South Korea ranks as one of the most connected countries globally, measured in terms of both usage rates and connection speeds.

As of December 2023, the number of smartphone subscribers reached approximately 55.1 million, exceeding the nation’s population of 51.7 million.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that an estimated 99.96 percent of South Korean households had internet access in 2022, outpacing other advanced economies.2 According to the speed-testing company Ookla, South Korea’s median mobile internet download speed was 139.98 megabits per second (Mbps) in May 2024, while the median fixed-line broadband download speed stood at 169.53 Mbps.3

In 2019, South Korea reportedly became the first country to launch commercial fifth-generation (5G) mobile services.4 However, in June 2023, the Ministry of Science and ICT (information and communication technology) revoked SK Telecom’s 5G frequency allocation, citing advertisements in which the company made exaggerated claims about its 5G service capabilities.5 In 2022, the ministry had revoked the frequency bands of KT (formerly Korea Telecom) and LG Uplus (formerly LG Telecom), similarly because they had failed to meet service-deployment targets.

High-speed internet service is relatively affordable. The Inclusive Internet Index 2022 report ranked the country 37th out of 100 for affordability, a metric defined by the cost of access relative to income and the level of competition in the internet service market.6 The average price for 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data is approximately $5,7 while the minimum wage is set at about $7.50 per hour.8 The monthly cost for broadband in the country is roughly $26.9

There is no significant digital divide with respect to gender or income. However, there remains room for improvement in digital competency among the elderly and rural populations.10 In 2020, South Korea became the eighth country in the world to enact a policy mandating access to broadband service for all users, with a minimum speed set at 100 Mbps.11

The country’s internet backbone market is dominated by a small number of companies. KT, established as a state-owned enterprise in 1981 and privatized in 2002, is the largest provider.

The network infrastructure is connected to the international internet primarily through the southern cities of Busan and Geoje, from which international submarine cables extend to Japan and China.12 Although the police and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) have oversight over the access points for national security reasons, the government is not known to implement politically motivated restrictions on internet or mobile access.13

The South Korean internet service market is relatively diverse and competitive,14 though three companies dominate the sector.

As of December 2023, KT held 40.8 percent of the fixed-line market, while SK Telecom held 28.7 percent and LG Uplus held 21.4 percent.15 The same firms also control the country’s mobile network market, with respective market shares of 30.2 percent, 44.0 percent, and 25.7 percent.16

While all three companies are publicly traded, they are part of the country’s system of chaebol—large, family-controlled conglomerates that are interconnected with the political elite, often through marriage.17 This has led to speculation that favoritism may have influenced the telecommunications industry’s privatization process and the selection of bidders for mobile service licenses.18

The Korea Communications Commission (KCC) regulates the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors, while the KCSC oversees content and ethical standards. Both commissions, whose members answer to the president, have faced criticism for politicized appointments and a lack of transparency.

The five-member KCC, which was established in 2008, consists of two commissioners appointed by the president, including the chair, and three commissioners selected by the National Assembly.19 Several KCC chairs have faced investigations, been fined, or resigned prematurely amid bribery scandals or allegations of preferential treatment, including during this and the previous coverage period.20 Additionally, in August 2023, three committee members’ office terms expired, all of whom were recommended by the National Assembly, and through the end of the coverage period, the seats remained vacant.

In August 2023, President Yoon appointed Lee Dong-kwan to serve as KCC chair without parliamentary consent, after dismissing incumbent Han Sang-hyuk in May 2023.21 Since then, through the end of the coverage period, the KCC operated with three seat vacancies, with only then-Chairman Lee Dong-kwan and then-Vice Chairman Lee Sang-in, both presidential nominees, serving the commission.22

In August 2023, the two-member KCC dismissed the chair of national broadcaster Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Nam Young-jin, and separately nominated Seo Gi-seok, a former justice on the Constitutional Court, to fill a vacancy on the board of directors. Critics and members of the opposition raised concerns about the commission’s independence, given its history of politicized appointments, and because Nam’s dismissal and Seo’s appointment switched the KBC board in the favor of the ruling party.23

Lee resigned just three months after assuming the post, amid separate accusations that his efforts to combat misinformation were intended to increase government influence over media outlets (see B3).24 The president then appointed Kim Hong-il, a former senior prosecutor who had supervised Yoon when he was a public prosecutor himself, in December 2023.25

