Update on political developments and political violence in Sindh, in particular Karachi [PAK32639.EX]

This Extended Response updates two previous Research Directorate Issue Papers on human rights issues: Pakistan: The Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi January 1995-April 1996 (November 1996), and Pakistan: Update on the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi (June 1997). These Issue Papers are available in the Regional Documentation Centres, in the IRB's REFQUEST Database and on the IRB Website at .
    The contents of this response briefly review events in the aftermath of the February 1997 provincial and national assembly elections before examining the sudden upsurge in politically motivated killings in the summer of 1998, the federal government decision to impose governor's rule in Sindh province in late October 1998, and the implications of that decision on the current human rights situation in Karachi. The primary focus of the response will be on the MQM, both factions of which have been most involved in targeted killings and other political violence, and both of which have been the primary focus of the current government law and order operation designed to reduce the amount of politically motivated violence1 (Dawn 1 Jan. 1999; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a; HRW 1999; UNCHR 6 Jan. 1999).
    After a period of relative calm in 1997 and early 1998, the number of politically motivated killings in Karachi escalated rapidly during the summer of 1998 (JIR Jan. 1999; The Independent 21 July 1998; The Herald Oct. 1998c, 29; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998g, 42). By year end between 650 and 1,000 people had been killed in politically related violence in Karachi (Dawn 1 Jan. 1999; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a; HRW 1999; The Herald Oct. 1998a, 25), as many as 300 in June and July alone (HRW 1999). Many were MQM activists killed in factional fighting between the Altaf and Haqiqi groups2 (Dawn 1 Jan. 1999; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a; HRW 1999; UNCHR 6 Jan. 1999), but many political activists, especially MQM members, also died in encounter killings carried out by members of various law enforcement, paramilitary or intelligence agencies (ibid.; Country Reports 1998 1999, introduction; Dawn 12 Apr. 1999a). Special rapporteur to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Asma Jahangir, received numerous allegations in 1998 of killings carried out by law enforcement or paramilitary personnel in conjunction with armed militant groups, or by members of such groups supported by or under the protection of state agents (UNCHR 6 Jan. 1999; Dawn 12 Apr. 1999a). Pakistani journalist Zahid Hussain, writing in May 1999, states that "the number of alleged criminals and political activists killed in so-called police encounters and in police custody has reached an all-time high" in Pakistan (The Daily Star 28 May 1999). 
Background
    Under the terms of its February 1997 accord with the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the MQM(A) was given cabinet portfolios in both the Sindh and federal governments, thousands of its jailed workers were released and the government agreed to pay reparations to the family members of MQM activists killed in encounters with the law enforcement agencies during the Bhutto administration (IHT 12 Feb. 1999; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 178-79). However, sources indicate the coalition partners quickly developed sharp differences over implementation of the agreement (IHT 12 Feb. 1999; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 178-79; ibid. Feb. 1998, 121). The MQM complained that its detained activists were not being released quickly enough (ibid.; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1d), that its longstanding demand for abolition of Haqiqi-controlled areas of Karachi was not being implemented (The Tribune 16 Aug. 1998; The Herald Sept 1998, 58; The Sangat Review Aug. 1998), and that MQM workers were still being killed by various state agencies and their proxies, the Haqiqis (ibid.; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 179). The MQM(A) also complained that even though they formed part of the government, its ministers had very little real power (The Sangat Review Aug. 1998; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 179; ibid. Feb. 1998, 121; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998c, 35). For its part the political establishment in Islamabad continued to regard the MQM, its principal adversary in Sindh, with a significant degree of mistrust (The Sangat Review Aug. 1998; Asian Survey Feb. 1998, 121; The Herald Feb. 1999b, 27; ibid. Sept. 1998, 58). As early as April 1997 the MQM was threatening to quit the Sindh government if its demands were not met (DPA 13 Apr. 1997), and it organized periodic strikes and protest marches to press those demands (Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 179). The result for much of 1997 and 1998 was "virtual paralysis of the administrative machinery" in Sindh (Dawn 12 Jan. 1999; Asian Survey Feb. 1998, 121), with Sindh chief minister Liaquat Jatoi considered to be "arguably the most ineffective chief minister the province has ever seen" (The Herald July 1998, 52; The Independent 21 July 1998).
