• Train law enforcement officials, including investigators, prosecutors, and judges, on human trafficking and the anti-trafficking law.
• Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms.
• Using the established SOPs, systematically and proactively identify trafficking victims, including among vulnerable populations such as displaced persons, ethnic minority groups, and children allegedly associated with armed groups, and refer victims to care.
• Cease the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers, hold complicit officials accountable, and expand efforts to sensitize national security forces on CAR’s directives to prevent the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers.
• Cease coordination with and support to non-state armed groups, including the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, that recruit or use child soldiers.
• Develop and adopt an updated 2025-2030 national action plan to combat trafficking and dedicate resources to its implementation.
• Allocate funding and in-kind resources for anti-trafficking efforts, including victim services and, in collaboration with international organizations and NGOs, increase victim services, including in remote areas.
• Work with international organizations and civil society to develop a nationwide data collection system on anti-trafficking statistics and victim identification efforts.

The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.

Articles 5 and 6 of Law 22015, the anti-trafficking law, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving adult victims and five to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard labor for those involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as kidnapping. Additionally, Article 7 of the law outlined penalties for trafficking crimes involving aggravated circumstances.

In 2024, the government reported investigating 187 trafficking cases – 125 forced labor cases, 50 sex trafficking cases, and 12 cases of unspecified forms of trafficking – compared with no investigations in 2023 and 42 investigations in 2022. The government reported prosecuting 183 alleged traffickers – 121 forced labor suspects, 50 sex trafficking suspects, and 12 suspects for unspecified forms of trafficking – a significant increase compared with prosecuting two suspects in 2023 and no prosecutions in 2022. The government reported convicting 153 traffickers, the first trafficking convictions in three years. The government did not report sentencing data for any of the convicted traffickers. Government data may have included other crimes outside the international definition of trafficking. Data collection and information sharing remained challenging due to ongoing conflict and limited information technology access throughout the country.

The Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Repression of Sexual Violence (UMIRR) served as the lead government agency to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and consisted of gendarmes and police with civil society representation. The government maintained two special prosecutors dedicated to cases involving trafficking in persons, conflict-related sexual violence, and protection of minors. The government also reportedly maintained two focal points within each ministry to handle potential trafficking issues. The government remained severely resource constrained, and key ministries relied heavily on international financial support and security. Most government officials, including law enforcement and judges, continued to lack an understanding of human trafficking and conflated human trafficking with other crimes, hindering the government’s ability to investigate trafficking crimes and identify victims. The government and its international partners continued to train police and gendarmerie officers on the anti-trafficking law and enforcement strategies. Years of destabilizing conflict exacerbated by ongoing violence severely limited formal government capacity outside the capital, leading to inconsistent enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and the frequent use of customary dispute resolution methods relying on traditional chiefs or community leaders.

The government reported limited efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict government employees allegedly complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. FACA forcibly recruited and used child soldiers during the reporting period. The government also coordinated with and provided support to the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, a non-state armed group that recruited and used child soldiers. The government reportedly arrested several members of the Wagner ti Azande (WTA), a non-state armed group affiliated with Wagner Group, for human rights violations, including human trafficking, and established a commission to investigate the Azandé Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG), another state-affiliated armed group, for similar human rights violations, including human trafficking. The government did not report updates on any previous investigations, including those involving a customs agent charged with trafficking-related crimes and FACA soldiers charged with violating command directives by forcibly recruiting at least one child and using seven children in support roles to serve at checkpoints and run errands. Observers expressed concern that political interference, including Wagner Group activities, reduced the independence of the police and judiciary. Some officials allegedly accepted bribes from traffickers to ignore trafficking crimes.

The government made mixed victim protection efforts.

The government reported it identified 225 trafficking victims – 106 forced labor victims, 90 sex trafficking victims, and 29 victims of unspecified forms of trafficking – a significant increase compared with identifying nine trafficking victims the previous year. Government data may have included other crimes outside the international definition of trafficking. While the government reported continued use of SOPs on victim identification and referral to services, it again did not report how many victims were referred to care. The government, in collaboration with an international organization, organized workshops to train UMIRR officers and other officials on the SOPs and victim care. However, resource constraints limited SOP trainings for frontline officials while frequent staff turnover reduced the use of procedures.

UMIRR led government efforts to provide services for trafficking victims. UMIRR relied on NGOs and international organizations to provide legal assistance, medical care, basic necessities, and shelter for trafficking victims. The government reported providing services in collaboration with NGOs and international organizations to all 225 identified victims, compared with an unknown number the previous year. Due to limited resources, the government did not operate any shelters for trafficking victims and continued to rely on NGOs to provide shelter services. Observers reported government support for victim protection and services remained significantly limited, and NGOs funded and provided the majority of victim care. Observers reported NGOs tended to focus the majority of services on women and girls, resulting in limited availability of services for men and persons with disabilities.

The government continued to provide reintegration support for former child soldiers. The government worked with an international organization to reintegrate children associated with armed groups and placed children in community shelters, in foster homes, or with relatives. For the second consecutive year, the government did not report whether it released any children, including potential trafficking victims, previously detained for alleged association with armed groups nor if it screened for trafficking indicators among these children. The government did not operate separate juvenile prisons, and some children were potentially detained with adults. In September 2024, the government and an international organization signed a handover protocol for the transfer of children allegedly associated with armed groups, including potential trafficking victims, to protection actors for services. Authorities began implementing the protocol, but officials did not report the number of children transferred to protection actors.

