• After the political crisis in autumn 2021, the main political parties—the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Social Democrat Party (PSD) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)—agreed to form a coalition government that remained in power in 2023. For the first time in Romania’s history, there was a peaceful rotation of power that replaced a PNL prime minister with a PSD prime minister.4 This rotation, although delayed from March to June due to a teachers’ strike (see Civil Society section), was a milestone for the governing coalition. Moreover, the rotation saw the exclusion of UDMR from the governing coalition, as the proposed list of ministers from incoming Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu (PSD) included only one portfolio for the UDMR, which precipitated the party’s withdrawal from the coalition. The leader of the UDMR likened the snub to being “pushed down the stairs.”5
• During his tenure, which ended in June, former prime minister Nicolae Ciucǎ implemented several fiscal reforms, some of which were controversial. New reforms debated in 2023 included the introduction of special taxes for owners of more expensive cars and homes, new excise duties on tobacco products,6 and the doubling of the turnover tax on banks.7
• Three opposition parties— Union Save Romania (USR), the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), and Renewing Romania's European Project (REPER)—each separately attempted to censure the government in an effort to stop the reforms.8 However, because they did not file one censure motion together,9 all three motions were not even tabled since they lacked the required number of signatures.10 The USR appealed to the Constitutional Court to cancel or delay the implementation of the law.11 The court ruled the law constitutional in October and President Klaus Iohannis promptly signed the law into effect.12
• The PSD-PNL government significantly expanded the government workforce in 2023, especially at the local level. This raised concerns that the governing parties have expanded bureaucracy as a means to strengthen themselves politically ahead of the 2024 elections, by hiring people to cushy government jobs in exchange for their support during the electoral campaign.13 With over 1.2 million public servants, Romania has one of the highest shares of government workers in the EU.14 Moreover, in December, the government created a new agency for monitoring state-owned companies: the Agency for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Enterprises (AMEPIP). The rather politicised organizational structure and high compensation for the agency’s leadership have caused skepticism about the transparency and accountability of AMEPIP, as well as the government’s intent in creating this agency as another source of patronage and vested interests.15
• In December, Parliament passed a controversial law that allows tax evaders to avoid imprisonment by repaying the damage plus additional interest and penalties.16 The opposition and other critics argued that the law, which was intended to increase the state budget, incentivizes tax evasion and fraud.17 The draft law was ready to be sent to President Iohannis for signature at year’s end.
• The far-right AUR party has played a significant role in Romanian politics since the COVID-19 pandemic,18 with a platform that includes support for the unification of Romania and Moldova and elements of Christian nationalism with some fascist undertones.19 According to certain polls, the AUR was at times the second strongest party in Romania in 2023, suggesting a possible rise in far-right sentiment.20 Although the party’s leader is banned from entering Ukraine and Moldova over his alleged Kremlin connections, the AUR gained support and is expected to place third in the upcoming European Parliament elections, after the PSD and the PNL.21 The AUR and the SOS Romania Party led by the MP Diana Șoșoacă threaten liberal democracy through their nationalist and populist rhetoric, misinformation, conspiratorial beliefs, particularly regarding COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, and a confrontational political style that worsens political polarization and undermines democratic institutions and norms.22 Their growing power was on display when a planned speech at Romania’s Parliament by Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky was cancelled due to objections from far-right members of Parliament. The growing acceptance of far-right rhetoric narrows the democratic arena, shifts political discourse further to the right, and narrows the scope for balanced democratic debate.

