5. Juni 2026

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Allgemeine Informationen zur Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit bei palästinensischen Flüchtlingen

Anzahl der palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, denen die Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt wurde (Zeitraum 2025/26, in den vergangenen fünf Jahren, jährlich, insgesamt)

Willkürlichkeit der Aberkennung

Merkmale von Personen(gruppen), die ausschließlich oder gehäuft von Aberkennungen betroffen/davon gefährdet sind

Details zum Aberkennungsverfahren, Existenz von wirkungsvollen Rechtschutzmöglichkeiten

Konsequenzen für Personen, denen die Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt wurde (rechtlich, faktisch, praktisch)

Quellen

Anhang

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Bitte beachten Sie, dass sich viele der online gefundenen Quellen teils oder vollständig auf einen Bericht von Human Rights Watch (HRW) über die Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit aus dem Jahr 2010 beziehen. Aktuellere Informationen liegen nur in begrenztem Umfang vor. Es konnten jedoch auch keine Hinweise auf jüngere Änderungen der beschriebenen Praxis gefunden werden.

Allgemeine Informationen zur Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit bei palästinensischen Flüchtlingen

The Cairo Review of Global Affairs führt in einem Essay vom April 2025 aus, dass der Prozess der Aberkennung der Staatsbürgerschaft bestimmter Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft begonnen habe, als König Hussein 1988 die administrativen und rechtlichen Beziehungen zum Westjordanland beendet habe (The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 22. April 2025; siehe auch: PRC, 11. September 2012).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) erklärt in seinem Bericht aus 2010, dass König Hussein in einer Rede vom 31. Juli 1988 die Beendigung der Verbindungen Jordaniens zum Westjordanland verkündet habe. Zwei Tage zuvor habe das Innenministerium Anweisungen dazu in Form von 22 Artikeln herausgegeben. Artikel 2 dieser Anweisungen sehe den Entzug der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft für Bewohner·innen des Westjordanlandes vor. Demnach gelte jede Person, die sich vor dem 31. Juli 1988 im Westjordanland aufgehalten habe, als palästinensische·r und nicht als jordanische·r Staatsbürger·in. König Hussein habe in seiner Rede betont, dass dies nicht jordanische Staatsbürger·innen palästinensischer Herkunft in Jordanien betreffe (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 17; siehe auch: Frost, Februar 2022, S. 26–32; Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020; The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016).

Das Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) schreibt im September 2012, die oben genannte Rede König Husseins habe keine Gesetzeskraft besessen. Dennoch seien ihr Rechtsanweisungen („legal instructions“) gefolgt, die die niedrigste Ebene des jordanischen Rechts darstellen würden. Daraufhin hätten Beamt·innen des Innenministeriums „geheime Auslegungen“ vorgenommen, um festzulegen, wie die Entscheidung des Königs umzusetzen sei (PRC, 11. September 2012).

Das Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (BADIL) veröffentlichte im Herbst 2012 ein Interview mit Anis F. Kassim, einem palästinensischen Juristen aus Jordanien. Kassim zufolge gebe es in Jordanien ein Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz, das die Aberkennung der Staatsbürgerschaft regle. Die gesetzlich vorgesehenen Verfahren würden jedoch vollständig missachtet, wenn Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt werde. Es sei nie eine Richtlinie oder ein Gesetz, das sich mit der Aberkennung befasse, veröffentlicht worden. Gleichzeitig habe die Abteilung für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion in den Jahren vor 2012 ihren Zuständigkeitsbereich bei der Auslegung der Regierungsverordnungen von 1988 zur Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft von Palästinenser·innen erweitert (BADIL, Herbst 2012; siehe auch: Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020; Frost, 2022, S. 26–32).

Anzahl der palästinensischen Flüchtlinge, denen die Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt wurde (Zeitraum 2025/26, in den vergangenen fünf Jahren, jährlich, insgesamt)

Es konnten im Rahmen der Recherche keine aktuellen Informationen über die Anzahl der Aberkennungen gefunden werden.

Ghantous und Eller von der Boston University School of Law halten im März 2021 fest, dass die genaue Zahl der Aberkennungen unklar sei, da keine offiziellen Angaben veröffentlicht würden. Schätzungen reichten von Hunderten bis zu Zehntausenden Fällen (Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58; siehe auch: Frost, 2022, S. 26–32; BADIL, Herbst 2012).

Al-Araby Al-Jadeed (The New Arab), ein 2014 in London gegründetes Medienunternehmen, schreibt in einem zuletzt im Juni 2020 aktualisierten Artikel, dass es beim jordanischen Innenministerium angefragt habe, um die Zahl der Bürger·innen zu erfahren, denen die jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen worden sei. Eine Antwort habe das Medienunternehmen jedoch nicht erhalten (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020).

Das US Department of State (USDOS) schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht 2021, dass dem Hilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen für Palästina-Flüchtlinge im Nahen Osten (UNRWA) seit Beginn des Syrienkonflikts im Jahr 2011 mindestens 50 Fälle bekannt seien, in denen palästinensischen Flüchtlingen aus Syrien mit jordanischer Staatsbürgerschaft diese entzogen worden sei (USDOS, 12. April 2022, section 2f).

HRW zufolge hätten jordanische Beamt·innen Statistiken veröffentlicht, die darauf hindeuten würden, dass Tausenden von Personen die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei. Offizielle Statistiken der Abteilung für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion würden zeigen, dass 2.732 Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft zwischen 2004 und 2008 auf Grundlage der Anweisungen zum Truppenabzug ihre Staatsbürgerschaft verloren hätten. Laut lokalen Medienberichten habe es im ersten Halbjahr 2008 352 Aberkennungen gegeben. Zwischen dem 1. März und dem 30. Juni 2009 seien 190 gelbe Karten[1] durch grüne Karten ersetzt worden, was zum Verlust der Staatsbürgerschaft führe. Ein im Juni 2009 veröffentlichter Artikel von Fact International Jordan enthalte Interviews mit Beamt·innen der Abteilungen für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion sowie für Personenstandswesen und Pässe des Innenministeriums. Den Interviewten zufolge würden die Fälle von 300.000 Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft noch überprüft (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 26–28).

The New Arab berichtet in einem Artikel vom April 2018, dass laut Menschenrechtsgruppen Tausenden Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft im vorangegangenen Jahrzehnt willkürlich die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei (The New Arab, 26. April 2018; siehe auch: Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 14–15).

Willkürlichkeit der Aberkennung

Freedom House schreibt 2025, dass jordanische Staatsbürger·innen palästinensischer Herkunft dem Risiko einer willkürlichen Aberkennung ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft ausgesetzt seien (Freedom House, 2025, F4).

Das Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) zitiert im Oktober 2024 einen Programmmanager für den Nahen Osten und Nordafrika beim European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Diesem zufolge hätten seit 2004 zunehmende Fälle willkürlicher rechtlicher Verfahren sowie undurchsichtiger Richtlinien, mit denen jordanische Behörden palästinensischen Flüchtlingen zuvor gewährte Dokumente und Rechte entzogen hätten – darunter auch Personen mit „voller jordanischer Staatsbürgerschaft“ –, zur Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft von Tausenden palästinensischen Jordanier·innen geführt (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 2.2).

Lillian Frost, Assistenzprofessorin am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Virginia Tech, führt in einem Bericht über jordanisches Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht vom Februar 2022 aus, dass seit 1988 zahlreiche Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Abstammung ihre Staatsangehörigkeit aus Gründen verloren hätten, die weder im Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz noch in den Bestimmungen zur Trennung Jordaniens vom Westjordanland genannt seien. Einige jordanische Beamt·innen hätten die Trennung in Bezug auf die palästinensische Abstammung aus dem Westjordanland und nicht auf den Wohnsitz im Westjordanland ausgelegt und damit ihren Anwendungsbereich erweitert (Frost, 2022, S. 26–32).

Von Al-Araby Al-Jadeed interviewte Expert·innen merken gegenüber dem Medienunternehmen an, dass die Anweisungen und Auslegungen der Entscheidung zum Entzug der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft für palästinensische Staatsbürger·innen uneindeutig seien. Laut Anwalt Anis Qassem habe die jordanische Regierung geheime Regelungen erlassen, die nicht im Amtsblatt veröffentlicht und der Öffentlichkeit nicht bekannt gemacht worden seien. Der Artikel schildert den Fall einer Familie, in dem dem Mann und infolgedessen auch seinen Kindern die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei. Als Begründung sei angeführt worden, der Mann habe sich 1988 im Westjordanland aufgehalten. Nach Angaben seiner Ehefrau habe er Jordanien jedoch seit 1979 nicht verlassen (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020).

Das PRC zitiert 2012 den Experten Bassam Badareen, der zahlreiche Fälle von Palästinenser·innen in Jordanien dokumentiert habe, denen die jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft willkürlich entzogen worden sei. Der Artikel nennt den Fall eines Mannes, der 1988 in der jordanischen Armee gedient und nie im Westjordanland gelebt habe. Dennoch sei ihm die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden (PRC, 11. September 2012).

Anis F. Kassim erklärt in seinem Interview mit BADIL, dass ursprünglich der 31. Juli 1988 als Stichtag gegolten habe. Personen, die sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Westjordanland befunden und eine grüne Karte besessen hätten, hätten ihre Staatsbürgerschaft verloren. Seitdem hätten die Behörden die Aberkennung jedoch auch auf andere Personengruppen ausgeweitet. In der Zeit vor dem Interview sei vielen Palästinenser·innen mit gelber Karte die Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen worden. Zudem seien etwa Palästinenser·innen, die sich als Wähler·innen für die jordanischen Parlamentswahlen im November 2010 registrieren lassen wollten, ihre nationalen Nummern[2] aberkannt worden. Kassim zufolge gebe es Beschäftigte der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde mit jordanischen Personalausweisnummern, während anderen die Staatsbürgerschaft mit der Begründung entzogen worden sei, sie hätten für ein Unternehmen oder eine zivile Einrichtung der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde gearbeitet. Aus diesen und weiteren Beispielen schließe Kassim, dass es so wirke, dass die Aberkennungen willkürlich erfolgten (BADIL, Herbst 2012).

HRW berichtet 2010, dass die betroffenen Personen in allen von HRW geprüften Fällen zum Zeitpunkt des Truppenabzugs 1988 nicht im Westjordanland ansässig gewesen seien. Seit den 1990er Jahren sei Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft die Staatsangehörigkeit entzogen worden; die Zahlen stimmten jedoch weder mit der Zahl der in Jordanien lebenden Inhaber·innen grüner Karten noch mit jener der nach 1988 eingewanderten Jordanier·innen palästinensischer Herkunft überein. HRW zufolge deute dies darauf hin, dass der Entzug der Staatsbürgerschaft sehr selektiv angewandt werde. Ein erkennbares Muster bei der Auswahl lasse sich nicht feststellen. Ein weiteres willkürliches Merkmal sei, dass in mehreren Fällen nur einzelnen Familienmitgliedern die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei, obwohl sich alle Angehörigen derselben Familie in derselben Situation befunden hätten (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 36; siehe auch: BADIL, Herbst 2012).

