Overview

 
“Mit rund drei Millionen Einwohnern ist es die mit Abstand größte kaukasische Teilrepublik, und wegen seiner Lage am Kaspischen Meer bildet es für Russland einen strategisch wichtigen Teil dieser Region. Zugleich leben hier auf einem Territorium von der Größe Bayerns drei Dutzend autochthone Nationalitäten. Damit ist Dagestan das Gebiet mit der größten ethnischen Vielfalt nicht nur im Kaukasus, sondern im gesamten postsowjetischen Raum.“ (SWP, April 2015, p. 5-6)[i]
 
“Dagestan is now considered both Russia’s most ethnically diverse republic and the region where Islam is most deeply rooted. More than 90 percent of the population is Muslim – 97 percent are Sunni and 3 percent are Shia. Sufism, which emphasizes the mystical dimension of Islam has long been practiced in the North Caucasus and is deeply entwined with Dagestani identity.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 14)[ii]
 
Religious conflict
 
“Значительное влияние на разные стороны общественной жизни Дагестана оказывает ислам. […] Традиционно население здесь исповедовало различные тарикаты (‚пути‘) суфийского направления в исламе. До сих пор большинство верующих в республике придерживаются именно этого направления. […] С 90-х годов прошлого века в республике начало активно распространяться новое для Кавказа религиозное течение – салафизм, или фундаменталистский ислам.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8)[iii]
 
“Islam is the majority’s religion, especially in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, where the internal factors of the umma (Islamic community) have an increasingly profound impact on society. Most of the region’s Muslims follow a form of Islam perceived as ‘traditional’ in the region because it is deeply interwoven with local customs, practices and beliefs. The east has a strong tradition of Sufism, whose brotherhoods (tariqas) have been in conflict with the Salafis for over a decade. […] Traditional Muslims are more successfully integrated into the Russian secular system and recognise its institutions and law; their religious boards have become semi-government institutions.” (ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 2)[iv]
 
“Салафиты, которых часто неточно называют ваххабитами, не признают святых и учителей, считая их наличие нарушением принципа единобожия в исламе. Они не признают вкраплений в религиозную практику народных традиций, выступают за упрощение обрядности и буквальное толкование Корана. […] В Дагестане, в отличие от Чечни, где конфликт начинался как сепаратистский, раскол был изначально как политическим, так и религиозным. […] В 90-х годах XX века конфликт, тогда еще не вооруженный, происходил как внутри исламских общин в населенных пунктах, так и между представителями духовенства: Духовного управления мусульман Республики Дагестан с одной стороны и лидерами салафитов – с другой. Одновременно нарастало давление на салафитов со стороны государственных силовых структур.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 8-9)
 
“Towards the end of the decade, the Salafi movement began to spread throughout Dagestan, bringing religious conflict between Sufis and Salafis. By late 1996, the official religious establishment, dominated by Sufi leaders, grew openly hostile to Salafi adherents. Said Muhammad Haji Abubakarov, then head of the pro-government, official Muslim Spiritual Board, made a speech in which he said that ‘any Muslim who kills a Wahhabi will enter Paradise.’” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 15)
 
“On August 7, 1999, fighters closely linked to Magomedov invaded Dagestan with a group of 1,500-2,000 armed Arab, Chechen, and Dagestani fighters […] In September 1999, federal authorities began to pursue individuals suspected of involvement in or supporting the August 1999 incursion from Chechnya. This marked the beginning of a concerted, multi-year campaign in which the net was cast widely to include suspected Islamist extremists.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 16)
 
“После событий 1999 года государство стало привлекать к уголовной ответственности участников и пособников нападения на Дагестан. Тогда же Народное Собрание РД приняло закон ‘О запрете ваххабистской и иной экстремистской деятельности на территории Республики Дагестан‘. Внятного определения ‘ваххабизма‘, да и ‘экстремизма‘, в этом законе нет. В правовом смысле его последствия ничтожны. Однако этот закон создал предпосылки для репрессий: фактически каждый, кто по субъективной оценке сотрудника правоохранительных органов мог быть причислен к приверженцам ‚ваххабизима‘, становился жертвой милицейского произвола. Произошло смешение уголовно-правового и религиозного понятий: борьба с терроризмом фактически превратилась в борьбу с приверженцами ‚ваххабизма‘ как религиозного течения.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 9-10)
 
“For almost a decade after the second Chechen war began, Dagestan authorities made no distinction between moderate and radical, violence-oriented Salafis, which contributed to radicalisation of the entire community.” (ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 9)
 
“A survey in Dagestan has found that 20 percent of the republic’s youth consider themselves moderate Salafis. Only 10 percent of the respondents referred to themselves as Sufis – traditionally the main Muslim branch in Dagestan. The most educated among those who identified themselves as moderate Salafis said they were in favor of mimicking the experience of such countries as Brunei, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman in bringing norms of sharia into governance in Dagestan. The survey also found that 12 percent of the respondents favor the radical methods of struggle adopted by the North Caucasus militants. It is especially striking that young people openly stated support for rebels in the republic. According to a Dagestani expert on Islam, Ruslan Gereyev, the survey was conducted only in cities, and support for the rebels would have been even higher had the interviews been conducted in rural areas of the republic (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, December 9).” (Jamestown Foundation, 14 December 2011)[v]
 
“Весной и летом 2012 года начался диалог и между находившимися в конфликте суфиями и салафитами.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 5)
 
“The most thorough attempt, after years of violence, to bring Salafis into a dialogue with the state and Sufi leaders, is in Dagestan. The insurgency itself is not interested in dialogue and seeks to undermine it with new terrorist attacks, while the security services also disrupt the process by further heavy-handed measures. […] The dialogue may have come close to its end with the killing of Sheikh Said Afandi, the most influential sheikh in the North Caucasus, by a newly converted Islamist in his home on 28 August 2012. […] When the moderate Salafi organisation condemned the killing and called for continuation of dialogue, insurgents threatened its leaders. The leader of the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), Doku Umarov, made a video asserting that Sufis who do not cooperate with the authorities are ‘brothers in Islam’ and invited them to join jihad.” (ICG, 19 October 2012, p. 3-12)
 
“Unter Abdulatipow ist der unter seinem Vorgänger Magomedsalam Magomedow erfolgreich installierte Dialog zwischen traditionellen Sunniten und einem gemäßigten Flügel der Salafisten zum Erliegen gekommen. Stattdessen nimmt die staatliche Repression zu.” (AI, October 2013)[vi]
 
“With the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games fast approaching, in late 2013 the authorities opted for more ‘heavy-handed security policies in the North Caucasus.’ Law enforcement agencies in Dagestan boosted their efforts to control Salafi communities. Police started rounding up, photographing, fingerprinting, and questioning Salafis, and placing them on ‘extremist’ watch lists, a process colloquially known as ‘Wahhabi registration [uchet vakhabitov or vakh-uchet].’” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 42)
 
