Dokument #1024109
IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Autor)
A Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Buffalo, whose research interests include African politics, human rights, civil-military relations, and political change, and who is a member of the Board of Human Rights Watch/Africa, provided the following information during a 17 January 2000 telephone interview. He stated that the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) has a history of working for a reunification of Issa regions in Ethiopia with Somalia and that Ethiopia still feels bitter about a 1976 Somali invasion. While noting that organizations with a Somali membership are typically Islamic, he stated that the WSLF did not previously have a "fundamentalist" character, but rather focused on reunification with Somalia. However, he was unaware of the current relationship between the WSLF and Al-Itihad but speculated that it could be likened to that of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Fein.
In terms of the current relations between the Ethiopian government and the Issa people the Professor stated that they are very complex and reflect the "nature of Somali infighting." He said that Somalis, and WSLF members, are generally suspected by the Ethiopian government and, in his opinion, the government could put "strong pressure" on Issa individuals with links to the WSLF. Such pressure could include surveillance as well as making it difficult for them to find employment. He added that some Issa persons had been imprisoned in the past. However, the professor qualified these generalizations. He stated that the government's suspicion would be related to the individual circumstances. He said that while the government's pressure on individuals affiliated with the WSLF could extend to immediate family members such as spouses and direct children, it likely would not go beyond that. In addition, he stated that the Ethiopian police "are not too effective" with regard to their surveillance activities. He also characterized as a positive measure the changes to Ethiopia's constitution involving greater regional recognition, that were brought about by the present government.
A 31 January 1999 report from Cultural Survival Quarterly supports some of the professor's statements. The article describes the conditions in Ethiopia for the Gurgura clan, around the village of Hurso, including its relations with the Ethiopian government and community feelings about the expropriation, by the current government, of land for the expansion of a military training base after the war against Mengistu.
The relationships among and between community members, government, military, and the workers hired by the military to guard the expropriated lands are complex. Resentment against the military base and the workers was minimal; the community's anger is directed not at the soldiers, but at the government. Some Gurgura men from the village itself, former members of the Gurgura Liberation Front, were also being trained at the base. ...
Relationships between Somali Ethiopians and the Ethiopian state are ambivalent -- clearly illustrated in Hurso. The history of relations between Somalis and the Ethiopian state is long and generally negative from both the Somali and Ethiopian perspective. The current Hurso situation is clearly the result of acts by the Ethiopian state against a predominantly Somali population. In the newly refederated Ethiopia, however, Somalis now speak and go to school in Somali, have their own regional government (albeit corrupt and inefficient, in the view of many), and are for the first time, potentially equal to other Ethiopians as citizens. Many of my Somali interlocutors were cautiously optimistic about the possibilities for Somalis in the new Ethiopia.
Loyalty and identity, however, were invested in the clan, land, and Somali ethnicity. What becomes clear through examining the history of land claims in Hurso is that the state is not seen as an oppressive and unitary force, but rather as a feature of the environment, currently a powerful actor with a tendency to swallow all other players, but with whom it is possible to make certain tactical alliances. In Hurso and elsewhere among both men and women, national politics are now seen as crucial to development and survival.
Currently, both necessity and the tentative opening of the Ethiopian state to regional autonomy and full participation by all citizens lead Hurso and other Somali Ethiopian communities to conclude that the potential benefits are worth the risk of aligning themselves with the state. Nevertheless, it is always better to keep as many options open as possible. ...
Their reasons for wanting more links to the state are pragmatic. In interviews about the larger context of Somali-Ethiopia relations, respondents stressed the importance of the clause in the new constitution permitting secession as a last resort. In the current circumstances, both union with Somalia and outright independence seem decidedly inferior to active participation in the Ethiopian state which offers at least the possibility of political power and economic advancement, while safeguarding Somali autonomy should the situation become unacceptable (ibid.).
A 6 March 1999 report from The Indian Ocean Newsletter states that Mohamoud Dirir Gheddi, a former WSLF member, had been appointed by the Ethiopian government as its minister of transport and communications. According to this report:
In 1976, he joined the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) fighting for an independent Ogaden, with support from Somalia. After Ethiopia's victory in the Ogaden conflict, he taught in Hargeisa (then still Somalia) from 1980 to 1983, then went to Syria to continue his studies, obtaining a diploma for English literature from the University of Damascus. He did not return to Ethiopia until after EPRDF led by Meles Zenawi took power in Addis Ababa, and then launched a Somali language newspaper in Dire Dawa. Elected chairman of the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) in 1993, Mohamoud Dirir participated in founding ESDL in February 1994. Two years later, he was rewarded with the post of ambassador to Zimbabwe.
It is unclear whether the organizations known as WSLF and Al Itihad are separate and distinct. Sources quoted in ETH31497.E of 19 March 1999 state that WSLF is now known as the Islamic fundamentalist group Al Itihad. However, there are several current references to the WSLF, as well as other recent reports of military activities conducted by Al Itihad in Ethiopia.