Das jordanische Onlinemagazin 7iber veröffentlicht in einem undatierten Artikel Berichte von Palästinenser·innen über die Aberkennung ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft. Einer Familie sei 2004 die Staatsbürgerschaft mit der Begründung entzogen worden, sie besitze eine grüne Karte, obwohl sie diese nach eigenen Angaben nie gehabt habe. Einem weiteren Mann, der 1974 in Amman geboren worden sei, sei bei einem einmonatigen Besuch seiner Familie im Westjordanland in den 1990er Jahren eine grüne Karte ausgestellt worden. Jahre später sei ihm deshalb die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden. Ein junger Mann habe vier Tage vor seinem 18. Geburtstag die Staatsbürgerschaft verloren, weil diese zuvor seinem Vater entzogen worden sei, obwohl dieser eine gelbe Karte besessen habe. Seiner Schwester, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits volljährig gewesen sei, sei die Staatsbürgerschaft hingegen nicht aberkannt worden. Einer weiteren jungen Frau sei die Staatsbürgerschaft 2009 entzogen worden, nachdem sie eineinhalb Jahre als Musiklehrerin im Westjordanland gearbeitet habe und ihr Pass bei ihrer Rückkehr nach Jordanien eingezogen worden sei (7iber, ohne Datum).

Mehrere Quellen berichten, dass seit Beginn des Syrienkonflikts im Jahr 2011 palästinensischen Flüchtlingen aus Syrien mit jordanischer Staatsbürgerschaft diese aberkannt worden sei. In den meisten Fällen hätten die Behörden keine Gründe für die Aberkennung angegeben (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 34; Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58; USDOS, 12. April 2022, section 2f; USDOS, 23. April 2024, section D).

Merkmale von Personen(gruppen), die ausschließlich oder gehäuft von Aberkennungen betroffen/davon gefährdet sind

Laut Ghantous und Eller gebe es kein klares Muster, wem der Entzug der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft drohe (Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58).

HRW schreibt in seinem Bericht von 2010, dass Inhaber·innen von grünen Karten seit Jordaniens Rückzug aus dem Westjordanland 1988 als Palästinenser·innen und nicht als Jordanier·innen betrachtet würden. Dies gelte, obwohl die Rückzugsbestimmungen lediglich jenen Personen die jordanische Staatsangehörigkeit entzogen hätten, die am 31. Juli 1988 im Westjordanland gelebt hätten, nicht jedoch beispielsweise Jordanier·innen westjordanischer Herkunft mit grünen Karten, die bereits seit einiger Zeit im Ostjordanland oder im Ausland gelebt und sich auch zum Zeitpunkt der Verlautbarung dort aufgehalten hätten (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 22).

Die in Doha ansässige Nachrichtenorganisation Al Jazeera zitiert in einem Artikel vom Juli 2009 den Rechtsexperten Zuhair Abu Al-Raghib. Ihm zufolge beschränkten sich Fälle des Entzugs der Staatsbürgerschaft nicht auf Bewohner·innen des Westjordanlandes, wie es in der Entscheidung zum oben beschriebenen Rückzug vorgesehen gewesen sei. Vielmehr seien auch Jordanier·innen betroffen, die das Westjordanland besuchten oder dort ein Aufenthaltsrecht hätten, obwohl sie die volle jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft besäßen (Al Jazeera, 5. Juli 2009).

HRW zufolge sei im Jahr 2010 der häufigste Grund für den Entzug der jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit gewesen, dass Jordanier·innen mit einer gelben Karte es verabsäumt hätten, eine von Israel ausgestellte Aufenthaltsgenehmigung zu erhalten oder zu verlängern, eine israelische Familienzusammenführungsgenehmigung zu bekommen oder einen palästinensischen Personalausweis zu erlangen. Für ein solches Vorgehen gebe es jedoch keine Rechtsgrundlage (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 41–42; siehe auch: BADIL, Herbst 2012).

Die Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit betreffe Männer und Frauen palästinensischer Herkunft aus allen Gesellschaftsschichten. Lkw-Fahrer·innen, Ingenieur·innen, Chirurg·innen, Geschäftsleute und ein UN-Beamter seien Opfer eines willkürlichen Entzugs ihrer jordanischen Staatsangehörigkeit geworden. Das einzige verbindende Merkmal seien familiäre Wurzeln im Westjordanland. Zudem führe der Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit eines Vaters automatisch auch zum Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit seiner Kinder – unabhängig davon, ob diese minderjährig oder volljährig seien, jemals im Westjordanland gelebt hätten oder die jordanische Staatsangehörigkeit durch Geburt erworben hätten. HRW berichtet vom Fall einer Frau, der 2009 die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei, obwohl sie eine gelbe Karte besessen habe. Als Begründung sei angeführt worden, sie habe ihre israelische Aufenthaltsgenehmigung für das Westjordanland nicht verlängert, obwohl sie zuletzt 1993 für einen dreiwöchigen Besuch im Westjordanland gewesen sei. Einem weiteren Mann sei die Staatsbürgerschaft mit der Begründung aberkannt worden, er habe einen „feindlichen“ Pass verwendet, um nach Venezuela zu fliegen. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt sei er ein Kind gewesen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 26–28). Weitere Schilderungen von durch HRW interviewten Betroffenen finden sich auf den Seiten 28–35 des Berichts.

The Legal Agenda führt in einem Artikel vom Februar 2016 aus, dass die einschlägigen Bestimmungen immer wieder geändert würden. Seit 2011 werde Personen, die unter bestimmte Kategorien fallen, die jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt. Dazu gehörten Personen mit palästinensischem Personalausweis, die für die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde arbeiten würden (The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016; siehe auch: Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020; BADIL, Herbst 2012), Personen mit gültigem oder abgelaufenem israelischem Personalausweis, Inhaber·innen einer grünen Karte[3], Personen, die Palästina zwischen 1967 und 1988 verlassen hätten und einen israelischen Personalausweis besäßen, sofern sie im Rahmen der von der israelischen Besatzungsmacht nach 1967 durchgeführten Volkszählung erfasst worden seien, sowie Personen palästinensischer Herkunft mit arabischen Ausweisdokumenten (The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016).

Der Danish Immigration Service (DIS) schreibt in einem Bericht vom Juni 2020, dass immer mehr Inhaber·innen befristeter Pässe keine Verlängerung erhielten. Dies betreffe unter anderem palästinensische Jordanier·innen mit fünf Jahre gültigen Pässen. Die Organisation Jordanian Centre for Legal Aid (JCLA) betrachte auch diese Fälle als Aberkennung der Staatsbürgerschaft. Der Bericht zitiert Professorin Susan Akram von der Boston University School of Law. Akram zufolge seien Palästinenser·innen, die ab 1967 nach Jordanien gekommen seien und keinen Reisepass mit nationaler Nummer besäßen, vom Entzug der Staatsbürgerschaft bedroht. Einige Personen, die zwischen Jordanien und dem Westjordanland pendelten, würden bei ihrer Rückkehr nach Jordanien ihre temporären Reisepässe oder jordanischen Personalausweise verlieren. Anderen würden die Reisepässe in Jordanien entzogen oder nicht verlängert (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 67).

Laut DIS sei die Zahl der Personen, denen die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei, in den Jahren vor 2020 gestiegen. Der Anstieg habe in vielen Fällen jordanische Staatsbürger·innen betroffen, die in Syrien gelebt hätten und aufgrund des Konflikts nach Jordanien geflohen seien. Unter anderem sei Personen, die für die Palästina-Befreiungsorganisation (PLO) gekämpft hätten, die Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen worden (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 23, 34; siehe auch: Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58; USDOS, 12. April 2022, section 2f; USDOS, 23. April 2024, section D).

Details zum Aberkennungsverfahren, Existenz von wirkungsvollen Rechtschutzmöglichkeiten

Al Jazeera schreibt im genannten Artikel, dass die Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen werde, indem die gelbe Karte jordanischer Staatsbürger·innen aus dem Westjordanland durch eine grüne Karte für Inhaber·innen temporärer jordanischer Pässe ersetzt werde. Diese gewähre ihnen nicht die Rechte der Staatsbürgerschaft (Al Jazeera, 5. Juli 2009; siehe auch: The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016).

USDOS führt im April 2024 aus, dass das Gesetz Bedingungen festlege, unter denen das Kabinett mit Zustimmung des Königs die Staatsbürgerschaft entziehen könne. Das Innenministerium nehme Aberkennungen jedoch mitunter auch ohne Zustimmung des Kabinetts oder des Königs vor, ohne die betroffene Person zuvor zu benachrichtigen und ohne ihr die Möglichkeit zu geben, dagegen vorzugehen (USDOS, 23. April 2024, section D; siehe auch: Frost, 2022, S. 26–32).

Laut einem Artikel des Cairo Review of Global Affairs vom April 2025 gebe es kein formelles Berufungsverfahren (The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 22. April 2025).

HRW berichtet 2010, dass der Entzug der Staatsangehörigkeit in allen untersuchten Fällen ohne Vorwarnung erfolgt sei. Dieser habe weder auf einer veröffentlichten Änderung von Vorschriften oder Richtlinien noch auf einer offiziellen Benachrichtigung der betroffenen Person beruht. Betroffene hätten etwa bei der Erneuerung ihres Reisepasses, der Eintragung eines Kindes in ein Familienbuch, der Beantragung einer Verlängerung des Aufschubs des Militärdienstes, der Beantragung eines Führerscheins oder nach einer Reise ins Westjordanland von der Aberkennung erfahren (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 38). Die Abteilung für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion beziehungsweise die Abteilung für Zivilangelegenheiten des Innenministeriums würden in der Regel weder eine schriftliche Bestätigung des Staatsangehörigkeitsentzugs noch eine rechtliche Begründung für die Entscheidung ausstellen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 39).

The Legal Agenda erläutert in einem Artikel vom Februar 2016, dass der Entzug der Staatsbürgerschaft als Verwaltungsentscheidung gelte, die vor dem Verwaltungsgericht angefochten werden könne. Eine solche Entscheidung könne daher aufgehoben werden, wenn bei der Umsetzung der Anweisungen ein Fehler vorliege (The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016; siehe auch: Frost, 2022, S. 26–32). Auch HRW führt aus, dass jordanische Verwaltungsentscheidungen grundsätzlich angefochten werden könnten. Die gerichtliche Zuständigkeit erstrecke sich jedoch nicht auf Fragen, die Hoheitsakte betreffen würden. 1990 habe der Oberste Gerichtshof entschieden, dass die Anweisungen zum Rückzug einen Hoheitsakt dargestellt hätten. Mit dieser Entscheidung habe das Gericht Rechtsmittel gegen Aberkennungen nicht ausdrücklich ausgeschlossen, jedoch einen Präzedenzfall geschaffen, der Betroffene davon abhalte, rechtlich dagegen vorzugehen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 44–45; siehe auch: Frost, 2022, S. 26–32; Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020; The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016).

Laut einem Anwalt hätten Gerichte seit Ende der 1990er Jahre bei Aberkennungen der Staatsangehörigkeit von Personen palästinensischer Herkunft nur selten zugunsten der Antragsteller·innen entschieden. HRW verweist zudem auf mangelndes Vertrauen in die Gerichte (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 44–45). Betroffene würden in der Regel Anträge auf Wiedererlangung ihrer Staatsangehörigkeit stellen, meist aus humanitären Gründen. Erfolgreiche Anträge erforderten demnach die Nutzung von Kontakten zu einflussreichen Personen in der Regierung (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 39).

