Dokument #2115569

Freedom House (Autor)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Kazakhstan

Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
5
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 4.76 / 100
Democracy Score 1.29 / 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
5 / 100 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Authors

  • Anonymous

Score changes in 2024

  • Local Democratic Governance rating declined from 1.75 to 1.50 due to the long-term erosion of local government autonomy, which was demonstrated during the 2023 local elections, as well as the failure of recent decentralization efforts to make an impact.
  • As a result, Kazakhstan’s Democracy Score declined from 1.32 to 1.29.

Executive Summary

Following snap presidential elections in November 2022, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev secured another seven years in office and focused on stabilizing the political and socioeconomic situation in Kazakhstan. President Tokayev faces many domestic and foreign policy challenges. It is important for Tokayev to maintain the loyalty of political and business elites who were previously aligned with former president Nursultan Nazarbayev. President Tokayev adopted a cautious approach to key personnel decisions by maintaining a balance between his own appointees and Nazarbayev allies who retained their posts under the new president. Surrounding himself with trusted people remains a challenging task for Tokayev. Patronage is deeply rooted in public administration, with key figures across the government closely connected through family and personal networks.1

It is equally important for President Tokayev to maintain social stability as the country endures hyperinflation, rising poverty, and deep socioeconomic inequality. To restore public trust, fighting high-level corruption became a key priority in 2023. The government sought to reclaim illegally acquired assets by targeting former top government officials, oligarchs, and their key associates.2 The returned assets financed social and infrastructure projects (schools and hospitals) to demonstrate the government’s efforts to restore social justice.

A series of laws were passed in 2023 that weakened former president Nazarbayev’s political position, including a law that stripped Nazarbayev of his “First President – Elbasy” special status and ended special privileges for him and his family members. Key Nazarbayev allies in high-level government roles were removed from office. Some went to prison, faced investigations, or escaped abroad.3

Kazakhstan held multiple elections in 2023. Elections to the Senate (the upper chamber of Parliament) and Majilis (the lower chamber of Parliament) were held in January and March, respectively. For the first time, there were self-nominated, independent Majilis candidates who competed against party-affiliated candidates in single-mandate districts that comprised 30 percent of the seats. The other 70 percent of seats were elected through party lists. Half of the seats for maslikhats (local representative bodies) elections in the regions and in three major cities (Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent) were elected in single-mandate districts, with the other half elected through party lists.

President Tokayev called for more citizen participation in local decision-making in 2023. The first direct elections of governors occurred in November, in 42 districts and three towns of regional significance (Kurchatov, Priozersk and Rudnyi), as part of a pilot program. Opposition leaders and activists faced various administrative hurdles and were banned from running in both parliamentary and local elections. The progovernment party Amanat won the most seats. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers raised concerns about the impartiality and independence of election commissions and restrictions on fundamental freedoms and participation.4

The government has taken some steps to implement the “Listening State” agenda. The “Listening State” is a state concept that emphasizes active government efforts to engage with citizens and understand their concerns and needs. This concept involves the creation of channels for open and transparent communication between government and society, and aims to ensure that the voices of citizens are heard and taken into account in decision-making.5

The Constitutional Court was established in January to improve human rights mechanisms by allowing citizens to appeal directly to the court. In June, National Qurultay—a consultative-advisory body housed in the executive branch—gathered parliamentary deputies, public figures, civil society leaders, and political party representatives to discuss key priorities including education and science; culture, art, and spirituality; social consolidation; and national identity-building.6

However, social media remains the main platform for the public to express views on the government’s performance and push for policy changes. In response, the government further restricted social media by adopting a new law in July that imposes potential fines on journalists, bloggers, and activists for ‘dissemination of false information’. The law’s vague language leaves it vulnerable to manipulation to punish government critics and could facilitate state censorship.

