Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire

Table of Contents  Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................  i I. Introduction .....................................................................................................................  1 II. Why the NCAG? ................................................................................................................  4 A. The Task at Hand .......................................................................................................  6 B. Israel’s “Best Bad Option” ..........................................................................................  8 C. Aligned Palestinian Factional Interests .....................................................................  9 III. A Dysfunctional Decision-making Hierarchy ..................................................................  12 A. Protectorate vs. Statehood .........................................................................................  12 B. Gatekeeping Aid .........................................................................................................  16 C. The Bottom Rung .......................................................................................................  20 IV. The Disarmament Deadlock .............................................................................................  24 A. Clash over Scope and Sequencing .............................................................................  24 B. An Overcrowded Security Field .................................................................................  28 C. Mismanaged and Lopsided Diplomacy .....................................................................  31 V. Three Roads to Failure .....................................................................................................  35 A. Palestinian Priorities Downgraded ............................................................................  35 B. Freezing the Status Quo .............................................................................................  36 C. Return to War? ..........................................................................................................  38 VI. Opening a Way Forward ...................................................................................................  41 A. Raising the Price of Intransigence or Escalation .......................................................  42 B. Backing a Realistic Plan for Decommissioning .........................................................  44 C. Bolstering Palestinian Decision-making Power ........................................................  46 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................  49 APPENDICES A. Map of Gaza as Formed by the First Phase of the Ceasefire Plan ....................................  50 B. Board of Peace in Gaza: Structure and Members  ............................................................  51 C. About the International Crisis Group ..............................................................................  53 D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on the Middle East and North Africa since 2023 ...  54 E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................  56   Principal Findings What’s new? In July, Hamas agreed to a Board of Peace roadmap to advance the Gaza ceasefire deal, requiring Israel to release aid and tasking a Palestinian technocratic committee with decommissioning weapons while Israel withdraws troops. After Israeli objections, the Board backtracked on the roadmap’s terms, further clouding the enclave’s fate. Why does it matter? The Palestinian committee has yet to begin governing the strip, obstructed by dysfunctional U.S.-led decision-making and Israel’s refusal to let Gaza recover until Hamas fully disarms. If this impasse persists, Israel could  entrench its occupation of most of Gaza while Hamas controls the rest, trapping Palestinians. Worse, war could resume. What should be done? To give the roadmap a chance, governments should press Israel to loosen its chokehold on Gaza. They should insist that Hamas’s decommissioning proceed in lockstep with Israeli withdrawals and be decoupled from aid. They should also ensure Palestinian ownership of Gaza’s future by bolstering the technocratic committee’s capacity and  legitimacy. International Crisis Group  Middle East Report N°257 24 August 2026 Executive Summary On 30 July, ten months into a tenuous ceasefire in Gaza, the Board of Peace established by U.S. President Donald Trump and endorsed by the UN Security Council declared it had reached a “historic” agreement with Hamas and other Palestinian factions to decommission their weapons. The fifteen-point roadmap appeared to settle a dispute over disarmament, seen as a key obstacle to advancing the truce, while empowering a team of Palestinian technocrats, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), to lead the process. But the proclaimed breakthrough was short-lived. Within days, Israel dismissed the deal and the Board then seemingly backtracked on its terms. The episode was emblematic of a ceasefire that has failed to deliver most of its promises and threatens to trap Gaza’s 2.1 million Palestinians in permanent deprivation or throw them back into war. Preventing those outcomes will require the U.S., regional and European governments to press Israel to ease its chokehold on Gaza, support the decommissioning plan agreed to by Palestinian factions and ensure that Gaza’s rehabilitation is Palestinian-driven. Though the ceasefire deal went into effect in October 2025, the work of rebuilding Gaza and its beleaguered society has not even begun. The truce’s first phase largely halted Israel’s military offensive that followed Hamas’s 7 October 2023 assault; freed remaining Israeli hostages and hundreds of Palestinian prisoners; and brought desperately needed aid into the strip. Yet the suffering has not ended. Gaza lies in ruins, its territory in effect partitioned. All but a few residents are crammed into a third of the enclave, struggling to secure adequate food, water, shelter and medicine. The Israeli army has expanded its presence, striking the strip regularly and maintaining a stifling blockade, which it eases only under outside pressure and by tiny increments. Hamas is tightening its grip on the populated portions of Gaza, reorganising its ranks and clashing with local gangs that operate with Israeli support. Progress in Gaza, already tortoise-like, has been either stalled or set back. The Board of Peace’s fifteen-point roadmap was supposed to chart a fresh way forward by charging the NCAG with the task of handling Gaza’s recovery and demilitarisation. The committee enjoys political backing from major Palestinian parties and foreign governments, which could help it unlock vital resources. To date, however, the commissioners have not set foot in the strip, let alone assumed governing duties. Beyond Israel’s opposition to Palestinian self-rule, two main obstacles have stood in the way: a dysfunctional, U.S.-led Board that has muddled decision-making and neglected humanitarian priorities; Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page ii and a deadlock over the sequencing and scope of Hamas’s disarmament, for which Israel has laid down maximalist red lines, using these as pretexts for blocking Gaza’s reconstruction. The 30 July roadmap appeared, fleetingly, to overcome those roadblocks. First, it clarified that the truce’s second phase, which is meant to reorganise security and governance in Gaza, would not proceed until Israel fulfilled all its first phase obligations – notably, meeting aid quotas and ceasing military operations. Secondly, it laid out a decommissioning sequence pursuant to which Palestinian factions would be required to turn in “heavy” weapons to the NCAG under international monitoring, with light weapons subject to registration. The handover would occur in tandem with gradual Israeli troop withdrawals. Hamas, though noting that the deal entailed hard concessions, endorsed it. Israel did not; among other objections, it insisted that no withdrawal would occur until Hamas was stripped of all weapons and all its tunnels were destroyed. Faced with Israel’s refusal, the Board did an aboutface on 3 August, stating that total disarmament must come first. Washington bears a great deal of responsibility for this situation. It claims to want to move the ceasefire along, yet its control of diplomacy has created more problems than it has solved. The Board has turned into a convoluted bureaucracy, bidden by the Trump administration to assert itself beyond its UN mandate in Gaza while failing to make meaningful progress in the strip. Its envoys repeatedly mishandle negotiations and misrepresent the outcomes, tarnishing their credibility. The U.S. is frustrating other mediators by condoning Israel’s ceasefire violations and dismissing pragmatic approaches to Hamas’s disarmament. Instead, it has promoted ideas of a hyper-developed “new Gaza” that pay little heed to Palestinians’ wishes or to their history. To many in Gaza, these plans appear paternalistic, dystopian and neo-colonial, undermining any real prospect of self-determination. Many Palestinians are raising serious questions about a ceasefire deal that, in their view, has not ended the war but merely slowed it down and institutionalised it to Israel’s advantage. Should the situation persist, one bleak but realistic scenario is that the parties barely move past the truce’s first phase, keeping most of Gaza’s residents in humanitarian limbo, subject to periodic Israeli attack. A bigger danger is that Israel could resume full-scale operations, before or after its October elections, with even more destruction and displacement. In either case, the NCAG risks being made irrelevant – either straitjacketed by the powers that control it, rebuffed by the people it is meant to serve or rendered inert by surging violence. Averting those scenarios will require the U.S. as well as regional and European powers, including members of the Board of Peace, to focus on three steps to break Gaza’s perilous logjam. First, as laid out in the July roadmap, they should press Israel to satisfy its first phase obligaHollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page iii tions, independent of Hamas’s disarmament. To do so, they need to raise the cost to Israel of blocking aid flows and continuing military advances in the strip. Secondly, they should support the decommissioning scheme to which Hamas and other factions consented in July. A combination of sustained pressure and diplomatic guarantees will be needed, both for the factions to abide by the process and for Israel to agree. Thirdly, these actors should bolster the NCAG to keep Gaza’s governance in Palestinian hands as much as possible. It must be able to forge links with the Palestinian Authority and civil society, including in the West Bank, so that they can shape its priorities. Mediators, along with the High Representative for Gaza, should encourage the U.S. to rely on local institutions and UN-backed multilateral frameworks, rather than the Board’s ad hoc inventions, to help Gaza recover. Until the Palestinian political leadership can heal its fissures, the NCAG may help in reviving Gaza and preserving its people’s agency in their homeland. Palestinians have endured decades of hollow promises; the ceasefire need not become another. Ramallah/Jerusalem/London/Brussels, 24 August 2026 International Crisis Group  Middle East Report N°257 24 August 2026 Hollow Promises:  Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire I. Introduction The Board of Peace’s fifteen-point roadmap announced on 30 July appeared to be the most important breakthrough yet in bringing the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire deal to fruition. That deal, driven by the U.S. and brokered by Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, halted Israel’s 20232025 war with Hamas in the strip.1 First outlined in May as a means of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (which had endorsed the ceasefire deal the previous November), the roadmap underwent a series of amendments before Hamas and other Palestinian factions accepted its terms. The text focuses on a decommissioning process for Gaza, seeking “a full Hamas relinquishment of armed rule in exchange for an orderly process of reconstruction, civilian governance and [phased] withdrawal”.2 The body tasked with follow-through was the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a team of technocrats serving as the Board’s Palestinian face. But momentum dissipated almost as quickly as it had emerged. After meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 3 August, the Board issued a social media post that contradicted the terms it had laid out days earlier, saying prior reports were “inaccurate” while echoing Israel’s longstanding positions instead.3 Palestinian factions and other mediators, who had accepted the roadmap based on the original provisions, were flummoxed. On 9 August, Netanyahu bluntly told his cabinet that Israel rejects the roadmap, adding that the Israeli army will not withdraw from Gaza until Hamas undergoes a “genuine disarmament, not a fictitious one”.4 On 17 August, U.S. Special Envoy Jared Kushner, after meeting with Hamas and Israeli leaders, said “we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until demilitarisation occurs”, adding that the U.S. will back Israel to “finish the job” if Hamas did not begin surrendering its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days.5 1Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°97, Gaza Ceasefire is Vital, But Only a Start, 21 October 2025. 2 “Gaza Roadmap”, Board of Peace, 30 July 2026. 3 Post on X, Board of Peace, @BoardOfPeace, 3 August 2026. 4 Lazar Berman, “Netanyahu says Israel rejects Board of Peace Gaza disarmament plan”, Times of Israel, 9 August 2026. 5 “Kushner gives stark ultimatum: Disarm or Israel gets U.S. backing to ‘finish the job’”, Fox News, 17 August 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 2 Any hope of implementing the tenuous ceasefire deal, broadly organised into three phases, now depends on overcoming this new obstacle.6 While aspects of phase one have been observed – major fighting largely stopped, a hostage-prisoner swap was completed and assistance has entered the strip – aid flows have remained far short of the promised volumes, while periodic Israeli attacks have killed more than 1,200 people in Gaza. Israeli troops also are pushing beyond a demarcation, known as the Yellow Line, to which they had previously withdrawn as required under the first stage. With key elements of phase one stalled, phase two has yet to get off the ground: neither disarmament nor the mandated troop withdrawals have begun; the envisioned International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and new Palestinian police force have not been deployed; and the NCAG has yet to take up its post. Many doubt that the parties will ever reach the third phase, which would open Gaza to full reconstruction and offer Palestinians a possible path to statehood (see Appendix A for a map of Gaza as designated by the ceasefire plan and Israeli authorities). The gridlock is not surprising. The original deal’s text did not specify the exact scope or sequence of phase two’s contentious provisions, resulting in months of haggling that so far has led nowhere. The political conditions needed to make the ceasefire stick – deploying the right mix of incentives and disincentives to keep both parties invested in the truce – have been lacking. The process has instead been marred by recurring patterns: Palestinian factions try to signal relative flexibility on some issues while holding onto core positions that Israel deems intolerable; the Israeli government creates new facts on the ground in Gaza, while maintaining a hard line in negotiations or adding fresh conditions that make compromise elusive; the Board of Peace boasts of progress that rarely transpires in practice while deferring to Israel’s stance in talks, to the chagrin of regional mediators. All the while, Gaza’s 2.1 mil6 The plan’s text did not explicitly divide the truce into phases, but Board of Peace officials routinely do. The first phase was to see a stop to all hostilities; an exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners; a partial Israeli troop withdrawal leaving 53 per cent of Gaza under the army’s control, and the entry “without interference” of aid previously blocked by Israel (about 600 trucks a day), including “rehabilitation of infrastructure … rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open routes”. The second phase is to see the NCAG installed and the demilitarisation of Gaza under international monitoring, with Hamas and other armed groups placing their weapons “permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning”. It also entails deploying an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and a new Palestinian police force, as well as the beginnings of an economic development plan. Israeli troops are to gradually withdraw from Gaza to a buffer zone along the strip’s perimeter, after demilitarisation has been verified and territory handed over to the ISF. The third phase is to open Gaza to full reconstruction. A “credible pathway” to selfdetermination and statehood may also be entertained, based on the pace of Gaza’s redevelopment and reforms by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. “Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full”, BBC, 30 September 2025. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 3 lion people languish in terrible conditions, many barely able to survive, let alone see a horizon beyond indefinite suffering or renewed war. This report examines the state of the ceasefire plan and the hurdles in its path. It focuses on the NCAG’s role, laying out the challenges the committee is facing before the members even start their work. It recommends ways to overcome the impasse by supporting the NCAG, so that Palestinians in Gaza may see at least modest improvement in their lives amid the misery the war has left behind. This report is based on interviews and consultations with some 60 senior officials, diplomats, journalists and experts both in Israel-Palestine and abroad, as well as on research in publicly available materials.7 7Most of the interviewees were men, reflecting the gender imbalance in their respective fields. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 4 II. Why the NCAG?  