Under the 2019 constitution, the president and vice president of the republic are chosen by the National Assembly to serve up to two five-year terms. The prime minister and the Council of Ministers are designated by the National Assembly upon the president’s recommendation. In practice, these processes ratify candidates who have been preselected by the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez was reelected president in April 2023 in a nearly unanimous National Assembly vote. The legislature also reelected Salvador Valdés Mesa as vice president and Juan Esteban Lazo Hernández as president of both the National Assembly and the Council of State. That month, the National Assembly reappointed Manuel Marrero Cruz as prime minister on the recommendation of President Díaz-Canel.

Former President Raúl Castro Ruz retired as PCC first secretary during the April 2021 party congress and was succeeded by Díaz-Canel. Castro maintains significant influence despite his retirement.

The unicameral National Assembly is directly elected to serve five-year terms, but a PCC-controlled commission designates all candidates, presenting voters with a single candidate for each seat. Those who receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast are deemed elected. The National Assembly in turn selects members of the Council of State, a body that exercises legislative power between the assembly’s two brief annual sessions.

All 470 of the approved candidates for the March 2023 National Assembly elections were deemed elected. However, the 2023 general elections featured the lowest voter turnout since 1993, with an official figure of 76 percent, though independent groups suggested that even that number may have been inflated.

The only Cuban elections that offer a choice of more than one candidate per office are those for municipal assemblies, but no campaigning is allowed. This did not change under the electoral law unanimously approved in 2019 following ratification of the new constitution, which retained the system of PCC-controlled electoral and candidacy commissions. However, the new law eliminated provincial assemblies, calling instead for municipal assemblies to approve provincial governors proposed by the president, and cut the number of National Assembly delegates from 605 to 470 as of the 2023 elections.

The constitution identifies the PCC as the “superior driving force of society and the state.” All other political parties are illegal. Political dissent is a punishable offense, and dissidents are systematically harassed, detained, physically assaulted, and imprisoned for minor infractions. Supposedly spontaneous mob attacks, known as “acts of repudiation,” are often used to silence political dissidents. Madrid-based NGO Prisoners Defenders reported that 1,161 political prisoners were being held by Cuban authorities at the end of 2024.

The PCC has monopolized government and politics in Cuba since the mid-1960s, allowing no electoral competition and preventing any alternative force from succeeding it through a democratic transfer of power. No opposition candidates were allowed to contest the 2023 national elections.

The authoritarian one-party system in Cuba excludes the public from any genuine, autonomous political participation. Intelligence agencies play an important role in suppressing dissent and wield deep influence over virtually every aspect of the state. Members of dissident groups and even independent actors in the arts, journalism, private business, and other fields are systematically surveilled and periodically interrogated in order to silence them or turn them into informants.

State employees who express political dissent or disagreement with the authorities often face harassment or summary dismissal. Professionals dismissed from their jobs in the state sector have difficulty continuing their careers.

The PCC leadership has exhibited greater gender and racial diversity in recent years. However, since political rights are denied in practice to all Cuban citizens, women, Afro-Cubans, migrants, and members of other demographic groups are unable to choose their representatives or organize independently to assert their political interests.

Women continue to hold more than half of the 470 National Assembly seats following the 2023 parliamentary elections. However, women held only three seats in the 13-seat Political Bureau of the PCC Central Committee and were underrepresented in the Council of Ministers as of 2024. Cubans of African and mixed-race descent are well represented in the legislature. Juan Esteban Lazo Hernández, an Afro-Cuban PCC stalwart, simultaneously holds the powerful positions of National Assembly president and head of the Council of State, and Afro-Cuban Salvador Valdés Mesa holds the position of vice president.

LGBT+ people are not able to pursue their political interests outside the PCC structure. Some public advocacy is allowed, but only with the permission of the PCC and under the threat of persistent police harassment.

None of Cuba’s nominally elected officials are chosen through free and fair elections, and major policy decisions are reserved for the PCC leadership in practice. The National Assembly, which the constitution describes as the “supreme organ of state power,” has little independent influence, meets for brief sessions twice a year, and votes unanimously on nearly all matters before it.

