While reforms adopted since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016 have led to improvements on some issues, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state with few signs of democratization. No opposition parties operate legally. The legislature and judiciary effectively serve as instruments of the executive branch, which initiates reforms by decree, and the media are still tightly controlled by the authorities. Reports of torture and other ill-treatment persist, although highly publicized cases of abuse have resulted in dismissals and prosecutions for some officials, and small-scale corruption has been meaningfully reduced.

• In March, the first of a series of trials of major organized crime figures concluded with a conviction for Salim Abduvaliyev, a leader in a criminal network that has maintained close ties to political elites in both Russia and Uzbekistan. Abduvaliyev and several of his associates were convicted of trafficking arms, explosives, and drugs; he was sentenced to six years in prison. Another key defendant, Baxtiyor Qudratullayev, was sentenced to 20 years in prison in July.
• Parliamentary elections held in October offered voters no meaningful choice, as all participating parties supported the government. Despite 2023 constitutional and electoral-law changes that were meant to make the system more competitive, the president’s Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan won 64 out of 150 seats in the lower house, half of which was filled through national party-list voting and half through single-member districts. This represented a gain of 11 seats. Three smaller parties lost ground—Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) with 29 seats, the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party with 21, and the People’s Democratic Party with 20—while the Ecological Party gained a seat for a total of 16. The 65-member upper house, or Senate, was indirectly elected in November, with 56 members chosen by local and regional councils and 9 appointed by the president. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe found that the year’s balloting was again marked by numerous violations, and that registration for opposition parties or independent candidates remained effectively impossible. As a result of a new 40 percent gender quota for party lists under the 2023 reforms, women took 38 percent of the seats in the lower house, but retained about 24 percent of the seats in the Senate. Separately, in February authorities had banned the unregistered political party Alga Karakalpakstan, which supports independence for the autonomous Karakalpakstan Republic, as an “extremist” organization.
• Authorities reportedly renewed efforts to suppress forms of dress and appearance that they associated with banned Muslim organizations. Police raided markets and other public spaces, detained young men with beards, and compelled them to shave or face up to 15 days in jail. Also during the year, Uzbek courts convicted several citizens for serving as mercenaries in the Russian military’s invasion of Ukraine; Uzbek migrant workers in Russia have faced pressure to enlist, often to avoid criminal prosecution or imprisonment in that country.
• Over the course of the year, multiple citizens across the country were convicted of insulting or slandering the president through social media posts and sentenced to penalties ranging from forced psychiatric hospitalization to five years in prison.
• In April, an investigation by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty found that some $100 million in government contracts for delivery of overpriced natural gas had been granted in 2021 and 2022 to an obscure company linked to President Mirziyoyev’s son-in-law, Otabek Umarov. Prior investigations had established a pattern of state contracts and investments going to networks of companies owned by the president’s extended family. Meanwhile, citizen journalists and anticorruption activists remained subject to physical attacks and prosecution for alleged extortion or slander when they investigated alleged corruption by local and regional-level officials.

This report has been abridged for Freedom in the World 2025 due to ongoing budget constraints. Freedom in the World is entirely funded by nongovernmental sources such as private foundations, corporations, and individuals like you. Please consider making a donation to support future editions of this vital resource.

For additional background information, see last year’s full report.