• Investigate and prosecute traffickers and operators involved in forced labor crimes in online scam operations, including government officials; seek adequate penalties for all convicted traffickers, which should include significant prison terms.
• Allow civil society organizations and journalists to operate freely and effectively to support trafficking victims and raise awareness of and report on trafficking issues in Cambodia.
• Fully implement victim identification guidelines, apply them to domestic and foreign suspected victims, and train officials in all areas of the country on their use.
• Screen all individuals in immigrant detention or custody for human trafficking indicators.
• Waive immigration overstay fees for foreign victims who are pending trafficking victim identification procedures or who are participating in criminal or civil proceedings against their traffickers.
• Increase resources and accountability for anti-trafficking law enforcement units – especially in border areas, airports, and known and emerging scam compound hotspots – and disburse it in advance of investigations, rather than by reimbursement.
• Increase unannounced labor inspections in high-vulnerability professions, especially in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and at brick kilns, entertainment venues, construction sites, and plantations, with a focus on identifying labor trafficking and debt bondage and holding business owners accountable to the law.
• Increase the availability of services for male victims, especially men and boys exploited in commercial fishing abroad.
• Increase inspection and oversight of lending institutions, including private micro-finance organizations, to reduce risk to debt-based coercion among economically vulnerable communities.
• Establish and allocate resources to implement systematic procedures at diplomatic missions to assist Cambodian victims abroad, including in countries without Cambodian diplomatic representation.
• Strengthen efforts to inspect private labor recruitment agencies and their sub-licensed brokers for fraudulent recruitment and other trafficking indicators.
• Eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by Cambodian labor recruiters; ensure any fees are instead paid by employers.
• Amend regulations on labor recruitment licensure and contract requirements to include strengthened language on worker protections and labor rights.

The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts; official complicity remained a significant concern and impediment.

The 2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Sex trafficking crimes were often prosecuted under lesser statues, incurring lower penalties. NGOs reported that in practice the government did not issue criminal penalties under the anti-trafficking law for labor traffickers; instead, it utilized the labor law to issue fines and/or short jail sentences of six days to one month, which did not represent sufficient punishment to deter future crimes or provide justice for victims.

The government did not maintain a centralized record or database of investigations and judicial proceedings that clearly distinguished trafficking crimes; however, the government made improvements to data collection and disaggregation compared with prior years. Reported law enforcement data, including prosecutions and convictions, included nontrafficking crimes such as kidnapping; therefore, the actual number of trafficking prosecutions and convictions was lower than reported. The government reported investigating 196 trafficking cases involving 261 suspects (145 sex trafficking cases and 51 forced labor cases), compared with 27 trafficking cases investigated during the previous reporting period. In 2024, the government reported initiating prosecutions for approximately 380 cases (318 alleged traffickers), compared with 354 cases (600 alleged traffickers) in the previous reporting period, and provided disaggregated judicial data by type of trafficking. The government reported continuing 20 prosecutions initiated in previous years. The government reported convicting 658 traffickers, but did not report if any convictions were under the trafficking law, provide details to indicate whether all convictions involved trafficking crimes, or disaggregate data by type of trafficking; courts convicted 109 traffickers under the trafficking law in the previous reporting period. The law allowed for retrials for suspects who evaded arrest and were convicted in absentia; the government did not report whether any retrials occurred.

The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting government employees allegedly complicit in human trafficking crimes, nor did it report issuing fines or other penalties for complicit officials during the reporting period. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes at many levels of government remained significant concerns, hindering law enforcement action and perpetuating impunity. Observers reported prosecutors and judges accepted bribes in return for dismissal of charges, acquittals, and reduced sentencing. Nationwide, law enforcement authorities often did not effectively investigate or prosecute suspected traffickers despite credible allegations due to resource constraints and official complicity. The government conducted anti-trafficking operations in provinces outside of the capital, but official complicity and corruption in rural and remote communities inhibited law enforcement efforts. In April 2024, 72 Cambodian women in domestic work abroad publicly requested assistance and reported indicators of forced labor via social media to the Cambodian government. The government repatriated 26 of the potential victims by the end of the reporting period but did not report initiating any trafficking investigations; observers reported a high-level Cambodian government official owned the agency that employed the workers.

