Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

InSight Crime, a non-profit think tank and media organization that studies organized crime in the Americas (InSight Crime n.d.), indicates in its country profile on Mexico that it is "home to some of the [Western] hemisphere's largest, most sophisticated, and most violent organized criminal groups" (2024-01-19). Vanda Felbab-Brown [1] indicated in her testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on breaking up transnational criminal organizations in the Americas that not only are Mexican cartels like the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG "by far the most dangerous criminal groups in the hemisphere," their global reach has increased, with operations expanding from Mexico and the US to Canada and throughout Latin America; they have also established a presence in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand (Felbab-Brown 2025-07-23).

International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) reports that "[d]ecades of militarised crackdowns" by successive Mexican governments have not decreased the "number of Mexican criminal groups, restricted their territorial reach or curbed their grip on illicit and, increasingly, licit businesses" (2025-04-29). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) [2], Mexican drug cartels are "in a constant state of flux," and in recent decades have "grown, splintered, forged new alliances, and battled one another for territory" (2025-02-21). Bismarck Brief [3] reports that while cartels operating in Mexico "toda[y]" have high turnover rates in terms of their leadership and alliances with one another, the major groups remain "relatively stable despite periodic inter-cartel wars" (Bismarck Analysis 2024-05-08). Finally, according to Felbab-Brown, despite criminal groups facing "significant fragmentation," whether due to state responses, pressure from other major criminal groups, or infighting over the control of local illicit economies, criminal groups in Latin America, including Mexican cartels, "rarely" lose power from their fragmentation (2025-07-23).

CFR reports that Mexican drug cartels are the main suppliers of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, "and other illicit narcotics" to the US (2025-02-21). The source adds that the activities of drug cartels contribute to "tens of thousands of homicides in [Mexico] each year" (CFR 2025-02-21). Similarly, the US Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) indicates that Mexican criminal groups are "leading producers" and traffickers of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin, and are involved in "extreme violence," such as "murder and intimidation, and hostile takeovers of territory and trafficking routes in Mexico and throughout Latin America" (US 2025-05, 6−7). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) [4] notes that groups like the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel have moved from trafficking cocaine to the sale of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine and fentanyl as their main "business model" (2024-12-12, 36, 37). In addition, Felbab-Brown indicates that Mexican criminal groups are "increasingly" involved in "fisheries, poaching, and wildlife trafficking," the revenues from which are used to pay for the precursor chemicals from Asia needed to manufacture fentanyl (2025-07-23).

According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that collects data on political violence and protest in various regions around the world (ACLED n.d.), Mexico's criminal groups continue to fight for dominance in the country's drug trade and are increasingly competing for control of other illicit trades such as extortion, human smuggling, and fuel theft (2024-12-12). According to Felbab-Brown, Mexican cartels have, over the course of former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador's administration [2018−2024], come to control "ever larger portions of Mexico's territory, legal economies, population, political offices, and government institutions and administrations," as well as exercise an "unprecedented level of influence" over elections through violence and bribery (2025-07-23). CFR similarly reports that drug cartels bribe judges, politicians, and police (2025-02-21). InSight Crime reports that Mexican criminal groups launder their proceeds through moneychangers and banks, real estate, and "local economic projects" (2024-01-19).

According to CFR, Mexican drug cartels are "one of the country's top employers" (2025-02-21). A research article authored by Prieto-Curiel, Campedelli & Hope [5], published in the peer-reviewed journal Science (Science n.d.), similarly indicates that all of the cartels combined make up the "fifth largest employer" in the country; based on the number of cases of cartel-related homicide and missing persons, and the incarceration of cartel members, the source estimates that cartel members number between 160,000 and 185,000 as of 2022 (Prieto-Curiel, et al. 2023-09-22, 2, 3).

According to ACLED, while violent events continued to occur "in established hotspots" like Guanajuato, Nuevo León, and Michoacán, the months of January to November 2024 saw an expansion of "conflict zones" (2024-12-12). The source indicates that violence during this period surpassed rates recorded in all of 2023 in "at least" 14 of Mexico's 32 federal entities, due in "significant" part to internal fractures within "established criminal groups," notably the Sinaloa Cartel (ACLED 2024-12-12). ACLED adds that the CJNG has been coming into conflict with other groups as it seeks to expand its territory, causing a rise in violence (2024-12-12). According to the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), an "independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank" headquartered in Australia that conducts research and publishes reports on the cultural, economic and political factors of peace in countries around the world, in 2024, 18 Mexican states' peace score improved while 14 "deteriorated" (2025-05, ii, 2). With organized crime identified as "the main driver of the extreme levels of violence in Mexico," the source notes that the "most violent" state was Colima, followed by Guanajuato, Morelos, Baja California and Quintana Roo, while the state of Yucatán was the "most peaceful," followed by Tlaxcala, Durango, Chiapas, and Nayarit (IEP 2025-05, 2).

