According to official data from the Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation, and Aerospace Industry (MDDIAI), 96.2 percent of households have internet access, including access to mobile broadband.1 In 2023, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reported an internet penetration rate of 92.9 percent, a fixed-line broadband penetration rate of 17.6 percent, and a mobile broadband penetration rate of 101 percent.2

The country’s mobile networks continue to expand. According to official data, mobile broadband internet is available to 94 percent of the population as of April 2023,3 including fourth-generation (4G) networks. Several mobile service providers piloted fifth-generation (5G) services. In June 2022, the MDDIAI announced that 5G networks would be launched in Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent by the end of 2022, with networks launched in other “regional centers” between 2023 and 2025.4 As of February 2024, no operators offered 5G services. In October 2023, President Qasym-Jomart Toqaev urged providers to launch 5G in all major cities by 2026 “to foster innovation.”5

According to April 2024 testing data from Ookla, the median download speed of a fixed-line broadband connection in Kazakhstan was 51.8 megabits per second (Mbps) and the median mobile broadband download speed was 43.6 Mbps.6

Most people access the internet from their mobile devices at home and at work. In cities, including Almaty,7 Astana, and Pavlodar,8 high-speed internet is available on public transport and in open spaces. However, internet coverage in many rural areas remains low (see A2).

Both mobile and fixed-line internet connections remain relatively affordable, though operators have continued to raise the prices of internet services during the coverage period. According to 2023 data from the ITU, 2 gigabytes (GB) of mobile data cost 0.84 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita, while a 5 GB fixed-line broadband plan costs 1.06 percent of GNI per capita.9

In July 2023, all mobile operators notified subscribers of price increases, citing economic challenges and rising infrastructure costs.10 July 2023 estimates concluded that the price hike could range between 10 and 30 percent,11 but in December 2023 plan prices reportedly increased by as much as 57.3 percent.12 The State Agency for Competition Protection announced an investigation into raised tariffs and potential violations of antimonopoly laws13 after originally condemning the proposed hikes in February 2023.14 In July 2023, the agency released a statement condemning high market concentration.15 It also noted that it was possible the government would step in to temporarily regulate mobile service prices.16

The affordability of internet services relative to other costs of living also decreased after the sharp devaluation of the national currency in March 2022 and subsequent price spikes.17

Internet access is more limited in rural areas, where about 40 percent of the population resided as of 2022.18 In October 2023, the government launched the “Accessible Internet” project, which costs 1.5 trillion tenge ($3.3 billion) and aims to reduce digital inequality in rural areas and provide the entire country with high-speed internet access, with a speed of at least 100 Mbps, by 2027.19

In the fall of 2023, the story of schoolchildren in a village trying to catch a signal on top of a hill or along the highway in order to access educational resources went viral.20 Shortly after, MDDIAI minister Bagdat Musin announced that the country turned to SpaceX to provide internet access to schools in remote areas because telecommunications service providers failed to reach many rural locations.21 In February 2024, Kazakhstan received the first batch of 500 Starlink units that were installed in rural schools in the Turkistan and Akmola regions. Reportedly, as of May 2024, 256 rural schools were equipped with Starlink internet access.22

At the same time, the MDDIAI warned that using Starlink for personal purposes is illegal in Kazakhstan, referring to unnamed “security issues,” and punishable by potential fines of up to $80.23 The government also plans to launch OneWeb satellite internet in 2024, with the construction of a ground station nearing completion. Initially, 328 villages will be connected to the internet, according to an agreement with OneWeb made in March 2021.24

There is no apparent gender-based internet access divide in Kazakhstan.25

During the coverage period, the government briefly throttled internet connections during regional public protests and gatherings, including during the spontaneous rallies in Kulsary and other areas affected by floods in May 2024.26

The government also throttled internet connections ahead of opposition protests in Almaty in October 2023.27 In previous years, the government has similarly disrupted internet connectivity during protests and rallies.28 These disruptions usually do not last long and affect a narrow geographical area.

In January 2022, the government disrupted nationwide internet access for a week in response to protests, which were triggered by rising gas prices and were marred by violent responses from the authorities and armed groups in Almaty.29 The government justified the shutdown as necessary to prevent alleged terrorism, and mobile service providers Kcell and Beeline explained that “competent bodies” suspended communications as part of counterterrorist activities.30 In November 2022, the MDDIAI announced the creation of a roster of internet resources that would maintain uninterrupted access during states of emergency. The roster is supposed to include vitally important state and private enterprises.31

In April 2024, minister of information and social development Aida Balayeva said that the government is considering blocking of TikTok, following a similar decision in Kyrgyzstan.32

Certain legal mechanisms allow the government to suspend telecommunications networks at will. According to a 2018 decree, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the National Security Committee (NSC) have priority access to telecommunications networks as well as the right to suspend those networks in an emergency or at the risk thereof. The decree does not specify limits on the duration of network suspensions.

Since 2017, the NSC has controlled the State Technical Service (STS), which has centralized telecommunication networks and internet exchange points (IXPs),33 assuming the authority to block content and disrupt internet networks for crime prevention purposes. In October 2020, the government reorganized the STS34 into a state-owned joint-stock company,35 which still has the legal authority to censor content and restrict connectivity.36 The NSC can act without a court order, though it must notify other state bodies of its activities within 24 hours.37 A 2016 law empowers the NSC to suspend “networks and means of communication and access to the internet” in “urgent cases that may result in [the] commitment of grave or especially grave crimes.”

Since 2012, amendments to the Law on National Security have allowed the government to forcibly suspend telecommunications during antiterrorist or riot-suppression operations.38 In 2014, the Prosecutor General’s Office was authorized to issue orders to shut down communication services without a court order if “networks are used for felonious aims to damage interests of individuals, society or state,” which include the dissemination of illegal information and calls for extremism, terrorism, mass riots, or participation in unauthorized public gatherings.39 These orders must be executed by either telecommunications companies or the STS within three hours.