Institutionalized and pervasive corruption and official complicity in labor trafficking and forced criminality persisted. Senior government officials, family members of senior officials, and business elites with close relationships with senior officials, including a U.S.-sanctioned senator, reportedly were involved with and benefited from online scam operations or owned properties on which online scam compounds operated. Involvement of such officials and elites resulted in selective and politically motivated enforcement of laws, which inhibited effective law enforcement action against such operations which remained widespread during the reporting period. Observers reported such compounds often received advanced warning of impending law enforcement actions, were not investigated, or required local law enforcement to receive permission from senior government officials to enter, giving compound operators time to adjust operations and move victims. The government carried out a pattern of intimidating victims and civil society working to identify and support victims in online scam compounds and raise awareness of the issue, as well as prohibiting local officials from investigating or holding high-level government officials or individuals with close ties to high-level senior government officials criminally accountable. Government officials actively stymied countervailing efforts, with officials publicly and privately denouncing victim accounts, victim credibility, and reporting by international organizations, journalists, and civil society on the prevalence and severity of online scam operations; the government frequently downplayed scam operation cases as labor disputes. Despite widespread reporting of forced criminality in online scam compounds in known and emerging online scam hotspots, the government has never arrested or prosecuted a suspected scam compound operator or owner, including high-level officials. Observers reported compounds that authorities shut down were often reopened, sometimes within days, after seven-figure “fines” were paid to high-level officials. The government took no action to hold criminally accountable a U.S.-sanctioned senator, despite extensive evidence of widespread online scam operations through several corporate entities he owns or controls, including several hotels and resorts that remained in operation.

In February 2025, the prime minister established an Ad Hoc Commission to Combat Online Scams comprising law enforcement and military officials, which reportedly cooperated with a foreign government to conduct two large law enforcement actions resulting in the recovery of trafficking victims in scam compounds; however, observers reported the government did not investigate, arrest, or prosecute the compounds’ owners or operators. The government took limited steps to effectively disrupt or shut down such operations. Cambodian and some foreign government officials reported successful law enforcement cooperation during the reporting period to take law enforcement actions on select online scam operations. Aside from those law enforcement actions, the government typically only took steps to rescue suspected trafficking victims in online scam operations following diplomatic pressure from foreign governments with impacted nationals, civil society interventions, or negative media coverage of individual cases; such efforts resulted in the selective removal of specific victims from such compounds without any reported efforts to screen for and identify additional victims. Throughout the reporting period, the government did not investigate, arrest, or prosecute any of the owners or operators of buildings implicated in victim recovery or law enforcement actions taken on online scam operation.

An observer reported the government increasingly conducted law enforcement patrols in locations of suspected sex trafficking, including guesthouses, massage parlors, and karaoke bars, although other observers noted police complicity sometimes impeded law enforcement actions. Authorities often overlooked, denied, or downplayed labor abuses committed against children and adults – including forced labor – and colluded with brick manufacturers to arrest, jail, and return indentured laborers who had attempted to escape.

The government reported the Cambodian National Police (CNP) cooperated with foreign governments, including Australia, Belgium, India, New Zealand, Poland, South Korea, the UK, and the United States on trafficking investigations. The government continued to cooperate with a foreign government through a law enforcement task force dedicated to combating online child sexual exploitation and other child sex crimes; authorities reported identifying 210 victims of child sex trafficking through this effort. Observers reported authorities appropriately understood and applied trafficking indicators and were more likely apply the law for Cambodian victims exploited abroad.

The government – in collaboration with and through funding from NGOs and other donors – provided some training for police, prosecutors, judges, and other government officials on anti-trafficking laws, investigative techniques, evidence collection, victim identification, and protection guidelines. Many police – particularly in rural areas – remained unaware of how to conduct anti-trafficking work, as most did not receive training on basic law enforcement techniques. Law enforcement and judicial officials lacked the necessary equipment to handle trafficking cases appropriately, including vehicles, computer and communications equipment, and forensic tools. The government required the funding of all anti-trafficking investigative work to be conducted through reimbursement, resulting in individual police units fronting expenses with personal funds. Some officers waited months for this reimbursement, which was sometimes not repaid in full, and the ensuing financial hardships made some police units more susceptible to corruption.

The government maintained inadequate efforts to identify and protect victims, especially among those exploited in scam operations.

