Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1989
CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian
one-party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Following the Beijing massacre in early June, the Government
reinforced totalitarian measures to control political views.
A closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercises
ultimate power over the nation, with Deng Xiaoping the first
among equals. Some of these party elders hold positions
within the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, or
other organs. Others hold no formal positions of authority
but still wield considerable influence.
The Government maintains control through a nationwide security
network which includes the Ministry of State Security; the
Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of National Defense;
state judicial, procuratorial , and penal systems; and through
traditional societal pressure. In 1989 the security network
was responsible for widespread human rights abuses, especially
in Beijing and Xizang (Tibet).
Despite 10 years of economic reforms intended to expand the
role of market forces, China's centrally planned economy still
retains price controls and allocation of some key goods by
administrative directive. The Government has decentralized
some economic decisionmaking authority and endorsed the
development of a small private sector, particularly in retail
sales and services. As part of a comprehensive economic
austerity and restructuring program initiated in late 1988,
the Government took a more aggressive approach in scrutinizing
private firms, punishing tax evaders, and attempting to limit
the incomes of private entrepreneurs. The central authorities
also withdrew some of the economic decisionmaking power
delegated to lower levels.
The human rights climate in China deteriorated dramatically in
1989. On March 5-7, People's Armed Police (PAP) used
indiscriminate and excessive force in suppressing
demonstrations in Lhasa, Tibet, killing scores of persons.
These killings and other serious human rights abuses, however,
were dwarfed when the leadership ordered the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) and other security forces to suppress
forcefully a peaceful, student-led movement seeking greater
freedom for China's people. At least several hundred, and
possibly thousands, of people were killed in Beijing on June
3-4. The Beijing massacre was followed by a drastic,
country-wide crackdown on participants, supporters, and
sympathizers. Thousands were arrested and about a score are
known to have been executed, following trials which fell far
short of international standards, for alleged crimes committed
during the unrest. There have also been persistent but
unconfirmed reports of numerous unannounced executions. At
year's end the crackdown was still continuing. The Government
attempted to defend its actions by a massive disinformation
campaign, expulsion and harassment of foreign journalists, a
ban on the sale of books by dissidents, and the jamming of the
Voice of America and some other foreign radio stations.
Virtually all internationally recognized human rights
discussed in this report are restricted, many of them severely.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
By far the most serious instance of extrajudicial killing in
China in 1989 was the June 3-4 massacre in Beijing. Credible
evidence indicates that the leadership deliberately ordered
the use of lethal force to suppress peaceful demonstrations.
The excessive force employed resulted in the deaths of many
unarmed civilians. As noted above, estimates of the number
killed vary widely, and an exact accounting may never be
possible.
In early March, the PAP shot and killed scores of Tibetan
monks and their supporters during demonstrations in Lhasa.
Hundreds more were injured as police used indiscriminate and
excessive force to quell protests in support of Tibetan
independence.
Many independent observers believe that the number of persons
actually executed in connection with the 1989 demonstrations
throughout the country is far higher than those officially
announced to date. Confirmation of such executions is not
available, and Chinese officials have refused to respond to
diplomatic requests for information.
According to reliable sources, 2 persons were killed and 150
injured, 10 seriously, during an April police raid on an
underground Catholic church service in Shi j iazhuang, Hebei
Province.
b. Disappearance
The Government, as a matter of course, does not publicly
announce the names of those detained or arrested. In view of
the large number detained after the Beijing massacre, concerns
have arisen over the fate of those detainees whose status has
not been clarified.
There were credible reports of numerous raids on university
campuses, private residences, workers' dormitories, think
tanks, and hotels in the weeks following the June 3-4 massacre
by both the PLA and various security bureaus. Large numbers
of persons who participated in or supported the spring
demonstrations were detained. While most of these detentions
occurred soon after the June massacre, the crackdown continued
months later. When universities reopened, returning students
were investigated, and some students were detained by security
forces. The Government acknowledges that some students, such
as Liu Gang, Zhou Fengsuo, Ma Shaofang, and others on the list
of 21 most wanted, have been arrested; however, it has not
publicly charged, or acknowledged holding, the majority of
students reportedly detained whose whereabouts are unknown.
Some workers at a computer firm that supported deposed CCP
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, journalists from Beijing-based
newspapers, and intellectuals also remain unaccounted for.
Since announcing a total of about 2,500 detentions by the end
of June, the Government has refused to comment on the number
of additional detentions since that time or to provide any
information on those detained.
Detention of leaders of unofficial religious groups continued
in 1989, often with no notification to followers or family
members. At least two dozen bishops, priests, and laymen of
the underground Catholic church were detained during the year,
and the status of several of them remained unknown at year's
end.
The whereabouts and status of many Tibetans detained during
demonstrations in Lhasa are also unknown. A security official
told a Western journalist in October that 400 had been
arrested after the March demonstrations and that 323 were
subsequently released. Other reports from Tibet cite
significantly higher figures.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Reports of torture and degrading treatment of persons detained
for committing so-called counterrevolutionary crimes have been
persistent and consistent. Many Chinese citizens who
participated in the demonstrations suffered beatings and other
forms of ill-treatment in police efforts to extract
information about others who may have been involved in the
demonstrations. A person involved in erecting the Goddess of
Democracy statue in Tiananmen Square was reportedly detained,
beaten, and forced to implicate others. He remains under
detention, and it is not known if he has been officially
charged. As of year's end, there were continuing reliable
reports of beatings of political detainees in the Beijing area
by security forces.
In Tibet officials have rebuffed diplomatic requests to visit
prisons and to discuss individual human rights cases. Since
the suppression of the March 5-7 demonstrations in Lhasa,
there have been persistent and convincing reports of torture
of those detained or arrested. A March 1989 report by U.S.
Congressional staff related accounts, based on interviews with
refugees from Tibet, of cruel and unusual punishment of
Tibetans.
Conditions in Chinese prisons are invariably harsh and
frequently degrading. According to press reports, more than
200 students and intellectuals are being held in the Qincheng
maximum-security prison north of Beijing. Prisoners are
reportedly packed eight to a cell. A person imprisoned prior
to the June massacre reported beatings in prisons in western
China. Prisoners, both criminal and political, are subjected
to severe psychological pressure to confess their "errors."
Those who resist are sometimes beaten and denied family
contact. According to an official of the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, cases under investigation concerning illegal
arrests and the extraction of confessions by torture rose 57.7
percent during the first 6 months of 1989 as compared with the
same period in 1988. The People's Procuratorates agreed to
hear 21,838 cases involving charges of torture. Of these, 838
were major criminal cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
China's Criminal Procedure Law proscribes arbitrary arrest or
detention. According to the law, interrogation should take
place within 24 hours of detention, and the detainee's family
or work unit should be informed of the reasons for it and the
place of detention. Articles 43-52 of the Criminal Procedure
Law, however, permit the police to delay notifying the family
and work unit "in circumstances where notification would
hinder the investigation." Frequently family members are not
informed when individuals are detained for political reasons.
A detainee may be held legally for up to 10 days prior to
formal arrest. In some cases, however, detainees have been
held for months without charge.
Under Article 19 of "The Regulations of the PRC on
Administrative Penalties for Public Security," police have the
authority to assign persons accused of disturbing the peace,
fabricating rumors, hindering government officials from
performing their official duties, and other minor public order
offenses to "labor education" camps for up to 3 years.
