• Ensure police, immigration, labor, fishing, service providers at Ministry of Gender, Equality, and Family (MOGEF)-run centers, and other relevant officials use the victim identification index to conduct in-person interviews and proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including individuals involved in commercial sex, individuals with disabilities, fishermen, individuals who are homeless, and foreign migrant workers, and refer them to care.
• Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, particularly of adults and of labor trafficking – including of forced labor on ROK-flagged fishing vessels – by developing a dedicated national human trafficking investigation unit, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms.
• Strengthen interministerial coordination to combat trafficking by developing national and provincial interagency law enforcement task forces to investigate and prosecute cases and protect victims.
• Ensure prompt issuance of victim certificates for identified victims, including by opening regional determination committees.
• Increase the availability and improve the quality of specialized protection services – including short-term shelter, long-term housing, counseling, and medical care – for all trafficking victims, particularly male, child, foreign, and disabled victims, by collaborating with civil society service providers.
• Adopt a standalone criminal provision on human trafficking in alignment with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol and the 2023 Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, Etc. and Victim Protection Act (Prevention and Protection Act).
• Increase and enforce protections for migrant fishermen, including through a more frequent and consistent system of unannounced inspections of labor conditions on-board distant water fishing vessels and at Korean and foreign ports.
• Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked and improve coordination between police and immigration authorities in cases involving foreign victims.
• Institutionalize and expand anti-trafficking training for front-line officials in coordination with civil society on the indicators of trafficking, victim-centered and trauma-informed trafficking investigations, and the revised victim identification index, especially for Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) and Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) labor inspectors.
• Develop a specialized victim identification index in coordination with civil society to further tailor measures to screen for forced labor indicators among foreign migrants in the fishing industry.
• Expand efforts to raise awareness on all forms of human trafficking, particularly among employers, labor recruiters, and vulnerable populations, including individuals in commercial sex and foreign migrant workers.
• Train law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judicial officials, and social service providers to better understand trafficking as defined by the Prevention and Protection Act.
• Increase cooperation with civil society organizations on anti-trafficking efforts, including on efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims.
• Take steps to eliminate recruitment and/or placement fees charged to workers by labor recruiters in the ROK and the workers’ home countries and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers.
• Increase oversight of the SWP, including by ensuring local governments do not work with unscrupulous brokers who use exploitative practices to recruit workers and increasing coordination with source governments.
• Ensure protections for fishing industry workers are legally binding.

The government increased its law enforcement efforts.

Various articles in criminal- and employment-related laws, when read together, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Several articles in Chapter 31 of the Criminal Act prohibited some forms of sex and labor trafficking, and prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment for trafficking crimes. For example, Article 289 (“trading in persons”) prohibited the buying or selling of another for exploitation, but did not include a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime. Articles 288 (“kidnapping, abduction, etc. for the purpose of indecent acts, etc.”) and 292 (“receiving, harboring, etc. of person kidnapped, abducted, trafficked or transported”) could apply to trafficking crimes not covered under Article 289. Similarly, several articles of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles Against Sexual Abuse (Protection of Children Act) could be applied to child sex trafficking crimes, and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. The government prosecuted some trafficking crimes under other laws, including Article 18 of the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Article 86 of the Act on the Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, and Article 7 of the Labor Standards Act, which criminalized forced labor crimes and prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine. The prescribed penalties of these various laws were sufficiently stringent, and with respect to sex trafficking, the penalties were commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

The absence of a criminal offense that defined trafficking in a manner fully consistent with international law resulted in varying understanding of the crime among law enforcement and prosecutors and contributed to officials conflating trafficking with related crimes such as commercial sex, kidnapping, domestic violence, and other forms of sexual abuse. The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, etc. and Victim Protection Act (Prevention and Protection Act) guided the government’s prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts. The anti-trafficking law included a definition of trafficking in persons that aligned with the international definition; however, it did not create a standalone provision in the Crimes Act or amend the existing criminal provisions predominantly used to prosecute trafficking crimes to align with that definition.

