USDOS – US Department of State (Autor): „Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991“, Dokument #1092984

Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1991

CHINA

The People's Republic of China (PRO is a one-party state

adhering to Marxist-Leninist principles, in which the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP), backed by the military and security

forces, monopolizes decisionmaking authority. A closed inner

circle of a few senior leaders holds the right of ultimate

power. Some of these party elders hold positions within the

Politburo, the Central Military Commission, and other organs.

Others hold no formal positions of authority but still wield

decisive influence by virtue of their seniority in the

Communist movement.

The party maintains control through its widespread apparatus

and traditional societal pressure as well as through a

nationwide security network which includes the People's

Liberation Army; the Ministry of State Security; the Ministry

of Public Security; the People's Armed Police; and the state

judicial, procuratorial , and penal systems. The security

forces have been responsible for human rights abuses including

torture and arbitrary arrest and detention.

More than a decade of impressive economic growth and the spread

of market forces have resulted in a reduction of the center's

span of economic control. Although China's per capita

income—estimated at roughly $300—is one of the world's

lowest, wide disparities exist, with the living standards of

some coastal residents approaching those found in more

developed countries. China's leaders, with their overwhelming

emphasis on stability, continued to be concerned about

excessive growth rates and inflationary pressures but also

continued to be willing to move toward greater reliance on

markets to determine prices and allocation of resources.

China's human rights practices remained repressive, falling far

short of internationally accepted norms. After some loosening

of repression during the first half of 1991, heightened alarm

following the failed Soviet coup attempt in August resulted in

another effort by Beijing to strengthen central control,

reinforce ideological propaganda, and repress dissent, coupled

with efforts to bolster political stability by intensifying

economic reform. Serious human rights abuses persisted. The

early 1991 trials of several dozen persons detained in the 1989

crackdown were characterized by hasty verdicts, the defendants'

inadequate access to legal counsel, and the Government's

refusal to allow independent observers to attend the trials.

Several were sentenced to lengthy terms merely for expressing

views critical of the ruling regime. Despite statements that

these proceedings were "basically completed," the Government

acknowledged in mid-1991 that 21 democracy movement cases had

still not been brought to trial. Some of these persons were

being tried as the year ended, but no verdicts had been

announced.

Other serious human rights abuses continued, including

persistent abuses in Tibet, documented cases of torture and

mistreatment of those accused of crimes, and the repression of

Catholics and Protestants who refused to affiliate with

officially sponsored religious organizations and were charged

with conducting "illegal" religious services, proselytizing, or

maintaining illegal liaison with foreign groups. Although

Chinese media emphasized implementation of a new law allowing

citizens to sue officials for abuse of authority or

malfeasance, enforcement remained problematic and there was

little progress on political and legal reforms offering real

protection for individual rights. Severe restrictions on

SIQ

freedom of assembly, expression, and the press were

maintained. Independent reports generated international

concern about Chinese prison labor practices.

On the more positive side, the Government released some

detainees and in late 1990 began a limited dialog on human

rights with its foreign critics which led to a number of

serious exchanges with government and parliamentary

delegations. The Chinese were exposed to a greater range of

views on human rights practices, and modest progress was made

in resolving a small number of human rights cases. Beijing

issued a comprehensive white paper in November which laid out

in considerable detail its self-congratulatory views on Chinese

human rights. Beijing nevertheless continued to reject the

applicability under "special Chinese conditions" of many widely

accepted international human rights concepts, arguing that

economic development should be the main measure of China's

human rights progress.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a.' Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were no documented instances of extrajudicial killings in

the PRC in 1991.

b. Disappearance

There were no reported cases of disappearance in 1991. There

has not yet been an overall public accounting by the Government

of the fate of those detained during and after the suppression

of the 1989 demonstrations (See Section l.d.).

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Despite legal safeguards, the use of torture and degrading

treatment of persons detained and imprisoned has persisted.

There were credible reports in 1991 of police having illegally

detained and tortured suspects, particularly those held outside

formal detention centers in "shelter and investigation

centers." The Government has not yet made public its 1991

statistics regarding investigation of such abuses, but in April

the Chief Procurator indicated that in 1990, 472 cases of

confession by torture were filed for investigation and

prosecution. These figures cannot be confirmed. Punishment of

abusers has rarely been reported, although severe punishments

have been imposed in at least a few cases.

The August hunger strikes of Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming

focussed international attention on the poor prison conditions

and medical care endured by many prisoners. After the

international community expressed strong concern about these

cases, government officials confirmed that Wang and Chen had

been held in solitary confinement in cells originally designed

to punish prisoners who had violated prison regulations, and

admitted that both prisoners had health problems. Wang was

eventually hospitalized and Chen removed from solitary

confinement, but the Government refused to allow impartial

observers to visit the prisoners. Released prisoners and

detainees, however, have reported abuses. Democracy activist

brothers Li Lin and Li Zhi (see Section 2.d.) told of having

been tortured during their imprisonment in Hunan province.

Other former prisoners and detainees have indicated that

ordinary workers and unemployed youths suffer even worse

treatment than well-known prisoners like Wang, Chen, and the Li

brothers, with more frequent instances of torture and degrading

treatment. Workers are also more likely to be sentenced to

prison, reeducation through labor, or execution than are

students and intellectuals. According to one credible report,

six political prisoners in Liaoning Province, including student

leaders Liu Gang and Zhang Ming, attempted to launch hunger

strikes during Secretary Baker's November visit to China to

protest the harsh prison conditions they faced. According to

the report, Liu's arm was broken by prison officials trying to

force-feed him. This report could not be independently

confirmed.

Conditions in all types of Chinese penal institutions are harsh

and frec[uently degrading. The emphasis on obtaining

confessions leads to widespread abuses, particularly in

detention centers. Former detainees have reported the use of

cattle prods, electrodes, prolonged periods of solitary

confinement and incommunicado detention, beatings, shackles,

and other forms of abuse against detained women and men. Both

before and after trial, prisoners are subject to severe

pressure to confess their "errors. " Despite official media and

other reports that indicate that coerced confessions have led

to erroneous convictions, the fact that a confession was

coerced does not in itself prevent or invalidate a conviction.

According to judicial officials, however, confessions without

corroborating evidence are an insufficient basis for conviction.

There have been frequent credible reports from Tibetan refugees

of torture and mistreatment in penal institutions in Tibet. In

February officials confirmed that Lhakpa Tsering, a young

Tibetan who had been imprisoned in Lhasa (Drapchi) prison, had

died on December 15, 1990. The Government denied reports that

his death resulted from torture, asserting that he died from a

ruptured appendix. Chinese officials have not, however,

responded to outside requests that they release autopsy

findings. Tibetan authorities have reportedly returned Sonam

Wangdu to Drapchi prison in spite of his continued, serious

health problems. His family has been denied permission to

visit and assist him. Sonam is serving a life sentence for his

involvement in a 1988 riot which led to the death of a

policeman.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

China's Criminal Procedure Law proscribes arbitrary arrest or

detention and limits the amount of time a person can be held in

custody without being charged. According to the law,

interrogation should take place within 24 hours of detention,

and the detainee's family and work unit should be informed of

the circumstances of the detention within 48 hours. Articles

43 and 50 of the Criminal Procedure Law, however, permit the

police to delay notifying the family and work unit "in

circumstances where notification would hinder the

investigation.

A formal arrest under the Criminal Procedure Law of a suspect

detained by the Public Security Bureau should be approved by

the procuratorate within 10 days of the original detention.

Public security authorities, however, often detain people for

long periods of time under various informal mechanisms not

covered by the criminal procedure law. These include

regulations, some unpublished, on "taking in for shelter and

investigation" and "supervised residence" as well as other

methods not requiring procurator ial approval. These

administrative forms of detention were purportedly abolished by

a 1980 State Council document, but are still used. In April

the Government indicated that 3,509 cases of unlawful detention

were filed for investigation and prosecution in 1990. These

figures cannot be confirmed. The Government has not indicated

if or how those responsible for such cases have been punished.

