The territory’s chief executive is selected under electoral laws approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China in 2021, diminishing universal suffrage and giving mainland authorities near-total control over the office-holder’s selection. The chief executive serves a five-year term and can seek reelection. The Election Committee (EC), which was expanded under the 2021 laws and mostly consists of individuals backed by Beijing, selects the chief executive. Former Security Secretary and Chief Secretary for Administration John Lee was the only candidate vetted to succeed Carrie Lam in 2022; he won 1,416 votes in the 1,500-member EC that May and took office that July.

Under the 2021 rules, Beijing can vet EC and LegCo candidates, who must be “patriots.” The number of EC members was also increased from 1,200 to 1,500. Of the 300 additional representatives, 190 are delegates of either the NPC or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China’s top government advisory body. The remaining 110 members represent “Hong Kong members of relevant national organizations.” The number of eligible voters who select EC members was cut from some 200,000 “functional constituency” voters—representatives of elite business and social sectors, many with close Beijing ties—to around 4,800. Most individual votes were replaced with organizational votes; unions and other groups may cast only one vote on behalf of their members.

Nearly all of the 967 EC seats contested in September 2021 were filed by candidates considered to be aligned with the Beijing-backed authorities. The remaining 533 seats were occupied by individuals nominated directly from designated organizations and by ex officio members.

The electoral system imposed by Beijing in 2021 significantly altered the LegCo’s composition and power dynamic. The number of seats increased from 70 to 90, with 40 elected by the EC, 30 by the functional constituencies, and 20 elected directly by Hong Kong voters in five geographical constituencies. This reduced the proportion of seats open for direct election from 50 percent to 22 percent. Members serve four-year terms.

LegCo elections due in September 2020 were delayed due to COVID-19 and were held in December 2021. Prodemocracy candidates were prevented from running for LegCo seats in the interim. In November 2020, the NPC Standing Committee issued a directive allowing the territory’s government to summarily remove LegCo members deemed to have endangered national security; 4 prodemocracy members were removed, prompting the other 15 to resign. In January 2021, dozens of activists who organized or participated in a nonbinding primary in 2020 were arrested under the NSL, with most of them receiving prison terms in November 2024. The pro-Beijing camp, with candidates vetted in line with a “patriots only” policy, won all but one seat in the elections on a record-low turnout of 30 percent.

District council elections held in December 2023, which were affected by a significant decline in the number of directly elected seats and a “patriots only” vetting policy, saw a turnout of 27.5 percent, a record low for those contests.

Beijing has the ability to shape electoral outcomes under the 2021 rules. The EC is empowered to vet and preapprove candidates based on national security background checks that ensure they are “patriots.” This mechanism is more restrictive than the prescreening system for the 2016 LegCo election, in which the Electoral Affairs Commission required candidates to attest in writing their belief that Hong Kong is unquestionably a part of China. Far fewer EC and LegCo seats are directly elected under the current system.

Prodemocracy candidates were absent from the 2021 LegCo elections. The seven-member Candidate Eligibility Review Committee approved all but one of the 154 candidates, most of whom were part of the pro-Beijing camp. John Lee was the only candidate to be successfully nominated and vetted by the EC for the role of chief executive in 2022. District council candidates running in December 2023 were also vetted to ensure they were “patriots.”

Hong Kongers’ political choices are limited by an electoral system that ensures the dominance of the pro-Beijing camp by stifling prodemocracy opposition. The banning of the proindependence Hong Kong National Party in 2018 marked the first blanket prohibition of a political party since the territory’s 1997 handover from the United Kingdom to China. The government has since taken more aggressive steps to outlaw prodemocracy political activities.

Since 2021, leading prodemocracy figures have been effectively removed from the political arena under provisions of Beijing’s “patriots only” electoral makeover or via the NSL. Civic Passion, a localist party critical of Beijing, disbanded in 2021 after its chairman was ejected from the LegCo for being deemed insufficiently patriotic. In May 2023, the prodemocracy Civic Party announced its dissolution.