While the government maintained general statistics on victims and offenders across all subsections of the criminal code, it did not adequately distinguish trafficking cases from related crimes such as sexual assault, statutory rape, and commercial sex. This made it difficult to determine which law enforcement actions reported by the government involved human trafficking as defined by international law. In 2024, the government reported investigating 1,061 cases – including 708 for sex trafficking, 98 for forced labor, and 255 for unspecified forms of exploitation; this was compared with investigating 683 cases in 2023, including 89 for forced labor and 594 for unspecified forms of exploitation. Of 81 forced labor cases investigated by MOEL, 77 were closed with no legal violations found. Of the 64 sex trafficking cases investigated by the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) under Articles 12, 14 and 15 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth against Sex Offenses, nine may not have been for sex trafficking crimes; this was the first year the government reported investigations under these articles. The government reported continuing to investigate 29 previously initiated cases, including 28 by MOEL – all of which were closed with no legal violations found – and one by the Korean Coast Guard (KCG). The government initiated prosecutions of 612 suspects (593 in 2023), including four for labor trafficking and 464 for purchasing commercial sex acts from children (391 in 2023). Courts convicted 586 offenders (485 in 2023) for crimes related to trafficking, including 455 convictions of traffickers who purchased commercial sex acts from children (320 in 2023) and six labor trafficking convictions under Article 7 of the Labor Standards Act (33 in 2023). Approximately 95 percent of convictions were of child sex traffickers under the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth. Some of the investigations, prosecutions, and convictions may not have been trafficking crimes according to the definition under international law. Courts sentenced a majority of convicted traffickers to less than one year imprisonment, suspended terms of imprisonment, or fines. Courts reported sentencing 22 percent of convicted traffickers to at least one year imprisonment, compared with 35 percent in 2023. In comparison with other grave crimes, 39 percent and 22 percent of individuals convicted of rape and kidnapping, respectively, were sentenced to one year or longer in prison. This practice weakened deterrence, potentially undercut efforts of police and prosecutors, and contributed to increased risks of security and safety concerns, particularly for victims who cooperated with investigations and prosecutions. In October 2024, a court convicted a local council government official for purchasing commercial sex acts, in a case involving allegations of sex trafficking at an entertainment establishment, and sentenced him to a fine of two million Korean won KRW ($1,358). A court also convicted a local police officer for offences including bribery and violation of secrecy, in a prosecution initiated in 2022 involving allegations of complicity in trafficking-related crimes, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The government acquitted one local police officer investigated in 2022 for alleged complicity in trafficking-related crimes due to insufficient evidence.

The KNPA Women’s Safety Division and MOEL were the lead investigative entities for sex trafficking and labor trafficking crimes, respectively, although the KNPA also could investigate labor trafficking cases. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) Drug and Organized Crime Division in the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office could coordinate trafficking investigations and prosecutions, among other crimes. The KNPA reported they would only collaborate with MOJ on large-scale cases, and there have been no such cases. The government trained law enforcement officials, prosecutors, MOEL and MOF labor inspectors, seafarers’ support center employees, local government officials, and government social workers on various anti-trafficking topics, including the victim identification index and victim support. In addition, the government trained immigration officers on victim-centered approaches for working with trafficking victims. Reports in recent years indicated officials treated some potential labor trafficking cases as administrative labor violations. Officials sometimes did not prosecute cases involving debt-based coercion of foreign victims due to a perceived lack of jurisdiction over recruitment that generally originated in a victim’s home country. The government has never prosecuted a case of human trafficking in the distant water fishing sector; one NGO attributed this to a lack of inspection capacity. The government collaborated with foreign counterparts on extraditions and signed a judicial cooperation treaty, which aimed to strengthen international cooperation on transnational crimes, including human trafficking.

The government increased efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims.

The government reported screening 5,332 individuals – 272 Koreans and 5,060 foreign nationals – using its victim identification index, which included victim identification and referral SOPs, compared with screening 1,432 individuals in 2023. The government identified 130 potential trafficking victims as a result of these screenings, including 77 exploited in sex trafficking and 53 exploited in labor trafficking – compared with identifying 55 trafficking victims in 2023. For the third consecutive year, MOEL did not identify any labor trafficking victims. The government revised the victim identification index in consultation with civil society to include indicators of labor trafficking and began implementation in December 2024. NGOs commended the revised index but asserted it lacked adequate indicators to screen for labor trafficking victims among foreign migrants in the fishing industry. MOGEF developed and distributed to relevant ministries a guidebook for field practitioners to promote use of the victim identification index, which it updated in December 2024 to reflect revisions to the index. The KNPA, Korea Immigration Service (KIS), and MOGEF all distributed guidelines for using the victim identification index to their respective agencies. The government required all government officials who used the victim identification index to receive education on it. The KNPA reportedly used the index to interview potential victims, whereas the KIS asked potential victims to review the index themselves, limiting opportunities for the effective identification of victims. MOEL developed training materials to educate labor inspectors on the victim identification index; 83 percent of MOEL labor inspectors completed this training. NGOs reported employers usually accompanied entertainment visa holders when they renewed their residency at an immigration office, creating a barrier for potential victims to disclose exploitation or workplace concerns, and immigration offices did not routinely provide these visa holders with information on available protections. In July 2024, the government began screening SWP workers with the victim identification index when they applied for new visas or to extend their visas, and when they departed the country. However, authorities did not report proactively screening EPS workers for trafficking indicators despite reports indicating some foreign workers in both EPS and SWP faced indicators of forced labor. The KNPA reportedly provided a guidebook, available in seven languages, on trafficking victims’ rights and support services to all potential trafficking victims. MOF inspectors conducted 14 in-person victim identification interviews with migrant fishers on distant water vessels who had their passports withheld; however, despite NGO concerns that traffickers exploited migrant workers in the fishing sector, the government did not identify any confirmed labor trafficking victims among migrant fishermen. NGOs reported law enforcement often did not take steps to proactively identify victims and failed to identify many victims.