The idea of forming a Palestinian technocratic body to govern Gaza after the war had been floating around for some time before President Donald Trump folded it into his plan for the Board of Peace.8 Its composition – mediated by Egypt and approved by Israel – was negotiated and welcomed by all Palestinian political parties as part of reconciliation talks. It was then endorsed, along with other parts of the twentypoint ceasefire plan, by the UN Security Council in November 2025.9 The NCAG’s fourteen members all have family roots in Gaza and are seen as unaffiliated with any faction. They hold portfolios ranging from health, education, water management, transport and telecommunications to tribal and religious affairs.10 The committee is headed by Ali Shaath, a civil engineer who previously held senior roles in the Palestinian Authority’s ministries of transport, planning and international cooperation.11 Other commissioners hail from similar public service positions, as well as from civil society, academia and the private sector. Only one of them, social protection commissioner Hanaa Tarazi, is a woman. In accordance with the White House’s blueprint, the NCAG answers to a High Representative for Gaza, an office held by Nickolay Mladenov, a Bulgarian diplomat and former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.12 Mladenov is aided by an international Gaza 8 The body was first conceived as a “community support committee” in reconciliation talks involving Hamas, Fatah and other Palestinian factions. In March 2025, the Arab League incorporated it in an Egyptian-led reconstruction plan for Gaza, as did the signatories to the New York Declaration on the Two-State Solution that July. Trump then adopted it as part of the ceasefire deal in October, though subordinating it to his Board of Peace. A shortlist of commissioners had been drawn up months earlier, but it was not made final until the NCAG was launched a few weeks after the UN Security Council endorsed Trump’s deal. See “Cairo Statement and Arab Plan Adopted at the League of Arab States Summit for Early Recovery, Reconstruction and Redevelopment in Gaza”, UN, 11 March 2025; “New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution”, UN, 29 July 2025. 9 “Security Council authorises International Stabilisation Force in Gaza, adopting Resolution 2803”, UN News, 17 November 2025. 10 See the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza website. 11 A number of people familiar with Shaath described him as a well-connected professional who “knows how to play the game”. Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah and Jerusalem, January-February 2026. In January, Shaath gave several interviews to Arabic media outlets, indicating an interest in cultivating public trust in the NCAG. See the interviews on Basma Radio, 14 January 2026 and QNews, 16 January 2026 [Arabic]. But aside from brief comments at two Board of Peace meetings, he has said nothing in public since. In May, Awni Abu-Ramadan, the commissioner for economy, industry and trade, spoke in a webinar with other experts, focusing his remarks on Gaza’s needs rather than the NCAG itself. “Unmet Needs: Gaza’s Humanitarian Crisis and the International Response Gap”, Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, 11 May 2026. 12 The Board of Peace designated the High Representative’s office as the “operational arm” of the ceasefire plan under the oversight of the U.S.-led Executive Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 5 Executive Board that includes senior government officials from Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, as well as UN veteran and former Dutch official Sigrid Kaag and Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay. They are overseen by a separate overall Executive Board composed mostly of U.S. government and business figures. President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, his chief negotiator Steve Witkoff and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, who all helped design the Board of Peace, as well White House chief of staff Susie Wiles, sit on both executive boards.13 The top tier is headed by Trump as chair, along with representatives of 26 states that joined the Board of Peace in January. Two U.S. officials attached as advisers, Aryeh Lightstone and Josh Gruenbaum, appear to be chief administrators of the entire apparatus (see Appendix B for an organisational chart of the Board of Peace’s Gaza mission).14 Rather like the Board of Peace in which it is embedded, the NCAG is shrouded in ambiguity. Its mandate has been defined in differing ways in various documents – including in the July roadmap – creating confusion about the exact scope of its authority.15 Officials have ascribed to the NCAG a range of administrative, security and economic tasks, with little clarity as to how it is to divide up duties with other bodies operating under the U.S.-led plan. Few sources, including wellconnected officials, were able to say much about the NCAG beyond what has been publicly reported.16 The NCAG has thus been something of a black box with very limited contact with outsiders.17 As a PalestinBoard. The office has the authority to supervise the NCAG’s budgets, civil service appointments and police officers, as well as to enact, change or repeal laws in Gaza. Board of Peace Resolution (BOP/RES/2026/1), 22 January 2026. 13 “Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, White House, 16 January 2025. See also the Board of Peace website. 14 Crisis Group interviews, senior U.S. and Western diplomats, Tel Aviv, November 2025 and February 2026. See also Hadjar Aouardji, “‘Board of Peace’ or ‘Trump’s World’?” IRIS, 19 February 2026; and Hugh Lovatt, “Welcome to the Jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace Goes Global”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 January 2026. 15 See the NCAG website. See also “Security Council authorises International Stabilization Force in Gaza, adopting Resolution 2803”, op. cit.; and “President Trump Participates in the Board of Peace Charter Announcement”, White House, 22 January 2026. 16 Part of the problem, some said, is that the Board’s decision-making appears to be concentrated within a small, all-U.S. team run by advisers Lightstone and Gruenbaum. Sometimes dubbed the “envoy shop” or “Hilton club” (an allusion to the hotel chain the officials are said to frequent in their travels), the group appears to report to Kushner and Witkoff, the Trump administration negotiators who are simultaneously handling other files such as Iran and Ukraine. Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, February 2026. The members are also said to have been instructed by the U.S. not to divulge information about the body. Crisis Group’s own attempts to interview members were unsuccessful. 17 Cate Brown, Emma Graham-Harrison and Julian Borger, “‘The door to the future of Gaza is still closed’: Trump’s reconstruction promises stall”, The Guardian, 20 May 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 6 ian businessman said of the committee, “We’re learning live through the media like everyone else”.18 A. The Task at Hand What is clear, though, is the colossal scale of the catastrophe that the NCAG is meant to redress.19 The war has torn Gaza apart, killing at least 73,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and erasing entire families and communities.20 Other credible estimates are far higher.21 Over 1,200 of those people have been killed since the truce began in October, mostly in sporadic Israeli airstrikes as well as shootings along the Yellow Line drawn as part of the first phase. Despite the efforts of Gaza’s hospitals and doctors, the health care sector is too weakened to treat the 174,000 people who have been wounded, the tens of thousands suffering from malnutrition, the countless others afflicted with diseases and other illnesses, and a society traumatised by unfathomable violence and loss.22 Gaza’s landscape is unrecognisable to its people. Around 81 per cent of its buildings, including 90 per cent of homes and 93 per cent of schools, have been destroyed or severely damaged. The Yellow Line has partitioned the strip, with Israeli forces lethally enforcing it as a “no-go” zone; they have also levelled entire neighbourhoods on their side of the line as they push it farther toward the sea.23 Most Palestinians remain displaced and living in tents or crumbling buildings.  The ceasefire has brought some relief but little chance to rebuild lives. Israel has partially lifted the near-total siege it imposed from March to September 2025, which had starved Gaza and pushed some areas into famine.24 Food is now more readily available, but the debilitating effects 18 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian businessman, Ramallah, February 2026. 19 “A Cartography of Genocide”, Forensic Architecture, 8 October 2025. See also Crisis Group Statement, “The World’s Shame in Gaza”, 2 September 2025. 20 “Reported Impact Snapshot: Gaza Strip”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 5 August 2026; “Humanitarian Situation Report – 7 August 2026”, UN OCHA.  21 Michael Spagat, Jon Pedersen, Khalil Shikaki et al., “Violent and Non-Violent Death Tolls for the Gaza Conflict: New Primary Evidence from a PopulationRepresentative Field Survey”, The Lancet Global Health, vol. 14, no. 4 (2026); “Gaza: Study Reveals Unprecedented Losses of Life and Life Expectancy”, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 25 November 2025. 22 “Occupied Palestinian Territory Country Dashboard”, World Health Organisation; “The Systematic Destruction of Gaza’s Healthcare System”, Al-Haq, 23 January 2025. 23 Benedict Garman, Emma Pengelly and Matt Murphy, “Israel moves Yellow Line deeper into Gaza, satellite imagery shows”, BBC, 16 January 2026; Dawoud Abu Alkas, Catherine Cartier, Edward Carron and Rami Ayyub, “How Israel moved its ‘Yellow Line’ deeper into a shattered Gaza City neighbourhood”, Reuters, 23 January 2026. 24 Robert Blecher and Chris Newton, “The Gaza Starvation Experiment”, Crisis Group Commentary, 6 June 2025; Robert Blecher and Chris Newton, “The Worst Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 7 of hunger remain.25 Clean drinking water is scant.26 About 70 per cent of the electricity grid has been ruined and fuel is scarce. Very few tents are being allowed to enter the strip, and those that do come mostly in commercial shipments tend to be sold at a high price.27 Residents are exposed to serious health and safety risks in both winter cold and scorching summer heat.28 A Palestinian expert described Gaza as a “biological hazard”, with preventable diseases spreading rapidly due to lack of medicine and appalling living conditions.29 Such a collapse “cannot go on indefinitely”, warned a UN analyst, as families will become ever less able to cope absent an overhaul of conditions.30 The NCAG’s advocates argue that the committee can play a critical role in meeting Gaza’s urgent needs, which are now seen to by a battered network of municipalities, government ministries and aid groups operating on a shoestring. Rebuilding Gaza and restarting public services will be long and costly, with an assessment by the World Bank, European Union and UN estimating the cost of recovery and reconstruction over the next decade at some $70 billion.31 In addition, the fifteen-point roadmap of 30 July entrusted the NCAG with handling local security as well as the decommissioning of armed groups. The billions that governments have promised to the Board of Peace should in theory help the NCAG take up the mantle on Gaza’s reconstruction. But as discussed below, how many Board members will make good on their pledges is unclear, as is how much of those funds will be channelled through the NCAG. Still, many officials are eager for the technocrats to get to work. As a U.S. diplomat said, “They need to get quick wins, especially on the humanitarian front”.32 Several months on, however, the NCAG’s score sheet is still empty. Case Scenario of Famine is Currently Playing Out in the Gaza Strip”, Crisis Group Analyst’s Notebook, 31 July 2025. 25 “Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Assistance Drives Food Security and Nutrition, but Conditions Remain Highly Fragile”, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 23 July 2026. See also Alex de Waal, “Famine’s long shadow”, Jewish Currents, 6 October 2025. 26 “100 Days into Ceasefire, Gaza Still Deliberately Deprived of Water as Aid Groups Forced to Scavenge Under Illegal Blockade”, Oxfam, 14 January 2026. 27 Emma Graham-Harrison and Julian Borger, “Israel allowing traders to bring into Gaza ‘dual use’ items barred from aid organisations”, The Guardian, 1 January 2026. 28 “It is an epidemic waiting to happen”, said a manager for an international NGO working in Gaza. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, February 2026. 29 Crisis Group telephone interview, Gaza researcher, January 2026. 30 “Severity is cumulative”, explained the UN analyst, adding that “Even without mass-casualty events, the system is tested to its limits”. Crisis Group interview, UN OCHA analyst, Ramallah, February 2026. See also “The Ceasefire in Gaza”, Forensic Architecture, 23 January 2026. 31 “Gaza Strip: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment”, World Bank, European Union and UN, April 2026. 32 Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 8 B. Israel’s “Best Bad Option” Beyond its technical and administrative mission, the NCAG also serves a political purpose for each of the warring parties. For Israel, the committee is a temporary remedy for a problem of its own making. Following Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, the Israeli government vowed to keep prosecuting the ensuing war until the Islamist group – which has ruled Gaza since ousting the Palestinian Authority (PA), dominated by its rival Fatah, in 2007 – was destroyed or, at least, disarmed and barred from any role in governance. Many foreign capitals, including in the Arab world and Europe, echoed the latter demand. Israel’s military campaign dealt severe blows to Hamas’s capabilities and to Gaza’s governing apparatus, and today it has wrested 65 to 70 per cent of Gaza from Hamas’s direct control.33 Yet Israel has still failed to dislodge the group. Israeli efforts to weaken Hamas’s rule by backing a network of armed gangs in Gaza have also proven unsuccessful, with Hamas forces brutally cracking down on the gangs, whom much of the Palestinian public regards as extortionists and traitors.34 At the same time, Israeli officials have yet to decide what they think should replace Hamas and fill the void created by its war. Prime Minister Netanyahu has flatly rejected international calls to reinstate the PA, which ran Gaza from 1995 until 2007, or to allow Gaza to become part of a future Palestinian state.35 Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, have demanded that Israel reimpose direct military rule over Gaza, in part to pave the way for expelling Palestinians and building Jewish settlements.36 Israel’s defence establishment, however, is largely averse to shouldering the full burden of governing the occupied population, as it did prior to the PA’s creation by the 1993-1995 Oslo accords. With military campaigns on multiple fronts and a high-stakes election approaching in October, Israel appears to have reverted to its pre-war policy of conflict management, containing its Gaza problem at minimal cost while shaping the strip’s geography and launching attacks at will. 33 “Interactive Map: Gaza Strip in the Aftermath of the Ceasefire”, Institute for National Security Studies, 23 October 2025; Hani Mahmoud, “Yellow Line: The de facto Israeli buffer zone shaping life in Gaza”, Al Jazeera English, 26 January 2026. 34 Mehul Srivastava and Heba Saleh, “The militias seeking to fight Israel’s shadow war in Gaza”, Financial Times, 14 November 2025; Ben van der Merew and Sam Doak, “Guns, cash and American aid: Investigation reveals Israel’s support for Gaza militia”, Sky News, 4 October 2025. 35 Israeli officials accuse the Ramallah-based PA of incompetence and incitement, and in any case, they oppose any move that would look like a precursor to Palestinian statehood. In its vetting of NCAG nominees, Israel vetoed anyone it deemed too close to the PA (or to Hamas). Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, London and Doha, October-December 2025. 36 Sam Sokol and Reuters, “Smotrich calls to shutter U.S.-led Gaza coordination center, resettle strip”, Times of Israel, 19 January 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 9 Purporting to accommodate the NCAG within that policy is in part a response to external pressure, chiefly from the U.S.37 But some Israeli officials and analysts also argue that the NCAG may benefit Israel, allowing it to avoid humanitarian, financial and administrative responsibility for Gaza’s population while retaining overarching control of the territory.38  For critics, such an approach would mirror Israel’s policies in the West Bank, turning supposedly temporary measures into a long-term reality. According to this view, the NCAG could replicate the role played by the PA, which was designed to be a provisional Palestinian government but wound up serving as an instrument of Israel’s occupation.39 The added value for Israel would be that the NCAG, at least on the surface, would be stripped of any political role. As an Israeli expert put it, “In Gaza we face only bad choices, so the best one is the technocratic committee”.40 C. Aligned Palestinian Factional Interests While ostensibly an apolitical institution, the NCAG is heavily shaped by Palestinian political interests. Hamas had signalled for years that it was seeking to relieve itself of governing Gaza, in part believing that these duties had hampered its ability to resist Israeli occupation.41 Israeli military pressure and demands by foreign governments, including Arab states, for Hamas to give up its rule have left the group with little choice. Hamas is also wary of growing discontent among Gaza’s people, many of whom are furious at having paid the price for its 7 October 2023 assault.42 37 The U.S. incorporated the committee into its plan after intensive diplomacy by regional states, and Netanyahu in turn appears to have accepted the NCAG in order to stay in Trump’s good graces. Israeli politicians from both the governing coalition and the opposition complain that Netanyahu has ceded too much decision-making power to the U.S. and too much influence to states deemed hostile to Israel, such as Qatar and Türkiye, at the expense of Israel’s freedom to act in Gaza. Tobias Holcman, “‘Diplomatic failure for Israel’: Opposition and coalition slam Trump’s Gaza Board of Peace”, Jerusalem Post, 17 January 2026. 38 A former Israeli national security adviser argued: “You need a Palestinian body. The NCAG also needs the PA. I don’t want to replicate the dysfunction and administrative system in the West Bank, but you need personnel [to run Gaza]. Pushing Palestinians to start afresh is not a bad thing”. Crisis Group interview, Tel Aviv, February 2026. See also Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF suggests limiting humanitarian aid trucks entering Gaza”, Jerusalem Post, 29 January 2026. 39 Max Rodenbeck, “Why Some Relief for Gaza, but None for the West Bank?”, Crisis Group Commentary, 16 December 2025. 40 Crisis Group interview, Israeli expert on Palestinian affairs, Tel Aviv, February 2026. 41 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas politburo members and Palestinian analysts, 2025. See also Crisis Group, “What Does Hamas Want?”, Hold Your Fire! (podcast), 27 May 2021. 