1.1 Mexico's Main Drug Cartels

The US 2025 NDTA reports that the US government identified 6 Mexican "transnational criminal organizations" as "foreign terrorist organizations," namely the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, Gulf Cartel, Northeast Cartel (Noreste Cartel), La Nueva Familia Michoacana [the New Michoacana Family; see section 2.5 of this Response], and United Cartels (Carteles Unidos) (2025-05, 7). Public Safety Canada indicates that Canada also lists the Gulf Cartel, La Familia Michoacana, Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, and the United Cartels as "terrorist entities" (Canada 2025-02-20).

According to sources, the CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel are the major transnational drug organizations in Mexico (Crisis Group 2025-03-11, 12, 16; IEP 2025-05, 33). Crisis Group distinguishes them from "smaller outfits" like United Cartels, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, the Northeast Cartel and the Gulf Cartel, which have expanded their "extortion rackets into legal business, co-opted local governments and bolstered their sway over communities" in Mexico (2025-04-29). InSight Crime's Mexico profile notes that "dozens of independent cells throughout the country" are involved in illicit activities at the local level, such as oil theft, drug dealing, or providing services to the transnational organizations (2024-01-19). Crisis Group adds that against this backdrop are "local gangs" competing to partner with bigger criminal groups "in order to claim a share of criminal markets" (2025-04-29). IEP similarly identifies "local gangs and affiliates" of cartels, of which there are "an unknown number" across Mexico that may match cartels in "size and sophistication," resulting in "additional definitional challenges" (2025-05, 33). "Together," Crisis Group writes, "these criminal tiers have unleashed surges in violence" in the country, notably in states along the US border, like Baja California and Chihuahua, states on the Pacific coast like Michoacán, Colima, and Jalisco, and the 2 central states of Guanajuato and México (2025-04-29).

CFR lists the major drug cartels in Mexico as follows:

• Sinaloa Cartel
• CJNG
• Beltrán-Leyva Organization (BLO), and splinter groups Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos
• Los Zetas
• Gulf Cartel
• La Familia Michoacana
• Juárez Cartel (2025-02-21).
  
  

InSight Crime reports that the heads of the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, Juárez Cartel, [the "now-defunct" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27)] Tijuana Cartel, and the ["now fragmented" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27)] Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios), "have been killed or arrested in past years," and their organizations are in "varying states of decline," except for the Sinaloa Cartel, despite the recapture of Joaquín Guzmán Loera, also known as "'El Chapo'," in 2016 (2024-01-19). Similarly, according to Aristegui Noticias [6] with reporting from Agencia EFE (EFE), a news agency based in Madrid, in February 2025, the government of Mexico extradited 29 individuals accused of drug trafficking, including the head of the Guadalajara Cartel, 2 Los Zetas leaders, the long-time leader of the Juárez Cartel, one of the founders of the CJNG, and the brother of the current CJNG leader (Aristegui Noticias with EFE 2025-07-28).

1.2 Situation Under the Sheinbaum Administration

Information on changes to drug cartels and the organized crime situation in Mexico since President Sheinbaum took office was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The information in the following paragraph was provided in a 2024 ACLED article:

The election of President Claudia Sheinbaum on 2 June 2024 occurred amid "emerging and intensifying gang disputes," resulting in an 18% rise in the "lethality rate of clashes between non-state armed groups compared to 2023." Against this backdrop, the use of "explosives and remote violence," including "drone-delivered charges, grenades, homemade bombs, and improvised landmines," doubled from 2023 in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Guanajuato. There was also a documented rise in clashes between state security forces and criminal groups in Sheinbaum's "first months in office" (ACLED 2024-12-12).

The information in the following 2 paragraphs was provided in another ACLED article published in 2025:

Under Sheinbaum, the Mexican government's response to criminal groups has included "heightened deployments, intelligence-led operations, and high-profile arrests," tactics that are "partly influenced by renewed pressure" from the administration of the US President Donald Trump. However, as these actions are in their "early stages," there are "few" indications that they have had a substantive impact on criminal groups' power. In fact, data gathered in the first 6 months of Sheinbaum's presidency show that armed clashes between non-state armed criminal groups and security forces saw a "33% increase compared to the previous six months." However, this rise is "largely confined" to Sinaloa state where an internal conflict between Sinaloa Cartel factions is playing out. Indeed, the Sinaloa Cartel's in-fighting has

prompted a heightened security response from state actors as early as September, well before Sheinbaum's swearing-in. Initial efforts to contain the rise in violence in Sinaloa were followed by the government's heavy-handed security response in the first quarter of 2025, during which clashes were concentrated in states bordering the US, especially in Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, and in traditional hotspots of violence such as Michoacán.

