ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Autor): „Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Ehemalige IS-Kämpfer in der Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham (HTS) und syrischen Übergangsregierung; Rolle der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) und anderer extremistischer Gruppierungen im Transitionsprozess [a-12596]“, Dokument #2123745

Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Ehemalige IS-Kämpfer in der Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham (HTS) und syrischen Übergangsregierung; Rolle der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) und anderer extremistischer Gruppierungen im Transitionsprozess [a-12596]

7. April 2025

Das vorliegende Dokument beruht auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen, sowie gegebenenfalls auf Auskünften von Expert·innen und wurde in Übereinstimmung mit den Standards von ACCORD und den Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) erstellt.

Dieses Produkt stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar.

Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien im Original durchzusehen. Originaldokumente, die nicht kostenfrei oder online abrufbar sind, können bei ACCORD eingesehen oder angefordert werden.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Hintergrund

Ehemalige IS-Kämpfer in der HTS und der neuen syrischen Übergangsregierung

Rolle extremistischer Gruppierungen im Transitionsprozess

Islamischer Staat (IS)

Andere Gruppierungen

Quellen

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Hintergrund

Informationen zu Strukturen und wichtigen Akteur·innen der interimistischen Regierung in Syrien, die im Zeitraum zwischen dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung und Ende März 2025 das Land regierte, sowie zur neuen Übergangsregierung in Syrien mit Stand 3. April 2025 finden sich in folgender Quelle:

· ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Strukturen und wichtige Akteur·innen der interimistischen Regierung sowie der neuen Übergangsregierung vom 29. März 2025. Dominante Strömungen [a-12595], 3. April 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2123721.html

Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham (HTS) sei 2012 unter dem Namen Dschabhat Al-Nusra gegründet worden und habe seit seiner Gründung einige ideologische und organisatorische Veränderungen sowie Veränderungen in Bezug auf seine Verbündeten durchgemacht. Es habe sich dabei um eine graduelle Entwicklung gehandelt. 2012 bis April 2013 sei Dschabhat Al-Nusra Teil der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) im Irak gewesen. Im April 2013 habe die Gruppe mit dem IS im Irak gebrochen und sich mit der Al-Kaida (Al-Qaida Central) von Ayman Al-Zawahiri verbündet (ISPI, 20. März 2025; siehe auch WINEP, 13. Dezember 2024; CFR, 9. Dezember 2024; Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 16. Dezember 2024). 2016 habe sich die Gruppe in Dschabhat Fath Al-Scham umbenannt und sich von der Al-Kaida distanziert. Bis Ende Jänner 2017 habe sich die Gruppe weiter gewandelt, was in den Zusammenschluss verschiedener Gruppierungen, darunter die Gruppen Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zinki, Liwa Al-Haq, Dschaysh Al-Sunna und Dschabhat Ansar Al-Din, zur HTS gemündet habe (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 16. Dezember 2024; siehe auch Rudaw, 30. März 2025; FDD, 15. Jänner 2025). In einem Artikel von Mitte Dezember 2024 schreibt das Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), dass die HTS sowohl IS- als auch Al-Kaida-Splitterelemente in Syrien bekämpft habe (WINEP, 13. Dezember 2024). In einem Artikel vom 9. Dezember 2024 schreibt der Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), dass der syrische Präsident der Übergangsregierung und Leiter der HTS Ahmad Al-Scharaa (auch: Al-Dschawlani) angebe, dass die HTS im Jahr 2016 mit der Al-Kaida gebrochen habe und nicht länger an deren salafistisch-dschihadistischer Ideologie festhalte. Dies werde jedoch von sachkundigen Beobachter·innen angezweifelt (CFR; 9. Dezember 2024). Einem Artikel der Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) von Jänner 2025 zufolge habe die HTS jegliche Verbindungen zur Al-Kaida geleugnet, weil sie vor allem vermeiden habe wollen, von den USA und Russland militärisch ins Visier genommen zu werden (FDD; 15. Jänner 2025). Mit Stand Frühjahr 2025 habe sich die HTS Quellen zufolge nach wie vor auf einer EU-Terrorliste (SWP, 18. März 2025), auf der Sanktionsliste der Vereinten Nationen (UN) (DW, 12. Dezember 2024) und auf der US-Terrorliste befunden (France 24, 10. März 2025). Detaillierte Informationen zum Werdegang von Ahmad Al-Scharaa und seiner Verbindung zum IS und zur Al-Kaida finden sich in oben genannter ACCORD-Anfragebeantwortung.

Ehemalige IS-Kämpfer in der HTS und der neuen syrischen Übergangsregierung

Ende März 2025 berichten Quellen von der Vorstellung einer neuen syrischen Übergangsregierung (Der Standard, 30. März 2025; Die Zeit, 30. März 2025; Rudaw, 30. März 2025). In einem Artikel von Ende März 2025 berichtet Rudaw, dass das neue Regierungskabinett Personen inkludiere, die von der UN und den USA wegen Verbindungen zu extremistischen bewaffneten Gruppen auf die schwarze Liste gesetzt worden seien. So sei der zum Innenminister ernannte Anas Chattab ein hochrangiges Mitglied der syrischen Opposition und Gründungsmitglied der Dschabhat Al-Nusra gewesen. Chattab sei im September 2014 von der UN und im Dezember 2012 von den USA auf die Terrorliste gesetzt worden (Rudaw, 30. März 2025). Weitere Informationen zu Anas Chattab finden sich in folgender, bereits oben erwähnter ACCORD-Anfragebeantwortung:

Eine weitere umstrittene Figur laut dem Rudaw-Artikel sei der zum Justizminister ernannte Mazhar Al-Wais. Al-Wais sei ein hochrangiger HTS-Richter, der die Scharia- Kommission in den östlichen Regionen Syriens geleitet habe. Die Kommission sei nach der Abspaltung der Dschabhat Al-Nusra vom IS im Jahr 2013 eingerichtet worden. Al-Wais sei einer der religiösen Führer der HTS gewesen und habe den Obersten Justizrat der syrischen Heilsregierung (Syrian Salvation Government, SSG) geleitet. Darüber hinaus seien der Außenminister der neuen Übergangsregierung, Asaad Al-Schaibani, sowie der Verteidigungminister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, vor dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung Mitglieder der HTS gewesen. Der Artikel setzt fort, alle weiteren Regierungsmitglieder der neuen Übergangsregierung vorzustellen und nennt bei keinem weiteren Mitglied Verbindungen zum IS oder zu anderen bewaffneten Gruppierungen (Details siehe Anhang) (Rudaw, 30. März 2025).

Rolle extremistischer Gruppierungen im Transitionsprozess

In einem Artikel von März 2025 schreibt der Wissenschaftler Aaron Y. Zelin, dass die historischen Verbindungen der HTS zum IS und zur Al-Kaida zu Zweifeln an der Vertrauenswürdigkeit der HTS in Bezug auf Sicherheitsbedenken der USA und ihrer Verbündeten geführt hätten. Laut Zelin habe die HTS in den sieben Jahren ihrer Herrschaft in Nordost-Syrien vor dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung diese Herausforderungen angenommen. Sie habe dies auch nach dem Sturz weiterhin getan und scheine sich diesen Aufgaben verpflichtet zu fühlen. Die Übergangsregierung habe an diesen Fronten nachhaltige und ernsthafte Bemühungen gezeigt, den Herausforderungen zu begegnen. Die Bekämpfung der Sicherheitsbedrohungen durch den IS und die Hisbollah sei über den Allgemeinen Sicherheitsdienst (General Security Service, GSS) der HTS erfolgt. Der GSS sei die Strafverfolgungs- und Geheimdienstbehörde der HTS und bis März 2024 nicht offiziell Teil der SSG gewesen. Im März 2024 sei der GSS in die Abteilung für Öffentliche Sicherheit (Public Security Department, PSD) umbenannt und offiziell in das Innenministerium der SSG eingegliedert worden (Zelin, März 2025).

Islamischer Staat (IS)

Im oben erwähnten Artikel von Aron Zelin wird berichtet, dass die HTS in ihrer siebeneinhalbjährigen Herrschaft vor dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung 62 geheime Operationen zum Zweck der Verhaftung von Mitgliedern von IS-Zellen in insgesamt 39 Städten und Dörfern in der erweiterten Idlib-Region für sich beansprucht habe. Im Jahr 2023 hätten keine und im Jahr 2024 vier dieser Operationen stattgefunden. Der IS habe in den von der HTS kontrollierten Gebieten in der Zeit zwischen 2018 und dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung nur einen erfolgreichen Angriff, nämlich im April 2024, durchgeführt. Dies bedeute Zelin zufolge, dass die Bedrohung durch den IS in den Jahren vor dem Assad-Sturz nur sehr begrenzte Auswirkungen auf das tägliche Leben in den von HTS kontrollierten Gebieten gehabt habe und die HTS im Kampf gegen den IS Zelin zufolge sehr erfolgreich gewesen sei. Die vereitelten IS-Anschläge in Syrien im Jahr 2024 seien größtenteils auf die zunehmenden Aktivitäten des IS in Ost- und Zentralsyrien zurückzuführen gewesen. Der Sturz der Assad-Regierung und die Schwächung der Iran-nahen Kräfte in Syrien hätten jedoch die Hindernisse im Kampf gegen den IS reduziert. Die Übergangsregierung habe auch die Stadt Deir ez-Zor und den westlichen Teil des Gouvernements Deir ez-Zor übernommen, was das Umfeld für den IS weniger fruchtbar mache. Auch die Mitte März 2025 zwischen der Übergangsregierung und den Demokratischen Kräften Syriens (Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF) getroffene Vereinbarung über die Eingliederung der SDF-Kräfte in den Sicherheitskräfteapparat der Übergangsregierung trage dazu bei. Die Koalition der gegen den IS aufgestellten Streitkräfte mitsamt der neuen syrischen Regierung habe Zelin zufolge wesentlich freiere Hand im Kampf gegen den IS als vor einem Jahr. Die USA und die Internationale Koalition würden gemeinsam mit der SDF weiterhin Razzien gegen IS-Zellen im Nordosten und Osten Syriens durchführen. Zwischen dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung und dem 26. März 2025 seien Mitglieder von 13 IS-Zellen in den Gouvernements Raqqa, Hasaka und Deir ez-Zor festgenommen worden. Die USA habe außerdem zwei Luftangriffe und eine Festnahme von IS-Aktivisten seit dem Assad-Sturz in Gebieten der SDF durchgeführt. Dies habe die Anzahl der IS-Operationen in den der Berichterstattung vorangegangenen Monaten auf einem niedrigen Niveau gehalten. Ein weiterer Faktor, der sich im Kampf gegen den IS positiv auswirke, sei die Tatsache, dass die Freie syrische Armee (Syrian Free Armee, SFA)[1] Ende Jänner 2025 in das neue syrische Verteidigungsministerium eingegliedert worden sei. Dies stelle potenziell ein nützliches Vehikel in der Antiterror-Zusammenarbeit zwischen den USA und Syrien dar (Zelin, März 2025).