42 Crisis Group interviews, Gaza journalists and residents, February 2025-February 2026. See also “Perceptions in the Gaza Strip after the Ceasefire”, Institute for Social Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 10 Against this backdrop, since the NCAG’s incorporation into the Board of Peace, Hamas has oscillated between criticising “foreign custodianship” in Gaza and welcoming Trump’s engagement.43 In practice, it has made a number of moves toward accommodation – accepting independent officials to sit on the NCAG and even expressing openness to the body falling under the PA’s purview. The group has also sought to keep the option open for civil servants, including its party members, to join the new civilian government as well as the new Palestinian police force envisaged by the ceasefire deal (these demands were somewhat integrated into the 30 July roadmap text). Notwithstanding misgivings, Hamas formally dissolved its Gaza government in early July to signal its readiness to hand over duties to the NCAG. It has directed Gaza’s 40,000 government workers, including 10,000 police officers, to cooperate with the new body.44 Fatah, which dominates the PA, was opposed at first to creating a separate governing body in Gaza outside the PA’s control.45 Nonetheless, the PA succeeded in filling the NCAG with figures who have worked in its ministries or maintain close ties to West Bank elites, giving Ramallah an informal foothold in Gaza’s governance.46 Several analysts say the committee allows the PA to evade the unenviable task of managing Gaza immediately after such a destructive war, and also helps it to avoid the appearance of reclaiming the strip “on top of an Israeli tank”.47 and Economic Progress, 9-16 October 2025; Mahmoud Mushtaha, “Gazan anger at Hamas grows as war drags on”, +972 Magazine, 6 August 2024; and Khalil Shikaki, “What the anti-Hamas protests in Gaza actually mean”, Time, 2 April 2025. 43 The fact that U.S. envoys are talking to Hamas is especially seen as a diplomatic win. “This is certainly an opportunity because, in the end, it is better for them to hear from us directly than about us from others. … The Israelis hated it. They wanted their narrative to remain the exclusive narrative … [to] decide who is good, who is bad”. Crisis Group interview, Doha, April 2025. 44 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas and PA officials, February-April 2025. See also Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas seeks role for its police in Gaza ahead of disarmament talks, sources say”, Reuters, 27 January 2026; “Hamas announces dissolution of Gaza governing body”, Al Jazeera/AFP, 6 July 2026. 45 In December 2024, President Mahmoud Abbas refused to approve a FatahHamas agreement on the committee’s composition, arguing that such an institution would fragment the body politic and undermine the legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. According to some analysts, Abbas fears that the NCAG could represent a challenge to his authority or become a model that Israel would try to replicate in the West Bank to replace the PA. Others say Abbas may have stalled with the cynical hope that Israel’s campaign in Gaza could weaken Hamas further and give the PA an upper hand. When talks over the committee resumed a year later, the PA once again “dragged its feet” in naming the members, partly out of frustration with Israel’s refusal to allow a sitting PA official to join. Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian analysts, December 2024-February 2025; and senior European government adviser, November 2025. 46 “[Shaath] is acting as if he were part of a state apparatus. … He is in touch with the PA daily”. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian economic policy adviser, Ramallah, February 2026. 47 Leila Molana-Allen, “Palestinian Authority not going ‘to Gaza on an Israeli military tank’, PM says”, PBS News, 6 November 2023. A veteran political expert said Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 11 Formally, though, the PA hopes to integrate the NCAG into its statehood project, relying in particular on its Arab and European backers to advocate for Gaza’s reunification with the West Bank under the mantra of “one authority, one law, one weapon” – a principle promoted by the 30 July roadmap.48 At the same time, the PA and Hamas have had to contend with the influence of Mohammad Dahlan – a Gaza-born exiled Fatah leader who led the PA forces’ clashes with Hamas in 2007 but later fell out with President Mahmoud Abbas. Enjoying extensive networks in the occupied territories as well as the UAE’s patronage, Dahlan reportedly worked to place several people in the NCAG said to be aligned with his faction.49 Some experts say he is trying to present himself an interlocutor between, if not an alternative to, Hamas and the PA.50 Though he is distrusted by both parties, some observers argue that Dahlan could be effective at channelling money to the NCAG, given the UAE’s close ties to Israel and the U.S. as well as Abu Dhabi’s willingness to fund reconstruction projects in Gaza.51 the PA was putting “so little effort” into getting back into Gaza, instead relying on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and France to promote its statehood agenda and help fund reconstruction. Crisis Group interview, London, March 2026. 48 Crisis Group interviews, senior PA official and economic policy adviser, February 2026. 49 Muhammad Shehada, “How Netanyahu is sabotaging phase two of the Gaza ceasefire”, +972 Magazine, 29 January 2026. 50 A source in Dahlan’s circles claimed that U.S. envoys Kushner and Witkoff “took [Dahlan’s] contributions seriously” in shaping the committee and in U.S. negotiations with Hamas. Crisis Group interview, London, January 2026. Notably, Dahlan re-emerged on social media in late July after the Board of Peace and Palestinian factions agreed to the decommissioning deal in Cairo. He seems to have wanted to showcase his role in the talks, as well as his connections with Kushner, whom he mentioned by name. Post on X, Mohammad Dahlan, @mohammad_dahlan, 7:16pm, 2 August 2026. 51 Due in part to Dahlan’s engagement, the UAE reportedly delivered over $2 billion to Gaza’s hospitals during the war. Crisis Group interviews, January-February 2026. The UAE has also reportedly offered to pay for building pilot “safe” housing for some 11,000 people on the Israeli-controlled side of the Yellow Line – a project proposed by Kushner at Davos. See also Rami Ayyub, Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Alexander Cornwell, “Gaza firm to build UAE-funded housing compound in Israeli-held south, sources say”, Reuters, 25 February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 12 III. A Dysfunctional Decision-making Hierarchy In principle, the NCAG enjoys a broad base of support resting on U.S. backing, as well as on the 30 July deal that Hamas, other factions and regional mediators formally endorsed. In practice, however, the NCAG still faces a matrix of obstacles that the fifteen-point roadmap failed to fully resolve, beginning with contradictory visions that muddle the committee’s purpose and mire it in a dysfunctional decision-making hierarchy. A. Protectorate vs. Statehood The first set of obstacles lies in the Russian nesting doll in which the NCAG sits – and with it, a discrepancy regarding the political objective that the committee is meant to help realise. Since proposing the Board of Peace, the U.S. has radically altered the parameters of the organisation’s powers and composition – to the alarm of many governments.52 When Arab and European leaders first endorsed the twenty-point plan in late September 2025, many were privately dismissive of the idea of the Board but accepted it in the interest of keeping Trump invested in the truce – a tactic that an Arab official described as “ego maintenance”.53 Hamas, while criticising what it described as a “foreign trusteeship” over Gaza, nonetheless opted for what it saw as a pragmatic response that deferred the plan’s trickier components to later discussion.54 The Board has now become an even more convoluted institution. During UN Security Council debates about the ceasefire plan in November 2025, the U.S. pressed member states to grant the Board more authority in Gaza than had been previously assumed – albeit with an expiration date at the end of 2027 – in what a top European adviser described as a “step back” for the truce.55 Then, in January, the U.S. expanded the 52 Crisis Group interviews, Arab, European and Asian officials, London and New York, January-April 2026. See also Max Rodenbeck and Michael Wahid Hanna, “When the Board of Peace Meets in Washington, Gaza’s Future Will Be on the Line”, Crisis Group Commentary, 12 February 2026. 53 Crisis Group interview, senior Arab official, London, October 2025. 54 A Hamas official told Crisis Group during the truce’s first weeks: “The Board of Peace brings back uncomfortable memories of the British Mandate [for Palestine]. … But if the Board’s focus is on reconstruction, channelling funds … [and] keeping the flow of massive investment in reconstruction to the Palestinian committee, then that’s acceptable”. Crisis Group interview, senior Hamas political bureau member, Doha, November 2025. 55 Crisis Group interview, Paris, November 2025. The Security Council resolution promoted the Board as an “international legal personality” that would decide how to implement the ceasefire, have the power to establish new entities with privileges and immunities, and handle aid delivery and reconstruction. Council members, including veto-wielding China and Russia, acquiesced to these provisions after Arab and Muslim leaders urged them to accept the U.S. version for fear of losing momentum for the ceasefire. See also Daniel Forti, Richard Gowan and Max  Rodenbeck, “What to Look for as the Gaza Peace Plan Comes to the UN Security Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 13 Board’s canvas beyond the authority conferred on it by the Council, giving it a global remit that many saw as aspiring to rival the UN. Trump is set to hold lifetime executive power over the body.56 Later, during a Congressional hearing in June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. is considering turning the Board into an international NGO rather than a public or multilateral organisation akin to the UN.57 As for its mission in Gaza, under its first resolution in January, the Board has vested itself with “[a]ll transitional legislative and executive authority, emergency powers, and the administration of justice”.58 It is being directed by figures on the Israeli and U.S. political right, many of whom are also invested in real estate and other business ventures in the region.59 The Gaza Executive Board has a more international complexion, but it has played a distant advisory role at best. Trump’s inner circle appears to call the shots, with Kushner saying the Board will be run “like we do [it] in the private sector”.60 Because the Board’s top councils are unlikely to meet regularly, oversight of Mladenov’s office and the NCAG – and thus of Gaza’s overarching affairs – seems to be delegated to Lightstone and Gruenbaum, both of whom are closely aligned with Israel, as well as to Blair.61 Council”, Crisis Group Commentary, 14 November 2025; UN Security Resolution (S/RES/2803), 17 November 2025. 56 According to a diplomat from a country that eventually joined the Board, the expansion of the organisation’s mandate has done “serious damage” to its legitimacy, making its original task of aiding Gaza more difficult. Crisis Group interview, New York, April 2026. See also Richard Gowan and Daniel Forti, “Trump’s Board of Discord”, Foreign Policy, 22 January 2026. 57 See “‘I Have Serious Concerns’: Jacky Rosen grills Marco Rubio on how Gaza Board of Peace is funded”, video, YouTube, 3 June 2026. See also Zaha Hassan, “Board up Donald Trump’s failed Board of Peace”, Diwan (blog), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 June 2026. 58 Board of Peace Resolution (BOP/RES/2026/1), 22 January 2026. 59 Kushner and Witkoff, for example, are both reported to have continued profiting from private equity firms and other business deals while in their envoy positions. Other executive board members may also be poised to reap personal benefits. Martin Edelman is counsel to an artificial intelligence company and a real estate firm, a director of a UAE-based investment fund and a board member of a group owning several football clubs. Marc Rowan is CEO of Apollo Global Management, an asset management firm. See the executive board list at the Board of Peace website; Rob Copeland and Maureen Farrell, “Jared Kushner solicits funds for his firm while working as Mideast envoy”, The New York Times, 13 March 2026; and Giacomo Tognini, “How peace envoy Steve Witkoff got richer thanks to Trump and Elon Musk”, Forbes, 4 April 2026. 60 “President Trump Participates in the Board of Peace Event”, op. cit. 61 A U.S. diplomat described the division of labour between the two advisers as: “Lightstone does the ‘primary engagement’ with Israelis and regional governments. Gruenbaum is more on the supply chain”. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, February 2026. Lightstone was associated with the controversial Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which oversaw chaotic, violent aid distributions in early 2025, as well as the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states. Their “Hilton club” of envoys, set up in Israel, has lately added extra personnel, most of them seconded from the State Department. Crisis Group interviews, European diplomats, Tel Aviv, Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 14 The Trump administration’s proposition for what essentially amounts to an open-ended, U.S.-led protectorate in Gaza is at odds with the official positions of most governments, which want to integrate Gaza into an independent Palestinian state. That latter agenda is promoted by most Palestinian factions, including both the PA and (at least nominally) Hamas, as well as the Global Alliance for the Two-State Solution, a coalition of states that articulated its vision for Palestine in the New York Declaration of July 2025.62 (Of the 193 UN member states, 157 have so far recognised Palestine as a state.) The 30 July roadmap also reiterated several times the aim to “create appropriate conditions for a credible pathway toward achieving self-determination and statehood”. World leaders insist that the Global Alliance’s program is compatible with the twenty-point ceasefire plan and the UN Security Council resolution that endorsed it (which make only fleeting mentions of a “pathway” to statehood as an “aspiration”). Many Arab and European governments have openly said they see the NCAG as a stepping stone toward bringing the PA back into Gaza and reconnecting the strip with the West Bank. Mladenov has stated his own hope of helping foster a two-state solution. He has also created a liaison office between the PA and the High Representative, giving Ramallah a formal, albeit indirect link to the NCAG.63 The PA itself has embraced the ceasefire deal despite receiving only a marginal mention in the twenty-point plan and none in the fifteen-point roadmap. In an attempt to meet the terms for Gaza to come back under its jurisdiction, the PA has introduced a series of measures that it has presented as part of the plan’s demanded “reforms”, such as making finances more transparent, revising school curricula, drafting a new constitution and holding several layers of elections throughout 2026 (though many Palestinian experts and much of the public question the February 2026. See also Neri Zilber, “Trump administration prepares to unveil new Gaza leadership”, Financial Times, 13 January 2026; Liza Rozovsky, “U.S. mediates between Israel and UN to ease tensions over Gaza Humanitarian Foundation”, Haaretz, 16 August 2025; and Gerry Shih, Cate Brown, Claire Parker and Karen DeYoung, “Sweeping overhaul of Gaza aid raises questions of morality and workability”, Washington Post, 24 May 2025.  62 Initially signed by seventeen states, as well as the European Union and Arab League, the New York Declaration was endorsed in September 2025 by the UN General Assembly, with 142 of 193 members voting yes. “New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution”, op. cit. 63 The exact workings of the liaison office are unclear, but officials suggest that “[w]e are now in a state of ambiguity, which is not so bad – it allows for some relations between NCAG and the PA, but [committee chair] Shaath is being very careful”. Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. See also “Vice President Al-Shaikh tells Mladenov liaison office ready to assume full duties in Gaza”, Wafa News Agency, 21 February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 15 genuineness of these measures).64 Whether or not statehood efforts make headway, Palestinian and foreign officials argue that the need to keep the U.S. invested in a truce – specifically, for it to deter Israel from resuming large-scale military action – makes the Board of Peace initiative “the only game in town”.65 It is not a game that offers the Palestinians good odds. The claim of complementarity between the U.S. and Global Alliance visions appears ever less convincing as the Trump administration steers the ceasefire further toward foreign stewardship. The Netanyahu government has also been abundantly clear that it will not tolerate overt linkage of the NCAG to the PA, and it remains adamantly opposed to Palestinian statehood.66 In May, Finance Minister Smotrich even rejected a U.S. suggestion to direct some of the $5 billion in Palestinian tax revenues, which Israel has punitively withheld from the PA, to the Board of Peace’s work in Gaza.67 As a senior PA official told Crisis Group,  “We want to help Gaza, but we’re also the ones with the least amount of control”.68 Under the current structures, the Global Alliance could find a foothold through the Gaza Executive Board assigned to support Mladenov’s office. The bulk of that board’s members represent countries that formally endorse the two-state solution. In theory, they could use their platform to push for measures that are more reflective of the New York Declaration.  But that board has not met, does not have a collective form of communication and is not even being consulted as a group.69 Even if it were, the hierarchy does not give members much power vis-à-vis the predominantly U.S. officials at the top. Moreover, the regional states that are in both the Alliance and the Board have their own, often competing interests vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine.70 Each is keen to preserve its 64 Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, August 2025 and February 2026. See also Amjad Iraqi, “Palestinian Authority Claims Success in Local Elections amid Spiralling Crises”, Crisis Group Analyst’s Notebook, 30 April 2026. 65 Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian, Arab and European officials and diplomats, Jerusalem, London, Doha and New York, October 2025-February 2026. 66 In two minor but illustrative sagas, Israeli officials expressed outrage in early February when the NCAG changed its logo to mirror the PA’s golden eagle and when it was discovered that people crossing from Egypt into Gaza through Rafah were receiving “State of Palestine” stamps on their passports. Itamar Eichner, “Israel rejects Gaza administrative committee logo featuring Palestinian Authority emblem”, Ynet, 3 February 2026; Amir Ettinger, “Officials raise alarm over ‘State of Palestine’ passport stamps at Rafah crossing”, Ynet, 9 February 2026. 67 Jacob Magid, “Smotrich rejects U.S. request to transfer withheld Palestinian tax revenue to Board of Peace”, Times of Israel, 19 May 2026. 68 Crisis Group interview, senior PA official, Ramallah, February 2026. 69 Crisis Group interview, member of Gaza Executive Board, April 2026. 70 Saudi-Emirati tensions, which have spilled over into various conflict settings, are present in Gaza as well: Riyadh has invested in bolstering the PA, while Abu Dhabi has relied on a more informal network coordinated by Dahlan. Egypt is particularly concerned about the border it shares with Gaza; keen to stop weapons Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 16 relationship with the U.S. and, in some cases, Israel – thus limiting how far these governments are willing to act for Gaza. The nominal consensus behind Palestinian statehood is therefore not matched by unity over how to achieve it. 