    The uneasy truce between the coalition partners survived into early 1998, but began to break down when the cycle of politically motivated killings suddenly escalated in May and June 1998 (The Herald July 1998, 50-51; The Independent 21 July 1998; AFP 18 July 1998). The Herald and other sources indicate that beginning about mid-May 1998, scores of political workers, almost all MQM(A) or MQM(H) activists, were gunned down, particularly in the eastern Karachi areas of Landhi and Korangi (July 1998, 50-51; The Independent 21 July 1998; AFP 18 July 1998). Although most killings took the form of hit-and-run attacks, many of the bodies were mutilated or bore signs of torture (The Herald July 1998, 50-51; The Independent 21 July 1998; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1b). Also killed were a number of police officials and other key public figures (The Herald July 1998, 50-51; ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998g, 42; ibid. Oct. 1998b, 26-27; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 179). According to The Herald, little or no information was made public about the identities of the assassins, other than the fact that the killings were politically motivated (July 1998, 51). The immediate cause of the sudden escalation is not clear, but one source links it to the killing of an unidentified senior Haqiqi leader in late May (The Independent 21 July 1998). Significantly, a third MQM faction called BACK (Basic Association for the Citizens of Karachi), led by a former bodyguard of MQM(A) leader Altaf Hussain, emerged during this period to stake its claim in the ongoing Karachi territorial war (The Herald July 1998, 51; The Independent 21 July 1998; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a; AFP 20 June 1998). More than 20 BACK members were reportedly killed between 13 May and 30 June 1998 (The Herald July 1998, 52), but the group was also implicated in the torture and murder of members of both of the other two factions (Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a). With the Jatoi government floundering, observers speculated it was only a matter of time before Islamabad imposed governor's rule in the province (The Herald July 1998, 51; The Tribune 17 Aug. 1998).
    In mid-August 1998, following the killing of 10 of its activists the previous week, the MQM withdrew from the coalition government in Sindh (ibid. 16 Aug. 1998; ibid. 17 Aug. 1998; Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). On 21 September 1998, after lengthy discussions and hard bargaining, the MQM rejoined the Sindh government (AFP 21 Sept. 1998; The Tribune 22 Sept. 1998; Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). The new agreement allowed the Sindh government to fend off an impending PPP no-confidence motion (The Tribune 22 Sept. 1998; AFP 21 Sept. 1998). The new arrangement was short-lived, however; the MQM and federal government quickly developed sharp differences over the escalating violence in Karachi, and on 29 October 1998, citing the declining law and order situation and claiming he had incontrovertible proof of MQM involvement in the murder of former Sindh governor and prominent philanthropist, Hakim Muhammad Said, Prime Minister Sharif invoked article 232(2)(c) of the constitution and imposed governor's rule in Sindh (The Herald Oct 1998a, 24; ibid. Nov.-Dec.1998a, 31; The News 5 Nov. 1998). Article 232(2)(c) allows the central government, without dissolving the provincial assembly, to impose direct federal rule in any province, and sets no limit on how long such a scenario may be in force3 (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 32; Devamithran June 1993, 183-85). Three weeks later, on 20 November 1998, the Sharif government invoked article 245 of the constitution, promulgating the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Powers) Ordinance, 1998 (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 32a-32b; AI 23 Nov. 1998). Article 245 authorizes the army to assist police in maintaining law and order and suspends the High Court's jurisdiction to enforce basic human rights in any area where the army is acting in aid of the civil power4 (ibid.; Devamithran June 1993, 197). Military Trial Courts (MTCs) were established under the same ordinance (AI 23 Nov. 1998; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 32a-32b). These courts have the power to try and sentence civilians accused of disturbing law and order in just three days, with the only avenue of appeal being a higher military tribunal (AI 23 Nov. 1998; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 32a-32b; ibid. Feb. 1999e, 25; Country Reports 1998 1999, introduction). Sindh governor Moinuddin Haider, in an interview with Herald reporters Idrees Bakhtiar and Azhar Abbas, stated he expected he would need at least six months to "achieve some semblance of law and order" in Karachi (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998d, 40).
Human Rights Developments Under Governor's Rule
    On 1 November 1998, claiming he had a list of 200 hardcore terrorists, Governor Haider stated the government was not planning another wide-ranging crackdown like General Babar's operation of 1995, but a "selective action to nab those involved in terrorist activities" (DPA 1 Nov. 1998; The Herald Oct 1998a, 26-27). In the weeks following the imposition of governor's rule both the prime minister and the Sindh governor reportedly stated on several occasions that they had learned "valuable lessons from mistakes committed in the past" (ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 31). Observers agree that a key shortcoming of the 1992 and 1995 law-and-order operations was that they had not been conducted in an even-handed manner—that the government targeted only the militant wing of the MQM(A) (The Nation 7 Mar. 1998; The Herald Oct 1998a, 26-27). The Haqiqi faction and other smaller militant groups were "not targeted as a point of policy" (ibid.; The Nation 7 Mar. 1998). Another shortcoming was that in carrying out the operations, the government failed to take the other political parties into its confidence (The Herald Oct 1998a, 27).
