The president serves six-year terms and is not subject to term limits. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro was awarded a third consecutive term following the July 2024 presidential election. All major opposition candidates were barred from contesting the election. However, Venezuela’s main opposition alliance, the Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), was permitted to register retired diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia after several prominent opposition figures had been disqualified.

After the election, the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced Maduro’s victory but refused to release the full results or the voting tallies—a paper count from each voting machine used to corroborate the CNE’s digital results. According to voting tallies released by the opposition, however, González won the presidency with 67 percent of the vote. These voting tallies were legally collected by certified poll workers and volunteer election witnesses, and deemed credible by independent analysts.

The government-aligned Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) denounced the opposition-published voting tallies as forgeries and certified Maduro’s victory in August 2024, but failed to produce evidence to support either claim. Authorities subsequently issued an arrest warrant against González; he was ultimately forced to sign a document conceding the election and fled to Spain that September.

A wide range of independent analysts and observers agree that the election was neither democratic nor credible. The election was marred by the incumbent’s abuse of government resources, excessive media coverage benefitting Maduro’s campaign, a serious lack of transparency and integrity, and significant irregularities in the vote count. The governments of more than 30 countries and the European Union (EU) ultimately recognized González as having won the election.

The unicameral National Assembly is popularly elected for five-year terms, using a mix of majoritarian and proportional-representation voting. The country’s major opposition parties boycotted the May 2025 National Assembly elections to protest the regime’s control over the CNE and the extensive electoral fraud committed during the 2024 presidential election. The CNE also disqualified a number of opposition parties and candidates, preventing some who did not participate in the boycott from contesting the vote. According to the CNE, a coalition led by the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) won more than 80 percent of the vote, taking a majority of seats in the National Assembly. Progovernment candidates also took all but one of the country’s 24 governorships in the regional elections, held simultaneously with the legislative elections, and secured a majority of seats in the July municipal elections.

Voter turnout in May was low, with government sources reporting a 42 percent turnout and opposition leader María Corina Machado claiming that turnout was below 15 percent. Like in 2024, the CNE failed to publish official results for the May and July 2025 elections, prompting experts to question the government’s claims regarding both voter turnout and election results.

The opposition-controlled National Assembly that was initially elected in 2015 again voted to extend its term in December 2024. While the body continued to operate in 2025, internal criticism and divisions have grown, and its political relevance has declined significantly, even among the opposition.

The electoral system is heavily influenced by political manipulation and pro–PSUV institutional interference. A 2024 postelection report by poll observers from the Carter Center noted that the CNE “demonstrated a clear bias in favor of the incumbent” throughout that year’s election period.

In 2025, the government once again used its control of state institutions to gain an undue electoral advantage, securing unfair victories for progovernment candidates in the May and July elections. Though Venezuelan law requires the release of the full electoral results, the CNE failed to publish the full results of the 2024 presidential election or to produce evidence of Maduro’s purported victory. The CNE similarly failed to present the full results of the May legislative and regional elections and the July municipal elections in 2025.

While opposition coalitions and parties exist, the ruling PSUV uses state resources as well as security forces and the judiciary to disrupt parties that directly challenge its dominant position. In recent years, the TSJ has suspended and replaced the leaders of opposition parties. Of the 34 political parties that were able to present candidates for the 2024 presidential election, just three belonged to the opposition. Only one of the opposition parties that backed Edmundo González’s 2024 presidential bid, A New Time (UNT), was permitted to register candidates for the May 2025 legislative election.

Opposition leaders have long been harassed, attacked, imprisoned, and otherwise impeded from participating in political processes. Between January and June 2025, more than 60 political leaders were arrested, including Enrique Márquez, a former presidential candidate who condemned the fraudulent 2024 presidential election, and Juan Pablo Guanipa, a close associate of prominent opposition leader María Corina Machado. Although Machado remained a key target of government forces, and despite an existing travel ban, she was able to secretly leave Venezuela in December and travel to Norway to claim the Nobel Peace Prize, which was awarded to her earlier in the year for her support of democracy in Venezuela.