“Over the past few months most Salafi civic activity in Dagestan has been pushed underground. Moderate leaders have been harassed; some have fled the republic and their projects been closed. The Salafi human rights group ‘Pravozashchita’, which publicised abuses, was targeted, its leaders detained or placed under surveillance and an activist’s home searched. Its outspoken representative in Buynaksk was arrested and, human rights groups said, a criminal case fabricated against her. Since late 2013, the police have been detaining Salafis en masse from cafés, mosques, and homes. […] Arrests of men with beards or women wearing a hijab have become routine. They are usually released after their documents have been checked and they have been interrogated and fingerprinted. Such practices have visibly radicalised previously moderate believers. […] Abdulatipov has encouraged the creation of militias to combat extremism. In some cases these are made up of Sufis and have reportedly been involved in inter-confessional violence.” (ICG, 30 January 2014, p. 7-8)
 
“Mass arrests of Muslims in mosques have become a hallmark of the Dagestani head Ramazan Abdulatipov’s policies. […] However, some experts say the mass arrests are part of a campaign of harassment against some categories of Muslims in Dagestan and a step backward in the dialogue between religious groups. […] According to Akhmet Yarlykapov, a Moscow-based expert of Dagestani origin, up to 50 percent of the republic’s Muslims do not subordinate to the official Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan, which is dominated by the Sufi branch of Islam. According to Yarlykapov, government policies against the Salafis could drive them to become an underground movement, which would not be a positive development even though the Salafis would not necessarily turn to violence.” (Jamestown Foundation, 19 May 2015)
 
“Against the backdrop of multiple killings of young members of the jamaats, Salafi ideology will attract more young people who regard the teaching as the only way of resisting the local authorities who work under Moscow’s auspices. Salafism in contemporary Dagestan has become a serious counterweight to official Sufism, as the latter has undermined its authority by close cooperation with the government. Sufism’s loss of authority is directly linked to the young people’s drift toward joining the ranks of the jihadists.” (Jamestown Foundation, 10 January 2013)
 
“Mass arrests of parishioners of mosques associated with the Salafist movement have become routine in Dagestan. For example, on July 15, the police cracked down on the mosque on Vengerskikh Boitsov Street, in Makhachkala, when up to 50 parishioners were detained (Newsru.com, July 15). Exactly a month earlier, on June 17, the police detained up to 80 of the mosque’s parishioners (Newsru.com, June 17). The majority of the detainees showed documents issued by the police indicating they had previously been put on the Interior Ministry’s control and prophylactic list. However, the police nonetheless detained them ‘for identification purposes,’ and if they resisted, the police could put them under arrest for 15 days for disobedience. The authorities use various methods of harassment, including mass arrests of mosque parishioners as they exit mosques. Sometimes, the police enter mosques, install a video camera inside and then ask everyone to state their name, surname and address on camera (YouTube, May 9, 2015). According to Dagestan’s Interior Minister Abdurashid Magomedov, the police, using such methods, registered 20,000 adherents of Salafism. The figure may be even larger than the one Magomedov cited in his report for the Dagestani parliament (Regnum, June 2). That there are 20,000 active followers of Salafism in Dagestan is quite impressive. It explains why the republic remains one of the hotbeds of insurgency in southern Russia. […] The police put not only adults on the ‘prophylactic list,’ but also children as young as two years old. The registration term extends to 2060 - that is, for 40-45 years (Memohrc.org, August 6, 2015). The strategy of the police is unlikely to lower interreligious tensions between Dagestan’s Sufis and Salafists. In 2014–2015, many prominent Salafist leaders fled Dagestan. They included Abu Umar Sasitlinsky, who is now in a Turkish prison, Nadir Abu Khalid, who joined the Islamic State, and others who felt that the government’s stance on Salafists was changing. As the authorities increase pressure on the Salafists, they will increasingly join the underground movements, which will escalate Dagestan’s civil conflict.” (Jamestown Foundation, 29 July 2016)
 

Insurgency in Dagestan

 
Development of the insurgency
 
“Islamist militancy in Dagestan rose in the mid-1990’s, when links developed between Chechen separatist warlords and Dagestan’s Salafi religious community. Ideas of jihad, or holy war, in Dagestan can be traced to 1992, when Bagautdin Magomedov (Kebedov), who came to be known as ‘the father of the Dagestani jihad,’ established a Quranic school in Kizilyurt, a town in Dagestan. By 1996, he explicitly called for holy war against the ‘infidels.’ […] In the period between the two Chechen wars, from 1997 to 1999, Islamists shuttled between the two republics. On August 7, 1999, fighters closely linked to Magomedov invaded Dagestan with a group of 1,500-2,000 armed Arab, Chechen, and Dagestani fighters, supposedly to support Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, two self-declared ‘Sharia [Islamic law] mini-states’ influenced by Magomedov’s teachings. Russian troops eventually drove out the militant forces and a month later launched large-scale military operations in Chechnya, which became the second Chechen war. The Republic of Dagestan remained a volatile site of insurgency thereafter. […] In September 1999, federal authorities began to pursue individuals suspected of involvement in or supporting the August 1999 incursion from Chechnya. This marked the beginning of a concerted, multi-year campaign in which the net was cast widely to include suspected Islamist extremists. Hundreds were arrested. According to the Russian human rights organization Memorial Human Rights Center, the authorities tortured numerous detainees held in this campaign. Abduction-style detentions also became widespread. The majority of those abducted were Salafis.” (HRW, 18. Juni 2015, p. 15-16)
 
“The Republic of Dagestan has become the principal scene of all the North Caucasian resistance movement in the past two years. Not only does the republic have the largest number of jamaats operating on its territory in the North Caucasus, but it also boasts of having the largest group of people there who are literate in Islamic theology and adhere to the ideas of an all-out jihadism in the region.” (Jamestown Foundation, 17 May 2012)
 
“With the Kremlin’s appointment of Magomedsalam Magomedov as president of Dagestan in February 2010, the republic’s leadership launched a new, diversified effort to stabilize the republic. Magomedov spoke of the need for political change and pledged to modernize Dagestan’s economy, fight corruption, and encourage outside investment. He also promised a fresh approach toward tackling the insurgency, by stressing the importance of dialogue and guaranteeing the safety of militants who wished to return to ‘normal human life.’” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 19)
 
“In mid-March, a massive redeployment of military personnel from Chechnya to Dagestan took place. According to unofficial sources from Dagestan, up to 20,000-25,000 troops were moved to the neighboring republic. A military column including large amounts of armored fighting vehicles set out from Khankala, a military base to the east of Grozny, to the Karabudakhkent district of Dagestan on the outskirts of the capital city of Makhachkala.” (CACI, 4 April 2012)[vii]
 