Kassim erklärt, dass ein einfacher Beamter der Abteilung für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion über den Verlust der Staatsbürgerschaft eines·r Bürger·in entscheiden könne. Es sei einfacher, Bürger·innen mit gelber Karte die Staatsbürgerschaft zu entziehen als einen Führerschein. Die Abteilung für Nachverfolgung und Inspektion sei die einzige Regierungsbehörde, die keiner gerichtlichen Kontrolle unterliege. Ein Rechtsmittel sei ausgeschlossen, da die Regierung diese Entscheidungen als Hoheitsakt behandle. Zudem sei es praktisch unmöglich, solche Angelegenheiten vor ein internationales Gericht zu bringen. In Jordanien gebe es auch kein Flüchtlingsrecht. Sobald die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt sei, hätten palästinensische Flüchtlinge keinerlei politische, bürgerliche oder wirtschaftliche Rechte mehr (BADIL, Herbst 2012).

Frost erläutert in ihrem Bericht von 2022, dass Einzelpersonen den Entzug der Staatsangehörigkeit vor Gericht anfechten könnten und dies mit unterschiedlichem Erfolg getan hätten. Fälle, die vor dem Verwaltungsgericht verhandelt würden, würden laut einem Anwalt häufig aus verfahrenstechnischen Gründen verloren. Selbst wenn ein Verfahren gewonnen werde, gelte dies als Einzelfall und diene nicht als Präzedenzfall. Frost verweist zudem auf terminologische Unterschiede bei den Aberkennungsverfahren. Einige Staatsbürgerschaften würden „aberkannt“, während andere „geändert“ würden. Personen in letzterer Situation hätten es Frost zufolge schwerer, Berufung einzulegen. Die Entscheidung werde als außerhalb der gerichtlichen Zuständigkeit liegend betrachtet, da der Begriff der „Abänderung“ nahelege, dass die betroffene Person die jordanische Staatsangehörigkeit nie hätte besitzen sollen. Es handle sich demnach nicht um den Verlust der Staatsangehörigkeit, sondern um die Korrektur eines Fehlers des Rechtsstatus. Frost zufolge würden die meisten Betroffenen die Aberkennung nicht anfechten, da sie keine Anwält·innen fänden, die den Fällen Erfolgsaussichten einräumten. Zudem seien Betroffene laut einem Anwalt überzeugt, dass soziale Beziehungen wirksamer seien als Gerichte (Frost, 2022, S. 26–32).

Ghantous und Eller schreiben in ihrem Bericht vom März 2021, dass einige Aberkennungsfälle aus verfassungsrechtlichen Gründen angefochten würden. Viele Fälle gelangten jedoch nie vor Gericht, da hohe Gerichtskosten zahlreiche Betroffene davon abhalten würden (Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58).

7iber zitiert in seinem Artikel die Anwältin Hala Ahed. Ihr zufolge sei die Entscheidung über den Entzug der Staatsbürgerschaft ein Verwaltungsakt, gegen den Betroffene innerhalb von 60 Tagen nach Zustellung beim Verwaltungsgericht Berufung einlegen könnten. Viele Personen, denen die Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen worden sei, würden den offiziellen Berufungsverfahren jedoch misstrauen und stattdessen versuchen, jemanden mit Einfluss zu finden, der ihnen zur Wiedererlangung der Staatsbürgerschaft verhelfen könne. Laut einem Palästinenser, dem die Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt worden sei, habe seine Familie beim Innenministerium Berufung eingelegt; jahrelang sei jedoch nichts geschehen. Eine weitere von 7iber interviewte Mutter habe wiederholt versucht, die Staatsbürgerschaft ihrer Kinder wiederzuerlangen, nachdem diese sie verloren hätten, weil dem Vater der Kinder die jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft entzogen worden sei. Ihre Bemühungen seien erfolglos geblieben; in einem Fall sei sie von Angestellten verspottet worden. Eine junge Frau habe sich an Regierungsbehörden, die zuständige Ombudsstelle und Menschenrechtsorganisationen gewandt, um ihre Staatsbürgerschaft zurückzuerhalten. Schließlich habe sie diese mithilfe des Freundes eines Freundes, der einer einflussreichen Familie angehöre, wiedererlangt (7iber, ohne Datum).

Laut The Legal Agenda sei es dem Nationalen Zentrum für Menschenrechte (NCHR) im Jahr 2010 gelungen, die Staatsbürgerschaft von 14 von 54 Bürger·innen wiederzuerlangen, die sich wegen des Entzugs ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft an das Zentrum gewandt hätten (The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016).

Konsequenzen für Personen, denen die Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt wurde (rechtlich, faktisch, praktisch)

Laut Al Jazeera führe der Entzug der Staatsbürgerschaft zum Verlust von Bürgerrechten. Dies beginne mit dem Verlust der nationalen Identifikationsnummer und der Änderung des Aufenthaltsstatus durch Ausstellung eines befristeten Reisepasses und reiche bis zum Verlust des Rechts auf Bildung, Beschäftigung und medizinische Versorgung (Al Jazeera, 5. Juli 2009).

Kassim zufolge befänden sich Personen, denen die Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei, in derselben Situation wie staatenlose Palästinenser·innen aus dem Gazastreifen in Jordanien: Sie hätten keinen Zugang zu staatlichen Dienstleistungen und könnten unter anderem keine Bankkonten eröffnen (BADIL, Herbst 2012).

HRW beschreibt in seinem Bericht von 2010, dass der Verlust der Staatsbürgerschaft die Ausübung grundlegender Menschenrechte beeinträchtige. Die Aberkennung bedrohe das Aufenthaltsrecht in Jordanien und könne dadurch Familien voneinander trennen. Ein Betroffener habe gegenüber HRW erklärt, dass er zwar rechtlich im Westjordanland leben könnte, seine Frau jedoch nicht, da sie keine Familienzusammenführungserlaubnis besitze. Weiters seien staatenlose Palästinenser·innen von Leistungen des Gesundheitssystems ausgeschlossen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 47–48).

Jordanien verweigere Kindern ohne jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft den Besuch staatlicher Grund- und weiterführender Schulen. Kindern, deren Vätern die jordanische Staatsbürgerschaft aberkannt worden sei, werde der Zugang zu diesen Schulen verwehrt, selbst wenn sie diese zuvor als jordanische Staatsbürger·innen besucht hätten. Nicht-jordanische Kinder müssten zudem höhere Studiengebühren an Hochschulen zahlen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 50).

Staatenlose Palästinenser·innen, denen die jordanische Staatsangehörigkeit aberkannt worden sei, verlören automatisch die Möglichkeit, im öffentlichen Dienst zu arbeiten. Auch im privaten Sektor bestünden Beschäftigungshindernisse. Berichten zufolge müsse der jordanische Geheimdienst (General Intelligence Department, GID) zustimmen, damit Einzelpersonen in bestimmten privaten Unternehmen, insbesondere Banken und anderen strategisch wichtigen Firmen, arbeiten dürften. Laut einem Betroffenen erteile der GID keine Arbeitserlaubnis für Personen ohne jordanische nationale Nummer. Zudem sei für die Beantragung eines Visums für mehrere Golfstaaten ein Führungszeugnis des GID erforderlich, das dieser jedoch nur jordanischen Staatsangehörigen ausstelle. Schließlich würden gesetzlich geregelte Berufsverbände in Jordanien ihre Mitglieder unterstützen und Altersvorsorgeleistungen anbieten. Die Mitgliedschaft sei für die Ausübung bestimmter Berufe obligatorisch, stehe jedoch nur Jordanier·innen offen (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 52–53).

Darüber hinaus könnten Jordanier·innen, die ihre Staatsangehörigkeit verloren hätten, kein Eigentum erwerben, kein Fahrzeug oder Unternehmen anmelden und ihre Investitionen nicht liquidieren (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 54). Betroffene berichteten HRW außerdem, dass sie höhere Gebühren für eine Passverlängerung zahlen müssten, ihre Führerscheine nur noch ein Jahr gültig seien und sie für deren Ausstellung oder Verlängerung eine Genehmigung des GID benötigten. Einige würden bewusst keinen vorläufigen Reisepass ohne nationale Nummer beantragen, um ihre Staatenlosigkeit nicht offenzulegen. Dadurch werde jedoch ihre Reisefreiheit eingeschränkt (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 47–48).

Der oben genannte Artikel von 7iber enthält Berichte von Palästinenser·innen über ihr Leben Jahre nach der Aberkennung der jordanischen Staatsbürgerschaft. Die Betroffenen schilderten Probleme beim Zugang zu Schulen und Universitäten sowie Schwierigkeiten bei der Verlängerung von Führerscheinen. Ein Mann mit einem Masterabschluss in Betriebswirtschaft habe seine Anstellung bei einer UN-Organisation verloren, da er als Einziger keine Sicherheitsüberprüfung erhalten habe. Seine beiden Schwestern mit Masterabschlüssen seien arbeitslos. Er selbst finde keine Anstellung und müsse mit seinem Vater in einem Geschäft arbeiten, das ihnen eigentlich gehöre, dessen Papiere jedoch auf eine andere Person eingetragen seien. Auch ihr Haus sei auf den Namen eines Bekannten registriert; Versuche, das Eigentum auf sie selbst zu übertragen, seien bislang gescheitert. Der Mann überlege, wie er eine Familie gründen könne, da seine zukünftigen Kinder ebenfalls staatenlos wären und als Kinder einer jordanischen Frau rechtlich nicht gleichgestellt seien und leiden würden. Ein weiterer Mann berichtet, dass er seit der Aberkennung seiner Staatsbürgerschaft jeweils nur einmonatige Aufenthaltserlaubnisse erhalte. Sein Auto sei auf den Namen seiner Frau zugelassen, die weiterhin Jordanierin sei. Die Verlängerung seines Führerscheins sei ihm verweigert worden. Eine junge Lehrerin sei nach der Aberkennung ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft eineinhalb Jahre arbeitslos gewesen, da die Schulen, bei denen sie sich beworben habe, die erforderlichen Genehmigungen für sie nicht erhalten hätten. Schließlich habe sich ein Bekannter bereit erklärt, offiziell ihren Bruder einzustellen und sie stattdessen für ihn arbeiten zu lassen (7iber, ohne Datum).

Auch Al-Araby Al-Jadeed zitiert im bereits genannten Artikel Betroffene, die von Schwierigkeiten bei der Arbeitssuche und beim Reisen berichten. Zudem würden ihnen kostenlose Bildung und Krankenversicherung verweigert, und die Gebühren für offizielle Dokumente seien doppelt so hoch wie für Jordanier·innen (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30. Juni 2020; siehe auch: The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 22. April 2025).