Prodemocracy legislators, who have historically enjoyed substantial minority representation alongside their pro-Beijing counterparts, are absent from the LegCo and district councils. The expansive criminalization of speech and political activity under the NSL and Article 23, and the chief executive’s discretionary authority to remove “nonpatriotic” LegCo members, invite arbitrary enforcement and make genuine opposition representation effectively impossible.

The 2021 electoral reforms closed remaining avenues for the opposition to win political representation by reducing the number of elected seats, increasing the proportion of appointed seats, and implementing a vetting process to ensure that only “patriotic” candidates who accept Beijing’s rules for Hong Kong can contest elections. Similar restrictions were imposed ahead of the 2023 district council elections.

The unelected leadership in Beijing exerts a powerful influence on politics in Hong Kong through a variety of channels and methods, including the NPC’s ability to issue interpretations of the Basic Law, the co-optation of Hong Kong business leaders through their mainland assets and membership in the NPC or CPPCC, and lobbying or harassment of EC members and other political figures to ensure favorable electoral outcomes. The Liaison Office, which represents the mainland government in Hong Kong, coordinates nominations and campaigns for the pro-Beijing camp in LegCo elections.

The NSL, imposed without local consultation, gives Beijing vastly expanded powers in Hong Kong, in part by establishing a centrally controlled security apparatus in the territory and by allowing defendants in some NSL cases to be transferred to the mainland for prosecution and punishment. Article 23 of the Basic Law, which the LegCo passed in March 2024, proscribes harsh punishments for national security offenses including collaborating with “external forces.”

While there are no formal restrictions preventing women or members of ethnic minority groups from voting or running for office, their participation is limited in practice. There is no ethnic minority representation in Hong Kong’s government. A dwindling number of seats can be openly contested, as authorities vet candidates for their “patriotic” character including at the local level.

Of the 21 official members of the Executive Council, a body that advises the chief executive, 5 were women as of October 2024, and female legislators occupy only 16 of the LegCo’s 90 seats. Female representation at the local level is low.

Genuinely independent directly elected officials have little ability to set and implement government policy, and unelected mainland authorities are highly influential. The Basic Law restricts the LegCo’s lawmaking powers, prohibiting legislators from introducing bills that would affect public spending, governmental operations, or political structure. The LegCo presently offers no meaningful checks on executive authority and instead functions as a rubber-stamp institution, passing most bills with near unanimity.

Under the current electoral system, a vetting process ensures that only “patriotic” candidates who accept Beijing’s rules for Hong Kong may run in elections. Prodemocracy candidates have been barred from running for office, jailed, or forced into exile, and recent elections have proven uncompetitive.

Hong Kong is regarded as having generally low corruption rates, and some high-ranking officials have been successfully prosecuted for graft-related offenses in the past. However, residents perceive the government to be lagging in the fight against corruption. Authorities have also applied anti–money laundering and anticorruption laws against organizations connected with the 2019 protest movement.

Hong Kong has no freedom-of-information law, nor does it have any specific legislation relating to the management of government records and archives. An administrative Code of Access to Information is intended to ensure open access to government records but includes broad exemptions.

While there are public consultations on issues ranging from transit fares to the chief executive’s annual policy address, the range of consultation is narrow in practice. Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and controlled by ruling elites. In “public consultation meetings” hosted by John Lee, hand-picked supporters of the government attended by invitation. The government is highly insulated from civil society actors, especially those that are critical of Hong Kong and mainland authorities. The territory’s government does not consult with them when formulating policy.

Consultations between Hong Kong officials and the Liaison Office are opaque. There is no transparency regarding central government processes that directly affect Hong Kong. The NSL was drafted in secret and announced without public consultation, taking effect almost immediately after the text was first published. The LegCo quickly passed a security ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law in March 2024, which was enacted within days.