“Starting in early October, troops of the Russian Ministry of Defense are again participating in the counterinsurgency campaign in the North Caucasus. […] In fact, Moscow is actively strengthening its military presence in the region, with a particular focus on Dagestan. In the spring months of 2012, it deployed up to 25,000 MVD police units to Dagestan, the majority of which had previously been stationed in Chechnya. The recent decision to deploy army units to Dagestan seems to have been made in August or September and confirms that the success of the MVD troops has been limited. Indeed, the police units recruited from all over the Russian Federation and deployed to Dagestan for only a few months have proven incapable of grasping the peculiarities of local counterinsurgency warfare. In addition, the death toll on MVD troops deployed in the Dagestan campaign has increased steadily in recent months.” (CACI, 14 November 2012)
 
“In January 2013, Putin replaced Magomedov by appointing Ramazan Abdulatipov as Dagestan’s leader. A clear toughening of counterinsurgency strategy largely coincided with the June 2013 call by Caucasus Emirate leader Doku Umarov for ‘maximum force’ to attempt to prevent the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi did from taking place. The Dagestani presidential administration ceased efforts to foster ties with and integrate non-militant Salafis and instead presided over a crackdown on Salafi communities.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 21)
 
“Hopes for improvement of the security situation in Dagestan gradually dissipate as attacks intensify in the republic. In spite of an anti-corruption campaign introduced by Dagestan’s new acting president, harsher government tactics appear to be matched by more exasperated attacks by the militants, while new anti-insurgency jamaats are formed to avenge the casualties of terrorist attacks.” (CACI, 26 June 2013)
 
“On October 22, government forces deployed in Dagestan’s mountains were significantly reinforced when at least 500 servicemen arrived in the district of Untsukul. Government forces will reportedly also be sent to other districts in Dagestan’s mountainous region to improve the deteriorating security situation in the area.” (Jamestown Foundation, 28 October 2013)
 
“Dagestan remained the epicentre of insurgent violence in 2013, with a long list of violent confrontations, improvised explosive device (IED) incidents, killings of officials and attacks on shops selling alcohol. It also was subject to a significant number of alleged abuses by security officials. These included illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, falsified criminal cases and torture.” (ICG, 30 January 2014, p. 21)
 
“In 2013, the total number of victims of the armed conflict in Northern Caucasus decreased as compared to 2012 by 239 people, or by 19.5%. The death toll went down from 700 in 2012 to 529 in 2013, i.e., by 24.4%; the number of wounded persons – from 525 to 457 (by 13%). However losses among civilians went up. […] In 2013, the highest count of victims was recorded in Dagestan – 641 persons, including 341 people killed and 300 others wounded.” (Caucasian Knot, 31 January 2014)[viii]
 
“Nearly 70 percent of all militant attacks and victims of such attacks in the North Caucasus take place in the Republic of Dagestan. The center of the region’s political struggle also moved to Dagestan last year, which was connected to the fact that a Dagestani emir, Abu Muhammad (Aliaskhab Kebekov), replaced the deceased Doku Umarov as leader of the Caucasus Emirate. The new Caucasus Emirate emir endorsed the head of al-Qaeda, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri (Hunafa.com, June 23, 2014). By supporting al-Zawahiri, Abu Muhammad collided with the leadership of the IS and those North Caucasians fighting under the flag of its leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.” (Jamestown Foundation, 9 January 2015)
 
“In 2014, Northern Caucasus saw a dramatic reduction of the number of victims of the armed conflict. […] The statistics for Dagestan, which remained the leader in the number of victims among the regions of Northern Caucasus, shows that the republic preserved its leadership in 2014, except for Quarter 4, when Chechnya had more victims than Dagestan. However, in Dagestan, in 2014, the number of killed and wounded persons went down by 54.3%. The total number of victims of the conflict decreased from 641 people (of which 341 people were killed and at least 300 wounded) in 2013 down to 293 people, including 208 killed and 85 wounded. The number of victims of terror acts dropped 9.9-fold as compared with 2013.” (Caucasian Knot, 31 January 2015)
 
“Judging by the actions of the militants in Dagestan in February and the beginning of March 2015, a major regrouping in the ranks of the Dagestani jamaat has been completed. After the rebels in Dagestan resolved the issues of command and subordination, they have resumed attacking government forces as in the past.” (Jamestown Foundation, 13 March 2015)
 
“On April 19, 2015, the Caucasus Emirate’s leader Aliaskhab Kebekov, nom de guerre Ali Abu Mukhammad, was killed in a special operation carried out by Russian elite forces in Dagestan’s Buynaksk district. His death came at a time of profound decline of the North Caucasian jihadists, coupled with the ongoing split in their ranks as an increasing number of fighters and insurgent leaders turn to the Islamic State (IS). (CACI, 29 April 2015)
 
“Magomed Suleimanov (Abu Usman of Gimry), a Sharia militants' judge and the leader of the armed underground in Dagestan, has been appointed the new leader of the ‘Imarat Kavkaz’ recognized in Russia as a terrorist organization.” (Caucasian Knot, 28 May 2015)
 
“The leader of the North-Caucasian branch of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), which has been recognized as a terrorist organization, is the Dagestani commander Abu Mukhammad (Rustam Asilderov). […] The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that on June 21 a message was posted on the YouTube that militants of four vilayets of the so-called ‘Imarat Kavkaz’, which is regarded in Russia as a terrorist organization, swore their allegiance to Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the above IS (earlier named as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL). The IS has taken the oath of North-Caucasian militants and announced the establishment of its branch in the region.” (Caucasian Knot, 25 June 2015)
 
“While observers focused on the shift from the Caucasus Emirate to the Islamic State in the North Caucasus, the news that a single amir from the team of the slain CE leader took an oath of allegiance to the CE went almost unnoticed. The rebel leader who remained loyal to the CE is Said Abu Muhammad Arakinsky, the group’s amir of Dagestan (Kavkazsky Uzel, December 29, 2014).” (Jamestown Foundation, 9 July 2015)
 
“Despite these setbacks, the CE tried to survive and started to form new military structures in Dagestan (see EDM, August 6). An impression emerged that the two rebel organizations, the CE and the IS, would compete with each other for the right to represent the armed Islamic resistance movement in the region. However, what happened in recent days may change everything: the CE did not simply suffer another round of losses, but lost three of its top commanders, including the leader of the organization. […] Among the rebels killed was new CE leader Abu Usman Gimrinsky (Magomed Suleimanov), an Untsukul district native. Two other well-known commanders were reportedly also killed—Said Arakansky (Kamil Saidov), amir of the Dagestani Velayat, and Abu Dujan (Abdulla Abdullaev), amir of the Mountainous Sector of the Dagestani Velayat, (Kavpolit.com, August 11). Thus, practically all the top leaders of the Caucasus Emirate were wiped out. Within hours of the incident, the websites that represent the CE confirmed the death of the group’s leadership (Kavkazcenter.com, August 11).” (Jamestown Foundation, 14 August 2015)
 