MOGEF established a comprehensive victim support and referral system in the previous reporting period under the Central Victim Rights Protection Agency to provide victim counseling, case determination, victim certificates, livelihood support, and emergency relief funds for victim services via a public-private case determination committee; the committee issued 12 certificates to foreign trafficking victims in 2024, compared with three in 2023. Certificates allowed suspected victims to secure financial and immigration benefits prior to judicial proceedings. The government reported five certificate recipients held SWP visas. The government did not establish regional determination committees as required by the Prevention and Protection Act, which NGOs reported hampered victims’ access to victim certificates, especially those in rural or coastal areas or for victims reluctant to approach government offices. NGOs reported certificate applicants were required to provide a lengthy victim interview, potentially re-traumatizing some victims, and the application process took four months or longer, sometimes up to six months. NGOs reported some recipients of victim certificates had difficulty changing their residence status to humanitarian stay, and G-1 humanitarian stay visa applicants needed a guarantor, exposing NGO sponsors to legal responsibility for potential victims. NGOs noted the living stipend for certified victims – currently set at 700,000 KRW ($475) per month – was insufficient and that law enforcement and courts did not consider victim certificates as evidence of trafficking crimes.

The government expanded the victim support system in April 2024 to include a relief fund to provide tailored services to certificate holders, including medical care, livelihood support, employment, legal assistance, and repatriation assistance; the Central Victim Rights Protection Agency disbursed 35 million KRW ($23,757) in services for 10 victims. The government reported seeking input from civil society, including service providers and legal experts, on operational guidelines for support programs for victims of trafficking, such as the Central Victim Rights Protection Agency, and distributed the guidelines to relevant agencies, local governments, and victim service providers. The government did not repatriate any trafficking victims.

Victim identification index implementation guidelines instructed the KNPA to refer trafficking victims to protection and support systems. Some authorities reportedly only referred victims to services in extreme cases, and some victims did not receive timely support. The government took increasing steps to seek input from civil society organizations on anti-trafficking policies; however, NGOs reported collaboration to identify and protect victims was lacking. The government referred 34 potential victims to protection services, compared with referring 38 in 2023. The government reported providing accommodation, medical care, mental health and psycho-social support, financial support, legal assistance, and/or employment training to the 34 potential victims through various government-run facilities. In addition, MOJ reported providing residency permits to 13 victims, compared with two in 2023. MOGEF established a trafficking victim support network to enhance cooperation among 10 government-funded organizations supporting victims of labor and sexual exploitation.

The government reported allocating 67.41 billion KRW ($45.755 million) to MOGEF, including 160 million KRW ($108,602) for the Central Victim Rights Protection Agency, 88.6 billion KRW ($60.138 million) to MOJ, and 658 million KRW ($446,626) to MOF for protection and assistance funding for victims of crime, including trafficking. The KCG had a victim protection fund to provide temporary accommodation for victims of crime, including trafficking.

MOGEF operated multiple types of support centers nationwide, including approximately 150 facilities that provided protection services, including counseling services, psycho-social support, shelter for women and children, education, health care, legal assistance, job training, and other services to victims of crime, including trafficking. This included 33 support facilities and nine counseling centers specifically for migrant women and child victims of crime, including sex trafficking. MOGEF provided services to 5,642 individuals across 90 support facilities for individuals in commercial sex, compared with 5,404 individuals in 2023. MOGEF provided services to 1,187 victims at 17 support centers for child victims of sexual violence and sex trafficking, compared with 952 victims in 2023. The government reported six victim certificate recipients received assistance from MOGEF-run shelters. While the MOGEF facilities primarily served female victims of crime, the government made some services, such as counseling, medical, and legal assistance, available to male victims. Female victims and children could choose to live at a support facility for up to two years, as guaranteed by the Prevention and Protection Act, and leave the facilities freely. In response to a National Human Rights Commission of Korea recommendation, MOGEF updated shelter guidelines to allow operating funds for living, education, and clothing expenses for foreign sex trafficking victims at its shelters. MOJ also operated 16 facilities for victims of crime, including trafficking, where it could provide financial support, psychological and medical assistance, protective services, housing stability support, and legal assistance to men, women, and children. MOJ launched a comprehensive services center in July 2024 for victims of crime, including trafficking, that offered economic, legal, employment, welfare, and financial assistance.

