Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

The Pew Research Center, a "nonpartisan fact tank" that conducts "data-driven social science research" (Pew Research Center n.d.), reports that the number of Chinese Christians is "difficult" to ascertain, in part because Christians who belong to "'underground'" or "'house'" churches, "unauthorized" by the government, may be "reluctant" to admit their faith (2023-08-30, 63). The US Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report for 2023 similarly notes that it is "difficult" to estimate the number of Protestants, Catholics or members of other faiths because "many" worship at home or in churches not "sanctioned" by the government (US 2024-06-26, 8). According to Chinese government statistics cited in a 2024 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report on China, there are 38 million Christians who participate in "officially registered churches"; however, estimates of Christian population in China vary "significantly" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.64). The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, citing US government estimates from 2021, indicates that Christians represent 5.1 percent of the Chinese population (US 2024-06-26, 8). Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that China was home to an estimated 10 million Catholics in 2023, of which 60 percent were members of unregistered churches (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.68). Australia's DFAT report notes that unregistered Catholic churches in China tend to be "'underground', uncoordinated, and hard to unify" (2024-12-27, para. 3.68).

Sources indicate that only Buddhism, Taoism [Daoism], Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism are officially recognized in China (CFR 2024-05-15; US 2024-06-26, 10). The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023 states that only religious groups belonging to one of these five religions may register with the state to "legally hold worship services" (2024-06-26, 10). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an "independent" and "nonpartisan" US-based think tank and publisher on international affairs (CFR n.d.), Buddhism and Taoism are shown "more leniency" than Christianity and Islam, which are considered "'foreign'" by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (2024-05-15). The same source adds that "[i]n recent years," members of both state-sanctioned and underground groups of "all" religions have faced "intensifying persecution and repression," and have been "pressure[d]" to implement President Xi Jinping's sinicization [1] policies, which "aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP" (CFR 2024-05-15).

Australia's DFAT report indicates that the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) serves as the "official" governing body for Protestant churches in China and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) is the state organization that oversees the Catholic Church (2024-12-27, para. 3.82, 3.67). Sources report that the TSPM operates under the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP (US 2024-06-26, 10; Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.82), as do the governing bodies of the other "state-sanctioned" religions, including the CCPA (US 2024-06-26, 10). According to the US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) is the state body tasked with the implementation of the CCP's regulations on religious affairs and the management of the provincial and local bureaus of religious affairs (2024-06-26, 11). In a 2022 report, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) indicates that the UFWD and SARA supervise the 7 "state-controlled religious organizations" that manage affairs for the "officially recognized" religions (US 2022-12). According to the US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, Protestant and Catholic groups unaffiliated with their respective state body, the TSPM or CCPA, cannot form legal entities (2024-06-26, 10). For further information on state-sanctioned religious associations, including the TSPM and CCPA, and the treatment of their members by the authorities, see Response to Information Request CHN200992 of May 2022.

In an interview with the Research Directorate, a lecturer in Chinese studies at the University of Edinburgh, whose research focuses on society, culture, and Christianity in China, stated that there are "a large number" of unregistered or underground Christian house churches in China, ranging from "large networks," such as China Gospel Fellowship, Fangcheng, Word of Life, Wenzhou Church, and Green Pastures, to smaller congregations, of which there are "thousands" (Lecturer 2025-03-13). Australia's DFAT report indicates that house churches are Protestant while underground churches are Catholic (Australia 2024-12-27, 5).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, a professor of political science at the University of Ottawa who specializes in human rights and politics in China indicated that different denominations of house churches have varying degrees of cooperation with churches registered with the state (Professor 2025-03-17). The same source added that "official" churches cannot accommodate all their members due to space constraints, driving "many" of their members to worship in homes; these house churches are tolerated by the Chinese authorities and are not viewed as a "problem" (Professor 2025-03-17).

2. Legislation

The 2024 annual report of the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) notes that Chinese authorities "strengthened control over religious practices" through legal measures implemented in 2023, including the Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities] and the Patriotic Education Law (US 2024-12, 81).