The government reported identifying 443 victims or potential victims in 2024 (176 women, 134 men, 29 girls, and three boys), compared with 142 victims or potential victims in the previous reporting period. While the law specified individuals could not be confirmed as trafficking victims until a criminal trial ended with a conviction, the government could formally designate “suspected victims” to allow potential victims to receive services, including legal services. The CNP and Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSAVY) had victim identification guidelines, but law enforcement agencies’ victim identification, referral, and repatriation efforts remained disparate, time consuming, and burdensome for victims and victim support service providers, particularly for foreign victims who frequently opted to forego the process rather than wait months for victim identification interviews with different government offices. The government continued to implement a regulation barring NGOs from representing individuals seeking formal recognition as trafficking victims. Under this arrangement, authorities required victims to seek formal identification from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to access protection services. The National Committee for Counter Trafficking (NCCT) reported initiating a study, in coordination with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, to review the victim identification and referral process in consultation with civil society organizations and relevant government ministries.

While the government reported screening vulnerable groups for trafficking indicators, its screening of workers in online scam operations was inadequate, inconsistent, and selective; officials were reluctant to identify victims exploited in compounds connected to influential officials or advisors. Officials often did not follow established victim identification procedures for foreign victims recovered from online scam compounds and instead, detained and deported them without screening for trafficking indicators or providing services. Police could screen for trafficking indicators and refer victims to a MoSAVY office if they were not present; however, the Central Security Department led most of the operation activities to remove potential victims from online scam compounds, rarely screened for trafficking, and did not coordinate with MoSAVY to place victims in shelters. Officials inappropriately penalized some potential victims for crimes committed as a direct result of being trafficked by holding these victims in indefinite detention, and, in some cases, re-victimizing them by demanding bribes or ransom to police for release, or reselling them to other compounds. Foreign missions reported receiving hundreds of leads from potential victims in online scam operations in Cambodia; however, Cambodian authorities would often only take action and remove the specific victims when requested by a foreign government. The government classified many of these cases as “labor disputes” instead of human trafficking, despite the presence of trafficking indicators. The government’s referral procedures were inadequate for foreign potential victims recovered from online scam operation compounds.

MoSAVY reported partnering with local law enforcement and referring 351 individuals to NGO shelters for reintegration and social support services, compared with 436 individuals in the previous reporting period. However, the data includes 214 victims subjected to forced marriage which may have included nontrafficking situations. The government continued to operate a victim support center in Banteay Meanchey province to provide services – including temporary shelter, healthcare, and vocational training – for trafficking victims and other vulnerable populations; shelter coordinators reported providing services to at least 30 vulnerable Cambodian children who were trafficking victims, suspected trafficking victims, or victims of sexual harassment or assault. MoSAVY continued to operate a migrant transit center in the border town of Poipet and reported receiving 7,350 migrant workers, primarily from Thailand; the government reported 47 migrant workers at the center were potential trafficking victims. MoSAVY also managed long-term care and other assistance for child trafficking victims who could not reintegrate into their communities, but it did not operate any trafficking shelters for child victims; instead, the government relied on two NGOs to provide such shelter.

MoSAVY maintained guidelines outlining minimum standards for residential care of trafficking victims and the government’s trafficking victim assistance policy entitled victims to a food allowance of 150,000 riel ($37), living stipend of 120,000 riel ($30) for three months, job training, and reintegration assistance; however, as in the previous reporting period, MoSAVY did not allocate sufficient funding to provide all such assistance and remained without the capacity available to provide adequate protection services. MoSAVY continued to rely heavily on donor countries, international organizations, and NGOs to provide or support provision of such services to trafficking victims. The government authorized public health facilities to provide free medical services to all migrant workers in Cambodia, including foreign trafficking victims; this policy relieved NGOs of the financial burden of providing medical care to this vulnerable population. The government had only limited services, including shelters, for male labor trafficking victims and continued to cooperate with an NGO to provide services to Cambodian male victims exploited in the Thai commercial fishing industry.

The government continued to provide basic care to or assist in the repatriation of Cambodian victims exploited abroad, but it relied on donor organizations to finance their repatriation. Cambodian diplomatic missions overseas lacked adequate funding and capacity to provide basic assistance to or repatriate victims. Some victims were reportedly unable to secure assistance from Cambodian consular services overseas because of unattended hotlines and unresponsive staff. Victims identified in countries without Cambodian diplomatic representation had access to even less support.