B. Gatekeeping Aid The bureaucracy constructed by the U.S. has not altered the reality that Israel is still dictating facts on the ground. So far, Israel has opted to block the NCAG’s ability to work and Gaza’s capacity to recover, particularly by stifling the movement of aid, goods and people. In a clause pressed for by the Palestinian factions, the 30 July roadmap stated that Israel must complete its prior ceasefire obligations by “meeting the humanitarian aid threshold set in the [ceasefire] deal”. That means 6oo trucks should be entering Gaza every day bearing food, medicine, tents and equipment for repairing vital infrastructure.71 Yet despite the push to begin the ceasefire’s second phase, Israel has kept the first incomplete by obstructing aid to Gaza. Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), which stopped providing detailed data on daily movement at the crossings in 2025, has claimed, without substantiation, that the 600-truck mark is being met.72 Data from UN agencies, the Gaza Chamber of Commerce and others, however, suggest that less than half that quota is being satisfied.73 The Rafah crossing, Gaza’s main channel to the outside world, was only opened for movement of people on 1 February (nearly four months after the truce began). Traffic remains extremely limited.74 Restrictions got even tighter after Israel and the U.S. began their war with Iran on 28 February.75 smuggling and forestall the threat of mass displacement of Palestinians to the Sinai, it has tried to shape the strip’s security environment to its advantage. Others, such as Qatar and Türkiye, have their own calculations. Moreover, with the U.S.Israeli war with Iran and the Israel-Hizbollah war still unresolved, many of these states may opt to direct their diplomatic and financial energy to those files, pushing Gaza down their list of priorities. 71 The number of trucks and the metric tonnes of cargo (which COGAT prefers to cite) are dubious measurements, as what matters is the nature of the cargo and the extent to which it meets needs among the population. They are nonetheless referenced here as indicators of the movement of aid, which show that even by those limited standards, the promised aid levels are not being met. 72 Post on X, COGAT, @cogatonline, 12:35pm, 18 May 2026. See also “Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire, October 2025-June 2026”, COGAT, 9 July 2026. In January, the Israeli army, claiming that it had hit the daily 600truck mark, recommended lowering provisions to 200 trucks, saying Gaza’s critical needs had been met and the reduced rate would thenceforth be sufficient. Bob, “IDF suggests limiting humanitarian aid trucks entering Gaza”, op. cit. 73 Crisis Group interviews, aid workers and diplomats, Ramallah, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, February 2026. See UN 2720 Mechanism for Gaza, Monitoring and Tracking Dashboard, UNOPS. 74 According to World Health Organisation statistics, for example, more Palestinians were granted medical evacuations during the tw0-month ceasefire between Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 17 The stringent criteria for the types of aid allowed into Gaza have also barely changed – and, in some cases, harshened. Israeli authorities insist on the right to screen all shipments for what they define as “dual-use” items, including types of medical equipment and construction materials, that might be diverted to military purposes. UN bodies and NGOs have long criticised Israel’s “dual-use” classification as sweeping, opaque and at times absurd.76 On the few occasions when dual-use items get through, they are usually brought in by private companies or smugglers, with the consent of Israeli authorities, and sold for a high price.77 Such restrictions and selective enforcement render inadmissible the most basic materials required for recovery, let alone reconstruction.  At the same time, Israel has gone after international organisations that have traditionally distributed Gaza’s aid and that could complement the NCAG’s work. A principal target has been the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), historically Gaza’s largest aid provider. Israel, which has long been hostile to UNRWA for promoting the cause of Palestinian refugees, has made inflated accusations of it harbouring employees with ties to terrorist groups. Israel has aggressively campaigned to shut down the agency – even attacking it militarily.78 While other UN agencies such as the World Food Programme and World Health Organisation continue to operate in Gaza, all have stressed that UNRWA remains the most capable provider and that they rely on its January and March 2025 (about 1,700 patients and 2,500 companions) than in the six-month ceasefire between October and February 2026 (1,685 patients and 2,529 companions). Occupied Palestinian Territory Country Dashboard, WHO. See also Ruwaida Amer, “‘I would never do it again’: Inside the struggle to enter and leave Gaza”, +972 Magazine, 13 February 2026. 75 When it began its war with Iran, Israel first blocked all movement into Gaza, then reopened the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings after diplomatic intervention, but at drastically reduced volumes. In April, for example, according to Gaza’s Chamber of Commerce, only about 120 trucks were entering the strip as a daily average in the first half of the month and 170 trucks in the second half (with a sharp drop in the final week), with about 40 per cent of them commercial trucks. “Weekly Report 88-89 from March 30-April 12, 2026” and “Weekly Report 90-91 from April 13-26, 2026”, Gaza Chamber of Commerce and Industry. See also Nir Hasson, “Gaza aid reduced by 80 per cent since start of Iran war as food prices surge”, Haaretz, 19 March 2026. 76 “Essential and Denied: Israel’s Dual-Use Policy in Gaza”, Gisha, 17 March 2026. 77 Josh Breiner, “Shin Bet chief’s brother charged with aiding enemy during war, taking bribes for Gaza cigarette smuggling”, Haaretz, 5 February 2026.  78 Throughout the war, the Israeli army struck UNRWA facilities in Gaza, including schools that were being used as shelters. These attacks killed 310 UNRWA personnel. In October 2024, the Knesset enacted legislation that in effect barred the agency from operating in Israel and the occupied territories. It passed further amendments in December 2025 to block electricity and water supplies to UNRWA facilities. In the words of a top UNRWA official, “A political decision has been made to eliminate UNRWA as a war aim”. Crisis Group interview, London, December 2024. See also Crisis Group Statement, “Keep UNRWA Alive in Gaza and the West Bank”, 18 November 2024; and “UNRWA: Facts Versus Claims”, UNRWA, September 2025. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 18 staff to carry out their own work.79 Shrinking the aid sector further, Israel has revoked permission for 37 prominent aid groups, including Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam, to operate in Israel and the occupied territories for refusing to comply with Israel’s new registration criteria, which have been widely criticised for violating humanitarian principles.80 An underlying problem is the persistence of misinformation, peddled especially by Israeli officials and media, that Hamas is systematically hijacking and profiteering from aid. This claim has been repeatedly debunked by UN agencies and media investigations, which found that such racketeering stems overwhelmingly from Israeli-backed criminal gangs (which Hamas has worked to suppress) and other private smuggling networks.81 In the weeks after the truce began, Hamas launched a violent crackdown on the gangs and clans tied to them, redeployed its police and imposed levies and taxes on markets, all of which contributed to a sharp drop in aid diversions and helped lower the extortionate prices of commercial goods.82 Attempts by Israel and the U.S. to replace the UN-led aid system in Gaza – predicated in part on the accusations above – have ranged from ineffective to disastrous.83 The U.S. has attempted to take on some of the decisions over Gaza’s aid access during the ceasefire by establishing the Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) headquar79 Crisis Group interviews, UN OCHA staff, Ramallah and London, FebruaryMarch 2026. 80 The bans were partly imposed because international NGOs have resisted Israeli demands that they reveal biographical details of all Palestinian employees, which the groups say violate privacy laws and fear Israel could use to go after the individuals. Israel’s High Court rejected the organisations’ petitions to cancel the new requirements. “List of aid groups working in Gaza that Israel is suspending”, Associated Press, 30 December 2025; “Israel: Ban on 37 Aid Groups Makes Life Unbearable for Genocide Survivors in Palestine, Say UN Experts”, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 15 January 2026. See also Jeremy Sharon and agencies, “High Court nixes NGOs’ petition against new security regulations on aid”, Times of Israel, 21 May 2026. 81 Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: USAID analysis found no evidence of massive Hamas theft of Gaza aid”, Reuters, 25 July 2025; Claire Parker, Loveday Morris et al., “Gangs looting Gaza aid operate in areas under Israeli control, aid groups say”, Washington Post, 18 November 2024. 82 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Palestinian researchers and journalists in Gaza, October-November 2025. UN data similarly shows a sharp drop in aid interceptions starting in October 2025. “Intercepted”, UN2720 Monitoring and Tracking Dashboard. See also Gerry Shih, Ari Flanzraich and Hazem Balousha, “Hamas reasserts control on streets of Gaza, turning guns on its rivals”, Washington Post, 15 October 2025; and Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Hamas carries out wave of Gaza killings, citing crime and security concerns”, Reuters, 13 October 2025. 83 The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, a U.S.-sponsored private aid contractor, is one example. Thousands of Palestinians were killed and wounded at its distribution sites in 2025, and many more pushed toward famine, before it closed its operations in December. Blecher and Newton, “The Gaza Starvation Experiment”, op. cit. See also Tal Shalev and Eve Brennan, “Controversial Gaza Humanitarian Foundation to close aid efforts”, CNN, 24 November 2025. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 19 tered at an Israeli base in Kiryat Gat. At first, diplomats expressed optimism that the Centre, which claims to host over 70 countries and organisations, would loosen COGAT’s control and allow more aid into the strip.84 But sources at the CMCC have since said it is a murky structure, in which U.S. and Israeli officers operate on restricted floors while others are sidelined in areas of a building that, not coincidentally, previously served as the headquarters of the defunct Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), a U.S.-sponsored private contractor which oversaw a brief but disastrous stint in distributing aid in the strip.85 Several described the U.S. representatives as inexperienced people with little prior knowledge about Israel-Palestine.86 In practice, the U.S. army and COGAT remain the primary decision-makers, with other participating governments amounting to mere observers. The Board of Peace’s claims that the CMCC has brought unprecedented aid into the strip are also not backed up by available data.87 Like the GHF, the CMCC may end up having a short life span. Several diplomats told Crisis Group that they believed that the CMCC would be shut down sooner or later.88 But the replacement might be just as ineffective. Reports suggest that the U.S. and Israel are considering further shifting aid delivery toward a small group of private firms or organisations, akin to the GHF, including some linked to the UAE. The Board of Peace’s January resolution on Gaza included vague but ominous wording about its right to vet aid groups deemed to have “a demonstrated history of collaboration, infiltration or influence” with Hamas or other militant groups (Israel and the U.S. have accused 84 At the Board of Peace’s February meeting, Mike Waltz, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, claimed that the CMCC was the factor ensuring that humanitarian aid to Gaza had “absolutely surged”. “President Trump Participates in the Board of Peace Event”, op. cit. In fact, according to international groups, aid provision under the CMCC has fallen short not only of the amounts pledged in the ceasefire deal, but also of the amounts that were entering Gaza prior to the war. 85 Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, February 2026. 86 Crisis Group interviews, European diplomats, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, February 2026. According to a diplomat, in February, the U.S. replaced its army commander and staff with a lower-ranking contingent from the Texas National Guard, reflecting the lack of expertise on the region. 87 In one illustrative incident, on 9 April, Mladenov claimed that 602 trucks had entered Gaza that day, but Palestinian observers and relevant data showed that only about 200 had done so. Post on X, Nickolay Mladenov, Board of Peace directorgeneral, @nmladenov, 4:22pm, 9 April 2026. See also “Gaza’s media office denies Board of Peace envoy’s claims on 602 aid trucks entering Strip”, Middle East Monitor, 10 April 2026. 88 Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, Jerusalem and London, December 2025March 2026. Reuters reported as much, though the Board denied the claim. Alexander Cornwell, “Exclusive: US to close its flagship Gaza mission as Trump plan stalls, sources say”, Reuters, 1 May 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 20 many respected organisations of such complicity, but they have offered little credible evidence so far).89 The chaos that now defines Gaza’s aid distribution is untenable. It is likely to debilitate the NCAG, which will require a stable, reliable system of aid delivery in order to meet the population’s needs effectively. The decision to block certain organisations from helping may also cost NCAG a vital base of experienced, trusted and professional support. In his six-month report to the UN Security Council, Mladenov recognised the aid shortfall yet appeared reluctant to acknowledge that Israel is primarily responsible.90 Rather, his report and his public remarks up until the 30 July deal tended to assign responsibility to Hamas for refusing to accept a decommissioning plan as a precondition to unlocking assistance – even though it was supposed to be provided during the ceasefire’s first phase. C. The Bottom Rung It is unlikely that the NCAG will have much autonomy under the U.S.led Board of Peace structures. In what could in theory be seen as a notable improvement, the 30 July roadmap appeared to elevate the NCAG to be the principal operating agent in Gaza, even referring to its ability to apply Palestinian law in Gaza and its goal of facilitating a path to statehood.91 But the committee’s expanding list of ostensible responsibilities has not been backed by any power to meet them. Until recently, aside from Shaath, the commissioners seem to have had little to do. Sources described its members as “sitting in a rundown hotel in Cairo, under heavy security”, with a diplomat adding that they seemed “demotivated” in the absence of serious activity.92 Only in May did the NCAG begin to make more appearances on social media, sharing that it had started holding meetings with diplomats and international organisations at its headquarters, giving presentations about its plans for Gaza, and receiving trainings from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.93 In June, the NCAG attended a Board gathering in Cyprus, and Shaath participated in a Palestine Donor Group conference in Brussels a few weeks later.94 89 Board of Peace Resolution (BOP/RES/2026/1), 22 January 2026. 90 Report of the Board of Peace through the High Representative for Gaza, 15 May 2026. 91 Post on X, Board of Peace, @BoardOfPeace, 7:43am, 31 July 2026. 92 “As soon as the elevator reaches the lobby, they’re surrounded by Egyptian mukhabarat [security service officers]”. Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026; Another diplomat said much the same. Crisis Group interview, Cairo, May 2026.  93 Post on X by the NCAG, @NCAG, 7:43am, 10 May 2026. 94 Post on X by the NCAG, @NCAG, 8:32am, 15 July 2026. Jacob Magid, “Board of Peace finalizing plans for Gaza, but implementation timelines up in the air”, Times of Israel, 29 June 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 21 The committee seems largely excluded from the Board’s decisionmaking process. Sources close to the NCAG said commissioners have expressed feeling “totally foggy” about the deliberations among the upper echelons, adding that they have received “no clear messages” about how to advance the committee’s work.95 A senior PA official echoed the confusion: “The [NCAG’s] roles, its lines of communication, its laws, its staff, its budgets – all of it is unclear. … It’s a big mess”.96 A leading Palestinian human rights and development expert in Gaza who is working to support the NCAG in its transition remarked that the commissioners tended to have the same response when he asked them about their plans: “We don’t know”.97 In late July, Israel’s security cabinet finally agreed to permit Board of Peace officials, ostensibly including the NCAG, to enter Gaza, though reportedly they will be allowed to visit only the Israeli-controlled Rafah region.98 Sources suggested, though, that the commissioners may be reluctant to go in without clear guarantees that they will be safe and free to pursue their work undisturbed.99 Some members are also said to be resistant to the Board’s proposal that the NCAG start its operations on pilot projects in the largely depopulated ruins of Rafah, believing it could be seen as legitimising Israel’s control of the area and that it would not address the pressing needs of the Palestinian majority on the other side of the Yellow Line.100 The NCAG’s financing is also in serious doubt, as is that for Gaza’s recovery.101 In February, Board of Peace members pledged $17 billion to Gaza’s recovery and appointed the World Bank as a “limited trustee” through a Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund.102 The Board itself would distribute the money, seemingly giving no direct control to the NCAG.103 Questions have been raised about the mechanism’s lack of transparency, which differs from other World Bank funds, including 95 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian economic policy adviser, Ramallah, February 2026. 96 Crisis Group interview, senior PA official, Ramallah, February 2026. 97 Crisis Group telephone interview, Palestinian human rights worker in Gaza, April 2026. 98 Jonathan Lis and Liza Rozovsky, “Israeli security cabinet approves entry of Trump’s Board of Peace into Gaza”, Haaretz, 26 July 2026. 99 Crisis Group interview, diplomat at the UN, New York, April 2026. 100 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Palestinian and European experts, July 2026. 101 Only in April did the NCAG reportedly receive salaries and laptops, the former said to be provided by the UAE and the latter by a European government. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Ramallah and Cairo, April-May 2026. See also Liza Rozovsky and Jack Khoury, “Facing Tuesday deadline, Hamas still opposes Board of Peace’s disarmament plan”, Haaretz, 14 April 2026. 102 “President Trump Participates in the Board of Peace Event”, op. cit. 103 The 30 July roadmap did, however, earmark $400 million for the NCAG to carry out a “comprehensive audit of the financial and administrative affairs in Gaza” and address them within three years. “Gaza Roadmap”, op. cit. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 22 a pre-existing one for Gaza.104 Donors seem to have sent little of this sum due to uncertainty about which financial channels to use. Some funds will also inevitably be redirected to coping with the fallout of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.105  All this murkiness feeds fears that the Board is likely to put its principal members’ financial and ideological interests over those of the Palestinian population. At Davos in January, Kushner presented a vision of Gaza after a real estate makeover, including a colour-coded map and AI-generated images of luxury developments that many criticised as detached from the strip’s pre-existing character.106 The map’s compartmentalisation of Gaza into industrial and agricultural zones, with residential areas concentrated in pockets of land far from the strip’s perimeter, would in effect maintain Israel’s enlarged buffer zone and appears designed for counter-insurgency purposes. A European diplomat, confirming this sense of direction, recounted seeing a PowerPoint presentation given by U.S. officers that included the slogan “Build the green, squeeze the red”, in reference to the Israeli (green)- and Hamas (red)-controlled sides of the Yellow Line, respectively.107 Many Palestinians doubt that the committee will be allowed to function effectively.108 “No one in my circles is swallowing the [NCAG] apparatus”, said a Ramallah-based businessman. “What the NCAG can do is a function of what Israel and the U.S. will allow”.109 Some note that technocratic solutions have been tried before through the PA in the West Bank, with mixed or detrimental results.110 Others worry that the committee’s “apolitical” mandate in effect reduces Palestinian 104 Zaha Hassan and Charles Johnson, “The Board of Peace and Funding for Gaza Reconstruction: One Whose Account?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 March 2026. 105 Crisis Group interview, UN official, New York, April 2026. See also Neri Zilber and Abigail Hauslohner, “Donald Trump’s Board of Peace fund is empty”, Financial Times, 27 May 2026. 106 The map was reportedly produced by Israeli businessman and Gaza Executive Board member Yakir Gabay. Zvika Klein, “Who is Yakir Gabay, the billionaire on Trump’s Board of Peace?”, Jerusalem Post, 22 January 2026; Eti Abramov, “The connector: How Israeli billionaire Yakir Gabay found his way onto Trump’s Board of Peace”, Ynet, 6 February 2026. 107 Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Tel Aviv, February 2026. 108 According to a poll, only 32 per cent of Palestinian respondents said they trusted the NCAG, with 24 per cent saying the same of the Board of Peace. “Palestinian Politics after the Gaza War”, Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, 12 August 2026. 109 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian businessman, Ramallah, February 2026. 110 In the West Bank, the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (2007-2013) pursued such an approach, which somewhat strengthened PA institutions and eased redevelopment in Palestinian cities. But it also entrenched an authoritarian security force and failed to deter Israeli military and settlement expansion. Khaled Elgindy, “The End of ‘Fayyadism’ in Palestine”, Brookings Institution, 22 April 2013; Nathan Thrall, “Palestine after Fayyad: The Choice between Cooperation and Conflict”, Crisis Group Commentary, 18 April 2013. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 23 political demands to humanitarian need; as a Gaza-based expert put it, “The promise of the NCAG has now shrunk to improving the Rafah crossing”.111 111 Crisis Group telephone interview, Palestinian development expert in Gaza, April 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 24 IV. The Disarmament Deadlock The twenty-point ceasefire plan envisioned an elaborate security architecture for Gaza, one that has yet to transpire in a tiny strip of land that is also one of the world’s most densely populated and militarised territories. It foresaw a process of decommissioning for Palestinian armed groups, the deployment of an international force and a new Palestinian police force, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza while the army kept garrisons outside the strip.112 The 30 July roadmap sought to clarify these steps and the division of labour among the players, while designating the NCAG to be mainly responsible for policing and decommissioning. The disarmament question was always sure to be a big impediment to the truce, due to ambiguities in the plan’s text, the parties’ divergent threat perceptions and the immense power imbalance between them. But the whiplash induced by the Board’s volte-face on the very decommissioning deal it brokered on 30 July has once again made progress seem unlikely and hamstrung the NCAG before its work has even begun. A. Clash over Scope and Sequencing Since January, the Board of Peace has largely endorsed Israel’s view that Gaza’s demilitarisation – and in particular, Hamas’s total disarmament – must come before moving to the ceasefire’s next phases. In March, Mladenov presented Hamas and other factions with a proposal to surrender all weapons and dismantle all military infrastructure over a period of 250 days, “with no exceptions and no carveouts”, with no explicit linkage made to Israeli troop withdrawals.113 On 21 May, he outlined the general principles of his fifteen-point roadmap to the UN Security Council, focused heavily on decommissioning.114 The Palestinian factions disputed both plans, insisting that the truce’s first phase be completed before phase two’s security provisions begin; that decommissioning be carried out in lockstep with Israeli troop withdrawals; and that a timeline be set up front for the ceasefire’s next phases, including regarding a pathway to statehood.115 112 “Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full”, op. cit. 113 Sources involved in the talks showed Crisis Group a copy of the proposal. See also Abu Bakr Bashir and Daniel Estrin, “Trump’s mediators offer Hamas formal proposal to give up its weapons in Gaza”, NPR, 19 March 2026; and Pesha Magid and Rami Ayyub, “Trump’s peace board hands Hamas disarmament proposal, sources say”, Reuters, 21 March 2026. 