The information in the following paragraph was provided by the Lecturer in correspondence with the Research Directorate:

Regulations that have come into force since 2018 have given local officials "more recourse to crack down on religious groups" and "emboldened" authorities to shut down unregistered groups. These measures and regulations were designed to "restrict" religious groups and close some loopholes from older measures and regulations. Authorities have "largely" enforced them, but not to their "full extent." Unregistered religious groups can still survive and operate in this new environment despite attempts to limit their activities or shut them down. For example, one unregistered church that was asked by authorities to stop meeting in a certain place, but not to stop meeting altogether and consequently continued to meet in different places (Lecturer 2025-03-13). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.1 Provisional Agreement on Nomination [Appointment] of Bishops (2018) between China and the Holy See

According to sources, in 2018 the Holy See and the Government of China signed a "[p]rovisional" agreement on bishop nomination, which was renewed in 2022 (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.70; US 2024-06-26, 56) and still in effect as of October 2024 (US 2024-06-26, 56). Australia's DFAT report states that under this agreement, the Pope is allowed to appoint bishops of his choice with "recommend[ations]" from the Chinese government, where previously the Catholic Church would have chosen bishops from "'underground'" churches (2024-12-27, para. 3.70, 3.71). According to the US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, the agreement was perceived by "[s]ome" church leaders to be an "exception to government regulations prohibiting foreign involvement in religion" (2024-06-26, 56). The same source adds that the content of the agreement has not been made public (US 2024-06-26, 56).

2.2 Regulations on Religious Affairs (2018)

A summary of the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs that took effect in 2018, published by the State Council of China, indicates that the rights of "legitimate" religious organizations include the following:

Religious groups, schools, temples and churches are allowed to publish materials for their internal use.

…

Religious groups, schools, and venues can manage and use public assets or collective ownership assets in accordance with laws and regulations.

Land, houses, facilities and other legitimate assets of religious groups, schools and venues are protected by law.

Religious groups, schools and venues can accept overseas or domestic donations for charitable causes. (China 2017-09-07)

The same source indicates that the 2018 updated Regulations include the following requirements for religious organizations:

Venues for religious activities include temples, churches and other fixed places.

Other gathering places should be determined by the religious affairs departments of province-level governments.

Venues for religious activities are urged to … accept the guidance, supervision and inspection from local governments.

…

Religious staffers recognized by religious groups are allowed to conduct religious activities after filing a record with religious departments of local governments above county level. (China 2017-09-07)

According to Australia's DFAT, the 2018 update of the Regulations on Religious Affairs was intended to ensure "national unity and protect against 'dangerous behaviours'" (2024-12-27, para. 3.52). Sources from inside China informed Australia's DFAT that these regulations "explicitly prioritised national security considerations, aimed at countering 'harmful' foreign influences on China's officially recognised religions, over individuals' religious freedoms" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.52).

2.3 Measures on the Administration of Religious Organizations (2020)

According to the US CECC's 2020 annual report, the Measures on the Administration of Religious Groups, implemented in February 2020, contain "a set of 41 articles that emphasizes the role of the government and Party in controlling the government-affiliated religious associations that manage the five officially registered religions recognized by the government" and "supplement" the 2018 Regulations on Religious Affairs (US 2020-12, 111). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Asia Team of CSW [2] stated that the new regulatory measures further restrict the management of religious organizations (2021-09-22). Sources indicate that the new regulatory measures require religious groups to spread CCP ideology (CFR 2024-05-15) or to support CCP leadership (CSW Asia Team 2021-09-22).

The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023 notes that the 2020 measures "regulate the organization, function, offices, supervision, projects, and economic administration of [religious] communities and groups at the national and local levels" (2024-06-26, 11).

The Measures on the Administration of Religious Organizations provide the following:

[translation]

Article 3: The establishment of religious organizations shall comply with the national regulations on the registration and administration of social organizations and the management of religious affairs. Their establishment shall be subject to the review and approval of the religious affairs department of the people's government and be registered with the civil affairs department of the people's government.

No activities may be conducted in the name of a religious organization without the review and approval of the religious affairs department of the people's government or without registering with the civil affairs department of the people's government.

…

Article 6: The religious affairs department of the people's government shall serve as the competent business authority for religious organizations. Religious organizations shall accept the professional guidance, supervision and management of the religious affairs department of the people's government.

…

Article 25: The religious affairs department of the people's government shall fulfill its responsibilities as the competent business authority. In accordance with relevant national laws, regulations and rules, it shall manage and provide direction on the following matters concerning religious organizations:

Conducting business reviews prior to the establishment, modification or deregistration of religious organizations and approving their charters; reviewing the annual work reports of religious organizations; and directing the deregistration and liquidation of religious organizations in conjunction with the relevant authorities.