The Basic Law has historically acted as a bulwark for press freedom, and the mainland’s internet censorship regime does not yet apply in Hong Kong. Residents have long had access to a variety of print, broadcast, and digital news sources. However, press freedom has deteriorated after sustained political and economic pressure on independent media by the Hong Kong and mainland governments. The output of Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the territory’s public broadcaster, has been under the government’s effective control since 2021. According to a survey conducted by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents’ Club and released in July 2023, 65 percent of local journalists self-censor.

Independent outlets have closed or left the territory in recent years, while journalists have been prosecuted and convicted for violating security laws. In March 2024, Radio Free Asia (RFA) closed its Hong Kong office, citing the potential effects of Article 23. Gwenyth Ho, a former reporter for the shuttered Stand News outlet, was among those convicted of violating the NSL in May for participating in an unofficial primary election in 2020. In August 2024, two Stand News editors were convicted of sedition, having originally been charged under a colonial-era law. Chung Pui-kuen received a 21-month prison sentence in September, while Patrick Lam received a suspended 11-month sentence. Also in September, The Epoch Times, founded by practitioners of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, stopped printing in Hong Kong after it could not secure a new lease for a printing facility.

Prodemocracy media owner Jimmy Lai, who published the Apple Daily newspaper and Next Magazine, was arrested on suspicion of “colluding with foreign forces” in 2020, and the publications were closed in 2021. Lai, who has received two prison terms over protest-related activities and fraud allegations since his arrest, remained on trial for allegedly violating the NSL at the end of 2024.

In September 2024, the HKJA reported that at least 36 journalists had received defamatory or threatening messages—including death threats—since June.

While religious freedom has been generally respected in Hong Kong in the past, religious figures and groups that support the government’s opponents have been targeted by the authorities and pro-China actors. Adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement have been able to practice in public. However, they have faced counterdemonstrations and harassment by members of the Hong Kong Youth Care Association, which has ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Local churches have been affected by Beijing’s policy of “Sinicization,” with the government restricting the scope for religious freedom and more directly influencing the conduct of religious groups. Religious activity in Hong Kong has also been affected by the NSL. Religious schools in Hong Kong are obligated to teach NSL-related lessons, while the CCP is reportedly wielding more active control of churches there. Some churches self-censor and eschew pastors and sermons with political views. In recent years, the territory’s Catholic diocese has stopped holding masses to commemorate the victims of 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

University professors were historically able to write and lecture freely, and political debate on campuses was lively. However, an ongoing crackdown on free speech on campus, academic freedom, and student activity persists.

The NSL has been aggressively used to suppress discussions of Hong Kong independence and the 2019 protest movement at all levels of education. In 2021, the Education Bureau instructed public universities to bring curriculums in line with the NSL and “prevent and suppress” on-campus acts that could violate its provisions. University students are reportedly less willing to discuss politically sensitive matters.

Academics increasingly self-censor for fear of violating the NSL and some have chosen or were forced to leave Hong Kong. Hong Kong journalist Allan Au was listed as “on leave” from his teaching position at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in September 2024, days after four op-eds he wrote for Stand News were ruled “seditious.”

Hong Kong has a tradition of free personal expression and private discussion, but local and mainland security agencies have been suspected of monitoring the communications of prodemocracy activists for some years. These agencies are now mandated to do so under the NSL, which permits warrantless surveillance and wiretapping. The law also allowed mainland authorities to establish security agencies in the territory under their own jurisdiction, and people charged with NSL offenses can be detained and tried in the mainland. The NSL’s enactment has prompted many social media users to self-censor, close their accounts, or delete content that could run afoul of the law.

Security measures passed under Article 23 of the Basic Law in March 2024 further restrict online and offline expression. Among other things, the wide-ranging law contains broad definitions for “national security” and “state interests,” broadens the definition of espionage, and imposes long prison sentences for several offenses, including collaboration with “external” entities. The first arrests related to Article 23 occurred in May, when six people were arrested over “seditious” social media commentary related to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. One of the six was human rights activist Chow Hang-tung, who also faces NSL-related charges for her involvement in organizing vigils commemorating the massacre. In September, a man pleaded guilty to committing a seditious act while wearing clothing with a protest slogan, becoming the first person to be convicted under Article 23. That same month, another man received a 10-month sentence after pleading guilty for writing “seditious” graffiti on bus seats.

