Dokument #2115571

Freedom House (Autor)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Kyrgyzstan

Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
11
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 10.71 / 100
Democracy Score 1.64 / 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
11 / 100 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Authors

  • Anonymous

Score changes in 2024

  • Civil Society rating declined from 2.75 to 2.50 due to the ongoing detention of activists, the firing of the ombudswoman, and legislation proposed in the parliament that could be used to silence civil society and the media if passed.
  • As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s Democracy Score declined from 1.68 to 1.64.

Executive Summary

In 2023, authoritarianism persisted in Kyrgyzstan as the government pursued repressive policies. President Sadyr Japarov and his close ally, Head of the State Committee of National Security (GKNB) Kamchybek Tashiyev, consolidated power in the executive branch, undermining the balance of power and the system of checks and balances. Despite facing continued repression and harassment, Kyrgyzstan’s most vibrant democratic institutions, civil society and independent media, remained resilient by continuing their work and bringing attention to the government’s repressive measures.

Unpopular initiatives, broken promises, populist policies, and extrajudicial measures defined governance in 2023. In October, the GKNB killed criminal kingpin Kamchy Kolbaev in a special operation in Bishkek. Kolbaev wielded significant political influence and his death signaled further consolidation of power and the redistribution of illicit sources of income. After Kolbaev’s death, Tashiyev announced that there would be no more organized crime in Kyrgyzstan.

In addition to the informal redistribution of power, the executive branch further consolidated its power by introducing legal changes that undermined the judiciary. In October, President Japarov signed a bill that allows the president to cancel Constitutional Court decisions, removing a key check on executive power.1

The government and political leadership made a series of moves in 2023 that showed its disregard for public opinion. Despite widespread criticism of the initiative, the government adopted a new law in December that changed the national flag.2 Prominent opposition figure Adakhan Madumarov was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and arrested on charges of high treason and fraud as the government continued its campaign to silence critical voices.

Locally, the government continued to implement a poorly designed and unpopular administrative-territorial reform. One of the main elements of the reform consolidated smaller ayil aimaks (the smallest administrative units) into a few larger ones. Rural citizens complained that the closure of many smaller ayil aimaks meant that they had to travel further to access government services and were forced to share pastureland with people from other villages. The government argued that the reforms decreased personnel and operational costs and increased efficiency, without mentioning their unfavorable public reception. The president’s office is carrying out the reform without input from the parliament or local communities.

On the international stage, Kyrgyzstan deepened relations with authoritarian regimes, particularly Russia. In 2023, President Putin visited Bishkek and President Japarov traveled to Moscow. The two countries also signed an agreement on a common air-defense system. Kyrgyz companies continued to help Russia bypass sanctions and supplied Russia with sanctioned items. The United States sanctioned five Kyrgyz companies for their assistance to Russia during the year.

The government finalized the border demarcation agreement with Uzbekistan, in which Kyrgyzstan gave up the strategically important Kempir-Abad Reservoir in exchange for pastureland from Uzbekistan. Authorities negotiated the deal in secrecy, despite public protests, and did not consult with civil society or other relevant stakeholders.

Independent media faced challenges in 2023 that further threatened press freedom. The government advanced amendments to the law on mass media that would strengthen government control and oversight of media outlets. In December, the draft bill was registered in the parliament and was under the revision of relevant parliamentary committees. Authorities unblocked Radio Azattyk’s website in June, after the media outlet agreed to take down the video that the authorities had labeled disinformation. The disputed videos covered the military conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which took place in September 2022. In addition to blocking the website, the authorities exerted pressure on Azattyk’s by freezing its bank accounts. In 2023, the government filed lawsuits against media outlets that investigated high-level corruption and government misconduct. Most notably, in August the government filed a lawsuit that aimed to shut down Kloop, a news site that has reported critically on the government’s policies.

The government has expanded its use of fake social media accounts and troll farms to advance progovernment narratives and smear critical voices. Many of these fake accounts are allegedly connected to the national broadcasting company (KTRK) and the President’s Office.