According to an article in the official press in October, some
2 million Chinese citizens have been sent to these camps in
the past 10 years.
Sentences imposed by criminal courts may be served in prisons
or in "reform through labor" camps, whose function is not
fully explained in the legal code. Many of these are in
remote areas such as Xinjiang or Qinghai. Upon release from
these camps, many prisoners reportedly have been denied
permission to return to their homes and forced to remain in
these underpopulated regions. This amounts to a form of
internal exile.
Some of those detained since the June massacre may be charged
with "crimes of counterrevolution," under Articles 90-104 of
the Criminal Law. These articles are cast in such broad terms
that they empower the State to detain people for a wide range
of activities considered in violation of the law. Those
detained for committing "crimes of counterrevolution" are
treated in theory the same as those detained for other crimes,
and their cases are supposed to be handled in accordance with
the Criminal Procedure Law. The imposition of martial law in
parts of Beijing in late May permitted martial law authorities
to issue orders and detain people independent of the authority
of the local Beijing government. Large numbers of people may
be detained for long periods of time without any public
notification while the PLA and police conduct their
investigations.
In 1989 the number of persons accused of political offenses
rose dramatically as a result of the spring demonstrations.
The number of people initially detained and the number who
remain under detention has not been released. Estimates of
the number of detainees after June 4 vary from the 2,500
officially announced in late June to over 100,000 according to
some journalists and human rights groups. Western press
reports in December quoted "well-informed" government sources
as putting the figure at 10,000.
Most of those detained appear to be manual workers. A number
of prominent intellectuals were also detained, including
journalist Dai Qing, former Democracy Wall prisoner Ren
Wanding, reformist Party official Bao Tong, and several
student leaders.
Some applicants for foreign visas have reportedly been
detained and interrogated for at least several days.
Several hundred people connected with the March 5-7
proindependence demonstrations in Lhasa were subsequently
detained. The Tibet Daily published on September 14 and 25
the names of 14 Tibetan Buddhist nuns who were detained andsentenced to 2 to 3 years of "labor education" for
demonstrating in Lhasa on September 2 and 22. The nuns were
detained for shouting in a public area slogans demanding
independence for Tibet and were accused by the police of
engaging in "separatist activity." The police detained the
nuns and immediately adjudicated their cases under their own
authority. Because of the secrecy surrounding these matters
and the Government's refusal to discuss them, reliable
estimates of the total number of political prisoners in Tibet,
as in the rest of China, are not obtainable.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
China's judiciary is not independent but is controlled by the
CCP. The highest court is the Supreme People's Court. The
next level is the High Provincial People's Court, followed by
the Intermediate Local People's Court, and then the Basic
Local County People's Court. Separate and special military,
maritime, and railway courts function directly under the
Supreme People's Court.
In recent years the CCP and the Government have moved toward
establishment of a more independent legal system. There have
been efforts to define broadly stated laws more narrowly,
including the provisions of the law on "crimes of
counterrevolution," to make clear what are criminally
indictable offenses. Programs have been set up to provide
professional training for judges through overseas training
courses to acquaint them with legal procedures in the West.
Since June, however, the impetus for legal reform has waned.
Due process rights are stipulated under the Constitution but
are often ignored in practice. The law requires that all
trials be held in public, except those involving state
secrets, juveniles, and "personal secrets." It also states
that a defendant may be held in custody during investigation
prior to the trial for a maximum of 2 months, although a
1-month extension may be requested from the next highest
procuratorate . The procuratorate then has 1 1/2 months to
decide whether or not to prosecute the case. An additional
month is permitted if "supplementary investigation" is
needed. Any further delay requires approval of the Standing
Committee of the NPC. In practice, the period of pretrial
detention can be much longer. Two American citizens arrested
for alleged fraud and forgery were held for 7 months before a
decision was made not to prosecute.
The procuratorate sends to trial only those persons it
determines are guilty. Persons appearing before the court are
presumed guilty, and trials are thus, in effect, sentencing
hearings. Defense lawyers almost never contest their client's
guilt; their function is generally confined to requesting
clemency. There is an appeal process, but initial decisions
are rarely overturned, and sentences can actually be
increased. Defendants are expected to "show the right
attitude" by confessing their crime, and, because they are
presumed guilty, those who fail to confess are treated more
harshly.
The Government has publicly announced the executions of a
score of persons who were tried and found guilty of crimes
directly linked to the spring demonstrations. For example,
three were executed in Shanghai on June 22 allegedly for
burning a train, seven in Beijing on June 22 allegedly for
"setting fire to military trucks, stealing military goods, and
assaulting soldiers," and two in Chengdu in July allegedly for
arson. A factory worker in Jinan was sentenced to death in
late October for allegedly setting fire to a car, three in
Chengdu in November for burning a cinema, and two in Beijing
in December for beating a policeman to death.
The Government has repeatedly argued that those executed were
"legally" found guilty of destroying government property or
other internationally recognized crimes, and not of political
offenses. The executions in Shanghai at least tend to belie
the Government's assertion. On June 6, during demonstrations
protesting the massacre of civilians in Beijing, a train ran
over a group of demonstrators in the Shanghai suburbs, killing
six. Angered by this, hundreds of people reportedly stormed
that train or the next train nearing the station and burned
it. A railway court convicted and sentenced to death three
people for burning the train. No one was detained in
connection with the death of the six demonstrators. The
Government contended that the defendants were accorded their
full rights. Serious doubts about the fairness of the trial
remain, however, including the excessive sentences, the
selection of these three persons for prosecution from among
the hundreds involved, the hurried nature of the trial, and
the mental competence of at least one of the defendants.
Given the near total lack of procedural safeguards in these
trials, government claims that the accused received "due
process" are not credible.
Those arrested for crimes of counterrevolution frequently are
tried in secret and family members are not informed of the
charges or details of the case. Credible reports suggest that
even years after the conviction and imprisonment of a person
considered a dissident, family members still do not know the
details of the alleged crime.
A number of political prisoners jailed in previous cycles of
repression, notably "Democracy Wall" dissident Wei Jingsheng,
remain in prison. Yang Wei, a former student in the United
States who was jailed for 2 years for activities during the
1986 demonstrations, was released in January but detained
again in July for involvement in the spring protests. Among
those who have been tried and convicted for clearly political
offenses during 1989 are Xiao Bin, who received a 10-year
sentence for "spreading rumors" about the demonstrations to
the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) television; Zhang
Weiping, sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment for telephoning
information on Hangzhou protests to the Voice of America
(VOA) ; and Chen Zhixiang, a teacher in Guangzhou who was given
10 years for painting a "counterrevolutionary" slogan.
Persistent reports claim that many others, perhaps several
hundred, have been secretly convicted of similar political
offenses.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law requires that search warrants be issued before
authorities may search premises, but it is often ignored. It
is unlikely the army and the security forces obtained warrants
prior to their raids on homes and businesses to arrest
"counterrevolutionaries" for their role in the democracy
demonstrations.
Personal and family life are extensively monitored and
regulated by authorities. Most persons depend on their work
unit for employment, housing, ration coupons, permission to
marry or have a child, and other aspects of ordinary life.
