• Increase efforts to criminally investigate and prosecute labor trafficking crimes under the anti-trafficking law, including those that originate as labor violations and exhibit trafficking indicators such as wage theft, passport confiscation, and worker-paid recruitment fees.
• Strengthen efforts to refer cases with labor trafficking indicators, such as complaints of non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, and restriction of movement, for investigation and prosecution as potential trafficking crimes, rather than punishing such crimes administratively.
• Expand trainings to officials across all emirates to better identify potential trafficking cases that originate as labor violations and implement standard guidance for labor inspectors to improve identification of such cases during inspections.
• Draft and enforce unified, federal SOPs for victim identification and referral to care and train stakeholders on their use.
• Execute implementing regulations for and strengthen enforcement of the domestic worker law by increasing inspections of domestic worker recruitment agencies and ensuring access to grievance mechanisms for workers.
• Establish deterrent penalties for passport confiscation and provide training to officials to consider passport confiscation as a trafficking indicator.
• Consistently enforce regulations and oversight of labor recruitment companies, including by holding fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable and ensuring any recruitment fees are paid by employers.
• Proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including foreign workers, particularly women in commercial sex, domestic workers who have fled their employers, and workers arrested for immigration violations.
• Ensure authorities do not inappropriately penalize victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked or return victims to a trafficking situation or abusive employers.
• Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services, in a manner consistent with obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 2397.

The government made mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.

Federal Law No. 24 of 2023 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from five years to life imprisonment and fines of no less than one million Emirati dirhams (AED) ($272,260) and deportation for non-citizens. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

The government investigated at least 21 trafficking cases – 16 for sex trafficking, five for “selling” victims, and at least one labor trafficking case – a decrease compared with 37 investigations in the previous reporting period. The government prosecuted 118 alleged traffickers in 26 cases, including 61 alleged sex traffickers in 19 cases, 31 alleged labor traffickers in one case, and 26 individuals convicted for “selling” victims in six cases. This was a slight decrease compared with the prosecution of 141 alleged traffickers in 44 cases in the previous reporting period. Officials reported prosecutions of an unknown number of alleged labor traffickers in two cases and 10 alleged sex traffickers from five cases initiated in previous reporting periods remained ongoing. Courts convicted 58 traffickers – 20 for sex trafficking, 31 for labor trafficking, and seven for “selling” – compared with 54 convictions in the previous reporting period. Notably, courts convicted significantly more labor traffickers, compared with only two labor trafficking convictions in the previous reporting period. In the one labor trafficking case involving 31 traffickers, traffickers exploited 76 victims in forced criminality – a form of labor trafficking – in online scam operations. Courts sentenced all traffickers to between one year and life imprisonment with additional fines. Courts acquitted three traffickers for unspecified reasons. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking crimes.

The government maintained specialized anti-trafficking units at emirate-level police headquarters across the country and in the Public Prosecution Offices (PPO) at the federal and local level. Some officials did not routinely consider labor law violations that exhibited trafficking indicators, such as passport confiscation, delayed or nonpayment of wages, worker-paid recruitment fees, deceptive recruitment, contract switching, or restriction of movement, as potential trafficking crimes. Instead, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE) continued to address labor violations, including those involving labor trafficking, through administrative dispute resolution processes and labor courts, often settling such cases by levying administrative fines or canceling business licenses in lieu of criminal proceedings, which resulted in lesser penalties, weakened deterrence, and did not adequately reflect the nature of the crime.

The government, both independently and in partnership with international organizations, trained police, labor inspectors, prosecutors, and other officials on investigation techniques, distinguishing potential labor trafficking cases from labor violations during inspections – particularly in the domestic work sector – victim identification and protection, and trafficking trends. Observers noted Emirati officials would benefit from additional targeted training on effective implementation of the anti-trafficking law, victim-centered approaches to law enforcement efforts, screening procedures to identify potential trafficking victims from those arrested for immigration violations or commercial sex, and criminally investigating potential labor trafficking crimes. The government coordinated with INTERPOL on the arrests and extradition of three alleged traffickers.

The government modestly increased victim protection efforts.

The government identified and referred to care 121 victims, a significant increase compared with 59 victims identified and referred to care in the previous reporting period. Of the 121 victims identified, traffickers exploited 28 in sex trafficking, including nine children, 83 in labor trafficking, and 10 victims of “selling”, including three children. All identified victims were from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. For the first time in at least five years, the government identified male victims, including two exploited in sex trafficking, 69 exploited in labor trafficking, and two exploited in “selling.”