Even though the government released approximately 200 political prisoners between July and December 2025, according to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Foro Penal (Criminal Forum), 902 political prisoners were being held in Venezuela at year’s end. The majority were detained following the 2024 presidential election, after which authorities conducted mass arrests of dissidents without legal orders in an initiative labeled “Operación Tun-Tun” (Operation Knock-Knock).

Discontent with the Maduro regime remains widespread, but the government has cut off virtually all avenues for political change at a national level, and it has used a variety of tactics to create divisions within the opposition movement. Numerous prominent opposition leaders have been subject to arbitrary bans on their participation in elections in recent years. The regime also used the lifting of bans on certain politicians to sow discord and create divisions among the opposition. In 2025, the CNE lifted an earlier ban and permitted opposition candidate Henrique Capriles to participate in the May legislative election, while arbitrarily denying other opposition candidates the ability to contest the same polls.

The Maduro regime relies on the military, paramilitary forces, and opaque support from foreign states to retain political power. Military leaders have taken control of numerous offices, and Maduro has continued to strengthen the Bolivarian Militia, a millions-strong civilian militia group established in 2008 to support the military. In late August 2025, the United States began significantly building up its naval presence in the Caribbean, with the stated aim of combatting drug trafficking. In response, the Maduro regime began pressuring public employees to join the Bolivarian Militia to help patrol and defend the country; some people have claimed that they were ordered to join the militia by their superiors.

Separately, irregular, state-affiliated armed groups known as colectivos routinely commit acts of violence against civilians and carry out government-backed intimidation efforts. In recent years, some independent news reports have suggested that the Maduro regime may have worked with international criminal organizations like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and Tren de Aragua to attack and detain political dissidents.

The regime continued to intensify the repression and persecution of its political opponents in 2025. Real and perceived opponents of the Maduro government have been increasingly subjected to arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances. At least 15 forced disappearances of dissidents or those accused of opposing the regime have been reported since the 2024 presidential election, including the disappearance of Rafael Tudares Bracho, Edmundo González’s son-in-law, after his arrest in January 2025. Family members of opposition leaders and activists have been targeted for harassment and persecution. Dissidents outside of Venezuela also remain at risk.

According to a 2025 report by the NGO Families of Military Political Prisoners in Venezuela (FPPM), Venezuelan military personnel have been systematically targeted by the Maduro regime. Data released by Foro Penal in August 2025 indicated that around 20 percent of political prisoners in Venezuela had links with the military.

The regime’s increasing suppression of dissent in recent years has significantly reduced the ability of minority and marginalized groups—even those nominally represented in the government—to meaningfully advocate for their interests outside of the PSUV’s electoral and political goals.

Though some women hold senior positions in government, there is a lack of policy discussion regarding issues that primarily affect women. Almost no openly LGBT+ people hold senior political or government positions in Venezuela. Indigenous people in Venezuela are poorly represented in politics, and members of these groups struggle to bring government attention to their concerns.

Venezuela does not function as a representative democracy and the Maduro regime has become increasingly dependent on economic, medical, military, and other assistance from foreign allies, particularly the governments of Cuba, Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

Leftist guerrilla groups from Colombia have increased their influence in Venezuelan cities near the border. According to UN investigators, the ELN guerrilla group operates in the state of Bolívar and has an agreement with the government to control illegal mining activity.

A range of independent analysts, NGOs, and US government officials have linked the Maduro regime to domestic and international organized crime groups. High-ranking government and military officials, along with state institutions, have been accused of enabling or operating on behalf of these organized crime groups.

In August 2025, the US government began building up the country’s military presence in the southern Caribbean with the stated intent of combatting drug trafficking in the region; analysts viewed the deployment as an attempt by the US government to exert pressure on the Maduro regime, and perhaps a precursor to US military action against Venezuela. US troops launched numerous attacks in the Caribbean Sea on boats that left from Venezuela, which US officials claimed were smuggling drugs.

