• Increase efforts to criminally investigate and prosecute labor trafficking crimes under the 2011 anti-trafficking law, including those that originate as labor violations and exhibit trafficking indicators such as wage theft, passport confiscation, and worker-paid recruitment fees.
• Build law enforcement and prosecutors’ expertise to handle trafficking cases, including cases without victim testimony or physical evidence, through targeted training.
• Develop and implement whole-of-government SOPs for victim identification and referral and train stakeholders on their use.
• Proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including those arrested for immigration or “prostitution” violations, workers fleeing abusive employers and facing “absconding” charges, workers seeking remedy for labor abuses, Cuban regime-affiliated workers, including medical professionals, and Chinese overseas workers.
• Allow other government and non-government entities outside the NCCHT to refer victims to care.
• Equip the specialized trafficking shelter with long-term care options, enhance legal support for victims and other vulnerable workers residing at the shelter, and allow victims freedom of movement and the opportunity to work while in the shelter.
• Ensure the Wage Protection System (WPS) covers all companies and individuals, including domestic workers, holds accountable violators with deterrent penalties, and ensure officials screen all wage theft cases for other trafficking indicators.
• Continue reforms to the employer-based visa system by employing the new electronic transfer request platform to prevent contract switching and reduce the burden on workers and ensure officials explicitly prohibit No Objection Certificates (NOC) in practice.
• Prohibit employers from filing “absconding” charges or cancelling residency permits in retaliation for workers utilizing these reforms and hold non-compliant employers accountable with adequate penalties.
• Increase capacity of Labor Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs) to refer suspected trafficking cases for criminal investigative proceedings and ensure verdicts rendered by the committee can be enforced.

The government made mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.

The 2011 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 250,000 Qatari riyals (QR) ($68,587) for offenses involving adult male victims, and up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 300,000 QR ($82,304) for offenses involving adult female or child victims. Managers of recruiting agencies found guilty of trafficking faced up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 200,000 QR ($54,870). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

The government investigated 16 cases (10 sex trafficking, three labor trafficking, and three cases of “unspecified exploitation”), compared with the investigation of 19 cases in 2023. The government reported eight commercial entities were allegedly involved in investigations (five for sex trafficking and three for labor trafficking). The Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) prosecuted 21 traffickers, including 19 alleged sex traffickers in five cases and two individuals for “unspecified exploitation” in 2024, a significant increase compared with the prosecution of three traffickers in three cases in 2023. The government did not prosecute any labor traffickers in 2024. Courts convicted 25 traffickers – 15 sex traffickers, including six commercial entities, eight labor traffickers, including two commercial entities, and two individuals for “unspecified exploitation” – a significant increase compared with the conviction of seven traffickers and one commercial entity in 2023. Courts convicted all traffickers under the anti-trafficking law as well as the penal code, residency law, and labor law and sentenced traffickers to imprisonment ranging from six months to 15 years; the majority of convicted traffickers received one year of imprisonment or more. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes, despite concerns of corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes in previous reporting periods.

The government utilized its specialized trafficking units in the MOI and PPO, which had 11 dedicated prosecutors to handle trafficking cases; a trafficking circuit court in the judiciary, staffed by specialized judges, handled such cases in court. Observers reported some prosecutors maintained an assumption that trafficking cases required an abundance of evidence – including physical evidence and victim testimony – to be successfully prosecuted. This misperception contributed to an unwillingness by officials to consider cases – particularly those involving labor trafficking – without ample evidence of abuse and instead, potentially misclassifying such cases as labor violations. For example, following initial investigations, prosecutors determined two of the three alleged labor trafficking investigations did not involve trafficking and instead penalized the alleged perpetrator in one case under the labor law for “failure to provide adequate housing” with a 10,000 QR ($2,743) fine. The perpetrator in the second case was acquitted in civil court. Prosecutors also reported classifying 8,199 cases of non-payment of wages and 154 cases of passport confiscation – key trafficking indicators – as violations under the residency and labor laws without pursuing additional investigation under the trafficking law. Most labor violations – including potential trafficking crimes – were resolved through transfer of the employee to a different employer, mandated back payment of wages, fines, and blacklisting of companies, which resulted in lesser penalties and weakened deterrence. In December 2024, the government issued and enacted amendments to the anti-trafficking law which enabled law enforcement and prosecutors to detain alleged traffickers for longer periods of time before referring a case to court; officials reported these changes granted investigators additional time to collect evidence and refer stronger cases for prosecution.

