• The ODS-led center-right government of Prime Minister Fiala used its parliamentary majority to survive a no-confidence vote held in January.9 The vote came less than two weeks before the second-round runoff of the presidential elections between Pavel, a retired Czech Army chief of staff and former head of the NATO Military Committee, and Babiš, the populist leader, billionaire, and former prime minister.
• The opposition ANO party said that it had instigated the no-confidence vote in response to the ruling coalition scrapping discussions of ANO’s agenda during the Parliament session, but many political analysts interpreted the move as an attempt to turn the spotlight on ANO and its leader Babiš ahead of the presidential runoff. ANO and Babiš have adopted what they described as a “pro-people” stance, capitalizing on popular discontent over the high cost of living.10
• Pavel was elected president in January and was inaugurated in March, succeeding the outgoing nationalist and populist president Zeman in March. Pavel promised a clean break with Zeman’s administration and has been critical of outgoing members of the previous administration for their links to Kremlin officials and involvement in several high-profile corruption affairs11 . Pavel also asked the country’s Supreme Audit Office (NKU) to carry out an in-depth audit of the presidential office and its operations under Zeman’s staff. Pavel has vowed to bring the office of the president closer to the spirit of the Czech constitution by avoiding meddling with cabinet or judicial appointments, a practice for which Zeman was criticized.
• President Pavel did not intervene in any appointments to Fiala’s cabinet in 2023, in contrast to Zeman, who went beyond his presidential authority in by interfering with cabinet appointments while in office. Shortly after Pavel’s inauguration in March, the new president appointed Petr Hladík of the KDU-ČSL, whose nomination was shelved by Zeman in December 2022, as minister of the environment. He then processed other cabinet changes without obstruction, marking an approach which commentators and analysts assess as more in line with the formal role the president is assigned in the constitution.12 Pavel thus made cabinet swaps less contentious in 2023 and contributed to a more stable functioning of individual ministries. Prior to Hladík’s appointment, for example, the ministry of the environment had been functioning without a permanent minister since October 2022.13
• Another no-confidence vote was triggered by the opposition in October over Minister of the Interior Vit Rakušan’s alleged links to the Dozimetr corruption scandal.14 The Dozimetr scandal, which broke in 2022, affected several political parties, including Rakušan’s STAN party and the opposition ANO. While the no-confidence motion ultimately failed, the opposition used the marathon vote to criticize the cabinet over the austerity measures passed a month earlier.
• Fiala’s cabinet has one of the lowest government approval ratings in Czechia’s history according to CVVM surveys, which pointed to the soaring cost of living as a major factor.15 In June, Pavel criticized Fiala’s cabinet for insufficient public outreach and communication about its policies. ANO has dominated national polls throughout 2023, while far-right parties together commanded the support of between 15 percent and 20 percent of the population. In October, Babiš announced his intention to lead ANO beyond the 2025 parliamentary elections, which he reiterated early in 202416 as ANO eyes a return to the government. Over 2023, several politicians from a more conservative wing of ODS, including member of the European Parliament (MEP) Jan Zahradil and Senator Tomáš Jirsa, described ANO as ODS’s natural political ally along conservative lines.17
• Inflation remained high throughout the year, contributing to the ongoing cost of living and energy crises. The year-on-year rate eased over the course of 2023, from 17.5 percent in January to 7.3 percent in November, but remained well above the 2 percent target set by the Czech National Bank. The country also registered the steepest drop in real wages in the European Union. The Czech economy is the only one in the EU that has yet to recover to its pre-pandemic level, and gross domestic product (GDP) has been in decline through 2023. To combat the ballooning state budget deficit, the cabinet approved a series of austerity measures, passed by Parliament in October, which analysts warn are poised to severely impact state employees, low-income families, and the media market (see Independent Media). These measures are projected to slow down the economic recovery, which has already been under pressure throughout 2023 from low household spending.18

• Pavel narrowly won the first round of president elections on January 13–14, with 35.4 percent of the vote compared to Babiš’s 35 percent. Third and fourth place went to Danuše Nerudová, the former president of the Mendel University in Brno, with 13.9 percent, and Senator Pavel Fischer with 6.75 percent.19 Voter turnout was 68.24 percent.