Corruption remains a serious problem in Cuba, with widespread illegality permeating everyday life. The state enjoys a monopoly on most large business transactions, and there are no independent mechanisms to hold officials accountable for wrongdoing. The authorities do not tolerate civil society groups, independent journalists, or independent courts that might serve as external checks on government malfeasance. Internal reforms that would make the system more transparent and less prone to abuse have been rejected. The Comptroller General’s Office has inadequate resources and, notably, does not scrutinize the Grupo de Administración Empresarial SA (GAESA), a military-owned conglomerate with significant control over the Cuban economy.

In March 2024, the government announced that it had opened a criminal investigation into Alejandro Gil Fernández, who had been dismissed as economy minister and deputy prime minister the previous month, based on unspecified corruption allegations. The case represented an extremely rare instance of anticorruption proceedings against a senior government official, but little information about the investigation had emerged by year’s end.

Article 53 of the constitution recognizes that all people have the right to solicit and obtain information from the government. However, Cuba lacks effective laws that provide for freedom of information and access to official records. Decree Law 6 of 2020 allows individuals to request data from the national statistics office; in practice, officials can decline such requests. A social communication law approved by the legislature in 2023 states that public information is only accessible through state media. In July 2024, the National Assembly adopted a new law on access to public information, but critics argued that its vaguely worded exceptions, procedural barriers, and potential penalties for misuse of information would effectively allow authorities to retain broad control over official data.

Cuba has one of the most restrictive media environments in the world. The formal media sector is owned and controlled by the state, and the constitution prohibits privately owned media. The country’s independent press operates outside the law, its publications are considered “enemy propaganda,” and its journalists are routinely harassed, detained, interrogated, threatened, defamed in the official press, and prohibited from traveling abroad or reentering the country. Government agents regularly accuse them of being mercenaries and even terrorists, and many face charges of “usurpation of legal capacity,” “diffusion of false news,” or other vaguely defined offenses. Journalists at state-owned outlets engage in similar discourse when discussing dissidents.

Recent legal changes have further impeded journalistic activity. The 2022 penal code criminalizes the receipt of funds used to promote acts that the government considers contrary to state security, and the 2023 social communication law, which formally entered into force in October 2024, expanded censorship and severely restricted press freedom. Both pieces of legislation were applied during 2024 to detain and intimidate independent journalists. Beginning in mid-September 2024 and continuing after the implementation of the social communication law, media outlets such as El Toque, Cubanet, Periodismo de Barrio, and Magazine AM:PM reported a new wave of state repression against their collaborators on the island.

While Cubans enjoy comparatively robust religious freedom, official obstacles make it difficult for churches to operate without interference. Certain church groups have struggled to obtain registration, and association with an unregistered group is a criminal offense. The Roman Catholic Church has enjoyed some recognition of its pastoral rights, including periodic access to state media and the ability to build new churches, though some other activities have been restricted. Protestant and evangelical groups tend to face heavier constraints, but they too have experienced periods of relative official tolerance.

Academic freedom is restricted in Cuba. Private schools and universities have been banned since the early 1960s, teaching materials often contain ideological content, and educators commonly require PCC affiliation for career advancement. Despite the elimination of exit visas in 2013, university faculty must still obtain permission to travel to academic conferences abroad, and officials often prevent dissident intellectuals from attending such events. Officials also deny entry to prominent intellectuals who have been critical of the regime. Recent years have featured numerous cases of academics and students being dismissed from universities in reprisal for their political opinions or activities.

Cubans often engage in private discussions regarding everyday issues like the economy, food prices, foreign travel, and internet access, but tend to avoid discussing more sensitive political issues. Neighborhood-level “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution” assist security agencies by monitoring, reporting, and suppressing dissent.

The government closely monitors and criminalizes perceived dissidents within the artistic community and the small private sector, mainstream artists and intellectuals, and media figures who air independent or critical views. The new penal code adopted in 2022 increased the minimum penalties applicable for crimes of “contempt” and “public disorder,” which the government routinely uses to suppress opponents. In November 2023, for example, government critic Alina Bárbara López Hernández was found guilty of the crime of “contempt” after she refused to respond to a summons following a peaceful protest. During 2024, López Hernández continued to be harassed by police and state security forces. In June, while traveling to Havana to hold a protest, she and writer Jenny Pantoja were arbitrarily detained, interrogated, and charged with attempting to assault police officers. In September, López Hernández was expelled from the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC) for her criticism of authorities and for “showing solidarity” with the protests that began in 2021. Multiple other cases of harassment and intimidation of artists and activists were reported, particularly in the last quarter of the year.

