Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

Colombia's Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) writes that in the last 5 years, all criminal groups in Colombia have [translation] "expan[ded]" and "strengthen[ed]," especially the Gulf Clan (Colombia 2025-02-16, 4). The same source adds that criminal groups [translation] "have influence" in 73 percent (809) of Colombia's municipalities (Colombia 2025-02-16, 4). According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2024 saw a "worse[ning]" of the humanitarian situation in Colombia as criminal groups splintered into factions and "reconfigured," territorial conflicts escalated, armed incidents rose and, "in areas controlled by armed groups, mechanisms to control civilians were tightened" (2025-03-07). According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), "an independent civil-society organization, headquartered in Geneva" (GI-TOC n.d.), criminal groups in Colombia operate in "an unstable and rapidly changing environment," where alliances with other criminal groups are necessary to split up territory and control illicit revenue streams (2025-02-13).

According to InSight Crime, a non-profit think tank and media organization that studies organized crime in the Americas (InSight Crime n.d.), Colombia's organized crime scene "is deeply fragmented," made up of various dissident groups and rearmed guerilla fighters focused on drug production, trafficking and distribution, as well as "illegal mining, migrant smuggling, arms trafficking, money laundering, contraband, and extortion" (2024-07-31). Similarly, Human Rights Watch indicates that numerous criminal groups active in Colombia are funded through illicit industries like illegal mining and drug trafficking (2025-01-16). InSight Crime notes that criminal groups in Colombia partner with "mafias" from around the world to participate in the country's drug trade (2024-07-31). It adds that Colombia's "extremely porous" border, shared with Venezuela and other neighbouring countries, allows for "the flow of drugs, contraband, arms, and migrants, among other illegal bounty" (InSight Crime 2024-07-31).

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "the number of people affected by armed conflict and violence during the first quarter of 2025 quadrupled compared to the same period in 2024," leading to "forced displacement, confinement, and restrictions on mobility and access," especially in the Pacific region and near the border with Venezuela (UN 2025-05-16, 1). Violent confrontations between armed groups beginning in January 2025 in the Catatumbo region bordering Venezuela have resulted in killings [78 people between January 16 and March 8 (Human Rights Watch 2025-03-26)] and the forced displacement of over 50,000 people (GI-TOC 2025-02-13; Human Rights Watch 2025-03-26). Sources note that the ELN and the 33rd Front FARC dissident group [1] clashed over the control of local illicit economies in the region (GI-TOC 2025-02-13) or that the ELN targeted alleged supporters of the 33rd Front as part of a campaign to regain territory in Catatumbo (Human Rights Watch 2025-03-26).

1.1 Major Criminal Groups

Sources note that the armed groups operating in Colombia include

• the ELN;
• the Gulf Clan;
• FARC dissident groups ["especially" the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central, EMC) and "in smaller measure" the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia) (InSight Crime 2024-07-31)] (Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16; InSight Crime 2024-07-31).
  
  

Human Rights Watch reports that "[n]umerous" such groups are active in Colombia and "[m]any … have fluid and complex links to each other"; "some" are engaged in "non-international armed conflicts" (2025-01-16). InSight Crime notes that other paramilitary successor groups with "important territorial presence" making money through crime include Los Pachenca, Los Caparros [also known as Virgilio Peralta Arenas Front], and Los Puntilleros (2024-07-31). In February 2025, Colombia's Office of the Ombudsperson published a list of the criminal groups responsible for active humanitarian crises across Colombia, including the following:

• the ELN and a splinter group of the ELN known as Comuneros del Sur;
• the EMC and one of its dissident groups, Yair Bermúdez 57th Front (Frente 57 Yair Bermúdez);
• the Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera, CDF);
• the Gulf Clan;
• the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frentes, EMBF);
• Los Pachenca;
• Los Shotas; and
• Los Espartanos (Colombia 2025-02-16, 1).
  