In February 2024, the two-member KCC, led by then-Chairman Kim Hong-il and then-Vice Chairman Lee Sang-in, approved the sale of a majority stake in news channel Yonhap Television News (YTN) to Eugene Group, a South Korean conglomerate.26 The shares were previously held by two-state owned companies, and critics voiced concerns that the sale would effectively privatize YTN and limit the channel‘s ability to report critically on the government.27 In July 2024, after the end of the coverage period, opposition parties introduced an impeachment bill, claiming that the KCC, led by Kim, had been running an illegal “two-person system.” Soon after, Kim resigned, effectively avoiding impeachment.28

Established concurrently with the KCC in 2008, the KCSC monitors internet content and issues censorship orders to content hosts and other service providers (see B3). The KCSC’s nine members are also appointed by the president and the National Assembly.29 Observers have criticized the commission for its vaguely defined standards and broad discretionary power to decide what information should be censored, arguing that this arrangement leads to politically, socially, and culturally biased judgments that often lack a legal foundation.30

In December 2023, a whistleblower reported that Ryu Hee-rim, who had been appointed as chair of the KCSC three months prior, had enlisted his family and acquaintances to file at least 50 civilian petitions with the commission against Newstapa,31 a left-leaning news site that had previously reported on a corruption scandal involving President Yoon. The civilian petitions eventually formed a basis for the KCSC’s decision to hold an urgent deliberation and fine broadcasters that had reported on Newstapa’s investigation in November 2023 (see B3).32

During the coverage period, service providers continued to block content that was deemed to violate the law or social norms, including perceived threats to national security and public morality, mainly on the orders of the KCSC.33

While the KCSC does not publish a list of blocked sites, it does release the number of websites blocked under different categories of banned content, and in 2023 it reported that 220,403 websites or web pages were blocked.34

Political content, such as material praising North Korea, can be subject to blocking under Article 7 of the 1948 National Security Act.35 Most recently, in May 2024, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) requested the blocking of 29 versions of the “Friendly Father” music video, which depicted North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un as a friendly leader and had recently gone viral on the short-video platform TikTok.36

Also during the coverage period, the KCSC increasingly blocked content that was critical of the president, the first lady, or the government. In January 2024, for example, the KCSC cited national security grounds when ordering local internet service providers (ISPs) to block 37 videos on Voice of Seoul reporter Jeong Byeong-gon’s YouTube channel, which documented President Yoon’s frequent late arrivals at work in the morning.37 In February 2024, the KCSC requested platforms to “delete and block” a compilation video edited to depict President Yoon delivering a self-disparaging speech,38 though it remains unclear whether the video was taken down.39

In May 2024, the Administrative Court upheld a 2021 order instructing service providers to block the website of Women on Web, a Canadian nongovernmental organization (NGO) that provides information and teleconsultations on contraception and safe abortion. 40 The site remained blocked at the end of the coverage period.

In addition to blocking, some political and social content is subject to removal, primarily through orders from the KCSC to service providers. The police and other government agencies, as well as politically influential individuals,41 can also request the removal of content.

For instance, ahead of the 2024 legislative elections, members of the governing conservative People Power Party filed complaints with the KCSC against several unfavorable reports on the party or President Yoon, leading the commission to restrict content or impose other sanctions.42

Service providers that fail to adhere to the KCSC’s orders risk up to two years of imprisonment or a fine of up to 20 million won ($15,000), according to Article 73 of the Network Act (see B3). The KCSC also employs a range of tactics to regulate content beyond blocking and deletion orders, such as imposing legal sanctions—which include warnings, correction requests, suspensions, and fines—and issuing administrative guidance, like formal recommendations. Failure to comply with legal sanctions can result in more serious penalties, as they serve as demerits during the license renewal process for publishers.

According to Article 44(2) of the Network Act, companies are compelled to immediately hide any content subject to a takedown request from individual users for 30 days. If the content owner does not revise it or appeal during this period, the content is deleted. Meanwhile, Article 44(3) encourages online intermediaries to monitor and carry out proactive 30-day takedowns of problematic content, even without explicit complaints.43 Companies demonstrating proactive efforts to regulate content are viewed favorably by the courts, while those failing to do so could be held liable for illegal content posted on their platforms.44

The Telecommunications Business Act assigns online intermediaries the responsibility of removing nonconsensual images and videos of an intimate or sexual nature, and stipulates that if such content is not removed, intermediaries may face fines of up to 3 percent of their revenues. The fines are proportional to the duration of time that the content remains displayed.45

In the run-up to the presidential election in March 2022, the National Election Commission (NEC) asked service providers to remove over 86,000 online posts, the largest number of deletions requested during an election in the country’s history, including items that were flagged for containing unauthorized public-opinion polls, allegedly false information, and alleged slander of candidates.46

An expansive legal and administrative framework enables authorities to restrict a wide range of content and disproportionately assign penalties for alleged violations (see C2). In many cases, the KCSC can order the blocking of entire websites, even if only a portion of their content is deemed problematic (see B1).

