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Die Merkmale von PMF-Netzwerken würden über die einer traditionellen Militärorganisation hinausgehen, insbesondere in Bezug auf die Politik. PMF-Gruppen seien durch ihre eigenen politischen Parteien vertreten, die an Wahlen teilnehmen, Kabinettsminister ernennen und Beamte entsenden würden, um in leitenden Positionen im öffentlichen Dienst innerhalb des Staatsapparates zu dienen. Die PMF sei auch in lokalen Regierungen und in wichtigen nichtstaatlichen Institutionen vertreten, die an der Erbringung und Verwaltung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen beteiligt sind. Netzwerke würden oft ihre Namen ändern, wenn sie in die Politik gehen. Aus Badr-Korps sei die Badr-Organisation geworden, Asaib Ahl al-Haq habe den politischen Flügel Sadiqoun gegründet und Kataib Jund al-Imam nenne sich „Islamische Bewegung im Irak“. Trotz der Namensänderungen seien die Netzwerke weitgehend die gleichen geblieben. Einige Abgeordnete seien ehemalige oder aktuelle Kämpfer (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 20).

Die größten Wahlblöcke der nationalen Wahlen 2018 - Muqtada al-Sadrs Sairoun (Allianz zur Reform) und Hadi al-Ameris Fateh (Eroberungsallianz) - seien von PMF-Netzwerken unterstützt worden. Während Sadr oft einen gewissen Abstand zwischen Sairoun und den PMF halte, würden zu den Fateh-Kandidaten mehrere PMF-Funktionäre gehören, die (wieder) zu Politikern geworden seien. Dies ermögliche es den PMF, ihre Verbindungen zu Ministerien und Institutionen der Regierung zu stärken (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 4).

Innerhalb der 2018 gewonnenen Sitze der Fateh seien 22 Abgeordnete Badr zugehörig und 15 Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Das politische Netzwerk der PMF erstrecke sich jedoch über Fateh hinaus und umfasse andere politische Parteien, Wahllisten und Fraktionen. Fateh habe mit anderen PMF-Parlamentariern eine Allianz namens Binaa gegründet, die behaupte, der größte Block im Parlament zu seien.

Sadrs Sairoun Wahlblock gelte nicht als PMF-Netzwerk, jedoch sei Sadrs Militärnetzwerk mit den PMF verbunden (Sadr kontrolliere zwei Brigaden innerhalb der PMF-Kommission) und Sadr treffe regelmäßig hochrangige PMF-Führer und arbeite mit ihnen zusammen.

Bei den Wahlen 2018 habe Sadrs Sairoun zunächst besser als Fateh abgeschnitten, und mit 54 Abgeordneten die meisten Sitze gewonnen. Als Teil des Regierungsbildungsprozesses habe Fateh seine tatsächliche Anzahl von Sitzen jedoch von 48 auf etwa 60 erhöht, indem sie auf Personen des PMF-Netzwerks zurückgegriffen hätten, die mit anderen Parteien oder Blöcken verbunden gewesen seien. (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 21)

PMF-Netzwerke seien nicht von anderen Netzwerken des irakischen Staates zu unterscheiden. Sie würden nicht nur miteinander kooperieren und konkurrieren, sondern auch in Abstimmung mit anderen irakischen Beamten und Parteien agieren, einschließlich solcher, die ideologisch und politisch gegen die PMF zu sein scheinen. Diese Verknüpfungen und Verbindungen der Netzwerke würden es den PMF ermöglichen, in unterschiedliche Sphären der Sicherheit, Politik und Wirtschaft einzudringen (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 18).

Das am längsten bestehende Beispiel für die Kontrolle über ein Ministerium sei das von Badr kontrollierte Innenministerium. PMF-Netzwerke würden unter anderem versuchen, ihren Einfluss auf die Zentralregierung und deren Institutionen auszubauen, indem sie ihre eigenen Leute in hochrangingen Beamtenpositionen beschäftigen würden. Im November 2019 habe Naim Thajeel, der Kommunikationsminister, Idris Khalid Abdul Rahman (einen Wirtschaftsbeauftragten der Brigade 40, Kataib al-Imam Ali) als Generaldirektor des öffentlichen Unternehmens für Kommunikation und Information eingestellt. Rahman habe diese wichtige Position erworben, obwohl er nur ein Jahr in einer Juniorposition im Ministerium gearbeitet habe. Jasib Abdul Zahra, der politische Vertreter von Kataib Hezbollah in Basra, sei zum Generaldirektor der Petrochemical Industries Company im Industrieministerium ernannt worden. Im Jahr 2020 hätten Asaib Ahl al-Haq-Netzwerke die Ernennung eines ihrer Mitglieder, Hussein al-Qasid, zum Generaldirektor der Kulturabteilung des Ministeriums unterstützt. Im August 2019 habe der damalige Premierminister Adel Abd al-Mahdi, Ziyad Khalifa Khazal al-Tamimi, eine Stammesfigur aus Diyala mit engen Verbindungen zu Hadi al-Ameri und der PMF Brigade 24 als Generalinspektor im Verteidigungsministerium ernannt. (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 24)

Die PMF und die irakische Polizei

Ein Artikel von France 24 vom März 2021 gibt an, dass Mitglieder, Verbündete oder Verwandte der PMF unter anderem für die Polizei arbeiten würden (France 24, 29. März 2021).

Im oben genannten Chatham House Bericht von Renad Mansour erklärt ein Stammesführer aus Kirkuk, dass er sich bei Problemen eher an die PMF als an die Bundespolizei wende, da diese schneller reagieren und effektiver arbeiten würden (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 15).