• The two weeks leading up to the second round of the presidential elections was marked by an increased proliferation of disinformation on digital channels, including a hoax that Pavel died.20 In another instance, fake text messages allegedly from Pavel told recipients to mobilize for war in Ukraine.
• Babiš hardened his campaign rhetoric ahead of the second round of voting in an attempt to mobilize the far-right electorate and tap into unease over the ongoing war in Ukraine. He made increasingly aggressive attempts on social networks—mainly Facebook—to depict Pavel as a warmonger, tapping into narratives already circulating in disinformation channels. His Facebook page shows a steady stream of posts resonating with this image of his opponent , including block-letter messages such as “I am the only one who seeks peace” and “I don’t want the war to spread. I am not a general. I am a diplomat.”21 The Babiš campaign also placed billboards along the Czech highways proclaiming, “I won’t drag Czechia into a war. I am a diplomat. Not a soldier. Babiš for president,” and, “The general does not believe in peace. Vote for peace. Vote Babiš.” Pavel accused Babiš of resorting to lies and polarization and called for restraint. He also described his own campaign as a “defense of values.”22
• Pavel decisively won the second-round runoff held on January 27–28, with 58.3 percent of the vote to Babiš’s to 41.7 percent, and at a record turnout of 70.2 percent. A campaign which analysts described as polarizing23 rallied voters to back Pavel, who also distanced himself from the outgoing president Zeman, who openly backed his political ally Babiš. The vote showed that a decisive part of the electorate backed the more pro-EU candidate; Pavel led part of his campaign from Budapest, where he met with critics of the Orbán government and signaled his alignment with European criticisms of Hungary’s current orientation. However, political analysts also pointed out that Babiš was able to increase his party’s electoral base and gain supporters from the far-right by adopting more aggressive rhetoric than had been seen in previous campaigns.24
• Campaigns for the European Parliament elections scheduled for June 2024 began to take off towards the end of 2023. Parties, including the members of the ruling SPOLU alliance, started forming coalition lists to increase their electoral chances amid national political trends that see ANO dominating polls while the popularity of ruling coalition parties is stagnating or falling (see National Democratic Governance).

• Czechia has a vibrant and robust civil society sector that has played a significant role in shaping country’s policies and defending the rights of marginalized and disadvantaged groups. In 2023, the role of NGOs active in helping the victims of sexual and domestic violence, such as Konsent and proFem, stood out amid several high-profile cases of sexual violence that drew nationwide coverage and public attention25 .
• Authorities still have not mustered an adequate response to sexual assault and violence against women and minors, NGOs argue,26 in part due to the prevalence of “rape culture” in Czech institutions. This official indifference, including the failure to pass legislation widening the scope of what is considered rape and low conviction rates for sex crimes, contributes to an environment of impunity.27 Consequently, many victims feel deterred from reporting cases of rape. After a landmark court case in November where Dominik Feri, a former TOP 09 member of Parliament (MP) who had previously been a rising star on the political scene, was sentenced to three years of prison time for two counts of rape and one attempted rape—with five more instances under investigation28 —efforts to redefine rape in Czech legislation were reinvigorated (see Judicial Framework and Independence).29
• In August, the head of the Czech police, Martin Vondrášek, made insulting comments stating that rape cases are “very often” based on made-up claims. Vondrášek was forced to apologize amid public criticism, but he did not face any serious calls for his resignation from the government and remained in his position.30 Similarly, in October, Petr Angyalossy, the president of Czechia’s Supreme Court, was criticized for circulating a presentation about judicial ethics in which he had included derogatory rape jokes.31
• The exclusion of Czechia’s Romany minority from mainstream society was highlighted following Council of Europe commissioner Dunja Mijatović’s visit in February. Mijatović described the rights of Roma, as well as those of people with disabilities, as “a constant focus of her office” over the past two decades.32 Recent data from the Roma Survey 2021, conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, showed that in 2020, 77% of Czech Roma were at risk of poverty—meaning they resided in a household with an income less than 60% of the median national income—while the national at-risk rate was just 10%. In addition, while 80% of the general population reported being engaged in “paid work,” just 45% of Czech Roma reported the same.33