The NCCHT, PPO, MOI, Ministry of Labor (MOL), and Supreme Judiciary Council (SJC) financed and conducted anti-trafficking trainings for relevant officials and shelter staff. The SJC, PPO, and a foreign embassy facilitated a training for prosecutors, law enforcement, judges, labor officials, and shelter staff on how to build successful trafficking cases for prosecution, identifying victims, and understanding the elements of the crime, including coercion. Observers noted Qatari officials would benefit from additional targeted training on effective implementation of the anti-trafficking law; victim-centered investigative methods; screening procedures to identify potential trafficking victims among those arrested for immigration violations or commercial sex or those seeking remedy for labor abuses; shelter management and service provision; distinguishing potential labor trafficking cases from labor violations, particularly during labor inspections and upon receiving worker complaints; and criminally investigating potential labor trafficking crimes.

The government increased victim protection efforts.

The government reported identifying 74 trafficking victims, compared with 17 victims identified and referred to care in 2023. Of the 74 victims identified, traffickers exploited 24 women and seven men in sex trafficking, 35 women in labor trafficking, and eight child victims of “unspecified exploitation”; all identified victims were foreign nationals. The government referred all 74 victims to care. The MOI’s specialized unit reported it used written procedures to identify victims, but the government remained without standardized formal procedures for whole-of-government use. The PPO used an electronic program to monitor all reports received by PPO departments across the country and flag cases with trafficking indicators from existing criminal cases; flagged cases were shared with the PPO’s anti-trafficking unit and referred to MOI for further investigation as a trafficking case, if warranted, including identifying the potential victims involved and referring them to care. Experts noted while the system could identify trafficking victims from existing criminal cases, labor complaints such as wage theft, passport confiscation, excessive working hours – all labor trafficking indicators – were not considered as criminal cases on their own and therefore would not be seen in the system or subsequently screened for other trafficking indicators.

The NCCHT remained responsible for referring identified victims and potential victims to protection services, which included the provision of shelter, health care, and legal assistance. The NCCHT received referrals for potential cases from MOL, MOI, and PPO, as well as through its own complaint mechanism; upon receiving a complaint or referral, the committee worked to verify trafficking indicators existed and, if so, referred the case to law enforcement for further investigation and immediately referred all victims to care. The NCCHT remained the only authority able to officially refer victims to shelter; observers raised concerns, this policy, in some cases, delayed or restricted victims’ access to care. In October 2024, the government reported it signed an agreement with an international organization to develop an NRM, but did not do so at the close of the reporting period. Amendments to the anti-trafficking law legally required – for the first time – Qatari authorities to facilitate identified victims’ admission to the government shelter.

