Executive Summary:

• The Russian Supreme Court is preparing to consider a lawsuit designating the New York-based Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) as a “terrorist organization.”
• ACF is the U.S. arm of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), founded by the late Russian dissident and anti-corruption campaigner, Alexei Navalny.
• The move reflects the Kremlin’s securitization of dissent, using counterterrorism legislation as a tool of political control, and its broader attempts to intimidate, repress, and influence dissidents abroad, even those in the United States.

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On November 27, the Russian Supreme Court will consider a lawsuit from the Prosecutor General’s Office requesting that the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) be designated a “terrorist organization” (TASS, October 22). The New York-based ACF is the nonprofit overseas arm of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), founded by Alexei Navalny, who died in 2024 while serving a 19-year sentence in a prison colony located inside Russia’s Arctic Circle. The Russian government has long used legal mechanisms to restrict the activities of the FBK and its associates (see EDM, December 2, 2014, March 21, 2019, April 8, November 13, January 9, 2024). The Russia-based group was deemed a “foreign agent” in 2019 and “extremist” in 2021—with a demand for its formal dissolution—while the U.S. arm was listed as a “foreign agent” in 2022 and labeled an “undesirable organization” in 2023. This latest designation as a “terrorist organization” reflects the Kremlin’s expanded repression of those it considers “foreign agents and “terrorists and extremists” (see EDM, April 11, July 24). The move also demonstrates the Kremlin’s broader attempts to intimidate, repress, and influence dissidents abroad, even, as in the case of ACF, those seeking the safety of the United States.

The FBK established the ACF in 2021 to organize its crowdfunding. The FBK’s political director, Leonid Volkov, explained that registering American legal entities is a common practice for those crowdfunding, as it is easier to collect donations in the United States for reasons such as the ability to write them off as tax deductions (Meduza, October 22). There is additionally an obvious need to safeguard donations by keeping them out of the reach of the Russian state.

There are several important aspects to this case. First, as Volkov noted, terrorism cases are typically heard by military district courts rather than the Supreme Court (Meduza, October 22). He stated that the use of the Supreme Court as a court of first instance “happens extremely rarely,” thereby demonstrating the significance the Kremlin attaches to this case. Second, the proceedings will be held privately, with Volkov expecting that the ACF will be labeled a terrorist organization, thereby having the same status as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Such a move will also place the ACF in a stricter category than the Taliban, whose “terrorist” status in Russia has been suspended. Third, Volkov reports that the materials he and other activists have received do not explain the reasoning, and they were not permitted to read the prosecutor’s complaint.

This latest designation is likely to create practical obstacles to the group’s fundraising and operations and further indicates an escalation in state repression of its activities. Volkov assesses that the “terrorist” designation will interfere with the group’s international activities, specifically those “related to sanctions work, international lobbying, international politics, global travel, and fundraising” (Meduza, October 22). He further warned that the status could function as a “green light” for intensified attacks by Russian spies against the group’s activists who are living in exile. Volkov explained that Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) personnel would be more likely to receive approval from the Kremlin to target campaigners following this designation. Volkov believes that, while the Russian state already uses the “extremist” label to punish those it suspects of being FBK supporters, it will utilize the “terrorist” designation to target individuals more arbitrarily and severely.

Additionally, the Federal Security Service (FSB) will investigate cases rather than the Investigative Committee. This means that punishment of FBK supporters is likely to be harsh. Regarding his organization’s response, Volkov is uncertain whether the group will mount a legal challenge and whether any lawyer would be willing to represent them (Meduza, October 22).

This case is only the latest instance in a growing tendency by the Russian state to use terrorist legislation to target opposition figures. In October, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service added several individuals, including Vladimir Kara-Murza, Maksim Kruglov, and Ilya Yashin, to its list of “terrorists and extremists” (Telegram/@bad_list_updates, accessed October 27). Inclusion on the list has been described as a “civil death,” with measures including the blocking of bank accounts (Meduza, December 13, 2024).

The legal basis for this escalation comes from amendments to the federal law “On Countering the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Income and the Financing of Terrorism,” which took effect on June 1. These expanded the criteria so that individuals can be added to the list not just after conviction but also when suspected of violating Russia’s territorial integrity, committing genocide, engaging in political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or hatred towards a social group, or discrediting the armed forces, National Guard, volunteer units or state authorities (Meduza, October 23). Volkov expects that more opposition figures will be targeted in this way (Meduza, October 22).

Mere weeks can pass between accusation and registry on the list, while those included as “terrorists” lose various legal protections, including parole or reduced sentences, a sentence below the statutory minimum, exemption from liability due to the statute of limitations, and postponement of sentence. Meduza assesses that Russian authorities will regard monetary contributions to the AFC as “financing terrorism,” with a minimum of 8 years in prison and a maximum of life imprisonment. It remains “unclear” as to whether investigators will use the terrorism charges to pursue historic donations (Meduza, October 23).

This development will likely compound numerous other problems already faced by the FBK following Navalny’s death in February 2024 (see EDM, February 20, 2024, February 18). Maintaining public and media attention and remaining relevant after the loss of their charismatic founder will prove difficult. The group has also attracted controversy in Ukraine regarding Navalny’s widow, Yulia Navalnaya, over her comments on Russia’s war against Ukraine (Detector Media, October 25). This has placed her in a delicate position as she attempts to secure foreign support while not alienating those members of the Russian domestic population who have expressed support for the war (Levada Center, July 28).

The Russian Supreme Court’s upcoming consideration of designating the ACF as a “terrorist organization” ultimately reflects a continued expansion of the Russian state’s use of legal instruments to suppress political opposition. The domestic and international implications illustrate Moscow’s securitization of dissent, using counterterrorism legislation as a tool of political control, and raise concerns about the extraterritorial application of Russian law to suppress opposition abroad.