AP reported on 4 January 2000 that Ethiopian forces moved into the "Somali border town of Goldogob" in search of "fighters of the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Itihad al Islam." The forces withdrew after not finding any Al-Itihad members. In further information:
Al Itihad wants to unite eastern Ethiopia's Ogaden region, which is just across the border from Goldogob and is populated by ethnic Somalis, with Somalia to establish an independent Islamic state.
Ethiopia, which has been at war with its northern neighbor Eritrea since May 1998, had sent troops into Somalia a year ago after Mogadishu warlord Hussein Aidid, one of Somalia's most powerful faction leaders, began collaborating with Eritrea and with Ethiopian rebels.
But Ethiopia withdrew its forces from Somalia last month after it reached a deal with Aidid, whose forces were badly defeated by the Ethiopians in the central town of Baidoa (ibid.).
A 13 February 1999 report from The Indian Ocean Newsletter states that "three ambushes" on a road from Dijbouti, that set on fire oil tankers, were attributed by the Ethiopian military to "Afar or Issa rebels." In further information on this, and another, attack, PANA states in a 14 November 1999 report of a bomb blast on a train travelling between Addi Ababa and Dire Dawa, that:
Sabotage by separatist elements of the fundamentalist Al-Itihad group has not been ruled out.
The group is known to carry out occasional attacks and sabotage on government posts in neighbouring Ogaden area of eastern Ethiopia which is inhabited mainly by ethnic Somalis.
Al-Itihad, which seeks the secession of the vast Ogaden area from Ethiopia, was suspected of carrying out a similar attack on a train bound for Djibouti from Dire Dawa on 21 August, injuring a train conductor and his assistant.
That incident provoked a series of cross-border raids into Somalia by the Ethiopian army in pursuit of Al-Itihad combatants and those of another separatist group, the Oromo Liberation Front.
Ethiopia has described two groups as "terrorists" allegedly trained and armed by Eritrea to conduct a proxy war to destabilise eastern Ethiopia, thereby diverting attention from the border conflict between the two neighbours.
Human Rights Watch reported that Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia in May and June 1999 and that "the intervention force sought to dislodge the fundamentalist Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (Islamic Unity) which launched cross-border raids into southern Ethiopia from strongholds in Somalia" (Dec. 1999).
A 19 February 1999 report from Africa Confidential states that Eritrea had sent arms to a Somali warload and that they were intended for three Ethiopian opposition movements that included Al-Itahad al Islami.
With regard to WSLF activities, a 22 May 1999 report from the Mogadishu Times states that a meeting of "Oromo rebel officials" in Baydhabo, south central Somalia, was attended by representatives of the WSLF. A 5 November 1999 report from Africa Confidential states that "Eritrean radio on 26 October publicised a coordination meeting of six Ethiopian resistance movements" that included the WSLF. A 19 October 1999 report from the Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea claimed that the WSLF had issued a statement that its forces had killed 62 Ethiopian soldiers and wounded 34 in October clashes in eastern Ethiopia. "The WSLF vowed to continue its offensives against the aggressor weyane [Ethiopian] regime until the realization of the Ogaden people's self-determination for independence" (ibid.).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
References
Africa Confidential. [London].
5 November 1999. Vol. 40, No. 22. "Eritrea/Ethiopia: Ceasefire
Under Threat."
_____. 19 February 1999. Vol. 40, No. 4.
"Eritrea/Ethiopia: My Enemy's Enemy."
Associated Press (AP). 4 January 2000.
"Ethiopian Troops Capture Somali Border Town." (NEXIS)
Cultural Survival Quarterly
[Cambridge, MA]. 31 January 1999. Christina Zarowsky. "'Isn't This
My Soil?' Land, State and 'Development' in Somali Ethiopia."
(NEXIS)
Human Rights Watch (HRW). December 1999.
World Report 2000. http://www.hrw.org/ [Accessed 13 Jan.
2000]
The Indian Ocean Newsletter
[Paris]. 6 March 1999. "Mahamoud Dirir Gheddi (Ethiopia)."
(NEXIS)
_____. 13 February 1999. "Eritrea -
Ethiopia: Trench Warfare." (NEXIS)
Mogadishu Times [in Somali]. 22
May 1999. "Somalia: Oromo Rebel Officials Meet, Two Rebels Reported
Killed." (BBC Worldwide Monitoring/NEXIS)
Panafrican News Agency (PANA). 14
November 1999. Ghion Hagos. "Ethiopia; Two Killed in Train
Explosion in Ethiopia." (NEXIS)
Professor of Political Science, State
University of New York at Buffalo. 17 January 2000. Telephone
interview.
Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea
[Asmara, in Tigrigna]. 19 October 1999. "Radio Reports Ethiopian
Rebel Claims That 62 Government Troops Killed." (BBC
Summary/NEXIS)