  

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that collects data on political violence and protest in various regions around the world (ACLED n.d.), indicates that in 2024 "[m]ost" instances of violence between armed groups and security forces involved the Gulf Clan, EMC, or the ELN (2024-12-12). According to the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 5 "largest and most powerful" criminal groups in Colombia are the ELN, Gulf Clan, EMC, Second Marquetalia, and Los Pachenca (Netherlands 2024-06, 18, 24, 25).

1.2 Areas of Operation and Relations Between Criminal Groups

The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that, due to continuing fighting between criminal groups and group "mobility," it is not clear which territories each group controls; however, no criminal group has "a full presence within a department" (Netherlands 2024-06, 18). The Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz & Reconciliación, Pares), an NGO and think tank conducting research to support democracy, peace, and justice in Colombia (Pares n.d.), published an interactive map indicating which criminal groups are present in the different regions of Colombia in 2024, and lists the following criminal groups and the corresponding number of municipalities in which they operate:

• Gulf Clan: 316 municipalities
• ELN: 231 municipalities
• EMC: 209 municipalities
• Second Marquetalia: 65 municipalities
• Los Pachenca: 14 municipalities (Pares [2025]).
  
  

Colombia's Office of the Ombudsperson writes in a 2024 report that the Gulf Clan has a [translation] "presence" in 392 municipalities, the ELN in 232, EMC in 234, Second Marquetalia in 65, and other "organized crime groups" in 184 (Colombia 2024, 21). It adds that between 2019 and 2024 those numbers increased by 84 percent for the Gulf Clan, 56 percent for the ELN, and 141 percent for FARC dissident groups (Colombia 2024, 22, 23). Pares also lists the number of municipalities where criminal groups are present by department as follows:

Department	Criminal Group Present	Number of Municipalities Where Group is Present
La Guajira	Gulf Clan	8
ELN	6
Los Pachenca	5
Magdalena	Gulf Clan	20
Los Pachenca	5
Atlántico	Gulf Clan	11
Los Pachenca	2
ELN	1
Bolívar	Gulf Clan	28
ELN	17
EMC	7
Second Marquetalia	2
Cesar	Gulf Clan	19
ELN	15
EMC	6
Los Pachenca	2
Norte de Santander	ELN	24
Gulf Clan	10
EMC	7
Ejército Popular de Liberación	4
Sucre	Gulf Clan	26
Córdoba	Gulf Clan	30
EMC	4
Antioquia	Gulf Clan	66
ELN	33
EMC	19
Los Caparros	3
Santander	Gulf Clan	9
ELN	9
Chocó	Gulf Clan	31
ELN	28
Risaralda	ELN	3
Gulf Clan	1
Caldas	ELN	1
Gulf Clan	1
Cundinamarca	Gulf Clan	2
Bogotá, D.C.	Gulf Clan	1
Los Caparros	1
Boyacá	ELN	8
Gulf Clan	2
EMC	1
Arauca	ELN	7
EMC	7
Casanare	Gulf Clan	11
EMC	7
ELN	5
Valle del Cauca	EMC	21
ELN	7
Gulf Clan	5
Second Marquetalia	1
Tolima	EMC	8
Gulf Clan	6
Second Marquetalia	2
Huila	EMC	14
Second Marquetalia	6
ELN	3
Meta	Gulf Clan	14
EMC	11
Second Marquetalia	3
Vichada	Gulf Clan	4
Second Marquetalia	3
EMC	3
ELN	3
Cauca	EMC	40
ELN	29
Second Marquetalia	9
Gulf Clan	1
Nariño	ELN	26
EMC	16
Autodefensas Unidas de Nariño	12
Second Marquetalia	11
Gulf Clan	9
Putumayo	Second Marquetalia	8
EMC	6
ELN	1
Caquetá	Second Marquetalia	13
EMC	11
Guaviare	EMC	4
Guainía	ELN	5
EMC	4
Second Marquetalia	3
Gulf Clan	1
Vaupes	EMC	6
Amazonas	EMC	7
Second Marquetalia	4

(Pares [2025])

According to the Office of the Ombudsperson, there are [translation] "at least" 11 active humanitarian emergencies in Colombia related to criminal group activities, in the following areas:

• Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department;
• Chocó department;
• Nariño department;
• Cauca department;
• the Pacific region of Valle del Cauca department;
• Briceño, Yarumal and Valdivia municipalities, Antioquia department;
• Magdalena Medio region, Antioquia department;
• Bajo Cauca, Antioquia department;
• Sierra Nevada region;
• Serranía del Perijá region;
• Arauca department;
• Meta and Guaviare departments;
• Putumayo department; and
• Tolima department (Colombia 2025-02-16, 1-4).
  