The government did not utilize formal victim identification SOPs across the whole of government. While the Ministry of Interior (MOI) had standard procedures to assist law enforcement officers and immigration authorities in identification of potential victims, particularly at police stations, some officials did not proactively or regularly implement these procedures and instead continued to rely predominantly on third-party referrals to identify victims, including from foreign embassies, religious institutions, or tips received through government hotlines or shelter hotlines, smartphone applications, and the internet. Labor inspectors continued to implement a guide – tailored for MOHRE employees and law enforcement – to identify and refer potential labor trafficking cases found via inspections for criminal investigation; however, the government did not report if it identified any potential victims through these procedures during the reporting period.

Authorities continued to implement a formal referral process to transfer potential trafficking victims from detention centers, hospitals, houses of worship, facilities run by labor-source country embassies or consulates, and those identified through shelter-operated hotlines or MOHRE inspections, to government shelters. Government shelter staff reported that although police were supposed to refer all potential trafficking victims to government shelters, in some cases, police only referred individuals whom police officially determined to be trafficking victims. Authorities also sometimes held potential victims first screened by law enforcement at a transitional center until they could make an official determination of their trafficking victim status. Shelter staff assessed all individuals upon arrival using an international organization-issued screening questionnaire to better assess victims’ needs; in cases where shelter staff identified a victim but law enforcement did not come to the same conclusion, shelter staff reported all potential victims still had access to shelter and services, with the exception of employment assistance or financial support for repatriation, which only officially confirmed victims could access. Victims could self-refer to shelters without law enforcement approval, but shelter staff informed law enforcement authorities to begin an investigation while the victim received care, if they chose to pursue charges. The National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) previously established a sub-committee to update the government’s existing victim identification and referral guidelines; however, updated guidelines remained pending for the second consecutive reporting period.

The government maintained oversight and funding for shelters in four of the seven emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ras Al Khaimah), offering housing and assistance for all female and child sex trafficking and abuse victims across the country. The government operated one shelter for men in Abu Dhabi. Individual donations, local emirate governments, private businesses, religious institutions, and the NCCHT provided most shelter funding. The government reported budgets of approximately two million and three million AED ($544,514 and $816,771) for shelters in Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah, respectively. Protective services included shelter, medical care, legal assistance, education programs, free healthcare, reintegration support, counseling, and vocational training. Child trafficking victims and dependents of trafficking victims received services tailored to their needs, including separate living sections and case managers, as well as teachers who provided age-appropriate educational and psycho-social support. All police departments had a dedicated room for interviewing children and other vulnerable victims. The government continued to utilize a multi-purpose shelter in Dubai to care for children between the ages of 3 and 13 years who experienced abuse, including trafficking; it did not report if it provided services to any child trafficking victims during the reporting period. Officials distributed 257,500 AED ($70,106) through the Victims Support Fund to trafficking victims residing at government shelters across the Emirates, which financially supported victims by providing housing and education services, and covering medical expenses, repatriation, or resettlement. The government provided 587,900 AED ($160,060) via the fund in the previous reporting period.

Per the anti-trafficking law, victims could not be held criminally or civilly liable for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. However, due to a lack of standardized whole-of-government identification procedures and screening among vulnerable populations, including those arrested for immigration violations or engaging in commercial sex, the government did not take effective measures to prevent the inappropriate penalization of potential victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Previously, observers reported authorities returned some sex trafficking victims to a trafficking situation upon seeking police assistance, rather than providing protection services, which increased victims’ vulnerability to re-trafficking. In other cases, observers reported authorities sometimes inappropriately penalized potential and unidentified victims for immigration offenses or labor law violations such as “absconding” from employers, committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Observers continued to report potential victims were unwilling to approach law enforcement officials due to fear of being arrested and detained for immigration or other violations, such as “absconding” from their employer, rather than being accepted into a shelter as victims of crime.

