, in Pershad Area of Tirin Kot, two ANP were wounded following an AOG attack targeting an ANP patrol though the most deadly engagement was recorded in

Sarmurghab area of the said district when a PSC post came under AOG attack. ANP responded to the assault and the fire fight lasted for one hour, resulting in two PSC guards and one ANP killed.

Despite the fact that the level of direct attacks seems to be on the rise, IED deployment continues as the main challenge across the province. This reporting period, Tirin Kot remained the district where the IEDs were most frequent, followed by Chora, Dihrawud and Shahidi Hassas and IED strikes accounted for a total of six ANP wounded.

In the second week of this reporting period tensions have been reported in Khas Uruzgan District. On 12 June, in Shali




Nawa Area, AOG killed the nephew of an ALP commander. Subsequently, ALP deployed to the area and killed four AOG members. The following day another noteworthy incident occurred in Shali Nawa, when, following an argument, a Hazara ALP member killed one civilian and wounded another, both victims being local Pashtun tribesmen. On a different note, ANSF/IMF were quite active this period and conducted at least nine documented operations, primarily in Tirin Kot and Chora districts. Notably, in the later district IMF carried out an air strike targeting an AOG compound, killing four AOG members and arresting another one.

ZABUL

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

In Zabul Province the overall incident volumes have decreased in comparison with the particularly ‘active’ previous period which had also marked a two year high in incident volumes. During the present cycle, the majority of security events were reported from Qalat, Shahjoy and Tarnak Wa Jaldak. Along with the geographical distribution of incidents that remained consistent with previously observed patterns, AOG tactics have not recorded significant changes as almost 50% of all recorded security incidents were related to IED deployment. Qalat District has been increasingly marked by effective AOG IED activity, the trend that has been observed since the beginning of May and which has continued throughout this period. One of the most significant

incidents recorded in Qalat District occurred on 9th June in the Qalat City bazaar, when an IED detonated in front of the Eid Gah Mosque injuring three ANP and six civilians. Although the main AOG targets remain the security forces, the prevalence of IED deployment, as highlighted by the said incident, is related with a significant risk of collateral involvement. A high-profile attack took place on 13th June, as an RCIED detonated against the vehicle of the Qalat ANP Security Chief. The explosion occurred in the vicinity of the ANP officer’s residence while the Security Chief was on his way home. The official escaped the attack unharmed and following the detonation, ANP detained two suspects along with a remote control device in the area.



AOG direct attacks played just a minor role in the context, and this period were reported from Qalat, Shahjoy, Daychopan and Tarnak Wa Jaldak targeting IMF patrols, ANP check points and PSC escorts of IMF contracted logistical convoys. In particular, Qalat District witnessed quite effective AOG attacks against the PSCs. On 4th June, four PSC guards were wounded and one truck was burnt in Salam Rockety Village as an IMF contracted convoy came under fire while the following day in Maghlizi Area, four trucks were set ablaze during another attack.


HELMAND

During this reporting period Helmand experienced an extremely high number of security incidents with AOGs most active in Nahri Sarranj, Marja and Sangin districts, where they initiated a large number of attacks and IED strikes against security targets. Although significant, the number of AOG initiated direct attacks was still outnumbered by the IEDs—at least 154 IED related incidents were reported across the province, of which 46 % detonated. Sangin and Nahri Sarranj were the most affected, followed by Marja and Musa Qala. IED strikes also accounted for the vast majority of ANSF/IMF casualties. One of the most deadly incidents occurred in Shindak Manda area of Nahri Sarranj, when on 9th June an RCIED detonated against an


	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	1
This Report Period	0

ANP patrol, killing four ANP and wounding six others. In Sangin, Naway Karez area, an RCIED mounted on a motorcycle and parked on the side of the road detonated against a passing convoy of a commercial demining organization, injuring two staff members. From the details of the occurrence, this incident seems to be a case of a mistaken targeting as a PSC convoy was passing by, the likely target of the attack.