Weitere allgemein relevante und aktuellere Informationen zur Situation staatenloser Personen in Jordanien finden sich in den folgenden Berichten, die die Lage staatenloser Palästinenser·innen aus dem Gazastreifen in Jordanien beschreiben. Relevante Textpassagen auf Englisch finden sich im Anhang:

·      Cairo Review of Global Affairs (The), Who are Palestine’s Overlooked Refugees? Investigating Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 22. April 2025
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/who-are-palestines-overlooked-refugees

·      IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Jordan: Treatment of individuals of Palestinian descent, including stateless Palestinians, by society and state authorities; access to employment, education, health care, and housing; state protection (2021–May 2024) [JOR201736.E], 8. Oktober 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2120186.html

·      Pérez, Michael Vicente: Living as Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 7. März 2024
https://www.sapiens.org/culture/palestinian-refugees-exile-displacement-jordan/

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 5. Juni 2026)

·      7iber: Nach dem Entzug der nationalen Identifikationsnummer: Geschichten aus dem Leben ohne Staatsbürgerschaft [Arabisch], ohne Datum
https://www.7iber.com/after-having-your-nationality-withdrawn-personal-narratives/amp/

·      Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: Der Preis der Entkopplung: Jordanier palästinensischer Herkunft, denen die Staatsbürgerschaft verwehrt wird [Arabisch], upgedatet am 30. Juni 2020
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/%D8%AB%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9

·      Al Jazeera: Die Nationalität der Palästinenser in Jordanien ist Gegenstand von Kontroversen [Arabisch], 5. Juli 2009
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2009/7/5/%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84

·      BADIL – Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and the Revocation of Citizenship, Herbst 2012
https://badil.org/publications/al-majdal/issues/items/1489.html

·      Cairo Review of Global Affairs (The), Who are Palestine’s Overlooked Refugees? Investigating Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 22. April 2025
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/who-are-palestines-overlooked-refugees

·      DIS - Danish Immigration Service: Palestinian Refugees Access to registration and UNRWA services, documents, and entry to Jordan, Juni 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2032043/Palestine Refugees june 2020.pdf

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2025 - Jordan, 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2123540.html

·      Frost, Lillian: Report on Citizenship Law: Jordan; Country Report RSC/GLOBALCIT-CR 2022/2, Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2105003/RSC_GLOBALCIT_CR_2022_2.pdf

·      Ghantous, Kalya H. und Eller, Lori L.: The Campaign to end statelessness in Jordan, Boston University School of Law, März 2021
https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2021/09/Statelessness-In-Jordan-Report_3.2021-1.pdf

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Stateless Again, Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality, 1. Februar 2010
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/jordan0210webwcover.pdf

·      IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Jordan: Treatment of individuals of Palestinian descent, including stateless Palestinians, by society and state authorities; access to employment, education, health care, and housing; state protection (2021–May 2024) [JOR201736.E], 8. Oktober 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2120186.html

·      Legal Agenda (The): Revoking Jordanian Citizenship: Disengagement or Discrimination, 16. Februar 2016
https://english.legal-agenda.com/revoking-jordanian-citizenship-disengagement-or-discrimination/

·      New Arab (The): Jordan to 'revoke citizenship' of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, senior PA officials, 26. April 2018
https://www.newarab.com/news/jordan-revoke-citizenship-palestinian-president-mahmoud-abbas

·      Pérez, Michael Vicente: Living as Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 7. März 2024
https://www.sapiens.org/culture/palestinian-refugees-exile-displacement-jordan/

·      PRC – Palestinian Return Centre: Revoking Citizenships: Future of Palestinians in Jordan, 11. September 2012
https://prc.org.uk/en/post/2741/revoking-citizenships-future-of-palestinians-in-jordan

·      USDOS - US Department of State: 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Jordan, 12. April 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2071204.html

·      USDOS - US Department of State: 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Jordan, 23. April 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2107743.html

 

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Das Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (BADIL) ist eine unabhängige nichtprofitorientierte Organisation zum Schutz der Rechte von palästinensischen Flüchtlingen.

·      BADIL – Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and the Revocation of Citizenship, Herbst 2012
https://badil.org/publications/al-majdal/issues/items/1489.html

„First of all, the Jordanian Constitution, adopted in 1952, states that citizenship is a matter to be regulated by a law, and the Jordanian Citizenship Law was indeed adopted in 1954 replacing that of 1928 and its amendment. According to this law, it is possible to revoke the citizenship of a Jordanian citizen who is in the civil service of a foreign authority or government. The citizen must be notified by the Jordanian government to leave that service and, if the citizen does not comply, the Council of Ministries is the body with the authority that is able to decide to revoke his citizenship. Even if the Council does decide to revoke the citizenship, this decision must then be ratified by the King, and even then, the citizen whose citizenship was revoked has the right to challenge the Council of Ministries’ decision in the Jordanian High Court, and it is this court’s decision that is binding and final. These procedures are being completely ignored when the citizenship of a Jordanian of Palestinian origin is revoked. […]

The first category we can call hyphenated Palestinian-Jordanians. These are Palestinians who were in Jordan on the date of the disengagement with no material connection to the West Bank or Gaza Strip, or who were Jordanian citizenship holders abroad. These are regarded as Jordanians for all legal purposes.

The Palestinians in the second category are the green card holders whose citizenship was revoked by the government orders that I described earlier.

The Palestinians in the third category are the yellow card holders, who kept their citizenship after the disengagement, but many of whom have more recently faced the revocation of their Jordanian citizenship rights. […]

In recent years, the Follow-up and Inspection Department has been expanding on the scope of its authority in interpreting the 1988 government regulations dealing with the revocation of Palestinians’ Jordanian citizenship. We need to keep in mind also that these regulations were never made public, and that in fact no policy, let alone law, dealing with the revocation of Palestinians’ citizenship in Jordan has ever officially been made public. Originally, as I described, 31 July 1988 was treated as a cut-off date, if you were a green card holder in the West Bank, your citizenship was revoked, and otherwise you remained a citizen. The Department has since expanded to the revocation of citizenship from others under other pretexts.

For instance, many Palestinian citizens of Jordan were able to acquire Israeli-issued West Bank residency permits through such procedures as family-reunification since 1967. Of course, part of Israel’s ethnic cleansing policies manifested as revocation of West Bank residency permits over the years under various pretexts. For example, at one point West Bank residency permit holders who were away from the West Bank for more than three years had their residency revoked by the Israelis. The Follow-up and Inspection Department of the Jordanian Interior Ministry has revoked national numbers (i.e. citizenship) from many Palestinians who had their West Bank residency permits revoked by the Israelis under the pretext that these people should have kept these residency permits, and that the Palestinian should go and get the Israelis to reissue them their West Bank residency permits.
 
Another example is that of PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] or Palestinian Authority (PA) employees. Even though a Jordanian citizen can work for any other government, many Palestinian citizens of Jordan who have taken jobs in PA institutions have been stripped of their national numbers. A more recent example is that of the Jordanian parliamentary elections [November 2010]. Many of the Palestinians who went to register as voters were sent to the Follow-up and Inspection Department where they had their national numbers revoked.

Ultimately, however, it is difficult to discern a particular logic to the post-1988 revocations. In some cases, one person or group within the family has their citizenship revoked, while others in the same family remain citizens. With regards to employment in the PLO or PA, there are PA parliamentarians and ministers with Jordanian national numbers, while some Palestinian citizens of Jordan, for example, have had their citizenship revoked for working for a PA-owned Company or civil institution. We can only say that so far it seems very arbitrary. I should also add that this wave of citizenship revocation means that yellow card holders live with the perpetual fear of any interaction with the government bureaucracy, since this could result in being sent to the Follow-up and Inspection Department and having their citizenship revoked.

HJ: Is there a way to know how many Palestinians have had their Jordanian citizenship revoked since 1988?

AK: No, these numbers are kept secret by the Jordanian Ministry of Interior and are not made public. There are various estimates, but these numbers vary. The most well-known of these is that of the Human Rights Watch report that stated that over 2700 Palestinians citizens of Jordan had their citizenship revoked between 2004 and 2008, but this number is based on a journalistic article in a Jordanian newspaper, and so, in addition to not giving information on the years before or after the period, are not to be taken as authoritative.
 
HJ: What is the effect of the revocation of citizenship on the people involved?

AK: They become like the blue-card holders from the Gaza Strip that I talked about before without the ability to access any government services, open bank accounts, etc. It should be mentioned though that there is a potentially very dangerous situation for Jordan; if this trend continues it will become a ‘ghetto state.’ When you forfeit a Jordanian’s citizenship and keep him in Jordan because you don’t have the power to send him to Palestine—because the Israelis of course refuse—you will end up with over a million stateless Palestinians within your borders, and who have nowhere to go.

HJ: Earlier you described the Jordanian law of citizenship and the various levels of government and judiciary through which the revocation of citizenship must pass to become final. Can Palestinians who have had their Jordanian citizenship revoked make use of what you described as an advanced citizenship law to challenge the Follow-up and Inspection Department’s actions?

AK: As I described above, there is no question that the revocations of citizenship that the Jordanian authorities have carried out since 1988 contradict the written law and indeed the constitution. Under the law, the revocation of citizenship must follow the procedures I spoke about earlier, and are not the subject to such things as the color of your card or regulations. As it stands, however, a junior officer of the Follow-up and Inspection Department can decide the fate of a citizen’s citizenship rights. It is now a more simple matter to revoke a yellow card-carrying citizen from his citizenship than it is to revoke their driving license! With the revocation of a driving license, the citizen has the right to challenge the revocation in a court. The Inspection and Follow-up Department is indeed the only government department that is not subject to judicial review.

The government justifies this by stating that the revocation of citizenship by this Department is an ‘act of state.’ There is one judge, Justice Farouq Kilani, who was president of the Jordanian High Court of Justice who did challenge the government’s position, and stated that citizenship is a matter regulated by law and not regulations, and that therefore the actions of the Department are null and void. As a result of his ruling—this was in 1998—the Minister of Justice demanded his resignation, and Kilani resigned. He subsequently gave two public lectures on the topic, and wrote a book called Independence of the Judiciary, an excellent treatise in which he describes in detail both his landmark ruling and his encounter with the Justice Minister. His ruling was very correct, constitutionally sound and legally unchallenged. The Jordanian judiciary has a long tradition of reviewing administrative decisions, including decisions involving citizenship. As it stands now, the situation in Jordan is very suffocating on this issue of citizenship revocation because there is no right to appeal since the government treats these decisions as ‘acts of state,’ and it is practically impossible to take these issues to an international court.
 
It is also important to mention that there is no refugee law in Jordan. As such, once the citizenship is revoked, the Palestinian refugee is left with no political, civil or economic rights. “ (BADIL, Herbst 2012)

Die Cairo Review of Global Affairs ist eine vierteljährlich erscheinende Fachzeitschrift für internationale Angelegenheiten, herausgegeben von der School of Global Affairs and Public Policy der American University in Cairo (AUC).

·      Cairo Review of Global Affairs (The), Who are Palestine’s Overlooked Refugees? Investigating Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 22. April 2025
https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/who-are-palestines-overlooked-refugees

„Since 1988, Jordan has gradually withdrawn citizenship from some of its Palestinian-origin citizens, leaving many effectively stateless. This process began when King Hussein severed ‘administrative and legal’ ties with the West Bank in response to the first intifada, triggering the revocation of nationality for many Palestinians with ties to the region. In 2010, Human Rights Watch reported that approximately 300,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin had their nationality status under review. Additionally, between 2004 and 2008, 2,732 individuals had their nationality revoked.

The Jordanian government justified the revocation of nationality by referencing the 1988 severance of ties with the West Bank and deference to the will of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinian people. However, the legal grounds for this action remain unclear, and there is no formal process for individuals to appeal, leaving many in a state of legal uncertainty.

This policy has particularly affected Palestinians who had held Jordanian citizenship since the country’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950. While those living in Jordan or abroad at the time generally retained their nationality, other measures have extended the withdrawal of citizenship to individuals who had been residing in Jordan since the severance, further complicating their legal status. This condition denies individuals fundamental rights, such as political participation, healthcare, education, and the freedom to travel or work. […]

Palestinian refugees from Gaza face significant barriers to securing stable employment in Jordan, as restrictions on public sector employment for non-Jordanians and high work permit fees for the private sector leave them with few options. Less than three percent of ex-Gazans living in camps are employed by the government, compared to twenty percent of other camp refugees. And those who do find work in the public sector are limited to non-permanent, low-level jobs and are excluded from unionized positions, as national ID numbers are required for membership in professional syndicates. […]

To obtain a work permit, these stateless Palestinians must pay high renewal fees for their temporary passports—200 Jordanian Dinars (JDs)—and provide proof of residency. Additionally, work permits themselves cost around 165-180 JDs annually. These costs are out of reach for most of this population as more than half of ex-Gazans in the Jerash refugee camp live below the national poverty line of 814 JDs per year, according to a FaFo report.