The work unit, along with the neighborhood watch committee,
monitors activities and attitudes. In the wake of the
demonstrations, authorities have redefined the function of the
neighborhood watch committees, requiring them to work more
closely with the Public Security Bureau. Mail is often opened
and read, telephones monitored, and television cameras located
at some key intersections, in luxury hotels, and in some
buildings. After the post-Tiananmen crackdown began, the
authorities produced television footage from clandestine
cameras showing alleged Taiwan spies observing the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations, and student leader Wuer Kaixi and other
demonstrators eating at the Beijing Hotel.
The Government strictly regulates dealings between Chinese
citizens and foreigners. Virtually all foreigners are forced
to live separately in designated residential compounds, and
all Chinese entering the foreign areas are closely monitored
by guards and video cameras on roofs and in elevators.
Residences of foreign diplomats, journalists, and businessmen
are assum.ed to be electronically and physically monitored.
The Chinese Government maintains a comprehensive and highly
intrusive family planning program. Individual and family
decisions about bearing children are controlled by the State,
with severe sanctions against those who deviate from official
guidelines. The Central Government sets an annual nationwide
goal for the number of births to be authorized. This is then
apportioned among provinces, and further down through
prefecture, county, town, and district levels. Ultimately,
each work unit (village, factory, or government office)
receives a target figure for births over the next few years.
As the allotments are quite small, couples wishing to have a
second child often must wait many years before receiving
permission. In some areas, newly married couples have also
been required to wait years before having their first child.
While strongly encouraging all couples to have only one child,
Chinese policy allows two or more children for many rural
families. Members of ethnic minorities, particularly in
remote areas, are also generally not subject to the same
strict limitations imposed on the Han majority.
Implementation of the policy varies widely from place to place
and from year to year. In many areas, couples apparently are
able to have several children without incurring any penalty,
while in other areas enforcement has been excessively harsh.
Periodic campaigns exhort all Chinese to have fewer children,
to have them later in life, and to space them more widely.
When national targets are not met, officials call for stricter
implementation, and some have advocated more coercive methods
than central government policy currently authorizes. Local
officials have great discretion in how, and how severely, the
policy is implemented.
Under China's national Marriage Law, women may not legally
marry before age 20; men before age 22. In practice, early
marriages are discouraged, and the press frequently extols the
virtues of later marriage. Lack of available housing and
other social concerns are often cited as additional reasons to
delay marriage.
Couples are not allowed free choice about whether to practice
family planning, how many children they may have, or when they
may have them. In practice, most couples have little choice
concerning the form of birth control to use.
The population control policy relies primarily on heavy doses
of education and propaganda, augmented by severe psychological
pressure on those who resist. Disciplinary measures against
couples who violate the policy include stiff fines (often as
high as a year's salary), withholding of social services,
demotion, and other administrative punishments. If a unit
exceeds its allocation, punishment may be meted out to the
offending couples, to unit officials, and to the unit as a
whole. Some local officials have reportedly destroyed or
confiscated the private property of families with unauthorized
children if fines are not paid. In 1988 a Chinese couple
studying in the United States, Dr. Li Quanbang and Ms. Ping
Hong, were threatened with severe punishment if Ms. Ping
refused to abort her second child before returning to China.
Ms. Ping's employer warned her that, if she returned, she
would have to have an abortion even in the third trimester of
pregnancy. If she insisted on having the child, she would be
placed on probation and the entire factory would be punished.
Eventually the authorities relented, but the U.S. Government
determined that the Li family and a few other Chinese couples
who faced similar situations had demonstrated a well-founded
fear of persecution and granted them asylum in the United
States.
Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is
not authorized, but continues to occur as officials strive to
meet population targets. Reports of forced abortions and
sterilizations continue, though well below the levels of the
early 1980's. In early 1989, a U.S. Congressional staff
delegation interviewed Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They, and
some previous news stories, reported harrowing accounts of
abuses in Tibet.
Chinese officials have consistently maintained that China does
not condone forced abortion and sterilization and that
officials who commit such abuses are punished. They admit,
however, that such punishment is rare and have refused to
provide documentation of any punishments.
Female infanticide also persists in some rural areas.
Insistence that local officials meet population goals has
contributed to the reemergence of this traditional practice,
generally by parents who hope to have more sons without
incurring official punishment. There are allegations that
some Chinese officials and doctors have participated in
infanticide or in abortions so late in pregnancy as to be
tantamount to infanticide. The Chinese Government strongly
opposes infanticide, to the point of prosecuting offenders,
but has been unable to eradicate it.
One recent development in China's population control policy
was the passage in November 1988 of a set of eugenic
regulations in Gansu province prohibiting people with severe
mental handicaps from having children. Provincial officials
estimate the rules will affect some 26,000 persons whose
intelligence quotient is judged to be 49 or lower. Should any
of these persons decide to marry, one spouse must undergo
sterilization. For those already married, one partner must be
sterilized and any pregnancies compulsorily aborted.
Officials claim that permission for any operation requires the
consent of a mentally competent relative but acknowledge that
heavy psychological pressure may be employed to obtain
consent. As of December 1989, provincial officials said that
1,714 persons had been identified as requiring sterilization,
and 731 operations had been performed. According to a Health
Ministry official, the Government is drafting a new law to
extend the ban nationwide.
Despite a decade of efforts, officials acknowledge that
population growth has significantly exceeded the national
targets and that the goal of holding China's population to 1.2
billion by the end of the century will not be met. This
realization, together with a recent escalation of official
rhetoric, have led some observers to suggest that China may be
entering a new cycle of strict enforcement of family planning
policies, after a period of relative relaxation.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
On June 3-4, in order to clear peaceful demonstrators who had
occupied Tiananmen Square for several weeks, PLA troops fired
heavily and indiscriminately at crowds in the approaches to
and around Tiananmen Square, resulting in at least hundreds of
deaths and thousands of injuries. Some were crushed by
military vehicles driven into the crowd. The PLA also
suffered scores of casualties as enraged citizens fought
back. According to Western diplomats, some PLA casualties
also resulted from soldiers accidentally shooting or injuring
other soldiers. While it is difficult to know precisely how
many civilians died or were injured, the numbers are certainly
far greater than those cited by authorities. Mayor Chen
Xitong, in a speech before the National People's Congress
Standing Committee on June 30, said over 200 civilians were
killed, including 36 students, and 3,000 injured, with "dozens
of soldiers and police killed and 6,000 injured." Hospitals
and human rights groups, however, provided much higher
estimates. Visiting several hospitals in Beijing after the
June 3-4 massacre, diplomats and other observers viewed scores
of dead civilians, including women and children, with bullet
wounds and other injuries, and heard from medical personnel
the hardships the hospitals faced in treating the dead and
injured. At one hospital, doctors said that on June 3, 50
civilians had died from bullet wounds in their hospital alone.
The authorities clearly used excessive deadly force against
the demonstrators. While they used tear gas and rubber
bullets briefly in some areas of Beijing, the PLA and security
forces relied primarily on lethal force rather than
traditional riot control techniques to clear demonstrators
from the roads leading to Tiananmen Square. Foreign diplomats
and their families did not escape the heavy-handed actions of
the PLA. On June 7, PLA soldiers, allegedly returning fire
from a sniper, shot at a diplomatic housing complex, spraying
scores of apartments with gunfire but causing no casualties.
Chinese authorities have produced no evidence that a sniper
was actually present in the compound and firing at the PLA.