“While the governor of Dagestan, Ramazan Abdulatipov, has boasted of a drastic reduction in the number of attacks by insurgents in the republic, the Russian authorities’ statistics indicate that attacks in Dagestan are, in fact, increasing. At a recent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in Moscow, Abdulatipov claimed that ‘2014 was the first year that we lived through without terrorist attacks.’ He said Dagestan today is 3.2 times safer than the national average in the country: […] Dagestani experts point to a number of irregularities in Abdulatipov’s blissful reports. First, they say that the general level of crime in Dagestan has always been quite low. At the same time, the statistics provided by the Russian prosecutor general’s office indicate that the number of terrorism-related crimes have steadily grown in Dagestan over the past several years, and the republic has been at the top of the list in this regard in Russia at least since 2011. In 2011, prosecutors recorded 220 such crimes in the republic; in 2012, the number grew to 295; in 2013, the number of terrorism-related crimes reached 365; in 2014, that number hit 472. In the first six months of 2015, 352 terrorism-related crimes were already recorded (Kavkazskaya Politika, September 4).” (Jamestown Foundation, 16 September 2015)
 
“Abdurashid Magomedov, Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan, has reported that a lot of natives of Dagestan left for Syria with their family members and children. According to the Minister, all of the men who left for Syria are put on the federal wanted list. […]The Minister has also noted that there are serious hotbeds of tension in the territory of the republic. ‘At present, the main hotbeds of tension are located in the mountainous districts of southern Dagestan, including the Shamil, Khunzakh, Gunib, Tsumada, and Tsuntin Districts,’ the Minister has emphasized.” (Caucasian Knot, 10 December 2015)
 
“Auch in Dagestan, der Hauptkrisenregion des Nordkaukasus, sanken die Zahlen: 2014 mindestens 208 Getötete, 2013 noch 271 und im Jahr zuvor 410. Dieser Trend hielt im Jahr 2015 an: Laut der russischen Internetzeitung Caucasian Knot wurden im Nordkaukasus mindestens 209 Menschen – davon rund 135 in Dagestan – getötet. Ursache für den erheblichen Rückgang dürfte sein, dass sich seit 2015 vermehrt Kämpfer aus dem Nordkaukasus dem IS in Syrien und im Irak angeschlossen haben.” (BAMF, 25 January 2016, p.4)[ix]
 
“In 2015, Russia changed its assessment of threats, shifting its focus from the Caucasus Emirate to members of the so-called Islamic State (IS). The Russian government’s concern is not so much about the numbers of people who went to Syria and may return, but rather the possible influence the ideas of the IS might have among Russia’s 20 million Muslims. The activities of the IS in the North Caucasus also should be evaluated in the context of the armed Islamic underground movement and those Salafists who sympathize with it. According to Dagestan’s governor, Ramazan Abdulatipov, only 643 residents of the republic are fighting in the ranks of the IS. Dagestani Interior Minister Abdurashid Magomedov estimated the number of Dagestani IS recruits at 900 as of December 2015 (Kavkazsky Uzel, December 10, 2015). Abdulatipov must have meant only those individuals who went to Syria and whose involvement in insurgent activities has been confirmed. The Russian Ministry of Interior claims that jointly with the Federal Security Service (FSB), it is monitoring over 2,800 Russian citizens who went to fight in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the interior ministry launched criminal investigations into 889 militants who returned from the Middle East.” (Jamestown Foundation, 8 January 2016)
 
“In an attempt to decrease tensions in the North Caucasus, the Russian authorities set out to register all potential extremists who might carry out a terrorist attack, in the opinion of the police and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Since the start of 2016, reports started to emerge detailing the number of extremists and their locations. In Dagestan alone, the authorities reportedly registered 14,000 people as potential extremists (Riadagestan.ru, March 3). According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Dagestan, the authorities registered at least 15,000 potential extremists (Chernovik.net, March 1). A member of the Council for Human Rights under the President of Russia, Maksim Shevchenko, says the Dagestani authorities registered about 100,000 people as potentially unreliable (Echo.msk.ru, February 25). The estimates of extremists in Dagestan are quite high, especially given that there are about 21,000 police officers in the republic.” (Jamestown Foundation, 24 March 2016)

“In den vergangenen Jahren hat sich im Nordkaukasus die Hauptkonfliktzone von Tschetschenien weg in die Nachbarrepublik Dagestan verlagert, zum Teil auch nach Inguschetien und Kabardino-Balkarien […] Seit 2012 hält der Rückgang von Getöteten im Nordkaukasus an. 2015 starben bei Anschlägen und Kämpfen zwischen Sicherheitskräften und separatistischen bzw. islamistischen Aufständischen 209 Personen (2014: 341; 2013: 529; 2012: 700). Auch wenn in Dagestan ebenfalls ein deutlicher Rückgang der Opferzahlen zu verzeichnen ist, bleibt diese Nordkaukasus-Republik der Schwerpunkt von Gewalt und Todesopfern. 2015 wurden mindestens 126 Menschen (2014: 208; 2013: 271; 2012: 410) getötet. Nach Erkenntnissen der russischen Internetzeitung Caucasian Knot wurden im Nordkaukasus im 1. Hj. 2016 rund 70 Menschen getötet, davon 53 in Dagestan und vier in Tschetschenien.” (BAMF, 12 September 2016, pp. 3-4)

“Armed confrontations between Islamist insurgents and law enforcement agencies continued in the North Caucasus, particularly in Dagestan. Russia media continued to report on North Caucasus residents leaving Russia and joining the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) as well as on cases of detentions of North Caucasus residents allegedly affiliated with ISIS. Salafi Muslim communities in Dagestan were subject to intense scrutiny and harassment as law enforcement largely equated them with insurgents or their collaborators. Authorities placed Salafis on watch lists, repeatedly detained and questioned many of them without specific grounds; raided Salafi mosques; and carried out mass detentions of believers. They closed several Salafi mosques, including in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital.” (HRW, 12 January 2017)

 
Attacks and violations of human rights
 
“Across town in an outlying, concrete-block neighborhood, Svetlana Isayeva runs the group Mothers of Daghestan for Human Rights from a tiny ground-floor office. She started the organization after her 25-year-old son disappeared from the street outside her home three years ago. A stoic, dark-haired woman, Isayeva says many young men like him are detained by security forces, especially those who attend mosques and show other signs of religious piousness. She says they're forced to confess to terrorism and often killed. ‘Lately it's become common among law enforcers to burn people alive in their cars,’ she says. ‘Then they're accused of blowing themselves up by accident.” (RFE/RL, 4 November 2011)[x]
 