• Tensions rose between Czech Roma and Ukrainian refugees, stoked by online disinformation and hoaxes, as well as by the challenging living conditions faced by both groups.34
• In May, President Pavel attended commemorations of the Romany victims of the Holocaust at the site of the Lety concentration camp built during the Nazi German occupation during World War II, becoming only the second Czech president to visit the site.35
• Parliament debated legalizing same-sex marriage in May 2023.36 Currently, people in same-sex couples could register their partnerships but still would lack rights equivalent to those of married couples, including the ability to jointly adopt children, jointly own property, or access their deceased spouses’ pensions. A marriage equality bill passed its first reading in the Chamber of Deputies—the lower house of Parliament—in June,37 but a parliamentary committee considering the issue adjourned in November without approving either the original legislation or a modification that would provide same-sex couples access to a partnership that carried the same rights as marriage but not the title.38
• NGOS warn that Ukrainians in Czechia face marginalization.39 Czechia tops the list of EU host countries of Ukrainians fleeing Russian aggression per capita.40 Most of the refugees are largely women, children and elderly. Although two-thirds have obtained jobs, most work below their qualifications, leaving families with children particularly exposed.
• NGOs working with people migrating to Czechia also warned41 against persistent antimigration rhetoric spread by actors across the political spectrum and by disinformation outlets,42 particularly targeting refugees from Syria, as well as migrants from the rest of the greater Middle East and Africa.

• Concern over the intense concentration of media ownership in the hands of private companies whose main business was outside the media sector has been voiced by international watchdogs and analysts for years.43 Developments in 2023 further highlighted the risks of quality media falling prey to affluent oligarchs, especially given the financial pressures media face at a time of increasing digitalization.44
• In October, Parliament approved a set of austerity measures which were introduced back in May by Fiala’s cabinet. The measures included a tax hike on print media, moving it from the 10-percent to the 21-percent tax category and establishing the highest levy on print media in the EU. The move was criticized by country’s leading liberal dailies, which expressed fears that it will undermine their financial stability,45 and Jourová, the European Commission vice president from Czechia, warned about the impact on regional press outlets in particular.46 The government subsequently softened the print media tax increase, raising the taxes to which these outlets were subjected to 12 percent instead,47 but the controversy reinvigorated discussion of the insufficient media financing that already poses a serious risk.48
• In June, Parliament approved legislation tightening rules regulating conflicts of interest and ownership of media by politicians, and President Pavel signed it into law in August.49 The bill has been widely dubbed “lex Babiš” as it directly affects links between Babiš and Agrofert, a conglomerate he founded that was one of Czechia’s largest companies.50 The bill restricts legislators, cabinet members, and the president from owning or operating television, radio, or print media outlets—although it does not affect online media—and introduces fines for violations.51 The Senate has asked the government to draft a follow-up law that would define online media and restrict the influence of politicians over online outlets as well.52
• A new bill aimed at boosting the financial stability of public media was unveiled in September. Under the new legislation, the Czech Television (ČT) license fee paid by households would increase by 25 Czech koruna ($1.10) to 160 koruna per month by 2025, and the Czech Radio (ČRo) fee would increase by 10 koruna to 55 koruna per month. Once adopted, the law would secure an additional 1.4 billion for ČT (which had a 5.7 billion koruna budget in 2023) and 600 million for ČRo (which had a 2 billion budget). Still, some observers point out the move won’t be sufficient, since ČT license fees have not been raised for the past 15 years while ČRo’s fees have been the same for 18 years53 . For financial reasons, ČT had to sell some of its lucrative sports streaming rights to private competition in 2022, in a move which jeopardizes ČT’s viewership and redirects audiences to arguably lower-quality content producers.