Security forces used excessive force in breaking up a
religious ceremony and demonstration by members of the
underground Catholic Church near Shi j iazhuang, Hebei Province
in April, leaving 2 civilians dead and at least 150 injured.
In another major incident involving the use of excessive force
during demonstrations in Lhasa on March 5-7, police shot and
killed scores of Tibetan monks and their supporters.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech and self-expression are severely
restricted. Limited criticism of government policies and
officials is tolerated and had increased in recent years.
However, the limits were tightened again after June 4.
Citizens are not permitted to criticize senior leaders or to
express opinions contrary to the "Four Cardinal Principles":
Marxism/Leninism/Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical
foundation of the State, socialism as its goal. Communist
Party leadership, and the "people's democratic dictatorship"
(which includes the right to use force against "counterrevolutionaries").
Those who violate these guidelines frequently are severely
punished. Xiao Bin, a worker in Dalian, was sentenced to 10
years' imprisonment for expressing personal views on the
Beijing massacre to an ABC news crew, and Zhang Weiping, a
student, was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for informing
VOA about antigovernment demonstrations.
Renowned scientist and dissident Fang Lizhi sent senior leader
Deng Xiaoping an open letter on January 6 appealing for
amnesty for political prisoners. On February 16, 33 prominent
intellectuals signed an open letter to the national leadership
supporting Fang's call for amnesty. The Government attacked
the letter in the official press on February 23 and later
characterized it as an act of "counterrevolution." Some
signatories have since fled China while others have been
detained. Security forces stepped up surveillance of Fang and
restricted his movements. He and his wife Li Shuxian were
physically prevented from attending a banquet in Beijing
hosted by President and Mrs. Bush. In June Fang and Li took
refuge in the U.S. Embassy, after which the Government charged
them with criminal "counterrevolutionary" activity and named
them as key "conspirators" in the student demonstrations.
Television and radio are strictly controlled by the Government
and used to propagate the party's version of events. In the
wake of the June 3-4 events, the authorities began a massive
disinformation campaign, asserting that* the spring
demonstrations had evolved into a counterrevolutionary
rebellion led by a few conspirators. State Council spokesman
Yuan Mu claimed on June 16 that only 300 had died on June 3-4,
half of them PLA soldiers. Regular programming was replaced
by special programs giving the CCP ' s version of events. These
programs were broadcast several times a day for weeks. In
July China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast a four-part
program conveying the official version of the massacre.
Events were altered to suggest that the troops had been called
in to "quell a riot" rather than that troops fired on peaceful
demonstrators who then reacted in a rage. Again on September
23, CCTV televised a special program countering charges by
activists in the United States and featuring comments by Liu
Xiaobo, detained since June, denying that anyone had died in
Tiananmen Square. In the wake of the massacre, television
news constantly replayed assertions of government officials
such as Yuan Mu and selected remarks by the handful of foreign
observers supportive of the Government position.
Following the imposition of martial law in Beijing, the
Chinese cut off the satellite feed for U.S. network news
services. Security authorities and PLA soldiers on the night
of June 3-4 detained two U.S. reporters along with a number of
other foreign journalists. In the aftermath, authorities
severely restricted the movements of foreign journalists,
harassing and expelling several of them.
After an 11-year moratorium, the Government resumed jamming
VOA Chinese-language broadcasts on May 21. The official press
has harshly attacked VOA reports, claiming that they were part
of a Western conspiracy to subvert China. Chinese authorities
confiscated film from foreigners leaving the country and
insisted on developing it for review and censorship.
Restrictions on the publication of books and other printed
material, which had generally eased during the 1980's, have
become much more stringent since June. Print media, like the
broadcast media, have been used to disseminate disinformation
about the spring demonstrations and the Government's crackdown.
A number of journalists were detained or otherwise officially
harassed in 1989. During the demonstrations, then Shanghai
Party Secretary Jiang Zemin sacked the editor of the World
Economic Herald, Qin Benli, and closed the newspaper,
silencing one of the country's few independent journalistic
voices. Since June, Qin has been under investigation. His
Beijing bureau chief was arrested and several staff writers
are still detained. Other journalists apparently still under
detention include personnel from the government mouthpiece
People's Daily, the official English-language China Daily,
Guangming Daily, and Radio Beijing. Others have been
dismissed from their jobs for printing material at variance
with the party line, including editor Tan Wenrui and director
Qian Liren of People's Daily, publisher Zhang Li and editor Li
Jiawei of the Sichuan Provincial Social Science Academy
Publishing House, Editor-in-chief Yao Xihua of the Guangming
Daily, Editor-in-Chief Li Xiaoshi and Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Sun Chang jiang of the Science and Technology Daily.
On July 17 the Government temporarily removed from the
newsstands foreign language newspapers, magazines, and
publications in order to limit access by Chinese citizens to
foreign news and to consolidate government control over the
importation and distribution of foreign printed material.
While the ban was lifted at the end of August, tighter control
on distribution has enabled authorities to censor foreign
language material more effectively. For example, several
issues of the Far Eastern Economic Review were withheld from
newsstands or had offending articles removed. More recently,
foreign media reports on the overthrow of Romanian dictator
Ceaucescu have been barred from distribution.
The Government reportedly has also banned publications by
activists and other authors considered unacceptable. Writings
by astrophysicist Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian,
investigative journalist Liu Binyan, playwright Su Xiaokang,
intellectuals such as Su Shaozhi, Bao Tong, Jin Guantao, Ge
Yang, Cao Siyuan, Li Honglin, Zhang Xianyang, Dai Qing, Liu
Xiaobo, Yan Jiaqi, and dozens of others have reportedly been
banned. Li Ruihuan, member of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, on August 24 announced a campaign to "clean up and
rectify" the publishing and audiovisual industries. Li said
the campaign was aimed at curbing publications advocating
"bourgeois liberalization" (Western social, political, and
cultural ideas) and pornography.
In the wake of the student demonstrations, the Government has
worked to reimpose more rigid ideological control over the
school system. The State Education Commission ordered that
30,000 fewer first-year students be admitted to universities
for the fall 1989 semester. The cuts were primarily among
those seeking to study the social sciences. The number of
students studying Western philosophy, political science, and
management were reduced. The entire first-year class at
Beijing University, a main center for the demonstrations, was
sent to an isolated camp for a year of military training and
ideological indoctrination. (The Government said this program
might be expanded to include additional universities in the
future.) Some recent college graduates are being sent from
Beijing to the countryside or to factories for ideological
training. On July 1, a State Education Corainission official
told the Chinese press that "students' level of patriotism and
willingness to serve their country should be major criteria"
in decisions on who should be permitted to study overseas.
Required study of the writings of Communist theoreticians has
been sharply increased.
Investigations into press activities have led to intimidation
of journalists and broadcasters, stronger press control, and a
complete halt, for now, of press reform. The Government has
made it clear that the press must support the party line and
cannot question the "Four Cardinal Principles." The detention
of journalists and broadcasters described in earlier sections
reinforced the Government's message.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Article 35 of the Constitution guarantees the right "of
assembly, of association, of procession, and of
demonstration," but such activities may not infringe "upon the
interests of the State" (Article 51) . In an effort to prevent
students from again demonstrating or occupying Tiananmen
Square, the National People's Congress Standing Committee on
October 31 adopted a law governing assemblies, parades, and
demonstrations that significantly limits the right of
individuals or groups to organize mass political activities.
