Landlocked Malawi—with a population of more than 20.4 million people—has one of the lowest rates of internet access in the world.1 According to the latest data from the National Statistical Office of Malawi (NSO), 18 percent of individuals and 18.4 percent of households had access to the internet in 2023.2 DataReportal reported an internet penetration rate of 27.7 percent as of February 2024.3

According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) statistics from 2023, fixed broadband subscriptions are extremely rare, at less than 1 per 100 people. Mobile broadband subscriptions stood at 40.2 per 100 people as of 2023.4

The few users who have internet access experience slow internet speeds. For mobile connections, Ookla reported median download speeds of 20.32 Mbps and median upload speeds of 11.95 Mbps as of May 2024. On fixed-line connections, Ookla reported median download speeds of 19.71 Mbps and median upload speeds of 5.71 Mbps as of May 2024.5

These speeds reflect the rising cost of internet service provision due to poor infrastructure management and a lack of investment. Malawi’s economy has flagged over the past few years, with soaring inflation negatively impacting the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector.

Unreliable electricity and the high cost of fuel-generated power strain ICT use. According to the World Bank, just 14 percent of the country had access to electricity as of 2022, giving Malawi one of the lowest electrification rates in the world.6 Frequent electricity blackouts remain one of the country’s biggest problems. Slight improvements are seen during the rainy season, when increased water levels boost hydroelectric generation. Inconsistent rainfall and droughts, which have become increasingly frequent because of climate change, have a negative effect on power production.7 Although power blackouts decreased during the coverage period, the country’s sporadic and infrequent power supply continues to adversely affect the delivery of internet and mobile services in the country.8

Because Malawi is landlocked, it is connected to the international fiber-optic network in Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, and Tanzania through the SEACOM and Eastern Africa Submarine System (EASSy) networks. The fiber-optic network SimbaNET was launched in May 2016, establishing a connection between Tanzania and Lilongwe, Malawi’s capital.9 In April 2018, the National Fiber Backbone Project was completed by the Chinese company Huawei, with the aim of providing faster internet service.10

In July 2023, the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (ESCOM) signed a memorandum of understanding to connect the country to Tanzania’s ICT broadband backbone, managed by the Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation (TTCL).11 The connection is expected to lower the costs of communication (see A2) and improve connectivity for those in rural areas of Malawi. The same month, Liquid launched a new terrestrial fiber route connecting Zambia and Malawi, which the company said would improve connectivity and efficiency by providing a direct connection to content caches and data centers in South Africa.12

Despite efforts to reduce internet data prices, high data tariffs and expensive devices make accessing the internet prohibitively expensive for the majority of people in Malawi.

In April 2021, MACRA called on mobile service providers to lower the cost of data, specifically the cost of 1 gigabyte (GB) bundles.13 In March 2022, the country’s two dominant mobile internet providers, Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM) and Airtel Malawi, introduced cheaper promotional internet bundles.14 In January 2023, TNM announced the end of its unlimited monthly subscription bundle, effectively increasing the costs of connectivity for individuals who deplete their plan’s allotted data within a month, who will now need to purchase additional data.15

During this coverage period, both Airtel and TNM introduced data packages that offer a wider variety of choice. For instance, in April 2024, a monthly 4 GB data bundle from Airtel Malawi and TNM cost 6,000 kwacha ($3.54)16 17 The country’s minimum monthly wage is still 50,000 kwacha ($29), though most Malawians are employed outside of the formal sector.18

SpaceX’s Starlink launched in Malawi in July 2023, promising more reliable and faster internet. However, Starlink requires users to initially purchase hardware that costs 577,726 kwacha ($340.55) and then to pay a monthly subscription that costs 52,000 kwacha ($30.65),19 which would be very expensive for most Malawians.

Malawi’s regulator requires internet service providers (ISPs) to pay annual license and spectrum fees, a 3.5 percent tax on annual sales and turnover, and a 0.5 percent tax on all ICT equipment entering the country.20 Subscribers are also charged a 17.5 percent value-added tax (VAT) on mobile phones and services, a 16.5 percent VAT on internet services,21 and an additional 10 percent excise duty on mobile phone text messages and internet data transfers.22 While there are efforts to reduce the cost of internet data, the government is reluctant to revise its tax policy, which increases the cost of accessing the internet.