Corruption is rampant in Venezuela. The government’s economic policies—particularly its currency and price controls—offer significant opportunities for illicit market activity and collusion between public officials and organized crime networks. Authorities in jurisdictions including the United States, Canada, Panama, and the European Union have imposed sanctions on Venezuelan officials for corruption and other offenses that went uninvestigated in Venezuela.

Independent journalists have faced persecution after reporting about corruption.

There is virtually no transparency regarding government spending. The Maduro regime has consistently failed to publish reliable crime and economic data. In June 2025, the regime launched a crackdown on economists attempting to collect independent data on the country’s economic situation. At least eight people were detained, including Rodrigo Cabezas, who served as finance minister in former President Hugo Chavez’s administration.

The media operate within a highly restrictive regulatory and legal environment. The Maduro regime maintains a state-controlled media infrastructure that promotes its political and ideological program. In mid-2024, the National College of Journalists (CNP) reported that at least 405 media outlets had closed in the preceding 20 years. In 2025, the regime ordered the closure of at least seven radio stations and one television station across Venezuela.

Independent journalists are at risk of government pressure, arbitrary arrest, and physical violence. The CNP reported in December 2025 that it had documented 111 incidents of press freedom suppression between January and November, including harassment, obstruction, and 19 arbitrary detentions. In February, intelligence officers arrested Rory Branker, a journalist and the editor of Venezuelan news website La Patilla, in front of his home. He was forcibly disappeared following his detention and held incommunicado until September, when his family was permitted to speak with him; he was again disappeared within the prison system in December. The CNP counted 21 imprisoned journalists in Venezuela at year’s end.

Foreign media has also been targeted by the regime. In March 2025, the government blocked access to the website of international media agency EFE days after Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello criticized the outlet for publishing an interview with an opposition activist.

During 2025, numerous social media platforms, including Telegram and TikTok, were blocked at different times.

Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom are generally respected, though relations between the government and the Roman Catholic Church remain tense. According to the 2023 edition of the US State Department’s Report on International Religious Freedom, there is a pattern of antisemitic content in regime-affiliated media outlets and social media posts.

In recent years, Maduro has strengthened ties with evangelical groups and devoted significant resources to gaining the electoral support of evangelical voters. In January 2025, the government announced that it had established a Vice Ministry of Religious Institutions and Worship, which officials say will work with religious institutions and allow Christian churches to visit jails and prisons.

Academic freedom has come under mounting pressure in recent years, as budget cuts and other funding problems have led to a decline in research capabilities within Venezuela, undermined universities’ autonomy, and prompted repeated protests by university professors and an exodus of academics from the country.

The regime continues to exert political influence over universities’ leadership and internal affairs. In recent years, the TSJ has suspended the elections for leadership positions within at least two universities. In June 2025, the Ministry of Higher Education announced that universities would no longer be permitted to administer their own internal admissions tests for prospective students, instead granting control of all student admission processes to the government’s Office of University Sector Planning. It is unclear whether the system had been implemented by the end of 2025.

Freedom for personal expression is severely constrained in Venezuela, due in part to the deterrent effect of extensive government surveillance.

During 2024, the Maduro regime cracked down on perceived dissent both before and after the presidential election. International human rights organizations warned that the government had increased “its digital surveillance and censorship measures” in the postelection period, and numerous people were detained for expressing critical opinions about the election on social media. The repression of individuals’ freedom of expression continued in 2025, as the government sought to systematically suppress criticism of the regime.

In August 2024, the government implemented changes to the regime-backed VenApp, created in 2022 to report public services problems, to allow the public to report political protests and dissidents to the authorities. In October 2025, Maduro requested that the reporting feature be updated and expanded to allow users to report “everything they see, everything they hear.”

