Executive Summary:
- Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban have centralized control over Afghanistan’s trillion-dollar mineral wealth, treating it as a primary revenue source rather than a foundation for national development.
- The mining sector operates with severe opacity and resembles the group’s former insurgent financing methods, with revenues allegedly captured by elite networks instead of being transparently deposited into state accounts.
- The Taliban’s extractive practices prioritize short-term gains over sustainability, resulting in severe social and environmental consequences, including dangerous child labor, resource depletion, and the forced displacement of local communities.
In late June, the Taliban leadership deployed around 1,000 special forces officers to Badakhshan in an effort to tighten control over the province’s mines and bring them more directly under the authority of the Taliban leadership (Afghanistan International, June 22). This was not the first time the Taliban used coercive measures to consolidate control over Afghanistan’s mineral resources. Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, mining has become one of the group’s most important sources of revenue (Tolo News, January 16). Rather than developing the sector through transparent governance and accountable institutions, however, the Taliban have centralized resource extraction in ways that resemble their insurgent financing practices during the war in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
Afghanistan’s Minerals & Taliban’s Extraction Strategy
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth may exceed $1 trillion, and more than 1,400 deposits have been identified across the country’s 34 provinces (Geopolitical Monitor, June 6, 2025). These deposits include zinc, lead, copper, antimony, lithium, rare earths, cobalt, and other critical minerals. They have, therefore, attracted the attention of regional and global powers, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Pakistan, and the United States (The Interpreter, April 28).
The Taliban have awarded at least 205 mining contracts to more than 150 companies, and in September 2023 they announced new mining deals worth more than $6.5 billion (Centre for Information Resilience, June 26, 2024). In May 2024, the Taliban-controlled Ministry of Mines and Petroleum claimed it had secured more than $7 billion in investments from the PRC, Qatar, Türkiye, Iran, and the United Kingdom, although the details of these contracts remain undisclosed (Hasht-e-Subh Daily, June 1, 2024). Despite such high-profile international engagement, the Taliban continue to manage critical minerals less as a long-term state development project than as a centralized revenue enterprise.
To fund its insurgency, the Taliban generated significant revenue by taxing mining operations, controlling transportation routes, and collecting fees from traders (BBC, August 28, 2021). Since the Taliban assumed power in 2021, many of these practices have been institutionalized. Licenses are often issued through opaque channels, while access to contracts and mining revenues is reportedly shaped by ties to Taliban leaders, foreign intermediaries, and loyalist networks (Eurasian Review, January 8). Afghanistan’s suspension from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in June 2024 further underscored the absence of credible transparency and accountability mechanisms in the mining sector (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, January 8, 2025).
Transparency, Accountability and Mineral Resource Governance
The lack of transparency has deepened since Hedayatullah Badri—a UN-sanctioned Taliban member—was appointed Minister of Mines and Petroleum in July 2024. After his appointment, the ministry sharply reduced public reporting on mining sales. Official figures indicate that more than 95 percent of reported 2024 mining revenue was disclosed during the first seven months of that year, while only around $1 million in revenue was publicly reported over the following five months (Amu TV, January 4, 2025). This decline in reporting has intensified public concerns over whether Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is being used for public welfare or captured by elite Taliban networks.
In many cases, mining revenue appears to be diverted to individuals rather than deposited transparently into state accounts. Afghan observers have described the presence of a “mineral mafia” within the Taliban that collects taxes, royalties, licensing fees, and direct payments from miners, transporters, exporters, and local traders (Arab News, September 13, 2023). In some areas, operators have little choice but to comply with Taliban demands if they wish to continue their activities (RFE/RL, June 16, 2022; Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 16, 2023).
Nangarhar province—rich in chromite, talc, and nephrite—has received the highest number of mining contracts issued by the Taliban. Its talc deposits were the subject of a 2018 Global Witness report, which found that almost all Afghan talc generated revenue for the Taliban when the group was still operating as an insurgent network. Recent open-source analysis indicates that the Taliban’s post-2021 contract network has reinforced the province’s importance in the group’s extractive economy (Hasht-e-Subh Daily, May 13, 2023; Centre for Information Resilience, June 25, 2024).
Ecological and Social Costs
The Taliban’s mining economy also carries social and environmental costs. Although mining has revived some commercial activity, the sector consumes scarce resources, such as water, and is associated with dangerous labor practices. Children as young as eight years old have been documented working in coal mines in northern Afghanistan without machinery or protective equipment (NPR, December 21, 2022; Financial Times, June 26, 2024).
The use of child labor reflects a pattern common to militant and insurgent economies. Vulnerable populations are exploited to reduce costs and sustain revenue-generating activities. The Taliban’s disregard for environmental safeguards is consistent with militant groups’ tendency to prioritize short-term extraction over sustainable governance.
The Taliban have also used force and coercion to acquire land and settle disputes over mineral sites. In northern provinces such as Badakhshan and Takhar, gold extraction has expanded under Taliban-linked local leaders, while communities have complained of displacement and exclusion from the profits. In some cases, competition over mines has produced deadly clashes, including disputes connected to Chinese-backed mining interests (RFE/RL, January 11). The June deployment to Badakhshan therefore fits a broader pattern: mining is not merely an economic sector for the Taliban, but a mechanism of political control, patronage distribution, and internal power management.
Conclusion
Afghanistan’s mineral resources could support the country’s long-term economic recovery if they were managed in the public interest. Under the Taliban, however, growing evidence suggests that these resources are being treated primarily as sources of revenue, patronage, and private gain rather than as a foundation for national development. If this trajectory continues, Afghanistan risks deepening economic fragility and reinforcing governance based on extraction rather than institution-building.