Reports indicate that in the weeks and months following the imposition of governor's rule the number of politically motivated killings in Karachi declined sharply (Dawn 1 Jan. 1999; ibid. 12 Jan. 1999; The Herald Apr. 1999b, 34; IHT 12 Feb. 1999), as did the number of common crimes such as car-jackings, robberies, bhatta collection (extortion) and kidnappings (Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). Sources indicate that many MQM workers simply went into hiding once the operation began (ibid. 30 Oct. 1998a; ibid. 10 Aug. 1999; The Herald Apr. 1999b, 34), with those most wanted by police reportedly taking refuge in pre-established hideouts in Punjab province (ibid. Feb. 1999a, 46-7). According to Azhar Abbas, government claims that it was exercising greater restraint and selectivity than during previous operations are generally true (20 July 1999). The large-scale excesses of earlier operations—the cordon-and-search operations, mass arrests and arrests of family members to force the surrender of suspects—have been largely absent from the current operation (ibid.). However, sources generally agree that the MQM was once again being singled out by law enforcement authorities (IHT 12 Feb 1999; Dawn 12 Jan. 1999; ibid. 10 Nov. 1998; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 31; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1d). One source states that "hundreds of political workers, supporters and even common men" were arrested after article 245 was invoked, "nearly all of them belong[ing] to Muttahida" (Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). Another states that "anyone suspected of being even remotely connected to the MQM's militant wing is simply picked up" (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 31-32). Media reports indicate that even before the crackdown was launched, police chiefs in five districts of Karachi had been provided with a list of at least 7,600 MQM(A) workers, including 1,700-2,000 released on bail as part of the February 1997 agreement (Dawn 30 Oct. 1998b; The Tribune 1 Nov. 1998). Among the first to be picked up were MQM Members of Provincial Assemblies (MPAs), Shoaib Bokhari and Wakil Jamali, considered to be among the party's top leaders (Dawn 12 Jan. 1999; The Tribune 1 Nov. 1998; Dawn 23 Jan. 1999). Both were reportedly beaten and interrogated about a large number of criminal cases (ibid. 12 Jan. 1999). Bokhari, a former provincial minister, was implicated in 150 cases alone (The Tribune 1 Nov. 1998; Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). On 22 January 1999 a third MQM MPA, Afzal Anwar, was arrested in connection with the murder of a local PPP leader, Naeem Hasani, and his son (ibid. 23 Jan. 1999). As of early 1999 several other former and sitting MQM MPAs had gone into hiding to avoid arrest in connection with various cases, including the murder of Hakim Said (ibid.). As well, the names of all 45 MQM MPAs and Members of the National Assembly were placed on the exit control list (ECL) (ibid. 26 May 1999), in order to ban them from leaving the country. This prevented them from travelling abroad to consult with Altaf Hussain, the party leader who is in London (ibid. 3 Aug. 1999; The Sangat Review Aug. 1998).
Police and Security Forces
    Sources suggest the government's approach to the law and order situation in Karachi is one determined less by a coherent strategy than by political expediency (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 31-32; Dawn 10 Nov. 1998). In contrast to the 1995 operation, where a central coordination committee of officials from the various security forces met to discuss strategy and coordinate their efforts, a single body has not been given responsibility for the current operation, with the result that various groups within the law enforcement, paramilitary and intelligence agencies have been "working concurrently on their own agendas," with "little or no coordination between the various teams" (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998a, 31-32; ibid. Nov.-Dec 1998f, 44a-44b; Abbas 20 July 1999). According to Azhar Abbas, there is general agreement among observers that the 1995-96 operation was much better executed than the current one has been (ibid.). Nor does the government appear to have a plan to address the numerous grievances of the people of Karachi (Dawn 10 Nov. 1998; The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998f, 44a-44b; Dawn 8 Apr. 1999). In addition, Karachi's police force continues to be highly politicized and is plagued by growing corruption, poor moral and lack of discipline (The Herald Oct. 1998c, 26-30; ibid. Apr. 1999b, 34; The News International 7 Apr. 1999; Dawn 12 Jan. 1999). Reports indicate that police use of torture during criminal investigations continues to be widespread and systematic (Jilani 1998, 148; IHT 12 Feb. 1999; The Herald Oct. 1998c, 28-30; ibid. Feb. 1999e, 22-23).