The government had a trafficking-specific shelter, designated for male and female victims and consisting of six refurbished villas with a maximum capacity of 200 residents. The government maintained an agreement with the Qatari Red Crescent Society to manage the shelter and provided an annual budget of three million QR ($823,045) for the shelter’s operations. The shelter provided victims food, basic health services, legal services, internet access, and repatriation support; the shelter did not provide counseling services but referred victims to other service providers as needed. Victims could not work during their time as shelter residents; if victims chose to remain in the shelter instead of seeking work opportunities, the government provided them funds to purchase personal items outside what was provided in the shelter. Officials noted the maximum stay for victims was two weeks; if needed, victims’ stay could be extended to cover any pending judicial issues. However, the government shelter did not provide long-term care options to victims. As many victims desired to return to work during their legal proceedings, they chose to leave the shelter and find a new sponsor after their temporary stay; in some cases, this policy limited the long-term care victims received – specifically related to recovery services and counseling. While potential victims of trafficking could not formally self-refer to the shelter, officials reported, in practice, the shelter accepted individuals who sought assistance; however, shelter staff were required to notify law enforcement upon accepting an individual into care for “security” reasons. Experts reported notification to law enforcement upon admission suggested the government expected potential victims at the shelter to cooperate or engage with law enforcement, which was not a trauma-informed or victim-centered practice. Observers reported the government shelter hosted individuals that experienced labor abuse, including trafficking indicators, but were not officially identified as trafficking victims, while the workers awaited resolution of their labor cases.

The government-funded Aman Protection and Social Rehabilitation Center continued to provide basic medical care, social services, counseling, housing, repatriation assistance, and reintegration for female and child victims of domestic abuse, including female workers who fled abusive employers. The Aman Center could host child trafficking victims in coordination with the NCCHT and provided services to an unreported number of child victims during the year. Aman provided repatriation assistance to those who wished to return to their home countries. Residents had the right to leave of their own volition without supervision, although chaperones were on-call in the event security was needed; residents also could access the shelter even if their employers’ filed charges against them. The NCCHT reported victims could work directly with shelters operated by their respective embassies instead of the government to receive care if they chose; diplomatic missions did not report if they assisted any trafficking victims during the reporting period.

The government maintained victim-witness assistance for victims who chose to participate in criminal proceedings, including by providing legal counseling, ensuring their safety, and allowing them to pursue financial compensation; the NCCHT reported it recommended victims remain in Qatar until the closure of their legal case but would provide airline tickets to victims who desired to repatriate prior to a verdict. The NCCHT previously could amend victims’ legal status – per a recommendation from the PPO – to allow them to remain in Qatar and seek new work opportunities during legal proceedings after their temporary stay at the shelter. The new anti-trafficking law amendments required authorities – for the first time – to legalize the residency status of identified victims, if victims sought to remain in Qatar to work; however, victims were still required to find new employers, as a foreign worker’s residency and employment status were linked in Qatar’s employer-based visa system. Civil society continued to report vulnerable workers – including potential trafficking victims – residing at the shelter while their complaints remained in the labor courts did not receive adequate legal support, including those who sought new jobs and remained in Qatar after their labor case closed. The government reported 66 identified victims participated in legal proceedings. The government reported it did not deport those who faced retaliation or retribution in their country of origin and repatriated victims in coordination with foreign embassies. A new amendment to the anti-trafficking law legally required MOI to cover all victim repatriation expenses. The government reported it could award restitution during criminal proceedings and victims could file civil suits to receive compensation; 13 defendants were ordered to pay 360,000 QR ($98,765) in compensation to victims in 2024. The government reported this compensation remained unpaid while the traffickers served their sentences.

Due to a lack of standardized identification procedures and inconsistent screening among vulnerable populations, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, particularly for immigration offenses, such as “absconding” or residency violations. In previous reporting periods, officials detained and deported migrant workers, including potential victims, after attempting to report labor abuses indicative of labor trafficking, such as wage theft, excessive work hours, denial of end-of-service benefits, threats of salary reduction and ill treatment. Employers often lodged counter-charges – including “absconding” – against potential victims who reported labor abuses, which resulted in administrative deportation proceedings. Officials reported they did not consider “absconding” charges until after the resolution of existing labor disputes or criminal proceedings, including trafficking crimes, although labor attachés and worker advocates noted it was often difficult for workers to overcome the burden of such charges. Diplomats reported officials did not screen their nationals for trafficking indicators pending deportation proceedings; in some cases, the government did not alert foreign embassies their citizens were facing deportation unless they required travel documentation. Observers reported authorities sometimes deported workers, including potential trafficking victims, before their labor cases were resolved. The PPO’s specialized trafficking unit reported it continued to receive requests to remove individuals from MOI’s “absconding watchlist” who were identified as potential victims of trafficking or trafficking-related crimes and therefore advocated to legalize such individuals’ residency status. MOL and MOI previously linked their systems tracking “absconding” charges to address false “absconding” charges used as a form of reprisal from employers and required additional documentation from employers before they could submit such a charge. However, observers reported workers charged with “absconding” were required to go to law enforcement in-person to dispute the allegations, while employers were able to file such charges on an electronic application, placing the burden of proof on the worker.