Mit Stand März 2025 habe die Übergangsregierung vier wichtige Operationen gegen den IS durchgeführt (Zelin, März 2025). Am 11. Jänner 2025 sei ein IS-Bombenanschlag auf die schiitische Heiligenstätte Sayyida Zainab in der Vorstadt von Damaskus verhindert worden. Im Zuge der Einvernahmen der IS-Anhänger, die diesen Anschlag geplant hätten, sei festgestellt worden, dass auch ein Anschlag auf eine christliche Kirche in der Stadt Maaloula zu Neujahr geplant gewesen sei (Zelin, März 2025; Enab Baladi, 24. März 2025). Ebenso sei geplant gewesen, nach einem erfolgreichen Angriff auf die Heiligenstätte Sayyida Zainab, den Übergangspräsidenten Al-Scharaa bei einem Besuch der Stätte zu töten. Mitte Februar 2025 habe die GSS zudem Abu Al-Harith Al-Iraqi, einen hochrangigen Leiter des irakischen IS-Zweiges festgenommen. Des Weiteren seien Mitte Februar und Anfang März 2025 Mitglieder von IS-Zellen in den Städten Al-Naima und Al-Sanamayn im Gouvernement Daraa festgenommen worden (Zelin, März 2025).

Im Februar 2025 berichten das Critical Threats Project (CTP) und das Institute for the Study of War (ISW), dass der IS in Syrien nicht besiegt sei. Die Gruppe werde durch den Druck, den die US-Truppen in Irak und in Syrien und ihre kurdischen Verbündeten ausüben würden, in Schach gehalten. Ein Abzug der US-Streitkräfte würde diesen Druck beseitigen und dem IS die Möglichkeit geben, sich wahrscheinlich schnell und in gefährlichem Ausmaß neu zu formieren. Der IS habe die der Berichterstattung vorangegangenen Jahre dafür genutzt, in Syrien stärker zu werden. Dies habe dazu geführt, dass der US Central Command (US CENTCOM)[2] im Juli 2024 gewarnt habe, dass sich die Gruppe neu formiere. Der IS sei nach wie vor nicht in der Lage, Städte und Dörfer zu kontrollieren, doch könne der IS die Bevölkerung zur Unterstützung zwingen und vorübergehend unbewohnte Gebiete einnehmen. Der IS operiere hauptsächlich in der zentralsyrischen Wüste, die sich gut als Unterschlupf, zur Ausbildung und zur Organisation der derzeitigen IS-Kräfte eigne. Die Übergangsregierung sei vorrangig mit der Konsolidierung ihrer Position in Damaskus beschäftigt und daher nicht in der Lage, den IS in Zentral- und Ostsyrien ohne US-Unterstützung zu bekämpfen (CTP & ISW, 26. Februar 2025). Die SDF würde 28 Haftanstalten, in denen etwa 10.000 IS-Kämpfer und etwa 46.000 IS-Anhänger·innen und Geflüchtete in Vertriebenenlagern im Nordosten Syriens festgehalten werden, kontrollieren (CTP & ISW, 26. Februar 2025; siehe auch BBC News, 20. Dezember 2024). Mehrere US-Regierungen hätten versucht, sowohl die IS-Kämpfer als auch die Bewohner·innen der Vertriebenenlager zu repatriieren, doch dies sei wenig erfolgreich gewesen, da Drittländer nicht bereit seien, ihre Staatsangehörigen zurückzunehmen. Durch die Zusammenarbeit der Übergangsregierung mit den US-Geheimdienstbehörden sei ein IS-Angriff auf eine wichtige schiitische Heiligenstätte verhindert worden. Wäre der Angriff erfolgreich gewesen, wäre das Risiko einer Zunahme des Sektierertums in Syrien und einer Destabilisierung des Landes zugunsten des IS dramatisch gestiegen (CTP & ISW, 26. Februar 2025).

In einem Artikel von Mitte Dezember 2024 erläutert die New York Times (NYT), dass es in der Zeit vor der Berichterstattung Anzeichen eines Erstarkens des IS in Syrien, eingebettet in eine Destabilisierung, die die Region erlebt habe, gegeben habe (NYT, 11. Dezember 2024). US-Behörden hätten im Juli 2024 gewarnt, dass sich IS-Angriffe in Syrien und im Irak im Vergleich zum Vorjahr voraussichtlich verdoppeln würden (US CENTCOM, 16. Juli 2024). In einem Artikel von Mitte Dezember 2024 schreibt das Soufan Center, dass sich die Zahl der IS-Angriffe in Syrien im Jahr 2024 (etwa 700 Angriffe) im Vergleich zu 2023 fast verdreifacht hätte. Die Gruppe agiere zudem ausgeklügelter und tödlicher und sie habe sich geografisch mehr verteilt (The Soufan Center, 18. Dezember 2024). Die Gruppe habe wiederholt versucht, ihr Anhänger aus Gefängnissen zu befreien und habe in Teilen Nordost-Syriens eine Schattenregierung aufrechterhalten. Nach dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung hätte das US-Militär Luftangriffe in Syrien durchgeführt, um den IS daran zu hindern, im durch den Sturz entstandenen Machtvakuum zu erstarken (NYT, 11. Dezember 2024).

In einem Artikel von Dezember 2024 berichtet BBC News unter Bezugnahme auf Aussagen von General Mazloum Abdi, dem Kommandanten der SDF, dass der Sturz der Assad-Regierung dem IS den Weg für eine Rückkehr ebne. Abdi zufolge habe die Rückkehr des IS zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits begonnen. IS-Aktivitäten seien ihm zufolge bedeutend angestiegen und die Gefahr einer Rückkehr habe sich verdoppelt. Der IS sei Geheimdienstberichten zufolge an einige Waffen sowie Munition gelangt, die von Truppen der Assad-Regierung zurückgelassen worden seien. Es bestehe laut Abdi die „wirkliche Gefahr“, dass IS-Anhänger versuchen, in die von der SDF kontrollierten Gefängnisse in Nordost-Syrien einzubrechen, wo sich etwa 10.000 IS-Anhänger befinden würden. Da die SDF zunehmend von der Türkei und Türkei-nahen Fraktionen angegriffen werde, habe sie einige Kräfte in Richtung dieser Auseinandersetzungen umlenken und Anti-Terroroperationen gegen den IS einstellen müssen. Hunderte von insgesamt Tausenden Gefängniswärtern hätten nachhause zurückkehren müssen, um ihre Dörfer zu verteidigen (BBC News, 20. Dezember 2024; siehe auch CTP & ISW, 15. Dezember 2024). Im oben erwähnten Artikel von Zelin von März 2025 werden die etwa 9.000 männlichen IS-Häftlinge in Nordost-Syrien und die Gefahr, dass der IS sie befreien könnte, als „tickende Zeitbombe“ bezeichnet (Zelin, März 2025).

In einem Artikel vom 9. Dezember 2024, dem Tag nach dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung, schreibt der Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), dass der IS im Vergleich zu seinen Anfängen stark geschwächt sei. Er schreibt weiters, dass die Aussicht auf Versöhnung oder Verschmelzung mit der HTS nicht völlig ausgeschlossen werden könne (CFR, 9. Dezember 2024). Die Deutsche Welle (DW) berichtet in einem, ebenso am 9. Dezember 2024 veröffentlichten, Artikel zum IS in Syrien Folgendes:

„Der ‚Islamische Staat‘ war in Syrien nie völlig verschwunden, sagt der Nahost-Experte und Politik-Berater Carsten Wieland im DW-Gespräch. Zwar sei er weitgehend besiegt worden. ‚Aber es gibt im Zentrum und im Osten Syriens noch verschiedene Zellen - auch Schläfer-Zellen. Und die stellen durchaus noch eine Gefahr dar. Und die ist immer dann besonders groß, wenn es, wie derzeit, ein Machtvakuum gibt. Aus seiner Sicht hätten die USA richtig gehandelt, so Wieland. ‚Es kommt jetzt darauf an, die Kräfte, die nun die Macht in Syrien übernommen haben, auf möglichst friedliche Art zu stabilisieren und ihnen mit dem IS nicht noch eine zusätzliche Front aufzubürden.‘ […]

Gegründet im Irak im Kontext der US-Intervention von 2003, hatte sich der ‚Islamische Staat‘ von 2012 an in den Wirren des Aufstands auch in Syrien ausgebreitet. Dort nannte sich die Organisation Jabhat al-Nusra oder Al-Nusra-Front (‚Unterstützungsfront‘). Kommandiert wurde sie von Abu Mohammed al-Dschulani - eben jenem Mann, der nun den Milizen der Haiat Tahrir al-Scham (HTS) vorsteht, deren Vorstoß nun zum Fall von Diktator Baschar al-Assad führte. Ideologisch entfernte sich Al-Dschulani in den folgenden Jahren immer mehr von dem irakischen IS. In den folgenden Jahren wurde die Rivalität zwischen den beiden Gruppen immer heftiger ausgetragen. […]

Viele Mitglieder des IS [Islamischer Staat] wurden im Nordosten Syriens interniert. In den Lagern finden sich viele ihrer Mitglieder bis heute.