    A 7 April 1999 report in The News International indicates that the problems in the Sindh police go right up to the highest levels. According to the report, in October 1998, concurrent with the imposition of governor's rule, Prime Minister Sharif promoted Superintendent of Police of Sukkur, Farooq Amin Qureshi, to Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) of Sindh, and Rana Maqbool to Inspector General of Police (IGP) of Sindh (The News International 7 Apr. 1999; The Herald July 1999ba, 46). Both men were parachuted over at least 75 other officers senior to them in rank (The News International 7 Apr. 1999). It further states that former IGP of Sindh, Khawer Zaman, "one of the most respected police officers in the country," had "such an appalling opinion about … [Qureshi] that he recommended the officer was not even fit for police service" (ibid.; see also The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998f, 44a), while The Herald describes Rana Maqbool as the officer who reportedly began the practice of faked encounter killings back in Punjab in 1988 (July 1999b, 46). According to the "intelligence unit" of The News (NIU), the Sindh police, under the leadership of Qureshi and Maqbool, have woven "a maze of deceits and lies" about the cases they have investigated since the beginning of governor's rule (The News International 7 Apr. 1999). The NIU alleges the Sindh police have fabricated evidence, concealed evidence or key facts and misdirected top bureaucrats, including the prime minister, about police involvement in custodial murders and murders that were shown as encounters between the police and the murder victims (ibid.). It also found that officials of the Sindh police have ignored or refused to carry out Governor Haider's orders that police officials and officers suspected of involvement in extrajudicial killings be transferred or removed (ibid.; see also The Herald July 1999a, 48; Abbas 20 July 1999).
    A mission of peace and security experts from Colombia5 which visited Karachi between 16 November and 1 December 1998 recommended police reform, in particular, the creation of a Karachi metropolitan police force, as "the most critical single entry point for sustainable peace in Karachi" (Dawn 8 Apr. 1999; ibid. 12 Apr. 1999b; see also The Herald Oct. 1998c, 28-30; ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998b, 33). The Colombian delegation reportedly stated that the creation of a metropolitan police force was "essential … for the devolution to Karachi of the power, authority [and] responsibility necessary to locally construct sustainable peace," and that the current police force and the public administration system, both rife with corruption, are themselves the biggest obstacles to achieving the necessary reform (Dawn 8 Apr. 1999; ibid. 12 Apr. 1999b). Azhar Abbas points out that reorganization of the police is just one of many reforms that numerous government agencies require, and that while a few tentative steps have been taken, the problems are vast and little money is available (Abbas 20 July 1999).
Judicial Process
    Reports indicate there continues to be numerous problems with the judicial process (The Herald Feb. 1999c, 30-31; ibid. Feb. 1999e, 22-23). Prime Minister Sharif has indicated on many occasions that the civilian courts are inefficient and take too long to render decisions; he reportedly stated that he wants cases disposed of not in days, but in hours, which is why his government established military trial courts (MTCs) (ibid. 22; ibid. June 1999, 50; ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998d, 37). However, sources indicate the problems in the civilian court system are deep-rooted and complex, and that while successive governments have resorted to all manner of special courts, anti-terrorist courts and speedy trial courts over the years, the basic problems remain (ibid. Feb. 1999e, 22-23; ibid. Feb. 1999 c, 30-31; ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998d, 40). Sindh High Court chief justice Mohammad Ali Sayeed has complained publicly about the declining standard of legal education in Pakistan (Dawn 16 May 1999); however, according to The Herald, the inefficiency of the court system is largely attributable to sloppy police work, in particular poor investigation procedures and
the incompetence that often characterises the preparation of cases. Ill-equipped and badly trained, the police has no professional interest in its job. The methods it employs are primitive. For the police, investigation is a synonym for torture. … The police scoff at … rights of the individual, not realising that no court … will convict a man on the basis of evidence extracted by torture (The Herald Feb. 1999e, 23).
    Sources indicate the police often fail to produce accused persons in court because of lack of manpower or transportation (ibid.; Dawn 6 July 1999), and police witnesses trained and paid for this purpose sometimes do not even know what cases they are supposed to appear in (The Herald Feb. 1999e, 23). Senior judicial and police officials have pointed out that the problem with regard to the police and the poor preparation of cases in the regular court system has not changed with the creation of special courts, whether civilian or military, to try terrorism-related cases (ibid. Feb. 1999c, 31; ibid. Feb. 1999d, 32). According to one former police official, as reported in The Herald, "these are all makeshift and short-term arrangements…. Unless our police system is overhauled, all these exercises will remain meaningless" (ibid. Feb. 1999c, 31).