MOF could provide foreign seafarers with temporary accommodation and allowed victims to work on a different vessel, if requested. Trafficking victims who were foreign seafarers could receive legal assistance from the Korea Seafarer’s Welfare and Employment Center, funded by MOF. MOEL and local governments allocated 3.6 billion KRW ($2.444 million) to jointly operate settlement and integration programs at nine support centers for foreign workers who were victims of labor exploitation, including potential trafficking victims, and stopped providing subsidies to 35 regional support centers, following a transition from private to public oversight in 2023. In these centers, MOEL could provide interpretation, medical treatment, and counseling services to migrant workers. NGOs reported the quality of victim care was insufficient, particularly for male, disabled, foreign, and child victims.

The government reported MOEL provided interpreters to accompany investigators during site visits of workplaces employing foreign workers; however, civil society reported many local governments relied on labor brokers for language interpretation when investigating trafficking allegations, creating a conflict of interest for victims hesitant to report abuse. KNPA established its own corps of 3,375 civilian investigation interpreters for use in suspected trafficking cases; however, the KNPA did not report using these interpreters in practice during the reporting period, and observers reported the lack of trafficking-focused interpreters complicated potential victims’ interactions with civil society and government officials and delayed action, including obtaining victims’ testimonies.

The government did not require trafficking victims who were ROK citizens or foreign nationals with legal status to participate in investigations or prosecutions in order to receive protection services; the government did not report how many victims participated voluntarily in 2024, compared with three in 2023. The government could provide protective measures, including shelter, when victims of a serious crime, including trafficking, faced potential retaliation by the perpetrator. The government also could provide legal assistance, including legal representation, psychological treatment, and financial support to participating victims. The government allowed victims to provide testimony via video relay or after the alleged trafficker left the courtroom. The government provided an alternative option for trafficking victims to draft victim statements under an alias rather than speak with law enforcement officials during the investigation process. The government allowed victims with disabilities to receive assistance by a trusted individual during trial proceedings. Prosecutors could designate court-appointed lawyers to assist trafficking victims during criminal proceedings against traffickers; lawyers supported four cases in 2024.

The government did not provide undocumented foreign victims some services unless they cooperated with law enforcement in the investigation of traffickers. The government issued G-1 humanitarian stay visas to foreign victims of crimes, which allowed victims to work in the ROK for up to one year as long as they were cooperating in investigations and prosecutions. The Immigration Act, as amended in 2022, allowed foreign trafficking victims to extend their stay permits for the duration of criminal or civil proceedings. The government reported 66 potential foreign trafficking victims remained in the ROK on a G-1 visa at the end of the reporting period, compared with 65 in 2023. The government only permitted foreign victims to stay in shelters for three months; however, authorities could extend this period of stay if victims participated as witnesses in ongoing trials. The lack of an option to provide foreign trafficking victims with long-term or permanent residency reportedly discouraged victims from reporting trafficking situations and participating as witnesses in investigations of traffickers. MOJ reported foreign victims of sexual violence and trafficking were exempt from immigration penalties for remaining in the country beyond the permitted period of stay; it reported six victims benefited from this provision, compared with nine victims in the previous reporting period.

Government officials reported courts sentenced convicted traffickers to shorter prison sentences due to a judicial culture focused on ordering restitution instead of issuing lengthy prison sentences; however, the government did not report ordering any traffickers to pay restitution. The government operated a victim compensation fund for victims of crime, including trafficking. Victims could file civil suits to receive compensation.

Although the law prohibited punishment for illegal acts that individuals were coerced to commit, in recent years, government officials sometimes arrested and temporarily detained victims for commercial sex crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked. While the government required law enforcement authorities to use a victim identification index to screen individuals when arresting them for commercial sex acts, authorities did not consistently do so. NGOs reported some instances in which authorities sought deportation of potential foreign trafficking victims, including women exploited in commercial sex, without screening them for trafficking or providing services. In addition, NGOs previously reported authorities deported some foreign sex trafficking victim-witnesses who participated in prosecutions against traffickers. KNPA reportedly had a policy not to inform immigration officials of the undocumented status of foreign victims who self-reported their exploitation to authorities; however, KNPA did not extend this policy to victims who did not self-identify or were not accompanied by legal counsel or other service providers.