Supervising and guiding religious organizations as they conduct activities and perform their functions in accordance with the law and their charters; taking legal action against religious organizations that violate laws, regulations, rules, policies, and their charters.

Examining, approving, supervising and managing matters for which religious organizations are required by law to seek the approval of the religious affairs department of the people's government.

Supervising and guiding religious organizations, in accordance with the Constitution, laws, regulations, rules, policies, and practical operational requirements, to establish and improve their rules and regulations and to strengthen the development of their work style and their ideological, organizational and institutional development.

Other matters that require direction and management as stipulated by laws and regulations. (China 2020)

2.4 Measures for the Administration of Religious Clergy (2021)

The Measures for the Administration of Religious Clergy provide the following:

[translation]

Article 2: The term "religious clergy" as used in these Measures refers to individuals who have lawfully obtained the qualifications for religious clergy and are permitted to engage in activities concerning religious affairs.

Article 3: Religious clergy shall display deep affection for their country; support the leadership of the Communist Party of China; uphold the socialist system; abide by the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules; practise the Core Socialist Values; adhere to the principles of independence and self-governance of religion in China; follow the direction of the Sinicization of religion; and protect national unity and solidarity, religious harmony, and social stability.

…

Article 33: The religious affairs departments shall strengthen the informatization management of religious clergy in accordance with the principle of integrating management with service.

The National Religious Affairs Administration shall create a database of religious clergy. The local religious affairs departments of the people's government shall promptly provide and update the basic information of religious clergy, including information on rewards and punishments and deregistration records. (China 2021)

An October 2021 USCIRF report notes that religious activities by clergy of unregistered groups is "effectively ban[ned]" under the 2021 measures (US 2021-10, 4).

2.5 Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services (2022)

Australia's DFAT indicates that the Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services, which came into effect on 1 March 2022, banned the online promotion of "extremism, 'religious fanaticism' or messages that were not consistent with the CCP's wishes" (2024-12-27, para. 3.53). According to the US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, 2022 legislation bans "unauthorized" religious content online and requires organizations outside China to obtain a permit before providing online religious services in China (2024-06-26, 12). Australia's DFAT report also notes that a permit is required to proselytize online (2024-12-27, para. 3.53). The same report, citing "[i]n-country sources," states that registered churches had to stop streaming their services online due to the 2022 measures (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.53).

2.6 Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues (2023)

Australia's DFAT indicates that the Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues, which "govern the establishment and operation of religious venues in China," came into effect on 1 September 2023 (2024-12-27, para. 3.54). The same source adds that these measures formalized the following requirements of religious venues and their administrators:

• to teach and spread "political orthodoxy," including support for CCP's leadership and Xi Jinping Thought [3];
• to comply with the Sinicization of religion, by mandating services be in Mandarin and ensuring religious buildings respect traditional "'Chinese' style";
• to restrict religious activities to "government-approved" locations; and
• to prevent "foreign forces from 'using religion for infiltration'" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.54).
  
  

The Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues provide the following:

[translation]

Article 3: Religious activity venues shall support the leadership of the Communist Party of China; uphold the socialist system; thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; comply with the Constitution, laws, regulations, rules, and relevant provisions of the administration of religious affairs; practise the Core Socialist Values; follow the direction of the Sinicization of religion; adhere to the principles of independence and self-governance of religion in China; and protect national unity and solidarity, religious harmony, and social stability.

No individual or organization may use a religious activity venue to engage in activities that would endanger national security, disrupt social order, harm the physical well-being of citizens, interfere with the national education system, violate public order and moral standards, or otherwise harm national interests, social and public interests or the lawful rights and interests of citizens.

Religious activity venues may not engage in illegal activities or provide the conditions for illegal activities to take place.

…

Article 24: Management organizations of religious activity venues shall be established through democratic consultation and shall be comprised of religious clergy, representatives of local religious citizens and other relevant individuals.

Management organizations shall have at least three members, with one person serving as the head.

The appointment of, disciplinary actions against, and adjustments to the members of management organizations of religious activity venues shall be reported to the registration management authority to be put on record after consulting the local religious organizations.