Dessen ungeachtet haben sich einige Zellen und Camps des IS bis heute erhalten, insbesondere in der Badia-Wüste im syrisch-irakischen Grenzgebiet. Immer wieder hätten die IS-Milizen kleinere Attacken ausgeführt, sagt Carsten Wieland. Die richteten sich insbesondere gegen die ländliche Zivilbevölkerung und besonders gegen Menschen, die nach dem dort wachsenden Trüffel suchten. ‚Dabei sind zum Teil mehrere Dutzende Menschen getötet worden.‘ Andere Mitglieder fungieren als sogenannte Schläfer und warten auf mögliche Einsatzbefehle. Da der IS weitgehend dezentral organisiert ist, ist es kaum möglich, ihn endgültig zu zerschlagen. […]

Zwar gilt der IS als derzeit unfähig, sich weitflächig auszubreiten oder gar sein altes Herrschaftsgebiet wieder neu zu errichten. Aber nach dem Sturz Assads und der damit verbundenen politischen Veränderung in Syrien könnte er versuchen, seinen Einfluss zu vergrößern. Eben darum wird die für ihre Brutalität bekannte Gruppe derzeit so entschieden bekämpft. […]

Dass Mohammed al-Dschulani sich von der IS-Ideologie tatsächlich losgesagt hat, sei durchaus denkbar, sagt Carsten Wieland. ‚Die Gruppe hat ja mit verschiedenen anderen lokalen Akteuren Absprachen und Vereinbarungen getroffen. Das lässt mich etwas auf eine konstruktive Entwicklung hoffen. Bemerkenswert ist ja auch, dass es keine großen Massaker und Rachefeldzüge gegeben hat. Unter der IS-Ideologie wäre es in den vergangenen Tagen vermutlich zu einer ganz anderen Entwicklung gekommen.‘“ (DW, 9. Dezember 2024)

Andere Gruppierungen

Informationen zu Assad-loyalen und irannahen Gruppierungen, die sich dem bewaffneten Widerstand gegen die Übergangsregierung widmen, finden sich zum Beispiel in folgender ACCORD-Anfragebeantwortung:

· ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Sicherheitsrelevante Vorfälle im Aussöhnungsprozess mit ehemaligen Soldat·innen [a-12594], 1. April 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2123634.html

In einem Artikel von Ende Dezember 2024 berichtet France 24 von der Ernennung von neuen Armeeoffizieren durch die Übergangsregierung. Es seien sowohl ehemalige Rebellen, darunter einige HTS-Mitglieder, als auch ehemalige Armee-Offiziere, die in den Anfängen des syrischen Bürgerkrieges desertiert seien, darunter. Unter Bezugnahme auf Aussagen des Leiters der Organisation Syrian Observatory mit Sitz im Vereinigten Königreich berichtet der Artikel weiters, dass auch „ausländische Dschihadisten“ unter den ernannten Personen seien, darunter ein Albaner, ein Jordanier, ein Tadschike, ein Türke und ein Uigure, der Mitglied der dschihadistischen Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)[3] sei (France 24, 30. Dezember 2024). Die TIP- Fraktion habe nach dem Sturz der Assad-Regierung in einem Video zu globaler Gewalt aufgerufen (The National, 31. Dezember 2024). Ein Experte für dschihadistische Gruppen in Syrien, Aymenn Al-Tamini, habe ebenfalls Ausländer unter den Ernannten identifiziert, darunter einen Uiguren, einen Jordanier und einen Türken, der den „Block türkischer Kämpfer in der HTS angeführt habe“ (France 24, 30. Dezember 2024). Mitte Jänner 2025 berichtet Arab Weekly diesbezüglich, dass unter den 50 Ernannten sechs ausländische Kämpfer, darunter chinesische und zentralasiatische Uiguren, ein türkischer Staatsbürger, ein Ägypter und ein Jordanier, seien (The Arab Weekly, 11. Jänner 2025). Der chinesische Uigure Abdulaziz Dawood Chudaberdi, auch bekannt als Zahid, sei der Kommandant der TIP-Kräfte in Syrien (The Arab Weekly, 11. Jänner 2025; Reuters, 31. Dezember 2024). Einem Reuters-Artikel von Ende Dezember 2024 zufolge hätten zwei weitere uighurische Kämpfer, Mawlan Tarsoun Abdussamad und Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad, laut einer Stellungnahme der TIP den Oberst-Rang erlangt. Dem Artikel zufolge werde davon ausgegangen, dass die TIP einige hundert Kämpfer in Syrien habe (Reuters, 31. Dezember 2024). The National berichtet Ende Dezember 2024, dass die Sorge wachse, dass die syrische Übergangsregierung islamistischen Extremisten formelle Regierungsrollen übertrage, nachdem Verteidigungsminister Abu Qasra auch ausländische Kämpfer für hochrangige militärische Posten eingesetzt habe. Der Verteidigungsminister habe Militante befördert, wie beispielsweise Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad, stellvertretender Vorsitzender der TIP (The National, 31. Dezember 2024). Abu Qasra sei auch in der neuen Übergangsregierung Verteidigungsminister (DW, 30. März 2025).

Der ägyptische Kämpfer Alaa Mohamed Abdelbaqy, der zum Brigadegeneral ernannt worden sei, habe die Al-Kaida-nahe Dschabhat Al-Nusra in Ägypten angeführt und sei ägyptischen Sicherheitsquellen zufolge die Hauptverbindung zwischen ihr und anderen Al-Kaida-nahen Gruppierungen gewesen. Er sei 2013 aus Ägypten geflohen und 2016 wegen Terrorismusvorwürfen in Abwesenheit zu lebenslanger Haft verurteilt worden (The Arab Weekly, 11. Jänner 2025).

In einem Artikel von Mitte Dezember 2024 berichtet Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), dass sich hunderte ausländische Kämpfer in den Reihen der HTS befinden würden. Auf Videos in den sozialen Medien, die von RFE/RL auf ihre Richtigkeit hin geprüft worden seien, seien europäische und zentralasiatische Kämpfer in den Reihen der HTS bei der Machtübernahme in Syrien im Dezember 2024 zu sehen. In einem von RFE/RL verifizierten Video sei ein Albanisch-sprechender Mann zu sehen, der ein Abzeichen der Gruppe Albanian Tactical trage, einer Einheit von Xhemati Alban, die als Subgruppe der HTS betrachtet werde und aus ethnischen Albanern bestehe, die mehrheitlich aus Albanien, dem Kosovo und aus Nordmazedonien kämen. Dem in Washington sitzenden Sicherheits- und Radikalisierungsexperten Adrian Shtuni zufolge handle es sich bei der Gruppe um eine gut strukturierte islamistische Dschihadistengruppe, die unter dem Schirm der HTS operiere. Albanian Tactical konzentriere sich laut Shtuni auf spezifische militärische Fähigkeiten, darunter Scharfschützentraining und Einsatz von Sprengstoff, und bilde gleichzeitig andere Kämpfer aus. Dies zeige einen Wandel der Einheit von ihrer Bedeutung als Kämpfereinheit hin zu einer strategisch bedeutenden Kraft innerhalb der HTS. Schätzungen des albanischen Staates zufolge hätten sich mit Stand Mitte Dezember 2024 etwa 30 Albaner·innen in Syrien befunden (RFE/RL, 13. Dezember 2024). Auch laut dem oben erwähnten Reuters-Artikel von Ende Dezember 2024 sei einer militärischen Quelle zufolge ein ethnischer Albaner, mit dem Namen Abdul Dschaschari (auch: Abu Qatada al-Albani), Leiter der dschihadistischen Gruppe Xhemati Alban, in den Rang eines Obersts gehoben worden (Reuters, 31. Dezember 2024). In einem anderen von RFE/RL verifizierten Video sei ein Tadschikisch-sprechender Kämpfer zu sehen. Es sei unklar, welcher Gruppe dieser Kämpfer angehöre. Einige weitere HTS-nahe Gruppen hätten Kämpfer aus Tadschikistan, Usbekistan und Kirgisistan, darunter die Gruppe Katibat Al-Imam Al-Buchari und die Turkestan-Brigade dabei (RFE/RL, 13. Dezember 2024).

In einem Artikel von Ende Jänner 2025 berichtet Enab Baladi von der Auflösung der Organisation „Hüter der Religion“ (Huras Al-Din), dem Al-Kaida-Zweig in Syrien, der Ende 2011 begonnen habe, in Syrien aufzutauchen. Die Gruppe Huras Al-Din habe am 28. Jänner 2025 ihre Auflösung verkündet. Al-Kaida sei in Syrien nach einem Streit zwischen der Dschabhat Al-Nusra und der Gruppe IS im Irak öffentlich aufgetreten. Unter Bezugnahme auf Aussagen des Forschers Azzam Al-Kassir, der sich auf die Untersuchung islamistischer Bewegungen und den Wandel des dschihadistischen Salafismus spezialisiert hat, erläutert der Artikel, dass die Gruppe aufgrund der Kontrolle durch die HTS nie genug Macht gehabt habe, um in Syrien eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Sicherheitslage darzustellen. Die Existenz der Gruppe stelle für die Übergangsregierung bei ihrem Versuch, das Land zu stabilisieren mittlerweile eine Belastung dar. Einem Experten für dschihadistische Gruppierungen, Hassan Abu Haniyeh, zufolge bedeute die Auflösung der Huras Al-Din nicht das Ende der Al-Kaida in Syrien. Die Entscheidung sei im Einklang mit dem Machtzentrum der Organisation in Afghanistan und Pakistan getroffen worden. Abu Haniyeh zufolge bleibe die Al-Kaida in Syrien bestehen und es stehe die Frage im Raum, ob sich die Gruppe Huras Al-Din in Syrien als sicherheitsrelevanter Akteur positionieren werde oder sich in die neue Regierung integrieren werden. Der Experte habe spekuliert, dass sich die Gruppierung in einen „Schläferzustand“ begeben könnte. Sie habe in der Stellungnahme zu ihrer Auflösung nicht dazu aufgerufen, die Waffen niederzulegen, was die Übergangsregierung vor ein Dilemma stelle. Mit dem Dschihadismus in Syrien werde es sich der Einschätzung des Forschers zufolge ähnlich wie mit der Präsenz der Taliban in Afghanistan verhalten. Das bedeute, dass die Al-Kaida zwar existieren werde, jedoch nicht als offizielle Einheit, sondern „eher in einer unsichtbaren Funktion, als Projekt“, so Abu Haniyeh (Enab Baladi, 31. Jänner 2025).

