Country Report on Terrorism 2023 - Chapter 1 - Jordan

Overview:  Jordan remained a committed partner on countering terrorism (CT) and violent extremism (CVE) in 2023.  The country hosted regional and international initiatives in both the military and civic spheres and participated in international CT and CVE fora.

Jordan faced a continued threat from terrorist groups.  Its geographic location increases the possibility of a terrorist attack planned in Syria or Iraq against tourist and/or government locations in Jordan, and the Israel-Hamas conflict increases the risk of a spillover of violence and radicalization from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into Jordan.  The threat of domestic radicalization to violence persisted, especially online, with recruitment targeted at those with grievances over the Israel-Hamas conflict.

2023 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no terrorist incidents reported in Jordan in 2023.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  There were no significant changes in counterterrorism legislation law enforcement capacity or to the State Security Court (SSC).

Human rights groups and international NGOs reported that the government cited national security laws, the 2015 cybercrime law and its 2023 amended version, and CT laws to restrict and deter criticism of government policies and officials by journalists, activists, perceived dissidents, and others expressing political views.

The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is the primary government agency responsible for counterterrorism, while the Public Security Directorate’s (PSD’s) Police Special Operations (PSO) group is the primary responder to active terrorist incidents.  These two organizations operate with support from various elements within the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and the PSD’s Gendarmerie.  In 2023 the Government of Jordan (GoJ) continued to implement measures and conduct joint exercises to improve interagency coordination among security agencies.  Enhanced overt security measures continued across Jordan, most visibly at some hotels and shopping centers.

Jordan continued to reinforce its border defenses and surveillance capabilities in response to terrorist and criminal threats emanating from its 230-mile border with Syria and 112-mile border with Iraq.  In 2023, Jordanian security services – including the King Abdullah II Royal Special Forces Group (KAIIRSFG), the GID, the JAF, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Border Guards, the PSO, and the Antinarcotics Department – worked to secure Jordan’s borders against trafficking, resulting in seizures of weapons, explosives, and illegal drugs.  Additionally, through the assistance of the Export Control and Related Border Security program and Force Protection Detachment-Jordan, the JAF Directorate of Military Security began the biometric enrollment of smugglers apprehended crossing into Jordan from Syria.  The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program continued its Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience project to train first-response teams for a critical infrastructure incident and convene ministries to develop plans and exercises to respond holistically to such incidents.

During 2023, Jordanian authorities remained vigilant in tracking and countering terrorist plots and preventing attacks that target civilians and security forces.  The PSD announced on July 11 that the last wanted person in the al-Husaynieh terrorist cell, which was charged with killing PSD Col. Abd-al-Razzaq al-Dalabeeh and three other PSD officers in December 2022, turned himself in to the PSD’s Special Branch and was being detained for investigation before being referred to the court.  In June, local media reported that a “takfiri” and “ISIS sympathizer” who was accused of planning a terrorist attack at a Shia shrine in 2021 had been sentenced to five years of labor by the SSC.  The sentence later was reduced to four years.  On February 22 the SSC issued a verdict against the “Salt terrorist cell,” whose 2018 attack resulted in the death of two gendarmes.  Of the 14 defendants, two were issued the death penalty, nine received between five and 20 years of labor, two were acquitted, and one remains a fugitive and was sentenced to the death penalty in absentia.

The United States has continually emphasized to Jordanian authorities the importance of holding Ahlam al-Tamimi accountable in a U.S. court for her admitted role in a 2001 bombing in Jerusalem that killed 16 people, including Americans Malki Roth, Shoshana Greenbaum, and Chana Nachenberg.  Although the GoJ has argued that the extradition treaty raises issues under Jordanian law, as a matter of international law the extradition treaty is in force. The United States continued to impress upon the Jordanian government the importance of this case and continued to seek all viable options to bring Tamimi to justice.

In response to the October 7 attacks, the King and senior Jordanian officials condemned terrorism by all parties.  King Abdullah said: “All attacks against innocent civilians, women, and children, including those of October 7, cannot be accepted by any Muslim.  As I have previously stressed, we must make sure the horrors of the past few months since October 7 are never repeated, nor accepted by any human being.”

Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and its Financial Intelligence Unit, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In October, Jordan was removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “gray list.”  FATF reported that Jordan had substantially completed its action plan and made key reforms, including completing and disseminating the money laundering (ML)/terrorist financing risk assessments of legal persons and virtual assets; conducting inspections of reporting entities including financial institutions and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions; implementing a sanctions mechanism for violations of the transparency obligations related to legal persons and arrangements; applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions for noncompliance; pursuing ML investigations and prosecutions for predicate offenses in line with its risk profile; applying effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions in ML cases; implementing a legal and institutional framework for targeted financial sanctions (TFS); and demonstrating that TFS compliance is assessed and TFS deficiencies are rectified.

Countering Violent Extremism:  Jordan’s national strategy on preventing violent extremism (PVE) is coordinated by a PVE Unit in the Prime Ministry.  According to the international donor community, there has not been a sustained level of coordination or responsiveness by the GoJ for CVE efforts.  Moreover, there are numerous Jordanian government stakeholders with equities in PVE, making strategic collaboration by the donor community challenging.

International and Regional Cooperation:  Jordan is a major non-NATO ally and founding member of the GCTF.  The country has renewed its commitment to co-chair the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group, along with the United States, for two more years.  Jordan is a member of the UN, the Arab League, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.  Jordan is not a party to all UN conventions against terrorism and has not acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.  The country is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

In March the JAF – in coordination with other government entities and collaboration with members of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Colorado National Guard – participated in the “Jordan Shield” Field Training Exercise.  The exercise, which took place in various regions around Jordan to demonstrate Jordan’s capabilities to respond and react to a range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, featured a chemical scenario involving a terrorist attack that resulted in a pipeline explosion spreading ammonia among the population.  Under the auspices of the Aqaba Process, Jordan in June co-hosted a meeting with Spain on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel.  In November, Jordan and Rwanda co-hosted an Aqaba Process meeting in Rwanda focused on intelligence sharing.  In October, GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Working Group Co-Chairs Jordan and the United States, in partnership with implementing partner U.S. Institute of Peace, hosted a two-day workshop in Amman to discuss the challenges associated with repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of FTFs and their families.