A we 11 -documented estimate of the total number of arbitrary

arrests and detentions in 1991 is not possible. There are

credible estimates, however, that hundreds of thousands of

people, such as vagrants, the unemployed, and migrants, have

been arbitrarily detained. In addition, dozens of persons

involved in small demonstrations throughout the year have been

detained. For example, according to credible reports,

authorities in Beijing in late December detained several

persons overnight after they tried to organize a peaceful

memorial ceremony commemorating the death of 1989 democracy

activist Wen Jie. In March the Government provided new

information on detentions in Tibet in 1989, confirming that 400

people were detained by Tibetan public security and judicial

organs between March and November of that year. More than 300

were later released and about 60 were brought to trial,

according to these figures, which cannot be independently

confirmed.

Several hundred persons detained for activities related to the

1989 demonstrations were held in "detention during

investigation" or "administrative detention" status. These

persons were not formally arrested or charged with any crime,

although authorities began in late 1990 and 1991 to press

charges against at least some of these detainees. Chinese

authorities have begun to respond to international inquiries

about those detained since June 1989, although the responses

have not yet provided complete information. During the

November visit of U.S. Secretary of State Baker, the Chinese

provided a response by individual name to a list of political

prisoners that the United States had earlier given them and

agreed to continue a dialog on human rights with the United

States.

Repeated requests for information on Zhu Mei (or Sha Zhumei),

reported to have been arrested in 1987 and sentenced to 5

years' imprisonment on "counterrevolutionary" charges for

religious activities, have been met by denials from Shanghai

municipal authorities that such a person is imprisoned in that

city. Officials have also declined to provide information on

many Tibetans detained since 1989 or on many members of

unofficial Catholic and Protestant churches who have been

detained for months before being charged or released, according

to credible reports.

"Crimes of counterrevolution" are dealt with under articles

90-104 of the Criminal Law. Counterrevolutionary offenses,

which range from treason and espionage to spreading

counterrevolutionary propaganda, are defined by the Government

in light of its four basic principles: upholding

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought, the people's democratic

dictatorship, the Socialist system, and the leadership of the

Chinese Communist Party.

These principles are interpreted by the Government as

circumscribing the various rights provided for in the

Constitution. As a result, despite constitutional guarantees

of free expression, people who have tried to exercise this

right have in some cases been charged with counterrevolution

under Articles 90-104 of the Criminal Law. These articles have

also been used to punish persons who organized demonstrations,

disrupted traffic, disclosed official information to

foreigners, or formed associations outside state control.

Those detained for committing "crimes of counterrevolution" are

in theory treated the same as those detained for other crimes,

and their cases are supposed to be handled in accordance with

the criminal procedure law. In practice, the law's provisions

limiting length of detention and requiring family notification

are often ignored in "counterrevolutionary" cases.

Sentences imposed by criminal courts may be served in prisons

or in reform through labor camps. Many labor reform camps are

in remote areas such as Xinjiang or Qinghai. Some former

inmates have been denied permission to return to their homes.

(See Section 6 .c . )

The Government provided in 1991 a more complete accounting of

the number of persons detained in Beijing in connection with

the 1989 democracy movement. According to these figures, 1,804

were originally detained, of whom 970 have been released, 715

convicted on nonpolitical charges, and 72 convicted on

political charges through the end of 1990. At year's end some

21 cases remained in pretrial detention. These figures seem

generally credible but cannot be independently verified. They

apparently exclude those detained in other parts of China,

those held only briefly for questioning in 1989, and at least

1,000 participants in the 1989 demonstrations assigned without

trial to reeducation through labor camps. Additional

statistics released by the Justice Ministry in July indicated

that at least 37 people detained for taking part in the 1989

democracy movement had been tried, served their sentences, and

released. This figure cannot be confirmed.

The 1990 report mentioned Bao Tong, Gao Shan, Li Minqi, Liu

Gang, Peng Rong, Wang Zhixin, Xiong Yan, Yang Wei, Zhai Weimin,

and Zhang Weiguo as among the prominent political detainees not

formally arrested or charged by the end of 1990. In 1991 Xiong

Yan, Yang Wei, Wang Zhixin, and Zhang Weiguo were released.

(Section 2. a. discusses Zhang's subsequent detention.) Liu

Gang was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Li Minqi, as well as

journalist Wu Xuecan, was brought to trial in December, but at

year's end the outcome of these trials was not known. The

cases of Peng Rong and Zhai Weimin were described by the

Government in November as "under investigation." The status of

Bao Tong and Gao Shan remained unclear. Labor activist Han

Dongfang was given medical parole from prison. Following

Secretary Baker's visit in November, charges against him were

dropped. Hong Kong resident Luo Haixing, imprisoned in March

for attempting to aid fleeing democracy movement activists, was

given medical parole and allowed to return to Hong Kong.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Officials insist that China's judiciary is independent but

acknowledge that it is subject to the policy guidance of the

CCP. In addition, there are credible reports that party and

government leaders predetermine verdicts and sentences in some

sensitive cases.

According to the Constitution, the court system is equal in

authority to the State Council and the Central Military

Conunission, the two most important government institutions.

All three organs are nominally under the supervision of the

National People's Congress. The Supreme People's Court stands

at the apex of the court system, followed in descending order

by the Higher People's Court (province), the Intermediate

People's Court (prefecture), and the Basic People's Court

(county). Separate and special military, maritime, and railway

courts function directly under the Supreme People's Court. The

judiciary, however, falls under the policy control of the

party's Political and Legal Commission, headed by Politburo

Standing Committee member Qiao Shi.

During the 1980 's the Government moved haltingly toward the

establishment of a more autonomous and less arbitrary legal

system. There were efforts to clarify which offenses are

criminally indictable by defining more precisely or even

eliminating broad, general laws, including the legal provisions

for "crimes of counterrevolution." Programs were set up to

provide professional training for judges through overseas

training courses to acquaint them with foreign legal

procedures. As a result of the 1989 crackdown, however, the

tightening of political and ideological controls seriously

undermined these reforms, closed off debate on the relative

merits of "rule by man" and "rule by law," and set back China's

modest efforts to build a modern and more autonomous judicial

system. Official directives to the courts to produce quick

judgments during the anticrime campaign begun in 1990 further

undermined the integrity of the court system. A Justice

Ministry official acknowledged in September to a European

Parliament delegation that trials in China were conducted too

rapidly. He blamed a shortage of lawyers, of which there are

an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 in China. An Australian human

rights delegation that visited Shanghai in July found that of

the 16,000 criminal cases filed in that city in 1990 fewer than

half of the accused had a defense lawyer and only 30 were

acquitted. Defense lawyers, like other Chinese, generally

depend on their work units for employment, housing, and many

other aspects of their lives. As a result, they are often

reluctant to be seen as overzealous in defending individuals

accused of political offenses.

Due process rights are stipulated under the Constitution but

often ignored in practice. The Criminal Procedure Law requires

that all trials be held "in public," except those involving

state secrets, juveniles, and "personal secrets," but details

of cases involving "counterrevolutionary" charges have

frequently been kept secret, even from relatives of the

defendants, under this provision. Even when trials are

nominally open, in many cases the only "public" allowed to

attend are officially selected "representatives of the people"

and immediate relatives of the accused. Numerous requests by

independent foreign observers to attend 1991 trials of

democracy activists were all turned aside. The Government

asserted that foreign observers were not permitted to attend

trials unless the alleged crime directly involved a foreigner

or a Chinese related to a foreigner.

The law states that a defendant may be held in custody for a

maximum of 2 months during investigation, although a 1-month

extension may be requested from the next higher procuratorate.