Additionally, the state of Sinaloa has become the scene of "alarming levels of violence targeting civilians." Between July 2024 and March 2025, the targeting of civilians and "gang-on-gang clashes" almost quadrupled relative to the previous 8 months from 19 November 2023 to 24 July 2024, "reaching a peak in October and November [2024]." The violence "reached levels never seen in this state since ACLED began coverage of Mexico in 2018" (ACLED 2025-05-07).

2. Drug Cartels

2.1 Sinaloa Cartel

According to sources, the Sinaloa Cartel is the "leading" drug cartel in Mexico (Bismarck Analysis 2024-05-08) or the "most powerful" cartel in the Western Hemisphere (Insight Crime 2025-05-19). Other sources state that it ranks globally as "one of the most violent and prolific drug trafficking organizations" (Canada 2025-02-20) or one of the "top cocaine-trafficking" organizations (IISS 2024-12-12, 34).

Sources note that the cartel operates as a "network of Mexico's most important drug lords" (InSight Crime 2025-05-19) or as a "federal structure and system of alliances" (ACLED 2025-05-07). Sources add that the Sinaloa Cartel is composed of 2 main factions:

["La Mayiza" or "Los Mayitos,"] a faction commanded by loyalists of Ismael Zambada García, also known as "El Mayo"; and

["Los Chapitos,"] a faction commanded by the sons of El Chapo (ACLED 2025-05-07; Bismarck Analysis 2024-05-08; InSight Crime 2025-05-19).

InSight Crime reports that factions of the Sinaloa Cartel collaborate with each other for mutual protection and leverage their ties to "the highest levels" of Mexico's security forces to "maintain an advantage over rival organizations" (2025-05-19). However, sources indicate that factions also regularly engage in violent clashes with each other (Bismarck Analysis 2024-05-08; InSight Crime 2025-02-20).

According to InSight Crime, one of El Chapo's sons, Ovidio Guzmán López, was arrested by Mexican authorities in January 2023 and extradited to the US in September 2023 (2025-05-19). Sources report that El Mayo was arrested in the US in July 2024, along with another one of El Chapo's sons, Joaquín Guzmán López (InSight Crime 2025-05-19; US 2025-05, 7). According to sources, Joaquín is alleged to have coerced El Mayo into entering US territory and triggering the arrest (InSight Crime 2025-05-19; The New York Times 2024-07-29).

Sources report that El Mayo's arrest in the US prompted clashes between Los Mayitos and Los Chapitos (ACLED 2024-12-12; US 2025-05, 7), upending the organized crime scene across the country and causing violence to spill over into the border states of Chihuahua and Sonora (ACLED 2024-12-12). ACLED adds that the arrests were also followed by a transfer of power of each faction's leadership to succeeding family members (2025-05-07). InSight Crime similarly indicates that the "main link between the top leadership" of the cartel is familial (2025-05-19).

Sources report that the CJNG is the Sinaloa Cartel's main rival (IISS 2024-12-12, 34; InSight Crime 2024-05-27). A 2022 opinion piece written by Felbab-Brown notes that the Sinaloa Cartel employs a "rather careful calibration of violence" that residents, businesses, and local politicians are more able to cope with, in contrast to the CJNG ([2022-04-03]).

2.2 CJNG

Sources report that the CJNG is a "transnational criminal group" (Canada 2025-02-20; InSight Crime 2024-05-27) headed by Nemesio Oseguera Ramos, who goes by "'El Mencho'" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27). The group emerged out of the splintering of the Milenio Cartel (IISS 2024-12-12, 34; InSight Crime 2024-05-27). The US 2025 NDTA notes that the cartel operates as a "franchise-based command structure" (2025-05, 9).

According to sources, the cartel is known for its use of violence (Canada 2025-02-20; IISS 2024-12-12, 34; InSight Crime 2024-05-27) and "its public relations campaigns" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27). Sources report that the CJNG is one of Mexico's "most powerful" criminal organizations (US 2025-05, 9) or one of its "foremost criminal threats" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27). Bismarck Brief similarly states that CJNG has grown into "the only other cartel" to maintain a presence throughout Mexico "through extreme violence," apart from the Sinaloa Cartel (Bismarck Analysis 2024-05-08). The US 2025 NDTA indicates that the CJNG's wealth, "unique" command structure, "proclivity for violence" and ties to "corrupt officials" are what allow it to "maintain and expand its influence" over Mexico's drug trade (2025-05, 9). According to Public Safety Canada, CJNG deploys armed drones, and conducts public executions and kidnappings to "instill terror and depopulate communities" in areas they wish to control and conduct their activities (Canada 2025-02-20).