The 2022 penal legislation designates the use of social media to incite crimes or spread disinformation—as defined by the government—as an “aggravating circumstance,” allowing for higher penalties. Civil society groups have criticized the 2023 social communication law, which took full effect in October 2024, for restricting the creation and distribution of online and offline content unless it meets arbitrary and ambiguous conditions and aligns with the “purposes of socialist society.” New social communication “inspectors” were appointed and began working in November. The revised penal code, the social communication law, and other such laws were used in 2024 to intimidate and repress ordinary citizens who voiced antigovernment political views on social media. These included José Manuel Barreiro Rouco, who in September was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for sharing “degrading” memes about state officials in a private WhatsApp group, and Arony Yanko García Valdés, who in August was sentenced to one and a half years in prison for “aggravated contempt” after he posted a meme on Facebook.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because Cuban authorities in recent years have used new and existing legislation to intensify the intimidation and punishment of those who voice dissent, including activists, writers, artists, entrepreneurs, and ordinary social media users.

Restrictions on freedom of assembly remain a key form of political control. Security forces and government-backed assailants routinely disrupt peaceful gatherings or protests by political dissidents and civic activists.

On July 11, 2021, Cubans participated nationwide in the largest rallies in over 20 years to protest shortages of basic goods, economic difficulties, the government’s COVID-19 response, and a lack of fundamental freedoms. Authorities acted violently to disperse the protests; security officers used live ammunition, tear gas, and pepper spray, and were also seen charging protesters. One person was killed, and roughly 1,500 people were arrested. Hundreds of people have since been sentenced on charges related to their participation in the 2021 protests.

Antigovernment demonstrations, including local protests over frequent power cuts, fuel, water, and food shortages, continued through 2024, though not on the scale seen in 2021. Arbitrary detentions and police harassment were reported in March 2024, when hundreds of people mobilized to demand “power and food” in Santiago de Cuba and Bayamo. Meanwhile, protests on topics favorable to the government were allowed to proceed during the year. In December, thousands of people participated in a demonstration led by state officials in Havana against the United States’ trade embargo.

Citing the 1985 Law on Associations, the government refuses to register any new organization that is not state supervised. Nearly all politically motivated short-term detentions in recent years have targeted members of independent associations, think tanks, human rights groups, and trade unions.

During 2024, state repression of activist movements and human rights organizations that had supported the protests of 2021 and 2022 severely limited their ability to engage in their work, with members facing arrest, detention, and exile. The authorities also targeted relatives of political prisoners who had advocated for their liberation.

Cuban workers do not have the right to strike or bargain collectively, and independent labor unions are illegal.

According to the constitution, the National Assembly controls judicial appointments and suspensions, and the Council of State exercises these powers when the assembly is not in session. The Council of State is also empowered to issue “instructions of a general character” to the courts, whose rulings typically conform to the interests of the PCC. The Cuban Observatory of Human Rights (OCDH), a Madrid-based civil society group, has noted that the judicial code of ethics explicitly requires loyalty to the “Socialist Revolution.”

The regime’s systematic violation of due process is regularly illustrated by trumped-up criminal cases against protesters, dissidents, artists, and independent journalists. Cubans facing trial do not benefit from speedy and public proceedings.

Those arrested in connection with the 2021 protests and subsequent demonstrations have faced due process violations during summary trials. The criminalization of nonviolent protest and dissent under the new 2022 penal code has also resulted in violations of due process rights, including the lengthy and arbitrary pretrial detentions of multiple activists.

There is evidence that the economic crisis has contributed to a rise violent crime in recent years, and physical security for the population is further undermined by government-backed violence. Opposition activists, human rights defenders, and other perceived enemies of the regime are routinely subjected to public assaults, excessive use of force by police during raids and arrests, and abuse in custody. The government has repeatedly refused to allow international monitoring of its prisons. Prison conditions are poor, featuring overcrowding, forced labor, inadequate sanitation and medical care, and physical abuse.