Mansour beschreibt, dass die PMF als von der Regierung anerkannte Sicherheitskraft strategische Gebiete im Irak kontrollieren würden. Dies passiere weitgehend in Zusammenarbeit mit anderen staatlichen Sicherheitsbehörden. Die PMF würden aber manchmal auch andere staatliche Sicherheitsbehörden ersetzen und seien in einigen Gebieten der wichtigste Sicherheitsakteur, an den sich die Einheimischen wenden würden. Einige Mitglieder er PMF hätten auch Doppelpositionen. Abu Dergham al-Maturi habe beispielsweise die PMF Brigade 5 (eine Badr-Brigade) angeführt und gleichzeitig als stellvertretender Kommandeur der Bundespolizei im Innenministerium fungiert (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 19).

Entwicklungen bezüglich der Rolle und dem Einfluss der Milizen

Die folgenden Quellen enthalten Informationen zu den Aktivitäten, Einflüssen, Veränderungen und Rollen der Milizen, die über die politische Rolle und die Rolle als Sicherheitsakteur hinausgehen, mit einem Fokus auf die vergangenen zwölf Monate:

Associated Press (AP) berichtet in einem Artikel vom März 2021 von einem Konvoi maskierter schiitischer Milizsoldaten, bewaffnet mit Maschinengewehren und Granaten, die durch das Zentrum von Bagdad gefahren seien und gedroht hätten, dem Premierminister das Ohr abzuschneiden. Premierminister Mustafa al-Kadhimi habe es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, bewaffnete Gruppierungen unter staatliche Kontrolle zu bringen, doch würden laut AP Aktionen wie die genannte Prozession zeigen, dass die Milizen eine Bedrohung für den Irak darstellen und sich nicht leicht kontrollieren lassen würden. Seit dem Tod von Soleimani und al-Muhandis hätten sich die Milizen verändert. Sie würden sich in neue Gruppen unterteilen, die einzelnen Gruppen würden sich stark voneinander unterscheiden und seien noch schwerer zu kontrollieren (AP , 31. März 2021). Auch der Guardian schreibt im Oktober 2020 von einer Störung der Machtverhältnisse innerhalb der Milizen durch die Tötung von General Qassem Suleimani (The Guardian, 8. Oktober 2020).

Die Jamestown Foundation beschreibt im Oktober 2020 die bestehende Polarisierung zwischen den Fraktionen, die Grandayatollah Ali Al-Sistani folgen und solchen, die der iranischen Ideologie folgen (Jamestown Foundation, 23. Oktober 2020). Laut TRT World hätten im Dezember 2020 vier der Sistani-treuen Milizen die PMF verlassen, aus Sorge, dass der iranische Einfluss auf die PMF zu groß sei. (TRT World, 10. Dezember 2020)

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) beschreibt im Jänner 2021 einige Veränderungen innerhalb der dem Iran nahestehenden Milizen. Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) und Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HaN) hätten sich zusammengeschlossen, um gegen die westliche Militärpräsenz im Land vorzugehen. Die einzelnen Fraktionen hätten sich jedoch über individuelle Angriffe gestritten, sodass Iran sich habe einschalten müssen. (WINEP, 19. Jänner 2021)

Arab Weekly (AW) schreibt in einem Artikel vom März 2021, dass der schiitische Geistliche Moqtada Sadr, der selbst an der Spitze einer der mächtigsten Milizen Iraks stehe, bekannt gegeben habe, gegen das Waffenchaos im Land vorgehen zu wollen und Angriffe bewaffneter Fraktionen auf ausländische Streitkräfte, ihre Versorgungskonvois und das Hauptquartier der US-Botschaft in Bagdad eindämmen zu wollen. Laut Arab Weekly erwarte Sadr bei den nächsten Wahlen große Gewinne zu erzielen und habe vor, als nächsten Premierminister ein Mitglied seiner Bewegung einzusetzen. (AW, 26. März 2021)

Just Security nennt einen Anstieg von Angriffen schiitischer Milizen auf US-Ziele im Irak oder Ziele der Koalitionskräfte seit der Tötung von Qassem Soleimani und Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis Anfang 2020, wie zum Beispiel gegen die US-amerikanische Botschaft in der Grünen Zone von Bagdad und gegen irakische Lastwagen, die angeblich Vorräte für die Koalitionsstreitkräfte transportieren. Verschiedene Milizen mit neuen und unbekannten Namen würden die Verantwortung für die Angriffe übernehmen. Laut Just Security gebe es Beweise, dass diese kleinen Gruppierungen als Fassaden für größere (echte) Milizen, wie Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, und Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada agieren würden (Just Security, 10. März 2021).

Amnesty International schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht 2020 zur Situation im Irak, dass die PMF weiterhin für das Verschwindenlassen von Personen, von denen angenommen werde, dass sie mit der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) verbunden seien, verantwortlich seien. Außerdem hätten Mitglieder der PMF weiterhin Aktivist·innen getötet und entführt (AI, 7. April 2021).

Al-Monitor berichtet im März 2020, dass die PMF aktiv an Initiativen zur Eindämmung des Coronavirus beteiligt seien, unter anderem durch Sensibilisierung, Desinfektion, medizinische Hilfe und Durchsetzung der Ausgangssperre (Al-Monitor, 30. März 2020).