The government maintained prevention efforts.

The NCCHT met more than 30 times, a significant increase from two meetings in the previous reporting period, and allocated one million QR ($274,348) to prevention efforts. The NCCHT finalized and began to implement its 2024-2026 NAP to combat trafficking. The government and an international organization continued to jointly implement a 2024-2028 program focused on sustainable labor reform implementation efforts to prevent labor exploitation, including trafficking. The government continued to raise awareness of trafficking, including indicators and reporting mechanisms, through the publication of brochures, signage in airports and on social media. MOL, in partnership with an NGO, continued to publish two informational booklets aimed at raising awareness of domestic worker rights; the booklet aimed at workers was disseminated in 11 languages, while the booklet targeting employers was disseminated in two languages. The government, including MOI’s anti-trafficking section, the NCCHT, and MOL, operated hotlines to receive notifications of trafficking cases. The government reported the hotlines received 75 calls during the year and referred five potential trafficking cases to the NCCHT for referral to law enforcement.

The private sector labor law and the domestic worker standard unified contract prohibited recruitment agencies from receiving recruitment or placement fees from workers. Rights groups reported migrant workers in Qatar frequently paid illegal recruitment fees to unregulated agents in labor-source countries. Migrant workers who incurred debt to pay recruitment fees remained vulnerable to labor trafficking, including through debt-based coercion. The government continued to utilize 14 Qatar Visa Centers (QVCs) in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka – critical labor source countries providing 80 percent of the total workforce in Qatar – to address fraudulent recruitment practices. The centers were responsible for finalizing all procedural elements pertaining to labor recruitment for private-sector workers and domestic workers, including fingerprinting, medical examinations, verifying educational certificates, signing contracts in local languages, issuing Qatari residency permits prior to source country departure, opening bank accounts for workers, and attempting to ensure Qatari employers paid all recruitment fees. Although QVCs aimed to reduce instances of contract-switching, observers noted QVCs did not address workers who paid recruitment fees to brokers prior to visiting the centers as QVCs handled only the end of the recruitment process. Diplomats noted some QVCs experienced backlogs in medical examinations, sometimes delaying the process for workers; other observers alleged corruption and conflict of interest in the centers, noting in some cases, local recruitment agencies in source countries reportedly managed QVCs. While the government reported investigating an unreported number of worker-paid recruitment fee cases as potential trafficking crimes, it did not report penalizing employers for charging workers recruitment fees.

MOL oversaw issuance of licensing and regulation of recruitment agencies and companies through inspections and monitoring for employment and immigration violations; it also continued to use its hotline and dedicated email address to receive public complaints related to non-compliant conduct of recruitment agencies. MOL and an international organization conducted assessments of the government’s recruitment agency licensing, monitoring and inspection policies and mechanisms, and worksite inspection procedures to identify recommendations to enhance oversight and compliance. The government reported amendments to the ministerial decision regulating recruitment agencies were pending approval by the Council of Ministers at close of the reporting period. In 2024, MOL blacklisted 20 recruitment agencies and revoked the licenses of 10 recruitment agencies for violating the labor law. The government continued to conduct inspections on companies and worksites and accommodation visits; inspectors identified 5,035 companies for failing to provide suitable living conditions for employees and another 351 companies for violating other provisions of the labor law. It did not report referring any violations – by agencies or companies – to law enforcement for criminal investigation as potential trafficking crimes.