The law, in theory, guarantees the right to assemble and
demonstrate but stipulates that parades and demonstrations
must abide by the Constitution and laws and may not "infringe
on the interests of the State, society, and collectives or the
legitimate freedoms and rights of other citizens." In
practice, this proscribes any protests against socialism or
the leadership. Moreover, this stipulation could be used to
ban protests that disrupt traffic, interfere with business, or
occupy public places, and all acts that could be interpreted
as "infringing" on the freedoms of other citizens. Also
banned are demonstrations that advocate national separatism or
jeopardize national unity.
The law does not apply to "traditional cultural, recreational,
or sports activities; normal religious activities; nor
traditional, nongovernmental activities among the people."
Also exempt are celebrations held by the State and assemblies
held by "state organs, political parties, social groups,
enterprises, or institutions in accordance with the law or
their organic charters." Presumably, local authorities retain
the power to determine what are "normal" religious activities;
unapproved gatherings, such as evangelical revivals, religious
retreats, and outdoor masses could be restricted or banned.
Similarly, local officials would decide when "traditional"
cultural activities carry unacceptable political overtones
related to such sensitive issues as national separatism.
Procedures for obtaining a permit are extremely restrictive
and constructed in such a way as to discourage exercise of the
right of assembly. Demonstration organizers must apply for a
permit at least 5 days before the event, specifying the
purpose, type of demonstration, slogans to be used, the number
of participants and vehicles, the routes and times of the
march, the number and type of audio equipment, and the names,
addresses, and occupations of sponsors. Marches are generally
to be confined to the hours of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. except with
special permission. The law reserves to local officials the
right to change the time, location, and route of a
demonstration, even after giving approval, requiring only that
they "promptly notify" the sponsors. Citizens cannot organize
or participate in demonstrations outside their own locality,
nor can government employees organize or participate in
protests that "go against their responsibilities and
obligations prescribed in relevant laws and regulations."
Professional and other mass associations are for the most part
organized and controlled by the Communist Party. Other new
regulations require all organizations to be officially
registered and approved, including societies, research units,
foundations, and chambers of commerce. Ostensibly aimed at
secret societies and criminal gangs, the regulations are also
used to prevent the formation of unauthorized political or
labor organizations, such as the student and worker groups
that emerged before and during the spring prodemocracy
protests. The regulations can also be used to close down
unregistered house churches or discussion groups that local
leaders deem potentially subversive.
In parts of Beijing, martial law was imposed on May 20 and
remained in effect until lifted in January 1990. Under
martial law, groups of people were not permitted to gather and
demonstrations were strictly forbidden. Martial law has also
been in effect in Lhasa since demonstrations broke out there
in early March. In areas where martial law is not in effect,
authorities also have adopted a stricter policy toward
allowing groups of people to assemble. Informants and
security forces maintain a close watch on groups formed
outside the Party establishment, particularly unauthorized
religious groups and other associations. Associations
recognized by the State are permitted to maintain relations
with recognized international bodies, but these contacts are
monitored and limited by the Government.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom is subject to tight constraints. While the
Constitution affirms toleration of religious beliefs, the
Government severely restricts religious practice outside the
officially recognized and government-controlled religious
institutions. Religious proselytizing is restricted to
officially sanctioned places of worship or to the homes of
persons properly registered with an officially recognized
religious institution. Religious conversion is tolerated
(though generally not for Communist Party members).
By far the largest group of religious believers in China are
Buddhists who belong to the dominant Han ethnic group. Han
Buddhist leaders generally cooperate with the Government and
have experienced few reported difficulties. Daoism, widely
practiced in southern coastal provinces, is officially
respected as an important part of traditional Chinese culture,
but many of its practices conflict with government strictures
against superstition and waste of arable land and have been
heavily criticized. China permits Muslim citizens to make the
hajj to Mecca, and over 2,000 Chinese, most subsidized by the
Chinese Government or by overseas Muslims, make the journey
annually.
The Government insists that no religious institution may be
subject to foreign domination or influence. In order to
eliminate perceived foreign domination of Christian groups in
the past, the Government in the 1950 's established the
Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) and the Protestant Three
Self Movement (TSM) . The CPA ordains its own bishops and
priests, generally follows pre-Vatican II practices, and
rejects papal authority. Proselytizing by foreign groups is
forbidden. Americans and other foreigners have been expelled
for distributing Bibles or proselytizing. Twelve Americans
were detained in Kunming on June 23 and were later expelled
for having imported religious materials. Officially
sanctioned religious organizations are permitted to maintain
international contacts as long as these do not entail foreign
control. The TSM and its Buddhist and Muslim counterparts
have established extensive networks of international support.
The CPA has no official ties to Catholic churches outside
China, but its leaders frequently visit Catholic and other
religious leaders abroad.
Tibetan Buddhism is also tightly controlled. Religious
activity is thriving with some government support, though the
number of monasteries and monks remains far below the pre-1949
level. The Government does not tolerate religious
manifestations that advocate Tibetan independence. The
Government recognizes the Dalai Lama as a major religious
figure, but condemns his political activities and his
leadership of a "government in exile." As with other
religions, Tibetan Buddhist activities are subject to
government monitoring and control. The Government exercised a
considerable degree of control over the late Tibetan Buddhist
Panchen Lama, the second most revered religious figure in
Tibetan Buddhism. Following his death early in 1989, the
State Council approved procedures for selecting the
"reincarnated" Panchen Lama which will give the Government a
prominent role.
After forcefully suppressing all religious observance during
the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the
late 1970's to restore or replace confiscated churches,
temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official religious
organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic and
Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks. The
Government supervises the publication of religious material
for distribution, to ensure that it conforms to religious
beliefs and philosophical positions sanctioned by the
Government.CH I HA
There are active underground religious movements which pose an
alternative to the state-regulated churches and temples. The
Catholic underground church claims a membership far larger
than the 3.5 million officially registered with the CPA,
though actual figures are unknown. It has its own bishops and
priests and conducts its own services. Protestants also
conduct private services independent of government control;
some of these groups are apparently quite dynamic. The
Christian underground movement imports religious materials,
including Bibles, from abroad. Underground church officials
reject legally published material because it does not conform
to their beliefs. The Government generally tolerates but
sometimes actively suppresses nonsanctioned religious groups.
Security forces have raided illegal underground services,
resulting in arrests, injuries, and even deaths, as in the
raid on an underground Catholic service in Hebei in April in
which 2 persons were reportedly killed and 150 were injured.
A large number of Catholic leaders and somewhat fewer
Protestants have spent long periods in prison. Most long-term
Catholic prisoners had been released by late 1987, but
detentions continue. Bishops Julius Jia Guozhi , Joseph Fan
Xueyan, Pietro Liu Guandong, Giuseppe Li Side, Jiang Liren,
Mattia Lu Zhensheng, Filippo Yang Lipo, Paolo Li Zhenrong,
Bartolomeo Yu Chengdi , and other priests in the underground
Catholic Church as well as underground Protestant leaders were
reportedly detained during 1989 for varying periods of time.
Underground Catholic Bishop Casimir Wang Milu has not been
seen since his arrest in 1986 and is presumed to be in
prison. As of year's end, no information was available on at
least 20 Catholic priests detained by security forces in
Hebei, Gansu, Sichuan, and Fujian provinces. International
human rights groups report that at least 30 underground
Protestant leaders may also be in detention.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government uses an identification (ID) card system to
restrict the movement of Chinese citizens within the country.
