Haiti is currently led by a transitional presidential council and a transitional government with a prime minister. Previously, under Haiti’s semipresidential system, the president was directly elected for a five-year term. The prime minister was appointed by the president and confirmed by parliament. Jovenel Moïse of the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK) won the 2015 presidential election, but the results were nullified due to extensive fraud. Moïse won a repeat election in 2016, taking 55.6 percent of the vote.

Moïse frequently replaced the prime minister during his tenure, but after the terms of most lawmakers expired in early 2020, his appointees were unable to obtain parliamentary approval in keeping with the constitution. In 2021, Moïse appointed Ariel Henry through a decree published in the official state newspaper. Moïse was assassinated days after naming Henry, and key diplomatic representatives in the country—known as the Core Group—called on Henry to lead the government. Henry dismissed the electoral council and postponed already-overdue general elections in late 2021.

In March 2024, while Henry was traveling outside the country to finalize details of the multinational security support (MSS) mission, several armed groups in the capital formed a coalition to pressure him to step down, orchestrating attacks whose targets included universities and the country’s main port. As a result of these attacks, the international airport in Port-au-Prince was closed for three months. Following Henry’s resignation, a transitional presidential council was established. There are nine seats on the transitional presidential council, two of which are nonvoting seats, and the council currently operates on a system in which the presidency of the council rotates to between its members. While the transitional presidential council selected Gary Conille to serve as prime minister, Conille was later ousted and replaced by Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

The transitional presidential council is also tasked with establishing a security council, a truth commission, and an oversight body. The credibility and transparency of the process by which the transitional council was established has been strongly criticized.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the prime minister resigned during the year, and while another prime minister was appointed, the country’s new executive leadership is still not freely elected.

The directly elected, bicameral parliament was composed of a Senate, with 30 members who served six-year terms, and a Chamber of Deputies, with 119 members who served four-year terms. The 2015 legislative elections were plagued by disorder, fraud, and violence; runoff polls held in 2016 were marred by fraud and low turnout.

The legislative branch in Haiti is effectively nonexistent. Parliament was dissolved in 2020, and the mandate of 10 senators expired in 2023, leaving no elected legislators. Elections have not yet been organized.

The previous electoral council was established in the late 1980s as a temporary body. Despite constitutional safeguards against executive dominance of the electoral council, the executive asserted significant control over it in practice.

Alongside the new presidential transitional council and the transitional government, a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was established during the year. It is unclear whether the council will be able to operate, organize elections, and implement relevant laws.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because there have been no significant steps toward the organization of elections and citizens have lacked elected representation for several years.

Legal and administrative barriers that prevented some parties from registering or running in past elections have largely been eliminated, but pervasive insecurity, repressive authorities, and criminal violence impair political activity. Armed groups are often affiliated with political actors, and political actors have long employed criminal gangs to impede their opponents, further restricting competition. With armed groups controlling much of the capital and expanding to other regions, including the Artibonite Department, open and free political organization remains dangerous.

Haiti has a poor record of peaceful democratic transfers of power. It remains difficult for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections, which are regularly disrupted by violence, marred by accusations of fraud, and postponed.

Until Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation, political power was held primarily by the PHTK party or affiliated groups. It remains unclear whether the new CEP, transitional council, and government will be able to operate independently from the PHTK’s influence. High-profile individuals and government officials reportedly have ties to armed groups, increasing the repression of political organizing.

Haitians’ political choices are undermined by corrupt patronage networks, organized crime, and foreign actors. Many politicians have relied on money linked to drug trafficking, gang activity, and other illegal sources to finance their campaigns. The PHTK and opposition parties have enlisted armed criminal groups to either incite or halt residents’ involvement in protests and other political activities, according to local human rights activists.

Citizens’ democratic autonomy was further harmed by the assassination of President Moïse and its aftermath. In addition to the violence and criminality associated with the murder itself, many observers decried the role of the Core Group—comprising ambassadors or representatives from Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the United States, the European Union, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations—in accepting Henry as prime minister. The international community continues to face criticism for its deep involvement in steering domestic discussions on political representation, including the establishment of the transitional presidential council, which was heavily moderated by the United States and CARICOM.

Armed groups have garnered extreme power and political influence, as demonstrated by Ariel Henry’s resignation. In some areas, armed criminal groups exert explicit control over people living in the territory they control and punish people who cooperate with local law enforcement. A report published by the Office of the UN Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) found that armed groups often killed or mutilated people who were thought to have collaborated with the police.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to continued pressure from armed criminal groups, which resulted in the forced resignation of the prime minister.