MoSAVY reported helping repatriate 90 foreign labor trafficking victims back to Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, but did not provide further details on those cases. The government required the repatriation of foreign victims, except in rare cases, and did not have legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they would face retribution or hardship. The government did not identify individuals removed from online scam compounds as potential victims, precluding their access to shelters. In some cases, the government prevented civil society from providing referrals for NGO services to victims held in detention centers. Media reported police demanded detained victims pay for basic amenities, including food, and for their release from detention; some victims claimed they paid 20,255 riel ($5) for meals and 4.05-12.15 million riel ($1,000-$3,000) for their release from detention centers. Media reported the government cooperated with foreign authorities from Indonesian, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines to repatriate victims from online scam operations.

The government reported it did not require trafficking victims to participate in trafficking investigations or prosecutions to receive protection services; however, an observer reported this occurred on a case-by-case basis. The government did not report whether any victims participated in trial hearings or prosecutions against alleged traffickers but maintained a policy that allowed victims to testify through video or written statements. There were no legal provisions to offer work permits, temporary residency, or other immigration status to foreign victims wishing to remain in Cambodia to participate in civil or criminal proceedings. Corruption in Cambodia’s judicial system and the lack of any victim and witness protection, exacerbated by a lengthy trial process and fear of retaliation by traffickers, made victims unwilling to cooperate in many cases. NGOs reported victims preferred outof-court settlements over court proceedings as the fastest way to obtain monetary compensation. Restitution was difficult to obtain because of a legal requirement delaying payment until after the completion of a trafficker’s jail term. Some convicted traffickers absconded after serving their term. The government reported ordering three convicted traffickers to pay restitution of 38 million riels ($9,460) to trafficking victims in 2024, with actual payment pending by the end of the reporting period; this compared with no reported restitution ordered in 2023. The government did not have a victim compensation fund and victims could only receive compensation from traffickers through court-mandated actions. NGOs also reported judges had inadequate knowledge of victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches to engage with victims in courtroom settings; this led to the re-traumatization of victims.

The government made minimal effort to prevent human trafficking, and official complicity exacerbated human trafficking by discouraging reporting of trafficking crimes and preventing civil society from spreading awareness of forced criminality in scam centers.

The NCCT and its secretariat coordinated anti-trafficking activities and met on a quarterly basis. In August 2024, the NCCT launched the 2024-2028 Combating Trafficking in Persons NAP, with the secretariat set to monitor its implementation. The NCCT produced an annual report documenting the government’s antitrafficking efforts and made it available to the public. The NCCT reportedly invited survivors of trafficking to attend meetings and workshops to improve victim identification guidelines and policies. The secretariat maintained six working groups to monitor the efforts of the interagency committee, as well as those of its provincial subcommittees to counter trafficking (PCCT), which coordinated efforts at the local level to mirror the activities of the NAP. Four PCCTs continued to receive modest central government funds. Each PCCT maintained customized provincial-level action plans outlining how to report cases of trafficking to police, victim protection efforts, and prevention activities. A Monitoring Working Group continued to strengthen the work of the NCCT at the provincial level by meeting with provincial officials and assessing areas of improvement. The government has not reported its anti-trafficking budget since 2020 when it was approximately 2.2 billion riels ($547,950). As in previous years, NGOs reported the government’s inadequate funding for anti-trafficking activities led some NGOs to cover the expenses of government activities.

The government – in collaboration with various donors and civil society – disseminated information about trafficking laws, safe migration, child labor, and strategies to combat trafficking to law enforcement, other government personnel, and the general population through radio broadcasts, social media, public events, public statements, local press outlets, and state-sponsored media. Senior officials acknowledged online scam operations existed and remained a problem in the country but largely placed blame on foreign perpetrators.

The Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Police (AHTJP) and MOI continued to operate a hotline and a social media page to report human trafficking crimes. Callers to the hotline could submit requests in four languages (Chinese, English, Khmer, and Vietnamese). Observers reported hotline staff had limited training and understanding of trafficking and were unable to provide resource referrals for victims. Despite continuous reports of victims exploited in scam compounds calling the hotline for assistance, hotline staff reported the majority of calls to be sex trafficking and labor disputes. In August 2024, the CNP began referring all online scam-related trafficking victim requests to a separate hotline operated by the Central Security Department instead of the ADTJP. The MOI reported the hotline and social media pages received 1,600 reports, with 15-17% providing leads on potential crimes; the government did not report any trafficking victims identified or investigations initiated as a result. Hotline operators and questionnaires required victims and the public to provide an extensive list of details, which most callers would not have, including the specific location of a compound and a photo of the victim, for authorities to initiate an investigation. These onerous requirements disincentivized calls to the hotline and allowed officials to selectively disregard initiating investigations. Observers noted foreign embassy involvement led to higher likelihood of victim recovery compared with the hotline. The Ministries of Labor and Foreign Affairs operated hotlines for Cambodians working abroad to seek assistance and report cases of human trafficking, but did not report how many calls they received in 2024.

