Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

According to InSight Crime [1], gangs and organized crime groups have increased in "strength and influence" in the wake of the 2021 assassination of Haiti's president, with "hundreds" operating across the country (2023-03-21). The same source notes that Haiti lacks a "functioning elected government" and its security forces are "weak," with agents "often veer[ing] into crime" (InSight Crime 2023-03-21). Human Rights Watch writes in its report for 2023 that Haiti's "security, justice, political, and humanitarian crises worsened," noting a "dramati[c]" increase in violent crimes committed by criminal groups, a "weak to nonexistent" state response, and a "barely functioning" judicial system (2024-01-11). In its report on human rights in Haiti over the period of 29 February to 1 July 2024, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicates that criminal groups were "instrumental" in undermining the previous government, have "benefited" from the political unrest, and are now "demanding political influence and amnesties" and threatening "heightened violence" should they not obtain them (UN 2024-09-26, para. 9).

According to OHCHR, the period of 1 January to 30 June 2024 saw 2,652 individuals killed by gang violence, of whom 2,345 were civilians, and 1,280 individuals suffered injuries (UN 2024-09-26, para. 10). The same report indicates that "more than" 91 percent of deaths and injuries occurred in Ouest Department, while "almost" 6 percent were in Artibonite (UN 2024-09-26, para. 10). OHCHR further writes that criminal groups destroyed "at least" 600 homes, setting them on fire during attacks on neighbourhoods (UN 2024-09-26, para. 19).

2. Perpetrators of Acts of Revenge

Sources note the following actors among perpetrators of acts of revenge:

• gangs (Chancellor 2025-01-29; Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. F3)
• gang members (Dominican Today 2024-12-12; AFP 2024-12-11)
• vigilante (Radio-Canada 2023-05-08) or self-defence groups (Chancellor 2025-01-29)
• Bwa Kale movement [see section 2.2 of this Response] (CARDH 2023-07-03, para. 7)
• individuals with personal vendettas who were previously "victimized" (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

2.1 Gangs and Criminal Groups

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), "an independent civil-society organization, headquartered in Geneva" (GI-TOC n.d.), writes in its 2023 crime index profile on Haiti that the country has a "large number of mafia-style armed gangs" that control a "significant portion" of Haiti, some of which have ties to and are supported by state and political actors (2023, 4). The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US-based non-profit organization that collects data on political violence and protest in various regions around the world (ACLED n.d.), indicates that in 2023 the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area was the site of a number of territorial conflicts and expansions resulting in "deadly violence" (2024-01-17). Sources report that violence has also increased outside of Port-au-Prince (UN 2024-09-26, para. 7; ACLED 2024-01-17). The same sources note that in Artibonite department, "gang-related fatalities" increased by 70 percent in 2023 compared with 2022 (ACLED 2024-01-17) or criminal group violence rose "notably" between February and June 2024 (UN 2024-09-26, para. 7). OHCHR states that between 29 February and 1 July 2024, criminal group violence "sprea[d]" to northern parts of the country, where it had "previously been rare" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 7).

2.2 Vigilantes and Civilian Self-Defence Groups Supported by Police

A report submitted in September 2024 by the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Haiti indicates that between November 2023 and August 2024, the number of self-defence groups, "extrajudicial killings, including of minors, and mob lynchings" "multiplied" (UN 2024-09-30, para. 26). Radio-Canada reports that in April 2023, an anti-gang "vigilant[e]" movement known as "'Bwa Kale'" emerged in Port-au-Prince; the movement's name "literally means 'peeled wood' in Haitian Creole," and the term is "a metaphor for an act of swift justice" (2023-05-08). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023 indicates that Bwa Kale is a "nationwide" vigilante group made up of "neighborhood residents" engaging in killings of "alleged gang members" (US 2024-04-22, 13). GI-TOC notes that, at "key moments" of the Bwa Kale movement, "several hundre[d]" people were "mobiliz[ed]" (2024-02, 14). Radio-Canada adds, discussing the Bwa Kale movement, that "[m]any" alleged gang members have been "lynched or summarily executed" by citizen groups (2023-05-08). Citing local sources, GI-TOC indicates that Bwa Kale vigilantes committed "more than" 600 public lynchings and executions between April 2023 and February 2024 (2024-02, 14).

Sources report that the Bwa Kale movement "sometimes" (Radio-Canada 2023-05-08) or "[o]ften" (Human Rights Watch 2024-01-11) collaborates with police to kill suspected gang members (Radio-Canada 2023-05-08; Human Rights Watch 2024-01-11). GI-TOC indicates that Bwa Kale and other vigilante activity is "intimately linked" to police, and groups "tend to include police officers who support, tolerate and/or participate in the movements, usually on an informal basis" (2024-02, 15).

