Dokument #2144751
USDOS – US Department of State (Autor)
Country Overview: Ineffective coordination among security services, budget constraints, and instability in neighboring Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and the Lake Chad Basin strained Niger’s counterterrorism capacity. Terrorist groups active in Niger included ISIS-GS, BH, ISIS-WA, and al-Qa’ida affiliate JNIM.
The National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland dissolved Parliament, and a draft penal code revision remains suspended following the coup. On September 30, Niger’s transitional government created a terrorist registry to track individuals and groups suspected of terrorism. The government added armed groups that threatened Niger’s national security, attacked the Nigerien Defense Forces, or attacked critical infrastructure such as the Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline. Niger’s counterterrorist financing efforts remained consistent with previous years.
2024 Terrorism Trends: In 2024, terrorist groups committed 76 attacks with 773 fatalities: ISIS-GS and JNIM attacked in the Southwest and Northwest, while ISIS-WA and BH attacked in the Southeast.
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Boko Haram (BH) (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Jama’at Nusratal-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)
Country Report on Terrorism 2024 - Chapter 4 - Al-Murabitoun (Periodischer Bericht, Englisch)