• The local, parliamentary, presidential, and European elections scheduled for 2024 have major implications for the future of Romanian democracy. Most importantly, the transparency, fairness, and integrity of the electoral process will play a central role in shaping Romania's democratic trajectory. The PNL-PSD government in power since 2021 will administer the elections. The PSD and PNL are expected to perform well in the European elections in June 2024.23 PNL and PSD members currently run some of the most important government institutions, leaving them vulnerable to political interference or being exploited to enhance the parties’ visibility ahead of the elections. For example, PSD representatives lead or control a number of key institutions that will play a role in the upcoming elections, including the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), the Constitutional Court, the Court of Accounts, the Legislative Council, the People's Advocate, and the National Authority for Administration and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM).24
• In January, former AEP president Constantin-Florin Mitulețu-Buică resigned after the National Integrity Agency (NIA) filed a complaint against him for improperly employing his sister-in-law as an advisor.25 However, Mitulețu-Buică remained in the AEP as secretary general. The appointment of the new president of the AEP, Toni Greblă, with political backing from the PSD, UDMR, and other minority parties, raises concerns about the politicization of this crucial institution and the PSD’s influence over it. Toni Greblă, a former PSD senator and Constitutional Court judge, was acquitted in 2019 after being initially indicted for influence peddling.26 USR Senator Radu Mihail accused the PSD of seeking to “capture the most important institution for the 2024 elections and for democracy in Romania.”27
• Romania lacks a systematic directory of the 46,000 local elected officials currently in office, a major shortcoming in the electoral process. Such a directory would allow citizens, the media, and analysts to access information about local governance and scrutinize how well local elections and institutions follow legal and procedural standards.28 The failure of the AEP to develop such a database and align with best practices has caused concern among local observers that the country is unprepared to register the approximately 250,000 candidates expected to run for office next year.
• In September, the Senate passed amendments to political financing laws that would set limits for cash contributions from private donors and introduced additional provisions regarding loans.29 The bill also proposes that 25 percent of the annual budget allocated to political parties be distributed proportionally based on the number of votes each party receives in local elections.30 These amendments were prompted by the recent spike in political parties registered in Romania, which has arguably posed challenges for regulatory oversight.31 However, there are concerns that the new laws could reduce transparency in campaign and political party financing, and disadvantage smaller parties in the upcoming elections as it would diminish the share of government funding they would receive.32 Regarding the transparency concerns, for example, Article 24 (1) narrows the list of violations for which the AEP can suspend subsidies, which means that political parties can more easily avoid penalties for transparency-related infractions, and Article 28 (17) delays the publication of campaign contributions until 30 days after the campaign ends, limiting the ability of voters, observers, and media to scrutinize campaign financing in real time. This violates the Venice Commission’s electoral standards and recent ODIHR recommendations.33

• The ACCEPT Association, an LGBT+ rights group, won a landmark ruling against the Romanian government at the ECHR in May that affirmed the rights of same-sex couples. The group’s activism catalyzed the demand for legal recognition and protection for all families through amendments to the Civil Code and fostered a societal debate on LGBT+ rights.34
• The European Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law Report found that CSOs continued to face challenges in obtaining public funding and were impeded by unpredictable legal frameworks.35
• In May, approximately 150,000 teachers and an additional 60,000 to 70,000 education workers began a nationwide strike. Strikers demanded a 25 percent salary increase. Education workers negotiated with President Iohannis and staged demonstrations in Bucharest and other major cities. Due to the strike, Prime Minister Ciucǎ postponed the planned power rotation within the governing coalition until the government resolved the strike.36 In June, the strike ended after the government agreed to the salary increase. It was the fourth education workers’ strike since the Romanian Revolution (previous strikes occurred in 1999, 2000, and 2005). As a result of the strike, sixth grade exams and oral exams for the 2023 session of the Baccalaureate were cancelled.