France 24 veröffentlicht im März 2021 einen Artikel von AFP, die bei Investigativrecherchen entlang der irakischen Grenzen ein korruptes Zollhinterziehungskartell aufgedeckt habe. Viele der Grenzpunkte würden informell von Gruppen der PMF sowie anderen bewaffneten Fraktionen kontrolliert. Mitglieder, Verbündete oder Verwandte der PMF würden als Grenzbeamte, Inspektoren oder Polizisten arbeiten und von Händlern bezahlt bekommen, um behördliche Verfahren vollständig überspringen zu können oder um Rabatte zu erhalten. (France 24, 29. März 2021)

Weitere generelle Informationen zu den schiitischen Milizen im Irak finden Sie im folgenden Themendossier von ACCORD:

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net-Themendossier zum Irak: Schiitische Milizen, 2. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2038435.html

Schutzgewährung des Staates bei Verfolgung durch Milizen

Es konnten keine Informationen zu Schutzgewährung des Staates bei Verfolgung durch Milizen gefunden werden. Gesucht wurde mittels ecoi.net, Factiva und Google auf Deutsch, Englisch und Arabisch nach einer Kombination aus folgenden Suchbegriffen: Irak, Verfolgung, Milizen, PMF, Schutz, Staat, Regierung, Polizei, sichere Unterkunft, Zeugenschutzprogramm

Die folgenden Quellen berichten über das Unvermögen der Regierung, die Milizen zu kontrollieren, sowie die Angst vor den Milizen im Land:

AP berichtet von der Hilflosigkeit der Regierung gegenüber den Aktionen der Milizen am Beispiel einer Parade von Milizionären durch Bagdad (AP, 31. März 2021).

Der Analyst Seth Frantzmann bemerkte im Juni 2020 in einem Artikel für Foreign Policy (FP), dass die Macht der lokalen Milizgruppen noch von der Regierung eingeschränkt werden müsse und dass es den letzten Premierministern zum Zeitpunkt des Schreibens nicht gelungen sei, Kontrolle über die Milizen auszuüben (FP, 16. Juni 2020).

 

The Guardian berichtet im Oktober 2020 von einem Vorfall, bei dem hunderte Mitglieder von Milizen sich in und um die grüne Zone versammelt hätten, nachdem einige Milizsoldaten Stunden zuvor von irakischen Sicherheitskräften festgenommen worden seien. Die Milizionäre seien dem Haus des Premierministers nahegekommen. Er habe vom Verteidigungsministerium Unterstützung angefordert. Diese sei nie erschienen. Am nächsten Tag seien die festgenommenen Milizsoldaten freigelassen worden (The Guardian, 8. Oktober 2020)

PBS veröffentlicht im Februar 2021 ein Interview mit der Filmemacherin Ramita Navai, die als Teil einer Dokumentation die Vorwürfe untersucht, dass die schiitischen Milizen Attentate gegen Aktivist·innen und Kritker·innen begangen hätten. Navai sei im September 2020 in den Irak gereist und habe zu Menschen vor Ort gesprochen. Sie berichtet gegenüber PBS, dass sich im Vergleich zum letzten Mal, als sie Menschen zu den Milizen interviewt hatte, die Stimmung sehr geändert habe. Die Menschen hätten Angst vor den Milizen. Es sei sehr schwierig gewesen, Personen zu finden, die bereit gewesen seien mit ihr zu sprechen. Auch schiitische Iraker hätten große Angst gehabt. Sie seien besorgt gewesen, von den Milizen überwacht und verfolgt zu werden. Auch Menschen in hohen Regierungspositionen hätten Angst gehabt. Laut Navai sei die Regierung gespaltet, in Unterstützer und Gegner der Milizen. Die letzteren würden in Angst leben (PBS, 9. Februar 2021).

Informationen zu "Blacklists" von Milizen

Es konnten keine Informationen zu "Blacklists" von Milizen gefunden werden.

Gesucht wurde mittels ecoi.net, Factiva und Google auf Deutsch, Englisch und Arabisch nach einer Kombination aus folgenden Suchbegriffen: Irak, Milizen, PMF, Blacklists, hit lists, target lists, Listen, Angriffe, Ziele, Individuen, Personen von Interesse, Tötungen, Aktivist·innen, Verfolgung

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 7. Mai 2021)

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net-Themendossier zum Irak: Schiitische Milizen, 2. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2038435.html

·      AI – Amnesty International: Iraq 2020, 7. April 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048571.html

·      Al-Monitor: Iraq’s PMU throws weight behind countering COVID-19, 30. März 2020
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/03/iraq-pmu-coronavirus-covid19.html

·      AP– Associated Press: A growing challenge for Iraq: Iran-aligned Shiite militias, 31. März 2021
https://apnews.com/article/iran-middle-east-baghdad-tehran-iraq-ebcc325e288b8dad431c713283eab70c

·      AW – Arab Weekly: Sadr offers his own militias’ help to disarm other militias in Iraq, 26. März 2021
https://thearabweekly.com/sadr-offers-his-own-militias-help-disarm-other-militias-iraq

·      Chatham House: Networks of power; The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq (Autor: Renad Mansour), Februar 2021
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf

·      France 24: 'Worse than a jungle': the cartel controlling Iraqi borders, 29. März 2021
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210329-worse-than-a-jungle-the-cartel-controlling-iraqi-borders

·      FP – Foreign Policy: Iraq’s New Prime Minister Needs to Take Control of His Security Forces, 16. Juni 2020
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/mustafa-al-kadhimi-iraq-security-forces/

·      Jamestown Foundation: Fragile Pro-Iranian Militia Ceasefire Highlights Inter-Shia Polarization, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 19, 23. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2040111.html

·      Just Security: Iraq’s Legal Responsibility for Militia Attacks on U.S. Forces: Paths Forward, 10. März 2021
https://www.justsecurity.org/75232/iraqs-legal-responsibility-for-militia-attacks-on-u-s-forces-paths-forward/