The procuratorate then has up to 1-1/2 months to decide whether

or not to prosecute the case. An additional month is permitted

if "supplementary investigation" is needed. Any delay beyond

5-1/2 months theoretically requires approval of the Standing

Committee of the National People's Congress, but amendments to

the Criminal Procedure Law in 1984 allowed for further

-extensions of these periods without higher level approval,

including possible indefinite extensions while a suspect is

under "mental" examination. In politically sensitive cases,

the period of pretrial detention has often been much longer

than 5-1/2 months; many of the democracy activists tried in

early 1991 had bQen detained over 18 months, and some, who

still await trial, have been detained for 30 months. The

procuratorate sends to trial those persons it determines are

guilty on the basis of the police investigations, supplemented

if necessary by its own inquiries. The pretrial process,

during which the question of guilt or innocence is essentially

decided, does not give the defense adequate time and

opportunity to prepare its case. Defense lawyers may be

retained only 7 days before the trial. In some cases even this

period has been shortened under regulations issued in 1983 to

accelerate the adjudication of certain serious criminal cases.

Persons appearing before the court are not presumed innocent;

trials are generally, in effect, sentencing hearings.

Conviction rates average over 99 percent. Defense lawyers may

be retained privately, but most are appointed by the court.

They virtually never contest their clients' guilt; rather,

their function is generally confined to requesting clemency.

There is an appeal process, but initial decisions are rarely

overturned. Defendants are expected to "show the right

attitude" by confessing their crimes, and those who fail to

confess are typically sentenced more harshly.

Three sets of trials involving the 1989 democracy movement took

place in early 1991. The first set of trials, which began on

January 5, resulted in the sentencing of seven dissidents from

2 to 4 years' imprisonment and the release of two dissidents.

The second set of trials, which began on January 26, decided 71

cases. Among those sentenced to prison were student leaders

Wang Youcai (sentenced to 4 years but since released), Wang Dan

(4 years), and Guo Haifeng (4 years), activist Ren Wanding (7

years), and intellectual Bao Zunxin (5 years). Intellectual

Liu Xiaobo and 65 others were released. The third set of

trials began on February 12 and involved four cases. Law

professor Chen Xiaoping was released. Student leader Liu Gang

was sentenced to 6 years. Intellectuals Chen Ziming and Wang

Juntao were given 13 years each for allegedly masterminding the

demonstrations. In April the President of the Supreme People's

Court announced that the trials of cases related to the June

1989 demonstrations had been "basically completed." In

November, however, the Government released the names of 21

persons involved in the 1989 demonstrations who remained in

pretrial detention. At year's end, another series of trials

began, though no verdicts have been announced.

The Government characterized the trials as public and fair,

resulting in lenient sentences. It has steadfastly defended

its right to try and sentence any who transgress Chinese law,

rejecting the contention that "counterrevolutionary crime" is

an inappropriate, vaguely defined article which allows

punishment for peaceful dissent. Moreover, the speed of the

verdicts, the limited opportunity afforded defendants to

prepare a defense, and the inability of independent observers

to attend the trials raise serious concerns as to justice,

fairness, and due process.

In addition, a number of political prisoners jailed in previous

cycles of repression, notably 1979 Democracy Wall activist Wei

Jingsheng, remain in prison. Press reports claimed that Wei's

health had deteriorated during prolonged solitary confinement,

but authorities asserted Wei was in good health and received

family visits. A July press report quoted Vice Minister of

Justice Jin Jian as having said that Wei remained in solitary

confinement but had been transferred from Qinghai province to

Hebei province. These reports on Wei's status cannot be

independently confirmed.

In the northeast, five workers from Changchun (Jilin) received

sentences ranging from 2 to 20 years in prison for their

participation in June 1989 demonstrations. All were convicted

under Articles 98 and/or 102 of the Chinese Criminal Code. The

verdict was reached in a lower court in November 1990, but the

result of a superior court review was not released until April

1991. In Tibet authorities continued to impose harsh sentences

for political activities. Hotel bookkeeper Tseten Norgye was

sentenced in February to about 4 years (exact sentence unknown)

in prison for counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement

and distributing leaflets on Tibetan independence, according to

credible reports. Officials in Tibet said in July that since

1987 there had been 50 convictions for counterrevolutionary

activity in Tibet and that all of those convicted were still in

prison.

In 1990 China, citing a sharp increase in the crime rate

(though one still low by Western standards), launched an

anticrime campaign that continued into 1991. The CCP

leadership ordered public security, procuratorate, and court

officials to speed the process of investigation, trial, and

sentencing, raising serious due process concerns. Chinese

officials refuse to provide comprehensive statistics on death

sentences or executions, but according to figures compiled from

press reports, from January to July 1991 at least 449 people

were executed, with an additional 176 sentenced to death. The

actual numbers may be much higher. One Western source with

access to Chinese criminologists estimated the total number of

executions in China in 1991 might have been as high as 5,000 or

6,000. This report could not be independently confirmed. All

death sentences are reviewed by a higher court, but such

reviews are often very rapid, with some completed within a few

days after initial sentencing.

Under a set of regulations governing reeducation through labor

originally issued in 1957 and revised in 1979, government

authorities can assign persons accused of minor public order

offenses (e.g., disturbing the peace, fabricating rumors,

hindering government officials from performing their official

duties) to reeducation through labor camps without judicial

review. This allows security authorities to deal with

political and other offenders without need for recourse to even

the nominal procedures and protections offered by the formal

criminal process. Reeducation through labor sanctions were

used to circumvent the formal criminal process in the cases of

some 1979 Democracy Wall activists and appear to have been used

in the same way to deal with some persons involved in the

spring 1989 demonstrations.

In 1990 Chinese officials stated that 869,934 Chinese citizens

had been assigned to these camps since 1980, with about 80,000

assigned each year and 160,000 undergoing reeducation through

labor at that time. Justice Ministry officials reiterated the

160,000 figure in July 1991. It is not possible to verify

these official statistics; other estimates of the number of

inmates are considerably higher. Terms of assignment run from

a normal minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 3, although the

labor reeducation committee may subsequently extend an inmate's

sentence for a maximum of 1 year if his "reform attitude" is

not good.

The number of persons in Chinese penal institutions who would

be considered political prisoners by international standards is

impossible to estimate accurately. While Government officials

deny that the PRC has any "political" prisoners, they have

stated that there are just over 1.1 million inmates in Chinese

prisons and reform camps, and that 0.5 percent of these were

convicted of "counterrevolutionary crimes," for a total of

roughly 5,500 "counterrevolutionary" convicts. This figure

includes a substantial number convicted of crimes such as

"espionage" that are internationally recognized criminal

offenses; the secrecy surrounding espionage cases prevents

foreign observers from determining the validity of such

charges. On the other hand, the figure excludes the remaining

1989 detainees, at least 1,000 in labor reeducation camps, and

an undetermined number sentenced nominally for various criminal

offenses including religious activities (such as receiving

funds from abroad without authorization or changing such funds

on the black market). Estimates by some foreign researchers of

the number of political prisoners are much higher but cannot be

confirmed.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence.

Personal and family life in China is extensively monitored and

regulated by the authorities. Most persons depend on their

work unit for employment, housing, ration coupons, permission

to marry or have a child, and other aspects of ordinary life.

The work unit, along with the neighborhood watch committee,

monitors activities and attitudes. Since the 1989

demonstrations, Chinese authorities have strengthened the

surveillance functions of neighborhood watch committees,

requiring them to work more closely with the police. Search

warrants are required by law before security forces may search

premises, but this provision is often ignored. Daily life is

monitored in a variety of ways. Some telephone conversations

are recorded, and mail is frequently opened and censored, in

spite of the provision in the 1982 Constitution that "freedom

and privacy of correspondence of citizens ... are protected by

law." One purpose of this Government surveillance is to

regulate and limit contact between PRC citizens and foreigners,

who are generally required to live in segregated and monitored

compounds or dormitories.

The compounds in which foreign diplomats, journalists, and

business people live are under close physical surveillance,

have conspicuously placed television cameras in elevators, and

are presumed to be universally electronically monitored.

Chinese wishing to visit foreigners are deterred by this

pervasive system of monitoring. Since the 1989 crackdown, the

Government has intensified its efforts to restrict contact

between Chinese citizens and foreigners.