• During the year, activists staged demonstrations in response to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.. In spite of the government’s rhetorical support, Romanians housing Ukrainian refugees faced delays in receiving government subsidies, which were unpaid in January and February. The 50/20 Program, which is meant to provide refugees with 50 lei ($11) daily for rent and 20 lei ($4) each day for meals, has encountered bureaucratic hurdles that led to payment delays.37
• In October, several hundred people attended a Bucharest demonstration in solidarity with Israel.38 Twenty-two ambassadors from member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Romania also held a silent protest in solidarity with the Palestinian people. The demonstration occurred in front of the Palestinian Embassy in Bucharest, where protesters exhibited photographs of civilian victims in Gaza and laid wreaths in their memory.39
• An emergency ordinance adopted in December ended tax breaks for microenterprises that sponsor NGOs and churches, beginning in January 2024. Until the end of 2023, microenterprises could deduct money they spent sponsoring NGOs and churches (as well as funds dedicated to scholarships for students in vocational education) from their taxes.40 Thousands of NGOs expressed concern about the proposed changes to the Fiscal Code, as it would redirect corporate donations directly to the state, cutting funding to charitable organizations. This change would drastically impact healthcare, education, and social services, leading to reduced support for millions of impoverished Romanians. In August, over 1,300 NGOs have urged PM Ciolacu to abandon the plan, highlighting that it would jeopardize crucial projects such as healthcare caravans, neonatal equipment, and education programs.41

• The Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom’s 2023 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) report categorized Romania as “high risk,” reflecting concerns regarding the independence of media outlets, funding for such media, regulations on online political advertising, the representation of minority groups, local and regional media, gender equality, media literacy, and safeguards against disinformation and hate speech.42
• In April, more than 200 newsrooms, journalists, civic figures, and others signed a letter that condemned Romania TV for inciting “hatred and discrimination against people with mental health problems” following the death of journalist Iulia Marin. Her cause of death remained unconfirmed, but Marin had shared her struggles with mental illness prior to her passing. After her death, Romania TV aired shows that mocked and criticized journalists with mental health issues, prompting collective outrage. The letter highlighted the harmful impact of such rhetoric on people with mental health struggles. Critics have long accused the station of breaching journalistic standards, disseminating unsubstantiated statements, and spreading conspiracy theories.43
• The media landscape in Romania is diverse and provides fertile ground for impactful public interest investigations. However, media outlets face significant political and financial challenges. The lack of transparency in media funding (especially from public sources) and political influence over editorial content undermine public trust in the media.44 The governing parties that heavily fund media outlets have increased their control over journalistic output. This financial dependence compromises editorial independence and discourages media outlets from criticizing politicians in power.45 Market difficulties further erode the reliability of information and the public's trust in the media.46
• Political interference in editorial decisions is not a new phenomenon in Romania, but it often remains hidden from the public because journalists stay silent, fearing that they could lose their jobs or face defamation charges if they speak out. However, in October, more 70 journalists from Libertatea and Gazeta Sporturilor (GSP) staged a protest against editorial interference after the Ringier Sports Media Group (RSMG), which funds GSP, forced GSP editor-in-chief Cătălin Țepelin to step down. The journalists said RSMG forced Tepelin out after he refused their demands to review any GSP articles involving gambling firms prior to their publication, and to prioritize advertising clients. RSMG has business relationships with gambling companies and allegedly wanted to suppress negative coverage.
• In October, Reporters Without Borders, along with seven journalists and media freedom organizations, published an open letter to the general prosecutor that strongly criticized the “negligent and error-strewn” investigation into the theft of intimate photos of investigative journalist Emilia Șercan, which were posted on porn websites.47 Șercan is well-known for her exposing plagiarism in the doctoral theses of prominent Romanian politicians, including former prime minister Ciucă. Sercan was threatened after exposing Ciucă, but the general prosecutor ended the investigation into the plagiarism accusations, saying in was “not in the public interest” to continue.48 Șercan said the Bucharest Court of Appeal Prosecutor’s Office had closed the photograph case and that prosecutor Nicoleta Rotaru had determined that none of the crimes alleged, including: leaking police evidence, violation of private life, abuse of office, computer fraud, and theft of photos, had occurred. It is rather clear that the prosecutors dropped the case for political reasons.
• In its yearly report on the rule of law in Romania, the European Commission said the country has failed to strengthen the independence of media, improve media financing transparency, and address threats and harassment against journalists.49

• An analysis published in August by the Expert Forum (EFOR) highlighted significant gaps in local governance, including: the lack of a comprehensive, systematic, and up-to-date publication of local elected representatives’ mandates; the absence of comprehensive statistics on local elected officials; and the absence of a platform that houses election results.50
• According to analysts, the government has not yet implemented its local investment program in some parts of the country after two years and was not transparent about the program’s progress.51 Political connections have also reportedly played a role in determining who wins public procurement contracts from local administrations.52
• In August and September, a series of explosions at gas pipeline stations in Dâmbovița and Vrancea counties killed 10 people and injured 60, including 43 firefighters.53 The explosions also damaged more than 80 homes, as well as firefighting equipment.54 The owners of the stations were accused of neglecting workplace health and safety regulations, and were put under house arrest.55 The DNA also opened a corruption investigation into local officials responsible for overseeing the pipelines.