The territory’s government sought an injunction to prohibit the dissemination of the protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” in 2023. While a lower court initially denied the request, the High Court overturned the initial ruling in May 2024, describing the song as harmful to national security.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the territory’s government enacted a new security law affecting electronic and offline discussion and arrested individuals for violating that law, prompting increased self-censorship among Hong Kongers.

The Basic Law guarantees freedom of assembly, but the Public Order Ordinance requires organizers to give police seven days’ notice before protests and to obtain official assent. Organizers seeking to hold rallies have reported faced pressure to rescind public event applications.

The annual June 4 vigil to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre was banned for three years under COVID-19-related measures. Since 2023, with COVID-19 restrictions having been lifted, authorities took other steps to stop the vigil. In 2024, police stopped several individuals who sought to commemorate the massacre. Authorities allowed pro-Beijing organizations to organize a carnival at Victoria Park, where the vigils had been held.

Historically, Hong Kong hosted a vibrant NGO sector, including a number of groups focusing on human rights in mainland China. However, the introduction of the NSL dramatically affected the sector; in 2022, the Hong Kong Free Press reported that 59 organizations, including local press outlets, prodemocracy groups, and unions, had disbanded since 2021.

In August 2024, the Hong Kong Free Press reported that NGOs representing LGBT+ people and issues were receiving fewer public grants to support their activity, while public bodies and officials were interacting less with them than in the past.

Trade unions have shown independence in the past, but antiunion discrimination protections are weak, collective-bargaining rights are unrecognized, and labor organizations’ activities have been impacted by the NSL and Article 23.

Some unions took an active role in the 2019 protest movement and unsuccessfully attempted to organize a referendum on a potential general strike in 2020, drawing warnings from government ministers for their efforts. In December 2024, the HK Labour Rights Monitor said that 219 unions dissolved since the NSL was imposed.

In April 2024, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, which is pro-Beijing, said it would organize a march to mark Labor Day on May 1. Its leader, Stanley Ng, also warned of the risk of “anti-China forces” impacting local unions.

The Hong Kong judiciary has been undermined by the NSL and Article 23. The NSL was imposed on Hong Kong through a Basic Law provision that allows the NPC to list national laws that must be applied locally, bypassing both the LegCo and Hong Kong’s courts. The NPC has historically reserved the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law, limiting the independence of the Court of Final Appeal.

Judges, including Court of Final Appeal members, are selected by the territory’s chief executive with the support of the advisory Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. Under the NSL, the chief executive is empowered to designate a pool of judges to try cases related to that law. They are selected for a one-year term but can face removal should they make statements that “endanger national security.” The chief executive’s criteria for selecting the pool and the identities of assigned judges are not publicly available. Under a 2022 edict from Beijing, the Hong Kong chief executive may bar foreign lawyers from national security trials.

Five foreign judges resigned from the Court of Final Appeal in 2024, leaving six foreign members on that court as of September. Two of the judges who departed during the year cited the territory’s political and legal situation.

The courts typically upheld due process rights and adjudicated civil and criminal matters fairly and efficiently in the past. Following the thousands of arrests made during the 2019 protests, courts came under pressure to process cases faster, and pro-Beijing politicians and media called on them to side with the prosecution and issue heavier sentences.

Under the NSL, individuals charged with national security offenses are tried by judges selected by the chief executive, and Beijing wields influence over the appointment of prosecutors. Trials involving offenses against public order or state secrets may be closed to the public. Beijing’s Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong can assert jurisdiction over some cases and have them tried on the mainland. NSL-related cases face an especially high threshold for bail. The NSL also gave police powerful new legal tools including enhanced investigatory power to search premises and electronic devices, freeze or confiscate assets, and demand people and groups provide information. Prosecutors may challenge High Court decisions in national security cases where defendants were acquitted, opening the possibility that those defendants could be retried.