InSight Crime reports that the CJNG "coerces or forms alliances" with smaller gangs to gain access to new territory, particularly in border cities like Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez (2025-02-20). In another article, InSight Crime writes that the CJNG has a long-standing alliance with the criminal group called Los Cuinis, headed by El Mencho's brother-in-law; however, various sources disagree over whether Los Cuinis are the CJNG's "financial arm" or a distinct but affiliated cartel (2024-05-27). The US 2025 NDTA describes Los Cuinis as the "CJNG's financial arm," and adds that the latter has integrated Los Cuinis into its leadership structure (2025-05, 10).

Sources report that the Sinaloa Cartel is the CJNG's main rival (IISS 2024-12-12, 34; InSight Crime 2024-05-27), though the latter is "widely" seen as "more aggressive, ruthless, and less willing to negotiate" (IISS 2024-12-12, 34).

2.3 Los Zetas

According to sources, Los Zetas was initially an armed unit of the Gulf Cartel (CFR 2025-02-21; InSight Crime 2024-08-30) which broke off in 2010 (CFR 2025-02-21).

InSight Crime reports that although Los Zetas was "one of Mexico's most powerful and feared armed groups," internal strife and the removal of its "key leaders" triggered the cartel's decline (2024-08-30). Similarly, CFR notes that the cartel's power has diminished "in recent years" as it fractured "into rival wings" (2025-02-21). InSight Crime further indicates that the group is now a "fragmented force," loosely tied together by a common monicker and "increasingly" reliant on local crime proceeds rather than those from international drug trafficking (2024-08-30).

According to InSight Crime, the fragmented state of Los Zetas "has made it increasingly difficult" to map out the individuals at the helm of its main factions; however, one of its splinter groups, the Northeast Cartel, whose leader was arrested by US authorities, continues to maintain "firm control" over its original stronghold in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas (2024-08-30). The US 2025 NDTA reports that the Northeast Cartel is itself a "large network of compartmentalized cells" that are involved in the illegal synthetic, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana drug trade in Mexico and the US (2025-05, 11).

According to the US 2025 NDTA, the Northeast Cartel is allied with the Los Mayitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel, which supplies it with illicit fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, allowing the Northeast Cartel to import it into the US (2025-05, 11).

InSight Crime reports that the Northeast Cartel has, since 2019, clashed with the CJNG, independent groups, Sinaloa Cartel cells, as well as factions of Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel; however, the Old School Zetas (Zetas Vieja Escuela), another Los Zetas faction, has forged alliances in "recent years" with the CJNG and Los Metros, a Gulf Cartel offshoot, to back CJNG's incursions into Mexico's northern region, from Tamaulipas to the border with the US (2024-08-30). Similarly, CFR states that in the northeastern state of Tamaulipas, Gulf Cartel factions are reportedly working with CJNG members (2025-02-21).

InSight Crime notes in another article that the Old School Zetas, which operates along the Atlantic Coast, is battling the CJNG in the state of Veracruz (2024-05-27).

2.4 Gulf Cartel

InSight Crime reports that the Gulf Cartel is one of the country's "oldest criminal groups," but that it has ceded territory and influence "in recent years as it has splintered into several different rival factions," making it unclear who heads it (2024-08-20). CFR similarly indicates that the Gulf Cartel has fractured into "various factions," diminishing its power as it vies for territory against Los Zetas (2025-02-21). Public Safety Canada writes that although it is made up of various offshoots that "common[ly]" work together and clash with each other for control over illegal markets, particularly in Tamaulipas and near the border with the US, the Gulf Cartel is still "one of the largest organized crime groups operating in the north of Mexico" (Canada 2025-02-20).

The US 2025 NDTA indicates that the Gulf Cartel is "no longer a unified cartel" as of 2025 (2025-05, 16). Sources note that its offshoots, Los Metros and the Scorpions (Los Escorpiones), have become its " most" "power[ful]" factions (US 2025-05, 16; InSight Crime 2024-08-20). The US 2025 NDTA adds that the Los Metros and the Scorpions are competing for control over the leadership of the Gulf Cartel, in addition to trade routes and territory, particularly for the Port of Altamira (2025-05, 16). The same source states that Los Metros is "aligned with CJNG," becoming "an enforcement arm" of the group, for protection and to allow for the "uninterrupted flow of drugs from both CJNG and Los Metros" into the US (US 2025-05, 16, 17).

In addition to Los Metros and the Scorpions, sources identify the following Gulf Cartel factions: the Cyclones (Los Ciclones), Los Rojos, and the Panthers (Las Panteras) (Canada 2025-02-20; InSight Crime 2024-08-20). InSight Crime adds that the Scorpions and the Cyclones "have maintained an alliance in recent years" to ward off invasions from other Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas rival wings (2024-08-20).