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 7. April 2025)

· Arab Weekly (The): Western powers said to warn Syria’s rulers on integration of foreign jihadists in army, 11. Jänner 2025
https://thearabweekly.com/western-powers-said-warn-syrias-rulers-integration-foreign-jihadists-army

· BBC News: 'Danger of IS resurgence has doubled' - Syria's Kurds warn of group's comeback, 20. Dezember 2024
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgx3r4nd2mo

· Britannica: CENTCOM, zuletzt aktualisiert am 3. April 2025
https://www.britannica.com/topic/CENTCOM

· CFR – Council on Foreign Relations: Syria After Assad: What to Know About HTS, Hezbollah, and Iran, 9. Dezember 2024
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/syria-after-assad-what-know-about-hts-hezbollah-and-iran

· CTP – Critical Threats Project & ISW – Institute for the Study of War: Iran Update, December 15, 2024, 15. Dezember 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024

· CTP – Critical Threats Project & ISW – Institute for the Study of War: A US withdrawal from Syria will reinvigorate the ISIS terror threat, 26. Februar 2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/us-withdrawal-syria-will-reinvigorate-isis-terror-threat

· DW – Deutsche Welle: Der "Islamische Staat": eine Gefahr für Syriens Zukunft?, 9. Dezember 2024
https://www.dw.com/de/syrien-islamischer-staat-assad-usa-al-nusra-front-hts/a-71006764

· DW – Deutsche Welle: Time to take Syria's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham off terror lists?, 12. Dezember 2024
https://www.dw.com/en/should-hts-be-taken-off-terror-list/a-71038728

· DW – Deutsche Welle: Syria's interim president forms new transitional government, 30. März 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/syrias-interim-president-forms-new-transitional-government/a-72085409

· Enab Baladi: Does dissolution of Guardians of Religion end al-Qaeda’s existence in Syria?, 31. Jänner 2025
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/01/does-dissolution-of-guardians-of-religion-end-al-qaedas-existence-in-syria/

· Enab Baladi: Joint operations center to fight Islamic State: Regional awareness of an ongoing threat, 24. März 2025
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/03/joint-operations-center-to-fight-islamic-state-regional-awareness-of-an-ongoing-threat/

· FDD – Foundation for Defense of Democracies: How China’s Repressive Policies Could Fuel the Jihad, 29. April 2020
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/04/29/how-chinas-repressive-policies-could-fuel-the-jihad/

· FDD – Foundation for Defense of Democracies: Turkey and HTS: A New Era of Extremism in Syria?, 15. Jänner 2025
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/01/15/turkey-and-hts-a-new-era-of-extremism-in-syria/

· FDD’s Long War Journal: US-backed Syrian Free Army continues to patrol Tanf area in southern Syria, 10. Februar 2025
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/02/us-backed-syrian-free-army-continues-to-patrol-tanf-in-southern-syria.php

· France 24: 'Foreign jihadists' in Syria leader's pick for army officers: monitor, experts, 30. Dezember 2024
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241230-foreign-jihadists-in-syria-leader-s-pick-for-army-officers-monitor-experts

· France 24: Hundreds massacred in Syria, casting doubt on new government's ability to rule, 10. März 2025
https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250310-massacre-of-1-500-in-alawite-heartland-casts-doubt-on-new-syrian-government-s-ability-to-rule

· ISPI – Italian Institute for International Political Studies: Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: From Jihadism to Syrian Islamism, 20. März 2025
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-from-jihadism-to-syrian-islamism-203506

· Jamestown Foundation: Jihad in China? Marketing the Turkistan Islamic Party, 17. März 2011
https://jamestown.org/program/jihad-in-china-marketing-the-turkistan-islamic-party/

· Middle East Council on Global Affairs: Why Jihadist Groups Never Really Die, 16. Dezember 2024
https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/why-jihadist-groups-never-really-die/

· National (The): Syria's Hayat Tahrir Al Sham gives foreign Islamist fighters defence roles in bid to consolidate security, 31. Dezember 2024
https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2024/12/31/syrias-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-gives-extremists-defence-roles-in-bid-to-consolidate-security/

· NYT – New York Times (The): How to Understand the Armed Factions Operating in Syria, 11. Dezember 2024
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/10/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-government-assad.html (Login erforderlich)

· Reuters: Syria appoints some foreign Islamist fighters to its military, sources say, 31. Dezember 2024
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/

· RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: The Foreign Militants Among The Ranks Of Syria's New Rulers, 13. Dezember 2024
https://www.rferl.org/a/syria-hts-tajikistan-northmacedonia-kosovo-albania/33237636.html

· Rudaw: Syria's new cabinet draws criticism over controversial appointments, 30. März 2025
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/300320254

· Soufan Center (The): The Islamic State Will Exploit the Current Situation in Syria to Its Advantage, 18. Dezember 2024
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-december-18/

· Standard (Der): Syrien hat eine neue Regierung, 30. März 2025
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000263504/syrien-hat-eine-neue-regierung

· SWP – Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: The Political Transition in Syria: Regional and International Interests, 18. März 2025
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-political-transition-in-syria-regional-and-international-interests

· US CENTCOM – US Central Command: Defeat ISIS Mission in Iraq and Syria for January – June 2024, 16. Juli 2024
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3840981/defeat-isis-mission-in-iraq-and-syria-for-january-june-2024/

· WINEP – Washington Institute for Near East Policy: The U.S. Should Not Yet Trust Syria’s New Regime, 13. Dezember 2024
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/us-should-not-yet-trust-syrias-new-regime

· Zeit (Die): Übergangspräsident Ahmed al-Scharaa stellt neue syrische Regierung vor, 30. März 2025
https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2025-03/syrien-al-scharaa-bildet-neue-regierung

· Zelin, Aaron: The New Syrian Government’s Fight Against the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and Captagon, CTC Sentinel (Hg.), März 2025
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-new-syrian-governments-fight-against-the-islamic-state-hezbollah-and-captagon/

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

The Arab Weekly (AW) ist eine in Großbritannien, den USA und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten erscheinende Wochenzeitung.

„US, French and German envoys have warned Syria’s new radical Islamist rulers that their appointment of foreign jihadists to senior military posts is a security concern and bad for their image as they try to forge ties with foreign states, Reuters reports. […]

The foreign ministers of France and Germany, Jean-Noel Barrot and Annalena Baerbock, also broached the issue of foreign fighters drafted into the army during their meeting with Sharaa on January 3, an official aware of the talks said. […]

Late last year, it made nearly 50 appointments including at least six foreign fighters, among them Chinese and central Asian Uyghurs, a Turkish citizen, an Egyptian and a Jordanian. […]

Those appointed to the post of brigadier-general include Jordanian citizen Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib and Chinese Uyghur militant Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, also known as Zahid.

Zahid commands the Turkistan Islamic Party’s forces in Syria, which seeks to establish an independent state in parts of China and which Beijing designates as a terrorist group.

Also appointed was Egyptian militant Alaa Mohamed Abdelbaqy, who fled Egypt in 2013 and was sentenced to life in prison in absentia in 2016 on terrorism charges.

He headed the al Qaeda-linked al Nusra Front in Egypt and was the main link between it and other al Qaeda-linked groups, according to Egyptian security sources.“ (The Arab Weekly, 11. Jänner 2025)

Die British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) mit Hauptsitz in London ist ein öffentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunksender, dessen Abteilung BBC News-Nachrichten sammelt und veröffentlicht.

· BBC News: 'Danger of IS resurgence has doubled' - Syria's Kurds warn of group's comeback, 20. Dezember 2024
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgx3r4nd2mo

„The chaos since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad is ‘paving the way’ for the so-called Islamic State (IS) to make a comeback, according to a leading Kurdish commander who helped defeat the jihadist group in Syria in 2019. He says the comeback has already begun.

'Activity by Daesh [IS] has increased significantly, and the danger of a resurgence had doubled', according to General Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a mainly Kurdish militia alliance backed by the US. 'They now have more capabilities and more opportunities.'

He says that IS militants have seized some arms and ammunition left behind by Syrian regime troops, according to intelligence reports.

And he warns there is 'a real threat' that the militants will try to break into SDF-run prisons here in north-east Syria, which are holding about 10,000 of their men. The SDF is also holding about 50,000 of their family members in camps. […]

The risk of an IS resurgence is heightened, he says, because the SDF is coming under increasing attacks from neighbouring Turkey - and rebel factions it supports - and must divert some fighters to that battle. He tells us the SDF has had to stop counter terrorism operations against IS, and hundreds of prison guards - from a force of thousands - have returned home to defend their villages.“ (BBC News, 20. Dezember 2024)

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) ist eigenen Angaben zufolge eine unabhängige, unparteiische Mitgliederorganisation und Denkfabrik, die sich mit Außenpolitik beschäftigt.

„Ha’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Sunni Islamist group. How should the U.S. and its regional allies view its ascendancy in Syria?

With grave alarm. The U.S. State Department has long offered a $10 million reward for the capture of HTS founder and leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani. He fought under the notorious al-Qaeda in Iraq leader, Abu Musab Zarqawi, and subsequently spent five years in an Iraqi prison for his terrorist activities. In 2011, he returned to Syria and founded Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda franchise in that country. […] Al-Jawlani claims that HTS broke with al-Qaeda in 2016 and no longer adheres to its Salafi-jihadi ideology—a claim doubted by knowledgeable observers.

What are the dynamics between HTS and the Islamic State remnants in central Syria?

As noted above, HTS emerged from the older Jabhat al-Nusra founded by al-Jawlani. Al-Jawlani had resented the attempts of the self-declared Islamic State, known as ISIS, to dominate Jabhat al-Nusra, and this resulted in a permanent breakdown in relations when al-Jawlani refused to bend to ISIS founder and leader Abu Bakr al-Baghadai’s will. But that was a decade when ISIS was in its ascendance and could afford to ignore the upstart Jabhat al-Nusra. Today, the situation is the reverse, and with ISIS profoundly weakened, the prospect of reconciliation and even amalgamation or alliance cannot be completely dismissed.

What does Assad's fall mean for Hezbollah's military power in the region?

In the past, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had counted upon the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah’s well-trained and often battle-hardened fighters to backstop Syria’s military. Hezbollah’s intervention had thus proved critical in both the suppression of the array of rebel forces challenging the regime since 2011 and in preserving the Assad family’s rule. But over the past three months, Israel’s unrelenting assault on Hezbollah’s leadership and foot soldiers has decimated the movement, rendering it incapable of rushing to Assad’s aid this past week.

The rebel victory in Syria, led by HTS, thus poses an existential threat to Hezbollah. First, Hezbollah has lost its immensely important overland lifeline that ran from Iran through Syria to Lebanon. HTS will likely staunch the flow of Iranian weaponry and other materiel, as well as impede the ability of Iran’s Islamist Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force advisors to continue to sustain and support Hezbollah. Second, Israel’s Air Force has reportedly already struck Iranian missile facilities in Damascus that had nourished Hezbollah’s previously formidable array of long-, medium-, and short-range missiles and rockets. Finally, with Hezbollah already severely weakened by Israel and now more geographically isolated from Iran, its myriad opponents in Lebanon, after four decades, could be emboldened to move against it and curtail its power and influence over Lebanon once and for all.“ (CFR, 9. Dezember 2024)

Das Critical Threats Project (CTP) ist ein von der US-Denkfabrik American Enterprise Institute geleitetes Projekt zur Erstellung von Analysen und Einschätzungen zu Entwicklungen, die als Sicherheitsbedrohung für die USA und ihre Alliierten eingestuft werden.