Although there were no major elections in 2023, an election in Bishkek for a parliamentary seat was marred by vote buying and low turnout. The election was rerun because two candidates were credibly accused of bribing voters.

The parliament advanced a new law on foreign agents that threatened civil society, which remains Kyrgyzstan’s strongest and most vibrant democratic institution. The bill targets NGOs by exploiting their dependence on foreign funding. According to the bill, any organization that receives foreign money and engages in political activities is required to register as a “foreign representative.” NGOs with the “foreign representative” label would be subject to unannounced government inspections and required to report regularly to the government on their activities. Activists condemned the bill and said it could be used to shut down NGOs that criticize the government. The bill also uses vague language that could be used to prosecute and imprison civil society activists for a wide range of activities.

The government continued to retaliate against critical voices. The parliament sacked the ombudswoman after she delivered a report that criticized human rights violations and government attacks on freedom of speech. Her dismissal was not handled in accordance with the law, showcasing the authorities’ disregard for the rule of law.3

In addition, dozens of prevalent civil society leaders and politicians arrested in 2022 for protesting the border demarcation agreement with Uzbekistan remained in pretrial detention or under house arrest at the end of 2023. Despite these challenges, civil society remains a vibrant force capable of raising important issues and rallying citizens, as demonstrated by the march for women’s rights in Bishkek that civil society organizations (CSOs) organized in March.4

The government approach to fighting corruption in 2023 remained disorganized and ineffective. The GKNB’s strategy thus far has entailed arresting high-level officials and their relatives in an effort to showcase results to the public. Despite Tashiyev’s announcement that the government’s practice of forcing corrupt officials to pay the government to avoid prosecution, known as kusturizatsiya, had ended, high-level corrupt officials continued to avoid jail time after paying damages to the state. President Japarov contradicted Tashiyev and said kusturizatsiya would continue, highlighting potential disagreements among the political leadership and the absence of a long-term anticorruption strategy.

Overall, Kyrgyzstan’s authoritarian drift continued as the government attempted to silence critical voices and consolidate power in the hands of a few individuals.