• In September, the Babiš-linked Agrofert conglomerate sold Mafra, one of the two largest publishing houses in the country, to the Kaprain Group, owned by billionaire Karel Pražák.54 Kaprain acquired Mafra in a deal that also included purchasing the LONDA radio company and the Synthesia chemical plant, the latter of which was the most valuable asset in the whole transaction.
• Media analysts wrote that while Babiš has now left the media market, worries over media ownership concentration in large companies whose business is not primarily media remained, and some expressed concern that Babiš was able to resolve his conflict of interest while winning himself positive coverage at the same time.
• The Czech National Committee of the International Press Institute (CZ IPI) addressed energy and media tycoon Daniel Křetínský in an open letter calling on media outlets owned by the Czech News Centre (CNC), which is controlled by Křetínský and his business partners, to respect journalistic standards.55 CZ IPI issued the letter following a series of articles in which CNC’s Blesk tabloid, Czechia’s most circulated daily, criticized the acquisition of Net4Gas by the Czech state without noting that Křetínský’s energy company EPH was also interested in acquiring Net4Gas.
• In December, the online news outlet Seznam Zprávy reported on a police document outlining Křetínský’s communications with Jiří Malý, the deputy director of the Institute for Clinical and Experimental Medicine (IKEM) hospital, in which they discussed CNC’s Reflex magazine publishing an article about IKEM.56 Křetínský’s spokesperson Daniel Častvaj told Seznam Zprávy that while Křetínský did participate in editorial decision-making at his outlets, Častvaj himself had discussed the articles about IKEM with Relex’s editor in chief.
• Disinformation and Kremlin-backed propaganda remains largely unaddressed at the governmental level, after turmoil following the February dismissal of the government commissioner responsible for combating disinformation, Michal Klíma. It prompted some media observers to conclude that Fiala’s cabinet has abandoned efforts to address disinformation and propaganda in the Czech public and on the internet.57 Several analyses published in 2023 warn about the wide proliferation of climate skepticism and climate disinformation in the Czech media more broadly.
• Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are increasing. In one example, Gaby Khazalová, an editor at the independent online outlet Deník Referendum, won a court case in which she was sued by the wife of energy billionaire Pavel Tykač for the feature story “Hidden Empire of the Tykač Family” about the couple’s privatization of apartments in the Prague city center.58
• Parliament adopted amendments to the Acts on Czech Television and Czech Radio in July, distributing voting rights to elect members of both public broadcasters’ councils between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.59 The bill came into force in October and was designed to strengthen the system of checks and balances protecting the editorial independence of public media.
• The new head of ČT, Jan Souček, was elected in June, ending the tenure of Petr Dvořák, the broadcaster’s longest-serving director.60 In September, Souček introduced his vision aimed at developing ČT into “the leader of the Czech digital audiovisual market,” including by increasing investments into online content.61

• Ongoing antigraft probes in the municipality of Brno, Czechia’s second-largest city, widened after police indicted more suspects in connection with the rigged privatization of city-owned apartments.62 High-profile ODS politicians from the municipality, including Brno mayor Markéta Vaňková and state minister of justice Blažek, have been accused by a local politician, Pavel Hubálek, of running a ring during the 2010s that gave out the apartments in exchange for bribes.63 Hubálek testified to the police after being investigated for taking part in the plot.
• The Prague municipal government formed in February, after a record-length negotiation following municipal elections held in September 2022.64 A rift over the anticorruption efforts of local grassroots party Prague Together was at the core of the protracted negotiations involving the liberal Pirates and the right-of-center SPOLU, the latter of which refused to govern with Prague Together. Earlier, SPOLU was close to forming a government in Prague with ANO, but ultimately SPOLU, the Pirates, and the center-right Mayors and Independents (STAN) group formed a majority coalition, relegating Prague Together and ANO to the minority in the city parliament.