Internet costs impact the country’s poor the most. Those without internet access are effectively shut out of an increasingly digital world of essential communication platforms and important services, such as mobile banking and money services, which could help lift them out of poverty.

In September 2022, the government began providing free Wi-Fi in 32 public locations in the country, including schools, markets, hospitals, airports, and libraries.23

There are geographic divides in internet access. The high cost of infrastructure development in rural areas makes companies unwilling to invest in Malawi’s remote regions. According to 2023 NSO report, 40.7 percent of people in urban areas had access to the internet, as opposed to 13.5 percent of those in rural areas.24 Recently Malawi launched “diplomatic data corridor” agreements with Tanzania and Zambia to reduce internet landing costs, which should result in more affordable internet for Malawians.25

In February 2024, MACRA announced that it would use the Universal Service Fund (USF) to form community broadband operators that would provide lower-cost internet services under the Yathu Yathu Data (meaning “our own data”) initiative. The initiative will be operated by local cooperatives in remote rural areas.26

Malawi’s electric grid is concentrated in urban centers, giving 62 percent of urban households access to electricity, compared with a mere 5 percent of rural households.27 A low literacy rate of 62 percent also remains a barrier to accessing ICTs.28

There is a significant digital divide along gender lines.29 According to the NSO, 18.8 percent of Malawian men use the internet, compared with only 16.1 percent of women.30

There were no connectivity restrictions imposed during the coverage period, though outages during political events such as elections have been reported in the past. The government of Malawi does not have centralized control over the international gateway.31 The country’s internet exchange point (IXP) in Blantyre is operated by the nonprofit Malawi ISP Association (MISPA).32

Shortly after polling stations for Malawi’s 2019 tripartite elections had closed, Malawi experienced a disruption in nationwide connectivity for several hours, raising concerns that connectivity was intentionally disrupted.33 Connectivity through privately owned internet providers remained available.34 According to a report by the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the government denied that there was a network disruption and said that vandals had damaged infrastructure, causing a temporary shutdown. However, the report also noted that MACRA resisted government attempts to shut down the internet and alleged that the government applied direct pressure on ISPs to shut down their networks.35

Malawi has a total of six fiber-optic gateways to the SEACOM and EASSy cable landings, three each through Malawi Telecommunications Limited (MTL) and the state-owned ESCOM. The Malawi Sustainable Development Network Programme (SDNP), a licensed ISP, oversees the local traffic hub that connects the country’s ISPs, but it does not have the capacity to block content or restrict connectivity.36

Article 24(2)(e) of the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act provides that online public communication may be restricted in order to “protect order and national security,” while article 24(2)(f) provides that online public communication may be restricted in order to “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication.”37 These provisions are vulnerable to state abuse and could be used by the government to implement full or partial internet shutdowns.

There are no legal or regulatory barriers that restrict the diversity of service providers. However, despite the licensing of new providers, there is still a lack of diversity among mobile service providers in the country.

Mobile phone services are offered by five providers—Airtel Malawi, TNM, MTL, Starlink, and Access Communications.38 The industry is dominated by the de facto duopoly of Airtel Malawi and TNM. Access Communications, a fixed-line broadband provider that also offers mobile services, presents no serious competition to the two main operators.39 As of 2021, the most recent year for which data is available, TNM had a market share of 56 percent, Airtel Malawi had 44 percent, and Access Communications had less than 1 percent.40

According to a May 2022 report, Nyasa Mobile Limited was set to become the third mobile phone operator in Malawi.41 Nyasa Mobile Limited was not yet active at the end of the coverage period. However, another operator, Malcel, received a mobile operating license in October 2022 and announced plans to begin offering services in October 2023.42

The launch of the Yathu Yathu Data initiative, funded through the USF and introduced during the coverage period, is expected to diversify the mobile operator market and provide a lower-cost alternative to Airtel and TNM for mobile data, particularly in rural areas (see A2).43

Malawi’s ICT market is reasonably competitive, with 24 licensed ISPs as of 2022.44 The majority of ISPs are privately owned, with the exception of ESCOM and SDNP.45 Political connections are often necessary to obtain licenses from MACRA (see A5).

MTL operates the country’s telecommunications backbone and leases its infrastructure to most ISPs and mobile providers in the country.46 Previously a government-owned entity, MTL was privatized in 2005. At present, the government retains 20 percent of MTL’s shares while Telecomm Holdings Limited holds the other 80 percent.