According to a report by the Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme, CARDH), a Haitian NGO that monitors, promotes, and produces research favouring democracy, the rule of law, and good governance in Haiti (CARDH n.d.) [2], [translation] "in some cases" individuals "reportedly" collaborate with police to use the Bwa Kale movement for "revenge purposes" (CARDH 2023-07-03, para. 7).

According to ACLED's reporting, the departments of Centre, Grande-Anse [Grand'Anse], and Nord saw a rise in violence in 2023, due to "clashes involving law enforcement forces and self-defense groups seeking to contain gang activities" (2024-01-17). The same source specifies that in 2023, vigilante groups and police worked together on "anti-gang operations" that led to "a high number of deaths among gang members" (ACLED 2024-01-17).

OHCHR states that on 25 June 2024, 4 police officers were arrested in Pétion-Ville for their "alleged involvement" in the Ti Bois gang and the Caravanne vigilante group, which has "ties" to the Ti Bois gang and is "mostly made up of active and former police officers"; both groups operate in the Gressier and Carrefour communes (UN 2024-09-26, para. 29). The same source indicates that self-defence "'brigades'" are "increasingly using similar strategies to those employed by the gangs," such as checkpoints, extortion, and killings, and are, in certain areas, forming coalitions "with gangs to oppose rival gangs" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 13).

Human Rights Watch notes that "in retaliation" for the Bwa Kale movement, criminal groups have also created their "own movement" called Zam Pale (2024-01-11).

2.3 Others

According to a quarterly report submitted in April 2024 by the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti, BINUH), the Public Prosecutor for the Nippes department, Jean Ernest Muscadin, "reportedly continued to summarily execute people accused of gang affiliation," including two "unarmed individuals," one in the Fonds des Nègres commune on 25 January 2024, and the other in the Miragoâne commune on 25 February 2024 (UN 2024-04-19, 7). According to a February 2024 investigative report published by GI-TOC on Haiti's gang crisis, for "more than" two years Muscadin has led "a large vigilante-style group" whose members "regulate life" in their communities as well as track and "eliminat[e]" gang members (2024-02, 16). The same source notes, based on interviews undertaken for the report, that Muscadin has "considerable popularity," despite the existence of "videos allegedly showing him executing suspected gang members in broad daylight" (GI-TOC 2024-02, 16).

3. Acts of Revenge

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Chancellor of the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED), an organization based in Haiti that produces research and training to improve the "educational, socioeconomic and political conditions of Haiti's people" (INURED n.d.), indicated that acts of revenge by gangs and "various groups" are "widespread" and include "executions, intimidation, property attacks," as well as "serial rapes and kidnappings, among others" (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

3.1 Motivation

According to sources, motives for acts of revenge include the following:

• to [translation] "punish" or "dissuade" those who oppose, or who might be tempted to oppose, armed groups (Assistant Professor 2018-06-01)
• to seize and control new territories for gangs (Chancellor 2025-01-29)
• to settle disputes or scores (CARDH 2023-07-03, para. 7)
• in the context of "general criminal behaviour" (Chancellor 2025-01-29)
• to punish collaboration with the police (UN 2024-09-26, para. 6)
• in response to challenging a gang's authority (UN 2024-07-03, 6)
• in response to rivalries between criminal groups (Chancellor 2025-01-29; UN 2024-07-03, 6)
• in the absence of deterrence by the state "coupled with a sense of impunity" (Chancellor 2025-01-29)
• related to romantic relationships (RNDDH 2018-06-08; Chancellor 2018-06-18) or "to settle personal grievances over pride or women" (CDA 2015-05, 6)
• for political reasons (Défenseurs plus 2018-06-07; Project Leader 2018-05-29) or "politicians seeking to control neighbourhoods" to secure votes from "disaffected populations" residing under gang rule (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

According to the CARDH report, [translation] "in some cases" Bwa Kale is used by individuals, allied with police officers and other unknown actors, to seek revenge and to "settle scores with third parties" with whom they have various outstanding disputes (2023-07-03, para. 7).

OHCHR states that criminal groups target individuals "for allegedly informing the police or authorities, or for opposing the activities of gangs" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 11). The same source notes in the communes of Carrefour and Gressier gangs have "retaliat[ed]" against "perceived collaboration with the police" using execution and "mutilat[ion]" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 6). The July 2024 BINUH report finds that between 1 April and 30 June 2024, 28 residents of Cité Soleil were killed by Viv Ansanm coalition gangs for "challenging their 'authority'," including by "taking photos of gang members, committing petty theft or attempting to leave the neighborhood" (UN 2024-07-03, 6). In another case documented in the same report, a gang called Kraze Baryè executed and injured "at least" 10 people "in indiscriminate shootings or in retaliation for challenging its 'authority'" in its areas of operation (UN 2024-07-03, 6).