China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years,

seriously complicating the country's economic development. In

the early 1980 's the Government set a goal of limiting the

population to 1.2 billion by the year 2000. To meet this

target, it adopted a comprehensive and highly intrusive family

policy for Han Chinese in urban areas. Numerous exceptions are

allowed for Han in rural areas. Ethnic minorities are either

exempted or subject to less stringent population controls. In

September 1991, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said the

population of China had reached 1.15 billion; the State Family

Planning Commission indicated in October that China's revised

target for the year 2000 is now 1.294 billion. Individual and

family decisions about bearing children are regulated by the

State, with economic rewards for those who cooperate with it,

and sanctions against those who deviate from official

guidelines. The Government sets an annual nationwide goal for

the number of authorized births, apportioned down to the local

level and, ultimately, to each work unit. Fujian province, for

example, has implemented the national family planning policy

through a system of contracts setting population growth targets

which extend from the provincial Governor through provincial

leaders and work units to individual workers. Work units

exercise pressure to control births, and fines may be imposed

to penalize those who violate the terms of the contract. Birth

statistics reflected the widespread ineffectiveness of these

measures in limiting couples to only one child. In 1990, 21

percent of all births were at least a family's third child, 32

percent were second children, and 47 percent of births in

Fujian were first children. In urban areas, couples are

encouraged to delay marriage until well after the legal minimum

age of 22 for men and 20 for women, and to defer childbirth

until at least their mid-20 's. For most urban couples,

obtaining permission to have a second child is very difficult,

although the policy is sometimes evaded.

China's population control policy relies on education,

propaganda, and economic incentives, as well as more coercive

measures including psychological pressure and severe economic

penalties. Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy

include monthly stipends and preferential medical, food, and

educational benefits. Disciplinary measures against those who

violate the policy include stiff fines, withholding of social

services, demotion, and other administrative punishments.

Local family planning officials are also subject to penalties

for "excess births" in their units. In Shanghai, in addition

to 145 publicized cases of couples being fined for having an

unauthorized child, there were 3 publicized cases in 1991 in

which the offenders (2 women and a couple) were not only fined

but also fired from their jobs.

Chinese family planning officials have become increasingly

concerned about the ability of itinerant workers, whose numbers

are estimated to range from 70-100 million persons, to

circumvent family planning regulations. More than 50 percent

of these persons are in their prime child-bearing years.

Accordingly, in November the State Council passed new

regulations aimed at bringing this population more directly

into family planning programs.

Although the Government officially opposes physical compulsion

to submit to abortion or sterilization, the practice has

continued to occur as officials strive to meet population

targets. Chinese officials acknowledge privately that there

are still instances of forced abortions and sterilizations in

remote, rural areas, although the number of such cases is well

below levels of the early 1980 's. While recognizing that

abuses occur, officials maintain that China does not condone

forced abortion or sterilization and that abuses by local

officials are punished. They admit, however, that punishment

is rare and have yet to provide documentation of any

punishments. In part, they explain, there is a bureaucratic

disinclination to punish those doing the difficult, socially

unpopular, but economically necessary task of enforcing

national population policy.

According to officials in East China, local family planning

workers are penalized not only for "excess births," but also

for "excess abo-rtions." Family planning workers receive

negative performance evaluations for "excessively high"

abortion rates. Officials have not publicly defined the term

"excessively high."

Enforcement of the family planning policy is inconsistent,

varying widely from place to place and year to year. The 1990

census data indicate that the average number of children per

family (2.3) and the population growth rate (1.5 percent)

remain significantly higher than would be produced by

comprehensive national enforcement of official policy. In many

areas, couples apparently are able to have several children

without incurring any penalty, while in other areas enforcement

has been more stringent. Local officials have great discretion

in how, and how strictly, the policy is implemented. Because

penalties for "excess births" can be levied against local

officials and the mothers' work units, many people are

personally affected, providing an additional potential source

of pressure.

Female infanticide has persisted in some impoverished rural

areas. Insistence that local units meet population goals has

contributed to the persistence of this traditional practice,

generally by parents who hope to have more sons without

incurring official punishment. The Government strongly opposes

infanticide and has prosecuted offenders; it has been able to

reduce but not eradicate the practice. In order to discourage

the abortion of female fetuses, the Government has issued

regulations prohibiting medical personnel from using ultrasound

equipment to determine the sex of a fetus or from disclosing

the sex of a fetus as determined by testing conducted for

medical reasons, according to information Chinese officials

provided in July to an Australian human rights delegation. In

recent years, regulations with eugenics provisions have been

implemented in at least five provinces, beginning with Gansu.

These regulations seek to prevent people with severe mental

handicaps from having children and include provisions for

mandatory sterilization before permission to marry is granted

and compulsory abortion in the event of pregnancy. National

family planning officials reportedly have discouraged the

enactment and enforcement of such eugenics laws, though the

central Government has not overridden these provincial laws.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and self-expression are severely restricted.

Limited tolerance of some criticism of government policies and

officials had generally increased through the 1980 's, but after

June 1989 this trend was abruptly reversed. The party has

reasserted complete control over the press; the media's role of

transmitting the views of the people to the leadership has been

limited and carefully regulated. Citizens are not permitted to

criticize senior leaders or to express opinions contrary to the

"four cardinal principles," which provide for a Socialist state

under the Communist Party's exclusive control. Persons who

violate these guidelines are punished.

Television and radio broadcasting has remained under strict

party and government control and been used to propagate an

orthodox ideological line. Programming has been heavily laced

with party propaganda. As part of its control of citizens'

access to information, the Government has continued to jam many

Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and

British Broadcasting Corporation. The leadership has attacked

VOA, claiming it is part of a Western conspiracy to subvert

China. Despite the effort to jam VOA, the effectiveness of the

jamming varies considerably by region, with audible signals

reaching most parts of China. Cable News Network satellite

transmissions to international hotels were banned in Beijing

during the 1991 anniversary of the Tiananmen repression. Many

foreign journalists have reported episodes of surveillance and

harassment.

The party has ordered the domestic press to support the party

line and not question the "four cardinal principles." A

Communist Party Central Committee document called for renewed

prepublication censorship of all major state-run media,

according to credible reports. A number of Chinese journalists

have been detained and the ranks and leadership of many

newspapers and journals purged. Tightened distribution has

enabled authorities to control foreign language material more

effectively. The September 23 issue of Newsweek, which

contained investigative reports on prison labor, was not

distributed to the few newsstands (mostly located in

international hotels) that sell foreign magazines and

newspapers.

The Government has attempted to curb publications advocating

"bourgeois liberalization" (Western social, political, and

cultural ideas). Numerous publications have been closed,

heavy-handed ideological controls reimposed, and ideologically

suspect journalists replaced. The Government has banned

publications by authors considered politically unacceptable

such as Liu Binyan, Su Xiaokang, Su Shaozhi, Bao Tong, Liu

Xiaobo, Yan Jiaqi, and Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian.

The party has continued to impose tight controls on colleges,

universities, and research institutes. The entering freshmen

classes at Beijing University and Shanghai's Fudan University

were again sent to military camps for a year of training and

ideological indoctrination. Numerous textbooks and scholarly

works have been either censored or prohibited by the State

Education Commission. At all levels, the quantity of political

study has increased.

The heavy ideological control of academic institutions and the

censorship of the media have forced many Chinese journalists

and scholars to exercise great caution. Some researchers

engaged in work regarded as sensitive were prohibited from

accepting graduate students. Many scholars, including some of

China's most prominent, have declined opportunities to publish

or present papers on subjects that could be construed as

sensitive. More vigorous public debate on some subjects, such

as economic policy, has been tolerated.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of peaceful assembly and association is severely

restricted in practice. The Constitution has provisions for

the right "of assembly, of association, of procession, and of

demonstration," but such activities may not infringe "upon the

interests of the state." A "law governing assemblies, parades.

and demonstrations" was implemented in 1990. Like the

Constitution, it provides for the right to assemble and

demonstrate but stipulates that parades and demonstrations may

not "infringe on the interests of the state, society, and

collectives or the legitimate freedoms and rights of other

citizens." This provision would proscribe any protests against

Communist Party rule, socialism, or the leadership and can be

used to ban protests that disrupt traffic, interfere with

business, occupy public places, or that could be interpreted as

"infringing" on the freedoms of other citizens.