MOL maintained its responsibility to respond to worker complaints; around 73 percent of these complaints were settled amicably within one week, while the remainder were referred to the LDRCs to be handled in court. MOL referred at least one complaint to law enforcement as a potential trafficking case during the year. The law mandated the LDRCs reach resolution within three weeks for any contract or labor dispute; however, NGOs, media and observers consistently reported cases took significantly longer to resolve, noting some cases remained unresolved for several months up to a year. Most complaints included non-payment of wages, denied end of service benefits, and annual leave denied or not being paid – all key trafficking indicators. In many instances of wage theft or delayed payment of wages, the worker did not receive the wages they were owed because no timeframe existed for final sentencing or enforcement – even if a verdict was rendered by the committee. Observers reported access to justice through the LDRCs remained challenging, noting court processes were opaque and all court documents were in Arabic, limiting worker’s understanding of hearings and ability to seek legal recourse, including in potential trafficking cases. LDRCs were not able to refer cases with trafficking indicators to the MOI or PPO for investigation, despite the committees almost exclusively handling cases of non- or delayed-payment of wages, a significant trafficking indicator.

Workers awaiting payment from LDRC verdicts or navigating court proceedings were at increased risk of trafficking without means to support themselves. The government continued to use its Worker’s Support Fund – funded through mandatory employer contributions of 120 QR ($33) per worker per year – to provide compensation to workers in such cases. Observers reported concerns with the fund’s efficacy due to unclear guidance on a worker’s eligibility, an opaque decision making process, fear among workers of employer retaliation for seeking to use the fund and reliance of companies to use the fund to avoid bankruptcy, instead of facing wage theft consequences in court. The LDRCs and Workers Support Fund did not cover expenses workers incurred while attempting to retrieve unpaid wages, including transportation to and from the LDRCs and documentation costs; such costs coupled with missing wages rendered workers vulnerable to trafficking. The government previously issued procedures for disbursing worker’s entitlements through the fund, including parameters for eligible cases and caps on amounts paid to workers, and developed an electronic platform to receive applications and track follow-up payments; the government reported the platform was operational during the reporting period.

The government monitored instances of wage abuse for private sector workers through its WPS, which required employers to pay workers electronically on a timely basis in accordance with the labor law and automatically alerted officials to instances of non-payment or delayed payment of wages; the WPS could not detect if paid wages matched contract salary information and instead only detected lack of payment or payment less than the minimum wage. An international organization noted the WPS only flagged cases of wage theft when they amounted to more than half of the workers’ monthly salary. Given this limitation, observers asserted arbitrary and unfair penalties against a worker’s salary went undetected in the system. The WPS did not cover workers excluded from the labor law, including domestic workers; however, MOL and the Qatar Central Bank facilitated domestic workers’ access to bank accounts, thereby enhancing their wage protection and reducing their risk to wage theft. MOL’s WPS unit worked to detect non-compliance in the system and subsequently penalized companies and employers, often by “blocking” companies for non-compliance, which barred the companies from placing public bids, applying for bank loans, seeking new projects, or recruiting new employees and transferring employees; MOL reported issuing violations to blocked companies that did not immediately rectify the issue. MOL blocked 18,802 companies between January and September 2024 and issued 5,667 violations; 12,804 companies were penalized for such violations; however, observers reported actual penalties handed down remained unclear. An amendment to the WPS to automatically issue fines in cases of wage theft remained pending for the second consecutive year. Although MOL could refer companies to the PPO for criminal proceedings, referrals to the PPO were rare, as wage abuse cases could be lengthy in court. The PPO handled 8,199 cases of non-payment of wages during the year, all as violations under the labor law; the government did not report the outcome of the cases. Observers reported non-payment or delayed payment of wages continued to be one of the most prominent abuses perpetrated against migrant workers.