According to ACLED, lethal violence increased in 2023 in part as gangs and criminal groups retaliated against rising vigilante attacks (2024-01-17). The National Human Rights Defense Network (Réseau national de défense des droits humains, RNDDH), a Haitian NGO engaged in human rights education and monitoring of the Haitian police and judicial system (RNDDH n.d.), reports that the perpetrators of a "massacre" in October 2024 in Pont-Sondé, Artibonite, had "accused the local population of aligning with" a self-defence group "attempting to curb" Gran Grif's criminal activities (2024-10-04, 1). International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) similarly reports that Gran Grif claimed the attack was "retaliation for the local population's cooperation with vigilantes'' (2024-10). An October 2024 GI-TOC article states that "tensions" had been "exacerbated" in the weeks leading up to the attack, after Gran Grif claimed that residents were "collaborating with a self-defence group that opposed extortion" and was "preventing checkpoints and racketeering from operating smoothly" in the area (2024-10-09).

3.2 Attacks on Residential Neighbourhoods and Civilian Populations

In an April 2024 article, the Associated Press (AP) indicates that "[m]ore than" 95,000 people had fled Port-au-Prince in a single month amid gang attacks on residential neighbourhoods controlled by rival groups (2024-04-21). ACLED states that gangs and criminal groups use violence against residential populations to "subjugate" neighbourhoods "under their control or under dispute," or to target residents "allegedly cooperating with rival gangs or bypassing the ruling gang's authority" (2024-01-17). For instance, the April 2024 BINUH report states that "at least" 66 residents of the Brooklyn neighbourhood in Cité Soleil, including children, were shot at by snipers while going about "their daily activities," "simply because they lived in a territory controlled by a rival gang" (UN 2024-04-19, 6).

The OHCHR report indicates that gangs conducted executions "in broad daylight" to punish individuals seen as working with the police or against the gangs (UN 2024-09-26, para. 11).

Sources report that in early October 2024, members of the Gran Grif gang carried out a "massacre" in Pont-Sondé, in Artibonite (Crisis Group 2024-10; RNDDH 2024-10-04, 1). Sources place the death toll at more than 70 (RNDDH 2024-10-04, 2) or "at least" 115, making it ''one of Haiti's worst mass killings in years'' (Crisis Group 2024-10). Sources report that the gang leader (Crisis Group 2024-10) or the perpetrators (RNDDH 2024-10-04, 1) identified locals' cooperation with vigilantes as the reason behind the attack (Crisis Group 2024-10; RNDDH 2024-10-04, 1).

Crisis Group reports that after police took back control of the Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite commune from gangs on 7 December 2024, defence groups "targeted suspected gang members and alleged collaborators" in the community and gangs began "retaliatory attacks" against residents (2024-12). Sources indicate that on the night of 10 December 2024, gang members in Petite-Rivière killed 9 people (AFP 2024-12-11) or "at least" 20 people (Dominican Today 2024-12-12). Sources add that the killings were "reportedly in retaliation" for community and police resistance to the gang (Dominican Today 2024-12-12) or perceived as "revenge" against residents who had assisted the police in regaining control of their headquarters (AFP 2024-12-11).

According to sources, in the Wharf Jérémie neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince in early December 2023, the Wharf Jérémie gang led by Micanor Altès killed "at least" 207 residents (Crisis Group 2024-12; UN 2024-12-23, 1) or "'at least'" 110 people (ACLED 2024-12-09). A report by the UN OHCHR and BINUH indicates that the "majority" of those killed were elderly individuals (UN 2024-12-23, 1). Sources state that the victims were accused of "using witchcraft" (ACLED 2024-12-09) or "practicing Vodou" [Voodoo] (Crisis Group 2024-12; UN 2024-12-23, 1), causing illness to the gang leader's child (ACLED 2024-12-09; Crisis Group 2024-12; UN 2024-12-23, 1). The report by OHCHR and BINUH indicates that the killings also targeted family members of elderly residents "suspected of leaking information about these crimes to local media" (UN 2024-12-23, 1).

According to CARDH, the Bwa Kale movement has destroyed property, [translation] "particularly" residences, as a way of "settling scores" (2023-07-03, para. 10).