Das Institute for the Study of War (ISW) ist eine in Washington, D.C. ansässige Denkfabrik, die Analysen zu bewaffneten Konflikten und Sicherheitsfragen erstellt.

· CTP – Critical Threats Project & ISW – Institute for the Study of War: Iran Update, December 15, 2024, 15. Dezember 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2024

„The SDF’s [Syrian Democratic Forces] fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF is the key US partner in Syria against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. The SDF also controls al Hol IDP [Internally Displaced Persons] camp and a network of prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters. Turkish violence—including the threat of ethnically motivated killing—would almost certainly cause the SDF to mobilize its forces against Turkish-backed groups. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria. It is unclear if the SDF would be able to secure these key facilities if it faces a severe threat from Turkish-backed forces to Kurdish civilian areas.“ (CTP & ISW, 15. Dezember 2024)

„The withdrawal of US forces from Syria would risk reversing hard-earned gains against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). ISIS is not destroyed. It is kept in check by the combined pressure of US forces in Iraq and Syria and their Kurdish allies. The withdrawal of US forces will remove that pressure and allow ISIS to reconstitute, likely rapidly, to dangerous levels. […]

ISIS could resurge in 12 to 24 months without a US presence in Syria.[2] ISIS has spent the past several years building its strength there, leading US Central Command to warn in July 2024 that the group is trying to reconstitute.[3] Though ISIS remains unable to control towns and villages, it can coerce support from the population and seize unpopulated areas temporarily.[4] ISIS, if left unchecked, would gradually exert greater control over the population and try to seize populated areas. The central Syrian desert, where ISIS primarily operates, is well-suited for sheltering, training, and organizing its current forces. But a resurgent ISIS would try to control population centers to access financial and military resources, find new recruits, and restore reliable communications for operations across Syria and externally. ISIS would almost certainly leverage such momentum to attack detention centers and thus free more of its members. ISIS would, on this trajectory, eventually regain the ability to plan and conduct attacks in the West from Syria. […]

No other actor can fill this counter-ISIS role in Syria. All other major actors in Syria are preoccupied with the post-Assad political transition. The interim government is prioritizing consolidating its position in Damascus and thus lacks the capacity to fight ISIS in central and eastern Syria.[8] The US-backed, Kurdish-dominated SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] is facing existential threats from the interim government and Turkey.[9] Ankara, for its part, is prioritizing the destruction of certain Kurdish groups along the Syria-Turkey border either by force or negotiation.[10] Russia has reportedly offered to help Damascus fight ISIS but similarly lacks the ability and willingness to undertake the sort of robust counterterrorism campaign that the United States can and does conduct in Syria.[11]

The United States and SDF still need to repatriate ISIS fighters held in detention facilities, which will be much more difficult if the United States withdraws. The SDF controls 28 detention facilities holding 10,000 ISIS fighters and around 46,000 ISIS supporters and refugees in displaced persons camps in northeastern Syria.[12] Successive US administrations have attempted to repatriate both the ISIS fighters and occupants of the IDP camps with little success due to the reluctance of third countries to take back their nationals.[13] The SDF may be forced to abandon these facilities in the event of a US withdrawal as it attempts to prevent its own collapse in the event of a US withdrawal.[14] […]

US policy has for years been at a dead-end in Syria partly because Assad made it extremely difficult to defeat ISIS or accomplish other stated US objectives. Assad failed to take the ISIS threat seriously and even turned a blind eye to Salafi-jihadi activity on occasion.[16] There is now a government in Damascus, however badly flawed and potentially unstable, that has a deep-rooted interest in suppressing and ultimately defeating ISIS.[17] US cooperation with the interim government already paid dividends when Damascus stopped an attempted ISIS attack on a prominent Shia shrine using US intelligence.[18] The attack, if successful, would have risked dramatically increasing sectarianism in Syria and destabilizing the country—all to the benefit of ISIS. The US must be cautious about engaging the interim government fully, however, until it demonstrates that it has the will and ability to suppress the non-ISIS extremists that formed part of the coalition that brought it to power and keeps it there.“ (CTP & ISW, 26. Februar 2025)

Die Deutsche Welle (DW) ist der öffentlich-rechtlich organisierte Auslandssender Deutschlands.

· DW – Deutsche Welle: Time to take Syria's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham off terror lists?, 12. Dezember 2024
https://www.dw.com/en/should-hts-be-taken-off-terror-list/a-71038728

„HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] was previously linked to extremist groups like al-Qaeda and the 'Islamic State' (IS).That's why the United States designates HTS 'a foreign terrorist organization' and the UK considers it a 'proscribed terrorist organization.'

The European Union [EU] has two lists sanctioning terror groups. One is autonomous to the EU, a spokesperson for foreign affairs told DW, and the other follows the UN's [United Nations] example. On the EU's own list, HTS is not listed as a terror group. But on the EU's second, UN-based list, HTS remains part of a sanctioned organization due to its affiliation with al-Qaeda and IS since 2013.

Should the UN remove HTS from that list, then the EU would do the same, the spokesperson added.“ (DW, 12. Dezember 2024)

· DW – Deutsche Welle: Syria's interim president forms new transitional government, 30. März 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/syrias-interim-president-forms-new-transitional-government/a-72085409

„The 23-member Cabinet, dominated by close al-Sharaa allies who hold key positions, includes one woman and is religiously and ethnically mixed. […] Close allies of al-Sharaa held on to important positions, with Foreign Minister Assaad al-Shaibani and Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra retaining their Cabinet posts. Anas Khattab, the head of general intelligence and another al-Sharaa ally, was appointed interior minister. The Cabinet also includes Yarub Badr, an Alawite who was named transportation minister. Amgad Badr, who belongs to Syria's Druze minority, will lead the Agriculture Ministry. Veteran opposition figure Hind Kabawat, a Christian woman and longtime Assad opponent, was appointed as social affairs and labor minister. She is the first woman to be appointed by al-Sharaa. Raed al-Saleh, the leader of the White Helmets, the Syrian rescuers who worked in rebel-held areas, was appointed emergency minister. A Damascus-based Syrian Kurd, Mohammed Terko, was named minister of education while al-Sharaa's brother was replaced as minister of health.” (DW, 30. März 2025)

Enab Baladi ist eine syrische Medienorganisation, die der ehemaligen Regierung von Baschar Al-Assad kritisch gegenüberstand.

„After nearly six years of local and international pressure, the Guardians of Religion Organization (Huras al-Din), the al-Qaeda branch in Syria, announced its dissolution on January 28, which marked a public end to one of the most prominent branches of al-Qaeda globally. However, this raises questions about the future of al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria.

The public emergence of al-Qaeda in Syria began after the dispute between al-Nusra Front and Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Nusra Front announced in April 2013 its allegiance to al-Qaeda, which is considered the mother organization of both al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State.

The appearance of the al-Qaeda organization in Syria began in late 2011 when its members started entering the country under the slogan 'Support the People of the Levant.'

Not the end of al-Qaeda in Syria

Dr. Azzam al-Kassir, a researcher specializing in the study of Islamist movements and transformations in jihadist Salafism, affirmed that the dissolution of the Guardians of Religion Organization is positive because its external affiliations would have continued to create problems and challenges in the future.

However, it should be noted that the Guardians of Religion has never had sufficient power to pose a serious threat to security and stability, due to the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) over the organization and its knowledge of its movements and spread.

What has changed today, according to al-Kassir, is that the Guardians of Religion is no longer serving any purpose; rather, its existence has become a burden on the current administration, which is preoccupied with major files, such as enhancing communication and coordination with external parties, and providing assurances of its ability to control the situation in Syria post-Assad, ensuring that Syria does not become a launchpad for operations that may threaten international peace.

Previously, the presence of the Guardians of Religion Organization indirectly served Tahrir al-Sham by projecting an image to the outside world as a party less extreme than others and as a guarantor against the expansion of al-Qaeda and Islamic State organizations. Today, 'that necessity has vanished,' according to al-Kassir.

Expert on jihadist groups Hassan Abu Haniyeh told Enab Baladi that the announcement of the Guardians of Religion’s dissolution does not mean the end of al-Qaeda in Syria. The decision came in line with the leadership center of the organization in Khorasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan).

Abu Haniyeh clarified that the al-Qaeda project in Syria will continue, and there remains a question of whether the Guardians of Religion will position themselves in Syria security-wise or integrate into the new administration.

Regarding how the al-Qaeda project would continue, Abu Haniyeh speculated that its members might remain in a dormant state, pointing out that the organization, in its dissolution statement, called for not laying down arms, which creates a dilemma for the new leadership.

The Guardians of Religion have not abandoned their vision of maintaining their objectives, but 'with the changing circumstances, they will certainly reevaluate their approach while waiting for the outcome of the situation. Syria still has a significant amount of work to do and remains unstable on the security and military levels (stability is fragile),' according to Abu Haniyeh.

The jihadist situation in Syria will resemble the Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan, meaning that al-Qaeda will exist but not as an official entity, 'rather in an unseen capacity, present as a project,' according to Abu Haniyeh.“ (Enab Baladi, 31. Jänner 2025)

„The Islamic State’s threats did not stop at mere words and statements; it even attempted a bombing inside the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in the Damascus countryside, which the Syrian General Intelligence Service thwarted on January 11.

A source in the General Intelligence Service accused the Islamic State of being behind the planning for the bombing. The Ministry of Interior subsequently announced the arrest of several individuals involved and published photos showing four individuals it claimed were affiliated with the group.

On March 18, the Syrian Ministry of Interior released a recorded statement containing confessions of members of a cell it said was linked to the Islamic State group, accused of attempting to bomb several sites in Syria, including in the city of Maaloula and the area of Sayyida Zeinab in the Damascus countryside, and involved in the killing of Abu Maria al-Qahtani. […]

The cell also admitted to planning to attack a church in the city of Maaloula with a car bomb coinciding with the New Year’s celebration, but heightened security prevented the plan’s execution.“ (Enab Baladi, 24. März 2025)

Die Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) ist ein in Washington, D.C. ansässiges Forschungsinstitut mit Fokus auf nationale Sicherheit und Außenpolitik.