The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking.

The Policy Coordination Council on Human Trafficking (the Council) coordinated national efforts to combat human trafficking, including facilitating cooperation among 11 relevant government agencies and implementing the Comprehensive Plan for Prevention of Human Trafficking 2023-2027; the Council met once during the reporting period. The government allocated approximately 34.794 billion KRW ($23.616 million) towards the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, including prevention efforts, victim identification and protection, and law enforcement efforts, compared with 23.231 billion KRW ($15.768 million) in 2023. MOGEF’s human trafficking prevention division managed human trafficking prevention and victim support with an operational budget of 290 million KRW ($196,841), including 130 million KRW ($88,239) for prevention awareness and education and 160 million KRW ($108,602) for the Central Victim Rights Protection Agency. The government broadcast a public awareness video in eight languages, conducted online public awareness campaigns, and distributed printed awareness raising materials in 12 languages, developed by MOGEF, to foreign embassies, immigration offices, counseling centers for migrant women, and foreign worker support centers. In addition, MOGEF created an awareness raising video for mandatory reporters of human trafficking and conducted a study to identify areas for institutional improvement. An NGO indicated a need for the government to raise awareness among individuals traveling to ROK on the visa-waiver program, particularly women from Thailand and Russia, who were often subjected to sex trafficking. MOF provided online educational materials, available in Indonesian and English, for seafarers, masters, and ship owners. In recent years, anti-trafficking NGOs reported a low level of public awareness of human trafficking, as defined by international law. The government funded an NGO-operated dedicated trafficking hotline; the government reported 74 calls resulted in 13 referrals to protection services, 45 instances of abuse counseling, and 61 instances of providing information. The hotline operated for seven hours each weekday, provided counseling and relevant information to potential victims of human trafficking, and referred victims to law enforcement authorities. The government operated a counseling channel via five online platforms to provide counseling to children and youth who may be victims of sex trafficking; 502 potential victims used the channel in 2024 (319 in 2023).

MOEL inspected workplaces, including those that employed groups at risk of trafficking, including migrants and individuals with disabilities, and prohibited the operation of unlicensed and unregistered employment agencies. MOEL had guidelines for labor inspectors on victim-centered approaches when conducting investigations and included information on trafficking in training for new labor inspectors. The government had agreements with 16 countries to recruit migrant workers through its EPS, implemented by MOEL. The government stipulated in these agreements that only public sector entities could be involved in the recruitment of workers and banned third party brokers. However, the use of third-party brokers, who often charged recruitment fees up to 50 percent of a workers’ salary, remained a common practice in sending countries. There were more than 303,000 EPS visa holders in 2024, which was significantly higher than the annual quota of 165,000, which NGOs reported led to a lack of capacity within local governments to provide sufficient oversight. In 2024, MOEL identified 847 violations under EPS, compared with identifying 1,466 violations in 2023. However, MOEL did not identify any cases of labor trafficking. MOEL inspected SWP workplaces but reported it did not maintain separate statistics related to the SWP, which relied on broker arrangements between ROK municipalities and foreign local governments, not the national government. MOEL inspected 21 salt farms and identified six cases of failure to maintain labor records and provide notice of minimum wage in 2024, compared with 11 salt farms and 14 cases of delayed wage payments and failure to specify labor conditions in 2023. MOEL reported it conducted inspections at 17,974 workplaces through local governments and regional offices, after which it suspended 28 businesses, issued 62 warnings, imposed two administrative fines, and cancelled 24 agreements with businesses, compared with conducting inspections at 17,503 workplaces, suspending 24 businesses, issuing 108 warnings, imposing four administrative fines, and cancelling 32 agreements in the previous reporting period. MOEL did not report the number of recruitment agencies it investigated, compared with investigating 168 recruitment agencies in the previous reporting period. MOEL conducted surveys on housing conditions of foreign workers in agriculture in 2023 and publicly reported findings in March 2024. MOEL issued corrective orders for inadequate housing and reported 93 percent of surveyed workplaces were in compliance by the end of the reporting period. The government asserted it permitted workers who reported exploitation or labor violations to MOEL to change their employers while MOEL investigated their claims; the government reported MOEL was required by law to move an employee within three days if a worker alleged unsafe working conditions or abuse. However, according to NGOs, MOEL reportedly did not adequately investigate workers’ claims and some workers spent months attempting to prove their exploitation to MOEL before receiving permission to change their place of employment. Employers found guilty of exploiting their workers often only received fines or suspended sentences. NGOs reported some migrant workers experienced passport confiscation, wage withholding, and discrepancies between contracts offered by labor agents overseas and the actual job in Korea. Observers noted inconsistent implementation of post-arrival training for migrant workers, depending on the capacity of municipal governments. Civil society reported MOJ, which oversees the SWP, did not adequately share information on SWP operating rules or accept opportunities to discuss the conditions of seasonal workers. NGOs noted a lack of transparency by the government on which foreign local governments participated in the SWP and on violations of SWP operating rules by Korean municipal governments, foreign local governments, or brokers hindered efforts to protect workers’ rights and increased their vulnerability to forced labor. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea reported human trafficking occurred within the SWP and concluded the SWP lacked a legal operating basis, MOJ did not provide appropriate oversight, and some local officials’ reliance on unscrupulous brokers – who often charged workers excessive fees and confiscated their passports – increased risks of forced labor under the program. Local governments also reportedly used practices that exacerbated the risks of workers to exploitation, including by requiring they pay large deposits that prevented them from leaving exploitative working conditions.