  

Amnesty International states that "violations of international humanitarian law" documented in 2024 "particularly" affected the departments of Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Antioquia (Magdalena Medio region), Nariño, Putumayo and Valle del Cauca (2025-04-29). In its profiles on the major criminal groups operating in Colombia, InSight Crime identifies their areas of operation, alliances and rivalries as follows:

Major Criminal Group	Department(s)/ Area(s) of Operation	Relations with Other Criminal Groups	Sources
Alliances	Rivalries
CDF	Main area: lower Putumayo, along the border with Ecuador (rural areas) Other areas: Amazonas, Caquetá, Cauca, Nariño	Constru, Second Marquetalia (alliance "fractured" since November 2024)	Carolina Ramirez Front ["under the umbrella of the EMC" (InSight Crime 2024-06-14)]	InSight Crime 2025-01-30
Los Caparros	Antioquia, Córdoba	"[T]emporar[ily]" with the Paisas, the 18th and 36th Fronts of the "ex-FARC mafi[a]," and the ELN	Gulf Clan, Julio César Vargas Front in Cáceres, Francisco Morelos Peñate Front in Caucasia, Rubén Darío Ávila Front in northern Tarazá	InSight Crime 2024-01-15
EMC	"[S]trongholds": Guaviare, Meta, Caquetá, Vaupés and Guainía Presence in Amazonas (border with Brazil and Peru); Putumayo (border with Ecuador); Casanare, Arauca, and Norte de Santander (border with Venezuela); Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño (Pacific coast)	Brazilian and Mexican cartels	ELN, Second Marquetalia, CDF	InSight Crime 2024-06-14
ELN	"[S]trongholds": Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca "[S]trategic positions" in Antioquia, Bolívar, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, and Vichada	Second Marquetalia	"[W]ide range" of enemies, including Gulf Clan, EMC, and 10th Front of the ex-FARC mafia	InSight Crime 2024-06-18
Gulf Clan	Present in "at least" 20 departments "[S]tronghold": Gulf of Urabá in Antioquia and Chocó [bordering Panama], extending into Córdoba "[E]xtensive" presence along Caribbean coast; in Medellín (Antioquia); and in La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander departments	Los Rastrojos; international criminal groups such as the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel, Italian 'Ndrangheta mafia, and Balkan criminal groups	ELN, Los Pachenca	InSight Crime 2025-03-18
Los Pachenca	"[S]tronghold": Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Magdalena) "[I]nfluence" along Venezuelan border in La Guajira and northern Cesar	Gulf Clan (previously), small drug trafficking networks, small "hitman gangs"	Gulf Clan (since 2021)	InSight Crime 2024-10-11
Second Marquetalia	Along Colombian border with Venezuela, Arauca, northern Antioquia and southern Córdoba	ELN	Ex-FARC 10th Front, EMC	InSight Crime 2022-07-05; InSight Crime 2024-06-14; InSight Crime 2024-06-18

2. Gulf Clan

2.1 Areas of Operation

International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) reports that the Gulf Clan's "stronghold" is along the Atlantic coast, from which they control "some of the country's main drug trafficking routes as well as migrant smuggling rackets" and "exercise coercive control of numerous communities" (2024-03-19, Principal Findings). ACLED notes that the Gulf Clan has a "significant presence" in the departments of Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar, Chocó, Córdoba and Sucre (2024-11-04). Citing their interview with a Colombian senior military official, Crisis Group indicates that the Gulf Clan "control[s] large strips of land along the Magdalena River" in southern Bolívar (2024-03-19, 21). According to InSight Crime, the Gulf Clan is "steadily consolidating … power" in Chocó (2025-02-27).