At-A-Glance

In Kyrgyzstan, national governance is increasingly authoritarian as the repression of opposition voices, the media, and civil society has intensified. The central government controls local governance and continued to implement a poorly designed and badly communicated reform of local government that offered no tangible benefits to citizens. Elections are frequently marred by irregularities and voter turnout is low. Corruption remains widespread and the government lacks a systematic anticorruption strategy. The judiciary was effectively stripped of its power after the government pressured the highest court into overturning its own decision and granting the president the right to cancel its rulings. Independent media outlets and CSOs, the most vibrant democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan, face frequent lawsuits and restrictive legislation that threatens their survival.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 1.00 / 7.00
  • In December, the parliament passed a bill to change the national flag, which President Japarov quickly signed.5 The public and even some government officials opposed the decision as unnecessary. Authorities arrested activist and blogger Avtandil Jorobekov the day before protests he organized in opposition to the flag law.6 Defending the flag change, President Japarov said the old flag “looked like a sunflower and against this background the country could not rise from its knees.”7 Parliament Deputy Mirlan Samyikojo said the law was unconstitutional because altering state symbols requires a referendum.8
  • In October, GKNB officers killed criminal kingpin and so-called “thief-in-law” Kamchy Kolbaev in Bishkek.9 According to the GKNB, Kolbaev displayed armed resistance during the special operation, which was part of a broader investigation of organized crime.10 Kolbaev was an influential figure who wielded extensive political and economic power. Dozens of government workers and businessmen were also arrested over their alleged ties to Kolbaev, revealing the degree of Kolbaev’s sway in business and government, as well as organized crime’s corrupting influence on the state.11
  • In September, authorities arrested opposition parliament member Adakhan Madumarov after stripping him of his immunity in June.12 Following his arrest, prosecutors charged Madumarov with high treason and fraud.13 A parliamentary committee initially stripped Madumarov’s immunity on the basis of abuse of power charges that prosecutors wanted to lodge, rather than fraud and high treason.14 The treason charges stem from a 2009 protocol between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that Madumarov signed when he was the Secretary of the Security Council, in which Kyrgyzstan agreed to lease land in the Batken region to Tajikistan for 49 years.15 Madumarov denied the allegations, said the protocol was not legally binding, and stated that the case was politically motivated.16
  • In February, President Japarov met with the five former presidents in Dubai: Askar Akayev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Roza Otunbayeva, Sooronbai Jeenbekov, and Almazbek Atambayev. Atambayev, who the authorities had just released from detention where he spent 3.5 years for illegally releasing a crime boss, left for Spain to seek medical treatment after the meeting.17 According to Japarov’s spokesperson, the meeting was meant to prevent divisions and promote stability.18 The meeting was controversial because Bakiyev and his family members live in exile after being found guilty of multiple crimes and receiving long prison sentences. Authorities launched the investigations after Bakiyev was ousted from power in 2010, following the April revolution that left 87 people dead and more than 300 injured.19
  • In March, President Japarov attended the groundbreaking ceremonies for the construction of a mosque and business center in Bishkek with the projects’ investor, Habibullah Abdukadyr,20 who has been accused of wide-scale corruption along with his partner, former customs official Raiymbek Matraimov.21 When asked about the corruption allegations against Abdukadyr, Japarov replied, “The most important thing is that there are no search warrants and open criminal cases” against him.22 Abdukadyr, a Chinese national of Uyghur origin, has been implicated in a number of media reports as the mastermind of a smuggling empire in Central Asia who bribes high-level officials to mask his crimes.23 The March event was the first time that Abdukadyr made a public appearance as an investor, which was a controversial decision due to his questionable reputation and evidence that his businesses erode governance and democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan.
  • In May, the United States sanctioned Tro.Ya, an electronics company, for supporting Russia and helping it evade international sanctions.24 In July, the United States sanctioned four more Kyrgyz companies for supporting Russia.25
  • In May, the first casino opened in Bishkek after President Japarov lifted a moratorium on casinos that the government had imposed in 2022.26 The casino is affiliated with the former parliamentarian and Japarov aide Arzybek Burkhanov.27 Burkhanov’s ownership added another layer of controversy to the much-disputed decision to allow casinos. Proponents argued that casinos would attract foreign investment and add 2 billion som ($22.4 million) in annual revenue for the government. However, in 2022, Grand Kazino reportedly paid only 102 million som ($1.2 million) for the license and taxes.28 Commenting on the ownership of the casino, deputy in parliament Balbak Tulobaev complained that the decision to allow casinos was not meant to make the rich (such as Burkhanov) even richer.29