The government centralizes internet infrastructure in a way that facilitates the control of content and surveillance. State-owned Kazakhtelecom, through its own operations and through subsidiaries, holds a de facto monopoly on the country’s backbone internet infrastructure. The state’s supervision of the STS allows the authorities to exercise control over peering centers and international gateways.40 Amendments enacted in 2017 made the management of cross-border IXPs a state monopoly in the name of “information security.”41 In February 2019, KazNIC, the nonprofit registry for the country’s .kz domain, announced the launch of an independent IXP, but it offers peering only of domestic, not international, traffic.42

In September 2022, Kazakhtelecom and Azertelecom, a telecommunications company based in Azerbaijan, “signed a strategic partnership memorandum” to cooperate in installing fiber-optic cables in the Caspian Sea. The strategic memorandum is a component of the “Digital Silk Way” project, which aims to create “a digital telecommunications corridor between Europe and Asia.”43 In August 2023, the two companies formed a joint venture to move the project forward.44

Though the government has taken recent steps towards making the market more diverse, the information communication technology (ICT) market is still largely government-controlled. The state-facilitated merger of Kazakhtelecom with two major mobile service providers in 2019 has allowed the government to control a large share of the market.45 Kazakhtelecom’s only major competitor is the foreign-owned Kar-Tel (Beeline).46

According to a July 2023 statement by Kazakhstan’s anti-monopoly agency, the telecommunications market in the country is unbalanced by the state’s presence, as two out of three operators are Kazakhtelecom-owned Kcell and Mobile Telecom Service LLP, which together hold a 62-percent market share, while the private operator Kar-Tel (Beeline) holds the remaining 38 percent. Kazakhtelecom’s dominance was further intensified by the 5G frequency auction results, leading to the company receiving a full 5G monopoly.47 Furthermore, the MDDIAI agreed to cease issuing any new 5G licenses for three years following an investment agreement between Kazakhstan and Qatar.48

In July 2023,49 MDDIAI minister Musin announced plans to sell one of the two Kazakhtelecom-owned mobile service providers to a private entity; Musin previously proposed a similar plan in April 2022.50 In February 2024, it was announced that the Qatari Power International Holding would acquire Mobile Telecom Service LLP (Tele2/ALTEL). As of March 2024, no further details about the deal had been made public.51 The deal is expected to conclude before the end of 2024.52 Amid this news, the spokesperson of the Agency for Protection and Development of Competition admitted that Kcell may also be privatized.53

There are several internet service providers (ISPs) in Kazakhstan, but Kazakhtelecom holds a dominant market position, controlling 75 percent of the fixed-line broadband market.54 It fully or partially owns several other backbone and downstream ISPs. As of January 2023, the state owned 71.3 percent of Kazakhtelecom through Samruk-Kazyna, its sovereign wealth fund, and the Committee for State Property and Privatization under the Ministry of Finance.55 Skyline Investment Company, a Luxembourg-incorporated firm whose owner Kairat Satybaldy is the nephew of former president Nazarbaev,56 previously owned 24 percent of Kazakhtelecom;57 Satybaldy transferred his shares to the state58 in April 202259 after he was arrested on charges of embezzlement concerning Kazakhtelecom60 and “other crimes undermining the state security.”61

In October 2021, Kazakhtelecom sold 24 percent of mobile operator Kcell’s shares on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. They were acquired by Jusanbank, which owns mobile service provider KazTransCom.62 In April 2022, the government investigated whether Kazakhtelecom’s sale and privatization of the ISP Transtelecom constituted a “violation of state interests.” In August 2021, 75 percent of Transtelecom had been sold to Unit Telecom, a company run by former president Nazarbaev’s grandson Nurali Aliev.63

Companies providing telecommunications services must hold an operating license from the MDDIAI’s Telecommunications Committee under the Law on Permissions and Notifications.64 The Law on National Security limits foreign ownership of telecommunications companies.65 Moreover, these companies are required to purchase and install equipment to enable the functioning of the state’s System for Operational Investigative Measures (SORM), a lawful interception apparatus (see C5), and to bear the costs related to data-retention obligations (see C6). These companies are also required to cover the costs related to the database of international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) codes (see C4)66 and to pay regular fees to the State Radio Frequency Service, the IMEI database operator. These obligations may deter new players from entering the ICT market.

The MDDIAI is responsible for the telecommunications sector (including ICT infrastructure), e-government, and cybersecurity. The Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI)—formerly, the Ministry of Information and Social Development (MISD)—oversees mass media, including online content. The MCI was formed in September 2023.67

Ministers are nominated by the prime minister and appointed by the president. The ministries’ operations are not transparent or subject to independent oversight.

The NSC has increased its power to make decisions about ICT infrastructure and online content. In 2018, a cybersecurity entity called the National Coordination Center for Information Security was launched under the NSC’s supervision;68 its workings remain secret.69

The .kz country domain is managed by the nonprofit KazNIC registry. The Kazakhstan Association of IT Companies administers domain names and regulates KazNIC tariffs. A 2015 law granted the government the power to appoint both the registrar and the domain name administrator.70

The government has extensive authority to block online content and can compel ISPs to restrict access to “unlawful materials.” If ISPs fail to block content in a timely manner, the STS restricts access directly and the ISPs may face fines.

In response to an access-to-information inquiry, the MCI specified that in 2023, 15,835 pages were blocked following the regulator’s requests, and 435 of those were registered in the .kz domain zone. Overall, as of July 2024, there were 89,959 banned web pages, while only 3,878 of those had been blocked by a court decision. The main reasons for blocking included the dissemination of false information, terrorist and extremist propaganda, and copyright violations, as well as hosting content related to pornography, suicide, narcotics, and online gambling.71

In February 2024, the MCI ordered the blocking of Selftanu.kz, which provides materials for LGBT+ teenagers on health, relationships, and acceptance of sexual orientation and gender identity. The MCI claimed that the content on the website may harm children's health and development, citing the need to limit access to internet resources promoting LGBT+ ideas among the population. The move has been justified under the law on protecting children from harmful information (see B3).72

In October 2022, the Talgar district court approved a prosecutor’s request to order the MISD to block the World Health Organization’s (WHO) website because a news item allegedly displayed “suicide propaganda.”73 It was later specified that the court ordered the blocking of one page on the WHO website, but the government did not have the technical capacity to restrict single pages using HTTPS, so it blocked the entire website.74 The ministry complied but then asked the court to revise the decision, citing “reputational and other risks.” The Ministry of Health also intervened, and in January 2023 the WHO’s website was unblocked after the organization altered the disputed suicide-related newsletter.75

Archive.org, the petition website Change.org, and some foreign media outlets, including Kyrgyzstani news site Kloop and Russian-language news sites Fergana and Meduza, remained inaccessible during the coverage period. Since September 2022, Radio Azattyq websites in Kazakhstan have experienced slowdowns or, in some cases, remained inaccessible without the use of circumvention tools.76 In August 2023, it was reported that users in Kazakhstan were experiencing issues accessing Yandex services, including the search engine and email portal (see C6).77 In January 2024, the KazTAG online news agency reported a brief blocking of its website amid continuing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (see C8), although the site was still accessible through virtual private networks (VPNs).78

In November 2023, the government blocked Coinbase, the cryptocurrency trading platform, because it was in violation of the April 2023 Digital Assets Law, which bans cryptocurrency exchanges operating outside of the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC).79 The government blocked an additional 980 cryptocurrency platforms in 2023, citing money laundering concerns.80

Users who wish to circumvent censorship still use VPNs, although most anonymizing tools are blocked (see C4).81 The authorities have previously confirmed that they can block VPNs using court decisions or orders from the MISD, now called the MCI (see B3).82

The authorities use various nontechnical means to enforce the removal of content, including direct legal pressure on outlets to take down specific material and similar requests aimed at international social media platforms. There was a notable increase in cases of reported removal requests originating from the Russian government during the coverage period.