Procedures for obtaining a parade permit discourage and

effectively prevent the exercise of the right of assembly

insofar as that right might challenge the perceived interests

of the State. The Government said that some demonstrations had

been authorized, claiming that 13 applications for

demonstrations in 1990 were approved in Sichuan Province

alone. Officials provided no additional details on these

demonstrations, which attracted minimal press attention. At

any rate, such demonstrations must by law have been perceived

by the State as consistent with its interests. The law does

not apply to "traditional cultural, recreational, or sports

activities" and "normal religious activities," but local

authorities retain the power to determine what are legitimate

"traditional" or "normal" religious activities.

Professional and other mass associations are for the most part

organized and controlled by the Communist Party. Regulations

issued in 1990 require all organizations to be officially

registered and approved. Ostensibly aimed at secret societies

and criminal gangs, the regulations also prevent the formation

of unauthorized political, religious, or labor organizations,

such as the student and worker groups that emerged briefly

before and during the 1989 democracy movement. They have also

been used to disband groups, such as unregistered "house

churches" (religious congregations which gather in private

residences), deemed potentially subversive. Security forces

maintain a close watch on groups formed outside the party

establishment, particularly unauthorized religious groups.

Associations recognized by the State are permitted to maintain

relations with recognized international bodies, but these

contacts are carefully monitored and limited.

The Government monitors and discourages contacts between

dissidents and foreigners. In Shanghai, after dissidents Wang

Ruowang and Zhang Weiguo were released from detention, they

were subsequently accused of unauthorized contact with

foreigners (particularly the foreign media), detained, and

questioned several times for brief periods. During a visit in

November by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, two prominent

dissidents, Dai Qing and Hou Xiaotian, were detained to prevent

any contact with the Secretary's party. Dai Qing was forcibly

removed from a hotel, sent out of Beijing, and held until after

the Secretary's visit was over. Hou Xiaotian was briefly

detained near Beijing. No charges were filed against either

Dai or Hou, and Chinese authorities denied that they had been

arrested. Dai was later allowed to leave the country.

c. Freedom of Religion

Religious freedom in China is subject to restrictions of

varying severity. While the Constitution affirms toleration of

religious beliefs, the Government places restrictions on

religious practice outside officially recognized and

government-controlled religious organizations. Religious

proselytizing is restricted to officially registered and

sanctioned places of worship, although some discreet

proselytizing and distributing of religious texts seems to be

tolerated. The management and control of religion is the

responsibility of religious affairs bureaus across China,

staffed primarily by party members. Buddhists are by far the

largest body of religious believers in China. The Government

estimates that there are 100 million Chinese Buddhists, most of

whom belong to the dominant Han ethnic group. Other Buddhists

belong to Tibetan, Mongolian, and other ethnic groups. Han

Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the Government and

have experienced few reported difficulties. In Tibet, however,

where Buddhism and Tibetan nationalism are closely intertwined,

relations between Buddhists and secular authorities have been

tense. Daoism, widely practiced in southern coastal provinces,

is officially respected as an important part of traditional

Chinese culture, but some of its practices conflicting with

Government strictures against superstition and waste of arable

land have been sharply criticized.

China permits Moslem citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, but

limited state financing effectively constrains the number of

hajj is. Nongovernment sources indicated that about 1,500

Chinese made the hajj in 1991, roughly the same number as in

1990. Officially sanctioned religious organizations are

permitted to maintain international contacts as long as these

do not entail foreign control, but proselytizing by foreign

groups is forbidden. The Three-Self Patriotic Movement, the

official Protestant church, and its Buddhist and Moslem

counterparts have established extensive networks of

international support. While the Catholic Patriotic

Association has no official ties to the Roman Catholic Church,

its leaders frequently visit Catholic and other religious

leaders abroad. The Association ordains its own bishops and

priests, generally follows pre-Vatican II practices, and

rejects papal authority. Sources in Rome publicly indicated,

however, that 20 to 30 of the more than 60 Catholic Patriotic

Association bishops had been recognized by the Vatican.

The Government, after forcefully suppressing all religious

observances during the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, began in

the late 1970 s to restore or replace confiscated churches,

temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official religious

organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic and

Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and

Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.

Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate

"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an

examination of theological and political knowledge to qualify

for the clergy. The Government supervises the publication of

religious material for distribution to ensure religious and

political conformity.

Only those Christian churches affiliated with either the

Catholic Patriotic Association or the Three-Self Patriotic

Movement may operate openly, but active unofficial religious

movements pose an alternative to the state-regulated churches

and temples. The unofficial Catholic Church claims a

membership far larger than the 3.6 million registered with the

official church, though actual figures are unknown. It has its

own bishops and priests and conducts its own services. A large

number of Protestants worship privately in "house churches"

that are independent of government control. There is a dynamic

house church movement in many cities and, like their unofficial

Catholic counterparts, house churches often attract more

followers than the official Three-Self Patriotic Movement

churches.

The Government generally tolerates the existence of unofficial

Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they remain small

and discreet. -In some parts of south and east China, official

and underground churches seem to coexist and even cooperate.

In other parts of the country, however, authorities have

sporadically continued efforts to rein in activities of the

unapproved Catholic and Protestant movements, raiding and

closing a number of unregistered churches. The Government

suspects many leaders of unofficial churches of harboring

criminal or dissident intentions and has imprisoned scores of

them in recent years. There have been numerous credible

reports in recent years of raids on house churches and

detentions of members, particularly in southern and coastal

provinces and in Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Henan provinces.

While China remains a nominally secular society, the active

expression of religious belief has continued to grow.

Growth in expression of belief has been accompanied by

continued Government pressure on believers. In February the

Communist Party reportedly issued a secret document reflecting

heightened official suspicion of religious activities and

urging greater vigilance by the party in controlling such

activity. Shanghai Catholic Bishop Fan Zhongliang was arrested

in mid-June in Zhejiang Province, where he had reportedly

attempted to contact underground Chinese Catholic leaders. He

was returned to Shanghai where he remained in detention until

mid-August, when he was released pending further

investigation. According to Catholic sources, many other

bishops, priests and lay people remained in detention or

reeducation. Bishop Joseph Fan Xueyan, with the exception of a

period from 1979 through 1981, has been imprisoned or under

house arrest since 1958. The Government said in November that

Bishop Fan had been released. According to credible reports at

least 23 Catholics were detained in Hebei in December 1990,

including Bishops Simon An Shi 'en, Peter Chen Jianzhang, Cosmas

Shi Enxiang and Song Weill. One bishop from the group, Paul

Shi Chunjie, reportedly died in November. Another, John Han

Dingxian, was described by the Government in November as "under

investigation." A third bishop from the group, Paul Liu Shuhe,

was reportedly sent for reeducation through labor. Bishop

Casimir Wang Milu continued to serve a 10-year reform through

labor sentence. Cangzhou Bishop Paul Li Zhenrong and several

other people reportedly were arrested on December 11 in Tianjin.

Protestants faced the same sort of pressure. Members of the

Guangzhou house church of Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao)

continued to be harassed by local authorities, but the church

remained open. According to Protestant sources, many

Protestants remained in detention or reeducation for their

religious activities. These included Reverend Sun Ludian,

Reverend Song Yude, and Reverend Xu Guoxing. Many Tibetan

Buddhists and Xinjiang Moslems have continued to oppose Chinese

rule, and Chinese authorities have taken a harsh attitude

toward both. The Government tightly controls and monitors

Tibetan Buddhism and does not tolerate religious manifestations

that advocate Tibetan independence. It has recognized the

Dalai Lama as a major religious figure but condemns his

political activities and his leadership of a "government in

exile." A 1990 law sharply limits religious freedom for

Tibetan Buddhists. It provides for government regulation of

many religious activities, from burning incense to holding

ceremonies.