The government reported it exempted trafficking victims who overstayed their visas from fines. The government did not provide permanent or formal temporary residency status to victims; however, it permitted victims to stay in shelters and participate in court proceedings. The government worked with international organizations to resettle victims in third countries who could not return to their countries of origin. MOI officials could amend the immigration status of victims to enable them to seek job opportunities in the UAE, typically when the victim requested to remain in the UAE. Shelter staff noted they assisted an unreported number of trafficking victims in finding new employment or sponsors on an ad-hoc basis. The government provided victim-witness assistance to victims who chose to participate in criminal proceedings, including private interview rooms, free legal counseling, minimized number of interviews, the opportunity to speak to shelter staff or foreign embassy representatives instead of law enforcement, and safe transportation to court hearings. Police took measures to prevent communication between victims and suspects and enforced governmental decrees to ensure the media adhered to victims’ right to privacy, shelters adequately protected victims, and those who sought to publicly disclose a victim’s status or witness’ identity were held accountable under the anti-trafficking law. The anti-trafficking law also stipulated prison terms for officials who were found to have coerced victims to provide false testimony or withhold it.

Shelter staff reported courts attempted to accommodate victims’ desire to leave the country, and most victims participating in criminal proceedings were able to depart the UAE with a letter from the presiding judge after the first court hearing. Both police and shelter representatives reported victims often chose immediate repatriation at the UAE’s expense rather than remaining in country to testify against alleged traffickers or see a case through to final adjudication. Officials did not report the number of victims who participated in court proceedings. The government continued to utilize remote court trials and provided the opportunity for victims to submit video or written testimony; however, it did not report if any victims utilized such options. The government continued to employ its Witness Protection Program through Federal Law No. 14 of 2020, which gave judicial officials the authority to enroll witnesses to keep their identities confidential during legal proceedings. The government reported it could award restitution during criminal proceedings, while victims could file civil suits to receive compensation. Officials reported no victims sought compensation via civil suits or were awarded restitution.

The government maintained prevention efforts.

The NCCHT, chaired by the Minister of Justice, led government anti-trafficking efforts and met regularly. The NCCHT drafted and finalized a 2025-2027 NAP. The government did not report the amount of funding allocated for prevention efforts, including implementation of the NAP. The government held awareness campaigns and published print and broadcast media targeting government officials, recruitment agencies, employers, populations vulnerable to trafficking, and the general public on trafficking risks, reporting mechanisms, the anti-trafficking law, and protection services available to trafficking victims. The government funded and operated a 24-hour toll-free hotline to report trafficking, delayed wage payments, or other labor violations; it operated in Arabic, English, Russian, and Urdu. Hotline staff alerted police of all calls categorized as potential trafficking. Additionally, MOHRE, MOI, and shelters operated multilingual toll-free hotlines; MOI continued to host a mobile phone application that allowed users to access certain police services on their phones, and trafficking victims or witnesses could use the application to file reports. In Dubai, law enforcement authorities operated a separate hotline, and there remained a 24-hour toll-free number for migrant workers UAE-wide to make complaints or general inquiries. The government reported identifying an unknown number of victims from hotline calls.

The government primarily focused its efforts to prevent labor trafficking through labor regulatory and monitoring mechanisms. The government employed full-time labor inspectors, including some dedicated trafficking inspectors, to conduct routine and unannounced inspections of company housing and worksites. If inspectors found that a company violated the labor law, the government could fine the company or curtail its ability to operate or hire additional workers. Individuals could face jail time if they engaged in fraud that led to labor trafficking. During the reporting period, MOHRE officials identified 29,000 violations – including for worker-paid recruitment fees, companies operating without proper-licenses, non-compliance with the WPS and labor accommodation standards, among others – to private-sector facilities via inspection visits. The government did not report whether it issued penalties against violating establishments or if it referred any for civil prosecution or for further criminal investigation as potential trafficking cases.

MOHRE continued to oversee licensing and regulation of both private sector and domestic worker recruitment agencies, including by requiring a bank guarantee, a physical address, and proof of no prior criminal convictions or labor violations, among other requirements, to grant a license. MOHRE could suspend or revoke licenses of recruitment agencies, including in cases of fraud, non-payment of wages, and violations of recruitment regulations and in cases where the agency committed any act that involved trafficking. The government continued to require all domestic worker recruitment be done through private agencies with MOHRE licenses; licensed agencies were required to provide training to recruited workers, educate them on their legal rights, resolve employee-employer disputes, provide and prove wage payments, verify worker accommodations for compliance with domestic worker law minimum standards, and guarantee repatriation. Officials reported that in domestic worker-employer disputes, a worker could request assistance from a licensed agency instead of fleeing an abusive employer; however, such agencies could not enter or inspect private homes, which made verification of worker accommodations and other protections outlined in the law difficult.