The government has restricted access to foreign funding for civil society organizations (CSOs) under the pretext of furthering ‘transparency’. The government demonstrated increasing intolerance towards activists who criticized the lack of political pluralism and punished outspoken civic activists through closed trials and long prison sentences.7

Several deadly accidents (including a June forest fire that killed 14 forestry workers and an October explosion that killed 46 workers in a coal mine owned by ArcelorMittal) again highlighted the government’s weak capacity to protect health and safety and its tendency to shift blame to scapegoats to avoid public accountability. The bureaucracy remained ineffective and the muddled distinction between political and bureaucratic roles made the system prone to corruption.8

The slow progress of public administration reforms disappointed activists who hoped for democratic change following the 2022 mass protests. Kazakhstan’s long-standing ambition to obtain international legitimacy by joining the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was undermined as the government strengthened its grip on power.9 Behind the façade of the ‘Listening State,’ the government pursued cosmetic policy changes as citizens continued to face repression and injustice.10

At-A-Glance

National governance in Kazakhstan remained authoritarian despite the government’s rhetorical commitment to pursue political reforms aimed at democratization, increasing public trust, and building a ‘Fair Kazakhstan’ and ‘Listening State’. Elections to the Senate (upper chamber), Majilis (lower chamber), and maslikhats (local representative bodies) were tightly controlled and opposition leaders were barred from running for office. CSOs and individual activists struggled to obtain foreign funding and were harshly punished when they called for an open investigation into the deadly 2022 protests. Independent media outlets and bloggers face potential fines for “disseminating false information” in a vaguely worded new law that could easily be used to punish government critics. The first direct elections of governors were held in November and the ruling party, Amanat, dominated the contests. The government passed a series of laws that stripped former president Nazarbayev and his family members of their special status and special privileges. The government worked to reclaim illegally acquired assets from former top officials and oligarchs associated with Nazarbayev, demonstrating the tense inter-elite fight for power and financial resources.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Former president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled the country for nearly 30 years until his resignation in 2019, has lost his tight grip on power. The government adopted laws in 2023 that stripped Nazarbayev and his family of their special status and special privileges (see Judicial Framework and Independence section).
  • Key Nazarbayev allies lost high-level positions in the government and were imprisoned, under investigation, or had fled the country (see Corruption section). In April, former national security chief Karim Massimov was sentenced to 18 years in prison after he was convicted of high treason, abuse of power, and attempting a coup over his role in plotting the political unrest in 2022.11 Authorities also launched an investigation into Nazarbayev’s nephew, former deputy chairman of the National Security Committee Samat Abish, over his suspected involvement in planning the 2022 unrest.12
  • President Tokayev made key personnel changes to surround himself with trusted allies during the year. In April, Tokayev appointed former Anti-Corruption Agency chairman Olzhas Bektenov as the new head of the presidential administration in an effort to signal the president’s commitment to fighting corruption.13 As a result of a cabinet reshuffle in September, Alikhan Smailov was reappointed as prime minister and five new ministries were created.14 The new ministries are the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, the Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Ministry of Industry and Construction. The Cabinet of Ministers is now a mix of new officials appointed by President Tokayev and Nazarbayev appointees who retained their posts under Tokayev’s leadership. The gender imbalance in national governance did not improve. Only three of the 19 ministers are women and there are no women serving as regional governors.
  • In the annual address in September, President Tokayev emphasized the need for stable economic growth between 6 and 7 percent to double the GDP to $450 billion by 2029.15 Tokayev continued to push ‘Listening State’ narratives (i.e. open and transparent communication between the state and citizens) in an attempt to project legitimacy and restore public trust, but some experts expressed skepticism about how effectively these concepts would be implemented.16