Article 25: The term of office for members of management organizations of religious activity venues shall not exceed five years per term, and members may be re-elected. Upon the completion of a term, re-election shall be conducted under the direction of local religious organizations. In special circumstances, with the approval of local religious organizations and after being reported to the registration management authority to be put on record, the re-election may be conducted at an earlier or later date; however, an extension for a re-election shall not exceed the maximum of one year.

…

Article 31: For major matters that involve the appointment and dismissal of religious clergy, large-scale religious activities, establishment of legal entities, major economic decisions, large expenditures, disposal of fixed and intangible assets, site construction, and exchanges with foreign nations, the management organization of a religious activity venue shall hold a meeting for collective discussion and decision-making. The minutes shall be promptly submitted to the registration management authority to be put on record.

A management organization meeting shall be held only if over two thirds of the members of the management organization are in attendance. Resolutions from the meeting shall be valid only if passed by over two thirds of all members of the management organization. (China 2023a)

Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that these measures aimed to separate religious venues in order to "reduce the influence of individual leaders, who may have threatened the authority of the CCP"; term limits have been created for religious administrators and "major" decisions have to be endorsed by a committee vote (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.54). According to Freedom House's 2024 annual report, the 2023 measures require religious groups to "maintain files on staff activities," including interaction with "foreign entities" (2024-02-29, Sec. D2).

According to the 2023 annual report of ChinaAid, a US-based Christian non-profit human rights organization focused on religious freedom in China (ChinaAid n.d.), "some" local governments have begun to use "big data to informatize and digitalize their surveillance of religious activity sites"; for example, Henan province created a booking app through which individuals in "some parts" of Henan are required to make a reservation to attend religious services, a process that involves filling in personal information such as their ID number (ChinaAid 2024-03-01, 3, 4). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.7 Patriotic Education Law of the People's Republic of China (2023)

The 2023 Patriotic Education Law provides the following:

[translation]

Article 22: The state encourages and supports religious organizations, religious educational institutions and religious activity venues in conducting patriotic education to enhance the national and civic awareness, awareness of the rule of law and patriotic sentiments of religious clergy and religious followers, and to guide religion to be adapted to the socialist society. (China 2023b)

3. Treatment of Christian Groups by Authorities

Sources indicate that Christians in China "have been subjected to various forms of discrimination and persecution" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2024, 7) or that house churches are "persecuted harshly" (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. D2). According to Radio Free Asia (RFA), "a private, nonprofit corporation, funded through the US Agency for Global Media," an "independent" agency of the US government (RFA n.d.), state security police and religious affairs bureau authorities "frequently raid" house churches (2024-09-03). According to CFR, in "recent years" both house and state-approved churches have faced an increase in "state repression," with churches being demolished, "hundreds" of crosses being removed from church roofs, and Christian pastors and priests being "harass[ed] and imprison[ed]" (2024-05-15).

Australia's DFAT states that in 2023-2024, regulations preventing proselytization were "generally enforced" across China, and that providing religious education for minors was "not permitted" (2024-12-27, para. 3.55). The same source adds that church officials travelling outside China faced "[f]ormal and informal" travel restrictions, including a requirement to "obtain official permissions" because of their "potential susceptibility to foreign influence" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.55).

In July 2020 testimony to USCIRF on technological surveillance of religious groups in China, a fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Institution, a non-profit public policy research organization based in Washington, DC (Brookings Institution n.d.), and the [former] director of its Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology Initiative, notes that video and audio surveillance of houses of worship, including churches, has "exploded"; for example, due to the importance of video surveillance to the authorities, a "popular" Beijing church was closed when they refused to install CCTV (Brookings Institution 2020-07-22). The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023 cites media sources and human rights organizations as stating that authorities used "advanced" technology, including artificial intelligence, CCTV and facial recognition programs, and tracked individuals using social media apps, to impose "near-ubiquitous" surveillance of religious venues (2024-06-26, 43).