Haitian women are underrepresented in political life, with only four parliamentary seats held by women from 2017 to 2019. The constitution mandates that 30 percent of public officials be women, but there are no penalties for noncompliance. Election-related violence and social and cultural norms discourage women from participating in politics. Due to societal discrimination, the interests of LGBT+ people are not represented in the political system, and there are no openly LGBT+ politicians.

Of the nine seats on the transitional presidential council, only one is held by a woman, and it is one of the council’s two nonvoting seats. The current ministerial cabinet has four women.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because while women have nominal representation, they do not have meaningful input, and the unelected transitional council does not provide them with any further electoral opportunities.

The current head of government has not been freely elected, and there are no national legislative representatives to determine government policy. Corruption, instability, and security threats hinder the government’s ability to carry out its own policies and provide basic services. Armed groups often apply pressure to achieve their desired political outcomes, as demonstrated by the resignation of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry.

The transitional presidential council, prime minister, and ministerial council create and approve government policies. While the government is still relatively new, the challenges that face any governing body seeking to implement policies in Haiti persist. Since the creation of a coalition of armed groups, their political power has grown, and they have expanded to areas around Haiti’s main port and airport.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to the forced resignation of the prime minister and the absence of a stable and independent government.

The country’s anticorruption framework is weak, and corruption is widespread in Haiti, as are allegations of impunity for government officials. Anticorruption bodies remain targets for violence committed by armed groups. Over the course of 10 years, the Anticorruption Unit (ULCC) has published at least 67 reports that were referred to judicial authorities, but its reports have only led to one conviction and four indictments.

Haiti’s anticorruption efforts remain minimal. Since the establishment of the transitional presidential council, the minister of foreign affairs and religious affairs and minister of Haitians living abroad have requested ULCC investigations into their ministries. The ULCC produced several reports on corruption, and accused three of the transitional presidential council’s members of engaging in corruption and bribery, but the three remained on the council at the end of the year.

Haitians’ general distrust of the government stems in large part from the absence of transparency and accountability measures that are needed to reduce corruption. There are no access-to-information laws, and it is reportedly very difficult to obtain government documents and data in practice. A 2020 presidential decree that created the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) granted it total secrecy and the ability to conduct surveillance on individuals and businesses at any time, even if there is no relevant ongoing investigation.

The transitional government has made transparency a key pillar of its administration, as distrust could challenge the legitimacy of elections set to be organized in 2025. However, doubts have been cast on the transparency of the new CEP’s formation. Additionally, in August, three members of the transitional presidential council were embroiled in a corruption scandal, increasing doubts about the transparency of the council’s establishment.

The constitution includes protections for press freedom and the media sector is pluralistic, but the work of journalists is constrained by threats and violence, government interference, and a lack of financial resources. Journalists have died at the hand of police forces and criminal groups while on assignment. Nine journalists have reportedly been killed since 2022.

Reporters and international organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and Reporters without Borders, continued warn of the dangers faced by journalists in Haiti. In February 2024, 10 journalists were injured while covering protests across the country, one of whom lost an eye due to a police tear gas canister. In April, the offices of Haiti’s oldest daily newspaper, Le Nouvelliste, were ransacked and looted, allegedly by armed groups. That same month, the office of the National Press was also looted. In December, as a hospital that had been taken over by armed groups was officially reopening, it was attacked again and several journalists were killed.

In 2024, Haiti’s failing judicial system made it the country most likely to let journalists murders’ go unpunished. In May, eight people were charged in the 2019 murder of a journalist, including a former senator and the acting mayor of a small town.

Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed, and religious groups generally practice freely. However, the traditionally dominant Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and schools receive certain privileges from the state, while Vodou religious leaders have experienced social stigmatization and violence for their beliefs and practices. The government has denied registration to the country’s small Muslim communities.

While worshippers are not necessarily targeted by armed groups for their religious beliefs, criminal activity is impacting the freedom to practice religion peacefully. Armed groups have increasingly targeted churches and other gathering places for kidnappings, doing so openly and with little to no police response. Several killings have taken place in or in front of churches. A December 2024 massacre reportedly targeted Vodou practitioners.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because churches and churchgoers have been increasingly targeted by armed groups.