According to the MCI, in 2023 the regulator issued 2,755 removal requests targeting 44,219 pages, including 937 based in Kazakhstan’s domain.83 The government has not disclosed more detailed statistics.

During the coverage period, no notable cases of content removal demands from national or foreign entities were reported, though in the past news outlets have received orders from the MISD84 and Russian regulators and courts.85 For instance, in February 2023, a Russian court issued a subpoena to the Kazakhstani news site Arbat.media, accusing it of “discrediting the Russian army,” after sending an initial request in November 2022 ordering the website to remove an article written that September about Russia’s military losses in Kharkiv.86 Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Kazakhstan is beyond the jurisdiction of Russian courts and that Arbat.media did not violate any national laws.

According to Meta’s transparency report covering 2023, the company did not restrict any content based on requests from the Kazakhstani government.87 In the first half of 2023, Google received 188 removal requests from the authorities, targeting 38,419 items, and removed 1.1 percent of the requested content. Between July and December 2023, Google received 4 takedown requests from the government and the courts, targeting 8 items. Google removed 12.5 percent of the requested items because they violated company policy. The requests in 2023 mostly concerned national security, hate speech, and government criticism.88 X did not produce a report on content removal during the coverage period.

In 2016, the government adopted new rules for the monitoring of media, including social media, using the Automated System of Monitoring the National Information Space89 to uncover illegal content online (see C5). The authorities have continued to conduct manual monitoring since then.90 The system, which reportedly cost $4.5 million,91 became operational in 2020, according to the government’s response to an access-to-information request.

Website blocking and content removal procedures remain a common yet nontransparent practice. The government has developed several legal avenues to block websites and remove content.

According to the 1999 and 2024 Mass Media Law (see B6), all internet resources, including websites and pages on social media platforms, are considered media outlets. Since 2014, the Law on Communications provides for the procedures of restrictions. The Prosecutor General’s Office is authorized to order ISPs to block content without a court order. ISPs must comply with such requests until the website owner deletes the content in question. The law provides no leeway for an ISP to reject the order or for the website owner to appeal.92 The MCI has the authority to issue takedown and blocking orders until website owners remove specific content. The NSC also has the right to unilaterally suspend access to websites or information they host “in cases of emergency that may result in criminal actions” and are only obliged to notify the Prosecutor General’s Office and the regulator afterward.

By equating all internet resources with media outlets, the Mass Media Law makes web publishers—including bloggers—liable for the content they post, but the law does not specify whether publishers are responsible for content posted by third parties. Social media users can be held liable for extremist comments posted on their pages by third parties, as permitting the publication of extremist materials in a mass media outlet is an offense under the criminal code that can be punished with up to 90 days in prison. In June 2024, after the coverage period, a new Law on Mass Media came into effect (see B6).

In September 2023, the government enacted the Law on Online Platforms and Advertising (see B6, B7, C2, and C6). The law requires online platforms with more than 100,000 daily users in Kazakhstan to select a legal representative. The law also compels platforms to cooperate with government requests to remove content that is “contrary to the facts or [that] contains material misrepresentations that create a false belief regarding events and processes reported in any form” and illegal content (see C2). Additionally, the law allows users who have “been subjected to the dissemination of false information” to file removal requests to platforms and sue in cases when they fail to comply. Platforms can be sued for failing to remove the information. Platforms that fail to comply with government requests may also be blocked.93

In May 2022, the government enacted the Law on Amendments and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Protection of the Rights of the Child, Education, Information, and Informatization, also referred to as the Cyberbullying Law or the Law on Protection of Children’s Rights. The amendments compel websites, messaging applications, and social media platforms to delete illegal content related to cyberbullying within 24 hours.94 Under the amendments, platforms with at least 100,000 daily users are also required to appoint a special representative for direct communication with the MCI (formerly MISD) to promptly react to content removal requests within 24 hours.95

In July 2022, new amendments to the governmental decree that regulates the MISD’s authority were adopted to bolster the MISD’s ability to enforce the measures outlined in the Cyberbullying Law. For example, the MISD is authorized to request the number of daily users of messaging apps and social media platforms in Kazakhstan. It is also authorized to restrict the work of these internet resources in cases of noncompliance.96

Under amendments made in September 2020, websites in the .kz and .ҚАЗ domain names can be suspended if they are physically hosted outside of Kazakhstan, if they do not have a safety certificate (see A3 and C6), or if their software is hosted outside of Kazakhstan.97 In December 2020, the authorities said the amendments were needed to manage domestic data centers’ workload and to pursue “digital sovereignty.”98

Amendments to the Communications Law in 2016 obliged ISPs to monitor content passing through their networks and to decide whether to restrict any problematic material.99 The amendments do not specify how ISPs are to carry out this obligation. The administrative code, in force since 2016, imposes fines on ISPs for not complying with censorship orders.100

To avoid having a website or page permanently blocked and to escape legal liability, owners of internet resources must remove content that is deemed extremist or is otherwise banned. Once illegal content is identified, ISPs and the STS must suspend access to the entire website within three hours. The party responsible for the content then receives a request for its removal; if the party complies, ISPs and the STS must unblock the website.101

Websites can also be blocked by court order, even in the absence of the defendant’s representative. No notification—to the public or the website owner—about the reason for the blocking is required. The courts frequently issue orders to block websites, banning dozens at a time, mostly on the grounds of religious extremism. The appeals procedure is opaque. An individual must apply for judicial approval to simply view court rulings on blocking cases.102

In 2017, the MISD launched a pilot version of a blocked websites roster, which users could check to determine whether a website was blocked. Many blocked websites were not listed.103

Self-censorship in the media is pervasive, even among independent online news outlets, because existing legislation often contains ambiguity. Online media workers continue to test boundaries, despite facing legal harassment and digital attacks (see C3 and C7). IREX’s 2024 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) report noted that people working for the president urge journalists not to cover certain topics and “internal self-censorship” in the media persists.104

However, after the resignation of former president Nazarbaev in 2019, many users have visibly become more outspoken in online discussions even as most generally avoid a range of taboo topics, particularly concerning the former president. In May 2023, officials announced that the criminal code provisions penalizing insults against Nazarbaev would be invalidated as part of legislation on the recovery of unlawfully withdrawn assets (see C2).105 This law was adopted in July 2023.106

A May 2023 report on self-censorship in Kazakhstan found that journalists censor themselves for an array of reasons, including the fear of repercussions for negatively covering oligarchs, the views of media outlets’ owners, and repressive state policies.107

A 2017 law prohibits anonymous online comments (see C4).108 Although this ban is loosely observed, it limits the space for free speech on popular news sites that comply.