The practice of religion in Tibet is also hampered by the

limits the Government imposes on religious education and by the

small size of the religious community compared to traditional

norms. Access to religious sites, however, does not appear to

be a major problem, and large amounts of money are being

devoted to reconstruction of the main sacred sites including

the Potala Palace in Lhasa. In areas with large Moslem

populations, particularly Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia, there

continues to be concern regarding the sharp restrictions on the

building of mosques and the religious education of youths under

age 18 mandated by the 1988 religion law. Following the 1990

unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued additional

regulations further restricting religious activities and

teaching.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Government uses an identification card system to control

and restrict residence patterns within the country. Citizens

are required to carry their cards at all times when out of

doors (many apparently ignore this rule) and to present them to

authorities on demand. Individuals are registered as residents

of a particular jurisdiction and assigned to a specific work

unit. Change of residence or workplace is very difficult and,

in most cases, is possible only with government permission and

agreement by the work unit. The Government has placed travel

restrictions on several released detainees and religious

figures.

Authorities try to limit unauthorized migration to urban areas,

but they estimate there are at least a million unregistered

persons each in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Beijing.

Authoritative Chinese estimates of the itinerant population for

the entire country range from 70 to 100 million. Official

tolerance of this itinerant population has varied with the

economic need for a supplemental work force in the big cities.

Foreign travel is controlled, although Chinese citizens have,

and many exercise, the right to emigrate upon the Government's

review of their circumstances. Tiananmen hunger striker Gao

Xin was released and allowed to leave China for the United

States in March. Former University of Arizona student Yang

Wei, several other dissidents, and the families of some

dissidents residing in the United States were also allowed to

leave China in 1991. Secretary of State Baker was assured in

November in Beijing that any person against whom no criminal

proceedings were pending would be allowed to leave China after

completing the usual formalities. At year's end, intellectuals

Dai Qing and Li Zehou had received their passports; Dai left

China for the United States in mid-December, and Li was

planning to leave in early January. Other dissidents and

religious figures, however, were still encountering problems in

acc[uiring PRC travel documentation.

The State Education Commission has stated on a number of

occasions that a proper political attitude is a major criterion

in selecting people to go abroad for government-sponsored

study. The State Education Commission has also made efforts to

restrict administratively the number of privately sponsored

students going abroad. Regulations implemented in 1990 require

those college and university graduates who received free

postsecondary education to repay the cost of their education to

the state by working for 5 years or more before being eligible

for passports to go abroad to study. For those who have

overseas Chinese relatives or have not yet graduated, the

regulations provide a sliding scale of tuition reimbursement

exempting them from the work requirement. Students who must

pay the full amount are reportedly charged about $500 for each

year of study. Implementation of these regulations has varied

from place to place, and many students still managed to obtain

passports. Persons subject to the regulations on study abroad

appear to have had little trouble obtaining passports to visit

Chinese relatives overseas.

The Government has relaxed some restrictions on internal travel

by foreigners. Tibet and Xinjiang have allowed tourists and

some diplomats to visit, although with significant

restrictions. Senior officials have stated that students and

scholars returning from overseas have not been and will not be

punished for participation in prodemocracy activities while

abroad. It is not clear whether this guarantee applies to

leaders of student dissident organizations. Officials have

indicated that if such persons wanted to return to China they

would have to express "repentance," disassociate themselves

from "reactionary" organizations, and refrain from "subversive"

activities once they returned.

The Government indicated in September that since 1989 between

6,000 and 7,000 students had returned to China from the United

States on holiday. Another several thousand had returned to

work. None had been punished or refused permission to go

abroad again. None of the approximately 150 students

interviewed by the U.S. American Consulate General in Shanghai

reported experiencing any difficulties with the Chinese

Government when they returned on holiday from the United States

to China in 1991.

Although no instance of government harassment has been reported

with regard to returning students, nonstudent democracy

activist brothers Li Lin and Li Zhi were arrested, tortured,

and held for 5 months when they returned in February to their

native Hunan province. They had fled to Hong Kong after

participating in the June 1989 democracy movement but returned

to China after the central Government announced that it was

safe for dissidents who had broken their ties to counterrevolutionary

organizations to come home. Upon return, they

were arrested by local authorities, but following appeals by

former President Jimmy Carter and Hong Kong-based American

businessman John Kamm, a compromise between central and local

authorities was apparently struck whereby they were convicted

merely of illegally crossing the Chinese border, then released

and allowed to return to Hong Kong.

The Li brothers' case is the only known instance of activists

having been arrested after returning to China from abroad.

There have, however, been reports since 1989 of harassment of

Chinese students overseas, although the number of such reports

dropped off in 1991. Chinese officials indicated in September

that they intended to "be helpful" with regard to overseas

students' passport problems. Privately funded students could

have their passports extended as long as they had an academic

reason to remain overseas. Publicly funded students could

change their passport status to private by making a financial

settlem.ent with the work unit that had financed their studies.

It is too early to assess the implementation of this policy.

The Government accepts repatriation of citizens who have

departed China without authorization, in most cases apparently

without punishing them. For example, some 3,000 Fujianese

"boat people" who left China without authorization and entered

Japan illegally were repatriated in 1990 and 1991. Although

China accepted more than 280,000 refugees, mostly ethnic Han

Chinese, from Vietnam and Laos between 1978 and 1982, in recent

years it has adopted a stricter policy of no new admissions.

China has cooperated with Hong Kong to reduce the flow of

Vietnamese refugees into the colony. Although China has signed

the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at the

International Conference on Indochinese Refugees held in Geneva

in June 1989, it is unclear whether China considers itself a

participating state. Credible reports suggest the PRC has

repatriated persons of other nationalities seeking refugee

status.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens

to Change Their Government

Citizens cannot peacefully and legally change their

government. Chinese citizens can neither freely choose nor

change the laws and officials that govern them. China is ruled

by the Communist Party, the paramount source of political

authority, on Marxist-Leninist principles. Within the party, a

closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercises ultimate

power over the nation. Some hold key positions within the

six-member Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Central

Military Commission, or other organs. Others are nominally

retired but continue to exercise great political influence

despite holding no formal positions in party or government.

Although at age 87 he is less actively engaged in day-to-day

issues, Deng Xiaoping remains first among equals in this latter

group. These senior party leaders broadly determine policy,

which is then implemented by the Government.

According to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's

Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power. It

nominally selects the President and Vice President, decides on

the choice of the Premier, and elects the Chairman of the

Central Military Commission. During the 1980 's, the NPC had

begun to exercise increasing independence and influence.

Debates had become much more open, and several important

Government proposals were sent back for revisions. After 1989,

however, the NPC reverted to its more traditional role of

docilely ratifying decisions already made by the senior

leadership. There is no longer any real debate in the NPC

public sessions, though debate in closed-door committee

sessions on certain issues is still reportedly fairly vigorous.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

There are no organizations within China which monitor or

comment on human rights conditions. The Government has made it

clear that it will not tolerate the existence of such groups.

In Shanghai, Fu Shenqi, Gu Bin, and Yang Zhou were detained in

the spring for "violating Chinese law" and held by public

security authorities pending investigation of their alleged

involvement in the establishment of a human rights society and

newsletter.

Despite the Chinese Government's adherence to the United

Nations Charter, which mandates respect for and promotion of

human rights, Chinese officials do not accept the principle

that human rights are universal. The State Council Information

Office's unprecedented November "white paper" on human rights

argued that each nation has its own concept of human rights,

grounded in its political, economic, and social system and its

historical, religious, and cultural background. Foreign

Minister Qian Qichen said in his September address to the U.N.

General Assembly that the human rights forums of the United

Nations had been used by certain countries to wage "cold war."

Although officials no longer dismiss all discussion of human

rights as interference in the country's internal affairs, they

remain reluctant to accept criticism of China's human rights

situation by other nations or international organizations.