In September 2023, Lee Dong-kwan, then chair of the KCC, announced a new Fake News Eradication Promotion Plan, which included a one-strike policy against “disseminating malicious false information, regardless of whether intentionally or by negligence,”47 and the establishment of a Fake News Reporting Center to help streamline the review system.48 Early investigations by the center exempted major conservative-leaning media houses, instead focusing its efforts largely on Newstapa for “spreading fake news” through a March 2022 article that the online outlet had published about President Yoon’s potentially corrupt practices during his time as a prosecutor (see B6, C3, and C7).49

In December 2023, the KCSC shut down the reporting center.50

Some users in South Korea self-censor to avoid reprisals for their speech, including criminal charges of defamation, which incur heavier penalties when the alleged offense is committed online (see C2 and C3).

The Yoon administration has pursued charges against journalists and citizens who criticized the president, his wife, or his government, contributing to a more hostile media landscape (see C3 and C7). In January 2022, ahead of the presidential election, recordings of a phone call between a reporter and then candidate Yoon’s wife captured her stating that if her husband were elected president, she would have all journalists who were critical of his administration arrested.51

A 2023 survey by the Journalists Association of Korea found that under President Yoon’s administration, 74.2 percent of respondents felt that press activities were “not free,” “not very free,” or “not free at all,” largely citing “pressure on media companies” and “tangible and intangible pressure on reporters.”52 For instance, in November 2023, news presenter Park Young-sik was dismissed from his positions at KBS and Yonhap News Economy TV after he led a segment on the YouTube channel Voice of Seoul about alleged bribes accepted by the president’s wife.53

A 2022 study found that of 21 female digital content creators interviewed, 15 reported engaging in self-censorship, either by ceasing their use of social media or by refraining from using certain expressions or covering specific topics in their work (see also C7).54

During the previous coverage period, increased enforcement of the National Security Act’s content restrictions, including against a group of trade unionists in November 2022,55 raised concerns that it would encourage self-censorship.

The systematic manipulation of online content has long been a concern in South Korea, especially during and immediately after the 2012 presidential election.

Though the March 2022 presidential election and the June 2022 local elections did not feature the widespread manipulation of online content seen in some preceding years,56 key actors—President Yoon among them—were criticized for stoking misogyny and hate speech online and incorporating this rhetoric into their campaigns, including via social media posts.57

The Yoon administration has also sought to manage the public narrative, frequently framing its critics as procommunist and antistate.58 In addition, ahead of the 2024 National Assembly elections, the administration attempted to quell unfavorable publicity about political scandals and crises.59 The president is also known to maintain cordial relationships with far-right YouTubers, having invited them to his inauguration, sent them festive gifts, and put them on his staff (see C7).

In 2024, President Yoon pardoned Kim Ki-choon and Kim Kwan-jin for directing the military’s cyber command to post political comments in 2012, when they served as presidential chief of staff and defense minister, respectively.60

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 due to politicized legal and regulatory enforcement actions against media outlets and platforms which limited their ability to operate and publish content.

Economic and regulatory constraints, including the country’s high network-usage fees, hinder online content production and publication to some extent. In addition, certain media outlets have been punitively fined or had their licenses revoked after carrying criticism of the government.61

Journalists and civil society organizations have voiced their concerns about the government’s politicized definition of disinformation, which they argue under Yoon has often been used to suppress critical speech (see A5).62 In November 2023, the KCSC imposed a total of 120 million won ($93,000) in fines on four broadcasters—MBC, KBS, YTN, and JTBC—that had reported on or quoted Newstapa’s March 2022 investigation into Yoon’s potentially corrupt practices (see B3, B4, and C3).63