·      PBS– Public Broadcasting Service: ‘Absolute Fear’: ‘Iraq’s Assassins’ Filmmaker Ramita Navai on How Iraqis View Iran-Backed Shia Militias, 9. Februar 2021
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/filmmaker-ramita-navai-iran-backed-shia-militias-iraqs-assassins/

·      The Guardian: 'A threat from within': Iraq and the rise of its militias, 8. Oktober 2020
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/08/a-threat-from-within-iraq-and-the-rise-of-its-militias

·      TRT World: Splits emerge among Iraq’s Shia militias over closeness to Iran, 10. Dezember 2020
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/splits-emerge-among-iraq-s-shia-militias-over-closeness-to-iran-42234

·      WINEP – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Changing of the Guard: New Iraqi Militia Trends and Responses, 19. Jänner 2021
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/changing-guard-new-iraqi-militia-trends-and-responses

·      War on the Rocks: The ’Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A necessary compromise? (Autor: Renad Mansour) 21. Jänner 2021
https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-hybrid-armed-actors-paradox-a-necessary-compromise/

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Al-Monitor ist eine auf Berichterstattung zum Nahen Osten spezialisierte Medienplattform.

·      Al-Monitor: Iraq’s PMU throws weight behind countering COVID-19, 30. März 2020
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/03/iraq-pmu-coronavirus-covid19.html

„Iraq formed a national panel, headed by Health Minister Jaafar Allawi and including the interior and defense ministers, to unify all efforts in confronting the coronavirus.

In this context, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) is also pitching in. The umbrella military organization comprises dozens of predominantly Shiite militia groups, many backed by Iran. PMU involvement in the coronavirus initiative is being organized and overseen by the PMU Committee, led by Falih al-Fayyadh. The Prime Minister, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, supervises the committee. Almost all PMU factions have been assisting the government plans in fighting the virus. […]

The coronavirus provides the PMU an opportunity to step up as nationalists. The PMU said March 26 it had sanitized more than 2,000 sites. It has provided several field hospitals in the provinces of Dhi Qar, Babel, Karbala and Salahuddin.

This is part of the PMU plan, announced Feb. 26, to raise awareness about COVID-19 and counter the pandemic in Iraq. The plan first aims to protect the organization itself, and then the Iraqi public. The campaign, which officially started March 5, led by the PMU’s medical department, undertakes advocacy, sanitization and medical assistance, in cooperation with civil and state institutions, mainly the ministries of Health and Education.

The PMU also moved to assist the Iraqi government in enforcing the curfew across the country.“ (Al-Monitor, 30. März 2020)

Amnesty International (AI) ist eine internationale regierungsunabhängige Menschenrechtsorganisation mit Hauptsitz in London.

·      AI – Amnesty International: Iraq 2020, 7. April 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048571.html

„IDPs with perceived ties to the armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS) continued to be subjected to collective punishment and remained at risk of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. Thousands of others remained missing after being subjected to enforced disappearance by Iraqi security forces – including the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) – while fleeing IS-held territories. […]

Throughout the year, unknown gunmen and PMU members targeted activists for assassination or abduction, killing at least 30 in Baghdad, Nasriya and Basra. Attempts were made on the lives of more than 30 others, who escaped with injuries. By the end of the year, 56 activists had been subjected to enforced disappearance. Those subjected to enforced disappearance during the 2019 protests remained missing, including human rights lawyer Ali Jaseb Hattab, who was abducted by PMU members in the southern city of Amarah on 8 October 2019.“ (AI, 7. April 2021)

Die Associated Press (AP) ist eine internationale Nachrichten- und Presseagentur mit Hauptsitz in New York City.

·      AP– Associated Press: A growing challenge for Iraq: Iran-aligned Shiite militias, 31. März 2021
https://apnews.com/article/iran-middle-east-baghdad-tehran-iraq-ebcc325e288b8dad431c713283eab70c

„It was a stark message: A convoy of masked Shiite militiamen, armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, drove openly through central Baghdad denouncing the U.S. presence in Iraq and threatening to cut off the prime minister’s ear.

The ominous display underscored the growing threat that rogue militias loyal to Tehran pose for Iraq. […]

Last week’s procession also sought to undermine Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s credibility, with Iran-aligned militias driving down a major highway and passing near ministries as Iraqi security forces looked on. Ahead of a new round of talks between the U.S. government and Iraq, it sent a stark warning that the militias will not be curbed. […]

It is a tightrope for al-Kadhimi, who has said that bringing armed groups under state control is a goal of his administration but finds himself increasingly helpless in reining in the groups. […]

Both Soleimani and al-Muhandis were key in commanding and controlling a wide array of Iran-backed groups operating in Iraq, and their deaths in the U.S. airstrike outraged Iraqi lawmakers, prompting them to approve a non-binding resolution to oust U.S.-led coalition forces from the country.

Since then, militias have also become increasingly unruly and disparate. Some Washington and Iraq-based observers argue the militias have splintered into new, previously unknown groups, allowing them to claim attacks under different names to mask the extent of their involvement.“ (AP, 31. März 2021)

Arab Weekly (AW) ist eine in Großbritannien, den USA und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten erscheinende Wochenzeitung.

·      AW – Arab Weekly: Sadr offers his own militias’ help to disarm other militias in Iraq, 26. März 2021
https://thearabweekly.com/sadr-offers-his-own-militias-help-disarm-other-militias-iraq

„Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr is increasingly wanting to appear as a statesman while his political ambitions to hold the reins of the executive authority in the country are growing. […]

Iraq is meant to hold earlier parliamentary elections this year, a central demand of an anti-government protest movement which erupted in 2019 and involved Sadr’s supporters.