They reject reports by Amnesty International, Asia Watch, and

other international human rights monitoring groups on torture

and other human rights violations. The Chinese Foreign

Ministry publicly criticized the Department of State's 1990

report on human rights practices in China, charging that the

report had "cited false rumors to distort and attack China" and

was therefore "entirely unacceptable." Chinese officials have

stepped up their criticism of human rights problems in other

countries while arguing, paradoxically, that foreigners had no

right to criticize human rights abuses in China.

In 1991 Chinese officials initiated efforts to promote academic

study and discussion of Chinese concepts of human rights.

Articles in the official press argued that "Marxist human

rights" emphasizing collective economic entitlements were

superior to "capitalist human rights" stressing individual

civil and political liberties. The Law Institute of the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) held a symposium in

June on theories of human rights. A CASS delegation visited

North America in September and October to study international

concepts of human rights. In November the Government

published, and publicized widely, a report on human rights in

China which acknowledged the need for improvements, but

otherwise presented a one-sided and highly complimentary view

of individual rights in China, attempting to establish a

dichotomy between economic development and personal and

political liberties. The publication of the report and other

human rights activities appear to have originated in a desire

to improve China's image abroad and strengthen the Government's

ability to respond to criticism of its human rights record.

Whatever the motivation, this process of study and dialog has

exposed more Chinese to alternate concepts of human rights.

Chinese authorities continued to broaden their dialog with the

United States and other governments on certain human rights

issues, including judicial and penal systems, amnesties,

accounting for prisoners, emigration policy, and family

planning. Beijing also received several U.S. Congressional

delegations with a particular concern for Chinese human rights

problems. An Australian human rights delegation visited China

in July. A European Parliament delegation with an emphasis on

human rights made a September visit. Both the Australian and

European delegations visited Tibet. Other prominent visitors,

including a high-level U.S. delegation led by the Secretary of

State, also focused on human rights issues with Chinese

leaders. All of these delegations found restrictions imposed

by the Government which severely limited their contacts and

travel.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

While laws exist to protect minorities and women, in practice

discrimination based on ethnicity, sex, and religion persists

in housing, jobs, education, and other aspects of life.

The economic progress of minorities is viewed by the Government

as one of its significant achievements. Minorities benefit

from a policy of "privileged treatment" in marriage, family

planning, university admission, and employment, as well as

disproportionate infrastructure investment in some minority

areas. In practice, however, discrimination based on ethnic

origin persists. The concept of a largely homogeneous Chinese

people pervades the general thinking of the Han ethnic

majority. The 55 designated ethnic minorities constitute just

over 8 percent of the PRC ' s population. Most minority groups

reside in areas they have traditionally inhabited, with

standards of living often well below the national average.

Government economic development policies have had some success

in raising living standards but have at the same time disrupted

traditional patterns of living.

The Communist Party's avowed policy of increasing minority

representation in the Government and the CCP has resulted in

members of minority groups accounting for 15 percent of the

deputies in the NPC. Among the 19 chairmen and vice chairmen

of the NPC Standing Committee, 6, or 32 percent, are of

minority nationality. Such statistics, however, obscure the

reality that ethnic minorities are effectively shut out of all

but a few positions of real political and decisionmaking

power. Some minorities resent Han officials holding key

positions in minority autonomous regions. Ethnic minorities in

Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere have demonstrated against Han

Chinese authority, and the underlying causes of unrest continue

to fester. While martial law in Lhasa, Tibet's capital, was

lifted in 1990, foreign visitors to Tibet in 1991 observed that

there was still a pervasive armed police and military presence

there. Reports reaching the West in 1991 suggested the

existence of smoldering ethnic tension in Inner Mongolia.

Central authorities have made it clear that they will not

tolerate opposition to Beijing's rule in minority regions.

The Government has tried in some instances to adopt policies

responsive to minority sensitivities, but in doing so has

encountered the dilemma of how to respect minority cultures

without damaging minority interests. In Tibet and Xinjiang,

for example, there are two-track school systems using standard

Chinese and minority languages. Students can choose which

system to attend. One side effect of this policy to protect

and maintain minority cultures has been a reinforcement of a

highly segregated society. Under this separate education

system, those graduating from minority schools are at a

disadvantage in competing for jobs in government and business,

which require good spoken Chinese. These graduates must take

remedial language instruction before attending universities and

colleges.

The 1982 Constitution states tha.t "women in the People's

Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of

life," and promises, among other things, equal pay for equal

work. In fact, women experience many inecjualities . Most women

employed in industry work in lower skilled and lower paid jobs,

women hold relatively few positions of - significant influence

within the party or government structure, and there was no

notable improvement in women's rights or working conditions in

1991. Women have often been the unintended victims of reforms

designed to streamline enterprises and give workers greater job

mobility. Many employers prefer to hire men to avoid the

expense of maternity leave and child care. Reports by women of

discrimination, unfair dismissal, demotion, or wage cuts when

they needed maternity leave have continued.

The gap in the education levels of men and women has narrowed;

women now maKe up over one-third of both high school and

university students. Men continue, however, to constitute the

majority of the educated, particularly the highly educated, and

a disproportionate number of government-funded scholarships for

overseas study go to men.

The Government strongly condemns and is working hard to curb

traditional abhorrent practices against women such as the

abduction and selling of women for wives or prostitution, abuse

of female children, violence against women, and female

infanticide. In September the NPC's Standing Committee, in an

effort to curb such practices, adopted laws on protection of

minors, curbing of prostitution, and punishment of abductors of

women and children. Many discriminatory practices are rooted

in traditional rural attitudes and values. Rural parents tend

to view girls as liabilities because they are less productive

income earners and leave home without providing assistance for

their parents' retirement; boys are more highly valued as

prospective income earners and as future caretakers for elderly

parents. A number of provinces have sought to reduce the

perceived higher economic value of boys in providing old age

support by establishing more retirement homes and improving the

quality of those homes already in existence.

Finally, there is discrimination in China on the basis of

religion. Communist Party officials state that party

membership and religious belief are incompatible. This places

a serious limitation on religious believers, since party

membership is required for almost all high positions in

government and commerce. While there are some religious

believers in the party, especially in minority autonomous

regions, few hold important leadership positions. Most

government officials responsible for religious affairs work are

not religious believers.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The PRC's 1982 Constitution provides for "freedom of

association," but the guarantee is heavily qualified by

references to the interest of the State and the leadership of

the CCP. Though trade union officials recognize that workers'

interests may not always coincide with those of the party, they

claim their role encompasses both passing CCP demands and

propaganda down to the workers and channeling workers' demands

upward to the enterprises, the party, and the Government.

While union membership is voluntary for individual employees,

enterprises are generally required to have a union. Workers in

Chinese-foreign joint ventures are guaranteed the right to form

unions, which then must affiliate with the All-China Federation

of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and joint venture managers report

significant union activity and the need to bargain with these

unions over wages and benefits. Union officials indicate that

about 20 percent of joint ventures have unions, and attribute

the lack of unions in other joint ventures to the newness of

the firms. However, officials report that union membership is

much larger among large joint ventures, which include the

majority of U.S. company participation. They state that they

are actively organizing unions in those joint ventures that do

not have them, and report little opposition from foreign owners.

The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975

and 1978 Constitutions, was removed from the 1982

Constitution. In 1983, however, the Chairman of the ACFTU

stated that, if a trade union and its labor protection safety

officers found that a workplace was too dangerous, the union

should organize the workers to leave the hazardous areas.

Thus, Chinese authorities usually view strikes as justified

only when they respond to problems such as a sudden

deterioration in safety conditions. While Ministry of Labor

officials deny that there have been any recent strikes, there

were scattered press reports of strikes and other labor unrest

in 1991. Many of these continue to relate to the issue of

benefits for laid-off workers.

The ACFTU, nominally an independent organization, is in fact

closely controlled by the Communist Party. There have been

credible reports of Communist Party harassment through union

channels of workers with close working relationships with

foreigners. Virtually all state sector workers and nearly 90

percent of all urban workers belong to ACFTU chapters.