114 “Board of Peace High Representative for Gaza Briefs the Security Council”, UN, 21 May 2026. 115 Crisis Group interviews, senior Hamas members, Doha and Cairo, March-April 2026. See also Muhammad Shehada, “Gaza’s disarmament trap”, +972 Magazine, 29 April 2026; Jeremy Scahill and Jawa Ahmad, “Internal documents show Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 25 In addition to sequencing, the parties were at odds over the scope of disarmament. Based on a framework put forward by regional mediators, Hamas suggested that it would be willing to hand “heavy” or “offensive” weapons (such as rockets, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and improvised explosive devices) to a Palestinian body, but not to Israel. Further talks would be held about how to handle “lighter” weapons (such as AK-47s, M-16s and small firearms).116 Hamas signalled openness to a model along these lines for some time; its members frequently cite Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, saying this precedent – a decommissioning process that took a decade to complete and that was tied to political progress – informs their own thinking.117 Under the proposed framework, heavy weapons would be stored in facilities under international monitoring, with no display of small arms for propaganda or other purposes.118 A senior official from a mediating country described the formula as “face-saving” for both parties: Israel could say it accomplished Hamas’s disarmament by removing the most dangerous weapons in the group’s arsenal, while obtaining new diplomatic guarantees and security arrangements to ensure the group could not use whatever weapons it still had left. For its part, Hamas could claim it retained what it argues is its right to resist Israeli occupation with arms, while committing not to use them as long as Israel respects the truce.119 Hamas officials have also pointed to predatory gangs – some operating with Israel’s support – as a reason why it must hold onto its small arms, in order to protect public safety until the NCAG can handle the issue itself.120  The Israeli government, meanwhile, has rejected any attempt to distinguish among types of weapons. In February, Netanyahu set the bar of disarmament at assault rifles: “The heavy weapon, the one that does the most damage, is called an AK-47. … That’s what they used in the Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’ moving to crush Palestinian self-determination”, Drop Site, 23 June 2026. 116 Crisis Group interviews, London and Doha, October-November 2025. See also Muhammad Shehada, “Decommission, not disarm: How Europe can help nudge Gaza toward peace”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 21 July 2025. 117 Muhammad Shehada, “Rescuing the Gaza Ceasefire: What to Do with Hamas’s Weapons”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 22 May 2026. 118 See also Jeremy Scahill and Jawa Ahmad, “‘The occupation’s conditions’: Trump’s Board of Peace demands that Hamas surrender to Netanyahu’s Gaza agenda”, Drop Site, 22 May 2026. 119 By distinguishing between weapons categories, the official said, Hamas could claim it retained what it argues is its right to resist Israeli occupation with arms, while committing not to use them as long as Israel respects the truce. For its part, Israel could say it accomplished Hamas’s disarmament by removing the most dangerous weapons in the group’s arsenal, while obtaining new diplomatic guarantees and security arrangements to ensure the group could not use whatever weapons it still had left. Crisis Group interview, senior Arab official, London, October 2025. 120 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas members, February-April 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 26 massacre of 7 October”.121 Mladenov’s initial March decommissioning plan reflected Israel’s view, classifying AK-47s as heavy weapons and ordering their surrender within the first 90 days of the program.122 Many other Israeli officials, both in the coalition and opposition, have similarly stressed that they will accept nothing less than Hamas relinquishing all its weapons, no matter the type. The pushback from Palestinian factions, alongside the work of the regional mediators, eventually narrowed the gaps. On 30 July, the Board announced that all Gaza’s armed factions had agreed to give up weapons to the NCAG. Centring the principle of “one authority, one law, one weapon”, the text stipulated, among other things, that newly trained Palestinian officers would be “incorporated into existing police structures” and that all armed groups would “decommission and store heavy weapons, military production sites, depots of weapons and tunnels”. The handover would be monitored by a newly created International Verification Committee under the High Representative’s authority as well as by the (still largely incipient) International Stabilisation Force. Personal weapons would be registered and licensed by the NCAG. The roadmap explicitly stated that decommissioning would begin after previous ceasefire commitments were completed; carried out in a “gradual, sequential and time-bound manner” based on an agreed timetable; and “linked to an Israeli withdrawal, in phases”.123 According to Hamas, the factions consented to the roadmap after the Board accepted some of their amendments and, in particular, after it signalled that it would adopt the parameters that other mediators had been urging upon it for months.124 Other mediators shared the understanding that Palestinian decommissioning and Israeli withdrawal would proceed concurrently; so, too, did members of Israel’s cabinet and opposition who denounced the roadmap.125 Mladenov confirmed on 31 July that the two processes “must move in lockstep”.126 121 “Remarks by PM Netanyahu at the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations”, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, 15 February 2025. 122 Crisis Group review of Mladenov’s decommissioning proposal, March 2026. See also Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Trump board plan would disarm Hamas in stages over 8 months, destroy Gaza’s tunnels”, Reuters, 27 March 2026. 123 “Gaza Roadmap”, op. cit. 124 Crisis Group interview, Hamas political bureau member, August 2026. Hamas member Ghazi Hamad also explained the group’s position in an interview with Al Jazeera, posted in English translation on X by Drop Site, @DropSiteNews, 12:26pm, 31 July 2026.  125 “Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, KSA and Egypt”, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 August 2026. See also “Israel officially rejects BoP 15-point plan for Gaza’s reconstruction, Netanyahu declares”, Jerusalem Post, 9 August 2026; “Eisenkot, Likud clash over BoP framework for Hamas disarmament, IDF withdrawal from Gaza”, Jerusalem Post, 1 August 2026. 126 Post on X by Nickolay Mladenov, @nmladenov, 8:02pm, 31 July 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 27 Yet all that changed in quick order. In a meeting with Mladenov and Lightstone on 3 August, Netanyahu stressed that Israel would not proceed with withdrawal or halt its military operations until Hamas was fully disarmed and all its tunnels destroyed. It did not take long for the Board to recant. Immediately after the meeting, it parroted the Israeli premier’s message – contradicting the understandings reached in Cairo and the words of its own initial announcement.127 Speaking to Israel’s Channel 12, Mladenov said: “Nobody is required to do anything – last of all Israel – before we actually have verified steps on the ground”, adding that once weapons are “taken away from the factions, and stored, and ultimately rendered unusable, Israel then withdraws from Gaza”.128  In an attempt to keep the roadmap moving, top Board officials including Kushner, Blair and Mladenov met first with Hamas leaders in Cairo and then the Israeli premier in Jerusalem in mid-August. There are conflicting reports of what transpired, but no substantial development seems to have occurred so far. Speaking to Fox News, Kushner claimed that Hamas, which reaffirmed its commitment to the truce and the roadmap, “said all the right things, and so we’re going to give them a chance to perform”. But after meeting with Netanyahu, Kushner put the onus on Hamas to follow through on its disarmament pledges within 60 to 90 days with no mention of Israeli withdrawals; if Hamas did not, he warned, “everyone will see that [Hamas is] not genuine about peace, and then Israel will have a lot more support from the U.S. and others to go and finish the job in the appropriate way”.129 The Board’s deference to Israel was not new, and neither was its disruptive impact on the prospect of a workable disarmament program. Hamas had for months sought assurances, chiefly from Washington, that Israel would be brought into line with the ceasefire’s terms if the group made the concession to disarm.130 Hamas’s acceptance of the amended roadmap suggests that, at least in the Islamist group’s last meeting with Mladenov in July, the Board said it would deliver such guarantees. Yet as Israel’s response showed, the Netanyahu government has exhibited little care or patience for open talks on the disarmament issue. 127 The Board wrote: “Contrary to inaccurate reports, the withdrawal of the [Israeli army] beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete. … This applies to light weapons, heavy weapons and the tunnels alike”. Post on X by Board of Peace, @BoardOfPeace, 1:40pm, 3 August 2026. See also Liza Rozovsky, “How Netanyahu convinced Trump’s Board of Peace to rewrite its Gaza deal with Hamas”, Haaretz, 5 August 2026. 128 Lazar Berman, “Netanyahu says Israel rejects Board of Peace Gaza disarmament plan”, Times of Israel, 9 August 2026. 129 “Kushner gives stark ultimatum: Disarm or Israel gets U.S. backing to ‘finish the job’”, op. cit. 130 Crisis Group interview, senior Hamas member, Doha, December 2025. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 28 B. An Overcrowded Security Field On top of the decommissioning program, the truce envisaged an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to act as a buffer between the Israeli army and Hamas forces that would let the former withdraw from Gaza as the latter disarms. So far Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Morocco, Türkiye and Uganda have said they will contribute troops, with the Board of Peace seeking a total of 20,000 personnel. The White House appointed U.S. Major General Jasper Jeffers as commander of the force, who in February laid out a plan for its phased deployment that would begin in the southern region of Rafah and advance northward in five sectors.131 But many questions about the ISF remain unresolved. Prospective troop contributors have been hesitant to make more specific commitments, citing the absence of a clearly defined mandate or rules of engagement.132 Some worry that Palestinian fighters or the wider Palestinian public would be hostile to the presence of foreign troops operating under Israel’s occupation; as an Arab official said, countries “do not want their forces [to be] seen as working on behalf of the Israelis”.133 To the extent that the ISF is meant to create a buffer, some officials raise concerns about Israel’s track record with international peacekeepers, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon, whose mandate Israel has routinely overridden with unilateral military action.134 The misgivings are evident: as of August, the ISF reportedly consists of only 150-500 Moroccan troops and a few U.S. army officers.135 Facing these apprehensions, the Board has clarified that some of the tasks that ISF contributors are worried about performing will be carried out by the new Palestinian police force, which will be under NCAG’s supervision and is charged with taking over from Hamas in Palestinian-populated areas of Gaza.136 The fifteen-point roadmap stressed that 131 The U.S. is reportedly preparing to build a fortified base to house ISF troops in southern Gaza. Palestinians objected that any construction in Gaza should first be for the benefit of displaced residents. Aram Roston, “Trump’s Gaza Board of Peace issues first building contract – for a military base”, The Guardian, 6 August 2026. 132 Prior to the NCAG being tasked with decommissioning rather than the ISF, countries were concerned that once deployed, the force might be tasked with wresting weapons from Palestinian fighters absent a political agreement on decommissioning. Prospective troop contributors see this as dangerous, impracticable and a political non-starter. “It is crazy to think that someone from outside will fight Hamas to take its weapons”, said an Arab official. Crisis Group interview, October 2025. See also “Indonesia will quit Board of Peace if it does not help Palestinians, Prabowo says”, Reuters, 6 March 2026. 133 Crisis Group interviews, Arab foreign ministry official, October 2025. 134 David Wood, “Helping UNIFIL Restore Stability in Southern Lebanon”, Crisis Group Commentary, 14 August 2025. 135 Feliz Solomon, “Trump wanted to 20,000 peacekeeping troops in Gaza. He is starting with 10 to 20”, The Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2026; Caroline Dupuy, “Morocco’s Gaza deployment is reshaping its ties with Israel”, Middle East Eye, 4 August 2026. 136 “Board of Peace High Representative for Gaza Briefs the Security Council”, op. cit. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 29 the NCAG would be the “sole authority” to manage the Palestinian police, decommission weapons and register personal firearms.137 Many Arab and European backers see the reformed police as a critical step for state building, with one senior official saying “the best way to inject the PA into Gaza is through the security forces”.138  A cohort of recruits for the Palestinian police – nominally separate from the PA, but whose rank and file are partly drawn from its forces – have supposedly been training for months in Jordan and Egypt with U.S. and EU support, though details of their progress are unclear.139 Vetted recruits who are now inside Gaza also seem unable to leave the strip to join the trainings.140 Palestinian factions and mediators have said there is general agreement about how the policing transition will proceed, and Hamas has noted that the group has an internal committee assigned to facilitate the handover to the NCAG.141 Still, it is unclear how the NCAG – a newly invented body with no prior experience – would acquire the capacity and public legitimacy to do the security job that the roadmap assigned to it. Moreover, suggestions of police readiness have yet to be followed by evidence of a capable emergent force. On 19 February, Shaath stated that the NCAG would oversee the training of 5,000 police “to be deployed in 60 days”, while Jeffers mentioned that a total of 12,000  police would eventually be stationed in the strip.142 The UAE has also reportedly transferred $100 million to the Board of Peace earmarked 137 Mladenov has been vocal that Palestinian police are best suited for the decommissioning task, saying: “If we are relying on international troops – no matter where they come from – to police Gaza, we have a very wrong approach”. Jacob Magid, “Board of Peace envoy: Technocrats can’t enter Gaza if ceasefire violations persist”, Times of Israel, 13 February 2026. 138 Crisis Group interview, senior European official, Paris, November 2026. 139 Crisis Group interviews, Arab and European officials, October 2025-February 2026. Though Egypt has been slated to train and help supervise the NCAG’s new police, it is unclear whether this training is different from its pre-existing programs for PA security forces. See “New Gaza police force faces uncertainty over composition, representation”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 8 May 2026; Jihan Abdalla, “Reconstruction of Gaza stalls as Iran war diverts focus from Board of Peace”, The National, 3 June 2026; and “Egypt training hundreds of Palestinians for future Gaza police force”, Arab News/AFP, 30 November 2025. On EU policing support: Crisis Group interviews, European officials, Brussels and Paris, November 2025-February 2026. See also Lili Bayer, “EU considers training 3,000 Palestinian police officers from Gaza”, Reuters, 14 November 2025. 140 Nava Freiberg, “Vetting of first 5,000 cadets for Gaza police force complete, says official”, Times of Israel, 29 July 2026. 141 Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian and Arab officials, London, January 2025. See also Scahill and Ahmad, “‘The occupation’s conditions’: Trump’s Board of Peace demands that Hamas surrender to Netanyahu’s Gaza agenda”, op. cit. 142 On 19 February, the NCAG opened recruitment for police officers, saying 2,000 applications were filed on the first day. These recruits would supplement those trained in Jordan and Egypt. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 30 for police training.143 Some sources suggested that several hundred officers with ISF support could first be tasked with handling security at the Rafah crossing or at the “pilot city” planned in Rafah, seeing to the NCAG members’ personal safety before gradually taking on more duties.144 Whatever the plans, nearly six months after Shaath’s announcement, the new police have yet to be deployed. If and when the new police do take the field, local security may be the most politically contentious aspect of the NCAG’s remit. At present, the portfolio is to be handled by Major General Sami Nasman, who has had a long career in the PA’s intelligence services.145 But Nasman is a fierce opponent of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which critics say could affect his ability to do his job.146 The July roadmap tacitly incorporated Hamas’s demand that at least some of Gaza’s current police officers be allowed to integrate into the new force if approved after “comprehensive vetting” by the NCAG, with exceptions to be offered civilian posts or handled under Palestinian law. Israel, though, has in the past deemed this unacceptable, demanding a “full purge” of the force with no Hamas affiliates whatsoever.147 Even as Hamas publicly welcomes the NCAG’s takeover of policing duties, it remains unclear how much the group may seek to bypass the committee’s security purview. Hamas’s experience with the PA (as well as with Dahlan) makes them wary that the police could be directed to go after its members in Gaza. Its acceptance of the roadmap notwithstanding, the group might resist dismantling parts of its internal secu143 Jacob Magid, “UAE sends Board of Peace $100 million for training of new Gaza police force – officials”, Times of Israel, 8 May 2026. 144 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and experts, Jerusalem and London, December 2025-February 2026. 145 A Gaza court in 2016 charged Nasman in absentia with attempting to stoke disorder and undermine Hamas’s rule. A Hamas member said the group was cajoled into accepting Nasman’s nomination as the U.S. pressed all parties to finish designing the NCAG in time for the Davos summit. Crisis Group interview, Doha, January 2026. Reports also suggest that though Nasman is a long-time PA officer, his name was put forward by Dahlan. Muhammad Shehada, “How Netanyahu is sabotaging phase two of the Gaza ceasefire”, +972 Magazine, 29 January 2026. 146 A Hamas source told Crisis Group that some of the factions have pressed to replace Nasman, viewing him as too hostile to handle the sensitive file. Crisis Group interview, Hamas political wing member, Doha, January 2026. As of early August, Nasman remains in his post. 147 According to a senior Hamas member: “The mediators [Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye] had proposed options for what would happen to members of Gaza’s existing police force: reintegration, rotation or retirement [with pension] – which we accepted. Israel, however, has since walked this back and is now pushing for a full purge of the previous force. This is unrealistic. A de-Baathification-style model is unlikely to work in Gaza. When Hamas took control, it retained roughly half of the existing security structures. A complete purge would be socially and economically destabilising, particularly given that an estimated 40 per cent of the population is affiliated with Hamas in some capacity”. Crisis Group interview, Cairo, April 2025. Al-Mughrabi, “Exclusive: Hamas seeks role for its police in Gaza ahead of disarmament talks, sources say”, op. cit. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 31 rity apparatus and try to keep some tunnels intact. Hamas may also be working on the assumption that the NCAG police’s task to collect or register all weapons in the strip is virtually impossible to implement or verify completely: assault rifles and other firearms in Gaza are everywhere, held not just by the factions’ armed wings but by clans, criminal gangs and ordinary people as well. Another possible complicating factor is the criminal gangs and militias that collaborate with Israel. As noted, they were principally responsible for hijacking aid trucks entering Gaza, often under the watch of Israeli forces, profiting from the stolen goods while posing as alternatives to Hamas rule.148 Today, they are ensconced on the Israeli-controlled side of the Yellow Line, including in Rafah, where the Board of Peace seeks to test its first reconstruction projects; some Israeli officials are even touting the gang members as possible police recruits.  In response to concerns raised by Hamas, the 30 July deal clarified that the decommissioning process would also apply to the gangs. Still, it is unclear if the new Palestinian police will be willing or able to crack down on those cells by force. Some also raise the prospect that the ISF, at Israel’s behest, may end up coordinating a number of security activities with members of those gangs, particularly around the pilot projects in Rafah, where the few remaining Palestinians residing there under Israeli protection are linked to the gangs by family or trade ties.149 C. Mismanaged and Lopsided Diplomacy Central to the failure of the disarmament talks has been the dubious mediation of the Board of Peace itself. Washington’s longstanding leniency toward Israel when it comes to dealing with the Palestinians has also been in evidence. The result has been that U.S. brokerage of the Gaza ceasefire talks is volatile and lopsided, often complicating or foiling the efforts of its co-mediators Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye. The Board’s flip-flop on the 30 July deal is a stark example of this dynamic. Part of the problem with the Gaza talks is that U.S. envoys have seemed largely indifferent to addressing the reasons that make disarmament deeply fraught for Hamas while being highly sensitive to Israeli concerns. Hamas has been loath to be seen as giving ground on 148 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Palestinian analysts and journalists in Gaza, 2025. In July 2025, Yasser Abu Shabab, a leader of the Popular Forces militia in southern Gaza (who was killed that December), published an op-ed arguing that his group could serve as a “model” for anti-Hamas security forces. Yasser Abu Shabab, “Gazans are finished with Hamas”, The Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2025. See also Nour ElAssy, “Israel is arming gangs to fracture Gaza’s society from the inside”, The New Humanitarian, 25 June 2025; Lorenzo Tondo, “Israel accused of arming Palestinian gang who allegedly looted aid in Gaza”, The Guardian, 5 June 2025. 