The elections will be taking place under a new electoral law that has reduced the size of constituencies and eliminated list-based voting in favour of votes for individual candidates.

Sadr’s supporters are expected to make major gains under the new system.

In November, Sadr said he would push for the next prime minister to be a member of his movement for the first time.

With eyes on the executive authority, the Shia cleric has been calling recently for control of the weapons’ chaos in the country so as to curb attacks by armed factions on foreign forces, their supply convoys and the headquarters of the US embassy in Baghdad.

Sadr’s calls come even though the Shia cleric himself is at the head of the most powerful militias in Iraq, the Peace Brigades, which are seen as a heir to the Mahdi Army militia that had previously led an offensive against government forces under the rule of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.“ (AW, 26. März 2021)

Chatham House ist eine britische Denkfabrik, die sich mit internationalen politischen Themen befasst.

·      Chatham House: Networks of power; The Popular Mobilization Forces and the state in Iraq (Autor: Renad Mansour), Februar 2021
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf

„Despite efforts from its senior leaders, the PMF [Popular Mobilization Forces] is not a coherent, integrated organization. Instead, it remains a series of fluid and adaptive networks that vary in horizontal (leadership coherence) and vertical (ties to a social base) structure. […]

PMF networks enjoy a symbiotic relationship with Iraq’s security services, political parties and economy. Their members include not only fighters, but also parliamentarians, cabinet ministers, local governors, provincial council members, business figures in both public and private companies, senior civil servants, humanitarian organizations and civilians. […]

PMF networks enjoy state power – they are integrated into Iraqi politics and control a social base – but they do not necessarily always sit in a formal government.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 2)

„Following the fight against ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], PMF networks converted battlefield successes into ballot-box victories. The largest electoral blocs of the 2018 national elections – Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoun (Alliance Towards Reform) and Hadi al-Ameri’s Fateh (Conquest Alliance) – both drew support from PMF networks. While Sadr often maintained some distance between Sairoun and the PMF, Fateh candidates included several PMF officials turned (or returned) politicians. These electoral victories allowed the PMF to strengthen their connections to government ministries and institutions. The PMF also amassed an economic empire, working and competing with other Iraqi political parties to generate revenue from state coffers as well as from checkpoints, customs and other parts of the so-called ‘informal economy’.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 4)

„Even those who are not part of the social base tend to go through the PMF networks for expediency and to avoid government red tape. A tribal leader, who was critical of the PMF networks for blackmailing residents in his province of Kirkuk, acknowledged that if he encountered any trouble, his first resort was to go to the PMF. He found them quicker to respond and more effective because they were from the local area, unlike the federal police, who included officers from all over the country. A resident from Baghdad, who the PMF had kidnapped and later released, acknowledged that in most cases working closely with PMF parties, companies, economic committees or leaders meant that ‘loans can be obtained’ and ‘projects will not be obstructed or rejected’. Most interviewees – whether pro- or anti-PMF – agreed that its networks were key to delivering or facilitating public services.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 15)

„PMF networks have become indistinguishable from other networks that make up the Iraqi state. Not only do they cooperate and compete with each other, but they do so in coordination with other Iraqi officials and parties – including those who might on the surface appear to be ideologically or politically opposed to the PMF. The interlinkages and connections of its networks allow the PMF to permeate different security, political and economic spaces.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 18)

„As a government-recognized security force, its members are in control of significant territory and strategic areas of Iraq, largely in cooperation with other state security authorities; sometimes, however, the PMF takes advantage of its position in control of local terrain to advance its own interests, including financially. It cooperates with and props up other security institutions, but also sometimes acts to fill in gaps or substitute where there are deficits in the state security space. In some areas, the PMF is the main security actor, which locals turn to when they need protection or an advocate in disputes or law enforcement, as discussed later. […]

Some network members are double-hatted, enjoying a position in the PMF and another position in a government security institution. According to security analysts, several PMF-affiliated members enjoy senior civil service positions – special grades (al-darajat al-khasa) – in the National Security Council (NSC). Other leaders have led PMF brigades while also holding a government job outside the NSC. At one point, for instance, Abu Dergham al-Maturi led PMF Brigade 5 (a Badr brigade) while also serving as deputy commander of the federal police inside the Ministry of Interior. PMF networks are also heavily involved with the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). The Commander of Operations in Kirkuk is Brigadier Saad Harbiya, who works closely with Badr (Brigade 16) in Kirkuk. In Diyala, similarly, the ISF in the governorate is led by either Badr members or other members from the PMF networks. In the Green Zone, Commander of the Special Squad Lieutenant General Tahseen al-Aboudi (Abu Munthadhar al-Husseini) had been a member of Badr for decades.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 19)

„The characteristics of PMF networks go beyond that of a traditional military organization, particularly in regard to politics. Formally, PMF groups are represented through their own political parties that compete in elections, appoint cabinet ministers and send proxies to serve in senior civil service positions across the government and its institutions. The PMF is also present in local governments, and in key non-government institutions involved in public service delivery and governance. […]

