Dokument #2115564

Freedom House (Autor)

Nations in Transit 2024 - Bulgaria

Semi-Consolidated Democracy
59
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 58.93 / 100
Democracy Score 4.54 / 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
58 / 100 Semi-Consolidated Democracy
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Authors

  • Angel Petrov

Score changes in 2024

  • Judicial Framework and Independence rating improved from 4.25 to 4.50 due to multiyear efforts to reform the judiciary, including the unprecedented removal of Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev through legal channels and new provisions that allowed for investigations into future chief prosecutors.
  • As a result, Bulgaria’s Democracy Score improved from 4.50 to 4.54.

Executive Summary

In 2023, efforts at solving Bulgaria’s political crises met with mixed success, as some issues were addressed while new ones appeared. A government formed by political rivals ended a nearly ten-month stint of back-to-back caretaker cabinets, opening the door to long-delayed reform. Tensions among institutions, as well as the risk of diverging interests within the alliance, tested these plans.

The April parliamentary elections, held six months after the previous ones failed to produce a governing majority, did not drastically change the makeup of the National Assembly. Former prime minister Boyko Borisov’s Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party consolidated its lead over We Continue the Change (PP)–Democratic Bulgaria (DB), an informal alliance that was formalized for a joint run in April. Meanwhile, the pro-Kremlin Revival party became Bulgaria’s third-largest political party. The vote took place under amended rules, passed in 2022 by a deeply divided parliament, that had scrapped mandatory voting by machine.

In negotiations lasting from May into early June, GERB and PP-DB put their differences aside and agreed to form a government with an 18-month-long mandate and rotating prime ministers. Former education minister Nikolay Denkov of PP took the first turn at serving as prime minister, with former European commissioner Mariya Gabriel serving as foreign minister and deputy prime minister until she was slated toswap places with Denkov in March 2024. They joined hands in an alliance resembling what Borisov months earlier had dubbed “a Euro-Atlantic coalition” that aimed to steer Bulgaria through ongoing political and economic uncertainty.

This move to break the impasse set the parties on a collision course with both President Rumen Radev, who clashed with the ruling coalition on everything from aid to Ukraine to energy policies to judicial reforms to security sector appointments, and Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev, who was removed two weeks into the new government’s term, in a first for Bulgaria. However, the government also drew the public’s ire for its cooperation with Delyan Peevski, a member of the National Assembly with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party who had been sanctioned by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act. This cooperation called into question the thoroughness of promised reform. Finally, parliamentary discourse was made even more confrontational by supporters of Revival and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) marching to protest polarizing issues including Bulgaria’s support of Ukraine, adoption of the euro, and holiday designations.

Local elections were the other decisive battle, determining who would govern Bulgaria’s 265 municipalities and whether newcomers such as PP would be able to consolidate party structures throughout the country. After a campaign marred by infighting among GERB and PP-DB on the national level (with the two working together occasionally while also displaying animosity toward each other and vehemently denying they were in a “coalition”), a last-minute decision by GERB, DPS, BSP, and There Is Such a People (ITN) appointees on the Central Election Commission disallowed machine voting less than two days before the first round, although a court overturned that decision ahead of the runoff.

The year 2023 was mixed for the nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector. While the new government included at least two prominent NGO representatives, who took over the social policy and environment portfolios, NGOs remained the target of criticism from politicians. In 2023 there was an outburst of public activism, with tens of thousands taking to the streets and the civic sector joining public debates during the summer after a young man brutally attacked his girlfriend in July. The public’s outrage over the case resulted in changes to the relevant legislation and contributed to pressure that ended the political career of a veteran lawmaker. Numerous protests by agricultural and coal workers, however, also rocked Bulgaria in the autumn, challenging the government’s commitment to helping Ukraine and implementing energy and environment policies as required under the European Green Deal, which would unlock billions in European Union (EU) funding for Bulgaria. These protests exposed divisions in both society and the governing coalition, which had been expected to deepen as the local elections were approaching.

The media landscape was put under strain by a new strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) brought against an independent outlet, but also by the public radio broadcaster’s decision to drop an interview following comments from Peevski, which some observers and politicians regarded as political interference. The integrity of bTV, one of Bulgaria’s leading TV stations, was called into question in September as its head of news Anton Hekimyan quit to become GERB’s candidate for mayor of Sofia, the capital and largest city..

The local elections saw newcomers take over municipalities. The PP-DB alliance earned the mayoral seats in four regional centers, including Sofia and Varna, Bulgaria’s third-biggest city. Sofia will not have a GERB mayor for the first time 15 years. Bulgaria has begun to reform the power balance between central authorities and municipalities, albeit modestly. Across Bulgaria, natural disasters exposed chronic mismanagement the new government has yet to address.