3.3 Attacks on State Authorities and Public Infrastructure

According to reporting by ACLED, attacks on public figures, such as "government representatives, judges, politicians, and activists," were "twice as deadly" in 2023 compared with 2022, a change that indicates, in part, an "increasing willingness" by gangs to apply pressure against individuals "denouncing gang activities" (2024-01-17). The same source notes that gang attacks on security forces, including on police stations, in areas targeted for territorial expansion "intensifi[ed]" in 2023 (ACLED 2024-01-17). According to OHCHR, gangs "purposedly" burned the homes of police officers and local authorities during the reporting period (UN 2024-09-26, para. 19).

OHCHR documents attacks by criminal groups on Haiti's international airport, National Port Authority, and the Caribbean Port Services in March 2024 (UN 2024-09-26, para. 20). The UN Panel of Experts report notes that the Viv Ansanm [3] gang coalition has conducted "at least 10 major attacks" on the National Palace since March 2024 (UN 2024-09-30, para. 31). The same source further reports "repeate[d]" attacks by Viv Ansanm on police stations, government buildings, and the general hospital (UN 2024-09-30, para. 32).

3.4 Footage and Dissemination of Violent Acts

US Country Reports 2023 indicates that "serious" human rights violations by criminal groups "were publicized for maximum psychological effect" (US 2024-04-22, 13). The same source states, for example, that the Canaan gang shared footage of "themselves beating and torturing" parishioners who had demonstrated against the group's control of the Canaan area in August 2023 (2024-04-22, 16). The source adds that footage showing "acts of decapitation, butchery, and cannibalism" were shared on social media "to terrorize" authorities and rival criminal groups (US 2024-04-22, 16). Similarly, OHCHR indicates that the bodies of individuals killed for "opposing" gangs or colluding with authorities were "mutilated with machetes and then burned," with criminal groups having "filmed the scenes and shared them widely on social media to instil fear and control the population" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 11).

According to US Country Reports 2023, vigilante groups also filmed and shared videos of "alleged gang members being burned alive" (US 2024-04-22, 16). Radio-Canada reports that some gang members have been forced to admit their crimes or gang association on video; "[m]any" are burned with tires, "often while still alive," signalling a "retaliation in kind against gang members who have taunted police with videos of indignities done to the bodies of slain officers" (2023-05-08).

3.5 Abductions and Executions

According to the Chancellor, acts of revenge by gangs and "various groups" include executions and kidnappings (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

Radio-Canada indicates that criminal groups "routinely kidnap children and use torture" against captives (2023-05-08). According to OHCHR, the period of 1 January to 30 June 2024 saw "at least" 893 individuals kidnapped for ransom by criminal groups, of whom 360 were women, 13 were boys, and 12 were girls (UN 2024-09-26, para. 10). The same source adds that "mass kidnapping" on public transit is a "pervasive practice" which "disproportionately" targets women small-scale producers and traders of agricultural products, who frequently use public transportation to reach local markets (UN 2024-09-26, para. 12). The source notes that 35 percent of abductions occurred in Ouest department and 65 percent in Artibonite (UN 2024-09-26, para. 10).

The April 2024 BINUH report finds that between January and March 2024, "at least" 2,505 individuals were killed or injured due to gang violence, which reflects an increase of "more than" 53 percent from the previous quarter (UN 2024-04-19, 4).

OHCHR notes that, as part of the Bwa Kale movement, "'[s]elf-defence brigades'" use stones and machetes to kill "suspected gang members and individuals accused of petty crimes" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 13). According to CARDH, members of the Bwa Kale movement have carried out executions and disappearances (2023-07-03, para. 8). ACLED reports that in 2023, deaths from vigilante-related incidents accounted for 15 percent of political violence (2024-01-17). According to Freedom House, Bwa Kale vigilantes began "lynching suspected gang members" in April 2023 (2024-02-29, Sec. F3). ACLED adds that on 24 April 2023 alone, "mobs of vigilantes" executed "at least" 57 gang members in various Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods (2024-01-17).

3.6 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

According to the Chancellor, acts of revenge by gangs and "various groups" include "serial rapes" (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

According to Radio-Canada, gangs have "raped women and girls on a massive scale" (2023-05-08). OHCHR indicates that in the first 3 months of 2024, the number of gender-based violence survivors "quintupled," increasing from 250 to 1,543 (UN 2024-09-26, para. 16). The RNDDH writes, in a report on crime in the Gressier and Carrefour communes, that according to complaints made to RNDDH and information collected from 3 organizations based in Carrefour [4], 46 women and girls experienced sexual violence in Carrefour and Gressier between January and July 2024 (2024-08-15, para. 18–19).