Sources indicate that groups that are not part of "official" churches continue to face "very strong" (AsiaNews 2024-05-16) or "heavy" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.59) pressure to bring their activities in line with the CCP (AsiaNews 2024-05-16; Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.59). Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT in 2023 that unregistered religious groups were adding "pro-CCP messaging" in their sermons to "pragmatically" align with the new regulations to survive, and that those who do not cooperate with authorities had been shut down (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.59). According to a journal article written in 2020 by Sarah Lee and Kevin J. O'Brien [4], which is based on 120 interviews with Protestant pastors in 15 Chinese cities, the interviewees indicated that to cope with the CCP's religious policies, they demonstrate their "harmless[ness]" by avoiding "political or anti-government" messages in their sermons and choosing "suitable" subjects, such as love and "filial piety"; "many" interviewees also sought to alleviate the authorities' misgivings about their religion by staying away from "dissidents" and expressing support for the CCP's religious policies (Lee & O'Brien 2021-11, 4, 12, 13, 15).

Sources indicate that leaders and members of unregistered religious groups [including Catholic and Protestant house churches (Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16)] face arrest and detention (US 2024-06-26, 20; Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16) "routinely" (Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16). The same sources note that those individuals were convicted of "vague or insubstantial charges" (US 2024-06-26, 20) or "fabricated crimes" (Human Rights Watch 2025-01-16). The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023 cites NGOs, religious groups and media sources to state that individuals detained due to their religion face

torture, denial of medical treatment, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances (often through "residential surveillance at a designated location" – a form of black-site detention utilized by authorities against individuals accused of endangering state security), and organ harvesting in prison. (US 2024-06-26, 20)

According to the US Religious Freedom Report for 2023, citing NGOs and media reports, detainees faced "violence" and "tortur[e]," including being forced to "maintain stress positions," "beating[s]," "depriv[ation]" of food, water and sleep, as well as "forced indoctrination" (2024-06-26, 20). The same source adds, citing NGOs, that "some" detainees were denied freedom of movement upon their release (US 2024-06-26, 20-21).

3.1 Treatment of Catholics by Authorities

Sources indicate that there are no diplomatic ties between China and the Vatican (CFR 2024-05-15) or that the CCPA, the "sole 'official'" governing body of the Catholic Church in China, does not recognize the authority of the Vatican or the Pope (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.67). CFR indicates that the CCP attempted to "control" Catholics through agreements with the Vatican (2024-05-14).

Sources state that Catholic clergy that refuses to join the CCPA face detention (CFR 2024-05-15; US 2024-12, 84), "harass[ment]" (CFR 2024-05-15) or "forc[ed] disappear[ance]" (US 2024-12, 84). The US Religious Freedom Report for 2023 cites media and NGO sources as stating that the authorities "continued to harass, detain, disappear, arrest, imprison, and in some cases defrock" Catholic clergy who are not members of the official church despite the CCP's 2018 provisional agreement with the Vatican (2024-06-26, 24).

The CECC report notes that Catholic leaders faced "'fraud'" charges (US 2024-12, 85). AsiaNews, a news agency of the Pontifical Institute for Foreign Missions that covers Asia with a focus on religious freedom (AsiaNews n.d.), reports that an ordained priest in Zhejiang province was found guilty of "'conducting religious activities by deception or obtaining money by deception, under the guise of a religious cleric'" due to his refusal to join the CCPA; the priest received an "administrative sentence," including a fine of 1,527 renminbi (RMB) [C$301], the confiscation of 28,473 RMB [C$5,606] of "'unlawful proceeds'," and an order to cease his religious activities (AsiaNews 2023-09-08).

According to Australia's DFAT, "some" Chinese Catholics consider that "CCP-appointed priests and bishops are unable to validly confer sacraments that are central to their beliefs," and refuse to practice with CCP-appointed priests (2024-12-27, para. 3.69).

Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that in 2023 those loyal to the Pope faced "intensified" "repression" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.73). Australia's DFAT adds that "Catholics loyal to the Holy See are only able to practise their religion discreetly in unregistered churches" (2024-12-27, para. 3.74). According to the Lecturer, Catholic underground churches face "negative attention" as they refuse to join the registered church and are loyal to the Pope, though "many" Catholic leaders avoid "unnecessary" attention from the authorities by abstaining from public displays of loyalty to the Pope (2025-03-13).

3.2 Treatment of Protestants by Authorities

According to Australia's DFAT, the Three-Self Church, which is registered and recognized under the TSPM, is the only Protestant church approved by the CCP (2024-12-27, para. 3.82).

Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that Protestants did not "face much government interference" in comparison with other Christian denominations; Protestants were "less likely" to be considered a threat to the state and targeted, as their churches are "not linked to a central hierarchy or authority besides the TSPM" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.85). However, the same source indicates that Protestant churches that "refuse to align with the TSPM" face "threat[s]" of closure or have already been shut down (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.84). CFR notes that the authorities closed "big" Protestant churches with associated civil society organizations such as schools or charities and attempted to reduce the visual "prominen[ce]" of other churches by removing crosses on church buildings, particularly in eastern Zhejiang province (2024-05-14).

Australia's DFAT notes that the number of people worshipping at unregistered house churches grew during the COVID-19 pandemic due to services moving online (2024-12-27, para. 3.83). The same source also states that continuing efforts by the Government of China to "force" unregistered churches to join the TSPM, teach CCP doctrine, sever ties with foreign churches, and appoint pastors in accordance with TSPM rules "significantly increased" in 2021 (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.83).

According to Australia's DFAT, leaders of unregistered Protestant church have been "arrested and detained" (2024-12-27, para. 3.84). A report by CSW, based on its own research as well as information provided by two Chinese human rights lawyers through an online forum, notes that prosecutions of unregistered Protestant churches' leaders and staff have been "increasing at a concerning rate"; the charge against them is "typically … 'fraud'" for collecting tithes and offerings (2024-01-16, 3). The same source provides the following statistics on members of unregistered Protestant church facing "'fraud'" charges that are known to the CSW:

Year	"'Fraud'" cases known to the CSW	Individuals detained and released	Individuals who remain in pre-trial detention	Individuals in jail
2019	1	2	0	1
2020	1	0	0	4
2021	3	9	9	0
2022	5	2	9	3
2023 (until October)	3	7	4	0

(CSW 2024-01-16, 3)

Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that from 2021 to 2023, unregistered churches had their power shut off and faced "forc[ed]" eviction and being closed down on "procedural grounds" by authorities "pressur[ing]" them to comply with official regulations (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.84).

3.3 Treatment of Other Christian Groups by Authorities
3.3.1 Orthodox Church

According to the Lecturer, the Orthodox Church in China is made up of a "handful" of churches and has a "very small number" of followers, and therefore does not draw "much" attention from the authorities or the media and has not been affected by the authorities' attempts to "remove Christianity from the public sphere," despite an increase in the number of its members (2025-03-13).

3.3.2 Jehovah's Witnesses

Information in the following paragraph was provided by Australia's DFAT report:

The number of Jehovah's Witnesses in China is "small." The religion itself is illegal, as is proselytizing by practitioners, which is an "expression of their faith"; as such, information about this group is "limited," according to sources in China. Jehovah's Witnesses have reported that followers of the religion in China faced "home raids, physical abuse, separation from families (including visa cancellation and deportation of foreign spouses), interrogation, detention and placement in re-education centres." Jehovah's Witnesses "clergy are more likely than congregants to face officially sanctioned harassment, including detention and prosecution for religio[n]-related offences" and that church leaders and those who proselytize experience "greater scrutiny" from authorities and "face arrest" (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.79, 3.80, 3.81).

3.3.3 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons)

According to Australia's DFAT, the number of Mormons in China is "small" (2024-12-27, para. 3.75). The official website for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints indicates that despite being an unrecognized religion in China, "the Church has a good reputation and is respected" as its members follow official regulations and guidelines (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints n.d.). The same source encourages its members "to obey, honor and sustain the law" in China (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints n.d.).

3.4 Leaders and Members

According to the Lecturer, "if caught breaking the law," leaders of registered or unregistered churches "often" face "more severe punishment" than regular members (2025-03-13). The same source added that this is "often" to serve as a deterrent to other leaders or members (Lecturer 2025-03-13). The source provided the example of the pastor of a church in Chengdu city in Sichuan province, who was sentenced to 9 years in prison for objecting to state policies (Lecturer 2025-03-13). The International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA) [5] reports that the Chengdu pastor, who did not have access to legal representation, was sentenced to 9 years in prison in 2019 for "'inciting subversion of state power'" and "'illegal business activity'" (IRFBA 2023-10-20).

According to the Lecturer, the authorities' "targeting" of church leaders can be "direct," such as arresting them or charging them with disturbing the peace, or "indirect," such as preventing relatives or church members from attending universities or getting a job (2025-03-13). The same source also noted that while both Catholics and Protestants face "bad" treatment from authorities, the treatment of Catholic priests is "more brutal" (Lecturer 2025-03-13). Australia's DFAT notes that Catholic "clergy are more likely than congregants to face officially sanctioned harassment, including detention and prosecution for religio[n]-related offences" (2024-12-27, para. 3.74).

