Executive Summary:
- Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party announced the creation of a special division to monitor public communication and prosecute hate speech on May 18, adding to fears that the government is institutionalizing censorship and expanding control over dissent and online criticism.
- Critics, including human rights groups and even clergy members, warn that new laws criminalizing insults against officials enable arbitrary enforcement against journalists, activists, and opposition figures and threaten freedom of expression.
- Evolving censorship and surveillance in Georgia increasingly resemble People’s Republic of China-style internet controls, raising concerns that intensified repression could deepen polarization and spur new political resistance within Georgian society.
On May 18, Georgian State Minister for Coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies Mamuka Mdinaradze announced the creation of a special body within the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. This dedicated division will monitor “public communication” and ensure that hate, hostility, and insults are not spread in society. The Georgian government explains the initiative is necessary “to protect the public environment from aggressive rhetoric and toxic communication” (Facebook/GDMamukaMdinaradze, May 18). On May 22, Sputnik Georgia reported on the creation of the Council for Monitoring Russophobia in Georgia. The council says it intends to “document cases of alleged disinformation about Russia, distortion of historical events, as well as discrimination based on language or ethnicity.” The monitoring will cover public statements, publications, and the actions of individuals and legal entities. A group of lawyers is also being established within the council to provide legal assessments of identified cases and prepare appeals when necessary (Sputnik Georgia, May 22). This is just the latest step the ruling Georgian Dream government is taking to control the Georgian population, bringing the country farther down its authoritarian path.
This idea immediately provoked a strong reaction from human rights defenders. Chair of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Tamar Oniani, stated that this is not simply about combating hate speech but about creating an institutional mechanism to control dissent and criticism of the government. According to critics, this effectively creates a body for censorship and the restriction of freedom of expression (Publika.ge, May 18). Oniani also directed attention to a case law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which politicians and public officials must tolerate a significantly higher level of criticism than ordinary citizens. Therefore, attempts to provide additional legal protection against harsh criticism are seen as a threat to freedom of expression (Facebook.com/tato.oniani.756, May 18).
In February 2025, an article was added to the Georgian Code of Administrative Offenses allowing citizens to be held accountable for “insulting” public officials (Legislative Herald of Georgia, February 6, 2025). The relevant legal provisions already exist, and a new mechanism is now being introduced to ensure their more effective implementation. The introduction of such a requirement into the code, however, was sharply criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). According to the ODIHR, these norms are formulated too broadly and allow for arbitrary interpretation, including vague and subjective concepts such as “verbal insults” and “other insulting behavior” (ODIHR, November 12, 2025). This creates a risk of arbitrary enforcement against journalists, activists, and the opposition.
Under the law, initiating an administrative case previously required the injured party to file a complaint. In 2025, many civil activists, journalists, and opposition politicians were fined large sums for allegedly insulting public officials after representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party had filed lawsuits (Radio Tavisupleba, June 13, 2025).
According to statements from Georgian Dream representatives, the creation of the special division will mean that filing a complaint will no longer be required. From now on, this special division within the Ministry of Internal Affairs will conduct regular monitoring of social media and other media outlets. If such a violation is detected, the alleged offender will automatically be brought to court as a defendant. Critics of the government are concerned that the new agency will primarily focus on monitoring and controlling social networks, especially Facebook, which is the most active platform for political activity in Georgia (Netgazeti.ge, May 19).
According to the Code of Administrative Offenses, as an alternative measure, a court may impose administrative detention for up to two months (Legislative Herald of Georgia, February 6, 2025). As the newly established agency for monitoring and controlling expressions gains momentum, concerns are growing in Georgia that the number of prisoners in the country could increase. This comes despite Georgia already ranking among the leading countries in Europe in terms of incarceration rates. According to data updated on May 18, Georgia ranks fourth among European countries in prisoners per 100,000 people, with 232 prisoners per 100,000 people (Council of Europe, May 18).
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze justified the creation of the new body as a national task. He claims that it protects the country from attempts to artificially impose polarization that, according to him, originates abroad and is based on a pseudo-liberal ideology, aimed at sowing hatred in society (1tv.ge, May 18). On May 19, Kobakhidze additionally assured the public that the new structure would “operate in accordance with international standards of freedom of expression” (Netgazeti.ge, May 19). Within the country’s ruling elite, the legalization of what critics call censorship is essentially being justified on the grounds of national security. Georgian Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili claims that methods involving hate speech are being used to influence Georgia’s domestic politics and are allegedly borrowed from the manuals of foreign intelligence services, and notes that “hate speech is encouraged from Brussels” (Interpressnews, May 18).
The controversy surrounding the creation of the new body has revealed the gradual and unexpected emergence of a relatively independent actor within Georgia’s political landscape, in the form of certain representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC). This process has become especially noticeable amid growing discussions about the future balance of influence within the GOC following the declining public role of late Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II. Whereas in previous years many influential clerics largely refrained from publicly criticizing the authorities, some members of the clergy are now becoming increasingly vocal in political and social debates.
One of the first high-ranking clerics to publicly criticize the initiative was Zenon Iarajuli, a member of the Holy Synod. According to Bishop Zenon, there is a danger that the fight against hate speech could “gradually turn into a mechanism for controlling public discourse and consciousness, which would ultimately damage both freedom and the foundations of democratic coexistence and spiritual culture” (Facebook/zenon.iarajuli, May 19). The bishop also stressed that for the GOC, both hatred and humiliation of human dignity, as well as restrictions on freedom of expression, are equally unacceptable. Concerns over the possible transformation of hate speech regulation into an instrument of political control are now being voiced not only by human rights organizations and the opposition, but also by parts of the conservative clergy traditionally perceived as more loyal to the ruling party.
Local media suspect that Georgian Dream has borrowed methods from the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Cyberspace Administration—often referred to as the PRC’s “internet censor”—to suppress dissent under the pretext of combating “hate speech.” In April, Zhuang Rongwen, the director of the PRC’s Cyberspace Administration, visited both Georgia and Azerbaijan (Radio Tavisupleba, April 24). According to official reports, Zhuang arrived in Georgia to discuss cooperation in developing the digital economy, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence (Georgian Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development, April 21). Local media, however, link the visit specifically to Georgian Dream’s alleged plans to introduce PRC-style internet censorship methods (Radio Tavisupleba, April 24). Concerns stem from existing experience, as in recent years, Georgian law enforcement agencies have increasingly used PRC surveillance technologies, including facial-recognition-equipped video surveillance systems, to identify and track demonstrators. The Georgian authorities have used such technologies to identify activists participating in protests for subsequent prosecution (Facebook/monitorstudio, February 20, 2025).
On May 18, Georgian media reported that Georgian Dream is once again tightening the regulation of broadcasters. Last year, under amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, media companies were prohibited from receiving direct or indirect funding from foreign sources. Now, the Communications Commission will gain the authority to request information on financial transfers involving individuals who may directly or indirectly fund media service providers and video-sharing platforms (Interpressnews, May 18).
The introduction of new restrictive norms, rather than the declared goal of reducing polarization, may lead to an expansion of administrative control over public communication and increased pressure on critical speech in Georgia. At the same time, it may produce the opposite effect for Georgian Dream—heightening social tensions and encouraging the emergence of new, less predictable centers of influence. Noticeable activation of certain representatives of the clergy, who are beginning to act as a more independent political voice, is filling the emerging vacuum in the public sphere.