Human Rights Watch reports that criminal groups employ sexual violence "to terrorize the population" and signal their "control" over it (2024-01-11). Reports by "human rights organizations" cited in US Country Reports 2023 indicate that gender-based violence was used by criminal groups as "'retaliation'" against residents in areas controlled by other gangs (US 2024-04-22, 16). Similarly, evidence gathered by OHCHR for its report indicates that criminal groups use sexual violence as a means to "punish, spread fear and subjugate the population," including assaults on women and girls who were commuting from "'rival neighbourhoods'" to access education or basic services (UN 2024-09-26, para. 16). AP reports that residents who attempt to leave Port-au-Prince by bus are at risk of being "gang-raped or killed as they pass through gang-controlled areas" (2024-04-21).

The OHCHR report also documents women being "forced into exploitative sexual relations" with members of criminal groups; those who refused were "killed in broad daylight" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 16).

For additional information on sexual and gender-based violence committed by gangs and criminal groups in Haiti, see Response to Information Request HTI201783 of February 2024.

3.7 Extortion

According to the GI-TOC crime index, extortion and "protection racketeering" by gangs, targeting businesses and prominent individuals in their territories, are on the rise due to increasing violence and gang power as well as the "availability of weapons"; in Port-au-Prince, "[r]efusal to make extortion payments has led to brutal murders" (2023, 3). The UN Panel of Experts interviewed a Port-au-Prince resident from the LGBTQI+ community who faced "constant harassment and extortion by gang members"; after the individual was unable to pay his extortion fees due to a loss of employment, members of the gang entered his home and "assaulted his partner," prompting both men to leave Haiti (UN 2024-09-30, para. 123).

According to US Country Reports 2023, civil society and human rights organizations reported the detention of Haitian returnees who "were held illegally by government officials who sought to secure bribes in exchange for their release" (US 2024-04-22, 7–8).

4. Profile of Individuals Targeted

The Chancellor indicated that targets of acts of revenge include individuals who

• witnessed or "might potentially witness" violent acts
• "inadvertently find themselves" in a gang-controlled area
• "speak out against the presence of gangs in their neighbourhoods" (2025-01-29).

The same source added that other groups targeted include police officers who enforce the law and confront gangs; public prosecutors; civil society leaders who publicly express opposition to gangs; journalists; and former gang members "who leave their groups and neighbourhoods behind" (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

4.1 Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Information on the treatment of Haitians who return to the country after an extended absence abroad or who move to other regions of the country was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

For information on the treatment by society, criminal groups, and authorities, of Haitian nationals who return to Haiti after an extended absence abroad, particularly those returning from Canada, and whether their return represents a threat to the safety of their family members in Haiti, see Response to Information Request HTI201784 of February 2024.

The GI-TOC crime index indicates that Haitian migrants, including those returning from the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico, US, or the Bahamas, "are often left homeless and stigmatized by their families and society" (2023, 3).

The information in the following paragraph was provided by OHCHR regarding IDPs in Haiti:

"Many" IDPs are confronted with "major protection risks" in Haiti. "[A]pproximately" 75 percent of IDP shelter sites in Port-au-Prince are located in areas "controlled by gangs or in high-risk zones in which gang activity is prevalent," and criminal groups have breached them "[s]everal" times in "deadly incursions." Additionally, in the first 3 months of 2024, "at least" 216 incidents of sexual violence, such as "the collective rape of girls and boys under 5 years old," were recorded in the Port-au-Prince IDP shelters. IDPs have also been killed or injured in the crossfire between gangs and police (UN 2024-09-26, para. 22).

4.2 Civilians and Residents

According to ACLED, 53 percent of all "gang-related" violence recorded in Haiti in 2023 targeted civilians (2024-01-17). A July 2024 quarterly report from the BINUH notes that between April and June 2024, the 400 Mawozo, Canaan, and Chen Mechan criminal groups [5] continued to "attack the populations" in Canaan, Duval, Lilavois, and Santo (Croix-des-Bouquets), and killed residents in response to their "alleged support for rival groups" or police (UN 2024-07-03, 6). OHCHR similarly notes that in the communes of Carrefour and Gressier, gangs have publicly "mutilated" and executed residents as punishment for working with police (UN 2024-09-26, para. 6).

The July 2024 BINUH report indicates that "[s]ome" children were executed by criminal groups for their "alleged support for rival gangs or the police," while others were "lynched and killed by members of the local population," after being accused of "minor offences" (UN 2024-07-03, 8).

According to Freedom House, gangs engaged in "revenge killings" in "retaliat[ion]" for the actions of Bwa Kale movement participants (2024-02-29, Sec. F3).

The CARDH report states that, for killings and disappearances, the Bwa Kale movement targets individuals who have family ties to "alleged gang members" or whose properties (restaurant, club, etc.) were used by said gang members (2023-07-03, para. 8).