While guaranteed by the constitution, freedom of assembly is severely restricted in practice, and violent clashes between protesters and security forces are known to occur.

Mass protests broke out across Venezuela following the 2024 presidential election, with thousands of people taking to the streets to dispute incumbent President Maduro’s unsubstantiated claim to victory. Security forces and progovernment armed groups responded to the mostly peaceful protests with disproportionate force, carrying out arbitrary arrests and using tear gas and live ammunition to disperse crowds. Thousands of people were arrested, and over 20 people were killed during the protests. A September 2025 report by a UN independent fact-finding mission investigating human rights violations in Venezuela found that 25 people were killed during protests July 29–30, 2024, and presented evidence that implicated state security officials in at least 12 of the deaths.

Significantly fewer protests were held in the first half of 2025 than in the same period the previous year, according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict. In January, María Corina Machado emerged from hiding to participate in a mass opposition protest; she was arrested while leaving the event, but was ultimately released.

Harassment, threats, and legal and administrative sanctions against human rights activists and NGOs continued in 2025. The Center for Defenders and Justice (CDJ), a nongovernmental organization focused on human rights in Venezuela, documented 321 attacks on human rights defenders and organizations during the first half of 2025, categorized as stigmatization (190), intimidation and harassment (95), threats (27), arbitrary detention (6), judicialization (1), and other offenses (2).

Numerous human rights activists faced arbitrary and politically motivated arrests during the year, particularly during the lead-up to Maduro’s inauguration in January. The families of human rights defenders are also at risk of harassment and violence by the Maduro regime. In September, Pedro Hernández, a human rights activist, was forcibly disappeared; days later, his father and wife were also reportedly disappeared. In a May 2025 statement, Amnesty International said that the Venezuelan government had undertaken a “systematic policy of repression against civil society.”

The National Assembly approved a law in 2024 allowing the government to dissolve NGOs if they promote hate speech or fascism or become involved in political activity.

Workers are legally entitled to form unions, bargain collectively, and strike, with some restrictions on public-sector workers’ ability to strike. In practice, however, these rights are not guaranteed.

Between 2013 and 2023, 120 union leaders were arrested, according to Venezuelan human rights NGO Provea (Venezuelan Program of Education–Action in Human Rights), and a 2022 report from the Observatory for the Defense of Life (Odevida) recorded the assassinations of at least 44 union leaders between 2015 and 2020.

The politicization of the judicial branch, which increased dramatically under former President Hugo Chávez, has progressed further under Maduro. The TSJ, made up of 20 judges selected by the PSUV–controlled National Assembly, has issued numerous decisions that favored the Maduro regime. UN experts have repeatedly criticized the judiciary’s lack of independence.

In September 2025, at least 14 members of the judiciary were arrested for alleged corruption. Independent observers have described the arrests as likely representing a purge of the judicial system by the Maduro regime.

Perceived opponents of the government and the PSUV are routinely detained and prosecuted without regard for due process, including civilians and service members who are brought before military courts. Victims of violence at the hands of the state have no realistic avenue for redress.

In 2024, a UN fact-finding mission to Venezuela reported that the authorities had gravely violated the due process rights of people who were arbitrarily detained following the July presidential election. The mission later reported that detainees’ due process rights were being “systematically” violated at an “unprecedented level.” Due process violations documented in 2024 and 2025 included charging individuals with serious crimes without evidence, withholding information about detainees’ whereabouts from their families and lawyers, and preventing detainees from choosing their own legal representation.

Venezuelans face physical insecurity and violence from several sources, including irregular armed groups, security forces, and organized gangs. In 2024, Venezuelan human rights NGOs Provea and Foro Penal reported that at least 10,085 executions, 1,652 cases of torture, and 15,000 arrests had been carried out by police and military forces between 2013 and 2023. In an April 2025 publication, Provea reported that 522 people were killed by police, military, and government forces between January and December 2024.