The telecommunications regulator, MACRA, lacks political independence and is generally considered corrupt. MACRA’s board is appointed by the president and the regulator has strong links to the Ministry of Information and Digitalization.

MACRA remains the country’s sole telecommunications regulator, although there are reports that the government may seek to establish a regulatory authority focused on the ICT sector.47 MACRA was established under the 1998 Communications Act to regulate the entire telecommunications sector and issue operating licenses for mobile and fixed-line phone service providers, ISPs, and cybercafes.

The institutional structure of MACRA is subject to political interference. Its board is composed of a chair and six other members appointed by the president, as well as two ex officio members—the secretary to the Office of the President and Cabinet, and the secretary of the Ministry of Information.48 The director general of MACRA, whose appointment is also overseen by the president, heads the authority’s management and supports the board of directors in the execution of its mandate. Article 5(1) of the Communications Act stipulates that MACRA may seek direction from the Ministry of Information on its duties.49

During the coverage period, MACRA asserted its independence from the Ministry of Information by pushing back against a directive from the information minister. The information minister had directed MACRA to vacate a court injunction it obtained against MultiChoice Malawi, which had adjusted its tariffs without first getting MACRA’s approval. 50

Former MACRA board members and officials have faced corruption charges.51 In April 2022, MACRA suspended five senior managers without an apparent reason.52 In May 2021, a government watchdog found widespread misconduct in MACRA’s recruitment practices.53 In its 2015–20 Strategic Plan, the regulator states that one of its weaknesses is a perceived bias in regulation by operators.54

While past regimes have censored internet content,55 the current government does not block or filter protected content. Social media platforms are widely available.

There were no publicly reported cases of content removal in Malawi during the coverage period. However, in previous years top government and ruling party officials have requested that online media remove content.56

While there were no cases of restrictions on internet usage during the coverage period, the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act contains vague provisions that could be used by the government to restrict online content. Article 24 allows for restrictions on online public communications to “protect public order and national security,” a broad provision that is open to abuse.57 The same article would also “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication,” an unclear statement that could be interpreted to enable network shutdowns or blocks of social media platforms.

Without central control over infrastructure, the most direct way for the government to restrict content would be through an agreement with private telecommunications operators.58 Malawi has no laws prohibiting the government from doing so, and recent government suggestions that it could partner with telecommunications providers on monitoring programs (see C6) indicate that it could also restrict content through similar agreements.

Instances of content removal via unofficial directive are public and cannot be appealed.

There are no restrictions preventing internet users and commentators from discussing controversial topics. However, arrests of individuals for social media posts about high-profile figures (see C3) increasingly foster a climate of intimidation that prompts a degree of self-censorship, particularly among media professionals and social media users.59 In April 2021, the International Press Institute condemned recent detentions of journalists, claiming that the detentions “threaten[ed] to create a climate of fear” in Malawi.60 Online journalists usually also exhibit caution when handling news associated with ethnic, racial, or religious minorities.

There was no indication that online sources were being manipulated by the government or powerful actors during the coverage period. However, in the past, online news has been subject to government manipulation via government directives issued to media organizations and individual journalists.

Discussions with journalists revealed that in the past their articles were sometimes not published online or in print because their editors received directives from officials instructing them to refrain from publishing on certain topics (see B2). Newspaper journalists also indicated that politicians from both the opposition and ruling parties have demanded that they prioritize positive news articles and favorable reports on the politicians themselves.61 Previously, politicians have verbally threatened and abused journalists for their journalistic work (see C7).62

In the aftermath of the May 2019 tripartite elections, progovernment and ruling party groups circulated manipulated images of newspaper front pages to suit their interests, then circulated them online, misleading the public for political aims.63

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because MACRA did not revoke broadcast licenses again during the coverage period, though financial constraints continued to pose an obstacle for individuals publishing online.