4.3 Police and State Authorities

The OHCHR report indicates that following the formation of the Viv Ansanm gang coalition at the end of February 2024, inter-gang clashes have decreased, while "key State institutions and strategic infrastructure" in Port-au-Prince have been the targets of "coordinated attacks" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 4). The same report notes that in the period of March to June 2024, after "notorious gang leaders" escaped from Port-au-Prince's two major prisons, criminal groups increased their "threats and attacks" against state authorities, such as magistrates and police officers, and their family members (UN 2024-09-26, para. 17).

The July 2024 BINUH report states that members of the judiciary experience "threats and attacks"; "[a]t least" five magistrates and lawyers were murdered in the departments of Artibonite and Nord, and "[o]ther" magistrates received threats "because of their investigations into sensitive cases" (UN 2024-07-03, 10). According to Amnesty International, in May 2023 "armed individuals" shot at the car of a prominent judge who had overseen corruption cases (2024-04-24, 190).

Crisis Group reports that [in March 2024] criminal groups targeted police in attacks against "over a dozen police stations," as well as the police academy and headquarters; they also looted and burned down a police chief's residence (2024-03-21). OHCHR recorded "at least" 22 public institutions and 16 police stations and substations that were targeted in gang attacks between March and June 2024 in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite Department (UN 2024-09-26, para. 5). Between 1 January and 30 June 2024, OHCHR documented 53 state security force officers killed or injured by gang violence (UN 2024-09-26, para. 10). The same source notes that, in early July 2024, two police officers were killed in their homes in Carrefour after refusing to move out of the area despite gang threats against police officers residing in the commune (UN 2024-09-26, para. 30).

4.4 Gang Members and Alleged Gang Members

Radio-Canada reports that vigilante groups target suspected gang members; for example, during the first days of the Bwa Kale movement, crowds "drag[ged] suspected gang members out of police stations" to "kill them in the street" (2023-05-08). However, the same article notes that "innocent victims" are sometimes misidentified as gang members, including a police officer who was "lynched in St-Louis-Du-Nord" in May 2023 after being "mistaken for a gang member" after shooting and injuring two people in a fight (Radio-Canada 2023-05-08). Additionally, the Chancellor indicated that when gang informants in neighbourhoods targeted by gangs are caught by vigilante groups, "they're often fatally beaten or suffer other physical consequence" (2025-01-30).

The CARDH report, which covers the period of 24 April to 24 June 2023, states that the Bwa Kale movement operates in 8 out of 10 Haitian departments and has killed 204 [translation] "alleged gang members and associates"; 77.45 percent of these deaths occurred in Ouest department, 11.76 percent in Artibonite, and 5.88 percent in Grande-Anse (2023-07-03, para. 5). According to Freedom House, Bwa Kale vigilantes target "suspected gang members" and have executed "over 420 people" between January and September 2023 (2024-02-29, Sec. F3).

4.5 Journalists

OHCHR indicates that in the period of March to June 2024, which followed the escape of "notorious gang leaders" from Port-au-Prince's two major prisons, criminal groups increased their "threats and attacks" against journalists (UN 2024-09-26, para. 17).

According to US Country Reports 2023, journalists who reported on gang violence "feared reprisals from gangs," in part due to the following killings by "armed individuals":

• a radio journalist was killed in April 2023 in Carrefour, a "gang-controlled" area of Port-au-Prince;
• a Radio-Télé Evolution Inter journalist was killed in Saint-Marc in April 2023;
• a radio host was killed "near gang-controlled Canaan" in May 2023 (US 2024-04-22, 18).

5. Ability to Track Individuals

Information on the ability of perpetrators to track individuals they wish to target for acts of revenge was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

In correspondence with the Research Directorate in 2018, sources indicated that the principal means assailants use to find their victims is by word of mouth (Défenseurs plus 2018-06-07; Assistant Professor 2018-06-01). Sources also stated that perpetrators consider the networks of targets, including informal networks in the target's neighbourhood (Executive Director 2018-06-05) or "individual networks" (Chancellor 2018-06-18).

According to the Chancellor, "most gangs" lean "heavily on individual informants, known as 'antennas,'" word of mouth, and information networks for their intelligence needs, including to locate individuals (2025-01-30). The same source added that neighbourhood or residential raids undertaken by gangs "are frequently orchestrated with the assistance of these informants"; additionally, Haiti's Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (Direction centrale de la police judiciaire, DCPJ) indicates that antennas have been "strategically established" throughout various regions, including rural areas like southern Haiti and Artibonite (Chancellor 2025-01-30).

The Chancellor wrote that "some" gangs have "infiltrated the police force" to recruit informants among its officers, and stated that in the final week of January 2025, "police revealed a disturbing plot involving a police officer from an elite intervention unit in Petion-Ville who collaborates with the gangs" (2025-01-30).