The year saw a major change in the Prosecutor’s Office as Geshev was ousted as chief prosecutor. President Radev signed off on Geshev’s removal halfway into the prosecutor’s seven-year term, after years of accusations that Geshev had politicized the judiciary. While the term of Borislav Sarafov, who took over as chief prosecutor ad interim, was not free of controversy, the government used its majority in the National Assembly to take other steps seen as progress by European bodies, including the establishment of a mechanism that provided for investigating the chief prosecutor, who had previously enjoyed impunity and overarching competences under Soviet-era laws. The prosecutor given the authority to investigate the chief prosecutor was appointed in December. Constitutional changes were also adopted that the governing majority sees as a step toward improving the rule-of-law situation.

In June, the National Assembly voted to remove investigative prerogatives from the Prosecutor’s Office, but legislators subsequently reversed that move. Bulgaria also passed key pieces of legislation necessary to unlock funds from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), but months behind schedule because of 2022’s political crisis. Lawmakers also amended the country’s anticorruption framework with new legislation to split the country’s main watchdog into two separate commissions, ending a dispute that had bitterly divided the previous legislature.

However, Bulgaria’s government struggled with the aftermath of several corruption-related scandals it had inherited over the past several years. Businessman Vasil Bozhkov—who had been charged with having ordered two murders and a failed assassination attempt, as well as 20 counts of tax evasion—returned to the country three years after fleeing and claimed to be a protected witness. In addition, the “Eight Dwarves” affair evolved throughout the year, implicating the new chief prosecutor Sarafov and other judicial officials, but only a few new charges had been brought as of the end of 2023. Finally, a third high-profile corruption investigation known as “Barcelonagate,” was closed due to inconclusive evidence for the money-laundering claims.

A series of high-profile murders and deaths of mafia-linked figures sparked concerns over both law-enforcement capacity and alleged connections between politicians and the criminal underworld. Most notably, the killing of businessman Alexey Petrov in broad daylight in mid-August called into question the efficiency of the institutions charged with maintaining the rule of law, in a country scarred by killings of notorious underworld figures in the first years after communism fell.

Bulgaria’s accession to the borderless Schengen Area, as well as that of the neighboring Romania, was delayed time and again due to objections from Austria and the Netherlands based on their own domestic concerns and the need for Bulgaria to make progress on the rule of law. The impasse coincided with a number of incidents involving the smuggling of migrants, such as in March when 18 migrants were found dead in a truck near Lokorsko, north of Sofia. At the same time, accession to the Eurozone remained elusive for Bulgaria due to the EU’s own concerns and opposition among parts of the Bulgarian public and some politicians. Finally, tensions with North Macedonia, which had been prominent the previous year, surfaced only occasionally in 2023 without impacting Bulgarian politics deeply, as North Macedonia continued to negotiate agreed-upon constitutional changes.