• Regional assistance centers for Ukrainians seeking shelter in Czechia were set up in 2023 to relieve the overcrowding of centers in Prague and Brno. According to police data from January, Prague, Brno, and the regions surrounding those two cities—the Central Bohemia and South Moravian regions, respectively—host the majority of the Ukrainians sheltered in the country.65 The country has so far not been able to redistribute the Ukrainians it is sheltering more evenly across the regions outside of metropolitan areas in Bohemia and Moravia, underscoring Czechia’s long-term imbalance between large urban centers and outlying regions.66
• For the first time since the mid-1980s, the Czech population increased as a result of the inflow of people from war-stricken Ukraine.67 However, this growth does not appear to be evenly spread across the regions, highlighting the existing social and living standard gaps between the rich urban centers of Prague and Brno and their surrounding regions, and peripheral regions like the Ústecký, Karlovy Vary, and Moravian-Silesian regions. In recent elections, this gap was also mirrored in political preferences, with populist and antiestablishment parties winning or performing better in the poorer regions while liberal parties did better in the wealthier regions.68
• The long-awaited community energy bill was approved in December 2023. Proponents argue that the approval of the bill could lead to the decentralization of Czech energy distribution and an increased use of renewable energy in regional towns. Czechia is currently facing EU infringement proceedings for failure to enable the development of energy communities.69
• A new nuclear waste disposal law faces strong opposition in the regions. In November, Parliament approved legislation that outlines rules for the construction of an underground storage facility for nuclear waste.70 The parliamentary version of the legislation does not give veto rights to municipalities near a future nuclear waste repository, leaves the Senate out of decision-making regarding the facility’s location, and moves forward the deadline for selecting the location to 2028, which was criticized by municipalities and NGOs as being too soon.71 The Senate returned the legislation to the Chamber of Deputies in December, in an effort to give the Senate a say over the facility’s location.

• After long delays, Czechia’s Whistleblower Protection Act (formally Act No. 171/2023 Coll. on the Protection of Whistleblowers) came into force on August 1 after being passed by Parliament and signed earlier in the year.72 The first high-profile case, involving a corruption complaint made by Jan Benýšek, the head of the Ministry of Justice’s corporate insolvency department, demonstrated that whistleblower protections are still not well-established. In November, Benýšek filed a complaint that his superior Antonín Stanislav—Minister Blažek’s deputy—had meddled with examinations for administrators who would oversee large corporate insolvencies and requested protection under the new whistleblower law.73 In an apparent act of retribution, Benýšek’s department was split into two shortly after reports of his filing appeared.74 The case was still ongoing at the end of the year.75
• The case underscored that although Czechia had adopted legislation introducing elements of protection for whistleblowers, considerable obstacles remain in implementation. In January 2024, the Whistleblowing Center, run by the NGO Revival, reported that in 2023, there had been 81 requests for whistleblower protection, 20 of which had been deemed valid and forwarded for to the relevant authorities.76 77
• In February, the outgoing president Zeman withdrew his plans to preemptively appoint the head of the Constitutional Court before leaving office. The previous year, Zeman had mulled such an early appointment, which legal analysts warned would lead to a constitutional disarray, in order to maintain his influence in case his ally Babiš lost the upcoming January presidential election. Instead, Pavel appointed Josef Baxa78 as the new president of the constitutional court after the term of the previous head of the court, Pavel Rychetský, expired in August. Before leaving, Rychetský warned in June that the Constitutional Court’s operations have been negatively affected by vacancies on the bench.
• Accusations of conflict of interest followed79 Minister of Justice Blažek throughout 2023. Early in 2023, reports emerged that Blažek had filed an internal complaint against Judge Aleš Dufek for granting the media access to court documents from police raids in Brno last October that implicate several of Blažek’s ODS party colleagues in corruption allegations.80 In March, the Czech Pirate Party called on Blažek to resign after media reports81 revealed that Blažek also made several requests to obtain information from prosecutors on the Brno investigation. Supreme State Prosecutor Igor Stříž said that “the frequency [of the requests] does not seem appropriate to me,” raising questions about the reason for Blažek’s requests and the possibility that he had meddled with the investigation.