Despite some recent easing of work permit rules by the Ministry of Labor, the lack of legal status for ex-Gazans continues to limit their employment opportunities. As a result, many rely on UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency] for support, while others seek low-wage informal work, such as seasonal jobs in agriculture.“ (The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 22. April 2025)

Der Danish Immigration Service (DIS) ist die für Einwanderung, Einreise und Aufenthalt von Ausländer·innen zuständige Behörde des dänischen Ministeriums für Einwanderung und Integration.

·      DIS - Danish Immigration Service: Palestinian Refugees Access to registration and UNRWA services, documents, and entry to Jordan, Juni 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2032043/Palestine Refugees june 2020.pdf

„After a period with few examples of citizenship withdrawals, recent years have seen an increase in the number of people who have had their citizenship revoked. The increase in withdrawals is in many cases related to people of Jordanian origin residing in Syria but who fled due to the conflict. Upon arrival to Jordan, they were confronted with the fact that their citizenship had been withdrawn.

Among those who had their citizenship revoked were some PLO [Palestine Liberation Organisation] fighters who fled to Syria and Lebanon after the Black September conflict between PLO and Jordan in 1970 as well as the families of these fighters.“ (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 23)

„Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011, cases of citizenship revocation for those PRS [Palestine Refugees of Syria] who held Jordanian citizenship have been documented. In most cases, authorities provided no information regarding the reasons for the revocation.“ (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 34)

„Nationality /citizenship

More of the temporary passports holders are not getting those passports renewed. This includes Palestinian Jordanians with the five year duration passports. The organisation Jordanian Centre for Legal Aid (JCLA) has been dealing with these cases as de-naturalisation cases and has represented the cases in court. The position is that they hold West Bank citizenships, which they do not. The denial of renewal of such passports still occurs. When meeting with JCLA in November, Akram explained that the organisation had a number of cases that they were currently defending in court. The practise started some time ago and has accelerated in the last couple of years. The acceleration came as part of the implementation of the ‘Jordan First’ policy. The policy – led by the King of Jordan – states that there are no Palestinians, and that the ones who are citizens are Jordanians. Anyone else residing in the country is considered a foreigner. This has resulted in the de-naturalisation process; implying that you cannot have something in between. When asked to clarify which groups are being stripped from citizenship, Akram explained that all the 1948 Palestinians have Jordanian nationality/citizenship. This group has a national ID number and a full passport. Any person, who holds a passport with a national ID number, is considered a Jordanian citizen. These are not at risk of being revoked. The 1967 and post 1967 Palestinians, who have anything less than a passport with a national ID number, appear to be vulnerable to de-nationalisation. Some people travelling back and forth from Jordan to the West Bank are losing their temporary passports or their Jordanian ID cards upon return to Jordan. Others, who have been in Jordan longer, and who may have passports without national ID numbers, are going through the process of revoking or non-renewal of passports. Without knowing the exact number, Akram expects that this is going to be a growing problem.“ (DIS, Juni 2020, S. 67)

Freedom House ist eine in den USA ansässige Nichtregierungsorganisation, die sich mit Recherchen und Advocacy-Arbeit zu Demokratie, politischen Freiheiten und Menschenrechten befasst.

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2025 - Jordan, 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2123540.html

„Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin risk the arbitrary revocation of citizenship or documentation and are often excluded from jobs in the public sector and security forces, which are dominated by East Bank tribes.“ (Freedom House, 2025, F4)

Lillian Frost ist Assistenzprofessorin am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Virginia Tech mit den Forschungsschwerpunkten Zwangsmigration, Staatsbürgerschaft und Geschlechterfragen, insbesondere in der arabischen Welt.

·      Frost, Lillian: Report on Citizenship Law: Jordan; Country Report RSC/GLOBALCIT-CR 2022/2, Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2105003/RSC_GLOBALCIT_CR_2022_2.pdf

„These events, coupled with decades of failed negotiations with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], culminated in King Hussein’s disengagement speech of 31 July 1988. This speech announced that the Jordanian government was ‘dismantling the legal and administrative links’ between the East and West Banks of the Jordan River. This announcement reduced Jordan to the East Bank alone and ended the Unity of the Banks that King Abdullah oversaw in 1950. Although Israel had occupied the West Bank since the 1967 war, Jordan had maintained its legal, administrative, and political connections to the territory, including by continuing to pay its civil servants on the West Bank. King Hussein framed this decision as a demonstration of Jordan’s commitment to support an independent Palestinian state on ‘Palestinian national soil’ (Massad 2001, 260–61).

The disengagement entailed three major changes for Jordan’s citizenship. First, it dissolved the House of Deputies to remove the West Bank seats. This measure halved the size of Jordan’s parliament from 142 to 71 seats and removed West Bank Palestinian voting rights (Robins 1989, 168–170). Second, it meant that Jordan ceased to employ the majority of the approximately 20,000 government civil servants on the West Bank. Third, it revoked the Jordanian nationality of everyone living in the West Bank at the time. The regulations released after the disengagement speech state specifically that ‘Every person residing in the West Bank before the date of 31 July 1988 will be considered as a Palestinian citizen and not as Jordanian’. This measure involved converting these individuals’ full Jordanian passports into temporary passports that required renewal every two years (instead of every five years), like the passports Jordan had issued to the refugees forced out of Gaza after the 1967 war. The temporary passports served as international travel documents but not as documents conferring Jordanian nationality.

Although the disengagement de-nationalized and disenfranchised all residents on the West Bank in July 1988, the King made clear in the disengagement speech that these measures did not apply to any Jordanians of Palestinian descent residing on the East Bank. The King stated:

‘It has to be understood in all clarity, and without any ambiguity or equivocation, that our measures regarding the West Bank concern only the occupied Palestinian land and its people. They naturally do not relate in any way to the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his/her origin. They are an integral part of the Jordanian state to which they belong, on whose soil they live, and in whose life and various activities they participate’.

King Hussein emphasized that the disengagement denationalized Jordanians based on where they resided rather than based on their descent. However, this interpretation was not always accepted by the predominantly Transjordanian public sector implementing the disengagement regulations […]. Instead, some Jordanian officials have interpreted the disengagement primarily in terms of West Bank Palestinian descent rather than residence on the West Bank, thereby expanding the disengagement’s reach.

2.8.1 Legal Ambiguities Concerning the Disengagement

A key factor contributing to different interpretations of the disengagement is that it was never translated into or published in law. There were no related amendments to the Nationality Law or Constitution preceding or following the overnight withdrawal of Jordanian nationality from the roughly one million Jordanians of Palestinian descent living on the West Bank in July 1988 (Halaseh 2016). There are disengagement regulations […], but they did not become higher-level legislation because they were not published in the Official Gazette. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain the disengagement regulations at a given time without being subjected to them directly. Officials typically do not inform individuals that they have lost their nationality until they interact with the MOI’s [Ministry of Interior’s] Follow-Up and Inspection Department […] during routine transactions, such as renewing passports or registering a child’s birth (HRW 2010, 3).

The legal uncertainty surrounding the disengagement became more problematic after 1990. At that time, approximately 200,000 Jordanians (mainly of Palestinian origin) fled or were expelled back to Jordan from the Arab Gulf states after Iraq invaded Kuwait and Jordan did not join the alliance against Iraq (Abu-Odeh 1999, 233). This influx raised new questions about how to determine who was ‘Jordanian’ and who was ‘Palestinian.’

2.8.2 Nationality revocations on the East Bank after the disengagement

Since 1988, the disengagement’s legal ambiguities, accentuated by the absence of a Palestinian state and economic turmoil in Jordan, have produced numerous cases of Jordanians of Palestinian descent losing their nationality for reasons not stated in the nationality law or the disengagement regulations (De Bel-Air 2012, 28–29; Halaseh 2016). Although there are no precise figures on how many individuals have been affected, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that thousands of citizens of Palestinian origin—over 2,700 between 2004 and 2008 alone—have lost their Jordanian nationality (HRW 2010, 1). […]

Regardless of the reason for these nationality revocations, their implementation has diverged from the nationality law’s stipulations (Frost and Brown 2020). First, the reasons for removing someone’s nationality differ (El-Abed, Husseini, and Al-Rantawi 2014, 27). Specifically, Article 18(2) of the nationality law stipulates the conditions under which the Cabinet may, with the King’s approval, revoke a Jordanian’s nationality. These reasons (specified below)—including refusing, after the Jordanian government asks, to leave the civil service of a foreign state—are not the reasons provided by the MOI for nationality withdrawal. Likewise, contrary to Article 18, the MOI performs this withdrawal without notifying an individual in advance and without giving that person the opportunity to correct the issue.

Second, the MOI has removed the nationality of children whose fathers lost their Jordanian nationality due to the disengagement. This practice is contrary to Article 10 of the nationality law, which states that a minor child whose father acquired a foreign nationality shall retain his or her Jordanian nationality. Third, the entity withdrawing nationality differs from that specified in Article 18 of the nationality law. This article stipulates that the Cabinet, with the approval of the King, is the legal entity that can revoke nationality. However, the MOI has been the primary governmental body conducting these revocations.

Judges and lawyers have described this process, typically in the context of implementing the disengagement, as a transfer, change, or correction of nationality […]. Although the term tathheer […] in a legal context often translates as ‘endorsement’, the Civil Status and Passports Department (CSPD) in Jordan uses the term differently. For example, when officials change an individual’s civil status from single to married, or married to widowed, the CSPD would describe this as ‘tathheer al-haalat almadaniyya’ […]. In addition, Article 25 of the passports law defines tathheer […] as ‘changing the occupation, correcting the age, or adding countries […]’ to a passport or travel document. Although it provides this definition— and actually only mentions this term—in the context of the fee charged for this service, it offers additional evidence that this term can signify a ‘change’ or ‘correction’ in Jordan. Thus, when officials use the expression ‘tathheer al-jinsiyya […]’, it typically refers to changing or correcting someone’s nationality. This includes instances when the government ‘corrects’ someone’s nationality to be Palestinian rather than Jordanian. As such, it is effectively another term for revoking someone’s Jordanian nationality, though it does not appear in the nationality law or in the published disengagement regulations.

2.8.3 Limited role of the courts in Jordanian nationality

Individuals have been able to challenge nationality revocations in court, but with varying success over time. One lawyer noted that many defendants won such cases in the period after the disengagement, including based on legal challenges to the disengagement itself. However, in 1990 Jordan’s High Court of Justice ruled that the disengagement was an act of the state ‘as a sovereign and not as an administrative authority’ and was thus outside the court’s jurisdiction. The decision was justified on the basis that ‘According to Article 9(b) of Law No. 11 of 1989 which instituted the High Court of Justice, the Court is not empowered to review [an] act of state’. Although ‘sovereign acts of state […]’ were originally imported from French law and served to remove judicial review from decisions on foreign affairs, Arab states, such as Egypt and Jordan, have used these acts to encompass state decisions concerning internal security and the ‘safeguarding’ of the state (Brown and Schaaf forthcoming, 11). These acts allow public officials to operate with ‘an authority unbound by law’, thereby preventing individuals from deploying laws against the most politically sensitive decisions issued by executive officials (Brown and Schaaf forthcoming, 11).