Citing interviews with government and military officials, Crisis Group indicates that the Gulf Clan also has "influence" over drug sales in Colombian cities, though "[i]n most cases," they "appear to contract out dealing to local criminal groups" (2024-03-19, 24-25). Crisis Group provides the following information based on its interviews with military and civilian authorities, as well as former members of the Gulf Clan:

The Gaitanistas say they seek to control the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines as well as the economic heartland of Colombia – and they appear to be working toward that goal. The group "is in constant expansion," a military officer noted. "It is filling spaces." … [T]he Gaitanistas are able to traffic and carry out specific operations in many major cities, including in districts controlled by rival outfits. They are pushing into new territory in Antioquia, Valle del Cauca, Chocó, Bolívar, Cesar, La Guajira, Catatumbo, Meta, Casanare and Vichada. (2024-03-19, 26, footnotes omitted)

2.2 Relations with Other Criminal Groups

According to ACLED, the Gulf Clan has clashed with the ELN over the latter group's expansion into Antioquia, Bolívar and Chocó (2024-11-04). Crisis Group notes, citing interviews with a military official and local leaders, that the Gulf Clan is seeking to expand into ELN and EMC territory in southern Bolívar, and that conflict broke out between the Gulf Clan and ELN in 2023 in the coal region of Cesar and in Segovia, Antioquia (2024-03-19, 21-22). ACLED further reports that in the departments of Cesar and Córdoba, the Gulf Clan's presence is contested by Los Pachenca and FARC dissident groups (2024-11-04).

A press release from the Office of the Ombudsperson indicates that the Gulf Clan is clashing with Tren de Aragua [see section 6 of this Response] in Bogotá through its allied groups, including the Oficina de San Andresito and Los Boyacos (Colombia 2024-02-27).

3. ELN

For information on the ELN, its activities and areas of operation, and its ability to track individuals, see Response to Information Request COL201938 of July 2024.

3.1 Areas of Operation

InSight Crime reports that the ELN is active in "at least 231 municipalities across 19 departments in Colombia" with "strongholds" in Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca (2024-06-18). The same source writes in another article that the ELN "dominat[es]" the Colombia-Venezuela border, "a key route for drug trafficking and a haven from Colombian security forces" (InSight Crime 2025-02-27). Sources indicate that the ELN had for a number of years "shar[ed]" control of the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander by mutual agreement with other armed groups (GI-TOC 2025-02-13; Human Rights Watch 2025-03-26). However, Human Rights Watch notes that in January 2025 the ELN began a violent campaign to seize control of "large parts" of the region, which is a "strategic location for drug production and trafficking" (2025-03-26). An Agence France-Presse (AFP) article from January 2025 similarly reports that the ELN is undertaking a campaign to "assert control" of a strategic region along the border in Catatumbo (2025-01-24).

3.2 Relations with Other Criminal Groups

According to El Espectador, a Spanish-language newspaper in Colombia, Nicolás Maduro's regime in Venezuela is [translation] "a refuge for criminal groups linked to drug trafficking," including the ELN (2025-03-08). According to InSight Crime, the ELN has "for years" enjoyed a "symbiotic relationship" with Venezuela's government, allowing the criminal group to carry out its activities on the Venezuelan side of the border "unimpeded" and to gain strength compared to its rivals in the area, such as FARC dissident groups (2025-02-27). AFP reports that, according to Colombian intelligence sources, the ELN has for a long time benefited from Venezuela's support and protection, "with some of the group's leaders believed to live across the border" (2025-01-24). The Guardian similarly writes that the Venezuelan president's ties to the ELN "have long been an open … secret" (2025-01-27). For instance, Human Rights Watch reports in 2022 that members of Venezuela's armed forces and national guard "have participated in joint operations with ELN guerilla fighters and have been complicit in their abuses" (2022-03-28).

According to the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP) [2], the ELN had the support of the Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental), an Arauca-based armed group, for its campaign against the 33rd Front in Catatumbo in early 2025 (FIP 2025-03-27). InSight Crime notes in February 2025 that ELN has resumed a conflict with the 10th Front FARC dissidents in Arauca (2025-02-27).