2.5 La Familia Michoacana

The US 2025 NDTA describes La Familia Michoacana as an "umbrella organization" that grew in response to Los Zetas' incursions into the state of Michoacán and that has since become known for "using violence and military-style tactics" to combat other criminal groups (2025-05, 12). The source adds, however, that the organization is no longer active "as a large cohesive" cartel, and operates rather as a "conglomerate of several powerful factions" (US 2025-05, 13). CFR similarly reports that La Familia Michoacana has "weakened and fragmented in recent years," although it adds that "some experts say it has revived" (2025-02-21). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to InSight Crime, La Familia Michoacana's offshoots still operate by allying themselves with other criminal groups like the Knights Templar, Los Viagras, and "other independent groups" under the moniker of the "so-called United Cartels" to fend off attacks from the CJNG (2025-02-20). Similarly, the US 2025 NDTA indicates that the United Cartels faction of La Familia Michoacana is a coalition of "multiple criminal groups," which came together to combat CJNG incursions in Michoacán state (2025-05, 15). Another offshoot identified by the US 2025 NDTA is La Nueva Familia Michoacana [the New Michoacan Family] (2025-05, 13).

3. Activities and Areas of Operation

3.1 Sinaloa Cartel

Sources report that the Sinaloa Cartel is involved in the synthetic drug trade (CFR 2025-02-21; Insight Crime 2025-05-19) and certain factions also engage in "small-scale drug dealing and taxing other criminal networks, including human smugglers" (InSight Crime 2025-05-19). Sources also report that the group is involved in extortion, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, and fuel and natural resources theft (CFR 2025-02-21; US 2025-05, 9), as well as prostitution, money laundering and the "illegal wildlife trade" (US 2025-05, 9). The US 2025 NDTA adds that the cartel uses "actual or threatened violence" to "intimidate" civilians, state authorities, and journalists (2025-05, 9). Public Safety Canada similarly indicates that the Sinaloa Cartel relies on "coercion, bribery, intimidation, and violence" to strengthen its political hold in its areas of operation and acquire new territory (Canada 2025-02-20).

According to the US 2025 NDTA, the Sinaloa Cartel also dominates and runs "extensive, multi-faceted, transnational networks" to import precursor chemicals from China and India and "synthesize deadly synthetic drugs, including fentanyl, in Mexico-based clandestine laboratories," which it then sells to the US market (2025-05, 8).

InSight Crime reports that the Sinaloa Cartel's base of operation is in Sinaloa state and in "some municipalities" of bordering states like Durango and Chihuahua, which together compose "a notorious drug producing region known as the Golden Triangle" (2025-05-19). According to ACLED, Los Chapitos' faction conducts its activities mostly in Sinaloa and maintains a "strong presence" in the state capital of Culiacán, as well as on the Pacific coast of the state, in Sonora and in Baja California (2025-05-07). The same source adds that Los Mayitos has territorial control of Durango and the rural regions of Sinaloa, along with a "strong presence in Baja California, Sonora, and Zacatecas" (ACLED 2025-05-07).

InSight Crime further notes that the Sinaloa Cartel also has "cells operating in other Mexican states," including Sonora, Baja California, Nayarit, Jalisco, and Chiapas, which give them "access to border crossings, drug corridors, and money laundering opportunities," as well as the US-Mexico border region, where the cartel charges taxes to other criminal organizations, such as human smugglers (2025-05-19). According to CFR, the Sinaloa Cartel has "strongholds in nearly half of Mexico's states," especially states on the Pacific coast in the country's northwest, as well as its southern and northern border areas (2025-02-21). According to the US 2025 NDTA, the cartel has a "[s]ignificant [p]resence" in the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Morelos, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, as well as Mexico City; the cartel has a simple "presence" in all other Mexican states, except for Jalisco (2025-05, 8). Sources note that the Sinaloa Cartel has a presence in "at least" 47 countries (CFR 2025-02-21; Canada 2025-02-20) or in "at least" 40 (US 2025-05, 7).

3.2 CJNG

According to sources, the CJNG's base of operations is in the state of Jalisco (IISS 2024-12-12, 34; InSight Crime 2024-01-19). InSight Crime adds that the CJNG's reach has expanded "to much of central and northern Mexico" (2024-01-19). A more recent article by the same source states that since its formation, the CJNG's reach has extended to "nearly every part of Mexico, except Sinaloa and the infamous Golden Triangle region" (InSight Crime 2024-05-27). CFR similarly reports that the CJNG is active in "some two-thirds" of Mexico and operates in "more than three dozen countries and all fifty U.S. states" (2025-02-21).

According to InSight Crime, the "level of control" the CJNG maintains in each region is variable: it is the "dominant criminal actor" in the states of Jalisco, Nayarit, Colima, Veracruz, Guanajuato, Puebla, Querétaro, and Hidalgo; it has a "strong" presence but "faces several competitors" in key areas like the Riviera Maya, border cities of Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Tierra Caliente (a region that crosses parts of Michoacán, Guerrero, and México State) (2024-05-27). According to the US 2025 NDTA, within Mexico, the CJNG has a "[s]ignificant [p]resence" in Mexico City, as well as the following states: Baja California, Chihuahua, Nayarit, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacán, México, Aguascalientes, Querétaro, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Puebla, Guerrero, Colima, Chiapas, Campeche, and Quintana Roo (US 2025-05, 10). The source adds that the CJNG has increased its geographic reach beyond Mexico, maintaining a presence in "over 40 countries" (US 2025-05, 9).