The July 2024 BINUH report indicates that, "particularly" in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite department, criminal groups run "numerous 'checkpoints'" along National Roads 1, 2, and 3, which "hampe[r]" freedom of moment; crossing such checkpoints is "extremely dangerous" and residents doing so risk extortion, rape, kidnapping, and murder (UN 2024-07-03, 9). The same source reports that checkpoints were set up by the Carrefour-based Caravanne "'self-defense' group," where "similar" crimes occur (UN 2024-07-03, 9). According to the Chancellor, both vigilante groups and gangs use checkpoints to "pinpoint potential targets" (2025-01-30).

6. State Protection

According to the Chancellor, Haiti's "ineffective" judiciary, "weak" police, absence of rule of law and public safety, "illegitimate" government, and prevalence of impunity for crimes "have all contributed to a situation where society is overwhelmed by organized revenge" from various actors, including gangs, self-defence groups, and individuals with personal vendettas (Chancellor 2025-01-29).

GI-TOC reports in its 2023 crime index that the Haitian state's inability to meet the basic needs of its citizens "has allowed criminal governance to embed itself in society" and led to "[m]afia-style groups" assuming roles as "quasi-state actors, sometimes at the request of state officials" (2023, 5). According to Amnesty International, impunity for the "widespread violence" in the country is "almost absolute" (2024-04-24, 190). Freedom House similarly reports that a "culture of impunity in law enforcement" has resulted in "little" available state protection against violence (2024-02-29, Sec. F3). Additionally, the same source reports that the hundreds of armed groups that control "over 75 percent" of Port-au-Prince are in turn "generally controlled by political actors" (Freedom House 2024-02-29, Sec. B1).

In reference to the country's judiciary, the July 2024 BINUH report indicates that it is in a state of "paralysis" due to the security situation and the "repeated strikes by magistrates and judicial staff," which have resulted in the courts having been "operational for barely ten days" between October 2023 and June 2024 (UN 2024-07-03, 9). OHCHR indicates that corruption is "one of the root causes of the weakness of the rule of law and ensuing violence in Haiti" (UN 2024-09-26, para. 33). According to the GI-TOC crime index, the judicial system in Haiti is "plagued with problems" which make it difficult to address organized crime, including the "poo[r]" training and "low salaries" of judges, leaving them "vulnerable to corruption" (2023, 5).

InSight Crime reports that Haiti's security forces are mired in "corruption, ineffectiveness, ties to gangs, chronic understaffing, and underfunding," exacerbated by the "absence of a functioning elected government" which results in "little supervision or instruction" for them (2023-03-21). Similarly, the Chancellor stated that Haiti's police is "under-equipped, overwhelmed, and inadequately trained," and added that the institution focuses its efforts on "reacting to high-profile gang crimes, such as massacres and other forms of public abuse" (Chancellor 2025-01-29). GI-TOC writes in its crime index that the police force, including the anti-gang unit, is "overwhelmed" by criminal groups and does not have the resources to resolve investigations, which contributes to a "culture of impunity" (2023, 5). The July 2024 BINUH report indicates that due to "gang violence and attacks" against police staff and properties, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police (Inspection générale de la Police nationale d'Haïti, IGPNH) was unable to conduct inquiries into human rights abuses "involving elements of the police force" between April and June 2024 (UN 2024-07-03, 10).

According to survivors cited by Crisis Group, the police ''failed to counter or prevent'' the October 2024 massacre in Pont-Sondé, Artibonite (2024-10). Similarly, according to RNDDH, despite rumours of the planned attack having been "circulating" in the community for "over" 2 months beforehand, the police did not intervene and arrived "more than" 24 hours after the fact (2024-10-04, para. 15, 18).

GI-TOC reports that, in the absence of the state, vigilante groups have emerged to protect their neighbourhoods, while "paradox[ically]" carrying out operations that are "intimately linked to police forces," at a formal and informal level (2024-02, 15). Formally, vigilante groups "cooperate" with police to "hunt down gang members" and secure their community, and police cooperate with vigilante groups to improve their legitimacy among local residents, gather information, and ensure their presence "through a proxy partner"; informally, interviewees in the article indicated that police officers are also involved in vigilante groups that operate where they reside, performing their "public duty, in uniform, during one part of the day, before becoming a vigilante, dressed as a civilian, during another" (GI-TOC 2024-02, 15).

According to GI-TOC, protection for victims and witnesses of crime is "almost non-existent in Haiti, creating an environment of fear throughout society" (2023, 6).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] InSight Crime is a think tank and media organization that studies organized crime in the Americas (Insight Crime n.d.).