4. Los Pachenca

4.1 Areas of Operation

Colombia Reports, an English-language online news site, indicates that Los Pachenca "dominate organized crime" in the city of Santa Marta and the Sierra Nevada mountains (2024-08-08). InSight Crime reports that Los Pachenca group has its base of power around Santa Marta in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta region of Magdalena department and "controls drug trafficking routes and runs extensive extortion networks" in that area; however, "its influence extends" to the border with Venezuela in La Guajira and northern Cesar (2024-10-11).

4.2 Relations with Other Criminal Groups

InSight Crime reports that the Gulf Clan has, at different times, been one of Los Pachenca's "main allies" and "fiercest enemies" (2024-10-11). The same source adds that as of 2021, the 2 criminal groups have been "wag[ing] a brutal war" to control the drug trade in Magdalena, La Guajira, and Cesar departments (InSight Crime 2024-10-11). In the past, Los Pachenca has forged alliances with "smaller drug trafficking networks," including in the port of Santa Marta, and with "small hitman gangs," particularly in urban centres where the gangs operate (InSight Crime 2024-10-11).

According to sources, Los Pachenca has been attempting to initiate peace talks with the government of Colombia since 2022 (Colombia Reports 2024-08-08; InSight Crime 2024-10-11). The same sources note that in August 2024 that the Colombia president authorized talks to begin with the group (InSight Crime 2024-10-11; Colombia Reports 2024-08-08). According to a March 2025 report on peacebuilding in Colombia coordinated by the GI-TOC and written by researchers, including from the GI-TOC, the negotiations between the group and the government "are still in their exploratory phases" (Johnson, et al. 2025-03, 15).

5. FARC Dissident Groups

For information on FARC dissident groups, including EMC and the Second Marquetalia, their activities and areas of operation, and their ability to track individuals, see Response to Information Request COL201939 of July 2024.

5.1 Areas of Operation

ACLED indicates that FARC dissident groups have recovered territory in the departments of Cauca, Meta, Putumayo and Valle del Cauca (2024-11-04). The same source adds that in Cauca and Valle del Cauca, these groups regularly come into conflict with the ELN (ACLED 2024-11-04).

InSight Crime reports that Second Marquetalia's areas of operation are "restricted to a few strongholds along the Colombian-Venezuelan border and in southwestern Colombian states like Nariño, Cauca, and Putumayo" (2024-06-27). The same source adds that even in these departments, due to their war against the 10th Front FARC dissident group and the ELN along the Venezuelan border in 2021, the Second Marquetalia "does not have the military capacity to act on its own" (InSight Crime 2024-06-27).

InSight Crime reports that the 33rd Front is "present" in Norte de Santander (2024-06-14). According to the FIP, the 33rd Front had been expanding its presence in Catatumbo, but the ELN has retaken control of 90 percent of 33rd Front's territory since they launched their attack in January 2025 (2025-03-27).

5.2 Relations with Other Criminal Groups

ACLED reports that there are violent confrontations between rival FARC dissident groups "vying for territorial dominance," including between the Gentil Duarte and Second Marquetalia groups in Meta and the CDF and Carolina Ramirez groups in Putumayo (2024-11-04).

InSight Crime indicates that Second Marquetalia has forged alliances "with stronger local organizations," including the ELN and the CDF in the aftermath of a war with the ELN and the 10th Front FARC dissident group that weakened it (2024-06-27).

According to the FIP, since the 33rd Front was created in 2017, it has established [translation] "agreements" with Venezuelan political and military authorities (2025-03-27). The group is also [translation] "accus[ed] by the ELN" of having allied itself with the Gulf Clan in the Colombian region of Catatumbo, escalating the conflict between the two rivals (FIP 2025-03-27). Clashes between them caused a [translation] "humanitarian crisis" in January 2025 in Catatumbo (FIP 2025-03-27).