The government reported prohibiting worker-paid recruitment or placement fees; however, in practice, observers noted the high costs, complex administrative requirements, and restrictive provisions inherent to formal migration drove most Cambodian labor migrants to pursue informal pathways to working abroad. In partnership with an international organization, the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) trained recruitment agencies on usage of an international recruitment system that promoted voluntary fair labor practices. The government reported conducting labor inspections but did not report screening for or identifying any labor trafficking victims through these efforts. The MOLVT maintained offices at the provincial level to monitor recruitment agencies and address complaints from workers, including potential incidents of trafficking. The government did not report conducting inspections of recruitment agencies allegedly involved in trafficking crimes.

The MOLVT did not report if it had conducted predeparture orientation briefings to Cambodians migrating abroad for work in 2024, compared with 1,328 in 2023. The government did not report efforts to raise awareness among Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand of how to apply for travel documentation or how much it should cost – leaving them at higher risk of travel through informal, more vulnerable means. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) continued to implement consular screening measures to reduce the sex and labor trafficking of Cambodian women via forced and fraudulent marriages; however, the MFAIC did not report identifying potential victims during these screenings.

The MOLVT maintained an action plan aimed at reducing child labor and debt bondage in the service, agricultural, mining, and energy sectors by 2025 through awareness raising, legal action, and collaboration with civil society funded in part through the national budget. MOLVT officials continued to deny the existence of child labor – including forced child labor – and debt-based coercion in the brick industry. The MOLVT did not report conducting any inspections of brick kilns in 2024, compared with 400 inspections in 2023, and for the third consecutive year, did not report identifying any adult or child trafficking victims. Observers stated police were often unaware that detection of crimes at brick kilns fell under their investigative purview or feared reprisals for conducting investigations or making any arrests; as previously reported, the AHTJP viewed brick kiln inspections as under the MOLVT’s purview and would only investigate kilns if the MOLVT referred a case to them. The AHTJP did not report any such referrals.

The government continued to produce public-facing materials targeting potential consumers of commercial sex with children. The CNP maintained teams of anti-trafficking and cybercrime specialists in each province to investigate cases involving online child sexual exploitation (OCSE). However, as in prior years, the government generally focused on deterring foreign perpetrators of child sex trafficking in the tourism industry, rather than targeting the local population that constituted the main source of demand for commercial sex with children in Cambodia. The government did not report denying entry to any foreign convicted sex offenders.

Trafficking affects all communities. This section summarizes government and civil society reporting on the nature and scope of trafficking over the past five years. Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cambodia, and traffickers exploit victims from Cambodia abroad. Traffickers exploit Cambodians and foreign nationals in forced labor and forced criminality in online scam operations largely run by locally operated Chinese organized crime syndicates in scam centers located in Cambodia. These traffickers use the Internet and social media to fraudulently recruit adults and children from Cambodia, China, and other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere, for high-paying technical and other jobs abroad and subsequently force them to facilitate illegal online gambling, cryptocurrency investment schemes, and romance scams, primarily in large commercial compounds in Cambodia. Increasingly, traffickers compel victims to recruit additional trafficking victims, often through personal relationships, in order to secure their own release. Brokers move victims through airports, overland, or by sea into Cambodia. Traffickers subject these workers to punishment for inadequate performance and disobedience, including, but not limited to, physical abuse and torture, sexual abuse, pay docking, and debt bondage, and may “resell” those who cannot meet sales quotas or repay recruitment debts to other criminal networks for forced labor in similar fraud schemes, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. NGOs estimate 150,000 workers are exploited in forced labor in approximately 350 compounds in Cambodia, though the actual numbers are likely higher. These compounds are largely clustered in the port city of Sihanoukville, along the borders with Thailand and Laos, and increasingly in rural areas, where they encounter less scrutiny by the government and NGOs and victims have less chance of escape.