MOF implemented the 2024 Plan for Further Enhancements for Working Conditions of Migrant Fishers on Distant Water Fishing Vessels (enhanced plan), developed in March 2024 in collaboration with civil society, to increase protections for foreign seafarers on distant water vessels. The enhanced plan mandated distant water vessels make annual port calls (14 vessels complied in 2024) and fishing companies pay all recruitment fees; required reduced fishing quotas for non-compliant fishing companies and the termination of contracts with non-compliant foreign recruiters; and established a public-private vessel inspection council, which convened three times to evaluate plan implementation. However, civil society reported concern that the updated plan was not legally binding, hindering authorities’ ability to adequately enforce the policies. The government amended existing policies to protect foreign fishers, but traffickers continued to capitalize on gaps in ROK labor laws to exploit foreign fishers in forced labor. The Seafarers Act exempted fishing vessel workers from the legal working and rest hours and paid holidays prescribed for workers on other vessels. The enhanced plan required all migrant fishers on distant water vessels receive 308 hours of rest per month; a seafarer and vessel captain could reach an oral agreement on how to allocate those hours over the course of a month. NGOs reported some migrant fishers on distant water vessels continued to work long hours, sometimes more than 18 hours per day. The government did not impose limits on the working and rest hours for coastal fishers. In addition, while MOF agreed in 2022 to increase the minimum wage of foreign seafarers to the same minimum wage as ROK seafarers over the course of three years; the lack of a minimum wage set for foreign seafarers increased their vulnerability to trafficking. The government imposed one fine for physical and mental harassment of seafarers under the Seafarers Act. The Korea Seafarer’s Welfare and Employment Center, funded by MOF, conducted checks of passport management plans, which were established by deep sea fishing vessel owners in 2023; 174 distant water vessels out of 182 completed installation of passport lockers. MOF imposed three fines of two million KRW ($1,358) on captains for retaining passports of 14 fishers in 2024. While the Seafarers Act prohibited ship owners from retaining identification documents, including passports, these regulations did not apply to ship masters and other seafarers. NGOs continued to report many migrant fishers still did not maintain control of their identity documents and that fines for violating this measure were inadequate to deter confiscation of seafarer documents. The government maintained an MOU with the Government of Indonesia on protections for migrant seafarers. The enhanced plan incorporated measures to prevent excessive working hours, set a minimum salary, and ensured the provision of clean drinking water for migrant seafarers, but NGOs reported authorities did not adequately implement these rules and called for stricter punishment of violators.