MOHRE mandated licensed agencies cover the cost of employer recruitment fees for domestic workers through an insurance policy with a two-year warranty; this policy aimed at ensuring recruitment fees would not be transferred to domestic workers from employers once they arrived in the UAE. In circumstances when a domestic worker demonstrated poor performance during the probationary period or unlawfully terminated their employment, employers were entitled to a partial or full refund of recruitment fees and any government fees, which the licensed agency would cover; this policy aimed to disincentivize employers from restricting a worker’s freedom to leave their employment, which increased risk of labor trafficking. Observers noted this insurance policy did not protect workers from fees they incurred from recruiters in their home countries. During the reporting period, MOHRE identified 36 domestic worker recruitment agencies for failing to refund recruitment fees to employers whose domestic workers did not complete their contract; officials reported holding the agencies accountable for such violations but did not report details on penalties or if the agencies were referred to civil or criminal prosecution. Despite the expansion of agencies with MOHRE licenses, the expensive costs of obtaining a license – coupled with mandated insurance requirements to cover recruitment costs – disincentivized some private recruitment agencies from obtaining a MOHRE license; some employers also continued to prefer unlicensed agencies as their services were viewed as cheaper, more flexible, and more accessible compared to those with MOHRE licenses. As non-licensed agencies were not strictly regulated, reports continued that many violated labor and immigration laws and failed to guarantee the rights of workers and employers, increasing vulnerabilities to trafficking. During the reporting period, MOHRE – as part of joint inspections with immigration authorities – shut down 20 unlicensed agencies operating illegally and one domestic worker agency for violations of the domestic worker law; all agencies were referred to civil prosecution for further legal action.

The labor law and domestic worker law prohibited worker-paid recruitment fees. However, observers reported many workers paid recruitment fees in their home countries and arrived to the UAE in debt, heightening their vulnerability to trafficking. MOHRE’s labor complaint system continued to register complaints related to illegal worker-paid recruitment fees and employers reducing worker’s salaries to refund employers for recruitment fees paid; the government reported it also used the WPS to monitor unlawful deductions from workers’ salaries, including recruitment fees. MOHRE inspectors’ guidelines continued to include identifying worker-paid recruitment fees or workers’ salary reductions to pay employers for recruitment fees. Aside from violations identified via inspections, the government did not report whether it received complaints from workers related to worker-paid recruitment fees or referred any to law enforcement for criminal investigation as potential trafficking crimes.

The government continued to make efforts to prevent wage theft through its WPS, which required and monitored electronic salary payments for private sector workers via vetted banks, currency exchanges, and financial institutions. The WPS automatically alerted officials to delayed salary payments or payments that were less than contractually agreed upon; upon an alert, authorities administered fines and other enforcement actions, including suspending noncompliant companies and employers’ ability to issue new work permits and increased inspections for companies with at least 50 employees. MOHRE reported it issued letters to companies and the PPO for WPS violations after salaries were 45 days late and only dropped cases when employers paid the missing wages and the company was current with all salary payments. MOHRE continued to implement 2022 amendments to the WPS regulations, including reducing the percentage of total employees companies must pay through WPS to remain compliant from 90 percent to 80 percent; this change limited accountability for employers who neglected to pay their workers, heightening their vulnerability to trafficking.

Media and diplomatic sources continued to report some companies retained workers’ bank cards or accompanied workers to withdraw cash, coercively shortchanging employees even when the WPS showed the proper amount paid. Such cases were difficult to prove in labor courts, given the WPS documented accurate payments via designated bank accounts. The WPS required inclusion of some professions in the domestic sector, while others, including domestic workers inside private homes, remained excluded. While enrollment in the WPS remained voluntary for this population, their exclusion, coupled with the lack of legal provisions requiring inspections of domestic worker accommodations, wage payment, and work hours, increased domestic workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. The government did not report WPS data for the reporting period, including violations or complaints of non-payment of wages or whether it imposed penalties on non-compliant employers. Despite wage theft being a trafficking indicator, the government did not report referring any non-compliant companies to law enforcement for criminal investigation for potential trafficking crimes.