“Похищения и насильственные исчезновения людей по-прежнему остаются одной из распространенных форм грубейших нарушений прав человека в Дагестане. За годы сложилась целая система незаконного насилия, включающая в себя неотъемлемые элементы – похищение людей, применение к ним пыток и осуществление внесудебных казней части похищенных. В Дагестане объектом похищений обычно становятся люди, исповедующие фундаменталистское направление ислама (салафизм), именно их силовики подозревают в пособничестве или причастности к вооруженному подполью. В Дагестане, как и в других республиках Северного Кавказа, нередко похищают и впоследствии убивают идеологов этого течения, тех, кому сложно предъявить официальные обвинения, но кого силовики считают ‘опасными’. Впрочем, среди похищенных есть люди, не принадлежащие к салафитскому течению.” (Memorial, 4 September 2012, p. 48-49)
 
“Die Dagestan-Spezialistin Ekaterina Sokiryanskaya berichtet von illegalen Verhaftungen und Misshandlungen von Personen, denen religiöser Extremismus vorgeworfen wird. Häuser von Angehörigen der Aufständischen seien in Brand gesetzt worden, so Sokiryanskaya. Staatlich geduldete Bürgerwehren würden die Bewohner einschüchtern. Tatsächlich treibe man mit diesen Methoden einen Teil der Opposition in die Hände der Aufständischen.” (AI, October 2013)
 
“In March, the security services in Dagestan revived an environmentally dangerous tactical tool for fighting the regional insurgency—arson attacks on forests. Multiple media outlets and Internet social media confirmed reports of forest fires in several districts in the republic.” (Jamestown Foundation, 1 April 2014)
 
“Few Russians, however, are interested in the rising number of kidnappings by government forces in Dagestan. Kidnappings are a way of putting pressure on the relatives of the militants or on their sympathizers—or, more generally, on Salafis.” (Jamestown Foundation, 15 May 2014)
 
“Media and local human rights groups have also reported on more than a dozen cases in 2013 and 2014 in which law enforcement and security forces blew up homes belonging to people whose relatives are suspected insurgents.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 28)
 
“Young men who are abducted by government forces in Dagestan are frequently found dead at the scene of a special operation (Chernovik.net, May 29). The government then declares them to have been rebels.” (Jamestown Foundation, 5 June 2015)
 
“The manner in which law enforcement and security personnel commonly detain suspects is one of the most distinctive abuses in the counterinsurgency campaign in Dagestan. Often these personnel do not identify themselves, show warrants, inform the detainee or their relatives where they are taking them, or the grounds for the detention, or provide timely access to a lawyer of one’s own choosing. In some cases, detentions are part of a highly visible operation in which security officers, backed by police, take suspects into custody without explanation or showing warrants. In other cases, the person is ambushed by men who sometimes wear masks and bundle detainees into a car and drive them to unknown destinations. These circumstances have led families and Russian human rights groups to refer to this pattern as abductions. Those targeted are typically young men who are suspected of having some link to the insurgency through family or other ties, are Salafis, or went to mosques frequented by Salafis. In some cases, the detainees may never be seen or heard from again: they are victims of enforced disappearances. In others, they may be initially forcibly disappeared but do show up within a few days in a detention facility, tortured, or threatened into signing confessions without the presence and advice of a lawyer.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 48)
 
“Attacks on police in the streets or on their offices are among the most frequent tactics used by insurgents in their assault on the authorities. Non-police victims are common and in some cases, the assailants attempted to magnify the killings by detonating a small bomb first and then a larger one when police rescue workers and sometimes civilians have gathered.” (HRW, 18 June 2015, p. 84)
 
“As part of their counterinsurgency efforts, law enforcement and security in Dagestan largely equated Salafi Muslims with insurgents or their collaborators. Police put Salafis on special watch lists, repeatedly detaining, questioning, photographing, and fingerprinting them -often without grounds - and in some cases carried out forced DNA sampling. Police also raided Salafi mosques across Dagestan and conducted numerous, abusive special operations using excessive force in detaining suspects and holding them incommunicado in undisclosed locations.” (HRW, 27 January 2016)
 
“Seven residents of Khasavyurt, four residents of Kaspiysk, and a native of Dagestan, who came from abroad to visit his relatives in Makhachkala, were kidnapped in the period from September 19 to October 4. These are the results of the calculations run by the Human Rights Centre (HRC) ‘Memorial’. […] The kidnapped men were not on the police prevention registration lists, reports the website of the HRC ‘Memorial’ with reference to relatives of the disappeared people.” (Caucasian Knot, 6 October 2016)
 

Timeline of attacks in Dagestan

Please note: Although a lot of information on the Russian Federation is available in Russian language only, currently only selected Russian documents are available on ecoi.net. No Russian language publisher is currently among the sources regularly covered by ecoi.net. The following timeline therefore does not purport to be an exhaustive list of attacks in Dagestan, but shall serve as an overview and introduction to the subject.
 
Please also see the archived versions of this featured topic for a timeline for previous years:
For 2011, see http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/220655
For 2012, see http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/242518
For 2013, see http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/270091
For 2014, see http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/293185  
For 2015, see http://www.ecoi.net/en/document/323719 
 
2017
 
January
 
“Силовики завершили штурм блокированного дома в селе Вперед Кизлярского района Дагестана, убиты двое предполагаемых боевиков.” (Caucasian Knot, 21 January 2017)
 
“Two armed men were killed during a special operation by security services in Russia's volatile republic of Daghestan, Russian media reports. A security-service official in Daghestan said on January 1 that two militants had been killed in a[n] counterterrorist operation by security forces as they hid in a house in the village of Yaman-Su in the Novolaksky district. Two security-service officers were reported wounded while storming the house during the operation, the official said, adding that the operation was ongoing.” (RFE/RL, 1 January 2017)

2016
 
December
 
“В перестрелке в Каспийске, согласно уточненным данным, убит мужчина, который открыл огонь по силовикам, сообщили источники в правоохранительных органах.” (Caucasian Knot, 30 December 2016)
 
“Russian authorities say one police officer and two suspected militants have been killed in a shoot-out in Daghestan, in Russia’s volatile North Caucasus region. Daghestan police spokeswoman Fatina Ubaydatova said on December 30 that traffic police officers were trying to stop a car with suspected militants outside the city of Khasavyurt late on December 29 when people in that vehicle opened fire on them.” (RFE/RL, 30 December 2016)
 
“Двое полицейских в Махачкале были убиты 25 декабря не при попытке остановить машину с неизвестными, а после того как сами были остановлены тремя вооруженными людьми. Третий из находившихся в автомобиле сотрудников полиции ранен, четвертый не пострадал, заявили в Следственном комитете.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 December 2016)
 
“Перестрелка сотрудников силовых структур с предполагаемыми боевиками произошла на окраине села Телетль, убиты два человека.” (Caucasian Knot, 24 December 2016)
 