The high cost of registering a domain is an obstacle to publishing locally produced content online, while a complicated online payment system limits content hosted on foreign domains. The SDNP administers the .mw domain on behalf of the Malawian government.64 As of March 2024, the cost of registering a new .mw domain was $40, with a $40 annual fee for the renewal of the domain.65

In November 2022, MACRA’s new administration revoked the broadcast licenses of some radio and television stations for late or nonpayment of license fees, which led to the closure of a number of broadcasters, some of which also livestreamed their programs online. While some were able to reapply for licenses, some of the impacted stations perceived the decision as silencing media institutions that were critical of government policies and initiatives.66

Malawians also face limitations when trying to access foreign domains because of the country’s limited options for online payments and restrictions on international payments due to insufficient foreign currency reserves.67 The 44 percent devaluation of the local currency over the course of the coverage period made accessing foreign currency even more difficult.68 In order to complete a transaction on the online payment system, users must have access to a foreign currency account, Mastercard, or Visa card, which the majority of Malawians lack.69 Despite efforts by TNM to introduce more accessible Mastercard services, complications related to online payment systems persist.70

Furthermore, the rate of online advertising is low because of a limited understanding of the internet among businesses, which are hesitant to advertise with independent media outlets. It is also difficult for online publications to attract large amounts of advertising because high internet costs make their platforms accessible by relatively few, often urban-based Malawians (see A1 and A2).

Even though the online landscape in Malawi is generally open and relatively free, it does not reflect a wide diversity of viewpoints, primarily due to the low level of internet use (see A1 and A2). Economic conditions make it difficult for local journalists and media groups to launch online outlets (see B6), and the few local publications available online provide limited coverage because of a lack of editorial staff.

The dominant local news organizations posting original content are traditional media outlets that have also established online platforms. Many of the discussions on online platforms are in English, which is the official language of the country but is only spoken by a minority of the population.71

Malawi’s information space has struggled with reliability. Misinformation about the 2023 cholera outbreak,72 the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 presidential elections, and political figures has spread online in recent years.73

Malawi’s blogosphere has stagnated as Malawians have shifted to social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook, as well as WhatsApp groups, where they engage in political discussions and express themselves freely. Some cultural topics remain taboo (see B4).

Foreign news sites and other websites are readily available and contribute to the diversity of content that Malawians have access to. However, much of what is published by these websites does not address local issues.

Online mobilization tools are available to users in Malawi, and digital activism for political or social causes occurs occasionally.

Messaging apps like WhatsApp and social media platforms like X and Facebook are regularly used to organize campaigns and demonstrations, garner political support, and conduct opinion polls. Malawians mobilized on social media to protest high internet data prices using the #DataMustFall hashtag starting in July 2020.74 In the lead-up to the 2019 tripartite elections, news organizations and outlets such as the Zodiak Broadcasting Station (ZBS) and the Times Group used livestreams on Facebook to cover events such as political rallies, the presentation of presidential nomination papers, and presidential debates. X Spaces and other new platforms are also increasingly being used to discuss political and social issues in the country.

Malawi has strong constitutional guarantees for freedoms of the press, expression, and access to information. The constitution is the supreme law of the land—meaning that any law that contradicts it should be invalidated. However, there are a number of laws that restrict freedom of expression and press freedom in practice (see C2).

In November 2022, the government amended the 1967 Protected Flag, Emblems, and Names Act, which had previously limited critical reporting on the president.75 Although demonstrating “ridicule” or “disrespect” to the national flag, armorial ensigns, or public seal is still criminalized, “insulting” the president is no longer a criminal offense under the act.76

While judicial appointment processes lack transparency, the judiciary is generally regarded as independent.77 The Constitutional Court’s annulment of the controversial May 2019 presidential election in February 2020 strengthened the perception of judicial independence.78

Several provisions of Malawi’s legal framework assign criminal penalties to online speech.

Libel is punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment if prosecuted as a criminal charge, although most libel cases are processed as civil offenses or settled out of court. Section 60 of the penal code penalizes “publication of false news likely to cause fear and alarm to the public” with prison sentences of up to two years, a fine, or both, which has been used to prosecute people for online activities (see C3). The Malawi chapter of MISA has urged the government to remove this provision from the penal code, as it hinders freedom of expression.79

In an effort to provide a regulatory framework for ICTs and address cybercrime, in July 2016 the parliament passed the controversial Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act; the law came into force in June 2017.80 Article 24 allows for restrictions on online public communications deemed necessary to “protect public order and national security.”81 The same article would also “facilitate technical restriction to conditional access to online communication,” another unclear provision that could be interpreted to enable network shutdowns or blocks of social media platforms.82 Article 87 penalizes “offensive” electronic communication that disturbs the privacy rights of any person with fines or a prison sentence of up to a year, a provision that that has been used to punish critical speech by online journalists and internet users through arrests (see C3).83 Article 52 of the law also places vague restrictions on encryption (see C4).