That same month, the KCSC issued a warning against the political commentary radio program News Factory, one year after its host, Kim Ou-joon, referred to President Yoon’s use of English in a speech as “pretentious.”64 By the time the warning was issued, however, the program had already been discontinued at the end of 2022 and migrated to YouTube in January 2023. It continued to operate there, under the name Modesty is Hard (Gyeomsoneun Himdeulda), at the end of the coverage period. 65

In August 2024, South Korea’s primary fact-checking platform, SNU Fact Check, suspended its operations indefinitely due to financial constraints after a major platform sponsor withdrew their funding. During the coverage period, ruling People Power Party legislators had launched a campaign characterizing the platform, which operated through a partnership between Seoul National University and dozens of prominent media outlets, as biased and “leading citizens using Naver to perceive that most statements by the Yoon Seok-yeol government, the People Power Party, and other conservative groups are fake news.”66

Amendments to the Telecommunications Business Act passed in 2020 hold content providers of a certain size responsible for ensuring “stable services” in the face of high user traffic,67 in some instances requiring them to pay network-usage fees to ISPs, effectively establishing a “sender pays” system. Under the revised law, content providers like Google, Netflix, Meta, Naver, and Kakao have to bear the financial and technical burden of providing uninterrupted services to customers.68 In 2021, Netflix legally challenged the obligation, arguing that requiring content providers to pay network-usage fees undermines net neutrality. However, the Seoul Central District Court rejected this argument.69

In December 2023, Dan Clancy, chief executive of Twitch, announced that the US-based video-streaming platform would be shutting down its services in the country, citing “prohibitively expensive” operating costs associated with the “sender pays” system. “Network fees in Korea are still 10 times more expensive than in most other countries,” he wrote in a blog post.70 In February 2024, the KCC fined Twitch 435 million won ($335,000) for suspending its video-on-demand service and an additional 15 million won ($11,600) for failing to prevent the distribution of illegal content. 71

In January 2024, reports emerged that the presidential office had canceled online news provider News Tomato’s press pass. The outlet had published an article in early 2023 suggesting that a soothsayer had influenced the president’s controversial decision to relocate his official residence.72 In August 2023, six individuals, including four journalists from News Tomato, were referred for prosecution on charges of defamation in connection with the same story (see C3).73

South Korea’s overall media environment features some restrictions, though alternative and activist outlets have developed online partly to challenge those constraints, contributing to a diverse information landscape.74 According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2023, the internet is the most popular news source for South Koreans.75

Amid the increasing crackdown on the press, particularly outlets that report critically on the current administration (see B1), users and journalists are turning to platforms like YouTube for the sharing of news and information.76 For instance, after the government cut funding to the television and radio network Traffic Broadcasting System (TBS) due to “biased” programs such as News Factory, the political commentary program relocated to YouTube under the name Modesty is Hard (Gyeomsoneun Himdeulda). In its new setting, it has amassed 1.6 million subscribers and become South Korea’s most-watched daily live program on YouTube (see B2).

The country is also home to OhmyNews, an open-source-style news outlet,77 and the crowdfunded investigative journalism platform Newstapa.78 However, during the coverage period, Newstapa struggled in the face of the government’s accusations of defamation and election interference (see B3). 79

South Koreans have long embraced online technology for civic engagement and political mobilization. Online petitions, events, and social media campaigns have frequently been used to raise awareness of various forms of injustice.80

For instance, after an elementary school teacher committed suicide in response to harassment from students’ parents, the National Teachers’ Association circulated online petitions and led online campaigns calling for the revision of the Child Welfare Act to better protect teachers and requesting that the death be investigated. In November 2023, the association hosted a press conference, announcing that the number of signatures on the online petition warranted a request for an investigation.81

Stricter penalties to combat the pervasive and abusive proliferation of molka, or “spycam porn,” came into effect in 2018, largely because thousands of South Korean women organized online and offline that year to press for legal remedies.82

The constitution guarantees freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and association to all citizens, but it also allows for restrictions, stating that “neither speech nor the press may violate the honor or rights of other persons nor undermine public morals or social ethics.” South Korea has an independent judiciary and a national human rights commission that have upheld free expression rights.

Despite these protections, the prosecution of individuals for online activities in recent years has produced a chilling effect and drawn international criticism. Several laws restrict free expression in both traditional media and online (see C2).

Several laws criminalize online activities in South Korea. The 1948 National Security Act, for example, imposes prison sentences of up to seven years for praising or expressing sympathy with the North Korean regime. The act applies both online and offline (see B1).