The government reported several victims participated in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. The government required victims to cooperate with law enforcement proceedings to access victim-witness protection services. The government could provide legal aid services to victims, but observers noted resource constraints often limited the availability of legal aid; UMIRR worked with NGOs and international organizations to assist victims who participated in investigations and prosecutions. The government reported it conducted victim interviews in private when possible. While foreign national victims and CAR citizens were entitled to the same services, UMIRR officials reported long-term assistance was not available to foreign national victims. Officials did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution. The law allowed victims to file their own civil suits against traffickers, but none reportedly did so. The government reported courts ordered restitution, however, it did not confirm specific cases and observers indicated restitution was rarely awarded in practice.

The government maintained weak efforts to prevent trafficking.

The government’s inter-ministerial National Committee for Trafficking in Persons (National Committee) continued to coordinate the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and convened regularly. The government’s NAP expired in 2023, and officials did not report efforts to update or create a new NAP. The government again did not report dedicating a budget or resources for anti-trafficking efforts. The government relied on an international organization to conduct some awareness trainings for officials. The government joined the Alliance 8.7, a global partnership to eradicate human trafficking. The government continued to carry out awareness-raising campaigns – including a month of awareness events in July 2024 – in collaboration with international organizations and local NGOs and funded an anti-trafficking radio program, billboards, and printed materials. UMIRR, in partnership with an international organization, continued to operate a hotline dedicated to violence against women and girls, including human trafficking; however, the government did not report any trafficking-related calls received by the hotline.

The government did not report any policies to regulate labor recruitment or prevent fraudulent recruitment and exploitation of CAR nationals abroad. The Ministry of Labor’s Labor Inspectorate Unit was responsible for investigating forced labor cases, although inspectors faced significant resource constraints and did not report conducting any labor inspections. The government provided training for some labor inspectors. Observers reported inspectors relied on formal complaints and did not proactively conduct inspections. The government previously drafted a mining code to align with international labor laws and improve standards for workers; it again remained pending. Since April 2022, the government has disseminated a command directive barring children from entry on military installations; the government did not report efforts to consistently enforce these measures. The government did not report efforts to prevent the recruitment or use of child soldiers by non-state armed groups, including the Wagner Group or its affiliated militias. The government made some efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including by arresting buyers suspected of exploiting children. The government did not report providing trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in CAR, and traffickers exploit victims from CAR abroad. Observers report traffickers primarily exploit CAR nationals domestically and, in smaller numbers, in nearby countries. Poverty, conflict, and weak governance continue to increase the risk of all forms of exploitation, including human trafficking. Traffickers reportedly exploit families’ poverty and cultural practices such as requiring children to perform labor to pay off debts; some community members exploit Aka (pygmy) minorities, who have protected minority status, in domestic servitude, especially in the southwest of the country. Observers noted most trafficking victims are individuals predominantly living in remote areas with limited to no government presence, including conflict or crisis zones, and overwhelmingly members of indigenous and ethnic minority groups, such as the Aka, Ba’Aka, and Bofi community. Traffickers – including non-state armed groups – exploit children in sex trafficking and forced labor in agriculture, domestic work, artisanal gold and diamond mines, restaurants and bars, shops, and street vending. Since 2012, violent conflict has resulted in chronic instability with more than 1.1 million people forcibly displaced and stateless, increasing the vulnerability of adults and children to labor and sex trafficking. In addition, the Wagner Group reportedly recruited foreign fighters in CAR for the Russia-Ukraine war, which fighters sometimes reported involved indicators of fraudulent recruitment. The government continues to provide mining companies linked to the Wagner Group with permits to operate gold mines, including mines exploiting child labor.

Sex trafficking, including child sex trafficking, remains a concern in CAR. Traffickers exploit girls as young as 12 years old in maisons de joie or “houses of joy” – private residences serving food and alcohol to middle and upper-class customers as a cover to exploit girls and women in sex trafficking – throughout Bangui. Observers continue to raise concerns regarding child and forced marriage and its associated risks of trafficking, including sex trafficking and domestic servitude. Violence against women and girls, particularly IDPs and refugees, and insecurity increase reliance on “survival sex” to meet basic needs for food and security, which further increases vulnerabilities to trafficking. Reports indicate armed groups, including the Wagner Group, exploit women and girls in sex slavery; the Wagner Group also reportedly engaged in sex trafficking of boys. Observers report sexual exploitation, including potential sex trafficking, committed by peacekeeping forces. In previous years, some government workers reportedly coerced women into sex in exchange for government employment or documents and services to which they were entitled.

Credible sources report FACA forcibly recruited and used child soldiers in support roles. The government also continues coordinating with and providing support to non-state armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers, including the Wagner Group and affiliates such as WTA and AAKG. Observers alleged armed groups in areas outside governmental control, such as southeastern CAR, kidnap children and coerce them into serving as child soldiers, – in combat and support roles, including as servants, sex slaves – and child brides. Armed groups also exploit children and community members in forced labor as cooks, informants, messengers, porters, and other support roles, or in illegal mining operations. A coalition of six armed groups (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique; Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation [3R]; Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique [UPC]; Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique [FPRC]; Anti-Balaka Mokom; and Anti-Balaka Ndomate) – the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) – continues to recruit and use child soldiers. In addition, individual militias associated with Anti-Balaka; Ex-Seleka; the FPRC; the Lord’s Resistance Army; 3R; the UPC; WTA; and other armed groups continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers in CAR before and after the creation of the CPC.