According to InSight Crime, armed clashes between the EMC and the EMBF occurred in early 2025 in Colombia's southeastern Amazon region (2025-02-27). The same source adds that along Colombia's Pacific coast in the department of Cauca, the EMC had violent clashes with the 57th Front, which operates in rural regions of southern Valle del Cauca and is attempting to extend its influence into Cauca (InSight Crime 2025-02-27). The EMC has also been engaged in battles with the ELN, Second Marquetalia, and Colombian security forces (InSight Crime 2025-02-27).

6. Tren de Aragua

According to AFP, Tren de Aragua is one of the biggest criminal groups in Venezuela and is active "across Latin America" (2025-01-24). Similarly, InSight Crime writes that the group is Venezuela's "most powerful homegrown criminal actor" and has "successfully projected its power abroad" (2025-04-25). According to the Guardian, Tren de Aragua is "a severe public safety issue in at least three countries outside Venezuela," including Colombia (2024-11-01). InSight Crime reports that Tren de Aragua operates a "permanent cel[l] in Colombia" (2025-04-25).

The Associated Press (AP) reports that Tren de Aragua's criminal activities include migrant smuggling, extortion, sexual exploitation and dealing drugs (2025-02-06). Police sources cited in an article by France 24 with AP, AFP and Reuters also mention kidnapping and money laundering among the group's activities (France 24 with AP, AFP & Reuters 2024-07-12). BBC states that the group engages in "sex trafficking, contract killings and kidnappings" (2024-07-01). Pares reports that Tren de Aragua is one of the [translation] "main drivers" behind an increase in extortion cases in 2024 (2024-12-20).

6.1 Areas of Operation in Colombia

InSight Crime notes that the group operates mostly "in border areas with clandestine border crossings regularly used by Venezuelan migrants," including the Venezuela-Colombia border region between Táchira state and Norte de Santander department (2025-04-25). Daniela Mogollón, a junior researcher at the FIP, and Angie Durán, a researcher with the Environment and Society Association (Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad) [3], indicate in an article for La Silla Vacía [4] that Tren de Aragua [translation] "leads" human trafficking networks in Norte de Santander in collaboration with other organized crime groups (Mogollón & Durán 2024-09-26).

Furthermore, InSight Crime notes that the group operates cells in urban areas with high concentrations of Venezuelan migrants, including in Bogotá (2025-04-25). According to Colombia's Office of the Ombudsperson, Tren de Aragua also operates in Barranquilla, Atlántico department (Colombia 2024, 61).

6.2 Relations with Other Criminal Groups in Colombia

According to InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua has "numerous links with organized crime and prison-based groups" (2025-04-25). The source adds that Tren de Aragua has "clashed with multiple groups," including the ELN, over control of the Venezuela-Colombia border (InSight Crime 2025-04-25). According to a February 2024 press release by the Office of the Ombudsperson, violence had flared in 9 areas of Bogotá due to disputes between Tren de Aragua and the Gulf Clan, affecting 11.8 percent of the city's population (Colombia 2024-02-27). The source indicates that the crimes were being committed by allies of the groups in conflict, noting that Tren de Aragua funds Los Satanás, which is fighting for control of territory against the Gulf Clan-affiliated groups Oficina de San Andresito and Los Boyacos, as well as other local groups, such as Los Camilos, Los Costeños, Los Paisas and Los Pereiranos (Colombia 2024-02-27).

7. Other Venezuelan Criminal Groups in Colombia

Information on other Venezuelan criminal groups operating in Colombia with ties to Colombian criminal groups could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The 33rd Front is a member of the General Staff of Blocks and Fronts (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frentes, EMBF) coalition and has its headquarters across the border in Venezuela (FIP 2025-03-27). EMBF is a FARC dissident group that used to be a part of the EMC (InSight Crime 2025-02-27).

[2] The Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas para la Paz, FIP) is an [translation] "independent" Colombian think tank that aims to contribute to "peace, security, and sustainable development" in Colombia (FIP n.d.).

[3] The Environment and Society Association (Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad) is an organization that advocates for improved environmental governance in Colombia from "a human rights perspective," promoting "a full application of civil society rights" (Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad n.d.).

[4] La Silla Vacía is a Colombia-based digital news source (La Silla Vacía n.d.).

References

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