149 Lucy Williamson, “Anti-Hamas armed groups seek future role under Gaza peace plan”, BBC, 21 November 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 32 what it describes as its right to engage in armed resistance to Israeli occupation. Hamas is also careful to preserve its internal cohesion – keeping a balance between the movement’s hardline and pragmatic camps, Gaza-based and diaspora members, and its political branch and military wing.150 A deal that is seen as too concessional could create problems for this cohesion. Broader Palestinian scepticism is also a factor: many invoke the PLO’s bitter experiences with disarmament as a cautionary tale.151 They argue that even if they were to give up their arms, Israel would still seek to annex or otherwise expand its control of the occupied territories (as it is doing in the West Bank), perhaps even at an accelerated pace if Palestinians have no means of fighting back. In contrast, the Board has typically appeared far more understanding of how politically charged the disarmament debate is in Israel, where memories of the 7 October 2023 massacres are strong and Hamas continues to be reviled. Israeli officials do not wish to replicate the situation that held in Gaza from 2007 to 2023, in which Hamas was permitted to rule with periodic armed confrontations.152 There is instead near-unanimity that Hamas can no longer be a military or governing force, though Israelis differ over the best means of achieving that goal.153 Politicians on the Israeli right invariably call for uprooting Hamas through firepower, direct occupation or tightened siege; many centrists and security officials, wary of the limits of military methods, prefer to deploy international or Arab-led troops to disarm Hamas while propping up an alternative local government; a small minority of leftleaning figures posits that, given Israel’s failure to defeat the group by force, a political process based on the two-state solution could be a more durable way to constrain Hamas from military action.154  The only party with sufficient leverage to move Israel toward compromise on this issue is the United States. But the Trump administration has not always demonstrated understanding of the nuances required to handle the thorny negotiations.155 According to a U.S. diplomat, 150 Amjad Iraqi, “Hamas Elects New Political Chief as It Navigates Crumbling Gaza Ceasefire”, Crisis Group Analyst’s Notebook, 22 July 2026. 151 Such critics (including some who question or oppose the idea of armed struggle now) cite the PLO’s flight from Beirut in 1982, which was followed two days later by the Israeli-sponsored Phalangist massacres in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, and the PLO’s abandonment of armed struggle in 1988, which they say did little to deter Israeli repression of the first intifada or to secure Palestinian aspirations writ large. Crisis Group interviews, Hamas members and Palestinian analysts, February-November 2025. 152 Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°90, A Way Out for Gaza, 9 December 2023. 153 Crisis Group interviews, Israeli former officials and experts, February 2025February 2026. 154 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Israeli political and security experts, July 2026; Crisis Group monitoring of Israeli media commentary, 2025-2026. 155 The U.S. seems to have similar blind spots in other talks. Patrick Wintour, “How ignorance, misunderstanding and obfuscation ended Iran nuclear talks”, The Guardian, 18 March 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 33 Washington does not have strong views about what constitutes  decommissioning; it has mainly looked for signs that Hamas would do something fitting the bill so that it could persuade Israel to ease restrictions on aid and reconstruction.156 An Arab official involved in the ceasefire talks similarly said U.S. negotiators have “little appetite … to talk about technical details”, which he noted makes it difficult for mediators to bring Washington on board with their proposals.157  Complicating the talks further is the role of Mladenov, whose mandate has sown confusion and elicited criticism. It remains unclear whether the High Representative is meant to be a mediator tasked with finding a compromise among all parties, an emissary conveying U.S. positions via the Board or the executive director of the NCAG. His rhetoric has been contradictory, oscillating between advocating Israel’s hardline position on disarmament and urging the unconditional release of aid. He has toggled between seemingly threatening Palestinian factions with the imminent resumption of war and promoting a long-term decommissioning process under the NCAG.158 He cheered the 30 July deal, only to misrepresent it days later to placate Israeli audiences.159 As a former Palestinian adviser put it, one of Mladenov’s diplomatic skills is that “he tells everyone what they want to hear”.160 That may be an asset if he is trying to keep all the parties engaged, but it is also a hazard. The Board’s credibility is already badly bruised. Critics say it has  allowed Israel to use obstruction of Gaza’s recovery as a “bargaining  collective punishment that leverages human suffering for political advantage.161 Its reputation stands to take another hit if it is seen  as squandering an opportunity to put the ceasefire deal on track. Hamas’s acceptance of the 30 July decommissioning plan offered a pragmatic way forward, though its declared commitment to the deal 156 Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. 157 Crisis Group interview, senior Arab official, London, October 2025. 158 Up until the 30 July deal, Hamas members chafed at what they perceived as the Board’s “take it or leave it” approach to negotiation. They have also expressed dismay with Mladenov personally: “We used to see him as a balanced interlocutor [when he was Middle East envoy]; now he is just echoing Israeli positions”, said a senior Hamas figure. Crisis Group interview, Cairo, April 2026. In a press release, senior politburo member Bassem Naim accused Mladenov of trying to be “more royalist than the king” and attempting to “invert the political process to serve the [Israeli] occupation’s agendas”. Posted on Telegram, 25 March 2026. 159 Stav Levaton, “Full, verified implementation of Board of Peace Gaza plan is ‘the only guarantee’ that October 7 tragedy won’t happen again, says Mladenov”, Times of Israel, 9 August 2026. 160 Crisis Group interview, former Palestinian political adviser, London, January 2026. 161 “Secretary-General urges Security Council to ‘rally world’ to use UN Charter tools to settle disputes peacefully”, UN Press, 10 June 2026; “UN relief chief tells Security Council Gaza civilians cannot wait for diplomacy”, UN OCHA, 18 June 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 34 would of course need to be backed up by action.162 In contrast, the Israeli government’s maximalist position leaves little if any space for compromise. While it may opt to make tactical gestures – fewer airstrikes, more aid and a modicum of troop redeployment – Israel is unlikely to make concessions that would alter the fundamental equation on the ground, at least without substantial external pressure. 

V. Three Roads to Failure Even if the deadlock over decommissioning can be overcome and implementation of the Gaza ceasefire deal can proceed, a broader course correction is needed lest the stage be set for yet more phases of conflict, occupation and suffering in Israel-Palestine. Three overlapping areas of risk are particularly crucial to avoid.  A. Palestinian Priorities Downgraded The ceasefire has until now largely relegated the priorities of most Palestinians in Gaza – humanitarian recovery and political renewal – to secondary status behind Israel’s focus on weapons. In principle, the fifteen-point roadmap includes positive language on the need to give Palestinians agency in the next steps of the truce, including by elevating the NCAG and centring the goal of self-determination.  Under current conditions, however, while the Palestinian commissioners may handle granular details, non-Palestinians will almost certainly dictate the parameters of Gaza’s recovery.163 The NCAG is thus likely to have trouble pursuing a reconstruction program that reflects the desires of Palestinians, their right to return to their homes and their wish to protect the strip from foreign exploitation. The Board, for example, is already pushing projects on the Israeli-controlled side of Gaza rather than the populated Palestinian side. These include plans for a “pilot city” that will house 11,000 Palestinians vetted by Israel; this construction, according to the Board’s presentations, will be a prelude to building a “new Rafah” and a coastal strip of hotels and commercial buildings.164 None of these schemes makes use of the Palestinian input that ought to guide reconstruction.165  Some observers have also noted that the Board’s plans either ignore or, in some cases, needlessly replicate existing ones devised by numerous experts over many years. Describing U.S. officials’ attempts to 163 Reflecting the sidelining of Palestinian voices, of the nearly 50 high-level participants at the Board’s 19 February meeting, only one, Shaath, was Palestinian. 164 Heba Saleh, Malaika Kanaaneh Tapper and Neri Zilber, “Donald Trump’s Board of Peace to set up Gaza ‘pilot’ city”, Financial Times, 22 July 2026. See also Rami Ayyub, Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Alexander Cornwell, “Gaza firm to build UAE-funded housing compound in Israeli-held south, sources say”, Reuters, 25 February 2026. See also Barak Ravid, “U.S. wants to start implementing Gaza plan in areas outside Hamas control”, Axios, 13 May 2026. 165 Beyond the Board, a study by a Palestinian institute concluded that few of the eleven prominent reconstruction plans by research groups, governments and other agencies adequately addressed Palestinian needs for “comprehensive political and social repair”. “Reconstructing Gaza through Spatial Planning: Comparative Readings of Gaza Reconstruction Plans and Proposals”, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, June 2025. As a further example, a plan promoted by the Board for freshly digitising telecommunications and commerce, coordinated by an Israeli tech entrepreneur and former intelligence officer, raises suspicions of deepened surveillance and restrictions by Israel or private companies. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 36 churn out white papers on a range of issues, a European diplomat lamented: “We hear critiques from colleagues in Ramallah who say, ‘We’ve already done this stuff a thousand times’”.166 A Palestinian development expert, who has partnered with Gazan municipalities to design an alternative reconstruction plan, criticised many foreign proposals for treating Gaza as if it had no history or institutions. “This is not an empty land”, she said. “We know how to build Gaza”.167 Under the circumstances, many Palestinians are not surprisingly sceptical that they will have much say in Gaza’s reconstruction. Residents of Gaza told Crisis Group that they feel disconnected from the diplomatic deliberations abroad and that they do not expect the NCAG to have an impact on the ground any time soon.168 A pollster said people in Gaza were barely paying attention to news about the NCAG, keeping expectations low while focusing on daily survival.169 Those who were somewhat optimistic when the committee was launched have since grown frustrated. As a journalist from Gaza wrote, the “fiction of a ‘day after’” and the reconstruction ideas it has engendered “becomes a way of discussing Gaza without having to confront why Palestinians still cannot live there safely”.170 The bitter experience of the PA and its entanglement with Israel’s occupation also colours Palestinian views of the NCAG. In acceding to the Trump plan’s deferral of statehood to an abstract horizon, the NCAG’s backers risk rendering the committee part of another protracted process like that which followed the Oslo accords and bore little fruit for Palestinians.171 Critics further say the Board of Peace’s dominion over Gaza recalls the colonial mandate that placed Palestine under British rule, which was sanctioned by the League of Nations a century ago.172 B. Freezing the Status Quo Despite all the planning, there is little guarantee that the parties will make any progress beyond the current status quo with respect to the precarious and routinely breached ceasefire deal. The asymmetric 166 Crisis Group interview, Tel Aviv, February 2026.  167 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian development expert, Ramallah, January 2026. 168 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian residents and journalists in Gaza, JanuaryMarch 2026. 169 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian polling expert, Ramallah, February 2026. 170 Mahmoud Mushtaha, “Everyone is planning Gaza’s future. But the governance crisis is now”, +972 Magazine, 11 August 2026. 171 Despite claiming otherwise, the PA, Arab and European states are in effect running counter to the “change of paradigm” that guided the Global Alliance’s diplomatic push in 2025, which asserted that Palestinian statehood should be a “prerequisite” for a peace process rather than a result. Amjad Iraqi, “Can the World Make Recognition of Palestine’s Statehood Matter?”, Crisis Group Commentary, 26 September 2025. 172 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Palestinian scholars and analysts, October 2025-January 2026. On the British Mandate, see Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (2000). Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 37 power dynamics that characterised the Gaza war remain unchanged almost three years on, and the lopsided truce is reflective of that. While Hamas has sought to bend some of the ceasefire conditions to its advantage on the ground, the weightier question is how Israel will decide to act in the coming months, either before or after its elections on 27 October. The likeliest scenario, as Crisis Group has warned, may be that Israel stalls indefinitely on moving to the next phases of the truce.173 Instead, it may seek to entrench phase one’s de facto partition of Gaza, keeping it stuck in privation and the NCAG in inactivity.174 An Israeli expert assessed that Netanyahu wants to “promote a Lebanese solution”, whereby Israel keeps a garrison in Gaza indefinitely with substantial freedom of action.175 Several foreign officials have told Crisis Group that they fear as much. “We’re pushing for the security and governance tracks to advance in parallel, but too often governments just surrender to a ceasefire and stop there”, warned a senior Qatari official.176 A highlevel European official put it more bluntly: “Everybody knows Israel doesn’t want to go to Phase Two”.177 If these premises are correct, it remains to be seen how far Israel could go in stalling the ceasefire plan without angering the White House or other partners, and what kind of operational flexibility it will claim within the limbo it has created. One scenario is that Israel might keep conducting sporadic, low-level military action as it sees fit, primarily with airstrikes and drones. In essence, it would resume “mowing the lawn” in Gaza – albeit at more frequent intervals and with more indiscriminate force – for the foreseeable future.178 In parallel, Israel might work to tighten its direct control of the strip, mirroring its de facto annexation of much of Area C in the West Bank.179 Israel is already pushing the Yellow Line deeper into Gaza, with Netanyahu saying at a settlement event that he had instructed the army to move from holding 53 per cent of the strip to 70 per cent.180 It might 173 Crisis Group Briefing, Gaza Ceasefire is Vital, but Only a Start, op. cit. 174 Ibid., Section II.D. 175 Crisis Group interview, Israeli expert on Palestinian affairs, Tel Aviv, February 2026. 176 Crisis Group interview, Doha, November 2025. 177 Crisis Group interview, Paris, November 2025. 178 Amjad Iraqi, “Short Cuts: From Gaza to Iran”, London Review of Books, 2 April 2026. See also Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict”, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 37, no. 1 (2014). 179 On this subject, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°252, Sovereignty in All but Name: Israel’s Quickening Annexation of the West Bank, 9 October 2025. 180 According to Netanyahu, “We are currently squeezing Hamas. We now control 60 per cent of the territory in the strip. You know, we were at 50, we moved to 60. My directive is to move to … 70 per cent”. See Seham Tantesh and Julian Borger, “Netanyahu orders Israeli army to seize ‘70% of Gaza Strip’, violating ceasefire deal”, The Guardian, 28 May 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 38 choose to facilitate U.S. or Emirati projects on the Israeli-run side of the line, and perhaps even to permit NCAG’s involvement, giving the impression that reconstruction is proceeding but with little regard for the needs of Palestinians on the Hamas-administered side. “It will be like East and West Berlin”, said a diplomat.181 If the NCAG is allowed to begin its work, Israel might try to render it impotent through bureaucratic and financial levers (a tactic Israeli governments have used for decades with the PA) or by claiming that Hamas has influence over the body, in violation of the Trump plan’s terms, to discredit its work. C. Return to War? Another, yet more worrying scenario is that Israel opts to return to allout war. The Israeli army has reportedly prepared contingency plans to restart an offensive in Gaza City, but it almost certainly would need a U.S. green light.182 Defence officials are said to have warned the Israeli government that Hamas is rearming, recruiting and rebuilding its tunnel networks, requiring fresh military action to degrade the group again.183 In a letter sent to the NCAG in April, Mladenov and Lightstone warned that Hamas’s refusal to accept a decommissioning framework would “render [Israeli] commitments null and void”, suggesting that Israel would then have a green light to tighten its siege or relaunch its assaults.184 In July, a U.S. official told Crisis Group that Washington has, in effect, given Israel a nod to “sustain [military] pressure” on Hamas despite the truce.185 For the moment, a resumption of full-blown war may not be the most likely course. In late February, Israel embroiled itself in a major war with Iran alongside the U.S., and it began a ground invasion of Lebanon in March, with a mass reservist mobilisation concentrated on its northern front; de-escalation efforts on both fronts remain uncertain. Some Israeli officials may also worry that relaunching a major operation ahead of October’s elections could be politically risky if voters deem it unnecessary. As such, the government and the army may not have the impetus or capacity to extend themselves into Gaza any time soon. If the other fronts were to wind down, however, and Israel to 181 “On one side, Hamas-run misery, full of rodents and cockroaches and poverty; on the other, this experiment with limited chances of success, fuelled by surreal construction projects”. Crisis Group interview, Cairo, May 2026. See also Barak Ravid, “U.S. wants to start implementing Gaza plan in areas outside Hamas control”, Axios, 13 May 2026; and Liza Rozovsky, “Moving on without Hamas: Gaza Board of Peace loses patience, pushes Trump plan”, Haaretz, 13 May 2026. 182 Jacob Magid, “Israel planning Gaza City offensive in March, but will need Trump’s okay – officials”, Times of Israel, 11 January 2026. 183 Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Maayan Lubell and Dawoud Abu Alkas, “Israel steps up attacks on Gaza since Iran truce, as military says Hamas rearming”, Reuters, 13 May 2026. 184 Jacob Magid, “Board of Peace won’t hold Israel to truce terms if Hamas doesn’t okay disarmament offer”, Times of Israel, 5 May 2026. 185 Crisis Group interview, U.S. official, July 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 39 turn its sights back to Hamas, little suggests that Israeli politicians or the Israeli public would oppose the move so long as it did not require another large call-up of reservists or other costs to citizens.186  As for Hamas, its designs are not entirely clear.187 The group does not seem eager to restart hostilities in the near term because of its diminished capacity, its inability to counter Israel’s overwhelming firepower and the unprecedented free hand that Israel’s diplomatic backers have given it in its post-7 October 2023 military campaigns. Nonetheless, local observers say the group’s armed wing is bracing for a renewed Israeli assault of some kind by replenishing its military ranks, stocking firearms and recycling unexploded ordinance.188  At the same time, Hamas has in its own ways drawn out the disarmament talks, raising concerns it could stall on meeting its own obligations under the roadmap.189 The group may be waiting to see how Israel’s fortunes turn vis-à-vis its operations against Iran and Lebanon as well as in its October elections. Some in Hamas may also believe that it could buy time and press the U.S. to move closer to its position, for the sake of showing signs of progress in the deal, perhaps allowing more aid or the NCAG to enter Gaza without completing decommissioning beforehand.190 But biding its time comes with risks, both for Hamas and for the Palestinian civilians who could be plunged back into the nightmare of fullscale war. Israeli officials and media have noted with alarm Hamas’s reassertion of its rule, including the prominence of its police and fighters on Gaza’s streets.191 For some Israelis, these moves are signs that 186 “No one in Israel cares about more [Palestinians] killed in Gaza during the last six months of war or about famine”, said a former Israeli national security adviser in February. Crisis Group interview, Tel Aviv, February 2026. 187 The sense among Hamas leaders is that Israel’s war has merely been “delayed” but not prevented. Some believe that Netanyahu may opt for another assault on Gaza ahead of the Israeli elections, expected to be held by October. Some also assess that Israel may not go back to a full-scale war, but instead stage airstrikes and ground incursions along the Yellow Line, shrinking the Hamas-controlled areas further and concentrating more of the population into smaller pockets. Crisis Group interviews, Hamas politburo members, Doha, February-May 2026. 188 Crisis Group interviews, Hamas members and Gaza-based analysts, JanuaryApril 2026. A veteran Gaza analyst said Ali Al-Amoudi, a deputy of the assassinated Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, has played a key role in restructuring Hamas’s political and military hierarchy in Gaza since the truce took effect. He has apparently succeeded in maintaining the group’s cohesion. 189 According to a Hamas member, the group doubted that Netanyahu would agree to the roadmap despite the factions’ agreement, as it would anger his far-right bloc and weaken his standing ahead of Israel’s elections. Still, Hamas believed that it was important to signal, particularly to the U.S., the group’s willingness to show flexibility without abandoning its core demands. In so doing, it could “throw the ball onto Israel’s court”. Crisis Group interview, Hamas political bureau member, August 2026. 190 Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian analysts, April-May 2026. 191 Crisis Group phone interviews, Palestinian analysts, November-December 2026. See also Nir Hasson, Jack Khoury and Liza Rozovsky, “Hamas forcefully reasserts Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 40 Hamas will not hand over governing duties to the NCAG or lay down its arms, despite its leaders’ statements and formal acceptance of the 30 July decommissioning plan.192 Hamas argues that it is simply filling a vacuum created by the stalled elements of the ceasefire plan, including the NCAG’s entry. But the more visible Hamas’s resurgence, the more Israeli leaders may argue to U.S. officials that the group is defying the ceasefire terms and fatally undermining the deal. The way could then be clear for fresh attacks on the strip and a full abrogation of the truce, throwing the NCAG and Gaza writ large into greater disarray.  rule in Gaza under cover of Israel-Iran war”, Haaretz, 15 March 2026; Nidal AlMughrabi, “Hamas quietly reasserts control in Gaza as post-war talks grind on”, Reuters, 15 November 2025; and Adam Rasgon, “A weakened Hamas still dominates Gaza, building day by day”, The New York Times, 8 December 2025. 192 Crisis Group interviews, Israeli political advisers and experts, February 2026. 