  • The presidential administration has been reorganized in September 2023 by splitting strategic and executive responsibilities between the presidential administration and the Cabinet of Ministers.17 The presidential administration has become a ‘political headquarters’ that focuses on setting policy at a high level and the Cabinet of Ministers should independently execute the administration’s initiatives with limited political interference.18 The role of five new assistants to the president, who focus on home affairs and communications, international affairs, legal affairs, and science and innovation, was introduced in the presidential administration.
  • To reduce discontent in rural areas, the government launched national projects in 2023 aimed at improving education and modernizing rural healthcare.19 A new program designed to improve internet access across the country and make Kazakhstan a digital hub in the region was approved for 2024-2027, with a budget of 1.5 trillion tenge ($3.3 billion).20
  • The government continued to withdraw money from the National Fund that was established as a safety net for times of crisis. In November, the government adopted a law to transfer 6 trillion tenge ($13 billion) from the National Fund between 2024 and 2026, and an additional 1.6 trillion tenge ($3.5 billion) to support national infrastructure projects.21 The key priorities for the three-year budget are development of human capital, improvement of education and healthcare systems, support for business (particularly agribusiness), and the implementation of crucial infrastructure and social projects.
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 1.25 / 7.00
  • In January 2023, elections for 20 of the 50 Senate seats were held.22 A 2022 law reduced the number of Senate deputies President Tokayev could appoint from 15 to 10. The Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, an advisory board chaired by the president, proposed five of the Senate appointments. Senators are indirectly elected to six-year terms by regional delegates. In January 2023 elections, 13 percent of candidates were nominated by maslikhats and 87 percent were self-nominated. Out of 20 new senators, 3 women and 17 men were elected.23
  • In March, the first elections to the Majilis under the new mixed-member system that replaced proportional representation were held.24 Under the new system, 30 percent of seats are filled in single-mandate districts where self-nominated candidates compete against candidates nominated by political parties. The other 70 percent of seats are filled through proportional representation using party lists. The number of seats in the Majilis was reduced from 107 to 98. The registration threshold for parties to participate in the elections fell from 20,000 signatures to 5,000 signatures. Parties and individual candidates addressed a wide range of social and economic issues but were generally supportive of the president’s reform agenda. All registered parties took progovernment positions and no genuine opposition party obtained the registration needed to nominate candidates and compete in the elections, including the Pillar of the Country party led by Nurzhan Altayev and the Forward, Kazakhstan! party led by Marat Zhylanbayev. However, independent candidates were allowed to compete for the first time and representatives from some banned parties ran as independents. Independent candidates, including candidates from opposition parties such as the Democratic Party and the Namys (Honor) party, faced pressure and various administrative hurdles during the campaign.25 According to the Central Election Commission, 54 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot in the Majilis elections. The ruling party Amanat secured the most seats in Parliament.26
  • OSCE observers acknowledged that the elections were more competitive than past contests and that voters had greater choice. However, the OSCE report on the election stated that administrative obstacles made it difficult for some self-nominated candidates to campaign and raised concerns about the impartiality and independence of lower-level election commissions, which were heavily staffed with Amanat party members.27 Authorities also continued to restrict freedom of expression and participation during the campaign.
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 1.25 / 7.00
  • The authoritarian politics of Kazakhstan in 2023 were characterized by restrictions on opposition leaders that barred them from participating in Parliamentary and maslikhat elections, as well as criminal and administrative charges against civic activists implicated in the 2022 public protests and those who called for a transparent investigation into the unrest.28
  • The government denied former top official Nurzhan Altayev registration to run in the presidential elections in 2022 and did not register his ‘Pillar of the Country’ party for the Parliamentary elections in 2023.29 Altayev openly criticized the lack of political pluralism in Kazakhstan. In November, Altayev was sentenced to 10 years in prison for bribery and received a lifetime ban from serving in the government.30 Altayev’s trial was closed to the public and he was considered as a political prisoner.