Compared with print and broadcast media, the online media and social media landscape remains a freer space for reporting and self-expression. However, the government routinely pays certain media outlets to advance their preferred narratives. According to one analysis, the activities of paid commentators serve to distract internet users in times of crisis and to play up the state’s successes. Observers reported that bots posted messages in support of President Toqaev ahead of the November 2022 presidential elections.109

According to a 2022 statement by Bella Orynbetova, a journalist who previously worked for progovernment media outlets, individuals or entities associated with the government will pay influencers 50,000 tenge ($98) to post in support of government policies.110

In January 2024, the Times, a UK-based media, reported that news outlets across Europe received pitches to publish AI-generated op-eds, which claimed to be written by prominent academics, in support of Kazakhstan’s government. The academics confirmed that they did not write or pitch the articles in question.111

Ahead of October 2023 protests announced by the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK) movement, which is banned in Kazakhstan, intimidating messages urging people not to participate in the upcoming protests were circulated across social media and messaging applications. Other messages told people not to leave their homes (see C7).112 In September 2023, The Diplomat, an online media outlet, reported that Russian Telegram channels spread false narratives about the presence of US-sponsored bioweapons in Kazakhstan. This conspiracy has been shared in several countries that were formerly a part of the Soviet Union.113 In October 2023, Russian Telegram channels also spread disinformation that Kazakhstan would host a “NATO facility” in Almaty.114

In the fourth quarter of 2023, Meta reported that it removed an inauthentic network of 1,020 Facebook accounts, 5 pages, 2 groups, and 711 Instagram accounts that originated in Ukraine and posted in support of the Kazakhstani government. The network also criticized the political opposition in the country.115

During the January 2022 protests and the ensuing violence, information was scarce, and there were instances of unverifiable information spread by government officials. For example, President Toqaev claimed that 20,000 terrorists had attacked Kazakhstan. The unsubstantiated allegation was later said by an analyst close to the presidential administration to have been deliberate misinformation funneled to the president by conspirators from the NSC leadership.116 Later, President Toqaev himself confirmed this claim.117 Disinformation also spread through messaging services. The government also pledged to “punish those spreading falsehoods and rumors online.”118

In December 2020, Facebook identified a network of 59 accounts, on both Facebook and Instagram, connected to the NSC and an antiextremism unit of a regional police department, which became active after a wave of political protests in 2019 and 2020 but was largely inactive by the time Facebook removed it from the platform.119

Officials, civil servants, and employees of state-owned companies are obliged to follow a set of guidelines on their internet use. These guidelines urge them not to post or repost materials that are critical of the government and not to “friend” the authors of such material to preserve the image of the public sector and prevent the dissemination of false information or leaks.120

Most major nonstate online news media outlets are affiliated with government officials or business figures with ties to the government. These outlets are likely to be recipients of government procurement contracts to produce favorable reporting. Indeed, many outlets, including domestic, privately owned blogging platforms, are frequent recipients of such contracts.121 According to IREX’s 2022 Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) report, many media outlets that receive state funding avoid angering the government to ensure they receive more funding and try not to disclose that they are recipients of state funding.122

The Law on Mass Media was adopted by the Senate and signed by the president in June 2024, after the end of the coverage period.123 The law, which was passed by the lower house of parliament in April, has been criticized by leading media rights defenders. For instance, human rights organization Adil Soz highlighted that the law lacks clarity on the practice of “monitoring of the media for violations of universal, cultural, national, and family values,” fails to strengthen responsibility for obstructing the work of journalists, and forces media workers to comply with internal regulations issued by state bodies. Adil Soz also emphasized the law’s insufficient requirements concerning media ownership and funding transparency.124 The law continues to define all online publishers as mass media (see B3). The law also includes a worrying provision on foreign media accreditation, namely suggesting a ban on foreign media and their journalists who have not been accredited on the grounds of “propaganda and extremism.”

At the same time, Adil Soz also noted that there are several improvements in the legislation when compared to the previous media law, including the establishment of a one-year statute of limitations for claims against media outlets, the reduction of response times to official media inquiries from seven to five days, the introduction of grants to nongovernmental media, and a special status for journalists.125

The provision on foreign media accreditation had drawn special attention amid denials of accreditation to Radio Azattyq (RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service) journalists. Since 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not issued or renewed accreditation for 36 correspondents of Radio Azattyq, despite the timely submission of requisite documents by the editorial team.126 In response, RFE/RL sued the government of Kazakhstan. In April 2024, the legal dispute between RFE/RL and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded with the signing of a mediation agreement. The contents of the agreement have not been disclosed, but Radio Azattyq commented that it will continue their work in Kazakhstan safely and without concessions.127

Media representatives expressed concerns that changes to the mass media law will negatively impact journalistic work because the foreign media accreditation provision allows the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deny accreditation based on national security grounds. The law also suggests mandatory registration for information agencies and voluntary registration for online media. Media experts highlighted the need for lawmakers to align with the goals of developing the media market, combating corruption, and improving governance.

In July 2023, president Toqaev enacted the Law on Online Platforms and Online Advertising (see B3, B7, C2, and C6), which requires social media users who earn revenue through their content—including influencers—to pay a tax ranging from 3 to 10 percent of any income they generate.128

Online news media are not required to register with the government. There are no serious restrictions on their access to advertising, but periodic blocking discourages businesses from placing ads on independent news sites. Furthermore, the digital media market in Kazakhstan, as in many other countries, is quite small. According to the 2022 VIBE report, most media in Kazakhstan depend on state financing or grants from international organizations.129 Online outlets’ ability to remain in business is also limited by certain regulations, including a 20 percent cap on foreign stakes in any company.130

Despite the challenging business environment for independent outlets, a small number of respected and critical websites continue to operate in Kazakhstan. The restrictions on the online media market remain less severe than those on the traditional media sector.

International social media and communications platforms are accessible and popular, although connectivity is sometimes restricted (see A3 and B1). According to DataReportal, which measures aggregate users across various platforms rather than unique individual users, there were 11.85 million social media users in Kazakhstan as of January 2023.131 The Law on Online Platforms and Advertising (see B3, B6, C2, and C6), which was enacted in September 2023, requires platforms to automatically translate other languages into Kazakh and limits targeted advertising to minors.132

All public institutions are required to provide at least Kazakh- and Russian-language versions of their websites, and many private sector entities follow this example.133

In October 2022, ISP and mobile operator Beeline announced that it would stop broadcasting 15 Russian TV channels in its digital television package. Following reported consultations with Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, Beeline reversed this decision.134

Misinformation circulates online. For instance, in April 2024, a rumor of a planned school shooting in Astana spread. Users who are found responsible for spreading this type of information are sometimes charged under the Law on Online Platforms and Advertising.135

Tools like VPNs are widely used to circumvent sporadic blocking, although the authorities have blocked some VPN services (see C4).

Social media platforms and other digital tools are used for civic and political organizing in Kazakhstan. Popular platforms are subject to periodic restrictions, particularly ahead of and during demonstrations (see A3). Discussions of political or social issues on social media platforms are often eclipsed by sensationalist content that is widely shared online.