    On 17 February 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the MTCs unconstitutional, ordered them immediately disbanded and ordered all pending cases transferred to the Anti-Terrorist Courts (ATC) set up under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 (AI May 1999, 4; The Herald Apr. 1999a, 31-32; ibid. June 1999, 50). Acknowledging that urgent measures were needed to deal with "terrorism," the Supreme Court also laid out a 10-point guideline for the speedy trial of such cases (AI May 1999, 4; The Herald June 1999, 50; Dawn 26 Apr. 1999). According to The Herald, Prime Minister Sharif was "acutely unhappy" with the Supreme Court ruling (Apr. 1999a, 31). On 27 April 1999, the government promulgated the Anti-Terrorist (Amendment) Ordinance, replacing the MTCs with refashioned Anti-Terrorist Courts (ibid. June 1999, 50; The Daily Star 28 May 1999). However, not only had the government ignored the Supreme Court's 10-point guideline, it had inserted into the new law a section from the ordinance that had created the MTCs (The Herald June 1999, 50; The Daily Star 28 May 1999). The new law allowed the government to try not only persons involved in murders, kidnappings or other politically motivated crimes in ATCs, but anyone accused of an act intended to "create civil commotion" (The Herald June 1999, 51; The Daily Star 28 May 1999). The law has been severely criticized by legal experts, opposition leaders and independent observers as being so loosely drafted that virtually any legitimate political or trade union activity falls within the definition of civil commotion (The Herald June 1999, 51; The Daily Star 28 May 1999). It allows bureaucrats to subjectively determine what constitutes an "internal disturbance" and "intention" to violate the law, and could be used by the government against opposition political activists, trade unions and the press (ibid.; The Herald June 1999, 51). PPP Senate leader Aitzaz Ahsan recently speculated that, instead of reducing political violence, by blocking non-violent political protest, the law may "incite people to resort to violence to defend their political rights" (The Daily Star 28 May 1999). The ATCs began functioning in early May; of the 26 suspects sentenced to death by mid-June 1999, 20 are Muttahida activists (Dawn 16 June 1999; see also Dawn 20 May 1999; Dawn 4 July 1999). For further information about MTCs and ATCs, please see the IRB Issue Paper, Pakistan: Sectarian Violence (July 1999).
    Despite its overwhelming majority in the National Assembly, the government chose to impose the new law by ordinance (The Daily Star 28 May 1999; Dawn 26 Apr. 1999). If not overturned in the Supreme Court or extended, the ordinance must be converted into an act of parliament within the four-month period specified in the constitution or it will lapse on 27 August 1999 (The Herald June 1999, 51). Sources suggest the ordinance is more likely to be repeatedly extended than to be adopted by parliament (Jilani 1998, 69-70; Dawn 5 May 1999).6 Abbas notes that a number of petitions challenging the constitutionality of the ATCs are before the Supreme Court, but to date the court has not rendered any decisions (20 July 1999).
Recent Developments
    On 18 June 1999, the federal government announced that Governor Haider had been dismissed and replaced by Mamnoon Hussain (Dawn 18 June 1999; ibid. 19 June 1999). Haider, a non-political appointee, and Prime Minister Sharif had apparently developed differences on a number of issues, in particular, Sharif's desire to stimulate political interest in the PML party in Sindh with a view to establishing a new PML government, an idea Haider resisted7 (ibid. 18 June 1999; Abbas 20 July 1999). Simultaneously the government amended article 232(2)(c) of the constitution to withdraw the existing governor's powers relating to the office of chief minister and to vest these powers with an "advisor to the Prime Minister on Sindh affairs" (Dawn 18 June 1999; ibid. 19 June 1999; ibid. 21 June 1999). The government then appointed federal education minister, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, to fill the position of advisor to the Prime Minister on Sindh affairs (ibid. 18 June 1999; ibid. 19 June 1999; ibid. 21 June 1999). Dawn reported that according to a spokesman for the prime minister's secretariat, the new governor will act on the advice of the adviser (ibid. 18 June 1999). Shah, a PML stalwart who has all the powers of a chief minister with the status of a federal minister, reportedly will be trying to bolster the status of the PML party in Sindh before Senate elections scheduled for March 2000 (The Herald July 1999b, 46; Dawn 18 June 1999; ibid. 1 July 1999; ibid. 7 July 1999; Abbas 20 July 1999).