• The Pirate Party passed an internal resolution in June stating that Blažek threatened public trust in the country’s judiciary and that his actions went against the cabinet’s program.82 The resolution was passed in response to media reports that month claiming that Blažek was withholding information about being questioned by police in 2020, when he had been approached in connection with the Brno graft probes. Blažek also invoked his immunity as an MP at the time and refused to answer questions from detectives from the General Inspectorate of Security Forces (GIBS) about where he obtained certain documents which earlier disrupted the Brno probe.83 Blažek is backed by Prime Minister Fiala, his close ally from the Brno branch of the ODS, and ODS legislators in Parliament passed a resolution in support of the minister of justice that has helped him stay in office.
• President Pavel’s nomination of Judge Robert Fremr to the Constitutional Court led to renewed discussion of the judiciary’s Communist-era past. Fremr withdrew his bid in August after the media reported that, during time serving as a judge during the 1980s, Fremr had given criminal sentences to more than 100 people for emigrating from the country without official approval, which was a crime in Communist Czechoslovakia.84
• In June, the Czech cabinet gave approval for Parliament to vote on ratification of the Istanbul Convention, which Czechia had signed in 2016 but never ratified.85 However, the Czech Senate failed to ratify the Istanbul Convention in a January 2024 vote, further jeopardizing its prospects.86 The stalled ratification, which had not yet taken place even though the country joined the international agreement in 2016, underscores the country’s inadequate record on women rights. Czechia’s placement on the Gender Equality Index maintained by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) fell for the third straight year in 2023, dropping by two places down to 25th out of the 27 EU countries. Its score of 57.9 is well below the European average of 70.2.87
• NGOs have long advocated for revising the definition of rape contained in existing legislation. In August, the Ministry of Justice submitted a proposal for comment that would define any sex without consent as rape, and would also apply that crime—rather than the less serious sexual assault—to any sexual intercourse with a child under the age 12, up from the current age of 5. NGOs warn that the proposal may not yet be sufficient but is a starting point for reform.88 As of December 2023, Czech law still requires physical force to have been used in order for a sexual assault to be categorized as rape, and does not recognize a victim’s verbal refusals, state of shock, intoxication, or disability as grounds for a rape charge. Calls for the legal redefinition of rape intensified in November after young former rising political star Dominik Feri was sentenced to three years in prison for two rapes and one attempted rape. When handing down the ruling, presiding judge Lenka Hájková described the three-years jailtime Feri received as low.89
• A May legislative proposal by the government aims to strengthen protections for victims of domestic violence. It is the first amendment to the existing legislation in 15 years and widens the definition of domestic violence, to what the media described as the first proper definition for the offense. It is expected to come into force in July 2024.90
• Czechia still has not completed foreclosure and insolvency reforms necessary to meet the standards set forth by the EU’s Restructuring and Second Chance Directive.91 Calls by NGOs for a more thorough reform of foreclosures, which still affect a high figure of 639,579 Czechs,92 were highlighted by Czech Television’s documentary series outlining the systematic abuse of people trapped in foreclosures.93
• The Olomouc Region state prosecutor, Radim Daňhel, resigned in June for “personal as well as professional reasons” that prevented him from effectively conducting his duties, according to Daňhel and a Ministry of Justice statement.94 Daňhel spent less than a year in office and was overseeing the Brno graft probes, over which Minister of Justice Blažek had faced criticism and accusations of conflict of interest. It was another change at the helm of closely watched Olomouc prosecutor’s office, one year after the previous prosecutor Ivo Ištvan had asked to be moved to another post.
• Babiš was acquitted in a €2 million ($2.1 million) fraud case in January, but the ruling was canceled nine months later by Prague’s High Court. After the case was appealed by the state prosecution in April, it was returned to the lower court for retrial in September. Babiš and his former adviser Jana Nagyova were alleged to have fraudulently obtained an EU subsidy in connection to the Stork’s Nest farm and conference center, whose ownership was transferred from Babiš’s Agrofert conglomerate to members of the former prime minister’s family—and then later back again to Agrofert—in an apparent attempt to get around the requirement that the subsidy benefit small- and medium-sized businesses.95

• Corruption is Czechia’s lowest-scoring section in the NIT ranking. This rating corresponds to the country’s standing in other international assessments such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), where Czechia’s 2023 score remained unchanged at 57/100, seven points below the EU average, though it has improved its rank by one place to 41st out of 180 countries.96
• The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) latest reports urge Czechia to do more to prevent corruption in the highest echelons of politics, state administration and law enforcement.97 In 2023, several high-profile corruption cases illustrated the persisting proliferation of corruption in politics, and, more recently, corruption in connection with evading sanctions placed on Russia.