During and after the January 2022 protests and the ensuing violence, the authorities claimed they disrupted online communications to prevent the spread of information and the use of apps for coordinating “riots.” They also cracked down on individuals who shared footage of the events (see C3). However, shortly after the protests, civil society and the general public started to advocate for more significant political transformation, which Toqaev had promised when he was elected in 2019. This resulted in significant activity both online136 and offline,137 including multiple online petitions as well as several rallies and humanitarian initiatives that mobilized participants, mainly through social media.138

The authorities sometimes block messaging apps or internet access ahead of protests to prevent users from accessing group chats to coordinate protest actions, including those run by the DVK, a banned opposition party. Informants have infiltrated critical groups on Telegram and other platforms to build cases for prosecutions.139

Many online petition websites remain blocked to prevent campaigning. The MISD initially announced its intention to create an official petition platform in 2019.140 In September 2023, Kazakhstan’s parliament approved a law, "On Amendments and Addenda to Legislative Acts on Public Oversight," introducing the legal framework for online petitioning. The number of signatures required for government bodies to mandatorily review petitions ranges from 2,500 to 50,000, depending on the level of administration.141 The law was signed by president Toqaev in October,142 and the online platform was launched in April 2024.143

Police routinely summon activists ahead of planned protests to warn them against holding demonstrations, intimating that they will face consequences, or preemptively detain them to prevent their participation.144

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, but this right is qualified by other laws and severely restricted in practice by prohibitions on defamation, the publication of false information, and other speech-related offenses (see C2). In June 2022, following a national referendum, the government published amendments to the constitution that transfer some of the president’s powers to the parliament.145 During the protests and ensuing violence in January 2022, Toqaev temporarily declared a state of emergency, which criminalized “mass gatherings.”146

Although internet resources are deemed mass media outlets, bloggers do not enjoy the same rights as journalists, and even formally employed journalists face numerous restrictions on their work. Police and government supporters who harass bloggers and journalists are seldom punished and enjoy de facto immunity. Nevertheless, the government’s plan for the development of Kazakhstan’s information sphere, adopted in April 2020, envisions raising the profile of bloggers, including by giving them the right to be accredited by various government institutions.147

The president appoints all judges, and the judiciary is not independent in practice. The Constitutional Court was abolished in 1995 and replaced with the Constitutional Council, to which citizens and public associations were not eligible to submit complaints. However, during the coverage period, as part of President Toqaev’s reform agenda and as a result of a June 2022 nationwide referendum on constitutional amendments, the Constitutional Court was restored. The court started accepting citizens’ appeals in January 2023, and as of February 24, 2023, nearly 1,500 complaints had been submitted; over 1,000 had received a written explanation, approximately 400 were under consideration, and 27 were under preliminary review.148

The government uses several provisions in the criminal code and the code of administrative offenses to restrict forms of online expression that may be protected under international human rights standards.149 Vaguely worded legislation leaves ample space for interpreting criticism and opinions as defamation or extremism.

Article 174 of the criminal code prescribes fines of up to $50,000, up to seven years of probation, or imprisonment of up to 20 years for the incitement of class, ethnic, national, religious, or social hatred.150 The maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment can be awarded if the crime is “committed by a criminal group or entails severe consequences.” Prosecutions under Article 174 are widespread, and human rights advocates have repeatedly voiced concerns about the lack of clarity in its terminology, especially the concept of “social” hatred.151 Article 179 prescribes 5 to 10 years in prison for “propaganda or public calls” for the seizure of power or “forcible change of the constitutional order” when made using mass media or telecommunications, while Article 256 prescribes 7 to 12 years in prison for “public appeals to commit an act of terrorism” made through the same means.152 Article 274 prohibits the dissemination of rumors or “knowingly false information that creates the danger of disrupting public order or causing substantial harm” to citizens, organizations, or the state, an offense punishable by up to seven years in prison in the most extreme cases.153

In March 2023, President Toqaev signed into law amendments to the criminal code that prescribe stricter penalties for incitement to riots using telecommunications networks, with possible sentences ranging from three to seven years’ imprisonment.154

In June 2020, President Toqaev signed into law amendments decriminalizing defamation.155 The amendments move defamation from Article 130 of the criminal code to the code of administrative offenses, which entails a fine between $1,000 to $3,500 or 15 to 20 days in administrative detention. If the act of defamation was made publicly, via mass media or on telecommunications networks, the fine increases to between $1,200 and $4,200, and the detention period increases to 20 to 25 days. If the act of defamation contains accusations of corruption against a public official, the administrative detention period can reach up to 30 days. Under these amendments, Article 174 remains in the criminal code, although the word “provocation” was changed to “incitement,” and violators can face fines ranging from $13,000 to $45,000 instead of prison sentences, in some cases.156

However, insult remains a crime. The criminal code provides stricter punishments for insulting state officials, judges, and lawmakers. Government officials and progovernment business magnates have a history of using defamation and insult charges to punish critical reporting. In January 2023, President Toqaev announced that he was nullifying a law that had prevented insults against former president Nazarbaev and his family members.157 The Ministry of Justice confirmed that it would introduce amendments to the criminal code eliminating these special protections.158 This measure was implemented in July 2023 (see B4).

In September 2023, the government enacted the Law on Online Platforms and Online Advertising (see B6), which stipulates that individuals who post false information on social media can be fined 69,000 tenge ($147), while business influencers can be fined up to 138,000 tenge ($294).159

In 2015, government officials stated that social media users could be held liable for extremist comments posted on their pages by third parties, an offense under Article 183 of the criminal code punishable by up to 50 days in jail.160 Users who post or share such content may be fined for its “production, storage, import, transportation, and dissemination” and, in some cases, jailed for up to 20 years under Article 174 of the criminal code.161

Individuals, including journalists, are frequently penalized for online activities. Kazakhstani authorities have a long track record of issuing charges of defamation and, more recently, the dissemination of false information as a pretext to silence or punish critics.162

In past years, the authorities routinely arrested and prosecuted individuals for posting critical commentary online, especially targeting online activities related to the banned DVK. The classification of the DVK as an extremist group made it illegal to disseminate its content online, including through private messages.163

In April 2024, prominent investigative blogger and the founder of online outlet ProTenge, Jamilya Maricheva, faced charges for her post in support of Radio Azattyq journalists, who were denied accreditation in Kazakhstan (see B6). Although the post was published in January, the MCI considered it “potentially disruptive to public order.” A police investigation found no criminal wrongdoing in the post, and the case was sent to an administrative court on the grounds of “false information.”164 Additionally, Askhat Niyazov, a citizen journalist, had faced libel charges for republishing Maricheva’s post but was later acquitted.165 In May 2024, the court found Maricheva guilty of spreading false information, imposing a fine of $160.166