VI. Opening a Way Forward With so much still unknown and undecided, it is natural for many concerned about Gaza’s future, most of all Palestinians themselves, to see little hope in the ceasefire plan or in a functional NCAG. Still, sensing the lack of an alternative, many Palestinian experts and civil society representatives interviewed by Crisis Group expressed the belief that the NCAG presents the only way out of a set of terrible choices. Absent a modicum of self-governance, the road ahead either leads to mass violence or systemic repression – which they described as “genocide or apartheid”. With a national movement far too enfeebled and fragmented to offer a way forward, and in the absence of reliable regional or international support, they believe their best if disheartening option may be to focus on near-term survival – at least until Palestinians can recover their political strength and better options emerge.193  Flawed as it is, the NCAG, by virtue of its incorporation under the U.S.-backed plan, could be a politically acceptable vehicle for Gaza to receive desperately needed funds from governments and donors that might otherwise be reluctant to supply them.194 That the committee is a product of rare Palestinian inter-factional agreement, especially after years of futile Fatah-Hamas talks, is a plus.195 Whatever its problems getting off the ground, the NCAG’s most important job, as voiced by a Gaza-based analyst, should be “to stop the collapse of the human condition in Gaza and to prevent the realisation of [Israel’s] grand plan of displacement”.196  For that to succeed, the truce must be grounded in a more sustainable framework than what has been promoted so far. The hazards and ambiguities baked within the twenty-point plan make it difficult to prescribe following the plan to the letter; as a diplomat put it, “Everyone is getting frustrated with the strangest ceasefire we have ever seen”.197 Moreover, the de facto approach of conditioning Gaza’s recovery on disarmament demands, in essence, has subordinated the basic needs of 2.1 million Palestinians to a scheme for the instant surrender of weapons that no one realistically thinks can be achieved.  That skewed order of priorities must be flipped, as the 30 July roadmap suggested. The regional mediators – Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye – with backing of other concerned governments should help reset the agenda by ensuring that the ceasefire’s ambiguities are not used to 193 Crisis Group interviews, December 2025-February 2026. “We’re depoliticised anyway”, said a Palestinian polling expert about the NCAG’s technocratic nature, adding that “real politics is about keeping people on the land”.  194 “For sceptics of the Board of Peace in Europe, the NCAG can be a face we can work with”. Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. 195 Crisis Group interviews, Palestinian analysts, December 2025-February 2026. 196 Crisis Group telephone interview, Gaza-based analyst, September 2025. 197 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 42 punish the people of Gaza. They will need to do what they can to bring Washington on board and to ensure the U.S. presses Israel accordingly. They should first get the U.S. to delink – in practice and in a sustainable manner – the disarmament dispute from Gaza’s immediate needs, as prescribed in phase one of the ceasefire deal and as a humanitarian imperative. Next, governments should press Washington to stick to a realistic disarmament plan and to ensure that Israel acquiesces. Three main measures will be required. A. Raising the Price of Intransigence or Escalation The NCAG can have no real prospect of advancement unless governments, in particular the U.S. but also regional and European states invested in the ceasefire, agree to press Israel to comply fully with the terms of its first phase. As Mladenov himself warned, “If you put the committee tomorrow in Gaza and the violations of the ceasefire continue the way they are now, we’re only embarrassing the committee and ultimately making it ineffective”.198  Both sides have dragged their feet, but they are very differently situated. Hamas leaders have long baulked at disarmament, but they seem to recognise that they have little to gain from providing Israel with a pretext for launching a major assault on Gaza, which they know will spell more devastation for the strip’s inhabitants, not to mention themselves. In contrast, the Israeli government, unmoved by the 30 July decommissioning deal, appears far more open to keeping the status quo or to resuming military action if it sees fit; it has faced little pushback for its ceasefire breaches, beyond diplomatic hand wringing, and for now it seems to believe it can manage the risk of overextension across multiple war fronts.199 Changing that calculus is key to breaking the current deadlock in Gaza, and will require much heavier political pressure, most of all from the U.S., to ensure a full cessation of hostilities and to fully lift the siege of the strip. Until now, the Trump administration has pushed through its ceasefire plan in part by threatening to let Israel unleash another onslaught. Though it occasionally presses Israel on small issues, the U.S. has largely allowed it to bend or break its own ceasefire terms – as the Board of Peace’s U-turn on the 30 July deal showed. But the White House should rethink its approach. It would, after all, have much to lose from a resumption of war in Gaza. Its war with Iran, encouraged by Israel, has spiralled out of control. Washington’s Gulf Arab allies are increasingly dismayed by U.S. leniency toward Israel’s military ventures, which have upended Gulf security; a fresh outbreak of war in Gaza would only sour these views further. They certainly 198 Magid, “BoP envoy: Technocrats can’t enter Gaza if ceasefire violations persist”, op. cit. 199 See Section V.B below. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 43 would make Trump’s expressed hope of expanding the Abraham Accords even more elusive. Some of Trump’s domestic political base has grown weary of his war-making, including the unprecedented scale of military supplies sent to Israel; some in his administration are also expressing distrust of Netanyahu.200 The U.S. president and his advisers should use U.S. leverage over Israel (as he has done on other occasions) to get it to fulfil its side of the bargain in Gaza. In parallel, and whether or not the U.S. is on board, European and Arab states should exercise their own influence to raise the costs to Israel of throwing up more obstacles to progress. While U.S. engagement is critical, it has the perverse effect of removing the onus on other countries to put pressure on Israel, thus weakening the collective diplomacy that helped bring about the ceasefire in the first place. That passivity has contributed to the present predicament. The focus should be on persuading Israel to lift the siege of Gaza to the greatest extent possible, prior to and irrespective of the decommissioning question, with appropriate standard security checks, and to roll back restrictions on humanitarian groups.  The EU – Israel’s largest trading partner – should use its unique clout in this matter.201 EU governments should revisit the measures that the European Commission put on the table in mid-2025, including reviewing the EU-Israel Association Agreement and suspending funding for research and development cooperation. They could also adopt measures to suspend visa-free travel for Israeli politicians and military officials pursuing intransigent or escalatory outcomes in Gaza. Sanctions by the European Union that require unanimity may be stymied by opposition from just a handful of members, but the option should nonetheless be floated to signal to Israel that its destructive actions in Gaza – as well as the West Bank – will have consequences.202 If multilateral action proves difficult, European countries, including the UK, should explore bilateral sanctions.  Arab leaders, too, should make clear to the U.S. that they will not tolerate more Israeli intransigence or belligerence ruining their diplomatic and financial investments in the Gaza truce. Even the UAE, which has partnered closely with Israel and the U.S. in aid and reconstruction 200 Anton Troianovski, “How the fight over Israel is playing out inside MAGA”, The New York Times, 6 May 2026; Juan Williams, “MAGA divides over Israel as Trump stirs Iran debate”, The Hill, 9 March 2026; “Make America Great Again vs. The Pro-Israel lobby: Examining MAGA dissonance on Israel”, AJP Action, YouGov and Underpin, April 2026. 201 Crisis Group Statement, “Europe on Gaza: Words are Not Enough”, 3 June 2026. 202 A seasoned Israeli expert argued: “It’s not a question of what to do [to stop Israel], it’s the will to do it. Just one act [from Europe] would stop Israel. … Yes, it is very difficult for foreign governments to deal with Netanyahu. His government is unengageable [sic] and undeterrable. Netanyahu would take any sanctions, run to the electorate and win with it. [But] We need a global return to sanity”. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 44 schemes for Gaza, would not want millions of dollars of its funds to go down the drain should the ceasefire collapse. As a Gaza-based analyst said, “Any solution must include political guarantees from everyone, both to the donors and to the parties responsible for reconstruction, that the destruction will not occur again. Previously, there were international, Egyptian, Qatari, Turkish and European reconstruction projects, but Israel destroyed them all in this war”.203 Absent external pressure, the NCAG risks suffering the same fate. B. Backing a Realistic Plan for Decommissioning Beyond the urgency of getting aid to sufficient levels, which should be delinked from other issues relating to the truce, it seems unlikely that the NCAG’s work will be allowed to move forward without both parties consenting to a decommissioning plan. Imperfect as it may be, the fifteen-point roadmap should serve as the blueprint. Outside actors will need to push Israel to show reason and flexibility, but also to press Hamas and the other factions to keep their promises. In agreeing to the July 30 decommissioning plan, Hamas proved responsive to the mix of pressure and incentives it faced. But the group’s perception that its compromises on disarmament may be in vain, and that the Board is an unreliable mediator, risk producing the opposite effect. The strong belief that Israel is likely to tighten its hold on Gaza or return to war, regardless of what Hamas does, gives the group a motive and pretext to hold onto its weapons.  Providing clearer openings for Hamas to eventually be accepted, or at least tolerated, by foreign governments as an unarmed political movement; acknowledging any cooperation by the group with the NCAG; and exerting adequate pressure on both Hamas and Israel, could keep the group moving in the right direction. Mladenov has notably tried to appeal to Hamas by saying decommissioning could help reunify the Palestinian polity, with a disarmed Hamas participating in civic life.204 But this prospect will seem dim as long as the NCAG’s viability is brought into question; while the PA, which cooperates with Israel on security, is being depleted by Israel in the West Bank; and while many foreign governments, at least publicly, have rejected the prospect of Hamas being part of Palestinian politics.205 203 Crisis Group telephone interview, Palestinian analyst in southern Gaza, April 2025. 204 “We’re not asking Hamas to disappear as a political movement”, Mladenov said. “A political party that disavows armed activity can compete in national Palestinian elections”. “Hamas must disarm, not ‘disappear’ from Gaza: Board of Peace’s Mladenov”, Al Jazeera English, 13 May 2026. 205 Several Arab and European officials acknowledged to Crisis Group that, despite their governments’ statements that Hamas should be excluded from governance, they were “realistic” about its influence in Palestinian politics and the need to engage with it accordingly. Crisis Group interviews, London and Paris, December 2025Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 45 Here, the longer-term and less rigid approach to disarmament offered by the 30 July deal, sequenced in parallel with Israeli withdrawals and compliance with other truce obligations, has far greater chances of success than the Israeli approach. The Trump administration, which had placed a degree of trust in regional mediators to formulate a decommissioning framework, should insist that Israeli leaders accept a lockstep sequence and a more nuanced categorisation of heavy and light weapons, making clear that Netanyahu’s maximalist line is unrealistic.  To help Washington’s case, the mediators can press for a reasonably short timetable for Hamas to submit heavy weapons such as rockets and RPGs, as well as to help the NCAG in mapping and dismantling tunnels deemed to pose the highest risk, namely those nearest to Israel’s borders. The optics alone of Hamas handing over heavy weapons  arguably could go a long way.206 But the mediators should also clarify that other demilitarisation goals, including dealing with light arms and destroying most tunnels, will likely require years – as well as stronger diplomatic guarantees of cessation of hostilities and movement toward a political resolution. Israel should not go further in its disarmament demands than is required to ensure its citizens’ safety. The shock of the 7 October 2023 assault has led Israel to fortify defences around Gaza; many of the deficiencies that Hamas exploited appear to have been remedied. While wary of Hamas’s recovery, Israeli officials and analysts do not foresee a similar attack coming from Gaza any time soon. By Israel’s own accounting, the army has wiped out most of Hamas’s heavy weaponry and projectiles capable of hitting Israeli towns, while destroying a large proportion of Gaza’s tunnels (though estimates vary and are difficult to verify).207 Mladenov has tried to posit to Israeli audiences that, if Hamas follows through on its pledges, it would make future attacks more unlikely.208 The threat may not vanish entirely, but little suggests that Israel’s methods to date have provided a long-term solution. January 2026. A U.S. diplomat similarly admitted, “We realise there are almost no people in Gaza with no PA or no Hamas affiliation. The intent is to keep [the PA and Hamas] as minimal as possible, a) to satisfy Israeli politics and b) because they are unpopular with Palestinians”. Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, February 2026. 206 “If you see images of Hamas piling up guns and delivering them to Israel, Netanyahu can say, ‘Look, I delivered’”, posited a former Israeli national security adviser. Crisis Group interview, Tel Aviv, February 2026. Hamas will likely be reluctant to participate in such a spectacle, for fear of serving Israeli propaganda purposes and appearing to surrender. 207 In early July, the Israeli army reported to Defence Minister Israel Katz that it had destroyed 83 per cent of the tunnels on the Israeli-controlled side of the Yellow Line, which would encompass 65 to 75 per cent of the strip. Gal Ganot, “Katz in security assessment: ‘83% of tunnels in Gaza’s Yellow Line area destroyed’”, Ynet, 2 July 2026. 208 Stav Levaton, “Full, verified implementation of Board of Peace Gaza plan is ‘the only guarantee’ that October 7 tragedy won’t happen again, says Mladenov”, Times of Israel, 9 August 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 46 Israel arguably would also benefit from the shift to a more realistic decommissioning plan. Israel’s endless military ventures are coming at internal costs that are bubbling to the surface. Israeli society is becoming disoriented from the political and socio-economic effects of nearly three years of multi-front war. Army reservists are exhausted from back-to-back campaigns with no end in sight. Public resentment of the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) population, which remains exempt from military duty, is growing, with some in that community clashing with state institutions in protest of court-ordered efforts to begin conscripting Haredim. Israel’s global reputation has seldom been lower. Its wars have burned bridges across the Middle East, weakening Israeli prospects of further normalisation any time soon.  