In practice, Jordanian legal expert Ayman Halaseh (2016) finds that this ruling means that the revocation of nationality, as an administrative decision, ‘can be challenged before the administrative court’. Thus, ‘if there is a mistake in the implementation of the instructions, the decision can be abolished”. However, ‘the disengagement decision, under which the written instructions were issued, is a sovereign decision that does not fall within its jurisdiction and may not be appealed’. This means that an individual can challenge a revocation based on an administrative error (e.g., by proving that the defendant was living on the East Bank in 1988), but an individual cannot challenge a revocation based on questioning the legality of the disengagement.

Despite the distinction between challenges against nationality revocations based on an administrative error and those based on questions concerning the legality of the disengagement itself, some administrative cases have been dismissed because they are characterized as challenging the disengagement’s legality. For example, one lawyer noted that the High Court has rejected some of these administrative cases on the basis that a nationality revocation that is connected to the disengagement ‘should not be discussed in the High Court’ since it is ‘a matter of state sovereignty’. Another lawyer explained that the government told the High Court to say that it does not have to take these cases because the revocations are an ‘act of state’ and because ‘all actions under emergency law are exempt from litigation’.

In addition, among the revocation cases that have been heard by the administrative courts, many of these cases have been dismissed. Specifically, one lawyer found that the cases he could bring to court were often lost due to procedural reasons. However, losing cases due to procedural reasons is a common trend across administrative court cases, not just those concerning nationality (Schaaf forthcoming).

Furthermore, terminology, as it connects to existing legislation, seems to play an important role in influencing when a procedural rejection occurs. For example, when individuals challenge an administrative decision to ‘revoke […]‘nationality, they have been more successful because it more clearly connects to the nationality law’s provisions on the conditions under which one can lose Jordanian nationality […]. Thus, the individual can succeed in reversing the nationality revocation if he or she can prove that those stipulated conditions were not in place. However, when the administrative decision was to ‘change […]’ nationality, they have lost due to procedural issues that indicate such a decision is outside the court’s jurisdiction, because the term implies that the individual never had Jordanian nationality and it is not an instance of losing nationality but rather of correcting an error in that individual’s legal status. More research is needed to better understand the ways these terms interact and reflect how officials govern nationality revocations.110 However, there does seem to be a tendency for individuals to lose their cases on procedural grounds when the administrative decision was to ‘change […]’ not ‘revoke […]’ nationality.

Regardless, even when a case is won, the Jordanian judicial system treats cases as isolated, distinctive events. Thus, no single case or ruling serves as a standard-setting precedent for others. This stems in part from Jordan’s civil law system as well as from Jordanian judges’ reluctance to engage in policymaking.

Although a relatively small number of individuals have challenged their revocations in court, most have not. This has occurred both because individuals cannot find a lawyer who thinks they have a chance at winning and because individuals do not think the state would rule in their favor (Schaaf 2021). One lawyer also described this reluctance as based on individuals’ beliefs that social connections (‘wasta […]‘) were more effective than the courts. Altogether, these findings suggest that courts have not played an active role in shaping nationality in Jordan, nor have they been a consistently effective venue for challenging how the state implements nationality revocation policies.“ (Frost, 2022, S. 26-32)

Kayla Ghantous und Lori Eller waren zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung des Berichts Studentinnen an der Boston University School of Law.

·      Ghantous, Kayla H. und Eller, Lori L.: The Campaign to end statelessness in Jordan, Boston University School of Law, März 2021
https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2021/09/Statelessness-In-Jordan-Report_3.2021-1.pdf

„However, for most Palestinian refugees residing in the West Bank, their Jordanian citizenship was revoked in 1988 when King Hussein bin Talal renounced all Jordanian claims of sovereignty to the West Bank. As a result, an estimated 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Israeli Occupied Territories lost their Jordanian citizenship and became stateless, many for a second time. […]

In addition to the revocation of Jordanian nationality to those in the West Bank, since 1988, there have been thousands of cases of persons of Palestinian origin having their citizenship revoked without notice and in an arbitrary manner. Stateless Again, supra note 18, at 3; The Danish Immigration Service, supra note 40, at 9, 23. Recently, following a lull for a number of years, there has been a marked increase in denationalization cases. Id.“ (Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 14-15)

„There has been a recent increase in denationalization cases, notably among people of Jordanian origin living in Syria who upon arrival to Jordan find that their citizenship had been withdrawn. In most cases, the Jordanian Government has not provided any reason for the revocation. There appears to be no clear pattern for who is at risk of having Jordanian citizenship withdrawn. Some denationalization cases have been challenged on constitutional grounds. But many cases never make it to court, as high court fees prevent many from contesting these denationalization claims. Over 2,700 Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost their nationality between 2004 and 2008. Numbers of denationalization cases, however, are unclear as no official numbers have been released, and estimates range from hundreds to the tens of thousands.“ (Ghantous und Eller, März 2021, S. 58)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) ist eine internationale Nichtregierungsorganisation mit Sitz in New York City, die sich für den weltweiten Schutz der Menschenrechte einsetzt.

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Stateless Again, Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality, 1. Februar 2010
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/jordan0210webwcover.pdf

„The West Bank came under Israeli occupation in 1967, and Jordan ceased to exercise control over the area, although it maintained its claim to sovereignty, and Jordanian law continued to apply in the West Bank. In 1983 Jordan introduced color-coded travel cards for Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the West Bank, in order to facilitate their travel to and from the West Bank under Israeli occupation: a green one for West Bank residents, and a yellow one for West Bankers who had moved to the East Bank. The introduction of this system of green and yellow cards in practice created three tiers of citizenship rights, differentiating original East Bank Jordanians and the two groups of West Bank-origin Jordanian nationals (whom Jordanian law still formally considered its nationals and citizens with equal rights). Jordanians residing in the West Bank sometimes lost their right to live in the East Bank. Today, possession of a green or yellow card can serve as the official basis for withdrawing nationality.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 2)

„In his speech on July 31, 1988, King Hussein announced the severance of Jordan’s administrative and legal ties to the West Bank, relinquishing claims to Jordanian sovereignty there. Jordan has not passed any law on the details of the disengagement.

Two days before the king’s disengagement speech, the Ministry of Interior had issued disengagement instructions comprising 22 articles. Article 2 of the instructions provides for withdrawal of Jordanian nationality from residents of the West Bank: ‘Every person residing in the West Bank before the date of 31/7/1988 will be considered as [a] Palestinian citizen and not as Jordanian.’ In his speech King Hussein stressed that disengagement ‘naturally do[es] not relate in any way to the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin.’ In this report, Human Rights Watch does not address the legality of the 1988 announcement of Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank that turned approximately one million Jordanians living in the West Bank into stateless Palestinians. Instead, we document the ongoing and current withdrawal of Jordanian nationality from Jordanians of Palestinian origin living in Jordan.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 17)

„After Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank in July 1988, holders of green cards were considered Palestinians and not Jordanians. This was despite the fact that the disengagement instructions only withdrew Jordanian nationality from those persons who on July 31, 1988, resided in the West Bank, but not, for example, Jordanians of West Bank origin with green cards who had been living for some time, and were presently residing, in the East Bank or abroad.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 22)

„Given the vague, changeable, and apparently unknowable criteria that Israel has applied to granting residency to persons from the West Bank, for Jordan to use these criteria, issued by another country, as the basis for the maintenance of Jordanian nationality is arbitrary.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 25)

„III. Withdrawal of Nationality

Withdrawals of Jordanian nationality have affected men and women of Palestinian origin from all walks of life. One thing they share is that their family roots are in the West Bank. Truck drivers, engineers, surgeons, businesspersons, and a UN official have all been the victims of arbitrary withdrawal of their Jordanian nationality, leaving them stateless, insecure, and with fewer rights than their (erstwhile) fellow Jordanians.

The loss of nationality in the 11 cases described here also extends to several dozen of their family members. For example, loss of a father’s nationality automatically entailed the loss of his children’s nationality, regardless of whether they are minors or adults and whether they had ever lived in the West Bank, and despite the fact that they had acquired Jordanian nationality by birth.

Jordanian officials have provided some statistics indicating that they have withdrawn the nationality of thousands of persons. On June 26, 2009, Fact International Jordan, a news website, published an article based on interviews with officials in the Follow-up and Inspection and in the Civil Status and Passports Departments of the Ministry of Interior, citing 300,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin as the number of files whose review of Jordanian nationality remained outstanding. But official statistics may not capture the real extent of the problem, since they refer only to cases in which new temporary passports without a national number were issued, or yellow cards replaced with green cards, or family books cancelled. These statistics thus fail to capture the number of all Jordanians liable to become subject to withdrawal of nationality. Hundreds of thousands may be at risk.

According to the Jordan Times, Member of Parliament Fakhri Dawud said that authorities had replaced 190 yellow cards with green cards from March 1 through June 30, 2009, compared with 204 such exchanges in the same period in 2008, and 244 in 2007. Exchanging yellow for green cards entails a loss of nationality. In July 2008, Jordan Zad, a news website, cited what it said were official statistics of 352 cases of loss of nationality for the period between January 1 and June 30, 2008. Muwaffaq Kamal reported in Al-Ghadd that official statistics of the Follow-up and Inspection Department showed that 2,732 Jordanians had had their nationality withdrawn based on the disengagement instructions between 2004 and 2008.

Jordanian newspapers have begun to delve into the process of how or why officials decide to withdraw nationality, highlighting some individual cases. The media’s portrayal of the fate of individuals and families at the hands of interior officials mirrors the stories of persons Human Rights Watch interviewed. Ahmad al-Jazzar, a surgeon with a specialization unique in Jordan, had his national number withdrawn, Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported on July 3, 2009. Following publication of his story, the Ministry of Interior on July 18 said the surgeon’s nationality had been restored, following the renewal of his Israeli-issued residency permit.

In an article in Al-Ghadd newspaper, Abu Salim recounts how his wife, who is not named, lost her nationality after trying to get a passport in May 2009. The passport department sent her to the Follow-up and Inspection Department, which claimed that she had failed to renew her Israeli residency permit for the West Bank. She had gone to the West Bank with her two young children around 1993 for a three-week visit, and added her children to her residency permit. While crossing, she was issued a yellow card. She had not left Jordan since that time. Despite having a yellow card, her nationality was withdrawn.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi, in its July 3 article, lists nine persons or families who lost their nationality. In addition to the surgeon al-Jazzar, they include the children of former Jordanian government spokesperson and minister of culture Asma Khadr, and Faris Yusif, who told the paper that officials withdrew his nationality because he had used an ‘enemy airport,’ presumably Israeli, when he flew to Venezuela to visit relatives there as a boy many years ago.