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 1.75 / 7.00
  • There were no major elections held in 2023. However, the May election in Bishkek to fill an open seat in the parliament was plagued by the same irregularities that have marred past national elections. In March, member of parliament Janybek Abirov resigned after his involvement in a restaurant brawl caused a scandal.30 Thirty candidates registered for the special elections, scheduled for May, to fill Abirov’s seat. The elections were organized by the Central Elections Commission (CEC), which is the main state body responsible for conducting all the elections.31
  • On election day, candidate Ertai Iskakov shared a video in which several people he called “supporters of [fellow candidate] Damira Niyazalieva” counted money that was allegedly used to bribe to voters.32 Niyazaliyeva won with almost 36 percent of the vote, ahead of Ulan Sariyev and Ertai Iskakov, who finished in second and third place, respectively. Turnout was 14 percent, significantly lower than the usual turnout for presidential and parliamentary elections.33
  • In May, after an audio recording emerged in which Niyazaliyeva and her supporters allegedly discussed bribing voters, the police arrested two Niyazaliyeva campaign staff members and charged them with vote buying.34 The police also searched Niyazalieva’s campaign headquarters. Niyazaliyeva denied the allegations.35 The court process involving the two staff members was still ongoing at the end of the year, but Niyazalieva was not charged.
  • In June, the GKNB launched an investigation against Sariyev for allegedly attempting to bribe voters, violating campaign finance laws, and abusing administrative resources.36 Sariyev denied the allegations.37 In response to these criminal cases, the CEC canceled Sariyev’s and Niyazalieva’s registration, annulled the election results, and scheduled a rerun of the election for September.38
  • In September, Kubanychbek Samakov won the new election with 26 percent of the vote. Turnout was again low at less than 16 percent.39 The contest exposed the shortcomings of the new mixed election system that the government adopted in 2021. According to the new system, 36 out of 90 deputies are elected to the parliament in single-mandate constituencies and the remaining 54 deputies are chosen from party lists. Activists pointed out that there is no cost- and time-effective mechanism to replace deputies in single-mandate constituencies when they resign or can no longer perform their duties.40 The only option is a costly special election with a lengthy campaign period. The May election in Bishkek cost 18.8 million som ($215,000) and the September revote cost 13.2 million som ($150,000).41
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 2.50 / 7.00
  • Civil society is vibrant in Kyrgyzstan. However, increasing government pressure threatens civil society’s future as effective institution. In May, 33 parliament members submitted a restrictive new bill on NGOs for public discussion.42 If passed, the bill would require NGOs that receive foreign funding and engage in political activities to register as “foreign representatives.” 43 Many NGOs could receive this label because the sector is highly dependent on foreign grants. NGOs with the “foreign representative” label would be subject to unannounced government inspections and required to report regularly to the government on their activities.44
  • Activists condemned the bill and said it could be used to shut down NGOs that criticize the government. Additionally, the bill would criminalize creating an NGO that “encroaches on the personality and rights of citizens, commits violence against citizens, harms their health or encourages them to depart from their civic duties,” which would be punishable with up to five years in prison.45 Individuals who work with such NGOs or promote their “propaganda” would face up to 10 years in prison.46 The vague wording of these offenses would leave the law open to manipulation and abuse to punish NGOs that criticize the government.
  • Local and international stakeholders have called on the government to withdraw the bill. In July, a group of international human rights organizations issued a joint statement warning the authorities that its adoption “poses a direct and serious threat to Kyrgyzstan’s vibrant civil society, in particular human rights defenders and their organizations.”47 After the public backlash, many of the 33 parliamentarians who initially submitted the bill withdrew their signatures from the bill, citing various reasons, such as not reading the text carefully and realizing that it will bring more harm than good.48 Despite the criticism, the parliament passed the bill after the first reading in October.49 If the parliament adopts it during the second and third readings, the bill will be sent to the president for signature.