According to InSight Crime, US prosecutors describe the CJNG, as well as the Sinaloa Cartel, as "a major supplier of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine and fentanyl into" the US; in addition, CJNG factions also carry out extortion schemes, commit mass kidnappings, and are involved in illegal mining (2025-02-20). The cartel is also involved in "sophisticated financial and money laundering schemes" (InSight Crime 2025-02-20). CFR similarly reports that much like the Sinaloa Cartel, the CJNG is one of the "largest" producers and importers of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine, among other drugs, to the US, and is also engaged in fuel theft, extortion, and migrant smuggling (2025-02-21). The source adds that the CJNG's "success" can be traced to its "control over several Mexican ports, granting it greater access to the global drug supply chain" (CFR 2025-02-21). According to IISS, the CJNG uses source material from China, India, and Türkiye to produce synthetic drugs, traffics "tonnes of cocaine" to the US and Europe, launders "billions of dollars in illicit proceeds," operates "illicit gold-mining" schemes in Ecuador and Venezuela in partnership with Colombian and Venezuelan criminal groups, and controls "key human-smuggling and human trafficking routes through Central America and Mexico" (2024-12-12, 34).

InSight Crime reports that in its most recent expansions, the CJNG has been "increasingly relying on improvised explosive devices (IEDs)" in its clashes on the border between Michoacán and Jalisco, against local criminal groups like the Knights Templar, Los Viagras, "remnants" of La Familia Michoacana, United Cartels, and "self-defense groups" that are resisting against its incursions (2025-02-20).

3.3 Los Zetas

InSight Crime indicates that factions of Los Zetas keep a "small patchwork of territory" across Mexico (2024-08-30). The US 2025 NDTA reports that its offshoot, the Northeast Cartel, maintains a "[s]ignificant [p]resence" in Mexico City and the states of Zacatecas, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas, as well as a simple "presence" in the states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Hidalgo, and Veracruz (2025-05, 12).

According to InSight Crime, while not "a major drug trafficking network," Los Zetas' "most dominant" faction, the Northeast Cartel, sources its funds from "taxing various groups" like drug traffickers and migrant smugglers crossing the border between Nuevo Laredo and Laredo and extorts illicit and some legal trades in territories it controls (2025-02-20). The US 2025 NDTA notes that in addition to its involvement in the illicit drug trade in Mexico and the US, the Northeast Cartel "regularly" carries out "public acts of violence, including assassination, torture, kidnapping, and intimidation" and operates "large-scale human smuggling" schemes into the US, "often kidnapping or exploiting migrants" to extort or indenture them (2025-05, 11).

3.4 Gulf Cartel

According to Public Safety Canada, the Gulf Cartel and its offshoots are mainly involved in "drug trafficking, illicit firearms trafficking, human trafficking, facilitation of illegal immigration, extortion, contract killing, and operational protection and security" (Canada 2025-02-20).

Sources report that the Gulf Cartel's base of power is in the state of Tamaulipas and around the Gulf of Mexico (CFR 2025-02-21; InSight Crime 2024-08-20). InSight Crime adds that Gulf Cartel factions continue to control "significant" territory around the US-Mexico border, with its "most important operational bases" in the border towns of Matamoros and Reynosa, and have in "recent years" been increasingly involved in smuggling migrants through the border (2024-08-20). The same source adds that "some" offshoots of the cartel maintain a presence in "parts" of San Luis Potosí and Nuevo León, "although they have a very limited presence elsewhere in Mexico" (InSight Crime 2024-08-20). According to the US 2025 NDTA, the Gulf Cartel maintains a "[s]ignificant [p]resence" in the states of Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz, as well as Mexico City (2025-05, 16).

InSight Crime indicates that in addition to smuggling migrants, the group also transports cocaine and methamphetamine into the US, and "high-powered weapons and cash back into Mexico" (2024-08-20).

3.5 La Familia Michoacana

According to CFR, La Familia Michoacana operates in the western state of Michoacán (2025-02-21). InSight Crime similarly reports that the group's "several different factions" operate in the state of Michoacán, in Guerrero and the State of México, and adds that they continue to be "an active player" in Mexico's southern and central criminal landscape (2025-02-20). The US 2025 NDTA writes that the group maintains territory in the states of Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos, and the State of México (2025-05, 12). The source adds that outside of Mexico, the group is active in "about one-third" of US states (US 2025-05, 13). The US 2025 NDTA further indicates that factions of La Familia Michoacana also control the Port of Lázaro Cárdenas, which is "one of the largest seaports in Mexico and key for the importation of precursor chemicals from China" (2025-05, 13).