With the stroke of a pen, or, as appears more often to be the case, by verbal notification of an arbitrary government fiat, the situation of these Palestinian-origin Jordanians has changed overnight from one of secure citizenship to a more circumscribed life with limited rights. To some, the shock of losing their nationality provoked utter disbelief. They returned to various Ministry of Interior branches to correct what they believed must be a mistake. ‘I sent perhaps 50 complaints to the ministry, with no result,’ Darwish Qawasma told Human Rights Watch. Others became fearful and cautious, preferring to avoid official contact. All but two persons Human Rights Watch interviewed said they did not want their real names mentioned, because, Fadi explained, ‘this may lead to negative [con]sequences on me and my family in Jordan.’ Several persons told Human Rights Watch of the anguish caused by the loss of their nationality.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 26-28)

„IV. Due Process

Arbitrary Application

In all of the examples cited, the person was not a resident of the West Bank at the time of the disengagement in 1988. In many cases, the person had established a presence in Jordan before 1988, or right after 1991, when Jordanians of Palestinian origin were forced to leave Persian Gulf countries, and Kuwait in particular. Around 250,000 Palestinians with Jordanian travel documents arrived in Jordan at the time, the great majority of whom had full Jordanian passports conveying nationality, while others had temporary Jordanian passports not conveying nationality.

Withdrawal of nationality from Jordanians of Palestinian origin has taken place since the 1990s, though on the scale of thousands, and not the hundreds of thousands of Jordanians who had returned from Kuwait or lived in Jordan but held green cards. As noted above in Chapter III, 2,732 Jordanians had their nationality withdrawn based on the disengagement instructions from 2004 until 2008 (no statistics are available prior to 2004). The fact that hundreds of thousands of persons are presumably in a similar situation living in Jordan indicates that the process of withdrawal is highly selective in its application. There appears no discernable pattern to the selection.

The withdrawals of nationality also have other arbitrary features. In several cases, only certain individuals within a family had their nationality withdrawn, although all family members were resident in Jordan or abroad as of July 31, 1988. Other family members, such as a brother in the army or a sister who is a public school teacher, who were in the same position regarding their residency, retained their national numbers, and thus their nationality.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 36)

„No-Notice Withdrawals

In all cases that Human Rights Watch reviewed, the withdrawal of nationality occurred without warning and was not based on a publicized change in regulations or policies, or following official notification of the person concerned. Rather, it took place during procedures such as renewal of one’s passport, registering of a child on a family book, seeking extension of a postponement for military service, applying for a driver’s license, or following a trip to the West Bank. Often, the person concerned had been living as a Jordanian in Jordan for years, sometimes decades, and there was no reason to doubt the validity of his or her Jordanian nationality. In some cases, they received passports with a national number, introduced in 1992, only to have the national number, and hence their nationality, withdrawn 10 or 15 years later.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 38)

„Appealing Withdrawal

The Follow-up and Inspection Department or the Civil Affairs Department of the Ministry of Interior generally did not provide written confirmation of withdrawal of nationality or a legal basis for the decision. The most common explanation was failure to renew an Israeli-issued residency permit for the West Bank (see below). Such a condition for Jordanian nationality, and only for certain Jordanians of Palestinian origin, is not specified in law.

Those who lost their nationality typically sought to appeal the decision not through a judicial appeal (see below) but by making the rounds of various government departments, including the General Intelligence Department. They wrote petitions for restoring their nationality chiefly on compassionate grounds. Successful appeals involved using connections to persons of influence in government. Procedures for administrative reviews were non-transparent and did not reveal the legal bases for decisions made.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 39)

„Israeli-issued Permits

The most common reason stated for withdrawing nationality was the failure of a Jordanian with a yellow card to obtain or renew an Israeli-issued residency permit, or to obtain an Israeli family unification permit or a Palestinian identity document. Israel controls who obtains Palestinian IDs. Neither Jordan’s nationality law, the disengagement instructions, nor any other published law or decree provides for conditional nationality based on such documents. The absence of a clear legal basis casts doubt on the validity of the requirements to obtain such documents to maintain Jordanian nationality. The fact that obtaining these documents is dependent on the actions of another sovereign state calls into question whether these requirements should properly be among the conditions for holding Jordanian nationality.

In most but not all cases that Human Rights Watch reviewed, Jordanian authorities withdrew nationality from its nationals of Palestinian origin who did not have valid Israeli-issued residence permits, regardless of their presence in the West Bank or in the East Bank in July 1988, when King Hussein announced Jordan’s ‘disengagement’ from the West Bank. Statements by officials confirm that this constitutes Jordanian policy.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 41-42)

„Judicial Redress

Jordanian administrative decisions can be appealed before the High Court of Justice; however, the court’s jurisdiction does not extend to questions involving ‘acts of sovereignty.’ In an early case brought against the withdrawal of nationality, the court in 1990 decided that the disengagement instructions ‘are acts of the State acting as a sovereign and not as an administrative authority. That sovereign has the power to determine that the petitioner, and those who are in the same positions, are Palestinian citizens. It is a well recognised principle that issues of citizenship fall within the very domestic jurisdiction of the State, and the regulation thereof is a matter that pertains to its sovereignty.’

It is difficult to reconcile this apparently unlimited latitude to regulate citizenship that the court grants the sovereign with Jordan’s constitutional mandate that nationality shall be regulated by law. The nationality law provides defined conditions for granting, losing, and withdrawing nationality.

The High Court’s 1990 decision has not barred judicial appeals, but it has set a precedent and deterred those whose nationality has been withdrawn from seeking redress in the courts. […]

In 2006 ‘only nine’ persons appealed decisions to withdraw their nationality to the High Court of Justice, according to NCHR [National Center for Human Rights]. None of the 11 persons Human Rights Watch interviewed sought judicial redress, despite the fact that they had access to available laws and rulings, and had the resources to hire lawyers.

The lack of confidence in the courts may not be justified, as the High Court of Justice has ruled in several cases against the decisions to withdraw nationality, although a lawyer told Human Rights Watch that the court has rarely ruled in favor of applicants since the late 1990s. The court has only provided individual redress, however, the government has continued its practice of arbitrarily withdrawing nationality.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 44-45)

„V. Rights Affected by Loss of Citizenship

The loss of nationality has not only left those affected feeling insecure, but also materially affects their exercise of basic human rights, such as the right to participate in public life, the rights to family life, education, health, work, and the right to property.

The victims of arbitrary withdrawal of their Jordanian nationality also told Human Rights Watch about other ways in which the decision has affected their lives and that of their families. Dr. Walid said, ‘Passport renewal fees for us [stateless Palestinians] are 50 dinars, but only 20 dinars for Jordanians.’ Others said that their driver’s licenses were now valid only for a one year instead of several years, and that they needed GID [General Intelligence Department] permission to obtain them.

Becoming stateless affected the ability to travel, too. Fadi Abbas and other interviewees were reluctant to obtain the temporary passport Jordan offers non-Jordanian Palestinians as a travel document. Abbas said his old passport with a national number expired in June 2009, but he did not want to apply for a temporary passport without a national number, thus documenting his statelessness. In particular, he wanted to keep his loss of nationality a secret so that his pension as a Jordanian would not be challenged. As a result, he does not have a passport and cannot now travel. […]

Right to Family Life

The decisions to withdraw nationality, and thus, in theory, the right to residency in Jordan, have threatened to split-up families, separating spouses from one another, or children from one parent. In all cases Human Rights Watch reviewed, the loss of Jordanian nationality for a man of Palestinian origin entailed the loss of nationality for his children, and often their children too.

Dr. Walid complained that, even if he wanted to, ‘I cannot live in the West Bank because my wife cannot join me there, she has no family unification [permit].’ […]

Right to Health

Jordanians can obtain certain medical treatment for free or at low cost at public health facilities. Stateless Palestinians are excluded from those benefits.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 47-48)

„Right to Education

Jordan does not allow non-citizen children to attend its state elementary and secondary schools. Children whose fathers had their Jordanian nationality arbitrarily withdrawn are thus denied access to these schools, even if they previously attended as citizens. NonJordanian children also face higher university fees, putting the dream of a degree beyond their reach. These now-stateless Palestinians do not have home countries whose education system they easily can turn to. Due to the difficulty of obtaining foreign visas, they may not be able to choose affordable universities in other countries to pursue their education.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 50)

„Right to Work and Social Security

As stateless Palestinians, those stripped of their Jordanian nationality automatically lose the ability to work as public employees for the government. What is more, loss of nationality entails a host of additional obstacles to work in the private sector. Human Rights Watch did not find cases in which Palestinians were required to obtain work permits, like other foreigners, although some said in theory they would be obliged to do so.

The General Intelligence Department in Jordan reportedly has to give its consent for individuals to work in certain private companies, especially banks and other strategic firms. Yusif Dawudiya said his son ‘will finish his master’s degree in 2009, but he cannot find work with private companies because they all require him to have a national number. The GID does not give work approval to those who don’t have the number’.

A GID certificate of good conduct is required for obtaining a visa to several Gulf countries, and the GID only provides them for Jordanian nationals. The children of those who worked in Persian Gulf countries and who are now stripped of their nationality face becoming stateless, too, and hence losing the legal basis for their own employment in the Gulf. […]

In Jordan, professional associations regulated by law support their members and provide retirement benefits. Membership is mandatory to practice a profession in Jordan, but open only to Jordanians.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 52-53)

„Right to Property

Jordanians who lost their nationality are finding that they cannot acquire property, register a car or business, or liquidate their investments. Human Rights Watch has not conducted a review of all applicable laws, but at least in the cases presented here, the rights of these persons to own property appeared to be restricted arbitrarily based on their statelessness.“ (HRW, 1. Februar 2010, S. 54)

Das Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) ist ein unabhängiges Verwaltungstribunal, das für Entscheidungen in Asyl- und Einwanderungsverfahren zuständig ist.

·      IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Jordan: Treatment of individuals of Palestinian descent, including stateless Palestinians, by society and state authorities; access to employment, education, health care, and housing; state protection (2021–May 2024) [JOR201736.E], 8. Oktober 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2120186.html

„In its 2024 report on Jordan, Freedom House writes that Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent are at ‘risk’ of ‘arbitrary revocation of citizenship or documentation’ (2024-02-29, Sec. F4). Similarly, the Programme Manager indicated that ‘increasing instances of arbitrary legal processes and elusive policies’ used by Jordanian authorities to ‘strip Palestinian refugees of documentation and rights’ previously conferred, including those with ‘full Jordanian citizenship,’ has led to the revocation of ‘thousands’ of Palestinian Jordanians' citizenship since 2004 (2024-03-06).“ (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 2.2)

„According to BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (BADIL), a ‘human rights non-profit organization’ that is registered with the Palestinian Ministry of Interior and advocates for the rights of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons (BADIL n.d.), Palestinian refugees without Jordanian citizenship have ‘limited employment opportunities and no access to social benefits’ other than the services offered by UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] (BADIL 2022, 59). Similarly, the Programme Manager spoke of stateless Palestinians as having limited to access to documentation and education, and no access to welfare support and health care, except for services offered by UNWRA (2024-03-06). An article published by a professor of history at Rice University, Texas, and two researchers in the Middle East program at the Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy also reports that ex-Gazans are ‘excluded’ from ‘most rights and services’ due to their citizenship status and have to get education and health care from UNRWA (Citino, et al. 2023-05-03).“ (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 3)

„Sources report that Palestinian refugees without Jordanian citizenship do not have access to [‘most’ (Programme Manager 2024-03-06)] jobs in the public sector (Programme Manager 2024-03-06; Associate Researcher 2023-10-31). Freedom House writes that Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent are ‘often excluded from jobs in the public sector and security forces, which are dominated by East Bank tribes’ (2024-02-29, Sec. F4). The Senior Researcher stated that it is ‘possible’ that Palestinians ‘may’ face additional obstacles to employment in some branches of the Jordanian military and security services due to their ‘suspected affinity to radical Islamism’ or other doubts about their ‘loyalty’ to the Jordanian regime (2023-11-10).  […]