At-A-Glance

In Bulgaria, national governance remains democratic, but in 2023 national politics faced persistent polarization and confrontational discourse between institutions, even if major parties made efforts to put differences aside for the sake of stable governance and resolving last year’s crisis. While elections are generally free, persistent vote-buying allegations and frequent changes of electoral legislation, alongside the political rhetoric of major parties, pose a risk of undermining trust in the voting process. Civic protests occasionally help usher in reform, but human rights activism comes under persistent attacks from some political forces equating it to foreign interference and a pro-LGBT+ agenda. The media environment has seen various forms of pressure, from non-transparent allocation of public funding to SLAPP cases. Local self-governance is chronically underfunded, with local officials claiming for years that fiscal decentralization would help deal with increasingly common environmental disasters. Efforts at reforming the justice system deliver mixed results, while a long-discussed reduction in the chief prosecutor's overarching authority remains elusive. The fight against corruption has a long way to go as both reform and implementation fall victim to frequently changing governments.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 4.25 / 7.00
  • Bulgarian parties’ efforts at forming a government after the October 2022 elections were unsuccessful,1 causing President Radev to set the next elections for April 2, 2023—the fifth one in two years.2 In the meantime, Radev appointed two back-to-back caretaker governments—both of them headed by former deputy prime minister and labor minister Galab Donev—to lead the country.3 The April 2023 vote did not see substantial changes in the National Assembly, dampening the prospects of forming a government without GERB and PP-DB.4 GERB consolidated its lead on PP-DB,5 while the pro-Kremlin Revival became Bulgaria’s third-largest political party. A consensus6 to elect GERB member Rosen Zhelyazkov as the speaker of parliament7 paved the way for coalition talks between GERB and PP-DB, despite DB and PP having built their political brands on the rejection of what they called “the GERB model.”8 Historically, GERB has showed equal dislike of PP-DB, a sentiment that deepened after the March 2022 arrest of former prime minister Borisov under the government led by Prime Minister Kiril Petkov of the PP.9
  • The alliance between GERB and PP-DB (which they adamantly refuse to call a “coalition”10 ) was created under a deal reached in May 2023. Former education minister Denkov and former European commissioner Gabriel would rotate on a nine-month basis as prime minister and foreign minister. The two agreed to refrain from reshuffling ministers beyond Denkov and Gabriel. They also committed themselves to judicial reform, which requires constitutional changes, electoral reform, and amendments to laws related to security and counterintelligence services to clear those sectors of “foreign influence,” namely agents allegedly affiliated with or lobbying for Russia’s interests.11 Following these commitments, the new government took office in June.12 GERB-PP-DB talks were marred by a leaked recording of a party meeting where PP cochair Asen Vasilev was heard alleging that the new government would seize control of security and intelligence services and replace their directors with people whose names had been approved by “the embassies.”13 Revival leader Kostadin Kostadinov suggested that Vasilev was referring to the US Embassy and alerted the Prosecutor’s Office, citing suspicions of high treason committed by Petkov and Vasilev. The prosecution said it was looking into the matter.14 PP never denied the recording’s authenticity but said it had done nothing wrong, labeling the leak a conspiracy to destroy the nascent alliance. The issue remained a leitmotif in the opposition and president’s political rhetoric throughout much of the government’s tenure.
  • The DPS’s role in the government came under scrutiny from the public, with the ruling alliance coopting the prominent DPS legislator Peevski to push through constitutional reform and other pieces of legislation. Peevski, a former media mogul,15 had been sanctioned in 2021 by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act. PP-DB had portrayed Peevski and the DPS as epitomizing corruption and state capture, but still sought DPS votes to amend the constitution. Peevski became one of the leading voices on constitutional reform and was briefly elected to head the parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs (albeit without PP-DB votes) but resigned following the public backlash.16 However, he went on to collaborate with the majority on other issues.17
  • Political figures used polarizing rhetoric when discussing the war in Ukraine, Bulgaria’s pending adoption of the euro,18 whether Bulgaria's most important official holiday should the changed,19 and measures against domestic violence. In December, the president and the government clashed publicly about the removal of a contentious Red Army monument in downtown Sofia that had divided opinions for more than 30 years.20 Proponents of this confrontational discourse included Revival and BSP, which competed over support from a likeminded electorate.21
  • GERB-PP-DB cooperation was not seamless, and more points of friction emerged as the October 2023 local elections approached,22 while other rifts deepened after them.23 Government formation also set the stage for further confrontation with the president, which added to the harsh tone in parliament. Radev had occasionally waded into political campaigning prior to the parliamentary vote,24 and PP-DB coleader Petkov accused him of delaying the constitutional procedure that would allow for the formation of the government for that very reason.25 Radev continued clashing with the new government on Ukraine, judicial reform, energy reform, public protests, and more. He exercised his veto rights on multiple draft laws (from reforms in the judiciary to energy liberalization) and on some appointments.26
  • In mid-October, Peevski became the cochair of DPS’s parliamentary faction.27 Three weeks later, DPS chairman Mustafa Karadayi resigned,28 with former leader and founder Ahmed Dogan taking over ad interim.29 The leader would be determined at a forthcoming national conference set for February 24, 2024. Peevski said he would be running,30 as the quick rise of his public profile made some observers assume that he would be the DPS’s next leader.31
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 5.50 / 7.00
  • The April 2023 elections took place under amended rules that had deeply divided parliament in 2022.32 A year earlier, machine voting had been made compulsory at polling stations with more than 300 registered voters. The Central Election Commission voted in February 2023 to oblige vote counters to tally paper- and machine-voting results together. Critics suggested that the move that could hamper the vote’s transparency because votes cast by the different methods could not be differentiated, with commission spokesperson Aleksandar Tomov resigning in protest.33 The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted, in its preliminary report on the elections issued April 2, that “frequent changes erode trust, undercut efficiency and pose challenges to timely preparation.” It singled out the decision “reducing the use of voting machines,” which it said “reignited concerns about the secrecy and integrity of the ballot and undue influence on voters in socially vulnerable communities.”34