    According to The Herald, another reason why Governor Haider was removed was because he and the prime minister also differed over Sharif's appointment of Rana Maqbool to the post of IGP of Sindh, "arguably the most sensitive post in the entire provincial hierarchy" (July 1999b, 46; Dawn 5 Apr. 1999; Abbas 20 July 1999). Sources indicate that since the beginning of his tenure as IGP, Maqbool reported directly to Islamabad, and at times "had better access to the prime minister than the governor himself" (The Herald July 1999b, 46; Dawn 5 Apr. 1999). Maqbool reportedly was operating on an agenda totally different than Governor Haider's, ignoring, for example, his directive that no elected representatives be arrested without prior approval, and that allegations of extrajudicial killings be properly investigated (ibid.; The Herald July 1999a, 48; ibid. July 1999b, 45). Azhar Abbas suggests that in recent weeks the MQM has gained a bit of breathing room, and that some observers feel party militants may soon be in a position to strike back against the government, possibly in the form of a general strike or an attack on police officials (20 July 1999). He states that because of mounting economic pressures, the situation in Kashmir, pressure from opposition parties and differences between the government and army over various issues, the Sharif government is under considerable pressure to reach some sort of compromise with the MQM (ibid.). Abbas indicates that the government's use of extrajudicial killings has also been a factor in undermining public support for the current operation8 (ibid.). He states that typically the MQM adopts a strategy of "passive resistance" at the start of these clean-up operations, and then as party workers fall victim to extrajudicial executions and other human rights abuses, public sympathy swings around in its favour (ibid.). Abbas feels the pattern appears to be the same for the current operation as well (ibid.). He also notes that public support for clean-up operations lasts for only so long; if after several months the public sees no improvement in the basic concerns that confront them each day—the provision of water, electricity, social services and all the other necessities of urban life—support for this type of government clean-up operation collapses (ibid.). Most citizens of Karachi, he states, want the parties to work together to solve their problems, not to be fighting one another (ibid.).
Further Considerations
    Many observers have argued that politically motivated violence in Sindh cannot be treated simply as a law-and-order issue (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998b, 33; The Nation 7 Mar. 1998). The current operation is the third major "clean-up operation" in Karachi since 1992, and in each previous case the militants responsible for the violence simply went underground, only to resurface the moment the operation was called off to resume their territorial war (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998g, 41; ibid. Apr. 1999b, 33). Every crackdown, according to The Herald, creates more uncertainty and gives added strength and legitimacy to the militant groups (Nov.-Dec. 1998g, 41). Politically motivated violence, observers point out, is largely a political problem that must be dealt with at the political level (ibid. Nov.-Dec. 1998b, 33; The Nation 7 Mar. 1998). Karachi and Sindh require "complete revamping of all their institutions, whether administrative, law-enforcing, economic or social," states one observer (ibid.), yet according to sources, the Punjabi-dominated political elite in Islamabad appears unwilling to relinquish political control of the province (The Sangat Review Aug. 1998; The Daily Star 28 May 1999; The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1999; PakBase 28 Feb. 1999). On the contrary, the Sharif government has pursued a "single-track policy of subduing all opposition in Sindh and acquiring total control … of the province" (Dawn 12 Jan. 1999; see also The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1999; Asian Survey Jan.-Feb. 1999, 177-80; The Herald Mar. 1999, 31; The Daily Star 28 May 1999). In addition, the federal government has become increasingly reliant on the military, Pakistan's most stable institution, not just to fight crime in Sindh but to carry out basic functions of civil administration, including road building, collection of unpaid electricity bills and conducting the census (The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1999). As resentment of the political and economic domination of Punjab grows in both rural and urban Sindh, discontent and a sense of alienation only increase (The Daily Star 28 May 1999; The Sangat Review Aug. 1998; The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1999). And with the militant groups and other players responsible for almost all of the politically motivated violence in Karachi refusing to accept responsibility for their respective roles in the problem, arriving at a political solution could be "next to impossible" (The Herald Nov.-Dec. 1998g, 41-2).
    One thing observers can agree on, however, is that Pakistan is at a critical juncture in its history and is rapidly running out of time to sort out its many problems in Sindh (PakBase 28 Feb. 1999; The Daily Star 21 July 1999; The Washington Post 1 Mar. 1999; Dawn 8 Apr. 1999).
    This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum
Notes on Selected Sources
Abbas, Azhar
Azhar Abbas is a senior reporter who writes on current political affairs for the Karachi-based monthly, The Herald. Prior to joining The Herald in 1994 he worked for The News, a Karachi daily. Abbas, who has studied in North America, is an economist by training.
Dawn
Published in Karachi and Lahore, Dawn is a widely read and respected English-language daily. The paper's Internet edition can be viewed on its Website at .