  • In 2023, 27 politicians, activists, and human rights defenders, who were arrested in 2022 for “preparation to organize mass riots” over their opposition to a border delimitation agreement with Uzbekistan, remained in pretrial detention centers or under house arrest.50 The agreement was finalized in January with the transfer of the Kempir-Abad Reservoir to Uzbekistan in exchange for pastureland.51 In January, authorities made the case classified, which prevented defendants from accessing case files.52 The trial has been repeatedly postposed and the court has extended the activists’ pretrial detention and house arrests several times. Most recently, in November, the court extended the defendants’ pretrial detention until January 2024.53
  • In November, blogger Yrys Zhekshenaliev was acquitted of charges stemming from his criticism in a Facebook video of an ore mining project in the Jetim Too region.54 The prosecutor general had accused him of active disobedience to the legal demands of government officials and inciting mass unrest and sought a seven-year prison sentence.55 Zhekshenaliev’s acquittal was a rare win for civil society in a year when activists and government critics faced growing government pressure and repression.56
  • In May, the parliament voted to sack Ombudswoman Atyr Abdyrakhmatova after she submitted an annual report on human rights that criticized the government for restricting press freedom.57 Bakytbek Sydykov, the leader of the progovernment Ata-Jurt Kyrgyzstan faction, pushed for her removal on the grounds that Abdyrakhmatova had failed to appoint a deputy ombudsperson for more than a year and that another 20 positions remained vacant at the Ombudsman’s Office.58 Deputy Dastan Dzhumabekov noted that the dismissal procedure violated the law, which “clearly states that a special commission of the Jogorku Kenesh must provide a conclusion on the existence of grounds for early dismissal of the Ombudsman.”59 No such commission was formed before the parliament voted to dismiss Abdyrakhmatova. In May, a former Deputy Prosecutor General, Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, was appointed as the new Ombudsperon.60
  • In March, a collective of exiled antiwar Russians known as Krasnaya Krysha announced its closure after facing harassment from the government. The group said it could not continue after the government surveilled them and arrested members over their opposition to the Ukraine war.61 Although Kyrgyzstan is officially neutral on the war in Ukraine, it has helped Russia bypass Western sanctions and silenced antiwar Russian nationals who relocated to Kyrgyzstan, extraditing some of them back to Russia.62
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 1.75 / 7.00
  • Independent media remained vibrant despite mounting pressure from the authorities. In May, the parliament published a controversial new draft of the Law on Mass Media for public review and discussion.63 After reviewing the draft law, the Institute of Media Policy concluded that it “could become a real legal instrument of pressure on independent media.”64 The bill includes several provisions that would violate constitutional norms and international covenants. The bill would require even non-news websites to register as media outlets. If the government denies them registration, these websites would not be able to promote their services on the internet. However, it is not clear if they will be shut down or simply no longer appear on search engines. Additionally, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Digital Development, and the Prosecutor General’s Office would all have control and supervisory functions to shut down media outlets for violating provisions in the new law.65
  • After the president introduced the legislation in 2022, a special working group that included media representatives was set up to revise the draft in the wake of harsh criticism, including from the Justice Ministry.66 Members of the working group said they had not seen and not approved a number of provisions in the draft law that was published in May.67
  • In July, a court ended the suspension of RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz branch, Radio Azattyk, which the government had initiated in 2022. The court decision came after Radio Azattyk agreed to remove a video from its website that covered the violent Septemver 2022 border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Ministry of Culture had accused Radio Azattyk of violating the 2021 Law on Protection from False Information by posting the video.68 Journalists criticized the deal and said it could lead to greater censorship.69
  • In August, a Bishkek prosecutor filed a lawsuit that sought the closure of the independent news site Kloop for “carrying out activities that go beyond the scope provided by the charter.” The lawsuit noted that the GKNB had examined Kloop’s content and concluded that it was “aimed at sharply criticizing the current government’s policies.” The suit said “most of the publications are of a purely negative nature, aimed at discrediting representatives of state and municipal bodies.”70 The lawsuit was filed immediately after Kloop, one of the few independent media outlets left in Kyrgyzstan, published an investigation about the involvement of President Japarov’s and Tashiyev’s relatives in the new FC Barcelona Academy that opened in Jalalabad in August.71
  • In July, the news site Checkit Media published an investigation into the government’s alleged use of fake social media accounts to advance progovernment narratives. The investigation connected the social media department of national broadcaster KTRK to the fake social media profiles spreading disinformation and propaganda.72 An anonymous source revealed that the people running the fake accounts received instructions from the head of the Information Policy Service of the President's Office, Dayirbek Orunbekov.73 Orunbekov has denied the allegations.74