In February 2024, Aqylbek Muratov, an activist who highlighted the repression of the 2022 protests in Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, on X, was arrested in Kazakhstan at the request of the Uzbekistani authorities. He was initially issued an asylum seeker certificate, but in September 2024, after the coverage period, his request for asylum was denied.167

In December 2023, Serik Ydyryshev, an activist from East Kazakhstan, faced a $870 fine for posting a video on social media in support of Marat Zylanbayev, the leader of the banned party "Alga, Kazakhstan" who was sentenced to seven years in prison for forming a political party earlier in the year.168

In November 2023, activist Sanavar Zakirova was sentenced to 15 days in prison by an online court for allegedly calling for “unsanctioned rallies” in a post. Although she did not write the post and was merely tagged, a fact corroborated by the author Makhabbat Qusaiynova, she was still sentenced.169

Also in November 2023, the court in Almaty issued an 18-month probation sentence and a 5-year ban on socio-political activity to Nazym Tabyldiyeva for her posts on social media criticizing the allegedly “pro-Russian policies” of the Kazakhstani government. She was charged with “dissemination of knowingly false information” and “insulting representatives of authority," and the prosecutor’s office initially requested a sentence of 18 months in prison and 100 hours of community service.170

In the same month, a court in Shymkent dismissed the administrative defamation case against journalist Marina Nizovkina, finding no evidence of Nizovkina "knowingly spreading false information" in her Instagram post, which had prompted a complaint from the deputy chief of the city's police department. Nizovkina said the complaint was an attempt to hinder her work.171 However, in February 2024, the Shymkent City Court, an appellate court, found her guilty of slander She was issued a $1,300 fine.172

Also in November, the Ministry of Internal Affairs declared Natalya and Aydos Sadykov “wanted” due to allegedly illegal content (flagged for “incitement of strife” and “false information”) on their popular political YouTube channel Base. Both authors reside abroad and had been wanted for defamation, but that international search warrant was discontinued due to the decriminalization of libel in Kazakhstan.173

An Almaty court fined Azattyq 103,500 Tenge ($22) in November for an article that claimed Russia led the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).174

In August 2023, a criminal case was initiated in Taldykorgan against critical journalist and local activist Sandugash Dyusenova for alleged infringement on personal data after she, 18 months earlier, posted a document on social media containing the individual identification number of a murder suspect. She was briefly detained at a police station, forced to undress, searched naked, and filmed (see C7). Dyusenova said the persecution was political, commissioned by the local governor to humiliate her. The criminal case against her was closed three days later.175

In July 2023, the authorities in the Southern Kazakhstan Turkestan Region detained Amangeldy Batyrbekov, the chief editor of the newspaper Saryagash-inform, for 20 days in a defamation case based on a complaint from member of parliament Bolatbek Nazhmetdinuly. The Facebook post cited as evidence of defamation alleged that Nazhmetdinuly was previously investigated for fraud. Batyrbekov was placed under arrest despite having documents supporting his posted claim, which were shown in court.176 In October 2023, Batyrbekov was once again sentenced to 20 days in prison after a local prosecutor claimed he spread "false information” about him.177

Also in July 2023, Zhibek Bostanbekova, a resident of Zhetysu District, was sentenced to one year of probation for posing a question to the leader of the DVK, Mukhtar Ablyazov, during his live broadcast on social media. The judge deemed that she thus "participated in the activities of a prohibited organization."178

In March 2023, blogger Duman Mukhametkerim, who contested the parliamentary elections that month, spent 25 days under administrative arrest for allegedly calling for “mass riots” after he called for protests against the “fraudulent” election results in a YouTube video.179 In June, he faced new, criminal charges of financing extremism and participation in a banned extremist group based on an interview he conducted with Ablyazov.180 The charges led to a two-month arrest.181 Mukhametkerim reportedly faced brutalities in detention (see C7)182 and initiated several hunger strikes.183 In February 2024, the trial began; Mukhametkerim is facing up to 12 years in prison.184 As of July 2024, after the end of the coverage period, he remained in custody and the trial was still in progress. He has also been hospitalized, and Human Rights Watch has called for “an end to the baseless case against him.”185

In February 2023, critical blogger Makhambet Abzhan was sentenced to nine years in jail for allegedly extorting a businessman and blackmailing him with the publication of defamatory materials.186 Abzhan had initially been imprisoned for two months on these charges, which other journalists condemned as a ”political hunt,” in July 2022.187 Previously, in January 2022, police in Astana (then called Nur-Sultan) briefly detained Abzhan,188 who was covering protest rallies in the capital, and later tried to storm his apartment (see C7). Fearing for his safety, Abzhan went into hiding until later that month, when he resurfaced and told the media that he had been designated as a witness in a criminal case189 that involved his interview with Dozhd, an independent Russian television channel.190

Most criminal “false information” trials end with probation or conditional sentences. Reportedly, as of October 2023, there were 3 cases of criminal prosecution that ended up with prison terms ranging from 2 to 10 years. The authorities refused to specify the content that was false and led to conviction in those cases.191

The government places restrictions on anonymous communication. Since December 2017, users have been required to identify themselves using government-issued digital signature technology or short message service (SMS) verification in order to comment on domestic websites;192 failure to enforce the rule can lead to fines.193 Some news outlets and other sites introduced identification functionality in response to the requirement, but many simply disabled their comment sections, inviting readers to comment on social media platforms instead.

The government is cracking down on VPNs and other anonymizing tools with court orders.194 Websites of popular VPNs, including TunnelBear and TouchVPN, are inaccessible. In 2020, the regulator blocked 148 circumvention tools (see B1).195

Encryption tools are not restricted, but most users do not employ them. When internet access was restricted during the January 2022 protests, neither VPN gateways nor other circumvention tools, including the built-in VPNs in the Telegram app, were available. However, some users were able to gain access because Kazakhstanis living abroad set up proxy servers, primarily for Telegram.196

SIM card registration is required for mobile phone users. The government also requires users to register all devices that use mobile networks with their mobile service providers, linking a person’s government-issued identification, SIM card information, and device IMEI codes. Under 2018 legal amendments, unregistered mobile devices were to be disabled by service providers beginning in January 2019.197 In October 2019, the authorities enabled the IMEI code system, forcing operators to disable numerous unregistered devices (see A3 and A4). By law, operators are prohibited from providing services to clients with unregistered devices.198

Authorities presented the 2018 amendments as a means of fighting mobile device theft, counterfeiting, and terrorism.199 However, human rights advocates warned of their effects on user privacy and their potential to enable surveillance.200 The technical capacity to disable a device was reportedly used to target activists participating in protests during and after the 2019 presidential elections.201

Since 2016, users have had to obtain an SMS code to access public Wi-Fi networks, which opens the door to surveillance because of the country’s SIM card registration requirement.202 Businesses can be fined up to 300,000 tenge ($680) for failing to comply with the new rules, while users can be fined up to 30,000 tenge ($68).203