At year’s end, publisher Jimmy Lai was facing a nonjury trial for NSL-related offenses. Some 47 prodemocracy advocates involved in an unofficial primary in 2020 faced nonjury trials in 2023. While 2 were acquitted in May 2024, 31 pleaded guilty and 14 were convicted. The 45 defendants received prison terms, the longest being 10 years, in November.

Article 23 of the Basic Law further augments local authorities’ powers. Authorities can seize assets and conduct searches without a warrant. They can also detain suspects for up to 16 days without filing charges. If a magistrate agrees, police may also prohibit detainees from consulting a lawyer in the first 48 hours after their arrest. Local courts may no longer review decisions made by the territory’s National Security Committee.

Police are forbidden by law from employing torture, disappearance, or other forms of abuse. However, the 2019 protest movement featured frequent episodes of police violence, which have generally gone unaddressed. There were also credible allegations of arbitrary detention and torture of protesters in 2019. The protest movement brought about a more general climate of unrest, due to both clashes that accompanied demonstrations and violent attacks committed by nonstate actors against protesters, activists, and bystanders at protest locations. Cases of arbitrary detention have reportedly decreased since, though the US State Department warned travelers that they still risk “arbitrary enforcement of local laws” in an April 2024 advisory.

Hong Kong has four antidiscrimination ordinances concerning sex, disability, family status, and race. Citizens are generally treated equally under the law, though people of South Asian origin or descent face language barriers and de facto discrimination in education and employment. Foreign delivery workers face racial discrimination. Women are also subject to some employment discrimination.

Antidiscrimination laws do not specifically protect LGBT+ people. In 2023, the Court of Final Appeal ruled that transgender residents could update their identity documents without being mandated to undergo surgery. In April 2024, Henry Tse, a plaintiff in that case, received an updated identity card. Also in April, the territory’s government announced a new identity-card policy to abide by the 2023 ruling.

Hong Kong residents generally enjoy freedom of movement, though authorities periodically deny entry to visiting political activists and reporters, raising suspicions of Beijing-imposed restrictions. Some Hong Kong activists and politicians have also faced difficulty traveling to the mainland.

Hong Kong police have reportedly compiled a watchlist of people to arrest under the NSL should they attempt to leave via border checkpoints or the airport. In December 2024, the Hong Kong government issued arrest warrants and bounties of HK$1 million (US$128,000) for six overseas activists and revoked the passports of another seven. In total, 19 people are on the city’s wanted list.

In 2023, the territorial government gazetted a new regulation to implement an Advance Passenger Information (API) system, which allows air carriers to send passenger information to authorities before a plane departs. The Immigration Department began implementing API in September 2024, saying that it would prevent “undesirables, including potential nonrefoulement claimants, from boarding flights heading to Hong Kong.”

While property rights are largely respected, collusion among powerful business entities with political connections is perceived as an impediment to fair competition.

Small business activity has been impacted by the NSL. In March 2024, Voice of America reported that a number of independent bookstores closed after the NSL was imposed, while other bookstores are monitored by the authorities.

Hong Kong residents are legally protected from rape and domestic abuse, and police generally respond appropriately to reports of such crimes.

Men and women enjoy equal rights in personal status matters such as marriage and divorce. There is no legal recognition of same-sex marriage or civil union in Hong Kong. But in September 2023, the Court of Final Appeal ruled that the territory’s government was obligated to provide “an alternative legal framework” for recognizing same-sex unions by 2025. In November 2024, the court issued rulings giving LGBT+ people married abroad equal rights to inheritance and subsidized housing.

While most Hong Kong residents enjoy equality of opportunity and freedom from economic exploitation, certain marginalized groups face substantial risks of exploitation and abuse. Many of Hong Kong’s migrant household workers remain vulnerable to a wide range of exploitative practices such as physical abuse, humiliation, and forced labor. Some migrant workers’ travel documents and mobile phones are seized by their employers. Since they may face deportation if dismissed, many are reluctant to bring complaints against employers.

Hong Kong is a significant site for human trafficking but lacks comprehensive antitrafficking legislation.