Cambodian adults and children migrate to other countries in the region and increasingly to the Middle East for work. Traffickers force many – often through debt-based coercion – to work on fishing vessels, in agriculture, in construction, in factories, and in domestic work, or exploit them in sex trafficking. International organizations estimate 1.1 million Cambodians work abroad, with Thailand as a primary destination country. Cambodian victims have been identified in other countries including Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, and South Africa. Migrant workers utilizing the assistance of unlicensed brokers are at an increased risk of trafficking, although those using licensed recruiting agents also become victims of forced labor or sex trafficking. Children from impoverished families are vulnerable to forced labor, often with the complicity of their families, including in domestic service and forced begging or street vending in Thailand and Vietnam. Some Cambodian migrants working in Thailand are at a high risk of trafficking, as are some Cambodians working in Vietnam. Traffickers continue to recruit significant numbers of Cambodian men and boys to work on fishing boats and exploit them in forced labor on Thai-owned and -operated vessels in international waters. Cambodian men working on Thai-owned and -operated fishing vessels report deceptive recruitment tactics, severe physical abuse, underpayment or nonpayment of wages, restricted access to medical care, and confinement at sea for years at a time without permission to come ashore.

Traffickers recruit women and some girls from rural areas under false pretenses to travel to China to enter into marriages with Chinese national men. These women incur thousands of dollars of debt to brokers facilitating the transaction; the Chinese national men force some of these women to work in factories or exploit them in sex trafficking to repay this debt. Some parents reportedly receive between 6.08-12.15 million riel ($1,500 and $3,000) from marriage brokers to send their daughters to China for marriage. Cambodian women serving as illegal surrogates for Chinese national families are vulnerable to domestic servitude. Stateless persons in Cambodia, namely in ethnic Vietnamese communities, are at a higher risk of trafficking. Foreign labor brokers fraudulently recruit foreign migrants, including from Bangladesh, China, and Nepal, to work in construction sites in Cambodia – some of which are affiliated with Chinese national-owned companies – where some are indebted to recruitment firms and experience passport confiscation. There were Cuban regime-affiliated workers in Cambodia, including sports coaches, athletes, and health workers; the Cuban regime may have forced Cuban regime-affiliated professionals in Cambodia to work.

A 2018 report stated the proprietors of brick kilns subject many of the more than 10,000 Cambodians living at such kilns, including nearly 4,000 children, to multigenerational debt-based coercion, either by buying off their pre-existing loans, or by requiring them to take out new loans as a condition of employment or to cover medical expenses resulting from injuries incurred while working. Observers have confirmed cases of child labor – including forced child labor – in brick kilns, as children are forced to work alongside their parents through debt-based coercion. Despite reports of reduction in consumer demand in brick kilns in 2024, traffickers continue to exploit victims – primarily Cambodian nationals from ethnic minority communities – in forced labor via debt bondage. An extensive, largely unregulated network of predatory micro-finance organizations and private creditors contributes to this arrangement by proactively advertising loans to families in vulnerable communities and connecting them with the kilns. Some Cambodian families experience conditions indicative of forced labor in the clay extraction process required for brick making. Traffickers exploit children as young as 13 in domestic servitude and in brothels to pay off family debts accrued through this system.

Cambodian and ethnic Vietnamese women and girls move from rural areas to cities and tourist destinations, where criminals exploit them in sex trafficking in brothels and, more frequently, clandestine sex establishments at beer gardens, massage parlors, salons, karaoke bars, retail spaces, noncommercial sites. Increasingly, Cambodian and foreign national women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking in online scam compounds. Cambodian men and men from Australia, South Africa, the United States, and other countries in Asia and Europe engage in child sexual exploitation and abuse in the tourism industry, increasingly facilitated through social media. NGOs and law enforcement officials reported the pandemic increased incidents of online child sexual exploitation in 2020, and incidents increased through 2022. Vietnamese women and children, many of whom are victims of debt-based coercion, travel to Cambodia and are exploited in sex trafficking. Traffickers in Cambodia are most commonly family or community members or small networks of independent brokers. Some Cambodian orphanages purchase local children from economically disadvantaged families and subject them to malnutrition and unclean living conditions in their facilities for the purpose of attracting and profiting from charitable donations; some of these children are at further risk of sex trafficking and domestic servitude as a result of inadequate government oversight of adoption processes.