  • In November, opposition leader Marat Zhylanbayev of the ‘Forward, Kazakhstan!’ party was sentenced to seven years in prison for participating in a prohibited organization and financing an extremist organization.31 Zhylanbayev contacted the local government in Astana several times to coordinate rallies to stop the persecution of political activists, push for an independent investigation into the 2022 unrest, and condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine.32 In November, Zhylanbaev sewed his mouth shut and went on a hunger strike in jail to protest a the decision to close his trial to the public.33
  • In September, the Ministry of Finance published a list of CSOs and individuals that received foreign funding, a move the government said would foster transparency. However, rights groups said the list was meant to intimidate CSOs.34 The list included 240 public figures, civic activists, journalists, human rights organisations, environmental funds, legal foundations, and media outlets. Following the publication of the list, several CSOs could not access their bank accounts and faced bureaucratic hurdles from authorities who demanded they provide the origin and intended use of their foreign funding.35
  • Several tragic accidents caused by insufficient safety standards demonstrated the weakness of trade unions and low capacity of the government to ensure workers’ safety. For example, 14 forestry employees were killed in a June forest fire and 46 people died in an October explosion at a coal mine owned by ArcelorMittal, which was the latest in a string of deadly incidents at ArcelorMittal mines.36 37 Facing public pressure after the deadly forest fire, Minister for Ecology Zulfiya Suleimenova, resigned.38 President Tokayev instructed the government to suspend cooperation with ArcelorMittal in Kazakhstan. Coal workers were also summoned by the police and told not to organize rallies.39
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 1.25 / 7.00
  • The government tightened control of the press and social media through new laws passed in 2023. A law that came into force in September labels social media influencers (known as bloggers in Kazakhstan) as ‘businesses’ and requires them to pay taxes on any income they make through their online activities.40 According to the law, the owners of online platforms that have more than 100,000 visitors per day must appoint a representative who will cooperate with the government to combat the spread of ‘false’ information.41 Online platforms must translate their user agreements into Kazakh and conduct content moderation in Kazakh. The law also introduces fines for ‘dissemination of false information’ (see Judicial Framework and Independence). The definition of misinformation in the law is unclear and does not specify who determines the veracity of online content or what criteria are used. The provision’s vague formulation leaves the law vulnerable to manipulation and could be used to silence independent voices.42
  • The ‘dissemination of false information’ provision was used to limit freedom of expression in a number of cases in 2023. In October, prosecutors opened a criminal case against local journalist Azamat Maytanov for spreading false information in Telegram posts from 2022.43 The posts concerned the authorities shooting citizens during the unrest that year and the arrest of Zhanbolat Mamay, the leader of the unregistered Democratic Party. In November, the civic activist Nazim Tabyldieva, was convicted of ‘knowingly spreading false information’ and ‘offending a representative of the authorities’ for a series of 2022 Facebook posts that criticized the government.44 Tabyldieva was sentenced to one-and-a-half years of restricted freedom, a noncustodial sentence that limits one’s movement. The sentence also prohibited her from engaging in public and political activities on social media for five years. In November, civic activist and blogger Nurlan Kanatov, was found guilty of falsely accusing the deputy mayor of the Zhambyl region of a serious crime and sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison. 45 In 2022, Kanatov reported on social media that his car had been set on fire and linked the incident to his criticism of alleged corruption among regional authorities.
  • In January, the government shared a controversial draft law “On Mass Media” for public consultation, which aims to regulate the activities of journalists and social media users.46 Media representatives criticized the bill and called for major revisions to protect freedom of the press.47 The bill included a provision to create a ‘social and professional council’ to regulate the activities of the media and compile a list of media outlets ‘spreading disinformation’. In November, the Majilis approved the bill, which was then sent to the Senate for debate.48