Australia's DFAT also states that "in most instances," members of unregistered churches were "warned verbally by authorities to only worship at registered churches" rather than being arrested or detained (2024-12-27, para. 3.84). According to ChinaAid, on 3 November 2024, a number of officers from the Public Security and Religious Affairs bureaus interrupted meetings of members of the Grace Light Church, the "largest" house church in the city of Changsha and in Hunan province; members received a verbal warning not to meet again but were not detained (2024-11-08).

3.5 Geographic and Demographic Differences

According to CFR, "Christianity is practiced among the Han Chinese majority, especially urban, white-collar professionals" (2024-05-14).

The Pew Research Center indicates that enforcement of religion restrictions has "varied over time and by province" (2023-08-30, 15). The Lecturer stated that treatment of Catholic and Protestant religious groups differs across regions and provinces, as well as within regions and provinces (2025-03-13). According to the Professor, the treatment of house churches varies across provinces and across regions within the same province (2025-03-17).

The Lecturer noted that in general, enforcement of measures and regulations is increasingly less "to the letter" the further south from Beijing; there are "less restrictions" on Catholics and Protestants in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, while further away from the coast, such as in the provinces of Henan and Anhui, these groups face "more restrictions" (2025-03-13). Similarly, according to Australia's DFAT, freedom of Protestants to practice varied across regions and communities in 2023 with southern China, especially Guangdong and Fujian, being "more favourable" (2024-12-27, para. 3.85).

According to the Lecturer, Catholic and Protestant religious groups in provinces away from the coast, such as in Shaanxi and Shanxi, tend to face "harsher treatment" by the authorities; "in general," the population further inland is less wealthy and treatment of them is "harsher" (2025-03-13). However, the same source noted that even within a province or region, authorities' implementation of religious measures and regulations may differ, which makes it "difficult to predict" where treatment might be better or worse (Lecturer 2025-03-13).

According to the Lecturer, it is "difficult to assess" differences in treatment of Catholic and Protestant religious groups between urban and rural areas (2025-03-13). The same source added that while in cities it is "easy" to monitor and track individuals and their activities by CCTV, ID cards or mobile phones, monitoring and tracking is also "easy" in rural areas where the population is not as dense (Lecturer 2025-03-13).

AsiaNews notes that the unregistered Catholic community in Baoding, Hebei province is "one of the most affected by China's crackdown on religious freedom" (2024-05-16). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Access to Legal Remedy

According to Freedom House,

[t]he CCP dominates the judicial system, with courts at all levels supervised by party political-legal committees that have influence over the appointment of judges, court operations, and verdicts and sentences. … Judges are expected to conform to CCP ideology and uphold the principle of party supremacy over the judiciary. (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. F1)

Sources in China informed Australia's DFAT that, since 2022, a "sustained government crackdown" has "significant[ly]" impaired the activities of activists and human rights lawyers (Australia 2024-12-27, para. 3.132). Human Rights Watch states that "[h]uman rights defenders in China are frequently harassed, tortured, and imprisoned" (2025-01-16). Freedom House adds that "[v]iolations of due process are widespread in practice. Trials of human rights activists, religious dissidents, and other human rights defenders are routinely held in secret" (2024-02-29, Sec. F2). The same source also states that "[m]any political and religious dissidents have died in prison or shortly after release due to ill-treatment or denial of medical care" (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. F3).

The 2024 CECC report notes that citizens do not have a legal avenue to assert or protect their constitutional rights and therefore do not have access to "enforceable legal remedies for rights violations committed by government officials" (US 2024-12, 113). The same source adds that petitioners [6] faced "retaliation from local officials" (US 2024-12, 113). The CSW report notes that enforcement agencies faced no consequences for "compliance failure" and no "effective remedies" are available to individuals that have been "wronged"; one of the lawyers speaking in the online forum noted that they had sent many letters of complaints but received "few responses" (2024-01-16, 1).