Educational institutions and academics choose their curriculum freely, but university associations and student groups that protest government actions are often met with police violence. Academic freedom is also negatively affected by the general climate of insecurity, and some scholars may self-censor to avoid conflicts with powerful groups or individuals. Given the increase in internal displacement, many schools have been used as makeshift camps for internally displaced people, limiting access to education for Haitian children. Many schools remain inaccessible due to armed group activity.

There are some formal constraints on the expression of personal views, including criminal defamation laws. The risk of violent reprisal also serves as a deterrent to unfettered discussion of sensitive issues such as corruption, gangs, and organized crime. The government has been accused of using criminal gangs to help suppress dissent. Private discussion is also constrained by the risk of kidnapping, which is a common occurrence in Haiti.

Freedom of assembly is constitutionally enshrined but often violated in practice. Police have used excessive force, including live rounds of ammunition, to disperse protesters. Criminal violence has also affected the ability to demonstrate. Antigovernment and anticorruption protests have decreased due to generalized insecurity and the increased targeting of politically active citizens by armed groups.

In February 2024, antigovernment protestors were met with violence by police, who used tear gas in their response. Five people were killed during the protests.

Numerous domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Haiti, but human rights defenders and activists who address sensitive topics are subject to threats and violence, which creates a climate of fear. Violence against activists is rarely investigated or prosecuted. Among other high-profile cases, the 2020 assassination of Port-au-Prince Bar Association head Monferrier Dorval remained unsolved in 2024.

Between March and June of 2024, OHCHR noted an increase in armed groups’ attacks and threats against human rights defenders, government officials and journalists. International humanitarian organizations and embassies were forced to evacuate nonessential staff several times during the year. The health sector in Haiti was also increasingly targeted in 2024, and 6 of the country’s 10 main hospitals were barely operational.

The right to unionize is legally protected and strikes are not uncommon. However, the union movement in Haiti is weak and lacks collective bargaining power in practice. Most citizens are informally employed. Workers who engage in union activity frequently face harassment, suspension, termination, and other repercussions from employers, though union workers enjoy public support.

The Haitian judiciary faces a multitude of challenges including corruption, safety concerns, a lack of accountability, political interference, and arbitrariness in operations, rendering the justice system ineffective by any standard. The judiciary system struggles with internal corruption but also struggles to uphold accountability and carry out its functions as defined by the law. Armed group have increasingly attacked courthouses across the country, contributing to a judicial backlog.

Constitutionally protected due process rights are regularly violated in practice. Arbitrary arrest is common, as are extortion attempts by police and at all levels of the legal system. Most suspects do not have legal representation. Those who do suffer from long delays and case mismanagement. In its third-quarter 2023 report, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) said 84 percent of all detainees were held on a pretrial basis. Many have never appeared before a judge despite the legal requirement of a court hearing within 48 hours of arrest, and some detainees have waited years for a trial. Haiti saw multiple jailbreaks orchestrated by armed groups in 2024.

Only one investigation by the country’s anticorruption body has led to a conviction. Most massacres are not adequately investigated, neither are the high profile killings of journalists Antoinette Duclaire and Diego Charles, LGBT+ activist Charlot Jeudy, or Bar Association President Monferrier Dorval. In 2021, Prime Minister Henry dismissed the justice minister and a chief prosecutor after investigators under their supervision uncovered evidence that appeared to link Henry to a top suspect in the Moïse assassination, prompting accusations that Henry was obstructing justice. Some progress on the case was reported in 2024, such as the official charging of 51 people, including Moïse’s wife and Haiti’s former prime minister, Claude Joseph.

Extrajudicial killing by law enforcement has also been recorded. In Miragoane, a prosecutor, Jean Ernst Muscadin, has been allegedly involved in the killing of armed group members. A prosecutor in Les Cayes was suspended following allegations of his involvement in the killing of a journalist.

Gary Conille’s government and the transitional presidential council established a Truth, Justice and Reparation Commission in September 2024. This move was highly criticized by civil society and local human rights groups for failing to consult women and human rights organizations, as well as for its members.

A culture of impunity in law enforcement leaves civilians in Haiti with little protection from the illegitimate use of force, and police and civilians are subject to lethal attacks by heavily armed criminal groups. In June 2024, the multinational security support (MSS) mission arrived in Haiti, and at the end of the year approximately 500 of its police officers had arrived in Haiti.