It is difficult to estimate the extent of government surveillance in Kazakhstan, but users in the country have been targeted by spyware. Digital rights groups allege that large-scale surveillance infrastructure is in place. The government employs SORM technology, which originated in Russia and is similar to that employed by other former Soviet countries, for deep packet inspection (DPI) and other purposes.204

In June 2022, Inga Imanbai, who is married to unregistered Democratic Party leader Janbolat Mamai, reported that her phone had been infected with Hermit spyware, which can record audio and extract information from Android devices.205 Imanbai’s claim came just days after Lookout Threat Lab released an investigation revealing that the Kazakhstani government had “probably” purchased Hermit from the Italian company RCS Labs and used it to target domestic actors.206 The software reportedly resembles the Israeli NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware, which the Kazakhstani government has also allegedly used, and specifically targets Android devices.207

In July 2021, Forbidden Stories, a French nonprofit news outlet, and a coalition of news organizations including the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), identified phone numbers linked to Kazakhstani oligarchs and political figures in a leaked dataset. Investigators described the dataset as a list of people of interest to clients of the NSO Group. According to the investigation, almost 2,000 Kazakhstani phone numbers were selected for targeting during former president Nazarbaev’s rule.208 Numbers belonging to President Toqaev, then prime minister Askar Mamin, prominent political figures, oligarchs close to Nazarbaev, and opposition figures were among them. The government has repeatedly denied the allegations. Additionally, two Kazakhstani journalists and at least one human rights defender identified their numbers on the list.209

In November 2021, six activists from Oyan Kazakhstan, a proreform youth movement, received messages from Apple warning them that their devices might have been compromised by Pegasus.210 A forensic investigation conducted by Amnesty International’s Security Lab confirmed that four activists’ devices had been infected with the spyware.211

In January 2018, new NSC-developed technical regulations for SORM entered into force.212 Local human rights monitors have since alleged that law enforcement bodies and special services watch and wiretap phone conversations of opposition activists without following proper procedures.213

Various authorities monitor internet traffic. The STS is responsible for overseeing cross-border network traffic through a system called the Centralized Management of Telecommunication Networks. All telecommunications service providers must be connected to this system and are required to grant authorities physical access to their control centers.214 Kazakhtelecom, which maintains a DPI system separate from SORM, insists that it is used for traffic management and provides no access to users’ personal data.215

A root security certificate called the Qaznet Trust Certificate had been introduced legally in 2016.216 Since then, it was “tested” several times in Astana.217 Users were warned218 that they might have difficulty accessing foreign websites, which were often inaccessible during these tests, if they chose not to install the certificate.219 The certificate’s introduction was justified as a means of fighting the theft of users’ personal data, fraud, and other online threats, including cyberattacks.220 In July 2019, the NSC admitted that the certificate enables it to decrypt secure traffic but said it did not plan to store and view the details of citizens’ online activities.221

In early August 2019, the NSC declared that the certificate’s trial period was over, claiming that the pilot test allowed it to test its cybersecurity systems as well as reveal and prevent millions of cybersecurity incidents.222 Apple, Google, and Mozilla promised to ban the certificate from their respective web browsers (Safari, Chrome, and Firefox) to ensure that their users’ personal data were not intercepted.223 In December 2020, these companies, along with Microsoft, followed through and banned the certificate from their networks and software.224

The authorities appear to engage in social media surveillance, including under the auspices of the MCI225 and via contractors.226

In May 2022, the Prosecutor General’s Office reported that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had obtained special equipment and software to monitor social networking sites and identify users of social media and messaging applications.227 According to government officials, they obtained this equipment to prevent scams, fraud, and Ponzi schemes.

Activists using social media are occasionally intercepted or punished, sometimes preemptively, by authorities who have prior knowledge of their planned activities.228 Reports have emerged that authorities penetrated group chats on WhatsApp and Telegram, based on claims by activists that they faced repercussions for material they posted only via those apps. It is unclear how the authorities could have gained access to these closed chats, but it is generally understood that either there are informants inside critical groups or the police seize and access the phones of detained activists.229

In November 2020, the NSC adopted the Rules of Operation of the National Video-Monitoring System.230 The system contains hardware and software for the collection, processing, and storage of video files for the purpose of ensuring national security and public order. The NSC determines if an individual or entity is obliged to connect to the system, defining them as “clients,” and outlines the costs for the installation and service of the equipment.

In June 2020, Toqaev signed the law on digital technologies, which designated the Information Security Committee at the MDDIAI as the body responsible for the protection of personal data. The law also provided for the creation of the national video-monitoring system, which lacks precise regulation and public oversight, and for the biometric authentication of citizens with no guarantee of data protection.231

Telecommunications companies have implemented SORM technical regulations (see C5), effectively granting the Kazakhstani government real-time access to their subscribers’ data.

The process that governs the authorities’ ability to request user data from various companies is not always followed. Security agencies can effectively access user data stored by the companies at will, as firms that wish to operate in the country have no means of resisting their demands. In its “exit report” upon leaving the Kazakhstani market, Tele2, the Swedish mobile service provider whose stake in Tele2-Altel was bought by Kazakhtelecom in 2019, noted that “it was not possible for Tele2 KZ to know how often the SORM system was used and whether the required warrant had been obtained.”232

Legislation obliges both fixed-line broadband and mobile ISPs to retain records of users’ online activities, phone numbers, billing details, internet protocol (IP) addresses, browsing history, protocols of data transmission, and other data.233 Providers must store user data for two years and grant access within 24 hours to “operative-investigatory bodies,” including the NSC and other security agencies, when approved by a prosecutor or “by coordination with the Prosecutor General’s Office.”234 The code of administrative offenses imposes fines on ISPs for failure to store user data.235 Tele2’s exit report revealed that it was not allowed to publicize the nature and number of the requests it received from law enforcement.236

Domain names using the .kz and .KA3 country codes must operate on domestic servers.237 According to Kazakhstan’s communications law, users’ personal data must be stored within the country’s borders.238 In late 2017, the government announced that it planned to negotiate with foreign social media platforms and persuade them to operate local servers that could provide easier state access to citizens’ personal data.239 In September 2020, the government amended domain registration rules, enabling the government to suspend a domain name if the website is physically hosted outside of Kazakhstan or if any of its software is hosted outside of the country (see B3).240

In May 2024, President Toqaev signed a law that prohibited the imports of essential telecommunications equipment that has a control center based outside the country.241 The passage of the law followed reports of a massive cyberattack from China-based hacker groups that targeted the telecommunications network in Kazakhstan (see C8).