MOF labor inspectors investigated labor violations involving seafarers, including cases of human trafficking. NGOs noted training for seafarers’ labor inspectors had improved and welcomed joint labor inspections with civil society but reported concern about the labor inspectors’ workload to adequately conduct field inspections of approximately 60,000 crewmembers. The government reported conducting on-board inspections of three coastal fishing vessels – two of which were conducted with NGOs – and five distant water fishing vessels – three of which were conducted with NGOs – and paper-based inspections of 966 coastal vessels and 188 distant water vessels in 2024. MOF reported employing 17 inspectors dedicated to distant water vessels and monitoring compliance with 18 improvement measures for distant water vessels, including wage standard adjustments, reduction of voyage duration, guaranteed rest periods, and improvement in passport retention practices and the recruitment system for migrant fishers. The government required coastal vessels to return to port for routine labor inspections; however, NGOs reported that unless they required maintenance, distant water vessels could avoid returning to port and many vessels remained at sea for more than a year at a time, increasing risks for forced labor. The enhanced plan required distant water vessels to enter a port within one year of departure; the government reported it would restrict fishing quotas for non-compliance in 2025 but did not report doing so by the end of the reporting period. In recent years, observers reported fishing vessels flagged for forced labor by foreign governments were able to enter Korean territorial waters without inspection. Civil society reported an inadequate legal framework and insufficient human and technical resources hindered authorities’ ability to monitor forced labor in their ports. MOF inspectors distributed surveys to migrant seafarers working on coastal and distant water fishing vessels to enable workers to report abuse and disseminated information posters on reporting human rights abuses in lounges on distant water vessels; in consultation with NGOs, the government revised the survey to better identify forced labor indicators. Although the government reported it required MOF labor inspectors investigating violations to separate potential victims from perpetrators, NGOs noted workers on distant water vessels often completed the surveys under the supervision of captains or other senior crewmembers or with prior knowledge of the vessel owner, who could coerce or manipulate workers to not report exploitation on these surveys. MOF also conducted outreach to foreign seafarers on social media to improve visibility of labor conditions and receive grievance reports; eight migrant fishers used social media to report captains retained their passports. MOF also operated a specialized hotline to handle grievances of migrant fishers; five call centers to provide counseling for migrant seafarers, with interpretation services in Indonesian, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Burmese languages; and an online platform available in three languages to provide anonymous reporting for seafarers. An NGO reported eight calls to the specialized MOF hotline, one of which was referred to the MOF regional office. NGOs reported crew members did not typically utilize government hotlines due to fear of retribution and sometimes lacked awareness of the online platform due to lack of required signage. The government also operated a dedicated reporting email for self-reporting abuse. The government reported distant water fishing vessels were equipped with wireless internet access, which could enable workers to report exploitation while at sea; nonetheless, NGOs reported many fishermen were unable to access their phones while on vessels. The government operated a virtual telehealth program for seafarers on ships; it did not report that these healthcare workers received anti-trafficking training.

The government did not adequately regulate the recruitment process for coastal or distant water migrant fishers. The government reportedly did not provide sufficient oversight of the cooperative of private agencies that regulated the process for coastal fishers and charged a standard recruitment fee of approximately $5,500 to workers, and many paid more than that. MOF’s enhanced plan reportedly established a framework to regulate recruitment fees for distant water vessels by imposing sanctions, such as reduced fishing quotas, on Korean vessel owners; the government did not report imposing any fishing quotas by the end of the reporting period. MOF responded to five cases of delayed wage payment in the fishing industry received from a foreign government; MOF confirmed payment in two cases and requested the foreign government submit petitions in two cases, and one case was under civil litigation at the end of the reporting period. MOEL reported it required recruiting agencies to publicly list the costs they charged to foreign workers on their webpages.

The government began a pilot program allowing legally present foreigners to provide childcare under a law exempting domestic workers from protections under the Labor Standards Act, including minimum-wage requirements, which could increase their vulnerability to trafficking. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including through public broadcasting programs, advertisement campaigns on social media, and the use of an automated calling system to disrupt communication of buyers of commercial sex acts. In addition, the government mandated one hour of education per year on sex trafficking prevention for all public sector workers.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in South Korea, and traffickers exploit victims from South Korea abroad. Traffickers exploit South Korean women and children – including children who run away from home and victims of domestic violence – in commercial sex, including in bars, nightclubs, and other entertainment establishments, or through internet-advertised escort services. Traffickers utilize online platforms to recruit and coerce victims to engage in commercial sex acts and to facilitate trafficking by communicating with purchasers of commercial sex. Chat room operators recruit South Korean women and children, including child sex trafficking victims, and threaten them with the release of compromising photographs to coerce them to participate in the production of pornographic materials. Perpetrators, many of whom are youth, are increasingly using “deepfake” explicit images, generated by artificial intelligence, to coerce these victims. Some brokers force South Korean women who worked in clubs into commercial sex. Individuals with disabilities, individuals who were homeless, undocumented migrants, and individuals arrested for involvement in commercial sex have an increased vulnerability to trafficking. Traffickers have forced some physically or intellectually disabled South Korean men to work on fishing vessels and fish, salt, and cattle farms.