„Although the victory of HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] over Assad has been heralded as an optimistic turning point for Syria, it is imperative to not lose sight of the fact that the group’s end goals have always been shaped by a commitment to armed jihad. HTS was founded and grew out of terrorist groups, an origin story that can be traced back to the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and is integral to their identity. […]

HTS, which continues to be led by Jolani, was officially created in 2017 when JN [Jabhat Al-Nusra] merged with other anti-regime groups in northwestern Syria. The new organization disavowed any links to al Qaeda, mainly because it wanted to avoid being militarily targeted by the U.S. and Russia. In May 2018, the U.S. State Department added HTS to the Nusra Front’s existing designation as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite attempts by HTS to distance itself from al-Qaeda or the associations of JN with terrorism, the United Nations continues to describe HTS 'as a vehicle to advance [JN’s] position in the Syrian insurgency and further its own goals as [al-Qaeda’s] affiliate in Syria.'“ (FDD, 15. Jänner 2025)

France 24 ist ein internationaler Nachrichtenkanal, der eine französische Perspektive auf globale Angelegenheiten bietet.

„The new leadership last week unveiled an accord to dissolve the myriad of armed groups operating in Syria and integrate them into the defence ministry, and has now named some prospective army officers.

A decree published late Sunday on the Telegram account of Sharaa's General Command listed 49 people to be made commanders, in the first such announcement since the fall of the Assad government on December 8. […]

The names include former rebels, some from Sharaa's Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), as well as ex-army officers who had deserted to join the opposition in the early days of Syria's civil war. […]

Rami Abdel Rahman, who heads the Syrian Observatory, told AFP [Agence France-Presse] that 'most of those who have been promoted are people within Ahmed al-Sharaa's inner circle'. […]

The majority of Syrians named in the military decree come from HTS, with the rest from 'allied factions', according to the Britain-based Observatory which has a network of sources inside Syria.

The monitor said it had identified six 'foreign jihadists' among those promoted, including an Albanian, a Jordanian, a Tajik, a Turk and a Uyghur who is a member of jihadist group the Turkistan Islamic Party.

Aymenn al-Tamimi, an expert on jihadist groups and the Syrian conflict, said he too had identified foreigners on the list.

He mentioned a Uyghur, a Jordanian and a Turk who 'headed the block of Turkish fighters under HTS, and is now a brigadier general'.“ (France 24, 30. Dezember 2024)

„HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] has its roots in the Syrian branch of al Qaeda and remains proscribed as a terrorist organisation by many governments including the United States.“ (France 24, 10. März 2025)

Das Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) analysiert laut Selbstbeschreibung mittels Forschungsprogrammen und Publikationen internationale Politik und Wirtschaft.

„Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, has undergone significant ideological, organizational, and alliance transformations since its foundation in 2012. This evolution occurred gradually, even during its affiliations with the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Qaeda, where its narrative remained distinct. Initially, when it was part of the Islamic State in Iraq (2012-April 2013), its approach was markedly less extreme than ISIS’s. Al-Nusra aimed at mobilizing regional fighters to challenge Bashar al-Assad’s regime rather than govern. Nevertheless, the group attracted thousands of foreign fighters into its ranks, especially in its early stage. The group focused on supporting fellow Muslims in Syria, without displaying ambitions to rule. During this period, it also sought to forge connections and alliances with local factions and civilians, positioning itself primarily as a movement dedicated to fighting the Syrian regime and its allies.

In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra severed ties with the Islamic State in Iraq and aligned itself with al-Qaeda Central, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Contrary to expectations that the group would adopt a less extreme stance given al-Qaeda’s relatively moderated approach compared to the Islamic State in Iraq, Jabhat al-Nusra entered a more radical phase. This shift was largely due to defections by hundreds of foreign fighters who perceived the group’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani (later known as Ahmed Al Sharaa, the self-appointed Syrian President), as too lenient. These fighters believed that the Islamic State in Iraq was more aligned with their views, leading to their departure.“ (ISPI, 20. März 2025)

Der Middle East Council on Global Affairs (MECGA) ist laut Selbstbeschreibung eine unabhängige politische Forschungseinrichtung mit Sitz in Doha.

· MECGA – Middle East Council on Global Affairs: Why Jihadist Groups Never Really Die, 16. Dezember 2024
https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/why-jihadist-groups-never-really-die/

„HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] was founded by Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a, popularly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. Dispatched to Syria by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2011, al-Jolani quickly demonstrated his independent streak and strategic acumen. Between 2012 and 2013, he defied ISI instructions and focused on establishing Jabhat al-Nusra’s own territorial control in parts of northern and eastern Syria. This bold move laid the groundwork for HTS’s future autonomy. When ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the merger of the two groups into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013, al-Jolani refused. He severed ties with ISIS and realigned the group with al-Qaeda, signaling a clear break and a strategic shift in allegiance. This early display of calculated decision-making highlights the group’s capacity to adapt and prioritize its interests, even in the face of pressure from more powerful actors like ISIS.

The shift was followed by yet another transformation in 2016. Rebranding as Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the group distanced itself from al-Qaeda—eschewing its transnational focus—to concentrate its efforts on the Syrian arena. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham continued its transformation in late January 2017, culminating in a merger with several other groups—Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din—to form Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This strategic evolution allowed HTS to embed itself more deeply into the Syrian context. By shifting allegiances and strategy, HTS was able to remain/enhance relevant within a localized context in which the battlelines had become static and activity was limited. Among jihadi groups, such adaptations are not altogether unique.“ (Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 16. Dezember 2024)

The National ist eine englischsprachige Nachrichtenorganisation mit Hauptsitz in Abu Dhabi und einem Fokus auf den Nahen Osten.

„Concern is growing that Syria’s transitional government, led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), is giving formal government roles to Islamist extremists, after foreign fighters were among nearly 50 top military appointments at the weekend. […] Mr Abu Qasra has promoted militants including Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad, deputy head of the Turkistan Islamic Party. The faction called for global violence in a video released following the toppling of the Assad regime, despite HTS’s insistence that it has no plans for transnational attacks. […] Meanwhile, Murhaf Abu Qasra, a senior HTS commander known by the nom de guerre Abu Hassan 600 […].” (The National, 31. Dezember 2024)

The New York Times (NYT) ist eine US-amerikanische Tageszeitung.

„The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, better known as ISIS, seized vast stretches of territory in Syria and Iraq in 2014, establishing a brutal regime before it was beaten back by a U.S.-led coalition. Now its members are largely in hiding.

Lately, there have been signs of the group’s resurgence in Syria amid wider instability in the region. The Pentagon warned in July that Islamic State attacks in Syria and Iraq were on track to double compared to the previous year. The group has repeatedly tried to free its members from prisons and has maintained a shadow governance in parts of northeastern Syria, the U.S. said.

President Biden announced on Sunday that the U.S. military has been conducting airstrikes in Syria to keep the Islamic State from reasserting itself in the power vacuum created by Mr. al-Assad’s ouster.

The United States has about 900 troops in Syria to help contain and defeat what remains of ISIS there. The U.S. has not given a date for ending its presence in the country, saying it was contingent on conditions within the war-torn country. Those conditions have now changed dramatically.

‘We’re cleareyed about the fact that ISIS will try to take advantage of any vacuum to reestablish its capability, to create a safe haven,’ Mr. Biden said. ‘We will not let that happen.’“ (NYT, 11. Dezember 2024)

Reuters ist eine internationale Nachrichtenagentur.

„Chinese Uyghur militant Abdulaziz Dawood Khudaberdi, also known as Zahid and the commander of the separatist Turkistan Islamic Party's (TIP) forces in Syria, was appointed a brigadier-general, a TIP statement said and the Syrian military source confirmed.

Two other Uyghur fighters, Mawlan Tarsoun Abdussamad and Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad, were given the rank of colonel, said the TIP statement published on its website, congratulating them and the Uyghur community on the appointments.

All the names appear in Sunday's Defence Ministry announcement, though the nationalities are not included.

The TIP is thought to have hundreds of fighters in Syria and aims to establish an Islamic State in parts of China and central Asia, where there is a large Uyghur Muslim population. […]

Abdul Jashari, an ethnically Albanian fighter also known as Abu Qatada al-Albani, was appointed colonel, the military source said.

Jashari head the Albanian jihadist group Xhemati Alban and was designated a terrorist by the U.S. Treasury in 2016.“ (Reuters, 31. Dezember 2024)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) ist eine Rundfunkorganisation, die von der antikommunistischen amerikanischen Organisation National Committee for a Free Europe im Jahr 1949 gegründet wurde und vom Kongress der Vereinigten Staaten finanziert wird. Sie bietet Nachrichten zu Ländern in Osteuropa, Zentralasien und im Nahen Osten.

„Hundreds of foreign fighters are in the ranks of the Syrian militants who seized power and toppled longtime President Bashar al-Assad, RFE/RL has learned.

Videos posted on social media and verified by RFE/RL show Europeans and Central Asians fighting for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) during the militant group's lightening takeover of Syria this month. […]

One video verified by RFE/RL shows an Albanian-speaking fighter standing in front of the Citadel of Aleppo in Syria's second-largest city. The video was recorded on November 30, the day HTS captured the northwestern city.

In the video, the unidentified man said the militants were fighting to 'remove oppression' in Syria, a reference to the brutal rule of Assad, and described the capture of Aleppo as a 'great victory.'

The man is seen wearing the insignia of Albanian Tactical, a unit of Xhemati Alban, which is considered a subgroup of HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] and made up of ethnic Albanians mostly from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia.

'It is a well-structured Islamist jihadist group operating under the HTS umbrella,' said Adrian Shtuni, a Washington-based security and radicalization expert.

'Albanian Tactical focuses on specific military skills, including sniper training and explosives, while also providing training for other fighters,' Shtuni added. 'This demonstrates a shift from being just combatants to becoming a strategic force within HTS.'

After Syria's civil war broke out in 2011, hundreds of ethnic Albanians flocked to Syria to join the Islamic State (IS) extremist group and the Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. The Nusra Front was later renamed HTS. […]

Albania estimates around 30 of its citizens are currently in Syria. […]

Another video verified by RFE/RL showed dozens of armed men in military fatigues in the Syrian village of Deir Semaan, the site of a Christian monastery located around 30 kilometers northwest of Aleppo.