  • The ODIHR also noted female underrepresentation in Bulgaria’s National Assembly, with the share of women remaining flat at 24 percent from the old to the new legislature. “With some notable exceptions, female candidates’ visibility remained low,” the report concluded, including in televised debates. At the same time, the ODIHR noted that there are no legal provisions for fostering the participation of members of Bulgaria’s ethnic minority groups, who are normally not included in parties’ platforms. Roma communities in particular are mentioned as the target of police anti–vote-buying operations, which were often perceived as intimidating by those communities.35
  • ODIHR observers also said they had noted instances of people tracking voters and the presence of unauthorized persons in polling stations, findings “which are often indicative of undue influence on voters.”36 In the final version of the report, observers noted “persisting allegations of vote-buying and controlled voting.”37 Vote-buying claims led to probes and detentions both in the run-up to the elections and afterward, but resulted in few trials and sentences.38 In one instance, the head of the taxation department of Nesebar municipality was detained in September for alleged vote buying. However, there were no subsequent announcements on the matter.39
  • Local elections, which were held in October, determined power in the 265 municipalities and whether newcomers such as PP would be able to consolidate its support throughout the country. Sofia was a key battleground.40 PP-DB and GERB both endorsed nonpoliticians who divided public opinion: businessman Vasil Terziev, cofounder of Telerik software company, was endorsed by PP-DB, while GERB backed Anton Hekimyan, who had been head of bTV’s news division until days before his nomination and whose choice both he and Borisov acknowledged was “nonstandard.”41
  • Parties continued to undermine machine voting, including GERB despite its role in the government. In the evening of October 27, the Central Election Commission barred machine voting for the local elections’ first round due to begin less than 36 hours later, citing a lack of certification for the machines. The decision was prompted by reports that a deputy minister for e-governance had taken a picture of the “hash code” of the machines,42 a move seen as irrelevant to the voting process by the government and experts alike.43
  • The voting was therefore conducted on paper only, amid an exceptionally low turnout of 34.16 percent.44 A day after the first round, the Supreme Administrative Court overturned the election commission’s decision, arguing that the deputy wielded no competence to certify the machines and could not delegate it to a minister, but giving the go-ahead for the runoff. Turnout in the runoff was slightly higher, at 36.87 percent.45
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 5.50 / 7.00
  • Civic pressure pushed lawmakers to bolster legislative protections against domestic violence46 after a brutal attack made national news. In July, reports broke of an 18-year-old woman stabbed dozens of times the previous month in the city of Stara Zagora by her boyfriend, who also broke her nose and shaved her head; she survived but left the hospital with 400 stitches. The perpetrator was detained and then released, with the prosecution investigating him for causing “minor bodily injury.”47 Thousands of people demonstrated over several evenings against gender-based violence in more than 30 cities.48 In August, legal changes enabled victims of domestic abuse to seek protection even if they did not live together. At least for a brief period, the public’s tolerance for insensitive remarks on the issue were lower.49 GERB lawmaker and former National Assembly speaker Vezhdi Rashidov quit both the legislature and politics in general following mounting public anger over a derogatory comment he made about victims of domestic violence.50
  • The case exposed how LGBT+ and gender issues are misused in the political discourse. BSP, Revival, and ITN politicians all voiced suspicions that the antiviolence bill would pave the way for legalizing same-sex marriage and “the third sex”51 and would promote “gender ideology.” 52 In their discourse, the parties’ usage of “intimate relationship” was limited to a relationship between “a man and a woman,” discriminating against LGBT+ people exposed to domestic violence.53 Culture wars also persisted beyond that topic. In June, far-right supporters foiled the screening of Close, a Belgian-directed movie about the complicated relationship between two male teenagers, in Sofia54 and, subsequently tried to do the same in Plovdiv55 and Varna,56 Bulgaria’s second- and third-biggest cities, arguing that it propagated LGBT+ values and pedophilia. In Varna, the demonstrators included BSP supporters. The same month, a “profamily” rally was organized to “counterbalance” Sofia Pride, with thousands of participants defying the rain in the capital’s center.57
  • Farmers blocked roads across the country in September and October in protest of Bulgaria’s decision not to renew a ban on Ukrainian imports, which had been imposed earlier in 2023 with the European Commission’s approval.58 In one instance, protesters ejected Kostadinov, the Revival leader, from a demonstration in a rejection of what they said was his attempt to coopt the protests.59 The government initially labeled the protesters as terrorists in September,60 but public backlash made Prime Minister Denkov backtrack, and a compromise was reached at the end of the month.61
  • Energy industry workers also took to the streets at the end of September demanding that Bulgaria withdraw plans submitted to the European Commission that foresee an end to coal mining by 2038. Although Bulgaria’s government promised some concessions to protesters, and it held firm against withdrawing the plans.62
  • A protest against the leadership of the Bulgarian Football Union in November during a Bulgaria-Hungary game in Sofia descended into chaos, with fights between Hungary fans and local football team supporters leading to dozens of injuries and arrests.63 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemned what had appeared to be “unprecedented police violence” shown in video footage.64 The Interior Ministry afterwards removed four officers for rights violations, and placed two others under investigation.65 The case became a locus of partisan conflict between the governing political parties, with Prime Minister Denkov of PP calling on Interior Minister Kalin Stoyanov to resign;66 when Stoyanov refused, PP leader Petkov labeled the interior minister, who did not have an official political affiliation, as “GERB’s minister.”67 The National Assembly set up an interim committee looking into police violence accusations.68