[2] In November 2023, the Center for Analysis and Research in Human Rights (Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme, CARDH) announced that it was ceasing all activities in response to "[i]mminent [d]anger" to its staff as it "awaits protective measures to be taken so that it can resume its work" (2023-11-22).

[3] Viv Ansanm is a coalition of Port-au-Prince's "main gang factions," G-9 and G-Pèp, formed in September 2023 (ACLED 2024-10-16).

[4] The 3 organizations that provided information are identified as Òganizasyon Fanm k ap Konbat pou Lavi Miyò (OFAKOLAM), Jeunesse Combattante (JECO), and the "feminist organization" Nègès Mawon (RNDDH 2024-08-15, para. 19).

[5] For information on major criminal groups in Haiti, see Response to Information Request HTI201332 of June 2023.

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024-12-11. "Nine Killed in Haiti in Latest Gang Attack." [Accessed 2025-01-17]

Amnesty International. 2024-04-24. "Haiti." Amnesty International Report 2023/24: The State of the World's Human Rights. [Accessed 2024-12-04]

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). 2024-12-09. Sandra Pellegrini. "ACLED Expert Comment: December 6 & 7 Massacre in Wharf Jérémie, Haiti." [Accessed 2025-01-23]

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). 2024-10-16. Sandra Pellegrini. "Viv Ansanm: Living Together, Fighting United – The Alliance Reshaping Haiti's Gangland." [Accessed 2024-12-24]

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). 2024-01-17. "Haiti: Gangs and Vigilantes Thrive amid Political Deadlock." Conflict Watchlist 2024. [Accessed 2024-12-24]

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). N.d. "About ACLED." [Accessed 2024-12-24]

Assistant Professor. 2018-06-01. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Associated Press (AP). 2024-04-21. Dánica Coto. "Haitians Scramble to Survive, Seeking Food, Water and Safety as Gang Violence Chokes the Capital." [Accessed 2025-01-16]

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA). 2015-05. Sabina Carlson Robillard. Do No Harm Teaching Case Study: Cité Soleil. [Accessed 2025-02-12]

Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme (CARDH). 2023-11-22. "The Center for Analysis and Research on Human Rights (CARDH) Is Suspending Its Activities Due to the Imminent Danger Threatening Its Staff / Le Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme (CARDH) suspend provisoirement ses activités, en raison du danger imminent qui menace son personnel." [Accessed 2024-12-10]

Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme (CARDH). 2023-07-03. "Bwa Kale" : deuxième bilan et urgente ogligation de protéger. [Accessed 2024-12-10]

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Chancellor, Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED), Haiti. 2025-01-30. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Chancellor, Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED), Haiti. 2025-01-29. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Chancellor, Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED), Haiti. 2018-06-18. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Défenseurs plus. 2018-06-07. Telephone interview with a representative.

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Project leader, Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale (CECI). 2018-05-29. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

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Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2024-10-04. Massacre at Pont-Sondé : National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) Demands Immediate Protection of the Population from State Authorities. (RNDDH - Com.P/A2024/No2) [Accessed 2025-01-17]

Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2024-08-15. Murders, Rapes, Looting, and Arson in Carrefour and Gressier Under the Indifferent Gaze of the New State Authorities. [Accessed 2024-12-23]

Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2018-06-08. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

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United Nations (UN). 2024-12-23. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) & Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH). Haiti Flash Report (23 December 2024): 207 People Executed by the Wharf Jérémie Gang (Port-au-Prince). [Accessed 2025-01-23]

United Nations (UN). 2024-09-30. Security Council. Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2700 (2023). (S/2024/704) [Accessed 2024-01-13]

United Nations (UN). 2024-09-26. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Situation of Human Rights in Haiti. Interim Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Advance Edited Copy. (A/HRC/57/41) [Accessed 2024-12-19]

United Nations (UN). 2024-07-03. Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH). Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: April – June 2024. [Accessed 2024-12-12]

United Nations (UN). 2024-04-19. Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH). Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: January – March 2024. [Accessed 2025-01-13]

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Associate professor at a university in the US whose research focuses on politics and violence in Port-au-Prince; Centre d'étude et de coopération internationale.

Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Austrian Red Cross – Austrian Center for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation, ecoi.net; AyiboPost; Center for Strategic and International Studies; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; The Guardian; Haitian Bridge Alliance; The Haitian Times; HaitiLibre; Médecins sans frontières; Miami Herald; The New York Times; Le Nouvelliste; Organization of American States – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; Radio France internationale; Reporters sans frontières; Reuters; Rezo Nòdwès; UN – Refworld; US Institute of Peace; Washington Office on Latin America.