Most key roads connecting the capital to other parts of the country remain under the control of armed groups, which have expanded into other areas like the department of Artibonite. Faced by a weak and corrupt police force and an underfunded MSS, these groups continue to attack churches, schools, shops, and private homes. Homes are often set on fire, contributing to mass internal displacement.

Armed group violence continued to escalate, and over 5,600 people were killed in 2024. An additional 2,200 people were injured and 1,400 were kidnapped during the year. Several massacres occurred, both within Port-au-Prince and beyond. Armed groups continued to subject women, girls, and LGBT+ people to sexual violence. At least 287 people were killed by the Bwa Kalé movement, a vigilante movement which began killing suspected gang members in 2023. Armed groups continue to retaliate violently to any perceived self-defense group.

In October 2024, the Gran Grif gang carried out a massacre in Pont-Sondé, allegedly in response to the community working with a self-defense group. Over 70 people were found dead, including 10 women and 3 infants, reportedly wiping out entire families. This massacre is believed to be the worst in recent years, with a death toll exceeding that of the La Saline massacre in 2018, where at least 71 people were killed.

Police are regularly accused of abusing suspects and detainees. Police have also been known to use extreme force to repress protests. Police are rarely held accountable for their use of physical force.

Prison conditions are especially poor. Facilities are understaffed and overcrowded, despite multiple jailbreaks, and the United Nations reported that dozens of inmates died during the year.

Discrimination against women, the LGBT+ community, and people with disabilities is pervasive. Among other problems, women face bias in employment and disparities in access to financial services. As the sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups has increased, the protection and inclusion of women’s rights in the political process has remained minimal.

A reformed yet highly contested penal code was published in 2020 by executive decree and was set to take effect in 2022. It prohibits gender-based violence, sexual harassment, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which occur regularly in practice. Conservative cultural and religious groups objected to the new code in part because it lowered the age of consent. Its implementation was further delayed to 2025 by the Conille government.

The government generally does not restrict travel or place limits on the ability to change one’s place of employment or education. However, insecurity has prevented free movement, particularly in Port-au-Prince, but increasingly in the department of Artibonite as well. Most roads are controlled by criminal groups, and many residents avoid unnecessary travel due to widespread gang violence. Haitians’ ability to leave the country has also been impacted by an increase in passport processing prices. Land, sea, and air travel to the Dominican Republic is restricted.

Over 700,000 people in Haiti are internally displaced. Due to armed violence, displaced people face harsh living conditions with limited access to water, food, and education. In October, the Dominican government announced a deportation campaign to return Haitian migrants back to Haiti, were many would face similar conditions to internally displaced people.

Although the legal framework protects property rights and private business activity, it is difficult in practice to register property, enforce contracts, and obtain credit. Poor record-keeping and corruption contribute to inconsistent enforcement of property rights.

Business owners regularly face intensive extortion efforts on the part of criminal gangs. Criminal gangs are also known to demand bribes or other support from officials. NGOs, meanwhile, have had to negotiate with criminal groups for access to territory and are pressured into providing financial assistance or hiring gang members. Businesses, particularly small businesses, frequently close due to insecurity. In 2024, farmers increasingly abandoned land due to gang violence. Armed groups often intervene in land disputes, and one group was suspected to have killed judges and lawyers involved in land dispute cases in Artibonite.

Basic freedoms related to marriage, divorce, and custody are generally respected. However, there are no laws specifically addressing domestic violence, which is a widespread problem. Both domestic violence and rape are underreported and rarely result in successful prosecutions. Spousal rape is not recognized as a criminal offense. Sexual violence has also become more common due to insecurity.

The government postponed the implementation of a reformed penal code in 2022, largely due to negative public reaction but also due to a lack of follow-through on its own part. It included provisions that would lower the consent age to 15 and decriminalize abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy in cases of rape, incest, or harm to the pregnant woman. Its implementation has been further delayed to 2025 by the Conille government.

Socioeconomic mobility is obstructed by entrenched poverty and inequality. Legal protections against exploitative working conditions in formal employment are weakly enforced, and most workers are informally employed. After workers protested for better pay, the government introduced new minimum wages for three wage classes in 2022.

As many as 300,000 children work as domestic servants, often without pay or access to education; they are especially vulnerable to physical or sexual abuse. Other forms of child labor are common.

To escape dire social and economic conditions at home, many Haitians have risked human trafficking and dangerous land and sea journeys to reach countries including The Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the United States.