  • Authorities continued to persecute journalists, bloggers, and media representatives critical of the government. Journalist Duman Muhammetkarim, who posts on his YouTube channel “What did they say?”, was arrested several times in 2023 and accused of ‘financing extremism’ and ‘participating in a banned organization.’49 Muhammetkarim’s legal trouble stemmed from his interview with exiled former banker and opposition leader Mukhtar Ablyazov of the “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan” movement. Muhammetkarim had reported on the 2022 unrest in Almaty and published reports on the torture of detainees.
  • Several independent journalists experienced attacks and physical threats during the year. For example, independent YouTube journalist Vadim Boreyko received threats that his apartment would be blown up before bombs exploded two of his cameraman’s cars.50 The car of Dinara Yegeubayeva, a former television presenter and YouTube journalist with 40,000 subscribers, was set on fire in January. Yegeubayeva was also barred from running as a candidate in the parliamentary elections.51 Authorities claimed that the attacks were a conspiracy meant to simulate the persecution of journalists and discredit President Tokayev.52
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 1.50 / 7.00
  • For the March elections to the maslikhats (local representative bodies) in the regions and in Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent, half of the deputies were elected from party lists and the other half from single-mandate districts.53 Both party nominees and self-nominated candidates competed in the elections. To nominate candidates, parties were required to have a registered branch in the region. Five established political parties established branches in every region, while two new parties — Baytak and Respublica — were not able to nominate candidates in all regions. After polls closed, ballots were counted manually rather than electronically, and the preliminary results were announced by the Central Election Commission the day after the elections.
  • The first direct elections of governors occurred in November in 42 districts and three towns of regional significance (Kurchatov, Priozersk and Rudnyi), as part of a pilot program. The elections occurred after President Tokayev called for increased direct participation of citizens in local decision-making.54 In most districts, incumbent governors or deputy governors won (out of 45 winners, 29 were incumbent governors, 12 were deputy governors, and 37 were members of the ruling Amanat party). Only two women were elected as governors. Direct elections for governors will be held nationwide starting in 2024.
  • The executive branch’s tight control over election administration and vote counting has continued under President Tokayev. According to a public opinion survey by Demoscope and the Paper Lab Center, nearly 63 percent of citizens believed that none of the parties participating in the elections represented their interests.55 Some civic activists and independent observers have called the elections to the Majilis and maslikhats ‘illegitimate’ due to evidence that election results were falsified and observers were physically removed from polling stations.56
  • A new bill on local self-government was presented in the Majilis in April.57 The bill defines local self-government bodies, their responsibilities, and powers, and the competence of government bodies to develop local self-government. The bill proposed new local councils for villages, towns, and rural districts that would be directly elected to four-year terms. The activities of the local councils will be supported by local mayors.
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 1.25 / 7.00
  • The process of ‘De-Nazarbayevification’ launched after January 2022 events has continued throughout the year of 2023.58 Several laws passed in 2023 stripped former president Nazarbayev and his family of their special status and special privileges. In January, the government adopted a law that stripped Nazarbayev of the title of ‘Elbasy’ which means ‘Leader of the Nation’ or ‘Father of the Nation’.59 In July, laws that criminalized insulting the ‘Father of the Nation’ were removed from the Criminal Code.60 Nazarbayev also lost his position as Head of the Supreme Council of Nazarbayev University, Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools, and the Nazarbayev Fund. In November, President Tokayev dissolved the board of the Samruk-Kazyna Welfare Fund, which had been led by Nazarbayev.61
  • In January, the government established a new Constitutional Court that citizens can appeal directly to, a mechanism that some observers believed would advance human rights.62 Former human rights commissioner Elvira Azimova was appointed chairperson of the new court.63 The Constitutional Court consists of eleven judges, six of whom are appointed by Parliament (three by the Majilis and three by the Senate), and five who are appointed by the president (including the chairperson, with the Senate’s consent). Citizens filed more than 5,300 appeals with the court in 2023, which focused on housing, labor relations, social protection, individual bankruptcies, criminal sentences, and access to information, among other issues.64