Traffickers exploit men and women, primarily from China, Thailand, Russia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Morocco, and other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and South America, in forced labor and sex trafficking in South Korea. Traffickers force victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or loan sharks into commercial sex. Sex traffickers exploit some foreign women on E6-2 entertainment visas – many from the Philippines and Thailand – in bars and clubs, including “foreigners only” bars near ports and U.S. military bases. Job brokers, unscrupulous recruitment agencies, and managers or owners of bars and clubs recruit foreign women under false promises of jobs as singers or performers but instead coerce victims to engage in commercial sex acts. Recruiters and owners of massage parlors fraudulently recruit women for work as professional masseuses in the ROK but force them to engage in commercial sex acts, sometimes through passport confiscation, physical violence, and threats of deportation or violence. Some victims are not provided an adequate number of days off, face harassment, verbal and physical abuse, and are paid less than the minimum wage or have their wages withheld to discourage them from leaving the ROK or seeking new employment. Some bar managers reportedly confiscate victims’ passports or alien registration cards and restrict their ability to go outside their workplace. Women from the Philippines and other countries in Asia enter Korea on tourist visas after receiving false promises of short-term work in factories or other industries but then have their passports confiscated by traffickers who force them to work in clubs and engage in commercial sex acts. Local governments provide financial assistance to South Korean men living in rural areas to pursue marriages to foreign women; some women from China, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, who are recruited for marriages to South Korean men through international marriage brokers, are vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor after their arrival. North Korean escapees living in the ROK often face economic hardship that increases their risks to trafficking, and traffickers exploit North Korean women in sex trafficking. The KNPA, MOJ, and MOF previously acknowledged instances of deportation of foreign trafficking victims, including some who self-reported, and attributed it to a breakdown in communication between investigators and immigration authorities.

Unscrupulous labor recruiters contribute to the forced labor of migrant workers, especially those from Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Mongolia, through debt-based coercion by charging workers excessive fees, sometimes leading to thousands of dollars in debt. In February 2024, the Government of the Philippines temporarily issued a ban on sending Filipino workers to South Korea due to reports of unsafe working conditions and complaints of abuse among Filipino seasonal workers. Traffickers exploit temporary migrants, including individuals in the SWP, in conditions indicative of forced labor in the agriculture, manufacturing, fishing, and aquaculture sectors. Approximately 303,000 migrant workers employed under the EPS work in fishing, agriculture, livestock, restaurants, and manufacturing. Undocumented workers are also employed in these sectors, although there are no official statistics on their numbers. Migrant workers in the agriculture sector are sometimes forced to live in inadequate housing, sometimes in greenhouses, shipping containers, or dormitories.

The ROK is a transit point for Southeast Asian fishermen exploited in forced labor on fishing ships bound for Fiji and other ports in the Pacific. There are ongoing reports of abuse, including forced labor, of migrant workers in the South Korean fishing fleet, one of the world’s largest distant water fishing fleets. Recruiters, boat owners, captains, and job brokers often use debt-based coercion to exploit migrant fishers in forced labor on South Korean-flagged or owned vessels. Reports estimate nearly 4,000 migrant workers, mainly from Indonesia, are employed on these vessels. South Korean distant water fishing vessels frequently use at-sea trans-shipment of catches and can often stay at sea for a year or longer without visiting a port, limiting the ability of workers to report exploitation to authorities or to safely leave their exploitation. Recruitment agencies and job brokers often charge fishermen excessive recruitment or administration fees, increasing their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. Employers often hold the first three months of wages of migrant fishermen on distant water vessels to serve as a “deposit” that they are unable to receive back until the completion of their contract. Such workers can be forced to work excessive hours, up to 18 hours per day, with limited rest hours or days off, abused physically and verbally by boat captains, subjected to salary deductions, provided inadequate food and water, or forced to live and work in unsanitary conditions. Migrant fishermen receive wages far below the government mandated standard. NGOs reported recruitment agencies, captains, and skippers retain coastal and distant water fishers’ passports to prevent them from leaving their employment. The use of oral agreements to determine rest days, instead of formal labor contracts, increases fishers’ vulnerability to trafficking.

Traffickers from the ROK and Southeast Asia force South Korean nationals into forced labor and sex trafficking in online scam operations in Southeast Asia with promises of legitimate job offers, then force them into conducting voice phishing and investment and romance scams. A small number of Korean national men may facilitate and engage in commercial sex and extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse abroad, including in the Philippines. Traffickers exploit South Korean women overseas, including in the United States and Australia, in sex trafficking in massage parlors, salons, bars, and restaurants, or through internet-advertised escort services, often through debt-based coercion. Reports indicate more than a dozen Australian education providers knowingly help South Korean women enter Australia on false student visas to work in the commercial sex industry, increasing their vulnerability to sex trafficking. Anecdotal reports indicate local police are occasionally complicit in trafficking and related crimes. Local police sometimes accept bribes from establishments facilitating commercial sex acts, which may facilitate sex trafficking. In prior reporting periods, NGOs reported some local police sexually exploited children and solicited individuals in commercial sex, including potential sex trafficking victims.