When the Badr Corps decided to enter politics, its name changed to the Badr Organization. In the lead-up to the 2014 elections, AAH established Sadiqoun as its political wing with members in parliament. However, its political leader, Qais al-Khazali, also led its armed group. Similarly, Kataib Jund al-Imam’s political name is the Islamic Movement in Iraq. However, although the names have changed, the networks have largely remained the same. A senior PMF leader told the author that after the fight against ISIS and in the lead-up to the 2018 elections, he switched from army fatigues to suits, since he was returning to politics. Moreover, several MPs [Members of Parliament] are former or even current fighters. Several of Sadr’s Sairoun MPs are former Mahdi Army fighters, such as Mudhafar Ismail al-Fadhil, who was in prison for murder but was released in 2018 and joined Sairoun. Ahmad al-Asadi and Qais al-Khazali are also MPs who would return to the battlefield when needed.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 20)

„With support from the large social bases of its parochial networks, Fateh candidates were elected as MPs. Within this figure, Badr maintained its 22 seats that it won in the 2014 election; AAH [Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq] increased its representation from one MP in 2014 to 15 MPs in 2018. Table 1 shows the seats won by the Fateh Alliance. The Fateh seats and other PMF parliamentary seats make up the Ameri-led Binaa alliance, which claims to be the largest bloc in parliament. The PMF’s political network stretches beyond Fateh and includes other political parties, electoral lists and parliamentary groupings that make up the Iraqi state. […]

In the 2018 election, Sadr’s Sairoun electoral bloc initially performed better than Fateh, winning the most seats with 54 MPs. Sairoun was primarily composed of the Sadrist movement, known as the al-Istiqama Party, with only a couple of seats going to its allied Iraqi Communist Party and the Republican Party. Sadr then formed the Islah parliamentary bloc, which was led by Sairoun and included the Victory Alliance, National Wisdom Party, and other groups. While Sairoun is not considered a PMF network, Sadr’s parochial military network is connected to the PMF, both inside the PMF Commission, where he controls two brigades, and outside it, where he regularly meets and works with PMF senior leaders. In the span of one week in September 2018, as the government formation process was finalizing, Fateh increased its de facto number of seats from 48 to around 60. It gained these seats by tapping into individuals in its networks who were affiliated with other parties or blocs.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 21)

„PMF networks seek to expand their influence in central government and its institutions and to build patronage networks by employing their own people in public sector jobs. The longest-serving example of control over a ministry is that of Badr in the Ministry of Interior. […]

Having significantly increased their political power in the 2018 election, PMF parochial networks sought to increase their representation across senior state bureaucratic institutions. In November 2019, the Minister of Communications Naim Thajeel hired Idris Khalid Abdul Rahman (an economic officer for Brigade 40, Kataib al-Imam Ali), as director-general of the Public Enterprise for Communication and Information. Rahman acquired this major position despite having only served one year in a junior position in the ministry. Jasib Abdul Zahra, the political representative of KH [Kata’ib Hezbollah] in Basra, was appointed director-general of the Petrochemical Industries Company within the Ministry of Industry. In 2020, AAH networks supported the appointment of Hussein al-Qasid as director-general of the cultural department at the ministry; Qasid was a university lecturer and also a member of the Iraqi Writers’ Union and of AAH since 2016. In August 2019, the then prime minister, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, appointed Ziyad Khalifa Khazal al-Tamimi, a tribal figure from Diyala with close connections to Hadi al-Ameri and PMF Brigade 24, as inspector general at the Ministry of Defense.“ (Chatham House, Februar 2021, S. 24)

France 24 ist das französische Auslandsfernsehen.

·      France 24: 'Worse than a jungle': the cartel controlling Iraqi borders, 29. März 2021
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210329-worse-than-a-jungle-the-cartel-controlling-iraqi-borders

„Along Iraq's borders, a corrupt customs-evasion cartel is diverting billions of dollars away from state coffers to line the pockets of armed groups, political parties and crooked officials.

The prime beneficiaries are Iran-linked Shiite paramilitaries that intimidate federal officials who dare obstruct them, sometimes through chillingly specific death threats, a six-month AFP investigation has found. […]

Many of Iraq's entry points are informally controlled by groups within the Hashed al-Shaabi, a powerful state-sponsored armed network close to Iran, as well as other armed factions, officials confirmed to AFP.

The Hashed's members, their allies or their relatives work as border agents, inspectors or police, and are paid by importers who want to skip the official process entirely or get discounts.“ (France 24, 29. März 2021)

Foreign Policy (FP) ist eine in den USA erscheinende Zeitschrift, die sich der Außenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten sowie internationalen Themen widmet.

·      FP – Foreign Policy: Iraq’s New Prime Minister Needs to Take Control of His Security Forces, 16. Juni 2020
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/mustafa-al-kadhimi-iraq-security-forces/

„But the inability of recent prime ministers to work within this system and exercise any meaningful control over paramilitary groups has completely undermined the state’s legitimacy, strengthened the local and national power of militia groups, and ensured that the government could not exert control when order broke down.

Reinstalling Saadi as counterterrorism chief and releasing protesters from prison will help to placate the public, but Kadhimi will need to curtail the power of local militia groups in order to bring a more lasting sense of stability to Iraq. This means exerting control over the PMU [Popular Mobilization Units] by replacing the multilayered leadership structure that currently exists with a more formalized hierarchy whose authority ultimately flows from the state. In addition to giving the government tighter control over militias, this would also help to identify and isolate those elements that continue to give their allegiance to groups other than the state.“ (FP, 16. Juni 2020)

Die Jamestown Foundation ist eine Denkfabrik mit Sitz in Washington, D.C, deren Ziel es ist, politischen Entscheidungsträgern Informationen über außenpolitische Entwicklungen zur Verfügung zu stellen, die für die Vereinigten Staaten von strategischer oder taktischer Bedeutung sind.