Helmand Province witnessed also several incidences of AOG intimidation. Although figures associated with targeted killings have been moderate as compared to the neighbouring province of Kandahar, Marja and Naw Zad experienced attacks involving AOG elements deployed on motorcycles which resulted in



death of three ANP officials, respectively two in Naw Zad and one in Marja and Sangin. In addition, a District Council member was killed in Nahri Sarranj on 10th June. Finally, Lashkar Gah City experienced an AOG IDF attack, while on 12 June two rockets were fired towards an IMF base. The attack was inaccurate and the projectiles impacted two houses, causing some structural damages. Occurrences of IDF are not very frequent in Lashkar Gah City as this incident marks the sixth rocket attack recorded this year with IMF base being the AOG favoured target.




GHAZNI

	NGO Incidents
Year to Date	0
This Report Period	0

The incident volumes in Ghazni topped the spike in AOG activity noticed in the neighbouring provinces (Wardak, Logar, Paktya) with nearly one hundred AOG-initiated incidents, and an additional 20 IED neutralized by the security forces recorded during this cycle. The volume of AOG incidents basically equaled the aggregated amount of incidents recorded in the provinces mentioned above, while security forces provided 30 entries this period. Typically for the area, the conflict vectors in Ghazni pursued a clear geographical pattern, with the primary distribution of AOG-initiated incidents encompassing the districts positioned on the Kabul – Ghazni Highway and easily accessible from the East. Ghazni, Andar, Qarabagh and Deh Yak each tallied between 10 to 20 AOG-initiated strikes, that is two thirds of all recorded AOG escalations. The remaining

districts marked between 1-7 escalations, Muqur and Gelan (positioned on the Southern extremity of the highway) again on the top within this group. The IMF-ANSF basically reproduced the pattern, with Andar, Ghazni and Dah Yak hosting over 60 % of all operations. Although the overall statics for criminal escalations may be misleading in the sense that a portion of AOG-initiated attacks in Ghazni is actually ‘out-sourced’ to criminal groups, there were virtually no properly criminal incidents recorded this period.

Besides the attacks on the highway, a distinctive feature this period was IED placement. Out of 40 occurrences including multiple ‘daisy-chained’ systems, every second IED-related incident took place in a district center (mainly within Andar, Dah Yak, Gelan, Qarabagh, and in Ghazni).



Similarly to other ‘kinetic’ provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand, Wardak and Logar, IEDs concentrated in the district centers represent a tangible risk for the civilian population. Among more spectacular incidents, the convoy of Ghazni Chief of Police came under a complex SAF & RPG attack in the DAC of Qarabagh, ultimately repelled by the COP’s escort. Following the attack, the force collected 12 IEDs emplaced on the exit avenues from the perimeter. In the provincial capital, an IED rigged inside an ice-cream handcart detonated in circulation, killing one and injuring three children on 11 June. The target and the definite TTP (a suicide mission or a drop-off method) have not been determined, as the incident most probably marked a premature explosion.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly.

Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

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ANSO ACRONYMS

ACG-Armed Criminal Group /
AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces
/ **ANA**-Afghan National Army /
ANBP-Afghan National Border
Police / **ANP**-Afghan National
Police / **ANCOP**-Afghan
National Civil Order Police /
AOG-Armed Opposition Group /
APPF-Afghan Public Protection
Forces (local deputised
militias) / **DC**-District Centre /
GOA-Government of
Afghanistan / **IDF**-Indirect Fire
(ex: mortars) / **IED**-Improvised
Explosive Device / **IMF**-
International Military Forces /
NDS-National Directorate of
Security (Intelligence) / **PRP**-
Previous Reporting Period /
PSC-Private Security Company
/ **RPG**-Rocket Propelled
Grenade / **SAF**-Small Arms Fire
/ **VBIED**-Vehicle Borne
Improvised Explosive Device /
PDO-Private Development
Organisation / **ALP**-Afghan
Local Police / **LDI**-Local
Defence Initiative / **IEA**-Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan
(Taliban) / **PSG**-Provincial
Shadow Governor (IEA) / **DSG**-
District Shadow Governor (IEA)
/ **APRP**-Afghan Peace and

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MISSING

This report ANSO
could not provide
analysis for the
provinces of:

Daykundi
Nimroz
Paktika

This is because we
do not know enough
about the area to
comment on the
significance of the
incidents occurring
there.

If you can help us
understand the
province better,
please contact us.

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