  • A new law banned the ‘posting and dissemination of false information’, which is punishable by a fine of up 345,000 tenge ($800). Journalists and bloggers could be prosecuted under the law, even for making minor factual errors.65
  • The death of Saltanat Nukenova, wife of the former minister of the national economy Kuandyk Bishimbayev, prompted a public outcry against domestic violence.66 In November, Bishimbayev was arrested on suspicion of beating his wife to death. In the wake of the death, more than 150,000 citizens signed a petition calling for the criminalization of domestic violence and a thorough investigation in the case.67 In response to public pressure, President Tokayev signed a decree in December that created an action plan intended to strengthen gender equality, combat domestic violence, protect the rights of defendants, and prevent torture and ill-treatment.68
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 1.25 / 7.00
  • Fighting grand corruption is a key priority in President Tokayev’s ‘Fair Kazakhstan’ agenda. In July, the government adopted a new law “On the return of illegally acquired assets to the state” that aimed to become a landmark in fighting major corruption.69 The law created a new committee within the General Prosecutor’s Office that is led by the prime minister and includes members of the government, heads of law enforcement agencies, and members of Parliament.70 The new law applies to high-level government or quasigovernment officials and any of their associates with assets of at least $100 million. Illegally acquired assets can be returned either voluntarily or compulsorily based on judicial acts of the state, foreign states, or decisions of competent authorities.
  • The Special State Fund was created to manage assets returned to the state, which are used to finance social and infrastructure projects. In November, Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov reported that 1 trillion tenge ($2.3 billion) in illegally acquired assets had been returned under the law, including about $600 million from abroad.71 Details about the owners of the returned assets are closed to the public.
  • Opposition leaders and independent experts criticized the provision that only individuals who illegally acquire, at least, $100 million in assets are included in the register. They also raised concerns about the transparency of the Special State Fund and the potential misuse of the funds.72 73
  • The return of illegally acquired assets highlights the intense inter-elite fight for access to power and financial resources. Kairat Satybaldy, Nazarbayev’s nephew and one of the 50 richest Kazakh businessmen, was sentenced to six years in prison for corruption in 2022, and the government seized his assets.74 A year later, Satybaldy reportedly returned $300 million in assets and was expected to receive parole.75
  • In 2022, Kairat Boranbayev, one of the wealthiest Kazakh oligarchs and Nazarbayev’s matchmaker, was sentenced to eight years in prison.76 In November, Boranbayev was released on early parole and returned 90 billion tenge ($192 million) in assets to the treasury, including a hotel in Astana, several fitness centers, and an oil field. Boranbayev sent 30 billion tenge ($66 million) to the Special State Fund to support education initiatives.77
  • In 2023, another Nazarbayev’s nephew, former deputy chairman of the National Security Committee Samat Abish, was accused of abuse of power and exceeding his official authority during the 2022 mass protests. Abish was ordered to remain in the country.78 Abish was reportedly assisting the investigation to return assets to the state.79 Abish was the only deputy chairman of the National Security Committee who did not receive a lengthy prison sentence.
  • The government launched a series of high-profile corruption cases against Nazarbayev allies. Former minister of justice Marat Beketayev was arrested in the Astana airport while attempting to flee the country. Beketayev had been under investigation for doling out government contracts for unnecessary services.80
  • Operator ROP, a company with a monopoly over recycling collection, led by the former president Nazarbayev’s daughter Aliya Nazarbayeva, was under investigation throughout 2023.81 Operator ROP collected extremely high utilization fees up front on imported cars and agricultural machines. Former vice-minister of ecology Akhmetzhan Primkulov and former Operator ROP chairman Medet Kumargaliyev were each sentenced to seven years in prison. Aliya Nazarbayeva avoided prosecution despite several suspects’ statements that implicated her in the scheme.82

Footnotes

ecoi.net-Beschreibung:
Bericht über Demokratisierung (Wahlen, Zivilgesellschaft, Medien, Staatsführung) und Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Korruption) im Jahr 2023
Land:
Kasachstan
Quelle:
Freedom House (Autor)
Veröffentlicht:
2024
Originallink:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/nations-transit/2024
Dokumentart:
Periodischer Bericht
Sprache:
Englisch
Verfügbar auf ecoi.net seit:
24. September 2024
Dokument-ID:
2115569

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