·      Jamestown Foundation: Fragile Pro-Iranian Militia Ceasefire Highlights Inter-Shia Polarization, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 19, 23. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2040111.html

„The more Kadhimi succeeds in regaining control of the security environment, the more the country’s inter-Shia polarization becomes apparent. The Iraqi Shia militias are largely divided between supporters of the Najaf clergy headed by Sistani and those adhering to the Iranian Wilayat al-Fiqh (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) ideology (Rudaw, June 10). Whereas the former has taken a broadly quietist approach to politics, the latter is inherently interventionist. KH [Kata’ib Hezbollah] and others consider the Supreme Leader of Iran to be the highest political and religious authority and thus seek to serve the interests of Tehran. With Kadhimi winning the support of important Shia voices and facilitating the defection of Sistani-aligned militias under direct Iraqi government control, the pro-Iranian camp has grown increasingly insecure. Following his support for elections, Sistani was attacked by an Iranian cleric close to the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei (al-Quds, October 3). Similarly, pro-Iranian militias began to talk about betrayal (Al-Monitor, September 28).“ (Jamestown Foundation, 23. Oktober 2020)

Just Security ist ein Online-Forum an der New York University School of Law, spezialisiert auf die Analyse von US Sicherheitsrecht.

·      Just Security: Iraq’s Legal Responsibility for Militia Attacks on U.S. Forces: Paths Forward, 10. März 2021
https://www.justsecurity.org/75232/iraqs-legal-responsibility-for-militia-attacks-on-u-s-forces-paths-forward/

„In the space of less than a month, coalition forces in Iraq have endured four separate rocket barrages. These attacks have killed and wounded coalition personnel and Iraqi civilians. Meanwhile, a campaign of bombings targeting Iraqi trucks – alleged to be carrying supplies to the coalition – has increased in intensity, while larger Iraqi militias have apparently launched attacks on Saudi Arabia in potential coordination with Yemen’s Houthis. All of these attacks were carried out by Iraq’s Iranian-backed militias – which collectively refer to themselves as “al-muqawama al-islamiyya” (Islamic Resistance). […]

The attacks – though becoming more frequent – are the latest in a spiral of violence since 2019. The violence greatly intensified in early 2020 after the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. But in October, Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH, one of the most powerful Iran-backed groups) announced a ceasefire (widely understood to have been imposed by Iran), which led to a fall in rocket attacks. Not all militias supported this ceasefire: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), another prominent militia, made clear its opposition, and occasional rocket attacks continued to occur throughout the period (leading to fierce criticism from KH leaders, and online spats between militia online influencers).

Increasingly, the militias – though themselves Iranian proxies – also operate their own proxies of a sort: “facade groups” that exist on paper to claim responsibility for controversial actions and to obfuscate attribution. A host of new groups have emerged over the last twelve months to claim attacks (mostly through online statements), only to disappear and be replaced by a new name. Their organizational titles have included Usbat al-Tha’ireen (“League of the Revolutionaries,” which claimed early attacks, including a lethal attack on Taji in March 2020), Ashab al-Kahf (“People of the Cave,” which has claimed numerous convoy strikes, along with a rocket attack on the U.S. embassy in November), Saraya al-Awliya al-Dam (“Companies of the Guardians of Blood,” which claimed the Erbil attack in February), “Qasim al-Jabbarin” (“Defeaters of Arrogance,” which also frequently claims convoy attacks), and al-Liwa Wa’ad Al-Haq (“True Pledge Brigades,” which claims attacks on Saudi Arabia). These groups, and others like them, exist to muddy attribution, slow adversaries’ decision making, and introduce enough uncertainty to make effective reaction difficult. Plenty of evidence exists in both open and closed source that proves them to be mere facades, acting as fronts for larger (real) militia such as KH, AAH, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HN), and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS).“ (Just Security, 10. März 2021)

Der Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) ist eine nichtkommerzielle TV-Senderkette in den USA.

·      PBS – Public Broadcasting Service: ‘Absolute Fear’: ‘Iraq’s Assassins’ Filmmaker Ramita Navai on How Iraqis View Iran-Backed Shia Militias, 9. Februar 2021
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/filmmaker-ramita-navai-iran-backed-shia-militias-iraqs-assassins/

„Ramita Navai has been reporting for years on the rise of Shia militias in Iraq, their links to Iran and allegations of abuses carried out against Sunni civilians. In her latest documentary for FRONTLINE, Iraq’s Assassins, Navai investigates accusations that these militias have unleashed a wave of assassinations against activists and critics. In the runup to the film’s February 9 premiere, FRONTLINE spoke with Navai about her past reporting and what had changed when she returned to Iraq in September 2020.

What she found surprised her: ‘When I first covered [the militias], even though we were exposing Shia militia abuses, they were still very much seen as heroes, especially by the Shia population,’ Navai said. ‘That has completely changed.’ She says she wasn’t expecting ‘how, in these few years, they’re now viewed with absolute fear and they’re viewed as villains. They’re no longer seen as the heroes they once were.’ […]

It’s clear in the film that people were afraid to talk to you about the militias. How did you find people who were willing to speak? And if it’s safe, can you share anything you heard from people who weren’t willing to speak on camera?

This was an extraordinary change since I reported on Shia militias in 2016. In 2016, Iraqis were absolutely willing to talk about [Shia militias]. They were scared to talk about their abuses, but you could get a Shia Iraqi to talk about the militias, and we did. This time, what struck me was just how scared Shia Iraqis were to talk about the militias. We expected that from Sunni Iraqis but not from Shia Iraqis, to the extent that we saw on the ground. People were absolutely terrified, so it was really, really difficult.