“Сотрудник полиции в Хасавюрте попросил прохожего остановиться для проверки документов, но тот начал стрелять и был убит ответным огнем, сообщил представитель дагестанского МВД.” (Caucasian Knot, 23 December 2016)
 
“В Карабудахкентском районе правоохранители застрелили двух человек, которые, по версии силовиков, открыли огонь при попытке остановить их автомобиль для проверки документов.” (Caucasian Knot, 21 December 2016)
 
“Der russische Inlandsgeheimdienst (FSB) verlautbarte, im Nordkaukasus am 03.12.16 den 35-jährigen ranghohen IS-Dschihadisten Rustam Aselderow und vier seiner Mitkämpfer bei einer Razzia in Machatschkala (Hauptstadt der russischen Nordkaukasusrepublik Dagestan) getötet zu haben. Aselderow, auch bekannt unter dem Kampfnamen Scheich Abu Mohammed al-Kadari, soll der Dschihadistenmiliz IS im Dezember 2014 die Treue geschworen haben und zuletzt ihr ‘Emir’ im Nordkaukasus gewesen sein. Er hatte früher für eine Gruppe von Aufständischen im Nordkaukasus gekämpft und war nach Informationen des FSB unter anderem in einen Anschlag in Wolgograd im Jahr 2013 mit 34 Toten verwickelt.” (BAMF, 5 December 2016, p. 6)
 
“Сотрудник УФСИН [Управление федеральной службы исполнения наказаний] по Дагестану убит в Махачкале вечером 2 декабря, подозреваемый в убийстве задержан, сообщила представитель МВД. По словам официального представителя МВД [министерство внутренних дел] России Ирины Волк, 2 декабря возле одного из домов в поселке Загородный Кировского района Махачкалы ‘неизвестный выстрелил в сотрудника УФСИН России по Республике Дагестан и скрылся на автомашине’.” (Caucasian Knot, 3 December 2016)
 
November
 
“Один человек убит силовиками в Дагестане Перестрелка произошла сегодня утром в Сулейман-Стальском районе Дагестана. По версии силовых структур, вооруженный человек открыл стрельбу по правоохранителям и был убит.” (Caucasian Knot, 5 November 2016)
 
“Четыре человека убиты в перестрелке в Дагестане Перестрелка началась в Хасавюрте после того, как силовики попытались остановить для проверки автомобиль. Один из убитых опознан как лидер хасавюртовской группировки Марат Махмудов, сообщил источник в правоохранительных органах региона.” (Caucasian Knot, 4 November 2016)

October
 
“В ходе спецоперации в дагестанском селении Тагиркент-Кизмаляр в заблокированном доме убит боевик, сообщил источник в силовых структурах региона. Как информировал ‘Кавказский узел’, в селе Тагиркент-Казмаляр Магарамкентского района сегодня введен режим контртеррористической операции.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 October 2016)

“В ходе боестолкновения в Цумадинском районе Дагестане убиты двое участников незаконных вооруженных формирований, сообщил источник в правоохранительных органах республики. ‘Кавказский узел’ сообщал, что в 22.00 мск 21 октября в селе Кванада Цумандинского района был введен режим контртеррористической операции (КТО), началась спецоперация по поиску боевиков. Район селения Кванада был оцеплен после боестолкновения силовиков с предполагаемыми боевиками.” (Caucasian Knot, 22 October 2016)
 
“Двое боевиков начали стрелять по сотрудникам федеральных сил в Кизилюртовском районе Дагестана и были убиты ответным огнем, сообщили в силовых структурах региона. Инцидент произошел в селении Стальское около 22:30 мск, уточнил источник в силовых структурах.” (Caucasian Knot, 21 October 2016)
 
“Russia's National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK) said on October 17 that the two suspects were killed in a special operation in Daghestan’s southeastern city of Derbent overnight.” (RFE/RL, 17 October 2016)
 
“Убитый сегодня в Губдене Абубакар Удзиев являлся лидером группировки, причастной к убийствам военнослужащих и мирных жителей в Карабудахкентском районе Дагестана, сообщил Национальный антитеррористический комитет. Как информировал ‘Кавказский узел’, сегодня с 09.50 мск в селе Губден действует режим контртеррористической операции (КТО). В селе был заблокирован дом с предполагаемыми боевиками, завязалась перестрелка.” (Caucasian Knot, 12 October 2016)
 
“Security forces in Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan say they have killed at least three militants in a special operation. Media reports in Russia quote security officials in Daghestan as saying the special operation launched on October 10 in the southwestern region of Suleiman-Stal is ongoing. Officials said one security officer was wounded in the operation.” (RFE/RL, 10 October 2016)
 
September
 
“At night of September 24, in the Tabasaran District of Dagestan, law enforcers were shelled when they attempted to stop a Lada Kalina car for a check. As a result, an armed clash occurred, and three attackers were killed by return fire.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 September 2016)
 
“In the morning of September 7, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime was introduced in Izberbash and the Kirov District of Makhachkala. Law enforcers have cordoned off the houses, which, according to them, were hiding members of the armed underground, involved in the attack on policemen near the town of Izberbash committed on August 12. Then, unidentified persons shelled inspector of the road-and-patrol service (known as DPS). As a result of the shootout, two policemen were killed. In Makhachkala and Izberbash, the CTO legal regime was lifted in the evening of September 7. According to the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC), six people were killed in Makhachkala and Izberbash, including Magomed Khalimbekov, the leader of the local grouping of militants.” (Caucasian Knot, 12 September 2016)
 
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that on September 4, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime was introduced in the Magaramkent District of Dagestan. In the course of the special operation in the vicinity of the village of Samur, three suspected militants were killed. One law enforcer was killed, and two others were wounded.” (Caucasian Knot, 5 September 2016)
 
August
 
“In Dagestan, in August 2016, 18 people suffered from the armed conflict, of whom 14 persons perished and four were wounded. In the course of armed clashes and special operations, 11 alleged members of the armed underground were killed. As a result of an attack committed by members of illegal armed formations (IAFs) two law enforcers were killed and three others were wounded. The attack of unidentified persons killed one civilian and wounded another one” (Caucasian Knot, 24 September 2016)
 
“On August 26, in a wooded area near the village of Gubden, law enforcers demanded from an armed man to produce his ID. However, in response, the man opened fire on the law enforcers from small arms. The suspected militant was killed as a result of the shootout. No injuries among law enforcers were reported.” (Caucasian Knot, 29 August 2016)
 
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that according to the law enforcement bodies, on August 23, two members of the ‘Shamil’ grouping of militants were killed in a shootout in one of the gorges of the Shamil District. According to sources, local residents were allowed to pick up the bodies of the killed Gasanguseinov brothers only after a protest action held in front of the police station. According to the villagers, the killed brothers were shepherds.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 August 2016)
 