Citizens are registered as residents of a particular
jurisdiction and assigned to a specific work unit. Movement
within the country or change of workplace can, in most cases,
be done only with government permission and agreement by the
work unit. Those workers on short-term work contracts with a
work unit have more leeway in movement. On expiration of a
contract, the worker may be able to negotiate a position in
another area or continue his contract. Significant numbers of
farmers have moved from the countryside to cities in search of
employment. Authorities are trying to limit the migration,
but they estimate there are at least a million unregistered
persons in Shanghai and Guangzhou and 700,000 in Beijing.
Measures undertaken in connection with the Government's
current austerity program will result in large-scale
unemployment and authorities reportedly intend to enforce
their return to the countryside.
After the June disorders, the Ministry of Public Security
ordered full national implementation of regulations on
carrying and checking residents' identification cards as of
September 15. The cards have been under partial and
experimental use for several years.
Under the new procedures, citizens are required to carry their
ID cards at all times when out of doors and must present them
on demand of authorities. They must also present ID cards
when registering for voting, residence, military service,
marriage, or school entrance; applying for employment,
licenses, loans, notarization of documents, social insurance
or relief, travel to restricted areas or to leave the country;
participating in lawsuits; picking up mail or claiming
remittances; boarding an .airplane; or registering in a hotel.
More stringent scrutiny of ID cards will close loopholes
through which many Chinese have slipped in recent years. Some
have used the relative freedom of travel to act as business
middlemen and fixers, often involved in quasi-legal or illegal
cash-and-carry deals, money changing, and black market
activity. Also likely to be caught in the tighter net are
itinerant preachers and evangelists, many of whom lack a
permanent residence. Recent Chinese press reports decry
incidents in which people caught without their ID card were
subjected to extortion by police or shaken down by criminals
posing as police.
Existing restrictions on foreign travel were tightened in
1989. In the wake of the Beijing massacre, the Government has
implemented more restrictive criteria for passport issuance.
Procedures reportedly include obtaining a political "bill of
good health" from the work unit and its party committee and
submitting to background checks by the Public Security Bureau
(and, in Beijing, the martial law command). Passport
applicants are screened to determine the applicant's political
loyalty and his role in the spring demonstrations. The double
exit permit system implemented on June 20 was designed to
support this objective. In Shanghai, dissident Zhang Cai was
detained at the airport when trying to board a flight out of
China. There are also reports that some Chinese who marry
foreigners and wish to emigrate have had to repay the cost of
their education in order to obtain a passport.
The Government has imposed restrictions on overseas studies.
New regulations reportedly require tighter ideological
screening, and perhaps several years' work experience, as
prerequisites for permission to study overseas. Furthermore,
lower limits will be set on the number of publicly funded
students sent abroad to study humanities, with the emphasis
instead going to more practical studies such as the sciences
and specialized training.
China has continued to relax restrictions on internal travel
by foreigners. Since last year it has increased the number of
cities open to foreign visitors from 504 to 626. Tibet, the
capital of which remains under martial law, has begun again to
allow tourism. Tourists, however, must travel in groups of at
least three, obtain prior permission, and travel with
officially designated travel agencies. Most requests by
foreign diplomats for travel to Tibet since March have been
denied.
China encourages its citizens who are legally overseas
studying or doing research to return to assist in China's
development. Some 35,000 Chinese citizens are currently
studying or conducting research in the United States. The
State Education Commission declared on December 8 that
scholars returning from overseas would not be held accountable
for participation in prodemocracy activities while abroad.
However, many of these scholars claim that they or their
families have been subject to threats of reprisals by Chinese
officials.
The Chinese Government accepts repatriation of PRC citizens
who have entered other countries or territories illegally.
The Hong Kong Government says it returned to the PRC 11,392
illegal immigrants in the first 9 months of 1989, compared to
21,001 in 1988. None of those returned were believed to be
considered by the PRC Government to have been participants in
or supporters of the spring demonstrations. To retaliate
against the Hong Kong Government for having allowed dissident
swimmer Yang Yang to depart for the United States, the PRC
temporarily suspended repatriation for 2 weeks in October.
Japanese authorities have decided to proceed with repatriation
of illegal immigrants from China who entered Japan by sea
during the summer of 1989. It remains unclear what
punishment, if any, these PRC citizens will face once they
have been repatriated.
China accepted more than 280,000 refugees and displaced
persons from Vietnam and Laos between 1978 and 1982. These
refugees were predominantly ethnic Han Chinese or married to
ethnic Chinese. In recent years, the Government has adopted a
stricter policy of "no new admissions." Thus, Chinese
authorities currently discourage Vietnamese refugees from
settling in China. There have been persistent reports that
local authorities along China's southern coast help to provide
food, water, and fuel to Vietnamese migrants so they may
proceed to Hong Kong, and in some cases, to Japan and Korea.
There also have been credible reports that Vietnamese refugees
reaching China's interior provinces have been forcibly
repatriated. Other credible reports suggest that the PRC has
also repatriated persons of other nationalities seeking
refugee status. Although China signed the Comprehensive Plan
of Action (CPA) negotiated at the International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees in Geneva in June 1989, it is unclear
whether China considers itself a CPA "participating state."
China has yet to create formal mechanisms to enforce CPA
provisions, and its policy on the principle of first asylum
remains ambiguous.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change their Government
The people of China do not have the right or the ability
peacefully and legally to change their government. Chinese
citizens can neither freely choose nor change the laws and
officials which govern them. China is ruled by the CCP, the
paramount source of political authority. Within the party, a
closed inner circle of a few senior leaders exercise ultimate
power over the nation. Most hold key positions within the
six-member Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Central
Military Commission, or other organs. Former senior leaders
continue to influence government policy. Deng Xiaoping
remains first among equals in this group despite his formal
retirement in October. The senior party leadership determines
policy, which is then implemented by the Government.
According to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's
Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of state power. It
nominally selects the President and Vice President, decides on
the choice of the Premier, and elects the Chairman of the
Central Military Commission. It had been granted, and had
begun to exercise, increasing independence and influence
during the late 1980' s. Debates had become much more open,
and several important government proposals were sent back forCH»JA
further study. During the May-June crisis, some NPC members
attempted to convene an extraordinary meeting of the body to
revoke the Government's declaration of martial law in Beijing,
but were unable to do so. Since that time, the NPC has
generally resumed its previous role of ratifying decisions
already made by the senior leadership.
The Government neither tolerates dissent nor accepts
challenges to its authority. The authorities denounce as
"counterrevolutionary" proposals to limit the power of the
Party or to alter the nation's ideology. The Government's
handling of the spring demonstrations, the killing of its
citizens, its subsequent crackdown on dissent, and its massive
disinformation campaign aimed at rewriting history demonstrate
the senior leadership's determination to retain power.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
China rejects the concept of universal human rights despite
its adherence to the United Nations Charter, which mandates
respect for and promotion of human rights. Chinese official
commentators in recent months have increasingly argued that
each nation has the right to define human rights as it
pertains to the human conditions existing within that
country. No nation or international organization, they say,
has the "legal right" to apply its definition of human rights
to conditions in other countries. Officials strongly reject
any criticism of China's human rights situation by
international human rights organizations and other nations,
and they assert that international groups and foreign nations
use human rights as a means to interfere in China's internal
affairs.