• Czechia implemented new legislation in August introducing basic elements of protection for whistleblowers for the first time, but the first high-whistleblower case that followed—of whistleblower Jan Benýšek from the Ministry of Justice—has already demonstrated that protections still lag in practice (see Judicial Framework and Independence).
• Increased media attention to sanctions against Kremlin-linked oligarchs, officials, and businessmen led to several investigations exposing assets in Czechia owned by sanctioned individuals and their families or business partners. In a high-profile revelation, Maria Pevchikh of Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation documented that the family of Boris Obnosov, CEO of the Russian-state–owned holding company Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV)—which manufactures weapons systems, including missiles used to attack civilian targets in Ukraine—is living in luxury in Prague.98 After weeks of media reports, Czech authorities seized the family’s Prague property.99 . Despite the adoption of a national sanctions list, the Obnosov family case shows that without publicity in the national media, assets owned by Kremlin-linked figures in Czechia can go unnoticed.
• Outgoing president Zeman pardoned the construction company Energie stavební a báňská (ESB) less than 48 hours before his term expired in March.100 . Energie had been implicated in a rigged public tender in March 2022 for the €8.5 million ($9.4 million) Klíčava water project organized by the Lány Forestry Administration, an organization responsible for the forests around the presidential country retreat.101 Zeman also pardoned the former head of the Lány Forestry Administration, Miloš Balák, shortly after he was sentenced to three years in prison for his role in the rigged tender.
• In September, the police raided the headquarters of the Czech Army General Staff in Prague in connection with public tenders linked to businessmen implicated in the Dozimetr kickback scheme, which had first been exposed in June 2022 in relation to other significant public tenders in IT and transportation.102
• Several Czech state companies were reported to have been granted exemptions from sanctions to continue in business activities with sanctioned Russian-linked companies in sectors like the nuclear and pharmaceutical industries that were critical to Czechia’s infrastructure and economy. In August, media outlets and NGOs accused state-owned oil transportation and storage company MERO ČR of breaching sanctions after contracting oil purchases worth 1.1 billion koruna ($50 million) from a company represented by the former vice president of Russian oil company Lukoil.103
• In August, KTRV CEO Boris Obnosov and his daughter and son-in-law were added to Czechia’s national sanctions list, which includes Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian oligarch Vladimir Yevtushenkov, the latter of whom also reportedly controls assets in Czechia. However, in November, Jana Šedivá resigned after four months of heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ new sanctions department. Šedivá’s resignation raised media concerns that the department is understaffed,104 something NGOs have also warned about.105
• Other developments pointing to persisting challenges in addressing the presence of Kremlin-linked businesses in the country include foreign media reports that by November, sanctioned Russian state energy company Gazprom was still a shareholder in Czechia’s most advanced gas storage facility at Dambořice.106 In September, Minister of Justice Blažek met with Martin Nejedlý, who had previously been an aide of the pro-Kremlin former president Zeman as well as a representative of Lukoil, in a highly criticized meeting.

Author: Albin Sybera, a Czech national living in Slovenia, is a freelance journalist, a news reporter covering Czechia and Slovakia at bne Intellinews, and a contributing editor at the Warsaw-based think tank and magazine Visegrad Insight. He is a doctoral student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, researching constructions of Czech national identity in the media. His articles, interviews, commentaries, and analyses regularly appear in the Guardian, Balkan Insight, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Just Security, Czech Radio, RTV Slovenia, N1, Britské listy, and Hospodářské noviny. Sybera holds degrees in philosophy from Carleton University, Ottawa, and in Reading European Cultures from the University of Glasgow.