One of the men in the video is a Tajik-speaking fighter who claims the group captured the area from 'infidels.' The footage was recorded on December 3.

It is unclear to which group the Tajik-speaking fighter belongs. But several smaller militant groups allied with the HTS consist of fighters from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, including Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari and the Turkistan Brigade.“ (RFE/RL, 13. Dezember 2024)

Rudaw ist ein in der Autonomen Region Kurdistan (Irak) ansässiges kurdisches Mediennetzwerk.

· Rudaw: Syria's new cabinet draws criticism over controversial appointments, 30. März 2025
https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/300320254

„Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa on Saturday appointed a 23-member cabinet, including four members from minority groups. However, the appointments have raised eyebrows as ethnic and religious groups say they were not consulted during the appointment process. The cabinet also includes figures who have been blacklisted by the UN and the US over ties to extremist armed groups. […]

The sovereign portfolios

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani retained his position in the new cabinet lineup. Born in 1987 in Hasaka, Shaibani holds a Bachelor's in English literature from Damascus University and a Master’s in political science and international relations from Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University. He is pursuing a doctorate in International Relations. Shaibani was a founding member of the Idlib-based Syrian Salvation Government in 2017 and served on HTS’s [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] Shura council - a traditional Islamic council that provides guidance based on religious principles.

Syria’s Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra will also continue in his role. A native of Hama province, Abu Qasra was born in 1984. He played a key role in the armed opposition against Assad and the HTS-led offensive that toppled him. He holds a degree in Agricultural Engineering from Damascus University and a master’s degree from Idlib University. Sharaa promoted Abu Qasra to Major General in late December.

Meanwhile, the ministry of interior has been assigned to Anas Khattab, a senior member of the Syrian opposition and founding member of the al-Nusra Front, which rebranded itself as the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016 when it split from al-Qaeda, and then again to HTS in 2017, when it merged with other factions. Khattab’s name is not far from controversy as he was listed by the UN on its terrorism lists in September 2014 and by the US in December 2012.

Another controversial figure that was assigned the Justice portfolio is Mazhar al-Wais. He is a top HTS judge who headed the Sharia Commission in Syria’s eastern regions. The commission was established following the split of al-Nusra Front from the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2013. He was one of HTS’s religious leaders and headed the Supreme Judicial Council of the Syrian Salvation Government.

Ministries led by minority members

Despite a majority Sunni Arab ministers, Sharaa’s new cabinet reportedly includes members from other Syrian ethnic and religious components.

Mohammad Turko, reportedly a Kurd from the Kurdish-majority city of Afrin in northeast Syria (Rojava), was appointed as minister of education. Born in 1979, Turko holds a law degree from Damascus University and a doctorate from Leipzig University. He has written on child rights, citizenship, and education and has taught at several universities in Syria.

Hind Kabawat, a Christian woman, was named Minister of Social Affairs. She holds degrees in economics, law, and a Master’s in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts University in the US. Kabawat has been a prominent figure in the Syrian opposition since the 2011 uprising, holding leadership roles in the High Negotiations Committee and Geneva Negotiations Office between 2015 and 2022. Following Assad's fall in 2024, she became a member of the National Dialogue Conference preparatory committee.

Amjad Badr, a Druze, was appointed Minister of Agriculture. Born in 1969, Badr holds a doctorate in Agricultural Economics from Aleppo University.

Ya’rub Badr, an Alawite, was named Minister of Transport. Born in 1959, he earned a doctorate in Transportation Sciences from Paris and served as the Regional Advisor for Transport and Logistics at the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). He also served as Syria’s Minister of Transport from 2006 to 2011.

Despite the inclusion of some ministers from different backgrounds, the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) on Sunday criticized Syria’s newly-formed government for 'allowing a single faction to maintain control,' saying that the country’s ethnic and religious groups were neither involved in nor consulted in the distribution of ministerial portfolios.

The Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (DAANES) warned that any government that does not represent Syria’s plurality will not be able to properly manage the country, stressing that it will not adhere to the decisions of the newly-appointed government.

Other ministries

The remaining ministers appointed are as follows:

Minister of Communications Abdul Salam Haykal holds a degree in Political Science and International Relations from the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).

Minister of Information Hamza al-Mustafa, born in 1985, holds a degree in political science. He was notably dismissed from his Master’s program in Syria during the Assad era over his support for the Syrian uprising. He later earned a master's degree from the Doha Institute and a doctorate in social science from the University of Exeter

Minister of Education Marwan al-Halabi, born in 1964, specializes in Obstetrics, Gynecology, and Surgery and has earned postgraduate diplomas from universities in France. A professor at Damascus University, he served as Head of the Department of Anatomy and Editor-in-Chief of the Damascus University Journal for Medical Sciences.

Minister of Tourism Mazen al-Salihani, born in 1979, holds postgraduate degrees in Business Administration and Project Management and has led major hotel and resort developments in the Middle East, including in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

Minister of Energy Mohammad al-Bashir, born in 1983, holds a degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from Aleppo University and a Master’s in Sharia and Law from Idlib University. He worked at the Syrian Gas Company before joining the revolution in 2011. He served as Prime Minister in the Syrian Salvation Government and later in the interim government.

Minister of Economy Mohammad al-Shaar has worked in financial regulation and international banking and has taught economics at George Washington University.

Minister of Local Administration and Environment Mohammad Anjarani, born in 1992, is a mechanical engineering graduate. He joined the Syrian uprising upon its debut and was arrested in 2011. He later held key administrative positions in the Syrian Salvation Government.

Minister of Finance Mohammad Barniyeh, born in 1967, is a graduate of Damascus University’s Faculty of Economics. He pursued further studies in the US at Kansas State and Oklahoma State universities. He trained at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and worked as an economist at the Arab Monetary Fund.

Minister of Sports Mohammad Hamoud, born in 1976, previously led the national basketball team to the Asian Cup qualifiers. He also worked in developing sports infrastructure in Idlib.

Minister of Culture Mohammad Saleh, born in 1985, studied Linguistics at London Metropolitan University and earned a master’s in translation from Westminster University. He worked in journalism, including at Qatar’s al-Jazeera Network.

Minister of Religious Endowments Mohammad Shukri, born in 1961, holds a doctorate in Sharia and Law from Beirut. He served as a preacher at Imam al-Shafi’i Mosque in Damascus.

Minister of Administrative Development Mohammad Skaf, born in 1990, holds a Master’s in Administration and a degree in Applied Mathematics. He has worked in public administration and budget management in northern Syria.

Minister of Health Musab al-Ali, born in 1985, is a graduate of Homs University’s Faculty of Medicine. He specialized in neurosurgery at Aleppo University before working in Germany. He is currently a consultant neurosurgeon.

Minister of Public Works and Housing Mustafa Abdulrazzaq, born in 1989, is a civil engineering graduate. He has worked in public administration and infrastructure projects in northern Syria.

Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Raed al-Saleh, born in 1984, has a background in business administration. He played a leading role in founding the Syrian Civil Defense (White Helmets) and has represented the organization at major international forums, including the UN Security Council.

The premier

While heads of ministries have been named, a prime minister has not been appointed as Sharaa is expected to lead the executive branch.“ (Rudaw, 30. März 2025)

The Soufan Center ist eine in New York ansässige nichtprofitorientierte Organisation, die Analysen zu Themen wie globaler Sicherheit erstellt.

· Soufan Center (The): The Islamic State Will Exploit the Current Situation in Syria to Its Advantage, 18. Dezember 2024
https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-december-18/

„Looking at openly available and unclassified data, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] attacks in Syria alone tripled from last year, hovering around 700 for 2024. They have also improved in sophistication, increased in lethality, and become more dispersed geographically. Given the Islamic State’s immense war chest, even in a diminished state, the group will have the resources necessary to rebuild its organization, recruit new members, and go on the offensive. The most obvious targets are the prisons and detention camps in northeastern Syria, currently guarded by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish militia allied with the United States.“ (The Soufan Center, 18. Dezember 2024)

Der Standard ist eine österreichische Tageszeitung.

· Standard (Der): Syrien hat eine neue Regierung, 30. März 2025
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000263504/syrien-hat-eine-neue-regierung

„Syrien hat eine neue Regierung, die den Umbau des Landes nach dem Sturz von Langzeitmachthaber Bashar al-Assad weiter vorantreiben soll. Übergangspräsident Ahmed al-Sharaa stellte am Samstagabend ein aus 22 Ministern bestehendes Kabinett vor. Nachdem Assad im Dezember gestürzt worden war, übernahm eine Übergangsregierung die Staatsgeschäfte.“ (Der Standard, 30. März 2025)

Die Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) ist eine politisch unabhängige deutsche Denkfabrik mit Sitz in Berlin, die politische Entscheidungsträger·innen zu Fragen der internationalen Politik sowie Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik berät.

„At the same time, sanctions against individual senior figures of the Assad regime and HTS [Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham] should remain in place. Before the latter is removed from the terror lists of Germany and the EU [European Union] and sanctions against its representatives lifted, there are clear conditions that have to be met. The new rulers in Damascus must demonstrate that they have genuinely distanced themselves from jihadism – for example, by fostering peaceful foreign relations, preventing sectarian violence, investigating the March 2025 massacres and bringing the perpetrators to justice, committing to transparent transitional justice and demonstrating respect for human rights.“ (SWP, 18. März 2025)

Der US Central Command (US CENTCOM) ist ein Teil des US-Militärs, der für den Schutz der amerikanischen Sicherheitsinteressen in den Regionen zuständig ist, die sich ausgehend vom Horn von Afrika bis Zentralasien erstrecken.

„From January to June 2024, ISIS has claimed 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria. At this rate, ISIS is on pace to more than double the total number of attacks they claimed in 2023. The increase in attacks indicates ISIS is attempting to reconstitute following several years of decreased capability. “ (US CENTCOM, 16. Juli 2024)

Das Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) ist eine US-amerikanische Denkfabrik für die Entwicklung von US-Strategien für und Engagement im Nahen Osten.

„The rebel alliance taking power in Syria now is led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham, a designated terrorist group that grew out of Al Qaeda and was first dispatched by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which later became Islamic State. While Hayat Tahrir al Sham has fought both Islamic State and an Al Qaeda splinter element in Syria, it remains a jihadist organization called out by the State Department.“ (WINEP, 13. Dezember 2024)

Die Zeit ist eine deutsche Wochenzeitung.