The Herald
A Karachi-based monthly, The Herald is a widely read, influential English-language news magazine. Affiliated to the Dawn group of newspapers, The Herald maintains offices in Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, Multan, Quetta and Hyderabad. An independent publication, the magazine maintains an Internet Website at .
References

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    _____. 20 July 1999. Correspondence.
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    ______. 16 May 1999. "Many Lawyers Do Not Even Know the Basics: CJ."  [Accessed 17 May 1999]
    ______. 5 May 1999. "Ordinances Not Being Sent to PA: Govt Accused of Violating the Constitution."  [Accessed 5 May 1999]
    _____. 26 April 1999. "New Anti-Terrorism Ordinance after Ashura." [Accessed 26 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 16 April 1999. "HRCP Critical of Conviction." [Accessed 19 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 12 April 1999a. Nasir Malick. "UN Report Accuses Govt of Extrajudicial Killings." [Accessed 13 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 12 April 1999b. "Foreign Experts Say Proposed Police Setup Should Be Apolitical." [Accessed 13 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 8 April 1999. Sarfaraz Ahmed. "Metropolitan Police Idea Backed: Foreign Experts Call for Change in Entire Set Up." [Accessed 8 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 5 April 1999. "MQM Fears Rise in Extra-Judicial Killings." [Accessed 6 Apr. 1999]
    _____. 23 January 1999. "Another MPA of Muttahida Arrested."  [Accessed 26 Jan. 1999]
    _____. 12 January 1999. Saleem Asmi. "Sindh: Theatre of the Absurd."  [Accessed 12 Jan. 1999]
    _____. 1 January 1999. Sarafraz Ahmed. "Over 650 Killed in Karachi Violence."  [Accessed 18 May 1999]
    _____. 10 November 1998. Eqbal Ahmad. "The Governor's Challenge." [Accessed 15 June 1999]
    _____. 30 October 1998a. "Altaf Asks Party Workers to Go Into Hiding."  [Accessed 30 Oct. 1998]
    _____. 30 October 1998b. Safaraz Ahmed and Tahir Siddiqui. "7,000 on Wanted List: PM Okays Plan to Face Possible Backlash."  [Accessed 30 Oct. 1998]
    Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). 1 November 1998. BC Cycle. "Governor Announces Ban on Political Rallies in Karachi." (NEXIS)
    _____. 13 April 1997. BC Cycle. "Pakistani Ethnic Leader Survives Assassination Attempt." (NEXIS)
    Devamithran, Joseph. June 1993. Vol. 14. "Islamic Republic of Pakistan," Constitutions of the Countries of the World. Edited by Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz. Dobb's Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications. 
    The Herald [Karachi]. July 1999a. Vol. 30, No. 7. Farahnaz Ispahani. "Interview: Moinuddin Haider."
    _____. July 1999b. Vol. 30, No. 7. Sachal Ahmed. "Back to Politics."
    _____. June 1999. Vol. 30, No. 6. Zaigham Khan. "Legal Terror."
    _____. April 1999a. Vol. 30, No. 4. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Your Men or Mine?"
    _____. April 1999b. Vol. 30, No. 4. Nusrat Amin. "Action Replay."
    _____. March 1999. Vol. 30, No. 3. "Populist Autocracy?"
    _____. February 1999a. Vol. 30, No. 2. Azmat Abbas. "The Karachi Connection."
    _____. February 1999b. Vol. 30, No. 2. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Judicious Comeback."
    _____. February 1999c. Vol. 30, No. 2. Azhar Abbas. "Courting Justice."
    _____. February 1999d. Vol. 30, No. 2. Abid Hasan Minto. "Constitution Misconstrued."
    _____. February 1999e. Vol. 30, No. 2. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Easy Justice?"
    _____. November-December 1998a. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. "Clueless in Karachi."
    _____. November-December 1998b. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Azhar Abbas. "The Colombian Connection."
    _____. November-December 1998c. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Interview: Altaf Hussain."
    _____. November-December 1998d. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Idrees Bakhtiar and Azhar Abbas. "Interview: Moeenuddin Haider."
    _____. November-December 1998e. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Interview: Ishtiaq Azhar."
    _____. November-December 1998f. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Ihtasham ul Haque. "Interview: Naseerullah Babar."