“At night on August 14, in the village of Tagirkent-Kazmalyar, Magaramkent District, Alikber Aliskerov, earlier announced wanted, was killed. The village was put under the CTO regime, which was cancelled in the evening of the same day.” (Caucasian Knot, 15 August 2016b)
 
“Two traffic police officers were killed by unknown attackers in Russia's volatile North Caucasus region of Daghestan on August 12. The Investigative Committee's local branch says that the attackers shot the police officers dead and took away their firearms. The incident took place near the western city of Izberbash. On August 11, Daghestani police killed four suspected militants in Daghestan's western district of Botlikh.” (RFE/RL, 12 August 2016)
 
“The following day, government forces killed a rebel in the Dagestani village of Andi. At 5:30 AM, the authorities had introduced a counter-terrorist operation regime (Echo.msk.ru, August 11). Several homes where suspected insurgents may have been hiding were sealed off, but only one suspect was eventually killed.” (Jamestown Foundation, 8 September 2016)
 
“A judge has been gunned down in Russia's volatile North Caucasus region of Daghestan. Daghestani law enforcement officials say that unknown attackers rushed into the house of Ubaidula Magomedov in the western Shamil district very late in the night on August 10, shot the judge dead and left the house. Investigators are working at the crime scene.” (RFE/RL, 11 August 2016)
 
“In the morning of August 8, a VAZ-2114 car with burned bodies of two men inside it was found on the outskirts of the village of Dyuzlyar of the Derbent District of Dagestan. According to a staff member of the Investigating Committee, two men whose bodies were found inside a burned-out car, were transporting a bomb in their car, and its detonation caused the fire.” (Caucasian Knot, 15 August 2016a)
 
July
 
“At least 21 people suffered in the course of the armed conflict in Northern Caucasus in July 2016, of whom 17 persons were killed and four others were wounded. […] All the July victims were registered in Dagestan. During armed clashes and special operations, 13 alleged members of the armed underground were killed, as well as two law enforcers (four others were wounded). Two civilians also perished in the attacks” (Caucasian Knot, 25 August 2016)
 
“Laut Angaben des Anti-Terror-Komitees der Russischen Föderation wurde am 29.07.16 der Anführer der Militanten von Süddagestan, Kamaldin Kazimagomedov, im Distrikt Suleiman-Stalsky bei einem Feuergefecht mit den Sicherheitskräften erschossen.” (BAMF, 1 August 2016, p. 6)

“‘Кавказский узел’ сообщал, что сегодня ночью на территории села Харачи Унцукульского района Дагестана введен режим контртеррористической операции (КТО). В перестрелке были убиты, по предварительным данным источника в силовых структурах, два предполагаемых боевика.” (Caucasian Knot, 14 July 2016)
 
“A counterterrorism operation in the Daghestan region of Russia's North Caucasus ended with the killing of an alleged militant by police, Russian law enforcement officials said on July 11.
The suspected gunman, Admir Talibov, was shot dead in the village of Miskindzha in the Dokuzparinsky district in Daghestan after being trapped in a house by a police siege.” (RFE/RL, 12 July 2016)
 
“In Dagestan’s Sergokalinsky district south of Makhachkala, which is predominantly populated by ethnic Dargins, unidentified individuals killed two men near the village of Sergokala. One of the slain men turned out to be a police officer (Gazeta.ru, July 10). According to law enforcement officials, the attackers killed the two young men, who were on a picnic, and stole their car. The two men may have been killed because the attackers recognized one of them was a police officer. The police said that the attackers may have been militants, but could not confirm whether there was a third victim, who was kidnapped.” (Jamestown Foundation, 14 July 2016)
 
“That same day, a school principal in Gubden was killed in his home, apparently by several individuals. ‘Unidentified individuals called the school principal of Gubden out. After a lengthy brawl, the attackers stabbed the man to death and ran away’ (Kavtoday.ru, July 10). School principals in the mountainous parts of the North Caucasus are more than simply school administrators. They are also among the most authoritative individuals in remote villages. In many instances, school principals are the leaders of the local community and act as a kind of counterbalance to the heads of the village administrations. School principals often testify as witnesses for the prosecution in court cases related to militants. Since school principals cooperate with the authorities, the insurgents sometimes regard them as enemies. (Jamestown Foundation, 14 July 2016)
 
“Russia’s National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK) reported that during a special operation in Dagestan’s Karabudakhkent district on July 7–8, ‘as a result of operational and combat activities, the forces of the FSB [Federal Security Service] neutralized nine people’ (Riadagestan.ru, July 8).” (Jamestown Foundation, 14 July 2016)
 
June
 
“In the evening of June 27, a blown-up BMW passenger car with the remains of two human bodies inside it was found in the Karabudakhkent District of Dagestan, near the 831st kilometre of the federal highway ‘Caucasus’. […] One of the men blown up on the IED was identified as Ramazan Rashidov, born in 1987, report sources from the law enforcement bodies of the region. Earlier, it has been reported about the disappearance of Kaspiysk residents Ramazan Rashidov, born in 1987, and Shamil Ramazanov, born in 1990. Their family members claim that they were kidnapped by people in uniform on June 16 and 17. The relatives believe that Ramazan Rashidov and Shamil Ramazanov were kidnapped and killed by law enforcers and that the version of their accidental explosion was constructed by staff members of the law enforcement bodies.” (Caucasian Knot, 4 July 2016)
 
“Russian security services conducted a special operation, on June 16–17, against militants in southern Dagestan’s Suleiman-Stalsky and Tabasaran districts. During the operation, the security forces located ten armed men in the area. The militants refused to surrender and opened fire on the authorities. All ten were reportedly killed in the ensuing shootout. […] Government forces also suffered losses during the special operation in southern Dagestan—according to unconfirmed reports, five servicemen were killed and four injured (Interfax, June 18). The five killed reportedly included four police officers and one Federal Security Service (FSB) officer.” (Jamestown Foundation, 23 June 2016)
 
“At night of June 3, in the village of Ashaga-Stal of the Suleiman-Stalsky District of Dagestan, two unidentified persons, armed with firearms, entered the house of the family of a police captain, a district police inspector. They shot and killed the owner of the house in front of his wife and his two children.” (Caucasian Knot, 6 June 2016)
 
May
 
“Сегодня утром в Сулейман-Стальском районе Дагестана силовики убили мужчину, открывшего по ним огонь в ответ на требование предъявить документы, сообщил источник в правоохранительных органах. По предварительным данным, убитый - член ‘южной’ группировки боевиков. Инцидент произошел в селе Касумкент.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 May 2016)
 