• A series of influential county and local politicians (known as “local barons”) were investigated for corruption in 2023, including Ionel Arsene (PSD) in Neamt56 , Doina Federovici (PSD) in Botoșani, Dragoș Benea57 (PSD) in Bacău, Maricel Popa58 (PSD) in Iași, and Dumitru Buzatu59 (PSD) in Vaslui. Notably, Vaslui leader Dumitru Buzatu was detained by DNA prosecutors after allegedly receiving a 1,250,000 lei ($275,000) bribe (see Corruption section). These cases have uncovered the gravity of corruption that persists at the local level, which undermines local governance and stunts economic development. For example, the above cases were all in the Nord-East Region, which has the lowest GDP per capita in Romania and is the most populous region, with around 3.6 million people. The concerns also extend to the influence of the PSD in local governance and how much local officials prioritize their constituents' interests over party politics and personal interests. The allocation of funds and contracts in local investment programs between the PSD and PNL appears relatively balanced, with PSD securing 53% of reimbursements compared to PNL's 39%. However, UDMR, with only a 26% contracting rate, seems politically disadvantaged, possibly due to its absence from the governing coalition.60
• In September, the Health Ministry surprised local communities by removing 6 hospitals from the list of 27 hospitals slated for upgrades or expansions under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. This decision followed unexpected economic growth in 2021 that led the government to reduce recovery plan grants by €2.1 billion. As a result, the hospital modernization budget was reduced by €740 million. Prime Minister Ciolacu said the hospitals removed from the list had the “lowest chance” of completing their projects by 2026. 61 However, local officials, such as Brașov Mayor Allen Coliban, criticized the ministry for removing the hospitals without first assessing the projects’ status.62

• The ECHR ruled in May that Romania’s refusal to legally recognize same-sex relationships infringes on their rights since it violates Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to private and family life.63 The ruling has sparked discussions about the need to pass laws to allow civil partnerships for same-sex couples. Despite prior Constitutional Court rulings and ECHR decisions, the government has not pursued a civil partnership law, which could lead to repercussions from the Council of Europe for breaching human rights conventions, such as monitoring under its Committee of Ministers for failing to uphold the European Convention on Human Rights.64 In light of recent developments, the government proposed a draft law in September that would recognize the marriages of same-sex couples in other EU member states. However, NGOs have said the proposed law falls short of ensuring equal rights for the LGBT+ community in Romania.65
• The European Commission’s annual report on the rule of law in Romania published in July acknowledged President Iohannis’ renewed commitment to upholding the rule of law after the closure of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) in 2022, a tool used by the European Commission to monitor Romania's progress in areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption since its EU accession in 2007.66 The report also praised the revised Justice Laws for reinforcing judicial independence. However, the commission still voiced concerns about the magistrate shortage, which could limit the effectiveness of the justice system over time. The 2022 Justice Laws were meant to address concerns about investigating and prosecuting criminal offenses within the judiciary, particularly through the establishment of an expert panel reviewing Venice Commission recommendations.67 However, the laws have not yet made a noticeable impact. Concerns exist regarding the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses within the judiciary, particularly relating to the organization of magistrates' careers, accountability regimes, the appointment, dismissal, and authority of senior prosecutors, and the governance of the Judicial Inspectorate. 68 The commission report also found that Romania achieved no significant progress in establishing a national human rights institution in line with the UN Paris Principles.69
• A report issued by the Council of Europe in June found that Romania had failed to implement 137 ECHR decisions, among the most in Europe.70 The report also found that Romania was the subject of the highest number of new ECHR cases per capita.71
• In October, President Iohannis signed a revised law on “special pensions” for retired members of Parliament, military personnel, police officers, secret service employees, and magistrates, which incorporated changes mandated by the European Commission and the Constitutional Court. The law marked the fourth attempt in the last four years to reform special pensions. President Iohannis took a cautious approach to the law to avoid discontent among beneficiaries, follow the Constitutional Court’s recommendations, and address fiscal concerns.72 However, the law did not significantly change benefits for magistrates, which confirmed citizens’ perception that magistrates enjoy special privileges, including salary and pension hikes and other benefits, with little room for debate or opposition to their advantageous position.73
• After 33 years since the 1989 Revolution, the long-awaited Revolution Dossier trial begins, representing an important step in holding the alleged perpetrators of atrocities during the 1989 Romanian Revolution accountable. The Bucharest Court of Appeal is trying former president Ion Iliescu, former deputy prime minister Gelu Voican Voiculescu, and General Iosif Rus for crimes against humanity over the deaths of 1,066 individuals.74 In October, the Bucharest Court of Appeals rejected the defendants’ complaints that the indictments against them were illegal.75 Significant delays in this case and past cases related to the revolution raise questions about the effectiveness of the judicial system, whether those in positions of power can be held accountable, the integrity of the investigative process, and the legal system’s ability to deliver timely justice, particularly in high-profile cases.