    _____. November-December 1998g. Vol. 29, No. 11-12. Zaffar Abbas. "Chasing the Elusive Dawn."
    _____. October 1998a. Vol. 29, No. 10. Zaffar Abbas. "Law and Disorder."
    _____. October 1998b. Vol. 29, No. 10. Hassan Mansoor. "Killers on the Loose."
    _____. October 1998c. Vol. 29, No. 10. Azhar Abbas. "Policing the Police."
    _____. September 1998. Vol. 29, No. 9. Idrees Bakhtiar. "Where Do We Go From Here?"
    _____. August 1998. Vol. 29, No. 8. Mazhar Abbas. "Bridging the Gap?"
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    The Independent [London]. 21 July 1998. Peter Popham. "Karachi Gripped By Gang Warfare: Pakistan: Factional Killings and Looming Economic Meltdown Combine to Bring the Spectre of Civil Disaster." (NEXIS)
    International Herald Tribune (IHT) [Neuilly-sur-Seine, France]. 12 February 1999. Barry Bearak. "Ripping at Karachi's Seams, Faction Wars Spill Out Mayhem: Political Terrorism / Leaders Attempt to Crack Down." (NEXIS)
    Jane's Intelligence Review (JIR) [Surrey, UK]. January 1999. Vol. 11, No. 1. Anthony Davis. "Pakistan: State of Unrest." (NEXIS)
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    The Sangat Review. August 1998. "Special Editorial: Bloodbath in Karachi."  [Accessed 29 June 1999]
    The Tribune [Chandigarh]. 1 November 1998. "Crackdown on MQM Leaders."  [Accessed 2 Nov. 1998]
    _____. 22 September 1998. "MQM Deal with PML-N."  [Accessed 22 Sept. 1998]
    _____. 17 August 1998. "More MQM Men Quit Sindh Coalition: Break with Sharif's Party Imminent." [Accessed 17 Aug. 1998]
    _____. 16 August 1998. "MQM Minister Quits over Killings."  [Accessed 17 Aug. 1998]
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NOTES

1 The documentary evidence on events in Sindh in 1998 and 1999 indicates that Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) activists are neither actively involved in politically motivated violence, nor the focus of the government law and order operation (Abbas 20 July 1999; Dawn 1 Jan. 1999; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1c). Violence against PPP activists generally takes the form of police excesses committed during anti-government demonstrations, although human rights sources have been critical of the ehtesab (accountability) process, which has been used to harass and arrest a number of top PPP politicians (Dawn 16 Apr. 1999; Country Reports 1998 1999, introduction, section 1c). For more information on the situation of PPP members in Sindh province and their treatment by government authorities and members of other parties and/or ethnic groups, please refer to Response to Information Request PAK31815.E of 13 May 1999, available in the Regional Documentation Centres, in the IRB's REFINFO Database and on the IRB Website at .
2 In 1997, in an effort to broaden its support base and better address national issues, the MQM-Altaf group (MQM(A)) changed its name from the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) to Muttahida Qaumi Movement (United National Movement) (The Herald Aug. 1998, 56, 58; Country Reports 1998 1999, section 1a; The Sangat Review Aug. 1998). The MQM-Haqiqi faction (MQM(H)), however, continues to refer to itself as the Mohajir Qaumi Movement. In order to avoid confusion, this paper will refer to the Altaf group as the MQM, MQM(A), Muttahida or the Altaf group, and to the Haqiqi group as either the MQM(H) or the Haqiqis.  
3 According to journalist Azhar Abbas, the provincial assembly cannot pass resolutions while the province is under governor's rule, but it can still make laws (20 July 1999).
4 Despite the sweeping powers granted by article 245, Abbas states that in contrast to previous operations the army's active role is limited to the paramilitary Rangers, which is commanded by serving army officers. Otherwise there is no direct army involvement in the current crackdown (20 July 1999).
5 The mission comprised Dr. Dario Barberena, coordinator of High Commission of Peace of the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, and Dr. Edgar Suarez, adviser for the high commission and deputy chairman of the Institute on Democracy of the Colombian Education Ministry (Dawn 8 Apr. 1999; ibid. 12 Apr. 1999b; The Herald Nov. - Dec. 1998b, 33). 
6 The 28 August 1999 edition Dawn reported that the Anti-Terrorist Ordinance was re-promulgated on 27 August 1999.
7 According to Azhar Abbas, the federal government's desire for a PML victory in Sindh was largely behind Haider's removal as governor. An appointee rather than a PML career politician, Haider apparently preferred that elections be held under an independent governor according to Abbas, while the Sharif government, preferring a result favourable to the PML, wants the election to be held under a PML governor (20 July 1999).
8 Abbas states that while there were a few extrajudicial executions at the start of the current operation, the practice was largely checked by governor Haider, which was yet another reason for his problems with IGP Maqbool (5 Aug. 1999). In the two months since Haider's removal, however, the number of extrajudicial executions has "significantly increased. Almost every other day there is an alleged encounter between the police and militants or dacoits" (ibid.).

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