The government continued to implement labor mobility reforms for foreign workers, allowing all workers to depart Qatar temporarily or permanently without employer approval and change jobs without permission of their employers after fulfilling certain conditions including completing a probationary period and serving notice. Employers still had the right to designate as critical 5 percent of their workforce, who required employer approval prior to exiting the country; domestic workers could not be deemed critical. The government included a provision in these amendments to ensure all workers could change jobs without the notice period if the employer did not fulfill their legal obligations to the worker, such as endangering the worker’s health, assaulting the worker, or misrepresenting contract terms. Observers reported migrant workers who desired to leave Qatar generally did so successfully without employer approval. Domestic workers were still required to inform their employer in person 72 hours prior to their departure; this requirement could give time to an abusive employer to use retaliatory measures against a worker to stop them from leaving Qatar.

Observers reported migrant workers experienced significant obstacles in the job transfer process, ultimately restricting their movement; this included companies requiring prospective employees to have a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC) or equivalent, such as a resignation letter signed and stamped by the former employer, in order to change jobs or employers illegally demanding fees from workers to “release” them from their current job, even if they had completed their contract. MOL officials reportedly continued to require workers to obtain an NOC from their current employer to facilitate a job transfer, despite legal reforms. Reports continued of employers retaliating against workers who initiated a transfer by canceling their visa or filing an “absconding” charge prior to the transfer being completed or during the required notice period – rendering the worker undocumented and at increased risk of trafficking, detention, or deportation. Domestic workers faced the greatest obstacles when attempting to change jobs as most workers’ new employers still required an NOC or “release paper”; because most former employers refused to provide this, some domestic workers, including potential trafficking victims, were unable to leave exploitative situations, including trafficking, in private homes. Some domestic workers did not seek transfers for fear of threats and retaliation from their employer.

The government reported launching a revised version of the electronic application to facilitate job transfers, removing the requirement for a paper submission by the worker and enabling the worker to approve or reject the job after the new employer uploaded contract details; these updates may have prevented contract switching for workers in new jobs and reduced inaccurate information on a paper form, a prominent reason for MOL rejection of transfer applications. The government did not report holding employers accountable for retaliatory actions taken against workers for seeking to change jobs or demanding fees to “release” the worker to a new employer, heightening workers’ vulnerability to trafficking by abusive employers. Observers noted, despite legal reforms, the employer-based visa system would continue to persist as long as the employee’s work and residence visas were tied to an employer and employers could continue to take retaliatory actions against a worker as a means of unilaterally controlling their workforce without being held accountable or penalized.

The 2018 domestic worker law stipulated domestic workers were required to have government-verified contracts and included broad regulations on adequate employer-provided food, accommodations, medical benefits, rest days, working hours, sick leave, return flight tickets, paid annual leave, end-of-service payments, and access to grievance mechanisms and enabled workers to leave their employers in cases of exploitation or violation of contract terms. According to the law, employers who breached their obligations on key provisions related to working hours, living conditions, weekly rest day, annual leave, and end of service benefits should receive a fine, which could be doubled if the employer failed to pay the worker on time. The government continued to utilize its standard employment contract for domestic workers, which provided clarity on overtime payment, termination, and sick leave and aligned such protections with those of private-sector workers. The government reported both private recruitment agencies and QVCs used the revised domestic worker contract, which was authenticated through MOL’s electronic service and required domestic workers to approve or reject the contract in the system and print a copy if needed.