In January 2024, the parliament passed amendments to the Public Official Election Act, which ban the distribution of political campaign videos created using deepfake technology for 90 days before an election. The amendments additionally mandate the labeling of AI-generated materials, including outside of the 90-day period, and empower election regulators to order the removal of violating content. Individuals found to be in violation of the act can face sentences of up to seven years in prison and fines up to 50 million won ($39,000).83

Defamation, encompassing both written libel and spoken slander, is a criminal offense punishable by up to five years in prison or a fine of up to 10 million won ($7,700), regardless of the truthfulness of the statement in question. Defamation committed via ICTs incurs even heavier penalties—a prison sentence of up to seven years or a fine of up to 50 million won ($39,000)—under the Network Act. The act rationalizes these harsher sentences by referring to the faster speed and broader reach of online communications.

Separately, insult charges, which unlike defamation charges must be initiated directly by the complainant, draw maximum criminal penalties of up to one year prison and up to 2 million won ($1,500) in fines.

The Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement introduced prison sentences of up to five years for spreading falsehoods, including through information and communications networks, about a 1980 prodemocracy uprising in the city of Gwangju.

The current administration has been a significant source of defamation suits, particularly against journalists and media outlets.84 In December 2023, Voice of America reported that within the first 18 months of his presidency, Yoon and his political allies pursued defamation cases relating to at least 11 different instances of media coverage.85

In November 2023, the left-wing YouTube news channel Voice of Seoul published a secretly recorded video of First Lady Kim Keon-hee accepting a luxury bag as a gift, and in February 2024, right-wing organizations filed defamation charges against both the reporter, Pastor Choi Jae-young, and the outlet. In January 2022, after Voice of Seoul published journalist Lee Myung-soo’s recording of Kim threatening to “jail all reporters” who criticized her husband should he win the upcoming election, she sought 100 million won ($77,000) in damages from Lee and Voice of Seoul chief executive Baek Eun-jong.86 Ruling on that lawsuit in April 2024, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s decision, ordering the YouTube channel to pay 10 million won ($7,700), one-tenth of the original demand, in compensation.87

During the coverage period,88 as in the previous coverage period,89 journalists who reported critically on the government were subjected to retaliatory investigations and raids. In September 2023, police raided the homes of Newstapa reporter Han Sang-jin and former JTBC reporter Bong Ji-wook, due to the outlets’ 2022 reports on Yoon’s alleged involvement in a corruption cover-up while he was a prosecutor (see A5 and B3).90 In December 2023, police raided the home of Newstapa chief executive and former editor-in-chief Kim Yong-jin as part of the same investigation.91

In November 2023, Lee Yoon-seop, a 68-year-old poet, was sentenced to 14 months in prison under the National Security Act for “produc[ing] and distribut[ing] a significant number of subversive expressions that represent North Korea’s position, glorify and praise it, and threaten the existence and security of [South Korea] or the basic liberal democratic order.” Lee had submitted a poem praising North Korea to a contest held by North Korea’s state website ‘Uriminjokkiri;’ after winning the contest, his poem was published on the site.92

In March 2024, ahead of the National Assembly elections in April, an unnamed man in his 50s was arrested for posting a satirically edited video of President Yoon appearing to admit to corruption (see B1). Police also investigated at least nine other users who shared the video on their social media accounts to determine whether the sharing was coordinated.93

In January 2024, after a Gwangju-based man in his 40s posted allegedly “menacing words” targeting former justice minister Han Dong-hoon in an open messaging chatroom, he was arrested and transferred to Jeju Island for processing. He was released on bail the next day.94

In January 2024, the Supreme Court upheld a 2019 ruling that found children’s rights activist Koo Bon-chang guilty of defamation, but granted him a suspended 1 million won ($770) fine.95 Koo operates a website that discloses the identities of parents who are allegedly evading child-support payment obligations.

The government does not restrict encryption, though there are some limitations on anonymous communication.

Mobile service providers require users to submit their government-issued resident registration numbers (RRN), and additional registration requirements remain under laws such as the Children and Youth Protection Act, the Game Industry Promotion Act, and the Telecommunications Business Act.96

In 2021, the Constitutional Court found Article 82(6) of the Public Official Election Act unconsitutional. It had required people to verify their real names before commenting on online news sites during election periods.97 That same year, the country abolished its controversial game shutdown law, which used an online identity verification system to prevent children aged 16 or younger from playing online video games between 12 a.m. and 6 a.m.98

Government surveillance of online activity is an enduring concern in South Korea.