  • In July, Revival’s Telegram channel reposted a collage showing Solomon Passy—a former foreign minister and prominent advocate of European integration who is Jewish—held by people in Nazi-style uniforms and wearing a striped prison uniform, with the caption reading, “Since you don’t want Russian gas, come so that we give you some of ours.”69 The Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office launched a probe, but did not announce any results as of the end of 2023.70 In October, the government adopted its first action plan to counter antisemitism.71
  • At the end of December, the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office ruled that a Facebook post by Kostadinov that had labeled civil society organizations and people working to boost democracy in Bulgaria as “ugly scum” did not amount to a crime. In the post, which the Revival leader had said was an “official position,” Kostadinov opined that “the savage and blood-thirsty human scum dreaming for wars and violence” should be destroyed as “it is a citizen’s duty to do everything in his power so that this ugly scum can be destroyed—for the good not only of Bulgaria, but also of humanity.”72
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.50 / 7.00
  • Bulgarian insurance company Lev Ins said in March it would sue the independent news website Mediapool.bg over an article about its business, which had been based on publicly available minutes of a government meeting.73 Lev Ins proposed to drop the lawsuit if Mediapool provided “truthful” coverage of the issue,74 but Mediapool did not amend its coverage.75 The lawsuit, which had its first court hearing in November,76 is being seen as a SLAPP case, as it echoes a similar lawsuit against investigative outlet Bivol.bg by another insurer in 2021.77 The Justice Ministry said in June that it would prepare legal amendments that would make SLAPP cases harder to file, but nothing was announced before the end of the year.78
  • In June, the Council for Electronic Media (CEM) decided to repeat the vote for the election of the director general of public broadcaster Bulgarian National Television (BNT).79 The procedure had been suspended after an inconclusive vote last year, extending the mandate of incumbent Emil Koshlukov, who enjoys a mixed reputation.80 In May, an administrative court in Sofia ruled that the procedure had been terminated in an unlawful manner and ordered the revote.81
  • In June, CEM Chair Sonya Momchilova sparked public outcry by calling Russian atrocities in Bucha, Ukraine, committed in April 2022 “Ukrainian propaganda.”82 Momchilova further claimed the watchdog should allow media outlets to reject political correctness.83 The EU’s annual rule-of-law report in July highlighted the lack of guarantees for the media watchdog’s independence.84
  • Anton Hekimyan stepped down in September as head of bTV’s news division to run for mayor as GERB’s candidate, sparking concerns over bTV’s impartiality. The commercial television station announced measures to ensure its impartiality such as hiring an external monitoring agency,85 given GERB’s political dominance86 in Bulgaria until 2021 and its ongoing governmental role. Hekimyan was barred from bTV’s newsroom, although he was invited to be interviewed on a few occasions about his decision to run.87
  • A GERB lawmaker filed amendments in June aimed at restricting access to public information. The amendments would require people requesting access to provide their personal identification number, evidence of “legitimate interest” in obtaining the data, and “membership in a local community” in the relevant municipality where they are filing the requests. It would also exclude some financial documents, including ones touching on budgets and EU funding, from the scope of “public information,” thus blocking public access to such information. The move sparked outcry from RSF, which said it risked undermining freedom of speech.88 GERB subsequently distanced itself from the proposal.89
  • The Revival party continued its confrontational discourse against the media. In February, it said it had called police to a site where veteran journalist Emiliya Milcheva was reporting on preparations for a referendum aimed at blocking the adoption of the euro, in a move ostensibly meant to intimate her.90 In another example, Kostadinov, the party leader, expelled a BNT journalist from an election event in April.91
  • In December, Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) decided not to run a recorded interview by journalist Petar Volgin with Russia’s ambassador just hours ahead of airtime, after an outcry from Peevski, who had argued that it was unacceptable for BNR to be complicit in Russia’s hybrid warfare. Volgin, who often draws public criticism for airing pro-Russian narratives, claimed Peevski had banned the interview, with the BNR complying. The BNR said the interview had violated its standards, despite having approved it the day before.92
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 4.75 / 7.00
  • In July, PP-DB proposed limiting the number of terms mayors could serve. The proposal was unveiled as part of an constitutional reform package, in line with plans the Petkov government had announced back in 2022.93 GERB rejected the idea, with Borisov saying mayors were elected by “the people” and therefore had a right to serve multiple terms.94 Peevski made clear that the DPS, whose votes would be vital for constitutional reform, was against a term limit. GERB and the DPS had held control of most of Bulgaria’s municipalities since 2019, while PP had yet to establish local-level party structures, which are considered essential to political power in Bulgaria. Some mayors in Bulgaria have been accused of entrenching their interests and networks in their municipalities as they win reelection time and again.95 For example, one mayor, Delcho Mitev of Bryagovo village in Plovdiv region, has been in office for 47 years.96
  • In August, the new central government stated that it would back long-discussed decentralization plans to shift authority around financial matters to the municipalities, saying that there was “political consensus” around the idea between the ruling parties. At a meeting with mayors, government representatives presented a draft decentralization model and discussed the goal of increased autonomy for municipalities.97 Municipalities have maintained for years98 that financial arrangements should be changed to address funding shortages that had prevented them from solving local issues. The last elected government, led by PP, had announced plans to pursue decentralization, but its collapse in the summer of 2022 put the plan on hold. While financial decentralization is yet to be fulfilled, in November, Finance Minister Asen Vasilev proposed “functional decentralization,” which would empower municipalities to choose their own priority projects and receive funding for them.99 He set out funding criteria later that month.100