Particularly in the run-up to October elections, making this case to Israeli leaders will be extremely challenging. Israeli opposition parties themselves are unlikely to argue for a fundamentally different approach to Gaza at a time when they are seeking to appeal to a largely rightwing populace still reeling from aftershocks of the 7 October attack. Nonetheless, Israel’s partners should keep impressing upon Israeli citizens that it does not serve the country’s long-term interests to keep Gaza in limbo or to ignore the humanitarian catastrophe at their doorstep. It is strategic folly as much as it is a moral stain. Alleviating conditions in Gaza and empowering the NCAG hold far more promise for Israel to block any danger emanating from the strip than does more bloodletting. A realistic decommissioning program could then advance the goals that Israel’s military might has failed to achieve. C. Bolstering Palestinian Decision-making Power The NCAG is unlikely to succeed without collective buy-in from the Palestinians it is meant to serve. Until now, people in Gaza have felt excluded from decision-making about their future, and few have faith that the NCAG can do its job. It is therefore crucial for foreign officials to stress, in public statements and through engagement with the U.S., the importance of Palestinian agency in rebuilding their homeland – as the July roadmap, at least rhetorically, does to an extent. It would also be a mistake to place such extraordinarily high expectations on a handful of technocrats to pull Gaza out of its predicament. A more holistic approach that opens the NCAG to exchanges with Palestinian civil society would be critical to mobilising public participation and shoring up the committee’s legitimacy.209 To that end, it would be valuable for Palestinian leaders, as well as the NCAG commissioners, to make the case for how the technical work of recovery serves the larger goal of national rehabilitation. Doing so 209 “Building the Gaza Strip Anew: Recovery Needs and Priorities, Palestinian Vision and Ownership”, Oxfam, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and Palestine Trade Centre (PalTrade), 23 July 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 47 would help allay Palestinian fears that the NCAG could fragment their polity. They should highlight the significance of Hamas and Fatah being able to come to terms on something as critical as Gaza’s governance; it shows that the factions can be moved to coordinate on specific matters that are important for the population. The road to recovery will require enormous help from the outside. Governments that have pledged to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction, including via the Board of Peace, should prove sceptics wrong by giving the NCAG the funds to make a material impact. Initial priorities include clearing rubble, opening roads for trucks and cars, repairing infrastructure such as hospitals, re-establishing schools, and building safer housing. Hamas authorities and others are already doing preliminary work, using the scant equipment available, but they will need much more capacity to do the job properly. An option could be to expand the NCAG’s membership to include more capable professionals or to forge stronger links with PA governing bodies and the Palestinian private sector to draw on existing Palestinian expertise, which would require Israel to ease its restrictions on access to Gaza.210 If the Board of Peace continues to be unable or unwilling to get this assistance to Gaza, there are other international mechanisms that could be used to channel financial and political support and guide Gaza’s reconstruction, generally with greater legitimacy. Along with the UN-led aid distribution system, there are the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (the multilateral body that coordinates aid to Palestinians, and of which the U.S. is a member); the Arab League’s Reconstruction Plan of March 2025; and the New York Declaration of July 2025, all of which are backed by the Global Alliance. Multilateral support offered by participants in these bodies and frameworks could bolster the NCAG to make it the primary agent for Gaza’s transitional governance (rather than the Board), establish it as a focal point for private-public partnership (which U.S. officials and businesses can engage with) and formalise its linkage to the PA (which the Trump plan hints at). But should the Board continue to be the centre of international efforts, actors that could help mitigate the tensions in Gaza’s governing structures, and perhaps steer decision-making power to the NCAG, are the High Representative’s Office and the international Gaza Executive Board. Despite criticisms, Mladenov enjoys a measure of respect due to his previous Middle East experience. Importantly, U.S., Arab and European officials view him as a pragmatist capable of handling fric210 A senior Palestinian adviser further argued that, should the NCAG be successful, it could help realign Gaza’s institutions with those in the West Bank, for example by standardising national laws, administrative systems and compensation mechanisms. Crisis Group interview, Palestinian economic policy adviser, Ramallah, February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 48 tions.211 Mladenov should make a stronger case to Washington that a more sustainable path to recovery should be Palestinian-led, rather than U.S.-led. The Arab and Muslim countries that signed onto Trump’s expanded Board should use that platform to persuade the president of that point.  The High Representative and the Gaza Executive Board should also try to convince the U.S. to allow the NCAG to rely on the technical infrastructure that already exists to guide Gaza’s recovery and governance, rather than attempting to devise new structures under the Board of Peace. These include Palestinian financial institutions in Gaza, EU programs for border control and law enforcement, Gaza’s civil service and others. “We have the systems in place”, said a senior PA official, referring to the PA’s financial, education, legal and other institutions in Gaza that Hamas has also used since the 2007 split. A Palestinian development expert argued that many of Gaza’s municipalities, while heavily depleted from the war, are still functioning and could serve as the building blocks for recovery; previous reconstruction efforts, she added, were coordinated with or run by local authorities.212 The Board seems to have absorbed this suggestion to some extent, with the fifteenpoint roadmap saying the NCAG shall “maintain the continuity of civilian institutions and public services” in accordance with Palestinian law.  Diplomats and experts suggest that Arab and European governments could try to frame their plans to Trump as a way to “take things off of Washington’s plate”, allowing him to take credit for progress without the headache of making it happen.213 That may also require those leaders to be more assertive vis-à-vis the White House. As a European diplomat argued, “We are not on the same page with the Americans. … So, we have got to be stubborn”.214 In September, when the UN General Assembly will mark the passage of one year since endorsing the New York Declaration, world leaders should assess whether they have advanced Palestinian statehood as promised. Gaza can be the place to start that reflection. 211 “I would think of Mladenov as the ultimate facilitator – he will connect the ground with the money”. Crisis Group interview, U.S. diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. 212 Crisis Group interview, Palestinian development expert, Ramallah, January 2026. The Gaza Phoenix alternative plan – one of the few plans produced almost entirely by Palestinian experts and local officials – envisions a reconstruction program led by the strip’s municipalities. 213 Crisis Group interviews, November 2025-February 2026. 214 Crisis Group interview, European diplomat, Jerusalem, February 2026. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 49 VII. Conclusion After enduring one of the most horrific wars of the 21st century, Palestinians in Gaza desperately need a way out of the ruins. If it could be revived, the fifteen-point roadmap, for all its limits, might provide them with tools that will help. Likewise, while the NCAG cannot heal Palestinians’ political fissures or give them a functioning national movement, let alone roll back Israel’s six-decade occupation, it could go some way toward helping Gaza prevail in the battle for survival. For many Palestinian families deprived of food, shelter and medicine, recovery is itself a political act. It allows them to reassert their place in their homeland, giving them space to reorganise and forge a viable path to self-determination. The world should not make the mistake of abandoning them again. Ramallah/Jerusalem/London/Brussels, 24 August 2026 Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 50 Appendix A: Map of Gaza as Formed by the First Phase of  the Ceasefire Plan The Israeli army is pushing beyond the Yellow Line, to which it had previously withdrawn under the truce, and as of early August 2026 controlled 65 to 70 per cent of the strip. The Orange Line designates areas to coordinate humanitarian aid deliveries. Source: Crisis Group research, OSM, as of August 2026 / CRISIS GROUP Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 51 Appendix B: Gaza Board of Peace: Structure and Members Deriving its authority from the twenty-point plan and UN Security Council Resolution 2803, the U.S.-led Board of Peace has created a multi-tiered apparatus to oversee the Gaza ceasefire and manage the strip’s affairs. Supposedly meant as a transitional arrangement, it places U.S. and other foreign officials at the top of the chain of command and Palestinian technocrats at the bottom. Sources: Board of Peace website; NCAG website. Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 52 Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international, regional and national decisiontakers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in up to 80 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. Crisis Group’s reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is cochaired by President & CEO of the Fiore Group and Founder of the Radcliffe Foundation, Frank Giustra, as well as by former Foreign Minister of Argentina and Chef de Cabinet to the United Nations Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra. Comfort Ero was appointed Crisis Group’s President & CEO in December 2021. She first joined Crisis Group as West Africa Project Director in 2001 and later rose to become Africa Program Director in 2011 and then Interim Vice President. In between her two tenures at Crisis Group, she worked for the International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Liberia. Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in the following locations: Abuja, Addis Ababa, Bahrain, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Guatemala City, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Kabul, Kyiv, Manila, Mexico City, Moscow, Seoul, Tbilisi, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon. Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, foundations, and private sources. The ideas, opinions and comments expressed by Crisis Group are entirely its own and do not represent or reflect the views of any donor. Currently Crisis Group holds relationships with the following governmental departments and agencies: Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Austria (Austrian Development Agency), Canada (Global Affairs Canada), Complex Risk Analytics Fund (CRAF'd), Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, DG INTPA), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), France (French Development Agency), Germany (Federal Foreign Office), International Organization for Migration, Ireland (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Japan (Japan External Trade Organization), Latvia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Principality of Liechtenstein (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Luxembourg (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), Malta (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), , Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Qatar (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Slovenia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Switzerland (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs), United Nations World Food Programme, and the World Bank. Crisis Group also holds relationships with the following foundations and organisations: Andrew Carnegie Foundation (formerly Carnegie Corporation of New York), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Henry Luce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy, Oak Foundation, Open Society Foundations, PAX sapiens, Ploughshares Fund, Pivotal Foundation, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Quadrature Climate Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Stand Together Trust, Stiftung Mercator, and Wellspring Philanthropic Fund. August 2026 Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 53 Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on the Middle East  and North Africa since 2023 Special Reports and Briefings Seven Priorities for the G7 in 2023, Special Briefing N°10, 15 May 2023. Ten Challenges for the UN in 2023-2024, Crisis Group Special Briefing N°11, 14 September 2023 (also available in French). Ten Challenges for the UN in 2024-2025, Special Briefing N°12, 10 September 2024 (also available in French). Ten Challenges for the UN in 2025-2026, Special Briefing N°13, 9 September 2025 (also available in French). Causes of Peace in an Era of Hard Power, Special Briefing N°14, 8 July 2026. Eastern Mediterranean Rethinking Gas Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East Report N°240, 26 April 2023 (also available in Arabic). Israel/Palestine Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition, Middle East Report N°238, 1 February 2023 (also available in Arabic). UNRWA’s Reckoning: Preserving the UN Agency Serving Palestinian Refugees, Middle East Report N°242, 15 September 2023 (also available in Arabic). A Way Out for Gaza, Middle East Briefing N°90, 9 December 2023 (also available in Arabic). Stopping Famine in Gaza, Middle East Report N°244, 8 April 2024 (also available in Arabic). Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root, Middle East Report N°246, 6 September 2024 (also available in Arabic). Sovereignty in All but Name: Israel’s Quickening Annexation of the West Bank, Middle East Report N°252, 9 October 2025 (also available in Arabic). Gaza’s Ceasefire is Vital, but Only a Start, Middle East Briefing N°97, 21 October 2025 (also available in Arabic). Chokehold: Countering Israel’s Grip on the West Bank Economy, Middle East Report N°255, 15 June 2026. Iraq/Syria/Lebanon Containing Transnational Jihadists in Syria’s North West, Middle East Report N°239, 7 March 2023 (also available in Arabic). Containing Domestic Tensions in War-hit Lebanon, Middle East Briefing N°94, 27 February 2025 (also available in Arabic). The New Syria: Halting a Dangerous Drift, Middle East Briefing N°95, 28 March 2025 (also available in Arabic). Supporting Effective Policing by Lebanon’s Embattled Security Agencies, Middle East Report N°251, 27 August 2025 (also available in Arabic). Restoring Security in Post-Assad Syria: Lessons from the Coast and Suweida, Middle East Report N°253, 26 November 2025.  North Africa Tunisia’s Challenge: Avoiding Default and Preserving Peace, Middle East and North Africa Report N°243, 22 December 2023 (also available in Arabic). Egypt’s Gaza Dilemmas, Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°91, 16 May 2024 (also available in Arabic). Getting Past Libya’s Central Bank Standoff, Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°93, 1 October 2024 (also available in Arabic). Managing Tensions between Algeria and Morocco, Middle East and North Africa Report N°247, 29 November 2024 (also available in Arabic and French). Frozen Billions: Reforming Sanctions on the Libyan Investment Authority, Middle East and North Africa Report N°249, 24 April 2025 (also available in Arabic). A Window for Diplomacy in Western Sahara, Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°96, 20 October 2025 (also available in Arabic and French). Algeria-Mali: Taking Advantage of the Thaw, Middle East and North Africa Report N°256, 15 July 2025 (only available in French). Assessing the New U.S. Initiative for  Libya, Middle East and North Africa Briefing N°98, 19 August 2026. Iran/Yemen/Gulf Iran’s Khuzestan: Thirst and Turmoil, Middle East Report N°241, 21 August 2023 (also available in Arabic). Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi Détente, Middle East Briefing N°92, 13 June 2024. Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President, Middle East Report N°245, 30 July 2024 (also available in Arabic). Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 54 Calming the Red Sea’s Turbulent Waters, Middle East Report N°248, 21 March 2025 (also available in Arabic). Grievance and Flawed Governance in Iran’s Baluchestan, Middle East Report N°250, 19 August 2025 (also available in Arabic). Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 55 Appendix E: International Crisis Group Board of Trustees PRESIDENT & CEO Comfort Ero Former Crisis Group Vice Interim President and Africa Program Director CO-CHAIRS Julius Gaudio Managing director of D. E. Shaw & Co., L.P. Susana Malcorra Former Foreign Minister of Argentina OTHER TRUSTEES Fola Adeola Founder and Chairman, FATE Foundation Abdulaziz Al Sager Chairman and founder of the Gulf Research Center and president of Sager Group Holding Zeinab Badawi President, SOAS University of London Carl Bildt Former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden Maria Livanos Cattaui Former Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce Ahmed Charai Chairman and CEO of Global Media Holding and publisher of the Moroccan weekly L’Observateur Nathalie Delapalme Executive Director and Board Member at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation María Fernanda Espinosa Former President of UNGA’s 73rd session Miriam Coronel-Ferrer Former Senior Mediation Adviser, UN Fatima Gailani Chair of Afghanistan Future Thought Forum and Former President of the Afghan Red Crescent Society Frank Giustra President & CEO, Fiore Group; Founder, Radcliffe Foundation Stephen Heintz President and CEO, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi Former UN Undersecretary General and Executive Secretary of UNESCWA Mo Ibrahim Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation; Founder, Celtel International Wadah Khanfar Co-Founder, Al Sharq Forum; former Director General, Al Jazeera Network Bert Koenders Former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and Under-SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations Andrey Kortunov Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council Nancy Lindborg President & CEO of the Packard Foundation Tzipi Livni  Former Foreign Minister and Vice Prime Minister of Israel Helge Lund Former Chair bp plc (UK) & Novo Nordisk (Denmark) Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown Former UN Deputy SecretaryGeneral and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme Peter Marrone Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Allied Gold Corporation Naz Modirzadeh Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict  Nadia Murad President and Chairwoman of Nadia’s Initiative Ayo Obe Chair of the Board of the Gorée Institute (Senegal); Legal Practitioner (Nigeria) Kerry Propper  Managing Partner of ATW Partners; Founder and Chairman of Chardan Capital Ahmed Rashid Author and Foreign Policy Journalist, Pakistan Nirupama Rao Former Foreign Secretary of India and former Ambassador of India to China and the United States Juan Manuel Santos Calderón Former President of Colombia; Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2016 Alexander Soros Deputy Chair of the Global Board, Open Society Foundations George Soros Founder, Open Society Foundations and Chair, Soros Fund Management Hollow Promises: Resetting Gaza’s Ceasefire Crisis Group Middle East Report N°257, 24 August 2026 Page 56 GLOBAL CORPORATE COUNCIL A distinguished circle of Crisis Group supporters drawn from senior executives and  private sector firms. Global Leaders Aris Mining Shearman & Sterling LLP White & Case LLP Global Partners (2) Anonymous APCO Worldwide Inc. BP Chevron Eni Equinor GardaWorld Sempra Energy TotalEnergies CRISIS GROUP EMERITI Gareth Evans – President Emeritus Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown – Founder and Chairman Emeritus Thomas R. Pickering – Chairman Emeritus