In November 2023, MACRA introduced the Cybercrimes Bill, 2023. If enacted, the bill would introduce penalties for offenses including cyberstalking, online harassment, offensive communication, and the publication of false information that “results in panic, chaos, or violence,” or that damages a person’s reputation.84

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because an internet user was convicted for insulting the president in a WhatsApp group.

Internet users continue to be penalized for online activities in Malawi, especially when their online expression is aimed at powerful individuals. A lack of transparency around which officials are responsible for ordering arrests for online expression has contributed to concerns that these penalties are applied disproportionately to those who criticize authorities.

Sainani Joshua, a resident of Mponela, was arrested in May 2024 for insulting the president in a WhatsApp group. He was convicted on charges of cyberspamming three days later and required to either pay a fine of 200,000 kwacha ($120) or spend six months in prison. After spending two weeks in prison, Joshua paid the fine and was released.85

In April 2024, Macmillan Mhone, who works for the online publication Malawi 24, was summoned for questioning. Months earlier, Mhone had published two stories alleging that the police were involved in corruption that was connected to a businessman facing charges of fraud. Two days later, Mhone was arrested and transferred from Blantyre to the police headquarters in Lilongwe. He was later released on bail and charged with “publication of news likely to cause fear and public alarm, cyberspamming, and extortion.” If convicted, Mhone could face a fine and up to 2 years in prison for the charge of publishing false news, a fine of 2 million kwacha ($1200) and 5 years in prison for cyberspamming, and up to 14 years in prison for the extortion charge.86 It was not clear who ordered Mhone’s arrest.

In February 2024, after receiving a complaint about a fake Facebook page impersonating the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), police seized phones and laptops from 14 MBC journalists and accused them of cyberspamming. Cyberspamming carries a maximum penalty of two million kwacha ($1200) and up to five years in prison.87 Some of their devices were returned after the police had held them for more than three weeks, during which time the journalists reported receiving email notifications about attempts to log in to their social media accounts (see C5).

SIM card registration is mandatory in Malawi, as stipulated by the 2016 Communications Act,88 and requires proof of identity, limiting anonymous communication. Accepted forms of identification include national identity cards, driver’s licenses, and passports.89

MACRA announced that SIM cards that were not registered by September 2018 would not be able to access phone services.90 As a way of enforcing the SIM registration, the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee stated that those who used unregistered SIM cards after the deadline would be fined 5 million kwacha ($2,900) and face five years’ imprisonment.91 This punishment, which section 93 of the 2016 Communications Act prescribes for people who sell SIM cards in violation of the law,92 was not enforced. SIM cards that were not registered by the deadline were deactivated.93

Article 31(1)(a) of the 2016 Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act mandates that online content providers must display the full name, address, telephone number, and email address of their editor on their website. While the government does not actively enforce this provision, its presence in legislation undermines citizens’ rights to privacy and anonymity and may encourage self-censorship.94

The Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act requires providers of cryptography services or products to register with MACRA and provide the regulator with “the technical characteristics of the encryption means as well as the source code of the software used.”95 This provision potentially affects services with end-to-end encryption, such as WhatsApp. Violations can carry a penalty of up to seven years in prison, a fine of 5 million kwacha ($2,900), or both.96

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because new reporting revealed that authorities had acquired Cellebrite’s UFED system and, separately, raised concerns that police used extraction tools to search journalists’ devices.

Government surveillance of ICT activities is strongly suspected in Malawi, although the right to privacy, including protection from interference with private telecommunications, is protected under the constitution.97

Investigative reporting in 2024 revealed that in 2019 MACRA procured Cellebrite’s UFED system, which is capable of bypassing passwords and extracting data from electronic devices such as phones and laptops. However, some sources reported that Cellebrite has since ceased issuing license renewals to several countries, including Malawi.98 MwCERT, MACRA’s cybersecurity unit, confirmed that it had access to the tool as of January 2023. MACRA also confirmed that it offers its services to the police, military, and intelligence services when conducting cybercrimes investigations, though the regulator stated that they follow a search warrant and approval process, which requires a court order.