As cited in the Danish Immigration Service report, the Principal Researcher at the Lebanese American University indicated that ‘[n]on-citizens, e.g. ex-Gazans’ face ‘constraints in getting private sector jobs,’ ‘often’ resulting in having ‘no other choice but to receive help from UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East]’ (Denmark 2020-06, 71). According to sources, Palestinians who do not hold Jordanian citizenship (Programme Manager 2024-03-06) or ex-Gazans (Associate Researcher 2023-10-31) require work permits (Programme Manager 2024-03-06; Associate Researcher 2023-10-31) to access private sector jobs (Programme Manager 2024-03-06). The Associate Researcher noted that these permits are ‘quasi free’ of charge for ex-Gazans (2023-10-31). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.“ (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 3.1)

„As cited in the Danish Immigration Service report, the Principal Researcher at the Lebanese American University stated that ‘[n]on-citizens, e.g. ex-Gazans, cannot enter Jordanian public schools for free,’ and ‘are treated as Arab foreigners when accessing higher education’ (Denmark 2020-06, 71). According to the article by the research team at Rice University, because they are ‘barred from citizenship’ and have to ‘pay double the tuition fees to access public schools and universities,’ Palestinians from Gaza must rely on UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] to access education (Citino, et al. 2023-05-03). The Associate Researcher indicated that on ‘principle, all refugees have access to primary and secondary education’; however, the same source noted that for university education, ex-Gazans or those who arrived from Syria are charged international tuition fees (three times higher) due to their status as ‘foreigners’ (2023-10-31).“ (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 3.2)

„According to the OHCHR [Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] compilation on Jordan, Palestinian refugees without Jordanian citizenship are confronted with ‘barriers to accessing health services’ (UN 2023-11-10, para. 32). A report on Palestinian refugees' access to health services in Jordan by UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] specifies that although ‘most’ Palestinians in Jordan possess Jordanian citizenship and ‘have the same access to health care as other Jordanian citizens,’ those who do not must contend with ‘restrictions on their access to health care, leaving them extremely vulnerable’ (UN n.d.d). According to the article by the research team at Rice University, because they are ‘barred from citizenship and are excluded from most rights and services,’ Palestinians from Gaza must rely on UNRWA for health care (Citino, et al. 2023-05-03). The Associate Researcher indicated that ex-Gazans turn to UNRWA for basic health services, but when it comes to serious illnesses like cancer, they are required to shoulder the expenses for treatment, because they are ‘foreigners’ (2023-10-31).“ (IRB, 8. Oktober 2024, section 3.3)

The Legal Agenda ist eine in Beirut ansässige, gemeinnützige Forschungs- und Interessenvertretungsorganisation, die 2009 von Juristen, Wissenschaftlern und Menschenrechtsaktivisten gegründet wurde. Sie ist im Libanon, in Tunesien und anderen Teilen der arabischen Welt tätig, um soziale Gerechtigkeit, Menschenrechte und öffentliche Rechenschaftspflicht zu fördern.

·      Legal Agenda (The): Revoking Jordanian Citizenship: Disengagement or Discrimination, 16. Februar 2016
https://english.legal-agenda.com/revoking-jordanian-citizenship-disengagement-or-discrimination/

„In 1988, King Hussein announced that Jordan ‘respects the desire of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people [under the Arab League decision in 1974], to separate from us as an independent Palestinian state’. Accordingly, Jordan cut legal and administrative ties with the West Bank in what is known as the ‘disengagement decision’. It should be noted that the widely-known decision was not issued in writing, but verbally by the Jordanian monarch.

Based on this verbal decision, the disengagement instructions were issued under which West Bank residents lost their Jordanian nationality and Jordanian citizenship rights, and became Palestinians without an official nationality under the Israeli occupation. Pursuant to these instructions, every resident of the West Bank before July 31, 1988 was deemed a Palestinian citizen, not Jordanian. As a result, the process turned one million people in the West Bank from green card holders to stateless Palestinians.

Withdrawing Jordanian Nationality

The Jordanian government continued to withdraw Jordanian nationality from all those the disengagement instructions were applicable to. It did so by refusing to renew their Jordanian passports and by giving them temporary ones that did not carry a national [ID] number assigned to Jordanian citizens only.

The instructions were repeatedly amended, the latest of which occurred in 2011. According to its current form, Jordanian citizenship shall be revoked from those who fall under the following categories:

Any person that has a Palestinian ID and works for the Palestinian National Authority;

Any person that has a valid or expired Israeli occupation ID card;

[US] Green Card holders;

Anyone who left Palestine between 1967 and 1988 and holds an Israeli ID card, among those covered by the census which was carried out by the Israeli occupation after 1967; and

Anyone holding Arab identification documents.

There are no clear figures on the number of people whose citizenship has been revoked. However, some unofficial figures indicate that the Ministry of Interior’s Follow-up and Inspection Department has withdrawn Jordanian nationality from over 2,700 Jordanians between 2004 and 2008 (a report by Human Rights Watch, issued in 2010).

The Jordanian Judiciary’s Position

The revocation of citizenship is considered an administrative decision that can be challenged before the administrative court. Consequently, if there is a mistake in the implementation of the instructions, the decision can be abolished. However, the administrative judiciary has concluded that the disengagement decision under which the written instructions were issued, is a sovereign decision that does not fall within its jurisdiction and may not be appealed. The most recent interpretation by the administrative court was Ruling No. 49/2014. […]

It is worth noting that in 2010, through administrative follow-up with the Ministry of Interior, the NCHR [National Centre for Human Rights] was able to retain citizenship to 14 citizens who filed complaints to the center to grieve the withdrawal of their nationality. The then-Commissioner General of the center Muhyiddin Toq said that the response ratio by the Ministry of Interior was 30% of the total number of people (54 persons) who filed complaints.“ (The Legal Agenda, 16. Februar 2016)

The New Arab ist eine in London angesiedelte Nachrichten-Website mit den Schwerpunkten Naher Osten und Nordafrika.

·      New Arab (The): Jordan to 'revoke citizenship' of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, senior PA officials, 26. April 2018
https://www.newarab.com/news/jordan-revoke-citizenship-palestinian-president-mahmoud-abbas

„Thousands of Jordanians of Palestinian origins have been arbitrarily stripped of their citizenship by Jordan over the past decade, rights groups say.

Jordanian officials have defended the policy as a means to counter future Israeli plans to transfer the Palestinian population of the Israeli-occupied West Bank to Jordan.“ (The New Arab, 26. April 2018)

Michael Vicente Pérez ist außerordentlicher Professor für Anthropologie an der Universität Memphis und Lehrbeauftragter an der Universität Washington.

·      Pérez, Michael Vicente: Living as Stateless Palestinians in Jordan, 7. März 2024
https://www.sapiens.org/culture/palestinian-refugees-exile-displacement-jordan/

„Because Gaza was under Egyptian administration until Israel occupied the territory in 1967, the Jordanian government has treated these individuals as Arab foreign residents in the country. Consequently, the government has refused Gazans many of the rights afforded by Palestinian citizens of Jordan, including equal access to health care, employment, and education—compounding the harsh conditions they already faced. […]

Gaza refugees, like Palestinian citizens in Jordan, can access primary and secondary education either through UNRWA or Jordanian public schools at no cost. Diala’s test scores were among the highest in her class—good enough to get accepted at the University of Jordan, the country’s top public institution. Without citizenship, however, Diala would have had to pay a much higher tuition rate, and she was not eligible for national scholarships. […]

Only after being rejected from all the jobs he applied for did her son discover a little-known regulation that prohibits Gazans from working in hotels. Like many of the rules governing Gazans’ lives in Jordan, she said the regulation was never publicized and thus took them all by surprise. […]

Today many employment restrictions for Gazans remain in place. As stateless people, they’re prohibited from employment in the public sector and face numerous restrictions on the private market in fields including dentistry, journalism, medicine, and engineering. Such restrictions have contributed to making Gazans among the poorest of all Palestinians in Jordan.

Until 2007, Gazans were excluded from government health care programs for the poor and certain treatments at government hospitals in Jordan. They had few options for addressing medical conditions that fell beyond the basic care offered by UNRWA. That’s the situation Walid had found himself in with his leg. Fortunately, the government extended national health care coverage for Gaza refugees under the age of 6 in 2007. It also extended subsidized coverage to adult Gazans for certain treatments at government hospitals, although their coverage remains limited compared to Jordanian citizens.“ (Pérez, 7. März 2024)

Das Palestinian Return Centre ist eine in London ansässige Interessensvertretung, die sich unter anderem für das Recht der Rückkehr von Palästinenser·innen einsetzt.

·      PRC – Palestinian Return Centre: Revoking Citizenships: Future of Palestinians in Jordan, 11. September 2012
https://prc.org.uk/en/post/2741/revoking-citizenships-future-of-palestinians-in-jordan

„Revoking the citizenship of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origins started when the late King Hussein severed the legal and administrative links between Jordan and its own occupied territory of the West Bank in July of 1988. […]

As far as citizenship, the King stated in his speech that whoever in Palestine at that time will be considered Palestinian (non-Jordanian citizen) and whoever in Jordan is a Jordanian (including Jordanian with roots in the West Bank).Although King Hussein speech did not and could not carry the force of the law and inherently unconstitutional, it was however, followed by ‘legal instructions’ which are the lowest level of the legal code in Jordan and were followed by ‘secret interpretations’ put forward by the interior ministry officials to decide how to enforce the king’s ‘unconstitutional’ decision. For Abu al-Riesh however, he was at that exact time serving in the Jordanian armed forces which was mandatory for Jordanian citizens and was never a resident of the West Bank therefore he should not have been stripped of his citizenship. In the view of Bassam Badareen who is one of the foremost experts on this issue in Jordan and the bureau chief for London-based Al Quds Al Arabi, this case and many others like it is an outright discrimination against Palestinians in Jordan. ‘Denationalizing Jordanian citizens is carried out by secret instructions by a secret committee within the intelligence and security agencies and its sole purpose is to scare the Palestinians in Jordan from demanding their civil and electoral rights. Badareen has chronicled numerous cases of Palestinians in Jordan who were arbitrarily stripped of Jordanian citizenship and is part of a group of activists who demand that the government restore the citizenship of those who were arbitrarily denationalized. […]

For Abu al Riesh, revoking his citizenship has almost ruined his $ 10 million a year car business and complicated his family life and his children lives who found themselves without documentation to even register for school.“ (PRC, 11. September 2012)

Das US Department of State (USDOS) ist das US-amerikanische Außenministerium.

·      USDOS - US Department of State: 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Jordan, 12. April 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2071204.html

„For PRS [Palestine Refugees from Syria] with Jordanian citizenship, potential revocation of that citizenship remained a concern. The UN Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) was aware of at least 50 cases of citizenship revocation since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011. In most cases authorities did not provide information concerning the reasons for the revocation.“ (USDOS, 12. April 2022, section 2f)

·      USDOS - US Department of State: 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Jordan, 23. April 2024
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2107743.html

„Citizenship: The law stipulated the conditions under which the cabinet could, with the king’s approval, revoke citizenship, but the Ministry of Interior sometimes performed revocations without cabinet or royal approval, without notifying an individual in advance, and without giving them the opportunity to correct the issue.

For some PRS [Palestine Refugees from Syria] with Jordanian citizenship, potential revocation of that citizenship remained a concern. In most cases, authorities did not provide information concerning the reasons for revocation.“ (USDOS, 23. April 2024, section D)

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