“On May 14, in Derbent, apartment was blocked in Krepostnaya Street. According to law enforcers, it was used as a shelter for the suspects of killing Gadjiakhmed Kaziakhmedov. On the same day, power agents reported the killing in the course of a special operation of four suspected militants. Also, during the armed clash, the head of the criminal search and an OMON (riot police) fighter were killed; sources reported that the number of wounded law enforcers reached 17. However, in the morning on May 15, a law enforcement source said that the body of one militant was found in the place of the special operation. The officially confirmed casualties of the special operation were one alleged militant – a local resident Bairamali Abbasov, as well as the death of one policeman and wounding of two others.” (Caucasian Knot, 16 May 2016)
 
“В районе дагестанского села Талги в результате перестрелки с силовиками убиты два человека. По данным МВД, 12 мая около 22.30 в Буйнакском районе полицейские пытались остановить автомобиль для проверки документов, однако водитель продолжил движение, а по силовикам был открыт огонь. Ответным огнем двое нападавших убиты, пишет сегодня со ссылкой на пресс-службу МВД по Дагестану ‘Интерфакс’.” (Caucasian Knot, 13 May 2016)
 
“In Derbent, on May 9, the body of the 82-year-old Gadjiakhmed Kaziakhmedov was found with gunshot wounds; he was the father of the former Mayor of Derbent Felix Kaziakhmedov; of the Lieutenant Colonel Marat Kaziakhmedov, an employee of the Prosecutor's Office of Dagestan; and of Seifudin Kaziakhmedov, the head of the Division for Investigating Especially Important Cases of the Investigating Department for Dagestan of the Investigating Committee of the Russian Federation (ICRF), who was killed in 2009. Initially, investigators put forward an attempted robbery as the basic version of his murder; then, it was replaced by a possible extremists' revenge.” (Caucasian Knot, 16 May 2016)
 
“At night on May 6, in the village of Ashagastal, Suleiman-Stalsky District, the chief accountant of the ROVD (District Interior Division), a captain of the internal service of the Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), was shot dead in the yard of his house. According to preliminary data, he was killed by a hired gunman.” (Caucasian Knot, 9 May 2016)
 
“On May 3, a shootout broke out in the Kizilyurt District. Three people were killed; one of them was Umar Sabuev, the leader of the local armed grouping. Another casualty was identified as Abas Khubaev, a native of the village of Endirey of the Khasavyurt District.” (Caucasian Knot, 9 May 2016)
 
April
 
“The regional Investigative Committee said on April 29 that unknown attackers shot the former chief of police in Daghestan's Shamil District overnight. The slain officer, whose name was not released, retired in 2015.” (RFE/RL, 29 April 2016)
 
“В селении Согратль Гунибского района Дагестана при оказании сопротивления убит находившийся в федеральном розыске боевик, сообщили в силовых структурах.” (Caucasian Knot, 14 April 2016b)
 
“Как писал ‘Кавказский узел’, 13 апреля один из въездов в поселок Ленинкент был перекрыт бронетехникой. Правоохранители начали здесь адресные проверки в поисках боевиков и их пособников. Впоследствии в поселке был введен режим контртеррористической операции (КТО), заблокирован дом, где были убиты трое предполагаемых боевиков.” (Caucasian Knot, 14 April 2016a)
 
March
 
“A car exploded in Russia's North Caucasus region of Daghestan on March 30, killing one police officer and wounding another. Local law enforcement officials say the car detonated with police in pursuit in Daghestan's southern Tabasaran district.” (RFE/RL, 30 March 2016)
 
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that at 8:30 p.m. Moscow time of March 29, two police vehicles with law enforcers sent from Krasnoyarsk for mission were blown up on the section of the federal highway ‘Kavkaz’ in the area of the ‘Uytash’ Airport and the village of Novy Khushet. The responsibility for the bombing was taken by the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), recognized as a terrorist organization and banned in Russia. Earlier, the Dagestani MIA has reported that one person was killed and two others were injured as a result of the explosion.” (Caucasian Knot, 30 March 2016)
 
“Last night, in Dagestan, an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the village of Mutsalaul of the Khasavyurt District. As a result, a man was killed. The police believe that he was a militant, blown up by his own bomb, reports a source from the law enforcement bodies.” (Caucasian Knot, 22 March 2016)
 
“Two members of the armed underground have been killed during the special operation carried out in the Khunzakh District, and law enforcers are searching for their accomplices. This was reported by the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC).” (Caucasian Knot, 11 March 2016)
 
February
 
“In the Suleiman-Stalsky District of Dagestan, policemen are engaged in identification of a driver of a passenger car. They shot and killed him when he opened fire on them. This was reported by a source from the law enforcement agencies. According to the source, the incident occurred near the village of Kasumkent at night on February 26.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 February 2016)
 
“In Suleiman-Stalsky District, an armed clash broke out between power agents and two militants, who were shot dead in the shootout, the Russian National Antiterrorist Committee (NAC) has reported.” (Caucasian Knot, 17 February 2016)
 
“Bei einem mutmaßlichen Selbstmordanschlag in der russischen Nordkaukasusrepublik Dagestan sind am 15.02.16 zwei Polizisten getötet und mindestens zwölf Personen zum Teil schwer verletzt worden. Polizisten hätten ein Auto an einem Kontrollpunkt nahe der Ortschaft Jemikent im Süden Dagestans angehalten, als das Fahrzeug explodiert sei, teilten die Sicherheitsbehörden mit. Man gehe von einem Selbstmordattentäter aus. Zu der Tat bekannte sich die Terrormiliz IS im Namen der Provinz Kaukasus. Die Moskauer Sicherheitsbehörden schätzen, dass sich mehr als 2.000 russische Staatsbürger dem IS in Syrien und im Irak angeschlossen haben und befürchten weitere Terroranschläge durch Rückkehrer.” (BAMF, 22 February 2016, p.7)
 
“The spokesman of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) has reported that on the highway Kizilyurt-Makhachkala a man, who opened fire on policemen, was killed during a shootout.” (Caucasian Knot, 4 February 2016)
 
January
 
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that on January 25, the counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime was introduced in the village of Andi of the Botlikh District. In the evening, law enforcers blocked a private house in the village, where, according to their information, three militants were hiding. During an armed clash, the house was heavily damaged, and after the completion of the active phase of the special operation, the law enforcers began to clear the ruins of the house. This morning, a body of a killed militant was found at the site of the special operation.” (Caucasian Knot, 26 January 2016)
 
“The ‘Caucasian Knot’ has reported that today, in the village of Kvanada, at 4:00 a.m. Moscow time, counterterrorist operation (CTO) legal regime has been introduced in the village of Kvanada of the Tsumada District. A shootout between suspected militants and law enforcers occurred there, and as a result, one man was killed. According to sources from the law enforcement bodies, he has been identified as Magomed Abdulkhalikov, who was on the wanted list since 2014. According to the NAC, Magomed Abdulkhalikov, born in 1986, was the leader of the Tsumada militant grouping.” (Caucasian Knot, 11 January 2016)
 
 
SOURCES: (all links accessed at 3 February 2017)

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