Following the surge in popular protests in 2021 and 2022, explicit violence against demonstrators at the hands of the authorities reportedly increased in frequency. In July 2021, security forces used live ammunition against protesters and subsequently engaged in violent and degrading treatment—including torture, sleep deprivation, and threats of reprisal—against those taken into custody. According to the OCDH and El Toque, police violence led to the deaths of at least 95 people between 2018 and 2023. In 2024, law enforcement continued to violently repress protests and perceived dissidents across the country, with many individuals subjected to physical assaults. In December, the OCDH reported that at least four people who had been jailed for participation in the 2021 protests had died in prison as a result of ill-treatment.

Article 42 of the 2019 constitution extended protection from discrimination to a wider array of vulnerable groups, explicitly adding categories such as ethnic origin, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, and disability to the existing safeguards regarding race, sex, national origin, and religion. PCC control of the government and justice system limits the authorities’ ability to enforce such guarantees impartially or effectively, and independent calls for equal treatment can draw state reprisals.

Women enjoy legal equality and are well represented in most professions, though their labor force participation rate lags well behind that of men, suggesting persistent economic disparities and societal bias.

Discrimination based on sexual orientation was criminalized in the new penal code of 2022. However, the advocacy efforts of independent LGBT+ groups and activists have continued to be either ignored or suppressed.

In July 2024, the National Assembly passed new citizenship and immigration laws that outlined procedures for Cubans located abroad to relinquish their Cuban citizenship and eliminated a rule under which Cubans who resided abroad for more than 24 months were considered to have forfeited their Cuban residency status. The new legislation also allowed the government to revoke a person’s citizenship for “acts contrary to” the economic, political, and social interests of the country. Although some elements of the laws represented a positive change, Cuban doctors, diplomats, and athletes who “defect” abroad are still prohibited from visiting for several years. Dissidents and journalists are regularly barred from foreign travel or prevented from reentering the country.

The number of people leaving Cuba has increased sharply since the July 2021 protests. Over a million people left the island between 2022 and 2023, according to the government’s own population statistics, with most seeking to reside in the United States.

The 2019 constitution recognized private property as one form of ownership, though opportunities to obtain property and operate private enterprises remain restricted. Since 2021, the government has allowed the creation of more than 11,000 small and medium-sized enterprises in sectors that are not deemed strategic. In September 2024, the government implemented new regulations that tightened state controls over the private sector.

A law that took effect in 2023, known as the forced expropriation law, allows the government to seize private property for “public utility” or “social interest.” Although the law requires the state to offer compensation to those whose property has been taken, critics expressed doubt that adequate compensation would be offered in practice. Some analysts said the law appeared to serve as a tool for the government to expand its role in the tourism sector.

Individuals enjoy broad freedom in their interpersonal, romantic, and sexual relationships. While divorce is common, men and women have equal rights to marital goods and child custody. The 2019 constitution recognizes women’s sexual and reproductive rights, and the family code adopted in 2022 recognizes same-sex marriage and grants same-sex couples the right to adopt or benefit from assisted reproduction techniques. Abortion is legal in Cuba.

Violence against women is a serious problem, with crimes committed by a woman’s current or former intimate partner accounting for the bulk of cases. In 2023 the government launched a new Gender Equality Observatory to provide official statistics on women in Cuba. However, independent women’s rights organizations and activists have criticized the observatory for underreporting femicide cases. In March 2024, independent NGOs reported that there were 89 femicides during 2023, more than the 72 cases recorded in the prior two years combined. Most of the crimes were committed inside the victims’ homes. Initial NGO statistics for 2024 showed some 55 femicides, lower than in 2023 but still elevated compared with previous years. Despite the prevalence of violence against women, the government has not acted on civil society’s calls for a comprehensive law to address the problem and continues to repress and harass independent women’s rights organizations and activists.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because of the prevalence of domestic and intimate-partner violence and the authorities’ ineffective responses to the problem.

Under the PCC’s tightly controlled economic system, average salaries remain extremely low, and the country faces high inflation. An independent study published in July 2024 found that 89 percent of Cubans lived in “extreme poverty.” Cubans who receive remittances from abroad, or who are employed by foreign firms and private businesses, typically enjoy better living conditions than their fellow citizens. At the same time, persistent socioeconomic constraints impose rigid barriers to social mobility on most Cubans, generally preventing them from rising to higher income levels over the course of their lives.