In a February 2024 letter, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers states that "many" human rights lawyers in China have had their licenses revoked or suspended and that lawyers working on "sensitive" cases have been charged with national security crimes; the relatives of arrested lawyers also faced consequences, including children not being permitted to attend school (UN 2024-02-14, 4, 5). According to International Christian Concern (ICC), a Christian non-profit organization based in Washington, DC, that advocates for and provides assistance to "persecuted" Christians around the world (ICC n.d.), a Christian human rights lawyer, who represented Christians in "various parts of China," was arrested and "disappear[ed]" in 2017; as of 2024, the lawyer remains in prison and the authorities have not provided information on his location and health since his arrest (2024-02-05).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report explains that in 2016, President Xi initiated a campaign to "'integrat[e] religious belief with Chinese culture'," after which the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became responsible for the "'Sinicisation of religions' to ensure 'socialist core values'" were central (2024-12-27, para. 3.51).

[2] CSW is a Christian advocacy organization working to protect the freedom of religion or belief by working with partners on the ground and documenting violations (CSW n.d.).

[3] According to the BBC, "Xi Jinping Thought" is the political ideology of the Chinese president, made up of 14 principles emphasizing "[c]ommunist ideals," which was incorporated into the Constitution in 2018 (2021-08-25).

[4] The authors of the journal article, which was published in the [peer-reviewed (Taylor & Francis Group n.d.)] Journal of Contemporary China, are Sarah Lee, who was a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, and Kevin J. O'Brien, who is a professor at the University of California, Berkeley (Lee & O'Brien 2021-11).

[5] The International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA) is a "network of like-minded countries" working to promote freedom of religion or belief, with the US Department of State serving as the alliance's Secretariat to coordinate meetings and information-sharing (IRFBA n.d.).

[6] According to the BBC, petitioning allows citizens to submit complaints to government officials, with the "majority" of cases handled by "localised" state-level governments (BBC n.d.).

References

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AsiaNews. 2023-09-08. "Priest Convicted of 'Fraud' for Refusing to Register with the Patriotic Association." [Accessed 2025-04-02]

AsiaNews. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2025-04-07]

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Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2024. "China Country Report." Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2024. [Accessed 2025-03-11]

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Brookings Institution. 2020-07-22. Chris Meserole. "Technological Surveillance of Religion in China." Testimony before the US Commission on International Religious Freedom's (USCIRF) Virtual Hearing on Technological Surveillance of Religion in China. [Accessed 2025-03-20]

Brookings Institution. N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2025-03-20]

China. 2023a. Measures for the Administration of Religious Activity Venues. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-04-01]

China. 2023b. Patriotic Education Law of the People's Republic of China. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-03-14]

China. 2021. Measures for the Administration of Religious Clergy. Excerpts translated by the Translation Bureau, Public Services and Procurement Canada. [Accessed 2025-04-01]

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CSW. N.d. "About CSW." [Accessed 2025-04-03]

CSW, Asia Team. 2021-09-22. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

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Human Rights Watch. 2025-01-16. "China." World Report 2025: Events of 2024. [Accessed 2025-03-10]

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International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). N.d. "International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance." [Accessed 2025-03-18]

Lecturer in Chinese studies, University of Edinburgh. 2025-03-13. Interview with the Research Directorate.

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United States (US). 2024-12. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). 2024 Annual Report. [Accessed 2025-03-11]

United States (US). 2024-06-26. Department of State. "China." International Religious Freedom Report for 2023. [Accessed 2025-03-05]

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United States (US). 2020-12. Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). 2020 Annual Report. [Accessed 2025-03-11]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant professor at a US university who studies Chinese theology; associate professor of Chinese Christian studies at a university in Canada; honorary professor at a university in Canada who researches the history of religion in China; honorary research fellow at a university in Hong Kong who has written books about Christianity in China; professor at a US university whose research focuses on Christianity in modern China; professor at a US university whose research focuses on Protestants in China; professor at a US university who specializes in Asian Christianity; professor at a US university who specializes in sociology of religion and religious change in China; research associate professor at a US university whose research focuses on the history of Christianity in Asia; research fellow at a university in Singapore researches Christianity in China; senior lecturer at a university in the UK whose research focuses on Chinese Christianity.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; Catholic News Agency; CBC; Chinese Human Rights Defenders; Christianity Today; CNN; The Dui Hua Foundation; Factiva; Foreign Policy; Global News; The Globe and Mail; The Guardian; The Los Angeles Times; Minority Rights Group International; Open Doors; Religious Freedom Institute; UN – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Refworld; The Washington Post.