  • Floods in 2023 exposed local- and national-level governance flaws across Bulgaria.101 Heavy rain hit the southern Black Sea coastal region in early September. Overflowing rivers damaged houses, bridges, and roads, and cut power and access to drinking water. Four people died in the Tsarevo municipality, which was heavily hit by the flooding.102 Some 4,000 people along the coast were affected, according to government estimates.103 A government report looking into the causes of the damage was expected to be published at the end of September. Instead, in October, the special commission created to look into the disaster placed the blame squarely on the rain, which the deputy minister of environment and water said was the worst in five centuries.104 However, media reports and local experts linked the disaster to a range of issues for which both local and central authorities are responsible. Among these is the fact that Tsarevo’s insfrastructure plan is 10 years behind schedule, which has delayed needed improvements such as waste treatment plant projects. Prime Minister Denkov noted that 360 sections of river across the country were clogged, seven of them in Tsarevo.105 Riverbeds were also in need of cleaning and, while riverbanks required reinforcement. Throughout the country, local authorities continue to claim that their disaster-management activities are underfunded.106
  • The PP-DB alliance, despite being the second-largest political force nationally, took control of the mayorship in only five of the 265 Bulgarian municipalities in the October local elections. However, its mayoral candidates won victories in four regional centers—mostly after contested runoffs—taking control of Sofia, Varna, Pazardzhik, and Blagoevgrad. While GERB won in 98 municipalities and 11 of the 28 regional centers (one less regional center than in 2019), its candidate Hekimyan failed to reach the runoff in Sofia, finishing third after the PP-DB–endorsed Terziev and BSP nominee Vanya Grigorova. The result marks the first time since 2007 that a GERB candidate fails to win the race in Sofia. DPS had the second-best result nationwide, at 38 municipalities. Revival, the third-largest political force in terms of National Assembly representation, showed the limits of its local success, only winning the race for mayor in one small municipality.107
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 4.50 / 7.00
  • Ivan Geshev, who had been repeatedly accused of interfering in politics since he started his term as chief prosecutor in 2019, continued to be embroiled in scandals until his dismissal in June 2023. In May, Geshev, then still serving as chief prosecutor, claimed that a bomb had exploded near him while he had been traveling by car outside Sofia.108 The caretaker interior minister at the time, Ivan Demerdzhiev,109 expressed suspicions that the alleged attack was an assassination attempt by Krasimir “Karo” Kamenov, a fugitive criminal boss who had reportedly threatened such attacks against government officials.110 However, Geshev’s then-deputy Borislav Sarafov subsequently began distancing himself from his superior, refuting some of his claims about the attack.
  • Then, in May, Sarafov disclosed three alleged legal violations by Geshev related to abuse of office to the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office, which contributed to Geshev’s ultimate ousting.111 GERB and PP-DB agreed in May to work as a governing majority toward securing Geshev’s dismissal through the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), an independent body with a mandate to guarantee judicial and prosecutorial independence and efficacy, as he had refused to resign willingly.112 On June 12, the SJC voted 16–4 to remove Geshev, a first in Bulgaria’s democratic history.113 Sarafov took over as chief prosecutor ad interim, while Geshev left the judiciary to found a conservative, patriotic movement together with the publisher of a sensationalist news agency.114
  • In January, four founders of crypto-services company Nexo who were active DB members were indicted on allegations of money laundering, cybercrime, and other offenses, in a case that many said Geshev had only brought to further his own political interests.115 After Geshev’s dismissal, the probe into Nexo was terminated in Decsember with the prosecution saying no crime had been committed.116
  • In early June while Geshev was still chief prosecutor, he demanded that Borisov’s parliamentary immunity be revoked due to his alleged involvement in the transnational “Barcelonagate” corruption scheme, which would have allowed Geshev to put the GERB leader under investigation and possibly disrupt ongoing coalition talks (see Corruption).117 Likely under the same political motivations, Geshev also demanded Petkov’s immunity be revoked118 in order to conduct a probe into his citizenship.119 The National Assembly formed an interim committee on both requests. Borisov and Petkov gave up their immunity voluntarily, with the latter doing so after Geshev’s dismissal. Later in June, Sarafov said he would not rescind the immunity request.120
  • The Bulgarian government proposed several amendments to the Judiciary Act in 2023, many of which proved to be politically contentious. In June, the National Assembly removed the investigative office from the jurisdiction of the General Prosecutor’s Office, reducing the latter’s overarching authority, but President Radev vetoed the legislation.121
  • In August, the National Assembly established a separate mechanism to investigate alleged wrongdoing by the chief prosecutor,122 overriding a veto by Radev.123 At that time, parliament also set a six-month deadline to form a new Supreme Judicial Council, since the current council’s term had expired in October 2022).124 In September, lawmakers not only overturned the vetoed June amendment that would have separated the investigative office from the General Prosecutor’s Office, but made the chief prosecutor and deputy chief prosecutors subject to investigations.125 Simultaneously, lawmakers passed another amendment in September forcing the SJC to introduce a new system allocating cases to judges randomly.
  • GERB and PP-DB also agreed to work on constitutional reforms that would split the SJC into two sections—one dealing with judges and the other prosecutors126 —limit which officials the president could choose to act as a caretaker prime minister,127 and shorten the terms of the chief prosecutor and chairs of top courts128 . However, in October, parliament failed to gather the three-fourths majority to pass the amendments.129 The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission (officially the European Commission for Democracy through Law), a legal advisory body, criticized the draft, arguing it lacked an impact assessment and a description of motives,130 even though another institution in the Council of Europe later offered a more positive assessment.131 In December, 165 lawmakers—more than two-thirds of the 240-member National Assembly—passed the amendments on a third and final reading. Among several minor changes added between readings was a provision to continue parliament's work, instead of dissolving the National Assembly, in cases where no governing majority has been able to be formed.132 After the final vote, President Radev said he would challenge the changes before the Constitutional Court.133
