Executive Summary:
- Since Russian President Vladimir Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine, the Kremlin leader has dramatically expanded the number and role of political commissars in the military, figures who watch over the attitudes and actions of both officers and enlisted men.
- This revival of a Soviet-era practice suggests that the Kremlin leader is worried about the loyalty of his military commanders and troops and sees such a system as the best way to ensure the army does not become a political threat.
- Just as in Soviet times, these commissars are despised by the military, and their revival now may again backfire, leading some in the Russian army to support opponents of the current ruler who promise to eliminate this competitor and irritant.
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin leader has dramatically expanded the number and role of political commissars, now called politruk (a contraction of the Russian for “political leaders” (Политические руководители, politicheskiye rukovoditeli), in the military. Politruks include figures who monitor the attitudes and behavior of officers and enlisted men, a system that Putin began to put back in place in 2018 (Izvestiya, November 8, 2018; Krasnaya Zvezda, May 15; Kasparov.ru, May 16). The revival of a Soviet-era practice almost a decade ago and even more its growth during the last four years of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine suggest that the Kremlin leader is increasingly worried about the loyalty and reliability of his military commanders and men. He has decided that the revival and expansion of such a system is the best way to ensure that the army does not become a political threat (TASS, July 30, 2018). Just as in Soviet times, however, these “commissars” today are despised by many officers and men, something Moscow’s military opponents played on to weaken Soviet forces. [1] That in turn raises the possibility that their revival now may again backfire, angering commanders who resent the interference of these political officers, undermining unit cohesion, and leading some military figures to support those politicians who promise to eliminate this irritant in the succession struggle after Putin leaves the scene (Noviye Izvestiya, March 6, 2019).
After the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, they established a system of political commissars to control what they referred to as the bourgeois specialist officers serving in the Red Army. These commissars had the same rank as the officers to whom they were attached and could countermand orders those officers gave or even remove them. Over the course of Soviet history, this system evolved, with the political commissars, who in some cases were also known as politruks, gaining power when the Kremlin was especially nervous about their loyalty and losing authority when the military was stronger, leading the country’s political leadership to dispense with them. After the Soviet Union collapsed, this system in the Russian army was dismantled only to be revived in the last decade, nominally to improve political education rather than improve the Kremlin’s control of the military, and at least so far, not allowing the politruks to have the powers that their Soviet-era predecessors did to overrule military officers. (For a useful survey of this complicated history, see Ray C. Finch, “Ensuring the Political Loyalty of the Russian Soldier,” Military Review, July-August 2020 at Army University Press.)
On May 15, for Political Officers Day, Deputy Defense Minister Viktor Goremykin, who oversees Russia’s politruk system, gave an interview to the military’s Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper. Putin established Political Officers Day earlier this year, signaling the growing power of politruks. In the interview, Goremykin linked what these political officers are doing now to what their predecessors did in Soviet times (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 15). He gave no specific numbers, but the Russian general said, “The total personnel strength of these military-political bodies has more than tripled” (stress supplied) in recent years, “primarily through the introduction of new positions at the unit level,” especially in the Russian forces now fighting in Ukraine. More significant are his comments about what the politruks are doing, which suggest that, in his mind, the role of these political commissars will only continue to expand, given the complexities of recent military conflicts from Chechnya to Ukraine and the challenges they pose to commanders and soldiers.
Unsurprisingly, Goremykin praised Putin’s 2018 decision to create a new system of military-political activities within the army and society. He said that “over the next four years”—that is, until the expanded war against Ukraine began—Moscow had been able to organize “a complex system of military-political work in support of the fulfillment of military and special tasks.” Today, he continued, “specialists of the military-political organs” are active in all aspects of the training and support of the Russian army, with “their main tasks” being intended to ensure a high level of motivation to fulfill all orders, support the legal order in the military, and keep military discipline at a high level. To that end, the politruks organize all kinds of educational efforts, support soldiers through lectures and publications on their responsibilities, and ensure that the fighting men can maintain ties with their families via telebridges (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 15).
Some of Goremykin’s comments suggest that the Putin-era politruks are growing in number and gaining more power over regular army officers. He stated:
Just as in the years of the Great Fatherland War, the majority of political worker officers have occupied their own place in the military, become a reliable support and right hand of commanders, and even, in critical situations, they frequently assume command and skillfully direct the actions of the units entrusted to them [stress supplied] (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 15).
These officers have been regularly decorated for their actions. If this assumption of power is taken with the agreement of the regular military officers, that is one thing. If the politruks are now in a position to take over when the regular commanders have failed or are not acting in ways that Moscow has ordered, that not only recalls what happened in World War II and earlier but is certain to worry the regular army whose officers thought that they had escaped this form of intervention and control over their actions with the demise of the Soviet system. They are all the more likely to be concerned given Goremykin’s additional comments about the Main Military Political Administration’s growth and politruks assuming a larger role across an ever wider range of military activities, a development that some commanders are likely to view as encroaching on their own authority.
Putin is probably aware of these risks. His firm conviction that Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin’s approach during World War II was effective, however, means he has decided to press ahead anyway, something he and others in Moscow may ultimately regret. On the one hand, such an approach may further reduce the effectiveness of the Russian army in Ukraine. On the other hand, it is likely to lead to the rise of a group of officers ready to support opponents of Putin’s approach, both now and especially as the succession struggle heats up.