A resolution passed by the U. N. Human Rights Commission's
(UNHRC) Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities in August, calling on the Secretary
General to collect information on the human rights situation
in China, was denounced by the Chinese Government as brazen
interference in its internal affairs. China defended its use
of force in suppressing the demonstrations in June
legalistically, citing the legitimate right of the Chinese
authorities "to maintain law and order." It has also rejected
Amnesty International's August 1989 report condemning the June
massacre, and it has harshly and aggressively attacked the VOA
for its coverage of and commentary on the June events.
In October the Government denounced the awarding of the Nobel
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, who has been an outspoken
critic of human rights violations in Tibet, as "gross
interference in China's internal affairs" and as "hurting the
feelings of the Chinese people." A Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokesman on October 7 said that awarding the Nobel
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama "constitutes open support to the
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan separatists in their activities to
undermine and split China."
There are no organizations within China which specifically
monitor or comment on human rights conditions. The Government
crushed an incipient human rights monitoring group--Amnesty
89--f ollowing the June crackdown and has made it clear that it
will not tolerate the existence of such a group. It has
reacted with equal defensiveness to international accusations
of human rights violations in Tibet. Authorities have refused
to respond to charges of human rights violations in connection
with the killing of demonstrators in Lhasa on March 5-7. They
have generally not permitted reporters or human rights workers
to visit Tibet, have refused diplomatic requests to discuss
human rights issues, and have generally denied diplomats
access to Tibet.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
While laws designed to protect women and minorities exist, in
practice discrimination persists in housing, jobs, education,
and other aspects of life based on sex, religion, race, and
class. The 1982 Constitution states that "women in the
People's Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all
spheres of life," and it promises, among other things, equal
pay for equal work. In fact, however, the general status of
women is not equal to that of men, and there was no
significant improvement in upholding women's rights or in the
working conditions of women in 1989. By many standards, the
status of women has regressed in recent years. Within the
work force, 83 percent of the 220 million women employed
perform physical labor. Seventy-seven percent of employed
women work in agriculture, 13 percent in industry, and 4
percent in the service trade. In industry, most women are
employed in lower skilled and lower paid occupations. The
number of professional women is low. Women who graduate from
college are less likely than men to be placed in prestigious
positions. There is a significant wage gap between men and
women performing the same tasks.
China's recent enterprise and labor reforms have sought to
streamline enterprises and give workers greater job mobility.
Women apparently bear the brunt of these reforms in terms of
job insecurity and cutbacks in welfare programs. Many
employers have admitted they prefer to hire men, citing the
avoidance of maternity leave and child care provisions as
their chief reason. Complaints from women of discrimination,
unfair dismissal, demotion, or wage cuts when they needed
maternity leave have risen significantly. There has been an
increasing number of reports of young women in the special
economic zones being fired when they become pregnant or reach
child-bearing age. The New China News Agency reported that
during factory efficiency drives in the second half of 1987,
over 60 percent of "redundancies" were women. To combat the
problem, on July 25, 1988, the State Council issued a
regulation on female employees' legal rights, stating that
work units will not be allowed to discriminate against women
or reduce their maternity benefits, but there is no evidence
that the regulation has been implemented effectively.
While the gap in the education levels of men and women is
narrowing, the majority of the educated, particularly the
highly educated, are men. Women now make up 37.4 percent of
high school students and 25.7 percent of university students.
Similarly, a disproportionate number of government-funded
scholarships for overseas study go to men. Women also
reportedly need higher scores than men to gain admission to
select universities.
There are reports of violence against women, particularly wife
beating, selling of women for wives, abuse of female children,
and female infanticide in some rural areas--practices the
Government condemns and attempts to curb. The Chinese have
admitted that there is very little legal recourse to curb what
is a traditional tolerance for abuse of women. Selling women
for wives is a growing problem; in December the Government
began a campaign against the practice, labeling it one of "six
evils" to be eradicated. Official statistics are lacking but
unofficial estimates are in the tens of thousands. A New York
Times article quoted a confidential government document in
September that cited the rising cost of traditional rural
weddings (more than $2,500) versus the cost of buying a wife
($500 to $800) as one reason for the practice. Female
children are seen, particularly in the countryside, as
unproductive. They will leave the family and not provide
assistance for the parents' retirement (as sons are expected
to do) . Some provincial and local authorities have attempted
to ease this traditional bias by facilitating establishment of
retirement homes. Many female children are forced to work
long hours at an early age and are sometimes beaten if chores
are not completed. Numerous reports tell of young girls being
removed from school at the age of 8 or 9 to work in rural
enterprises or the fields so that their families can "make
some money from them before they leave home."
Chinese authorities have not succeeded in stopping abductions
and the trading of women and children. People's Daily
reported on November 15 that between 1981 and 1988 some 16,000
women and 900 children who were abducted in Shandong Province
were saved by authorities. Of the more than 14,000 arrested
for abducting women and children, 22 percent or 3,100 were
sentenced to prison. The number of abductions nationwide is
not known, but the statistics from Shandong would indicate
that the number is high.
The economic progress of minorities is viewed by the
Government as one of its significant achievements. Ethnic
minorities benefit from special treatment in marriage and
family planning, employment, and university admission.
Nevertheless, discrimination based on ethnic origin persists.
The concept of a largely homogeneous ethnic race of the Han
people pervades the general thinking of the majority Han
Chinese. Less than 7 percent of the population belong to one
of the 55 designated ethnic minorities. Most reside in areas
they have traditionally inhabited. Their standards of living
remain far below the national average. Despite the CCP's
avowed policy of increasing minority representation in the
Government and in the CCP, ethnic minorities are effectively
shut out of all but a few leadership positions and play a
minor role in decisionmaking. Some minorities resent Han
officials holding key positions in minority areas. Tibetans
in Tibet and Uighurs in Xinjiang have demonstrated against Han
Chinese authority. PLA troops are stationed in these areas,
and martial law remains in place in Lhasa. During an
inspection tour of Xinjiang August 26, Minister for Public
Security Wang Fang accused Uighur separatists of fomenting
local instability.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The PRC ' s 1982 Constitution guarantees "freedom of
association," but the guarantee is heavily qualified by
references to the interest of the State and the leadership of
the CCP, and, in fact, workers do not have the right to form
or join independent unions of their own choosing. Union
membership is theoretically voluntary for individual
employees, but each enterprise must have a union and each
union must join the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU) , nominally an independent organization, but in fact
closely controlled by the CCP and the only legal national
federation. Virtually all state-sector workers and nearly 90
percent of all urban sector workers belong to ACFTU chapters.
The right to strike, which had been included in China's 1975
and 1978 Constitutions, was removed from the 1982 Constitution
on the grounds that the political system had eradicated class
contradictions between the proletariat and capitalists.
However, in 1983 the ACFTU Chairman stated that if a trade
union and its labor protection safety officers found that a
workplace was too dangerous, the union should organize the
workers to leave the hazardous areas. Thus, authorities
usually view strikes as justified only when they respond to
problems such as a sudden deterioration in safety conditions.
Nevertheless, strikes and, more commonly, work slowdowns do
occur. In the first half of 1988, 49 strikes were reported
officially. The number for 1989 is unknown, but reports of
job actions in support of prodemocracy demonstrations in the
spring of 1989 were widespread. Strikes and slowdowns
generally occur over distribution of benefits or safety
concerns at individual enterprises. They are usually resolved
without the need for intervention from outside the
enterprise. The usual role of the trade union in such strikes
is to persuade the workers to return to their jobs.