  • The National Assembly managed to pass several of the 19 pieces of delayed legislation listed in Bulgaria’s post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Plan called for by the EU.134 In January, mediation procedures were expanded to include divorce and parental rights cases in order to minimize case backlogs and lighten the load on the burdened court system.135 In June, parliament adopted a law allowing individuals to declare bankruptcy, making it more difficult for a private person to become an “eternal debtor” through excessive credit use or falling for pyramid schemes; previously, Bulgaria had been the only country in the EU without personal bankruptcy.136 These changes both improve the judicial system and ensured that Bulgaria did not lose access to portions of €10.6 billion in Recovery and Resilience Facility funding.137
  • The deaths of several men with suspected mafia ties sparked concerns over law enforcement’s capacity to guarantee public safety and hold criminal elements to account, and drew comparisons to a rash of killings of mobsters in the 1990s and early 2000s amid internal underworld conflicts. In May, the Bulgarian mobster Kamenov was found murdered at his home in South Africa along with his wife and two other people.138 Kamenov had recently been in the Bulgarian news over Geshev’s accusations that Kamenov had tried to assassinate him, and he had also been charged with ordering the killing of a police officer in connection with the case involving vanished cryptocurrency fraudster Ruja Ignatova.139 Then, in June, fugitive organized crime figure Angel Hristov—one of the two so-called Galevi Brothers—died in Bulgaria after he had secretly returned to the country,140 which he had fled in 2012 to escape a prison sentence.141 Prosecutors said he had died of a heart attack, but the exact circumstances of how he reentered the country have yet to be established.142
  • Fears continued to grow when Alexey Petrov, a wealthy businessman active in Bulgarian politics who had been investigated for alleged ties to organized crime, was shot and killed in broad daylight while walking with several bodyguards in Sofia in August.143 Petrov had been involved in forging the GERB-PP-DB government alliance, by Borisov’s own admission, although the details remain unclear, raising questions about links between Bulgarian politicians and the criminal underworld.144
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 3.75 / 7.00
  • In September, the National Assembly passed legislation dividing the Commission for Combating Corruption and Confiscation of Illegally Acquired Property (KPKONPI), whose mandate is to investigate high-level corruption, into two commissions, one assigned to fight corruption and the other focussing on seizing illegal assets.145 The anticorruption body has the authority to investigate presidents, lawmakers, ministers, judges, and watchdog heads, and accepts reports about corruption and conflicts of interest from anyone with information about potential violations. The commission is made up of three members with six-year terms, each of whom would chair it for two years.146
  • The United States added five Bulgarians to its sanctions list under the Global Magnitsky Act in February for their involvement in corruption:147 former finance minister Vladislav Goranov of GERB; former energy minister Rumen Ovcharov of BSP; Nikolay Malinov, the leader of the Russophiles National Movement lobbying group; and two former board members at Bulgaria’s only nuclear plant, Kozloduy.148 Bulgarian prosecutors did not take immediate action, saying that they had already investigated the designated persons149 and that they had asked the US Justice Department for more information.150 On the same day, the United Kingdom sanctioned Peevski, the DPS lawmaker, and Bozhkov, the fugitive businessman, for their involvement in corruption, thus joining the United States which had issued a similar designation against both men a year earlier.151 Peevski is not the subject of any investigation in Bulgaria; in fact, his role in Bulgaria’s political life has grown ostensibly (see National Democratic Governance).152
  • Veliko Zhelev, the owner of Bulgaria’s Hidrostroy infrastructure company, which was awarded tenders worth more than 1 billion Bulgarian lev ($544 million) over the past several years,153 was detained in March. While Zhelev was indicted over allegedly coercing another person into signing a contract and assuming a debt burden, the caretaker government called for the probe to expand into Hidrostroy’s highway construction dealings, where allegations of financial irregularities have been made for years.154 No results of the investigation have been announced as of the end of 2023, but in July, the new government canceled all infrastructure tenders launched by the previous caretaker administration except one linked to Zhelev’s company.155
  • The “Barcelonagate” probe into a possible money laundering scheme by top Bulgarian officials through the purchase of property in Spain, which was announced by Geshev while he was still in office, had inconclusive results. Several high-profile personalities were questioned in May, to no avail.156 In October, the Sofia City Prosecutor’s Office closed the probe, citing lack of evidence and labeling witnesses’ testimony mere “conjectures.”157
  • In 2023, a prosecutor was charged with unlawfully returning evidence from the “Eight Dwarves” case, an investigation into current and former magistrates who allegedly abused their positions in an attempt to seize assets from a wealthy businessman in 2020.158 In August, evidence was improperly returned to the central figure of the affair, Petyo “The Euro” Petrov, and his wife Lyubena Pavlova, both of which now face new charges for illegally acquiring it. Petrov, the former head of Sofia’s investigation service, had been indicted for coercion and unlawful surveillance in May before fleeing Bulgaria in June.159 Part of the evidence for the new charges was an interview given by Pavlova that also implicated Sarafov, who would soon be appointed Bulgaria’s new chief prosecutor, in the affair.160 The dramatic case, which had allegedly been swept under the rug by Geshev as well, highlights corruption at the core of Bulgaria’s prosecution that the country has yet to address, even after making changes at the very top. Later, in October, Petrov revealed from his unrevealed hiding spot that he had also repeatedly bribed a European delegated prosecutor to influence court outcomes, a claim which is still under investigation.161
  • In August, Bozhkov returned to Sofia from Dubai, after fleeing Bulgaria in 2020 ahead of being charged with 20 counts of corruption and other crimes.162 Bozhkov had alleged that he had been blackmailed by Borisov, Goranov, and their associates into participating in a corruption scheme worth millions of dollars. The Sofia City Court decided upon his return in August that Bozhkov must remain in custody while the circumstances of his departure from Bulgaria163 are investigated, as well as Bozhkov’s potential ties to Evgeniy Prighozhin, the late head and founder of Russian state-funded private military company PMC Wagner.164 Bozhkov maintained that Borisov and Goranov had taken bribes from him in exchange for granting protected status and preferential treatment for his business, which officials denied. Bozhkov was subsequently moved to house arrest.165