Even arranging to meet people in the first place, people were really paranoid of being monitored by the militias, of being followed by them, of them being associated with us — because, of course, we told everybody on the ground what we were doing, because they had to make that decision for themselves. […]

What surprised us [was] people in high positions in government were really scared. This showed you that there’s an absolute split within the government itself. The members of the government are split between those who are in bed with the militias — because the militias are pretty entrenched in government; they’ve embedded themselves in government — and those members of government who are against the militias. The ones who are against the militias are the ones who are really scared.“ (PBS, 9. Februar 2021)

The Guardian ist eine britische Tageszeitung.

·      The Guardian: 'A threat from within': Iraq and the rise of its militias, 8. Oktober 2020
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/08/a-threat-from-within-iraq-and-the-rise-of-its-militias

„In January this year he was killed in the same US drone strike that took out Iran’s top military commander, General Qassem Suleimani. By the time of his death the militias under his command, acting at the behest of Iran, were at the heart of the Iraqi establishment. In killing him, the US disrupted a fiendishly complicated set of power relations. It is on Iraqi soil, and not in Iran, that many fear the impact of the strike will be felt in the long term. […]

He said Kadhimi believed that any direct confrontation with the factions was dangerous and could have serious political and security repercussions, with no guaranteed positive outcome.

He pointed to a raid in June on a militia cell in south Baghdad as an example. A unit from the counter-terrorism force raided a farmhouse and detained a group of Iraqi and Lebanese militiamen, accusing them of planning to fire a barrage of Katyusha rockets at the heavily fortified Green Zone. The same night, hundreds of members of the militia gathered on the streets in a show of force, while others moved on the strategic targets in the Green Zone. The next day the men were released.

‘They sent a strong message to the prime minister, by coming close to his house, and he found himself alone,’ the government official said. ’The units he requested from the minister of defence never arrived. In a way the factions exposed their cards, showing the major positions they hold within the Green Zone and how will they react in any future confrontation.’

Kadhimi’s strategy, according to the official, is based on strengthening the army by advancing young officers, expanding the power of the counter-terrorism force and exploiting the rift between the pro-Sistani forces and the loyalist factions.“ (The Guardian, 8. Oktober 2020)

TRT World ist ein türkischer regierungsnaher Nachrichtensender, der in englischer Sprache sendet.

·      TRT World: Splits emerge among Iraq’s Shia militias over closeness to Iran, 10. Dezember 2020
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/splits-emerge-among-iraq-s-shia-militias-over-closeness-to-iran-42234

„Four armed groups loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have broken away from the Popular Mobilisation Forces over concerns that Iran wields disproportionate influence over the umbrella group of militias.

Forces loyal to Iraq’s most senior cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, are breaking away from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) amid tensions between rival Shia militias over Iran’s influence on the umbrella group.“ (TRT World, 10. Dezember 2020)

War on the Rocks ist eine Plattform mit Analysen und Kommentaren zu den Themen Sicherheit und Militär, die von einem Netzwerk von Experten auf unterschiedlichen Gebieten zu Verfügung gestellt werden.

·      War on the Rocks: The ’Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A necessary compromise? (Autor: Renad Mansour) 21. Jänner 2021
https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-hybrid-armed-actors-paradox-a-necessary-compromise/

„Kadhimi the most pro-American prime minister since 2003. Kadhimi, too, wants to see an end to such armed groups, which, over the summer of 2020, directly threatened him by sending fighters to his front gate. These groups also consider the prime minister pro-American. […]

In the everyday practices of politics and economics in Iraq, PMF groups are indistinguishable from Iraqi state actors across the spectrum. They take on the same mundane practices of a state. They compete for representation in the government. They work with formal government officials to generate revenue in the ’formal‘ and ’informal‘ economies. This reality complicates any attempt to split all these actors into state, non-state, and hybrid categories. Far from monolithic organizations, many of these actors are better understood as networks of state power, which I analyze in an upcoming Chatham House paper entitled ‘Networks of Power: The Popular Mobilization Forces and the State in Iraq’.“ (War on the Rocks, 21. Jänner 2021)

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) ist eine US-amerikanische Denkfabrik für Entwicklung von US-Strategien für und Engagement im Nahen Osten.

·      WINEP – The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Changing of the Guard: New Iraqi Militia Trends and Responses, 19. Jänner 2021
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/changing-guard-new-iraqi-militia-trends-and-responses

„In the year since their most iconic leaders were killed, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have been changing in crucial ways, providing rich insights into how Baghdad and its international partners should approach them in 2021. […]

Even so, this period provides a powerful lens into the trajectory of the country’s Iran-backed militias, with the top groups arguing internally over attacks that ranged from massage parlors to American diplomatic facilities, eventually spurring Tehran to intervene and knock heads together. The contours of a new, less kinetic militia strategy may be coming into view, presenting new challenges for the Biden administration and Iraq’s other Western partners.

Detailed scouring of militia activities, social media posts, and public statements provides a good overview of the rapidly evolving muqawama, the groups that wage self-styled “resistance” against the Western military presence in Iraq. Anti-Western militancy is increasingly undertaken by the Tansiqiya, a coordination committee made up of the three main players: Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HaN). Since shortly after Soleimani and Muhandis were killed by a U.S. strike last January, these groups have sought to dominate public and online spaces in Iraq, maintaining cohesion through a loose coordination mechanism.

They have also argued with each other, however—about KH’s November attacks on massage parlors in Baghdad under the banner of the Raba Allah street vigilantes, and about the “conditional truce” that KH spokesman Muhammad Mohi announced with the United States on October 10. This briefly created a schism between the core groups. (WINEP, 19. Jänner 2021)