· Zeit (Die): Übergangspräsident Ahmed al-Scharaa stellt neue syrische Regierung vor, 30. März 2025
https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2025-03/syrien-al-scharaa-bildet-neue-regierung

„In Syrien hat Übergangspräsident Ahmed al-Scharaa die Bildung einer neuen Regierung verkündet und treibt damit den Wandel seines Landes nach dem Sturz des jahrzehntelangen Machthabers Baschar al-Assad voran. Er wolle einen ‚starken und stabilen Staat‘ aufbauen, sagte Al-Scharaa bei der Vorstellung seines 23-köpfigen Kabinetts. Er besetzte die zentralen Posten mit Vertrauten und berief auch eine Frau in die Regierung.“ (Die Zeit, 30. März 2025)

Aaron Y. Zelin ist Fellow am Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), wo er auch das Projekt „Islamic State Worldwide Activity Map“ leitet. Er ist auch der Begründer der Webseite „Jihadology“.

„Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s background as a former branch of the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida has created a perception that it is untrustworthy when it comes to security concerns of the United States and its allies. This has come to the fore even more acutely with the fall of the Assad regime. Some of the largest threats to outside countries in Syria remain the Islamic State, remnant Hezbollah networks, and the criminal captagon trade. Although few paid attention when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was controlling territory in northwest Syria for seven years prior to the fall of the regime, it actually took those challenges on, and has continued to do so since it took over most of Syria on December 8, 2024. Of course, dealing with security challenges should not be the only lens through which to view the new rulers in Damascus; it should also take into account the nature of its governance and who is involved in it beyond its core supporters. Yet, if strictly judging the new rulers of Syria by its actions against the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade, they appear to be committed to these tasks, even if continued challenges will likely remain for the foreseeable future.

Ever since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, there have been a number of security concerns related to Syria. In particular, the future of the Islamic State threat, remnants of the Iranian proxy network, especially Hezbollah and weapons smuggling, and what happens to the former regime-linked captagon drug trade now that it is gone. On all fronts, there have been sustained and serious efforts by the new government in Damascus to address all of these challenges. […]

Broadly speaking, HTS can be described as having taken a lawfare approach to confronting the security threats posed by the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. This has been done via HTS’ General Security Service (GSS). The GSS was HTS’ law enforcement/intelligence body and had not officially been a part of the SSG [Syrian Salvation Government]. However, this changed in March 2024 when it was officially folded into the SSG’s Ministry of Interior and was renamed the Public Security Department (PSD) […]

The Fight Against the Islamic State

Prior to the fall of the regime, over a seven-and-a-half-year period, HTS publicly claimed 62 discreet operations to arrest members of Islamic State cells in 39 towns and villages throughout the greater Idlib region. Of the 62 discreet raids, five occurred in 2017, 22 in 2018, eight in 2019, eight in 2020, 10 in 2021, six in 2022, zero in 2023, and four in 2024. The data for 2017 only represents the second half of the year when the proto-GSS began publishing information on its operations.

The Islamic State only conducted a single successful attack in HTS territory from July 2018 until the fall of the regime, when HTS senior leader Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani was assassinated in early April 2024. This means that in the years leading up to the fall of the regime, the Islamic State threat had only a very limited effect on daily life in the area that HTS controlled. In other words, HTS was strikingly successful in its counterterrorism fight against the Islamic State.

The uptick in HTS thwarting Islamic State plots in 2024 compared with the previous year is to a significant degree explained by the growth of Islamic State activity in eastern and central parts of Syria in 2024. However, several of the key drivers that led to the Islamic State’s bounce-back in 2024 have diminished now that the Assad regime has fallen. A first factor that helped Islamic State activity tick up was the fact that during the summers of 2023 and 2024, the Assad regime and Iran-backed Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zor governorate had instigated uprisings against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in an effort to undermine the SDF and U.S. positions in eastern Syria. This undermined intelligence efforts by the United States and the Global Coalition and SDF in their fight against local Islamic State networks in eastern Syria. These obstacles to confronting the Islamic State were largely removed as a result of the regime falling and the huge weakening of Iran’s proxy network in Syria alongside the fact that the new government in Damascus has taken over Deir ez-Zor city and the western part of the governorate. Furthermore, the environment for the Islamic State has also been made less fertile because of the agreement signed on March 11, 2025, between the president of the Syrian transitional government, Ahmad al-Sharaa (previously known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani) and the commander of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi, to integrate the SDF forces into the central government’s institutions. Since then, the new government and the SDF have set up a central committee to implement the agreement with specialized military and economic subcommittees. There is also expected to be a prisoner exchange between the government and the SDF after the end of Ramadan in early April. Not only is it hoped the deal between Damascus and the SDF will unify the country, but the hope is that it will also create a more sustainable framework to confront the Islamic State.

A second key factor that had contributed to the Islamic State’s bounce-back in 2024 was the decision by Assad and his Russian allies to de-emphasize the fight against the Islamic State. HTS’ drone attack against a graduation ceremony for one of the Assad regime’s military colleges in Homs in early October 2023 led the Assad regime and its Russian allies to draw their forces away from the western side of Deir ez-Zor governorate to focus on attacking HTS’ base in Idlib in northwest Syria. This gave the Islamic State more space for attacks and movement of fighters across the frontlines between the Assad regime and SDF-controlled territories. Fast forward to the period after December 8, 2024, and this is no longer a factor.

A third key factor that had helped the Islamic State bounce back was that in the wake of the war in Gaza, U.S. assets and bases in eastern Syria were targeted by Iranian-backed Shi`a proxy groups in Iraq and Syria. These attacks resulted in U.S. forces and the coalition, as a force protection response, limiting their actions against the Islamic State—either independently or alongside the SDF—providing the Islamic State with more breathing room. However, fast forward to the present day and the Iran threat network has been significantly weakened in the region as a result of the serious blows Israel inflicted on Hezbollah in Lebanon in the latter part of 2024.

All in all, the coalition of forces arrayed against the Islamic State, including the new Syrian government, have a much freer hand to combat the Islamic State than they did a year ago. The United States and the Global Coalition alongside the SDF continue to conduct raids against Islamic State cells in northeast and eastern Syria. Based on the author’s Islamic State Worldwide Activity map, since the fall of the regime, the SDF has arrested 13 Islamic State cells in al-Raqqah, Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor governorates as of March 26, 2025. The United States has also conducted two airstrikes and one arrest with the SDF against Islamic State operatives in SDF-controlled territories since the fall of the regime. This continued pace has kept Islamic State operations at a relatively low level in recent months.

To make up for the disappearance of Assad regime forces from central Syria after the collapse of the regime, another U.S. partner force on the ground, the Syrian Free Army (SFA), moved from the Tanf Garrison that hugs the triangle border between Syria, Iraq, and Jordan into the central city of Palmyra to cover the broader desert terrain in Homs governorate. In the author’s assessment, the United States has been able to use intelligence against Islamic State cells and camps in central Syria in a much freer way now since it no longer has to deconflict with Russia. In September and October 2024, before the fall of the regime, the United States carried out three airstrikes against the Islamic State in central Syria. Then, the day the regime fell, the United States struck 75 Islamic State targets in central Syria and carried out another series of airstrikes there eight and 14 days later to try to ensure the Islamic State did not take advantage of any chaos following the fall of the Assad regime. One development that augurs well for the fight against the Islamic State is that the SFA joined the new Syrian Ministry of Defense in late January 2025, creating a potentially useful vehicle for counterterrorism cooperation between Washington and Damascus.

In its new guise as the Syrian government, HTS has continued to fight Islamic State cells. So far, they have announced four key actions against the Islamic State. Firstly, on January 11, the new government in Damascus thwarted an Islamic State plot to bomb the Shi`a Sayyida Zainab shrine in the Damascus suburbs designed to incite sectarian tensions. There are media reports that the United States provided the intelligence that led to this plot being broken up. In subsequent interrogation that the Ministry of Interior released from these plotters, those involved in planning this attack also disclosed that they attempted to attack a church in the Christian town of Maaloula on New Year’s Day with a car bomb, which was never actualized, and also had a plan to assassinate Ahmad al-Sharaa if he decided to visit the Sayyida Zainab shrine after a successful attack occurred.

Secondly, on February 15, 2025, the GSS arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, a senior leader in the Islamic State’s Iraq Province, who had been involved in the aforementioned assassination of former senior HTS leader Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani in April 2024 and assisting the Sayyida Zainab plot. The arrests relating to the latter plot appear to have led to information that allowed Damascus to find Abu al-Harith, which the Ministry of Interior recently disclosed. […]

Most recently, on February 18 and March 6, the GSS arrested Islamic State cells in the towns of al-Naima and al-Sanamayn, respectively, in Syria’s Dara’a governorate. […]

Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. […]

However, the security challenges posed by the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade are likely to endure for some time. One concern is the ticking time bomb of the 9,000 male Islamic State prisoners held in northeast Syria and the threat that the Islamic State could break them out.“ (Zelin, März 2025)

[1] Die SFA ist eine aus mehreren hundert Mann bestehende und von den USA unterstützte und ausgebildete Einheit, die im Süden Syriens in der so genannten Tanf-Garnison aktiv sei. Sie sei jahrelang vom Großteil des Landes abgeschnitten gewesen, da sie nur in einem kleinen Gebiet um die US-Garnison patrouillieren habe können (FDD’s Long War Journal, 10. Februar 2025).

[2] US CENTCOM ist ein Teil des US-Militärs, der für den Schutz der amerikanischen Sicherheitsinteressen in den Regionen zuständig ist, die sich ausgehend vom Horn von Afrika bis Zentralasien erstrecken (Britannica, zuletzt aktualisiert am 3. April 2025).

[3] Die Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) sei eine überwiegend uighurische dschihadistische Gruppe, die von der Al-Qaida unterstützt werde (FDD, 29. April 2020) und geschworen habe, einen Dschihad gegen die chinesischen Besatzer von Xinjiang zu führen (Jamestown Foundation, 17. März 2011).

ecoi.net-Beschreibung:: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Ehemalige IS-Kämpfer in der Hayat Tahrir Al-Scham (HTS) und syrischen Übergangsregierung; Rolle der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) und anderer extremistischer Gruppierungen im Transitionsprozess

Land:: Syrien, Arabische Republik
Quelle:: ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Autor)
Veröffentlicht:: 7. April 2025
Dokumentart:: Anfragebeantwortung
Sprache:: Deutsch
Verfügbar auf ecoi.net seit:: 7. April 2025
Dokument-ID:: 2123745