Recent cases where journalists’ devices were confiscated and inspected have raised concerns that authorities could be using extraction or surveillance tools without sufficient oversight. In February 2024, police seized phones and laptops from 14 MBC journalists while investigating a fake Facebook account (see C3). Police stated that they had received a warrant to search the devices. Some of the journalists received email notifications about attempts to access their social media accounts while the devices were in police custody. When the Committee to Protect Journalists asked what technologies had been used to search the devices, a police spokesperson said that the police used a “forensics laboratory”.99 Police also searched the laptop of Greyson Chapita, MBC’s controller of news and programs, during the same month. After police showed Chapita a warrant he entered his laptop password, and the officers manually looked through his Facebook account.100

Attempts by MACRA to procure a communications surveillance system were blocked by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in August 2022.101

Malawi requires all citizens aged 16 and older to register for a national identity card under the National Registration Act of 2010. Registration involves providing personal information and biometrics, including fingerprints and a photograph of the individual’s face, which are stored in a centralized database. Following a mass registration exercise in 2017, the national identity card has become the only acceptable form of identification in certain transactions, including accessing state services,102 banking services,103 healthcare services,104 taxpayer registration,105 and voter registration.106 Malawi’s new Data Protection Act, enacted after the end of the coverage period (see C6),107 is expected to address concerns that this mass personal data collection could facilitate increased state surveillance.108

Service providers do not necessarily monitor the communications of users, but they can be legally compelled by courts to hand over user information. Legal safeguards have failed to prevent such abuse in the past, particularly under past presidents.

Malawi’s parliament passed the Data Protection Act in December 2023, establishing MACRA as the country’s data protection authority.109 The law was welcomed by civil society groups, though some recommended creating an independent data protection authority rather than giving MACRA the authority to enforce the act.110 The law was enacted in June 2024, after the end of the current coverage period.

In January 2023, MACRA introduced plans to implement the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR), a central database that logs the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) numbers of mobile devices registered by network operators. MACRA says the system has been introduced to “track or trace any device that is operating in Malawi on any mobile operator,” in order to crack down on mobile money fraud and device theft.111 The system is being implemented in partnership with TNM and Airtel Malawi.112 MACRA began conducting an awareness campaign about the CEIR in November 2023, ahead of its rollout.

In January 2018, MACRA implemented the Consolidated ICT Regulatory Management System (CIRMS) system,113 known locally as the “spy machine” (see C5). MACRA described the system as a tool for monitoring the performance of mobile phone companies and improving the quality of service, though reports raised concerns that the system could be used to obtain data from operators without judicial oversight.114 However, according to a lawsuit MACRA filed against Agilis, the US-based company that produced the system, the company delivered a system that could only monitor international, rather than local, traffic. MACRA decommissioned the CIRMS system in March 2021 following the expiration of the agreement with Agilis.115

Periodic assaults, extralegal detentions, and harassment of opposition activists, journalists, and bloggers have contributed to a climate of intimidation for media professionals.116

In February 2024, Gregory Gondwe, a journalist with online Platform for Investigative Journalism, went into hiding after reportedly learning from government sources that the military planned to arrest him over a story, causing him to fear for his life.117 118 In the story, Gondwe wrote about the military’s connections to a businessman being investigated for corruption. While the military denies the allegations, Gondwe remains in hiding in South Africa.119 He was previously interrogated by police in 2022; the police confiscated his devices and demanded he reveal his sources.120

Physical assaults of journalists—whose work in the print media is often cross-posted to online platforms, livestreamed, or posted on X—take place occasionally.121 In September 2019, Golden Matonga, a blogger and Nation Publications Limited (NPL) journalist, and Gladys Nthenda, a reporter with Kulinji.com, were physically attacked while covering a public demonstration against the electoral commission’s role in the mismanagement of the May 2019 elections.122 Attacks against journalists are sometimes perpetrated by state security forces, who act with impunity.

There have been numerous reports in past years of threats against political commentators and journalists who are critical of the government and the ruling party.123 Threats tend to come through phone calls and text messages and are not usually prosecuted.

Technical attacks against independent news websites or activists are uncommon in Malawi.

In April 2022, the Platform for Investigative Journalism reported that its website had been hacked and compromised. Prior to the attack, the online investigative news site had published a series of stories exposing high-profile corruption cases in Malawi. MISA Malawi claimed that the hacking was intentional and was committed by state authorities.124