The domestic worker law provided some protections to all 19 types of domestic worker professions and prohibited recruitment and employment of workers younger than the age of 18. The law allowed domestic workers to terminate a contract without employer permission if an employer failed to meet contractual obligations, such as payment of wages; the worker was required to notify MOHRE within two weeks of the occurrence. The law also granted domestic workers the right to terminate employment without employer permission if the employee was subject to sexual harassment or physical or verbal abuse by the employer; in this case, the worker was required to notify MOHRE within three days of the abuse. However, in both instances, the law required the worker to obtain a judicial verdict demonstrating the employer breached contractual obligations and submit the transfer request to MOHRE for approval to terminate a contract; otherwise, employer approval was required to terminate a contract and enable the worker to transfer jobs. In cases of employer abuse, a MOHRE-licensed recruitment agency was required to provide shelter to the domestic worker. In previous reporting periods, domestic workers in recruitment agency accommodations, including those who sought assistance after leaving an abusive employer and those waiting to be hired by employers, were subject to physical and verbal abuse, lack of food and medical care, restriction of movement and passport confiscation. Despite domestic worker law protections, workers continued to be subjected to excessive working hours, denied overtime pay and rest days, nonpayment of wages, passport confiscation, substandard living conditions, and restriction of movement by their employers – all key trafficking indicators. Observers reported the government did not adequately enforce such protections, as barriers to grievance mechanisms for workers and regulations for in-home inspections, which only were allowed on the basis of complaints or reasonable evidence of violations – limited oversight of this population, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. However, the government reported conducting inspections into an unreported number of employers’ homes based on complaints from agencies, labor-source embassies and law enforcement during the reporting period; such investigations resulted in violations of the labor and domestic worker law, including for delayed wages and failure to renew work permits, and violating employers were fined in accordance with the law.

The labor law granted private sector workers the right to terminate their employment contract, leave the country, or switch employers at any time without employer approval provided they give between one and three months’ notice. The law also permitted both employers and workers to terminate contracts during the probationary period and allowed a worker 180 days to find a new job following contract termination, without incurring overstay fines or becoming undocumented, which may have prevented trafficking for such workers.

For both private sector workers and domestic workers, to be able to leave the country or switch employers, workers had to physically possess their passport. Although the labor law explicitly prohibited employers confiscating worker’s passports, the law did not stipulate penalties specifically for passport confiscation; instead, it stipulated fines between 5,000 AED ($1,361) and one million AED ($272,257) for any violation under the labor law. The domestic worker law also explicitly prohibited employers confiscating passports and stipulated a 500 AED ($136) fine for employers who did so, but it did not criminalize passport confiscation. Despite the explicit prohibition of passport confiscation for all workers, the absence of specific penalties for private sector workers and low administrative fines for domestic workers did not adequately deter employers from this practice, and observers continued to report instances of passport confiscation for workers. While the government reported referring 43 cases of passport confiscation – all received as worker complaints – as well as 51 companies and nine domestic worker employers to civil prosecution for withholding worker’s passports, it did not report how many total complaints of passport confiscation it received, the outcome of such cases, or if any were referred for criminal investigation as potential trafficking crimes. Because the government did not enforce a prohibition on employers confiscating workers’ passports, this practice remained pervasive and increased some workers’ vulnerability to trafficking.

The government continued to collaborate with labor-source countries and international organizations to develop orientation programming for workers prior to arrival in the country; separately, the government continued to utilize Tawjeeh Centers to provide mandatory orientation services to migrant workers on their rights, how to file complaints, UAE labor law, and health and safety regulations, as well as a SIM card available in 17 languages. Domestic worker recruitment agencies continued to provide mandatory orientation to newly arrived workers, including on relevant laws and regulations. MOHRE continued to utilize its “self-orientation” program through a smart application as a flexible option for newly arrived workers, available in 16 languages; 1.5 million workers completed this orientation during the reporting period. The government maintained trafficking-related MOUs with Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Fiji, The Gambia, India, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam to regulate recruitment mechanisms and prevent contract switching; it also provided regular updates to labor-source embassies on licensed, suspended or closed agencies to deter prospective workers from engaging with non-compliant recruiters. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit foreign victims in the UAE. Foreigners comprise nearly 90 percent of the UAE’s population. Lower wage labor, including most manual labor and a significant portion of the service sector, is provided almost entirely by migrant workers, predominantly from South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa. Employers exploit some of these workers in conditions indicative of labor trafficking, such as passport retention, non-payment of wages and unpaid overtime, restrictions on movement, contract switching, fraudulent recruitment, substandard food and housing provisions, debt bondage or a failure to meet other contractual agreements. Migrants travel willingly to the UAE to work as domestic workers, security guards, drivers, gardeners, massage therapists, beauticians, hotel cleaners, or elsewhere in the service sector, but traffickers subject some of them to labor and sex trafficking after arrival. A rights group previously reported recruitment agencies and employers exploited migrant workers employed to support a UN conference, hosted by the Government of the UAE in Dubai, in conditions of labor trafficking, including being charged recruitment fees, nonpayment or delayed payment of wages, passport confiscation, restriction of movement, debt bondage and other abuses.