Colombian guerrilla groups and criminal organizations continued to operate on the Venezuelan side of the border in 2025. According to a 2024 press release by NGO Fundaredes (Foundations), more than 1,000 Venezuelans have disappeared along the border since 2019.

Prisons in Venezuela are among the worst in the region. Detention facilities suffer from severe overcrowding, as well as poor sanitation and security conditions. Pranes, or gang leaders who operate from prisons, freely coordinate criminal networks throughout Venezuela. Detainees are vulnerable to sexual violence, and torture and inhumane treatment are endemic. Inmates are often denied medical treatment, sometimes leading to their deaths. The Venezuelan Prison Observatory (OVP) reported 149 deaths in detention facilities during 2024.

Between September and December 2025, US military forces launched airstrikes against boats in Caribbean waters that the US government alleged to be carrying drugs, including many that originated in Venezuela. Rights organizations including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and numerous legal experts said the attacks were extrajudicial killings.

Constitutional protections against discrimination based on sex, race, and other characteristics are not well enforced in practice. Women continue to face significant disparities in education, compensation, and employment.

The rights of Indigenous people, who make up 2.5 percent of the population, are guaranteed by the constitution but poorly protected. Indigenous groups often experience discrimination, labor exploitation, extortion by military and paramilitary groups, sex trafficking, and land grabs related to illegal mining which has resulted in the destruction of forests and other natural resources on which Indigenous residents depend. Indigenous Venezuelans also experience disproportionately high poverty rates and often face obstacles in accessing government services.

Although discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited, LGBT+ Venezuelans face widespread intolerance and violence. Following the crackdown on protests in 2024, many LGBT+ groups and individuals have felt unable to advocate for their rights due to fears of retaliation by the regime.

Following the 2024 presidential election, the government began canceling the passports of Venezuelan journalists, human rights activists, political leaders, and others without notice or reason, affecting their ability to travel into or out of Venezuela. In October 2025, the government initiated proceedings to strip the citizenship of opposition leader Leopoldo López after he spoke in favor of US military intervention in Venezuela.

Air travel to and from Venezuela was impacted by US military actions in the Caribbean between August and December 2025. The government revoked the operating permits of eight major international airlines after they canceled their flights to and from Venezuela for safety reasons. At year’s end, only four Venezuelan airlines and one Bolivian airline were offering international flights into and out of Venezuela.

Internal movement is limited by threats to physical security in some parts of the country.

Property rights have been damaged by years of price controls, nationalization, overregulation, and corruption. Illegal land seizures and extortion by armed groups also continue to undermine property rights and private business activity.

Personal social freedoms pertaining to marriage, divorce, and child custody are generally upheld, but members of the LGBT+ community lack equal access to fundamental rights like legal marriage, child adoption, and recognition of one’s gender identity.

A 2023 UN report found 259 maternal deaths per 100,000 births in 2020 in Venezuela, versus 92 in 2000—an increase of 183 percent in the maternal mortality rate. Abortion is illegal unless the patient’s life is at risk, resulting in many women and girls resorting to unsafe and unsanitary clandestine abortions or seeking abortions abroad.

A 2007 law was designed to combat violence against women, but domestic violence and rape remain common. Utopix, a Venezuelan women’s rights NGO, recorded 185 femicides in 2024, but noted that the true number may be higher.

The country’s prolonged economic crisis has left the population extremely vulnerable to human trafficking and labor exploitation. Women and children are also subjected to sex trafficking within Venezuela and abroad.

During 2025, workers in Venezuela’s oil sector were targeted by the state-owned oil company and the security services. In June, 30 workers in an oil refinery in Falcón were reported missing by their families; their arrests were confirmed a month later. In July, 35 oil workers in Anzoátegui and 18 in Carabobo were also arrested or forcibly disappeared. Oil union leaders claimed that the arrests were part of a wave of repression against oil workers by the state-owned gas company PDVSA and state security forces.