In August 2023, the domain name yandex.kz was suspended because its hardware and software had been hosted outside the territory of Kazakhstan.242 The data localization request came shortly after a regulation in Russia granted the Russian special services full access to Yandex.Taxi databases, including those in Kazakhstan.243 In December 2023, the company completed the transfer of servers for yandex.kz to Kazakhstan. The government spokesperson called it “an important step to ensure that the data of our users are processed in Kazakhstan."244

In April 2021, the government adopted the Rules on Examination of Processes Related to Personal Data, which allows the STS to access the hardware and software (“objects of informatization”) of “electronic information resources” to assess their “personal data management.”245 According to the administrative code, operators are also subject to fines for failure to distribute the National Security Certificate among clients, store personal information of users, or grant law enforcement bodies or special services access to data or equipment (see A3, B1, and C5).246

Domestic website owners are required to retain commentors’ data for at least three months and provide the government with this information upon request.247

The September 2023 Law on Online Platforms and Online Advertising, which is enforced by the MCI, also prevents platforms from disseminating users’ data without their consent and profiling “based on data related to race, national origin, political views, biometric or personal information that can identify an individual or health status.”248

Journalists and individuals in Kazakhstan often face retaliation for their online activities.

Individuals who have been detained over their online speech during the coverage period have also reportedly faced torture and inhumane treatment. For instance, journalist Sandugash Dyusenova, 249 who was detained in August 2023, was forced to strip naked while law enforcement officers recorded in order to humiliate her. Journalist Duman Mukhametkarim also claimed that he experienced torture after his February 2024 trial (see C3).250

In June 2024, after the end of the coverage period, Aidos Sadykov, a blogger and political activist who ran the YouTube channel Base, was shot in Kyiv, Ukraine, where he lived since 2014 after leaving Kazakhstan following alleged threats; he died two weeks later in the hospital.251 The following day, President Toqaev stated that the country's law enforcement agencies were ready to join the investigation. Two Kazakhstani citizens, one of whom is a former law enforcement officer, were identified by Ukrainian police as suspects in June.252 The government of Kazakhstan stated it would not extradite any citizens to Ukraine on the principle that it does not extradite citizens to other countries.253

In August 2023, Diana Saparkyzy, who works for the online outlet KAZTag, was confronted by five men at a mine in the Karaganda region where she was investigating a fire that had killed five workers. One of the men forcibly grabbed her phone. In the same month, a man destroyed a drone operated by journalist Sania Toiken and photographer Yerzhan Amirkhanov as they were reporting on equipment failures at the Mangistau power plant.254

A seemingly coordinated spate of attacks against journalists and media outlets began in October 2022, ahead of the snap presidential election in November, and continued into early 2023 in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections. In October, the Orda.kz editorial office received a severed head of a pig.255 Glass doors and windows at the office of Elmedia, an independent news site, were broken six times between October 2022 and January 2023.256 In January and February 2023, cars belonging to independent journalist Dinara Egeubaeva257 and journalist Vadim Boreyko’s258 cameraman were set on fire. Boreyko also reported in January that his apartment’s entrance door was blocked and torched.259 In February 2023, independent journalist Daniyar Moldabekov reported that he was punched in the face at his front door and instructed to “behave” by an unknown person wearing a medical mask.260

In February 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the NSC announced the arrest of Arkadiy Klebanov, the nephew of Kazakh oligarch Alexander Klebanov. The authorities called Klebanov a “coordinator” of the attacks against journalists and a “qualified hacker.” The equipment seized from this man reportedly provided evidence of a network of attackers and payment information. Later, in March 2023, four more foreigners were named as his accomplices,261 and seven more suspects in the case were arrested.262 According to the official press release, the attacks were intended to imitate “government-inspired persecution of journalists” and discredit “the president and his democratic reforms.”263 Prior to the arrest of the foreign nationals, 18 people were detained for crimes against journalists and bloggers between September 2022 and February 2023.264 Police deemed some of the acts, including the broken glass in the Elmedia office, to be minor hooliganism.265

These acts cast a chilling effect on independent journalism and were widely condemned by both Kazakhstan’s media community and international organizations, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). The spokesperson for the MISD (now MCI) commented that “attacks on journalists are attacks on the society and state,”266 and President Toqaev repeatedly urged law enforcement to investigate the cases, find the perpetrators, and protect journalists.267 In November 2023, it was reported that Klebanov was found to be “deranged” by a court and sent for involuntary treatment. His legal representative was instructed to pay over 14 million tenge ($30,000) as compensation for material damage and moral harm to the victims.268

In January 2023, journalist Dinara Egeubaeva's car was burned, and her son was threatened with a gun.269 In the same month, foam was poured on the door of journalist Vadim Boreyko's apartment and, later, two vehicles belonging to an operator working with him exploded.

Members of the LGBT+ community in Kazakhstan sporadically face online harassment and tend to exercise self-censorship.270

There were several major technical attacks against independent media during the coverage period. Government websites and the Kazakhstani internet sector in general continued to face significant cyberattacks.

Several Kazakhstani media outlets, including Kursiv, Inbusiness.kz, ProTenge, Airan, and journalist Askhat Niyazov, collectively urged the National Security Committee (KNB) to counter pressure on the media, including the cyberattacks many outlets were facing, in January 2024.271 In January 2024, the KazTAG news agency claimed that its website faced DDoS attacks for three months, linking it to their coverage of corruption.272 In December 2023, the Kursiv media portal reported a sophisticated cyberattack that arrived following anonymous demands to avoid certain topics in their reporting.273 Also in December 2023, ProTenge, a popular investigative media outlet based on Instagram, reported that their account was attacked and briefly disabled.274 In March 2023, Factcheck.kz reported a DDoS attack.275 In January 2023, UlysMedia reported that its website was hacked and defaced. The attackers also published personal data, identification documents, and family photographs belonging to Samal Ibraeva, the outlet’s editor-in-chief.276

There were also several cases of cyberattacks against independent journalists during the coverage period. Sandugash Dyusenova’s phone was hacked shortly after her brief detention in August 2023.277 Askhat Niyazov, known for his popular YouTube channel and his critical interviews with officials, reported that his Telegram channel was compromised in December 2023,278 in addition to his WhatsApp accounts, those of his colleagues, and his spouse’s accounts.279

In May 2024, unnamed hackers breached the phones of top officials from the Ministry of Energy. A representative of the ministry warned that people should be wary about messages with malicious links from the hacked numbers.280

In the same month, AlmaTV, a cable operator, had its online streams hacked to display videos of Russian president Vladimir Putin and propagandistic footage of military actions.281

In February 2024, the Cyber Attacks Analysis and Investigation Center, a nongovernmental entity, claimed that a hacker group tied to the Chinese state-sponsored APT41 espionage operation282 have been using various malicious tools, aiming at both general and targeted information for two years; they reportedly gained full access to the critical infrastructure of Kazakhstani telecommunications operators, the state-owned pension fund, Air Astana, and other companies in the private sector. The MDDIAI and the NSC started an investigation into the incident the same month.283

In September 2022, the STS reported large-scale, coordinated284 cyberattacks, allegedly originating from abroad, on the Kazakhstani segment of the internet, which caused serious congestion of the backbone networks.285