According to InSight Crime, "US authorities have accused [the members of La Familia Michoacana] of continuing to traffic fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine" into the US (2025-02-20).

4. Ability to Track Individuals

According to a blog post by Doug Livermore, a member of the Counterterrorism Group of the Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank that produces research, publishes papers, and runs programs on issues related to politics, economics, and security around the world (Atlantic Council n.d.), Mexican cartels have shown "an uncanny ability to adapt and retaliate against perceived threats" to their operations, such as members of the press and civilians (Livermore 2025-01-14). A partially redacted US Department of Justice (DOJ) inspector general's audit report documents examples of the use of "[u]biquitous [t]echnical [s]urveillance" [7] by Mexican drug cartels to track members of the FBI in Mexico as early as 2018, including the following examples:

The leader of an organized crime family suspected an employee of being an FBI informant. To confirm this suspicion, the leader went through the call logs for the suspected employee's cell phone looking for phone numbers that may be connected to law enforcement.

…

In 2018, while the FBI was working on the "El Chapo" drug cartel case, an individual connected to the cartel contacted the FBI case agent. This individual said that the cartel had hired a "hacker" who offered a menu of services related to exploiting mobile phones and other electronic devices. In this particular case, the hacker observed people going in and out of the US Embassy in Mexico City and identified "people of interest" for the cartel, including the FBI Assistant Legal Attache (ALAT).

Using the ALAT's mobile phone number the hacker was able to see calls made and received, as well as obtain the ALAT's geolocation data. According to the FBI, in addition to compromising the ALAT's phone, the hacker also accessed Mexico City's camera system, used the cameras to follow the ALAT through the city, and identified people the ALAT met with. According to the case agent, the cartel used that information to intimidate and/or kill potential sources or cooperating witnesses. (US 2025-06, 18−19)

In an article about the same DOJ audit report, CNN quotes the DEA Administrator until May 2025, who said that "'cartels run a multi-billion-dollar global enterprise and utilize sophisticated technology to enhance their business operations'," including "'state-of-[the]-art sophisticated surveillance techniques to identify law enforcement activities and their adversaries'" (CNN 2025-06-28).

The information in the following paragraph was provided in an article by VICE, a magazine and online news publication:

Mexican drug cartels are "allegedly tapping intelligence and security software," called Titan, which is also used by Mexican state governments, "to locate and disappear rivals and hide their crimes," according to "several sources within Mexican law enforcement and cartel members." Titan gives its users the ability to "geolocate persons across the country in real time, access minute-to-minute location logs, and obtain official identification documents, amongst other private information." Titan can track "a specific cell phone using either the phone number or the phone's ID" and that access to the system's services is offered through WhatsApp groups, "managed by a 'council'" which includes Mexican criminal actors and state officials, according to an unnamed "'council'" administrator. VICE interviewed an anonymous source inside the CJNG who stated that "his organization had been using this service for at least six years" and that it is "'the easiest way to locate someone or to know about their relatives if they are hiding'" (VICE 2023-12-14). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.1 Motivation to Track and Target an Individual

Information on Mexican drug cartels' motivation to track and target an individual could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4.2 Profiles of Individuals Targeted

Based on an interview with "an expert on organized crime and security dynamics," ACLED indicates that "[p]ublic displays of violence and targeted attacks on prominent figures believed to be connected to or critical of the cartel's leaders, including social media influencers," have been used to display the "strength of the difference factions and intimidate their followers" (2025-05-07). A March 2025 article in El Imparcial, a Mexican daily newspaper, reports that 6 online influencers had been murdered since the start of the Sinaloa Cartel's [translation] "internal war" (2025-03-29). However, according to IEP, while "many civilian deaths" occur during clashes between cartels, the "majority of victims" are cartel members, "young people who likely became involved in criminal activities due to limited opportunities elsewhere" (2025-05, 34).

According to CFR, drug cartels "relatively" regularly assassinate journalists and public servants (2025-02-21). It adds that the 2024 election was Mexico's most violent since 2018, "with more than thirty candidates killed" (CFR 2025-02-21). ACLED reports that Sinaloa Cartel factions have also "targeted politicians and political authorities to establish control" in their territories and "diminish their rivals' political influence" (2025-05-07).

InSight Crime interviewed Felipe Romero and Itzel Arteaga, authors of a 2024 report on environmental rights defenders by the Mexican Centre of Environmental Law (Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, CEMDA) [8], which found that environmental activists in Mexico are targeted for "increasingly lethal attacks" from criminal groups who have become "central players" in land and natural resources disputes, "often with the backing of public and private actors" (2025-06-06). The authors identified "over 100 attacks or aggression-related events" in 2024, which is "not an exhaustive analysis," but shows an upward trend since 2014's 78 reported incidents (InSight Crime 2025-06-06).