The NIS, the country’s main intelligence agency, has been at the center of major surveillance scandals in recent years.99 In addition to the 1948 National Security Act, the 2016 antiterrorism law enables the NIS to access individuals’ travel records, financial records, private communications, location data, and any other personal information for terrorism investigations, based on suspicion alone and without judicial oversight.100

After the October 2022 Itaewon “crowd crush” incident resulted in 159 deaths and injuries to at least 196 other people, leaked documents indicated that the National Police Agency had immediately begun surveillance of NGOs’ activities online, across multiple platforms, with the purported goal of tracking opinion trends that could undermine the Yoon administration.101

In recent years, critics have frequently expressed concern about the processes by which authorities access personal data. According to the 2021 Korea Internet Transparency Report by the Clinical Legal Education Center at Korea University, the police and other investigative agencies searched more than 3.8 million Naver or KakaoTalk accounts in 2020;102 the owners of many such accounts were not contacted until after the searches were conducted.

Court-issued warrants are required to access the content of private communications. However, the NIS, the police, public prosecutors’ offices, and other investigative agencies may request users’ metadata and communication logs from service providers without a warrant under Article 83(3) of the Telecommunications Business Act. Although the government discloses the number of times data were provided to agencies based on these requests, digital rights advocates argue that the figures may be misleading.103

In 2020, amendments to the country’s three major data privacy laws—the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), the Network Act, and the Credit Information Use and Protection Act—came into effect, reducing the scope of protected personal data.104 Civil liberties organizations have since raised strong concerns that the amendments create the potential for pseudonymized information to be re-identifiable.105 In addition, in March 2024 President Yoon announced plans to lower the consent standards for third-party use of personal health data, likely to facilitate the use of such data by private businesses.106

In March 2024, it was revealed that the country’s largest e-commerce platform, Coupang, retained the personal data of gig workers for over six years, in violation of the three-year maximum retention period stipulated by PIPA.107

While service providers are legally obliged to inform individuals whose personal information they have disclosed, they often fail to do so.108 An illustrative example occurred in January 2023, when lawyer Lee Jong-chan was questioned over the phone by the Seoul Yongsan Police about his search history related to the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act. Reportedly, in the course of investigating a case of bullets missing from the presidential security team’s supply, the police had obtained users’ search records from domestic web portals.109

In September 2022, the South Korean Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) fined Google and Meta approximately $50 million and $20 million, respectively, for not adequately informing, or obtaining consent from, users before using their personal data for targeted advertisements.110

During the coverage period, gender-based discrimination and harassment online continued, as did government retaliation against journalists who reported critically on the administration (see B3 and C3).111

South Korean women report experiencing widespread violations of their rights to privacy, safety, and dignity, both online and off.112 These violations include cyberstalking; online abuse and harassment, such as trolling and extortion; nonconsensual recording and distribution of intimate images; and nonconsensual use of deepfakes to generate sexual content.113

The partly online “Escape the Corset” movement in 2018, which involved women cutting their hair short as a political statement meant to challenge patriarchal beauty standards in South Korea, has resulted in women with short hair becoming targets of online harassment and abuse, regardless of whether they self-identify as feminists.114 In November 2023, a man in his 20s who belonged to an online men’s rights group assaulted a female convenience store worker because she had short hair. The victim, also in her 20s, suffered permanent hearing loss in one ear as a consequence.115

In recent years, a series of online campaigns have alleged that various female creators embedded covert symbols of misandry in their artwork. As a result of these claims, such creators have faced dismissal from employment or been pressured to issue public apologies for their social media activities. Many have also been asked to renounce feminism.116

The North Korean government frequently launches cyberattacks against South Korean private enterprises and public institutions.

In April 2024, police announced that North Korean hacking groups—known as Lazarus, Kimsuky, and Andariel—had mounted cyberattacks against defense companies over the past year by planting malicious code in their data systems.117

According to a 2022 report from the NIS, state-sponsored North Korean hackers had stolen an estimated 1.5 trillion won ($1.2 billion) in cryptocurrency and other virtual assets in the past five years, with more than half of that amount stolen in 2022 alone.118

In June 2023, the NIS, the National Police Agency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a “Joint Cybersecurity Advisory” with the United States on North Korea’s state-backed cyberattacks against think tanks, academic institutions, and media outlets.119