Unemployed workers are not considered union members.

The Government does not allow independent trade unions, and

none operates openly. In 1983 the ACFTU added a new clause to

its Constitution requiring that any attempt to set up or

dissolve a union be endorsed by its membership and approved by

higher bodies in the national trade union structure. While

this clause appears to allow for the existence of nonunion

worker groups, no such groups appear to be legally tolerated.

The Workers Autonomous Federations that were formed briefly in

the Spring of 1989 were all eliminated by arrests of their

leaders. Worker leader Han Dongfang was released and all

charges dropped in 1991, and the Government told the

International Labor Organization (ILO) that Liu Qiang had also

been released, but a number of other worker leaders who

attempted to form independent unions remain in detention.

Reports from several sources, however, indicated that

underground worker organizations exist in China. The Hong Kong

press has reported that these organizations were subject to

official harassment.

ACFTU international activities are subject to policy guidance

from the CCP. The ACFTU currently claims to have contacts with

trade unions in over 120 countries, without regard to whether

the foreign union is affiliated with the International

Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Communist-dominated

World Federation of Trade Unions, or other organizations.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Under the labor contract system that now covers approximately

10 percent of China's work force, individual workers may

negotiate with management over contract terms. In practice,

only the very few workers with highly technical skills are able

to negotiate effectively on salary and fringe benefits issues.

The Government does not permit collective bargaining. Without

legal status as a collective bargaining body, the ACFTU' s role

has been restricted to a consultative one in the decisionmaking

process over wages and regulations affecting labor. Most of

the terms and conditions of employment continue to be

determined unilaterally by management in most cases. In joint

ventures and some small collectives, workers have greater

influence. The ACFTU has shown itself increasingly concerned

about protecting workers' basic living standards and.

occasionally, protesting unsafe working conditions; it has

organized petitions and even sit-ins demanding that laid-off

workers' living wages be protected. Other than in cases where

it believes workers' basic welfare is severely threatened (such

as inadequate unemployment benefits), the ACFTU generally acts

simply as a channel for workers' complaints to the management

of individual enterprises and municipal labor bureaus, or as a

channel for passing CCP demands and propaganda to workers.

A 1988 law states that trade unions in private enterprises have

the right to represent employees and to sign collective

bargaining agreements with the enterprises. The significance

of this is muted by the fact that the work force of private

enterprises now accounts for less than 1 percent of Chinese

urban workers. Moreover, there have been no reports of

instances in which unions in private enterprises have

undertaken collective bargaining over wage, contract or safety

issues. Worker congresses, organized in most Chinese

enterprises, technically have the authority to remove

incompetent managers and approve major decisions affecting the

enterprise (notably wage and bonus distribution systems).

Worker congresses generally meet only once a year, however, and

appear to act primarily as rubber stamps on agreements worked

out among factory managers, party secretaries, and union

representatives.

In addition, a dispute settlement procedure has been in effect

since 1987. According to the procedure, workers who wish to

contest a dismissal or other unfair practice must first appeal

to an arbitration committee within the factory. If they are

not satisfied with the committee's decision they can appeal to

a local arbitration committee, chaired by a local labor bureau

official with representatives from the union and the

enterprise. If not satisfied with this committee's decision,

the worker can bring the matter to court, though in practice,

this has rarely, if ever, been done.

Laws governing working conditions in China's Special Economic

Zones are not significantly different from those in the country

at large. While the Government has regulations limiting wages

for joint venture employees to 120 percent of state enterprise

employees' wages (or 150 percent in highly profitable

ventures), these regulations are not uniformly enforced.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

While China has generally abandoned its traditional use of

massive corvee labor for construction of infrastructure

projects and public facilities, workers are still "mobilized"

for public works projects and to augment public security

forces. Imprisonment in China, except for those in detention

centers, generally entails compulsory labor. Almost all those

sentenced by the courts to prison or labor reform camps,

including political prisoners, are required to work, usually

for little compensation. In addition, China maintains a

network of reeducation through labor camps (see Section I.e.)

with an officially reported inmate population of 160,000, not

sentenced by a court, who also must work.

Under the "staying at prison employment" system, some prisoners

are denied permission to return to their homes after release

and instead are forced to remain and work in the vicinity of

the prison. For those assigned to camps far from their

residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile. While

the Ministry of Justice claims that only 200 to 300 former

prisoners are currently held under this system, most outside

observers contend that the true number is far higher, although

numbers are impossible to verify. Chinese penal policy

emphasizes "reform first, production second," but labor is an

integral part of the system both for rehabilitation and in

order to help support the facilities. Prisoners in both labor

reform and labor reeducation reportedly spend a maximum of 6

hours per day working and 3 hours per day studying. Most

reports indicate that work conditions in the export-oriented

light manufacturing factories are similar to those in ordinary

factories, but conditions on labor farms and in coal mines are

exceedingly harsh gnd in the mines possibly more dangerous than

in ordinary mines. Various Chinese newspapers have reported

that Chinese prison labor is used for many types of production

(examples in parenthesis): infrastructure (roads), heavy

industry (coal, steel), light manufacturing (clothing, shoes,

small machine tools) and agriculture (grain, tea, sugar cane).

The U.S. Customs Service has issued orders barring a number of

products which were reported to be made by prisoners from

entering the United States and has detained several shipments

of such goods. On October 10, 1991, the Chinese Government

published a reiteration of its regulations barring the export

of prison-made goods. It also reported to the U.S. Embassy on

the results of several investigations, including one where a

factory manager was relieved of his administrative duties. At

year's end, the U.S. Government was actively negotiating a

memorandum of understanding with the Chinese Government on

obtaining the necessary information to enforce U.S. law and

halt these exports.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of

school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9 years

of education. Statistics on school attendance indicate that

approximately 20 percent of school-age children in the cities

and villages do not attend school, and therefore are likely to

be working. The number may well be higher in poorer and

isolated areas, where child labor in agriculture is assumed to

be widespread. In connection with a crackdown on vices, there

were reports in the press and by public security officials of

female minors being sold into prostitution or to factories as

laborers.

In September 1988, the Ministry of Labor issued a circular

designed to curb child labor problems; it reiterated those

policies this year. It calls for severe fines, withdrawal of

business licenses, or jail for employers who hire child

laborers under 16 years old. Enforcement appears to have been

haphazard. Provincial officials in Guangdong, where the

problem of child labor is particularly serious, were unable to

say how many enterprises have been prosecuted for child labor

violations.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

China does not have a labor code. A draft is apparently

circulating, but it remains unclear whether it will be

published or made into law.

There is no minimum wage in China.

The legal maximum workweek excluding overtime is 48 hours, of

which 3 to 12 hours are generally spent in political study or

"education" on current social issues.

At factories and construction sites, occupational health and

safety are constant themes of posters and campaigns. Every

work unit must- designate a health and safety officer; the

International Labor Organization has established a training

program for these officials. Despite this, general health and

safety conditions in the workplace are poor. Both workers and

managers often disregard safety procedures. State procurators

deal annually with thousands of negligence and accident cases

involving criminal or civil liability. The absence of a

national labor code makes enforcement of safety regulations by

labor bureaus extremely difficult. Most of the cases mentioned

above involve physical injuries caused by machinery or

transport of materials. Chinese epidemiological officials have

only recently become aware of the threat to workers from

chemicals and are currently only beginning to monitor such

threats.

ecoi.net-Beschreibung:: Jahresbericht zur Menschenrechtslage (Berichtszeitraum 1991) [automatische Texterkennung von Scan durch archive.org; bei Fehlern siehe Originalscan]

Land:: China
Quelle:: USDOS – US Department of State (Autor)
Veröffentlicht:: Februar 1992
Originallink:: http://archive.org/stream/countryreportson1991unit/countryreportson1991unit_djvu.txt
Dokumentart:: Periodischer Bericht
Sprache:: Englisch
Dokument-ID:: 1092984 (frühere ID 241539)