4.2.1 Targets for Recruitment

According to interviews it conducted with individuals who "make fentanyl in cartel labs," otherwise known as "cooks," the New York Times reports that Mexican drug cartels are targeting chemistry students on Mexican university campuses (2024-12-01). The article notes that the demand for "workers with advanced knowledge of chemistry" is driven by an effort to make fentanyl "stronger" and "'get more people hooked'" (The New York Times 2024-12-01). The article further indicates that chemists employed by cartels are paid "more than many legal jobs in chemistry"—in one of the cases reported, "twice as much"—and are chosen for recruitment by cartels in the following manner:

The ideal candidate is someone who has both classroom knowledge and street smarts, a go-getter who won't blanch at the idea of producing a lethal drug and, above all, someone discreet[.]

…

To identify potential candidates, the cartel does a round of outreach with friends, acquaintances and colleagues, the recruiter said, then talks to the targets' families, their friends, even people they play soccer with — all to learn whether they'd be open to doing this kind of work. If the recruiter finds someone particularly promising, he might offer to cover the student's tuition cost. (The New York Times 2024-12-01)

Using the number of cartel members lost to "infer" recruitment rate, Prieto-Curiel, Campedelli & Hope estimate that all the cartels together must recruit between 350 and 370 people weekly to avoid "collaps[e]" (2023-09-22, 2, 3). In an article by Reuters, child recruitment by Mexican cartels is said to be "more common," and the article cites numbers provided by both the US Bureau of International Labor Affairs, which estimates that "some 30,000 children have joined criminal groups in Mexico," and by "[a]dvocacy groups," which put the "number of vulnerable children prone to being recruited" at 200,000 (2025-05-28). The source adds that while it is "not clear" how these figures have evolved in recent years, "experts" it interviewed indicated that child recruits "are getting younger" (Reuters 2025-05-28). Reuters writes that children as young as 6 have been recruited by leveraging digital platforms like "video games and social media," according to a 2024 Mexican government report, and that "70% of adolescents pulled into the cartels grew up surrounded by high levels of extreme violence" (2025-05-28).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors, as well as the Brookings series, the Fentanyl Epidemic in North America and the Global Reach of Synthetic Opioids (Felbab-Brown 2025-07-23). ^[back]

[2] The CFR is a "nonpartisan, independent" think tank in the US, which provides analysis and convenes experts on international affairs affecting US foreign policy, and publishes the magazine Foreign Affairs (CFR n.d.). ^[back]

[3] Bismarck Brief is an "ongoing guide" published on the Substack platform that provides intelligence and analysis on various world affairs by Bismarck Analysis, a firm based in San Francisco that conducts research and provides confidential analysis to "help companies, governments, philanthropists, and investors better understand the world" (Bismarck Analysis n.d.). ^[back]

[4] The IISS is an international organization that produces research and analysis, and holds forums to help "shape the strategic agenda for governments, businesses, the media and experts across the world" (IISS n.d.). ^[back]

[5] The Science journal article is authored by Rafael Prieto-Curiel of the Complexity Science Hub, a research organization based in Europe that analyzes data to understand "how complex systems will respond to change and propose realistic interventions" (Complexity Science Hub n.d.); Gian Maria Campedelli at the University of Trento in Italy; and Alejandro Hope, an independent security analyst based in Mexico City (Prieto-Curiel, et al. 2023-09-22, 1). ^[back]

[6] Aristegui Noticias is an online news media platform headed by Carmen Aristegui, "one of Mexico's most renowned journalists," and a team of investigative reporters, focusing on "possible crimes and conflicts of interest among government figures and elites" (ICFJ n.d.). ^[back]

[7] CNN indicates that the term "'ubiquitous technical surveillance'" is "jargon for the widespread availability of data to adversaries" (2025-06-28). ^[back]

[8] CEMDA is a Mexican NGO focused on protecting the country's environment and natural resources (CEMDA n.d.). ^[back]

References

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Animal Político; assistant professor at a university in Mexico whose research focuses on state and non-state armed actors in Latin America, including Mexico; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; Reinserta.org.

Internet sites, including: ACAPS; Americas Quarterly; Amnesty International; Associated Press; Asylos; Axios; BBC; CBS News; Columbia Journalism Review; The Conversation; El País; Foreign Affairs; The Guardian; Infobae; Lantia Intelligence; The Los Angeles Times; National Public Radio; New Lines; Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project; Small Wars Journal; Stanford University – Migration and Asylum Lab; University of Maryland – National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Uppsala Conflict Data Program; US – Congressional Research Service; Washington Office on Latin America; Wilson Center.