MOL inspectors remained without authority to conduct inspections in private residences without written permission from the PPO, limiting its ability to enforce legal protections and identify key trafficking indicators or potential trafficking victims from inspections. Although domestic workers could file grievances with MOL, workers rarely filed complaints because of prolonged court proceedings, the uncertainty the employee would receive the wages they were owed even if the dispute ended in the employee’s favor, and fear of retaliation from employers, including false accusations of theft or “absconding.” Between January and September 2024, MOL received 317 complaints from domestic workers (compared with 514 in the same period in 2023). While the government reported it investigated an unreported number of domestic worker abuse cases as potential trafficking cases, it did not report holding any abusive employers accountable for such allegations. Observers continued to report domestic workers regularly experienced conditions indicative of labor trafficking, including passport confiscation; excessive working hours; physical, sexual, and emotional abuse; non-payment of wages; and threats of force.

The government maintained 49 bilateral agreements and 22 MOUs with labor-source countries that addressed recruitment issues and worker rights, and it coordinated with individual countries to certify vetted labor recruitment offices to reduce fraud or excessive debts that could facilitate labor trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Qatar. Men and women from Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries voluntarily migrate to Qatar as unskilled laborers and domestic workers. Unethical recruitment agencies in labor-source countries extract inflated fees from aspiring migrant workers or lure them to Qatar with fraudulent employment contracts, rendering workers vulnerable to labor trafficking. Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to trafficking as they work in isolation in private residences and awareness and enforcement of the labor law remains limited. Systemic hurdles continue to limit victim protection and access to justice, especially for domestic workers who remained highly vulnerable to labor trafficking.

Men in the construction, food delivery, and security sectors who were employed at higher rates prior to and during the 2022 World Cup frequently experienced exploitative conditions indicative of labor trafficking, such as wage theft, requiring excessive hours, denial of overtime fees, and threats of salary withholding and deportation. After the end of the World Cup tournament, an international organization reported the increased use of “free visas,” where recruitment agencies sold workers visas to work for employers other than their sponsor, an illegal practice in Qatar. This practice leaves migrant workers without legal recourse against their respective sponsors who sometimes seek regular payments from workers to continue to sponsor them. In 2023, the government extended the use of the “Hayya” card, a version of a tourist visa that was used for World Cup visitors; observers report increasing use of “Hayya” cards to facilitate illegal recruitment of foreign workers seeking work in Qatar. Due to the slowdown of the economy and subsequent fewer available job opportunities after the World Cup, many workers who arrive on “Hayya” cards do not find work, rendering them vulnerable to trafficking and without legal protections.

Many businesses reportedly fail to pay their expatriate employees in a timely manner or at all, forcing workers to choose between leaving the country with heavy debts or staying in Qatar with the hope of eventually being paid without employment, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Debt-laden migrants who face abuse or are misled often avoid reporting their exploitation because of a fear of reprisal or deportation, the protracted recourse process, or lack of knowledge of their legal rights, thereby exacerbating or prolonging their labor trafficking situation. Many migrant workers often live in confined, unsanitary conditions, and many complain of excessive working hours and hazardous working conditions – all key indicators of trafficking. Reports allege the vast majority of expatriate workers’ passports were in their employers’ possession, despite laws against passport confiscation. Qatar’s employer-based visa system, while undergoing significant reform, continues to place control disproportionately in the hands of employers, who have unilateral power to cancel residence permits or file countercharges against workers to prevent them from exercising their rights under the most recent reforms.

There were approximately 1,232 Cuban regime-affiliated medical professionals working in Qatar, including 550 at the Cuban Hospital in Dukhan. According to a report, Qatari authorities paid the Cuban regime $10,000 per worker, of which the Cuban regime kept 90 percent. Cuban regime-affiliated workers in Qatar were vulnerable to abuses including sexual harassment, coerced enrollment into the medical mission program, surveillance, exploitation, restriction of movement, and passport confiscation. According to a former participant, officials confiscated the workers’ passports and confined them to a compound with prearranged activities and 24-hour surveillance. Chinese nationals employed in Qatar at worksites affiliated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative experienced labor trafficking indicators such as deceptive recruitment, contract irregularities, passport retention, and arbitrary wage garnishing or nonpayment of wages.