During the countrywide political demonstrations in the spring
of 1989, "Workers' Autonomous Federations" (WAF) were formed
in major cities. The Beijing WAF claimed to represent over
100,000 workers from 40 industries in the capital. WAF
leaders insisted they wanted to organize legally and did not
oppose the rule of the CCP. The concerns of the WAF included
bureaucratic corruption, wage disparities between workers and
plant managers, the absence of workplace democracy, the lack
of genuine workers' representation in the policymaking
process, and poor safety and working conditions. Established
primarily to mobilize and express workers' sympathy for the
demands of student demonstrators, the WAF did not have time to
build organizations at the enterprise level. Thus, although
there are workers who purport to carry on the work of the WAF,
the June crackdown apparently destroyed the federations. Many
observers believe concern over growing worker support for
students' demands prompted the Government to order troops into
Tiananmen Square on June 3-4. According to international
eyewitnesses, most of the Beijing WAF leaders were killed
during the massacre.
After June 4, workers became a primary target of government
reprisals. The Hong Kong Trade Union Education Center
(HKTUEC) compiled a list of 211 workers arrested in connection
with the demonstrations. According to the HKTUEC, 89 were
held on charges related only to their participation in the
autonomous federations. All of those known to have been
executed for offenses linked to the demonstrations were manual
workers.
At the ACFTU annual conference in December, its appointed
president declared that "trade unions must implement
resolutely the party's line and general and specific
policies." A senior party official, addressing the
conference, demanded that party committees at all levels
"exercise centralized leadership" over the union movement. He
explicitly ruled out the formation of independent unions:
organizations that contravene the "Four Cardinal Principles,"
put forward proposals contrary to party policy, or threaten
state stability, would be "dealt with according to the law
immediately.
"
The ACFTU claims to have contacts with trade unions in over
120 countries or regions and has stated that it will establish
links with foreign unions regardless of whether they are
affiliated with Western, Communist, or other federations.
However, its relations with the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) have been strained. China has ratified
neither ILO Convention 87 regarding Freedom of Association nor
Convention 98 on Collective Bargaining. The ICFTU vigorously
protested Chinese violation of worker rights at the ILO
Conference in Geneva shortly after the Beijing massacre. In
November, the ILO's Governing Body approved stiff detailed
questions on the death of workers during the massacre,
arrests, death sentences, and executions, and government
allegations against the WAF.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The Government does not permit collective bargaining. The
terms and conditions of employment, including wages, are
unilaterally determined through administrative regulations
which are treated as confidential material and are not
publicly available. Without legal status as a collective
bargaining body, the ACFTU' s role has been restricted to
consultation in decisionmaking on wages and wage reforms.
Trade unions have limited themselves to channeling workers'
complaints to the management of individual enterprises or
municipal labor bureaus.
Clause 33 of the "Provisional Directive on Private Enterprises
in the PRC" issued on June 3, 1988 states that trade unions in
private enterprises have the right to represent employees and
to sign collective agreements with the enterprise. Depending
on how it is implemented, this could form a basis for
important new trade union rights in China.
Under the labor contract system, which now covers
approximately 10 percent of the work force, individual workers
may negotiate with management over contract terms. In
practice, however, very few are able to negotiate effectively
on salary and fringe benefits. At its October 1988 National
Congress, the ACFTU leadership recognized that it would need
to be more responsive to worker demands for benefits and
improved safety conditions or face worker demands for a more
independent union. In reaction to the creation of the WAF,
the party began efforts to reassert control at every level of
the union structure. Thus, unions enjoy less freedom of
action than they have had for the last several years.
Labor practices in the Special Economic Zones do not vary
substantially from national practice. Although there are
reports of child laborers working in the Special Economic
Zones, the practice appears more prevalent in small
enterprises in the rural areas. Wages in the Special Economic
Zones, like those in other Chinese enterprises, are set by the
factory management in consultation with the factory Worker
Congress. In general, wages in foreign-invested joint
ventures tend to be higher than in Chinese enterprises.
Although Chinese workers still do not have complete mobility,
foreign-invested joint ventures are given greater freedom to
recruit workers than their Chinese counterparts are allowed.
Like Chinese state-run and collective enterprises, joint
ventures are required to have unions and to provide office
space and facilities for union activities.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
China is still considering ratification of ILO Convention 105
on Forced Labor. Assignment of minor offenders to punitive
"education through labor" camps without benefit of trial would
appear to violate the Convention. Prisons and labor reform
camps are expected to be partially self-supporting and thus
require productive and profitable labor, with little
compensation, from their inmates. Some observers consider the
recent directives requiring students to perform manual labor
during the school year and university graduates to work for a
year or more in "grassroots units" before pursuing careers or
graduate study as another form of compulsory labor. More
broadly, the longstanding practice of unilaterally assigning
school graduates at all levels to specific jobs and
effectively trapping them in those jobs through the worker's
dependence on the work unit deprives workers of any
significant degree of choice in employment.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Regulations promulgated in 1987 prohibit the employment of
school-age minors who have not completed the compulsory 9
years of education. The employment of child labor is
pervasive, however, particularly in the rural areas and
reportedly in the special economic zones. In addition, many
private enterprises regularly employ children, often falsely
representing them as the children of the enterprise owner.
The problem is most serious in Guangdong Province, where a
recent State Statistical Bureau survey found that only 71
percent of the province's school-age children were attending
school. As noted (Section 5), there have also been increasing
reports of children, particularly girls, being removed from
school at the age of 8 or 9 to work in the fields. In
September 1988, the Ministry of Labor issued a circular
designed to curb pervasive child labor problems. It imposes
severe fines, withdrawal of business licenses, or jail for
employers who hire child laborers under 16 years of age.
According to Ministry of Labor officials, however, the
circular cannot be fully implemented until a national
conference is convened sometime in 1990 to discuss the problem
of child labor. Guangdong has not yet promulgated any
regulations to enforce the 1987 directive.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
China has not yet adopted a labor code, and deliberations on a
draft labor law appear to have been derailed by the post-June
crackdown. There is no minimum wage in China, although
administrative regulations apparently fix the minimum at
between $9 and $13 per month. A large proportion of a
worker's income comes in the form of bonuses or subsidies
added to a basic wage rate. For example, many foreign
investors have found that basic salary costs may make up as
little as 20 to 30 percent of overall costs per employee. As
part of a comprehensive economic austerity program initiated
in late 1988, the Government is attempting to reduce the
amount of bonuses paid to workers.
The maximum and normal workweek is 48 hours, of which 3 to 12
hours are generally spent in political study or "education" on
current social issues. The time spent in political study
increased sharply in the second half of 1989, particularly in
work units whose members had been active in the spring
demonstrations.
At factories and construction sites, occupational health and
safety are constant themes of posters and campaigns. Every
work unit of any size must designate a health and safety
officer; the ILO has established a training program for these
officials. Even so, general health and safety conditions in
the workplace are extremely poor. The safety consciousness of
both workers and managers is generally very low. State
procurators deal annually with thousands of negligence and
accident cases involving criminal or civil liability. The
absence of a national labor code, however, makes enforcement
of safety regulations extremely difficult