Observers report the UAE serves as a trafficking hub, where recruiters sell migrants to families who afterwards illegally transport them to other countries in the Gulf. Some recruiters hire workers with false promises of large salaries, medical benefits, and accommodations; however, upon arrival in the UAE, workers discover the companies that hired them are fraudulent, leaving them undocumented, unable to obtain legal work, and vulnerable to trafficking. Recruiters in some source countries work as individual agents rather than for regulated companies, complicating law enforcement and monitoring efforts. Many source-country labor recruiters charge workers fees in their home countries, causing workers to commence employment in the UAE owing debts in their respective countries of origin, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking through debt-based coercion. Reports of employers engaging in the practice of contract-switching persist, leading to less desirable and lower paying jobs for migrant workers after arriving in the UAE.

The UAE’s employer-based visa system restricts foreign workers’ ability to leave a position without prior notice. Despite limited legal measures allowing workers to change sponsors or terminate their employment under certain conditions, some employers continue to exercise unilateral power over foreign workers’ movements, deny laborers working illegally the ability to change employers, restrict permission for them to leave the country, seek unlawful payment to approve a job transfer, and threaten employees with abuse of immigration processes, which heightens their vulnerability to trafficking. In some cases, employers refuse to return passports to workers until they reimburse the employer for visa or license fees (for delivery drivers), further exploiting the worker in labor trafficking through debt-based coercion, restricting their ability to seek new employers, and disincentivizing the worker from reporting exploitation.

Traffickers subject some women, predominantly from Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Eastern Europe, Iraq, Iran, and Morocco, to sex trafficking. Most trafficking cases registered in the UAE are classified as sexual exploitation despite significant labor trafficking concerns. Reports previously alleged an increase of traffickers in Laos recruiting young women through social media for commercial sex in Dubai. Previous reporting indicates traffickers exploited Mongolian nationals in labor trafficking in the UAE for herding, domestic servitude, and circus performance. Traffickers exploit foreign national victims in forced labor in online scam operations in the UAE. Some cases of child sex trafficking involve traffickers forging ages on passports to facilitate undetected entry into the UAE.

Some migrant workers enter the UAE on tourist visas and work for an employer who does not apply to exchange their tourist visa for the required work visa in order for the worker to have legal residency; employers subsequently use the worker’s legal status as coercion and further exploit the worker. Observers noted the frequency with which migrants sought to convert tourist to work visas remained a prevalent practice; one observer noted Filipino workers transiting UAE for work elsewhere in the region often deplane in Dubai and obtain a tourist visa to seek work in the UAE instead of their final destination. Observers reported increasing numbers of Nepali workers stranded in UAE after unknowingly arriving on tourist visas and paying recruitment fees to agents in Nepal with promises for employment in the United States or Europe. Diplomatic contacts previously reported the government increased scrutiny on individuals residing and traveling to the UAE on tourist visas – and reports claim individuals who overstay their tourist visa could be charged with “absconding.”

Many UAE households continue to employ domestic workers directly or through private recruitment agencies that were not government regulated, further increasing the vulnerability of domestic workers to trafficking without protection under the law. Some employers sponsoring domestic workers and unlicensed recruitment agents continue to use online platforms to advertise the “selling” of domestic workers. Migrant workers sometimes start with one employer and for various reasons, including abuse or exploitation, low salary, or simple dissatisfaction with the job, will follow alternate employment opportunities that ultimately prove fictitious, as traffickers in the UAE are adept at using manipulation to entice laborers with fraudulent higher salaries. According to reports, there were 110 Cuban regime-affiliated medical professionals present in the UAE as part of the COVID-19 pandemic response, of whom 45 returned to Cuba in 2021. The government did not report if others remained in the country in 2024. Regime-affiliated Cuban professionals may have been forced to work by the Cuban regime. North Korean nationals working in the UAE may be operating under exploitative working conditions and display multiple indicators of forced labor.