• In April, a move to again allow wiretapped evidence in corruption cases drew public scrutiny, especially as the country is set to receive significant EU funds that are vulnerable to corruption and embezzlement.76 The ruling coalition in the lower house of Parliament supported the proposal to make wiretap evidence from the Romanian Information Service (SRI) admissible in corruption cases after the Constitutional Court ruled such evidence inadmissible seven years earlier. Previously, the exclusion of wiretap evidence caused corruption cases to crumble, which impeded the fight against corruption and placed the integrity of the judicial system in question. 77
• In September, notable PSD figure and former Vaslui County Council president Dumitru Buzatu, was caught allegedly accepting a 1,250,000 lei ($275,000) bribe to facilitate a public procurement contract for the rehabilitation and modernization of roads in Vaslui County, which likely would have been funded by the Vaslui Council’s budget that Buzatu had overseen for years. This was one of several corruption cases in 2023 that involved prominent local and regional political figures. 78
• In July, the “horror asylums” scandal that exposed severe abuse and maltreatment of elderly and disabled patients in privately run nursing homes caused widespread public outrage and political ramifications. PM Ciolacu said after investigations into the care homes scandal that "it's clear we're talking about institutional corruption" and that "social protection was used as a business."79 PSD Labor Minister Marius Budai and PSD Minister of Family, Youth, and Equal Opportunities Gabriela Firea resigned as a result of the scandal. This scandal, which President Iohannis called a “national disgrace,” unearthed systemic corruption and negligence. It also significantly strained the government and highlighted the entrenched issues within the political and social care systems80 .
• Since DNA former director Codruta Kovesi was forced to resign in 2018, the DNA has seen a series of leadership turnovers, including in 2023, that significantly undermined anticorruption efforts.81 The power of anticorruption prosecutors has diminished and there have been efforts to politicize the DNA’s new leadership and shield politicians from corruption investigations.82 However, in March, Justice Minister Cătălin Predoiu replaced DNA chief prosecutor Crin Bologa with Marius Voineag,83 who handled the plagiarism case against former prime minister Ciucă as an official in the General Prosecutor’s Office. Voineag Voineag expressed, in October, concern that the DNA had strayed from its primary purpose of tackling high-level corruption and instead focused on small-scale corruption cases. He advocated for returning to the DNA’s core mandate to investigate high-level corruption. Voineag pointed out that corruption affects approximately 15 percent of the country’s GDP and costs tens of billions of euros annually.84
• In July, the European Commission acknowledged that Romania showed progress in implementing its Anti-Corruption Strategy 2021-2025 (adopted in December 202185 ), addressed operational challenges in combating corruption, and clarified the statute of limitations in corruption cases. However, no progress was made in reforming rules that regulate lobbying Parliament, since the enforcement of extant lobbying rules for members of government was yet to be improved for increased accuracy and transparency, and rules for lobbying members of Parliament were yet to be introduced.86

Author: Claudia Badulescu is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute of European Studies (IEE) at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), working primarily in the framework of the RED-SPINEL project (Responding to Emerging Dissensus: Supranational Instruments & Norms of European Liberal Democracy). Previously, Claudia worked as a PhD Researcher in Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute (EUI), where she analyzed the Europeanization of post-communist public administrations from Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. While at the EUI, Claudia has been working on a variety of international research projects, such as the Horizon 2020 InDivEU project, the ERC Synergy program SOLID, the POLCON project and the euandi2019 project. Previously, Claudia worked as a Senior Project Manager at the French École nationale d’administration (ENA), where she had a leading role in the management of international projects supporting administrative reform in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Northern Africa.