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 1.75 / 7.00
  • Ongoing administrative and territorial reforms first rolled out in 2022 compromised local governance during the year. The reforms consolidated smaller ayil aimaks (local administrative units) into a few larger ones. Authorities said the reform would improve “the quality of service to the population, the responsibility of local self-government bodies, the efficiency of local decision-making, and the reduction of corruption risks in the activities of local authorities.”75 The government took a top-down approach in pursuing the reforms, which were implemented without any input from local citizens affected by the changes. The reforms offer no tangible benefits to citizens but save the government money by cutting personnel and operational costs.
  • After piloting the project in the Tyup district of the Issyk Kol region in 2022, where 13 ayil aimaks were merged into 5, President Japarov signed a decree in April that expanded the reform to the sparsely populated Naryn region, which reduced the number of ayil aimaks there from 63 to 27.76 The government did not explain how it decided which ayil aimaks would merge, who participated in this process, or what would happen to local government workers who would lose their jobs. Authorities did not seek out the local population’s opinions on the changes.
  • At a July Cabinet of Ministers meeting, the president’s representative in Naryn said that as a result of the pilot project there, “more than KGS 100 million were saved, and access to databases for the provision of public services and information was increased from 63 to 143.”77 After listening to the reports, Akylbek Japarov, the chair of the Cabinet of Ministers, said the reform would be implemented nationwide.78 The meeting focused on the funds saved from cutting personnel and operational costs, with no mention of the workers laid off due to the reforms or the local population’s feedback.
  • In April, residents of the Kazybek village in Naryn recorded a video that appealed to President Japarov to make their village the center of the newly formed larger ayil aimak, rather than the neighboring Kyzyl Tuu village that had been selected. They argued that their village had a larger population and that three of the new villages in the ayil aimak’s jurisdiction were closer to Kazybek than Kyzyl Tuu.79 The residents complained that when they voiced their concerns to the governor, they were told that it was too late to make any changes.
  • After the video was posted, parliament deputy Mirlan Samyikojo addressed the parliament and said the constitution states that administrative and territorial reforms must be approved by the parliament (the reforms have been carried out by presidential decree). He also noted that “sufficient explanatory work has not been carried out among the population regarding this reform.”80 The government has not held any public discussions for citizens to learn about the reforms and voice their concerns.
  • In November, residents of the Sary Mogol village in the Osh region and Sheker village in the Talas region expressed their discontent with the reform in videos addressed to President Japarov. The villages’ residents said their villages deserved to be the center of the new ayil aimaks.81 They also complained that the new centers were far away, making it difficult to travel there to access government services, and that being forced to share pastureland with other villages under the reform could lead to conflict.82
  • In October, President Japarov appointed Aibek Junushaliev as the mayor of Bishkek to replace Emilbek Abdykadyrov, who had been appointed the president’s plenipotentiary representative in the Issyk-Kul region.83 Junushaliev had previously served as Bishkek mayor from August 2021 to February 2022.84
  • In November, deputies of the Osh City Council passed a vote of no confidence against Mayor Bakytbek Zhetigenov, who had been appointed by President Japarov in 2022. The deputies stated that the municipality had failed to implement 95 percent of the City Council resolutions.85 Zhetigenov said the move was politically motivated and that he would stay in office until the president made a decision, since the president has the power to appoint and sack the mayor of Osh.86
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Several key developments threatened judicial independence and the balance of power in 2023. Most notably, President Japarov signed a new law in September that gave the president the power to cancel Constitutional Court rulings, essentially stripping the judiciary of its power. According to the law, the president may exercise this power when the Constitutional Court’s “decision contradicts the moral . . . values, the social consciousness of the people of Kyrgyzstan.”87 The law says Constitutional Court rulings can also be reversed when the constitutional norms they were based on shift or new evidence comes to light.88
  • Japarov’s power grab came in the wake of a June Constitutional Court ruling that allowed citizens to choose a matronymic over a patronymic in their names. This ruling came after a two-year legal standoff between the State Registration Service (SRS) and activist Altyn Kapalova, who changed her children’s last name to her own and gave them the matronymic in 2021.89 Claiming that the name changes were illegal, the SRS sued Kapalova and won three consecutive court rulings until the Constitutional Court overruled their decisions and issued a final verdict in favor of Kapalova.90
  • In November, the Constitutional Court canceled its own verdict from June and banned the use of the matronymic, even though the constitution does not allow the Constitutional Court to overturn its own rulings. The court said it reversed the ruling because the public perceived it “as a negative phenomenon that encroaches on the moral principles, values and traditions of the Kyrgyz people.”91 High-level officials had pressured the court to reverse the ruling, including Tashiyev, who posted, “No to the matronymic! Whoever approved it must now cancel it!” on Facebook in July.92
  • In August, the Supreme Court overturned two courts’ verdicts against Askar Kubanychbek uulu, who had been sentenced to 10 years in prison in May for fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine as a mercenary.93 The Supreme Court’s ruling came after the Kremlin pressured Bishkek to release Kubanychbek uulu, who is a Kyrgyz citizen.94 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs even said it would work to grant Kubanychbek uulu Russian citizenship and issue him a Russian passport.95
  • In November, President Japarov dismissed nine judges, including Sokuluk District Court Judge Kiyalbek Toktomamatov. He was dismissed for assigning a probationary supervision to the multiple time sex offender who cut off his ex-wife’s ears and nose after being released from prison in September. The judge assigned probation sentence despite the fact that he was involved in rape cases twice, explaining his decision with the fact that the perpetrator had an old mother and two kids as dependants.96
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 1.50 / 7.00
  • For the third year in a row, the Tashiyev-led anticorruption efforts were defined by controversial decisions, overblown promises, and political expediency. The authorities continued the practice of “kusturizatsiya’ (from the Kyrgyz verb ‘kusturuu’, meaning ‘to induce vomiting’) in which government officials accused of corruption were released from pre-trial detention, after compensating damages to the state, which is defined by the GKNB.
  • In May, President Japarov stated that the authorities would continue to use kusturizatsiya, directly contradicting Tashiyev, who had said the government would end the practice and that those charged with corruption going forward would have their assets seized and serve a prison sentence in accordance with relevant legislation.97 The opposing statements revealed potential friction between the two leaders and illustrated the lack of a coherent anticorruption strategy. In November, authorities released former Kumtor Gold Mining Company CEO Tengiz Bolturuk, who had been arrested for corruption 2022, after he paid 10.8 million som ($125,000) to the government.98
  • Several high-level officials and relatives of the country’s political leaders were arrested on corruption charges. In March, the GKNB arrested six State Customs Service officials, including the brother-in-law of Prosecutor General Kurmankul Zulushev.99 In May, parliamentarian Nadira Narmatova’s son and customs official Azatbek Nurdinov was also arrested for corruption.100 In July, President Japarov’s nephew Ulan Japarov was arrested for corruption involving the State Customs Service.101 At the end of the year Ulan Japarov remained in pre-trial detention as the investigation was still ongoing.102 Activists argued that these high-profile cases were meant to create the perception that the government was seriously tackling corruption, but that authorities had failed to take the systematic approach needed to make real progress.
  • In July, the GKNB arrested former minister of natural resources, ecology, and technical oversight Dinara Kutmanova for corruption.103 In October, Kutmanova’s son Kemelbek Kutmanov was also arrested for corruption in connection with his mother’s ministry.104
  • All these suspects remained in pretrial detention at the end of the year. Some of the arrests came after Tashiyev’s announcement in May that the first of three stages in the fight against corruption, which focused on the “systematization of the fight and determining its directions,” had ended.105 Tashiyev explained that the second stage will focus on introducing “tougher penalties within the law.” He did not specify when the second stage would end, only mentioning that it would take between one and one-and-a-half years. 106 Tashiyev said the third stage would then focus on “information, explanation, consolidation of achieved success.”
  • In November, President Japarov announced that the authorities had almost eliminated corruption. In a Facebook post, he noted: “Although we have not eliminated corruption 100%, we have eliminated it 90%.” Japarov said kusturizatsiya had increased the state budget.107

Footnotes

ecoi.net-Beschreibung:
Bericht über Demokratisierung (Wahlen, Zivilgesellschaft, Medien, Staatsführung) und Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Korruption) im Jahr 2023
Land:
Kirgisistan
Quelle:
Freedom House (Autor)
Veröffentlicht:
2024
Originallink:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan/nations-transit/2024
Dokumentart:
Periodischer Bericht
Sprache:
Englisch
Verfügbar auf ecoi.net seit:
24. September 2024
Dokument-ID:
2115571

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