Author: Angel Petrov is a journalist on the International News Desk of Dnevnik.bg, a Bulgarian news website, with a focus on the Balkans, Middle East, and the post-Soviet space. He is the former editor in chief of Sofia News Agency, an English-language news service on Bulgaria and previously the Balkans. He has written for the Financial Times, Al Jazeera, and Balkan Insight, and was part of the Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence run by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) in 2019.

Footnotes

  • 1GERB’s offer to set up a “Euro-Atlantic” government based on the party’s commitment to Bulgaria’s Western affiliation, shared (at least in terms of rhetoric and geopolitical alignment) with PP and DB, failed, as neither GERB nor PP nor the BSP secured a majority.
  • 2Evgeniya Marinova and Elena Ilieva, “Президентът насрочва парламентарните избори на 2 април” [The president sets the parliamentary election for April 2], Investor.bg, January 24, 2023, https://www.investor.bg/a/516-politika/368164-prezidentat-nasrochva-par….
  • 3Donev was subsequently appointed chief of staff to Radev. See: Yoanna Vodenova, “Updated: President Appoints Galab Donev as his Chief of Staff,” Bulgarian News Agency (BTA), July 3, 2023. https://www.bta.bg/en/news/bulgaria/484517-president-appoints-galab-don….
  • 4Stoyan Nenov, “Bulgaria Set for Tough Coalition Talks after Fifth Inconclusive Election,” Reuters, April 3, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ex-pm-borissovs-gerb-nudges-ahead-….
  • 5Once an informal alliance of largely like-minded parties which were also coalition partners in Prime Minister Kiril Petkov’s government, PP and DB decided to run on a joint ticket in April 2023.
  • 6GEBR and PP-DB’s parliamentary factions joined hands with the smaller ITN, which had adopted a confrontational discourse toward both, to avoid a repetition of the 2022 stalemate. See: Elitsa Popova, “Росен Желязков—председател на НС с подкрепата на ГЕРБ-СДС, ПП-ДБ и ИТН (ОБЗОР)” [Rosen Zhelyazkov—Speaker of the National Assembly with support from GERB-SDS, PP-DB and ITN (roundup)], bTV News, April 19, 2022, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/rosen-zheljazkov-predsedatel-na-ns-s-po….
  • 7That was not the case in the autumn of 2022, when it took days to elect the parliament speaker, with the impasse creating the risk of further political paralysis.
  • 8PP and DB argued that years of Borisov’s dominance in Bulgarian politics (since 2009) had resulted in widespread corruption, nepotism, ineffective governance, and erosion of the rule of law. The phrase has been used persistently by GERB’s opponents over the years, BSP chairwoman Korneliya Ninova and Petkov being two of many examples. See: “Kиpил Πeтĸoв: ГEPБ мoгaт дa cъcтaвят ĸaбинeт cъc злaтeн пpъcт oт „Bъзpaждaнe“” [Kiril Petkov: GERB can form a cabinet with Revival’s golden finger], Money.bg, October 3, 2022, https://money.bg/politics/kiril-petkov-gerb-mogat-da-sastavyat-kabinet-…. “Нинова доволна, че вече се разгражда моделът „ГЕРБ“” [Ninova is happy that the "GERB model" is already being dismantled], Mediapool.bg, November 5, 2023. https://www.mediapool.bg/ninova-dovolna-che-veche-se-razgrazhda-modelat….
  • 9The US State Department concluded, in its 2022 report on human rights, that action against Borisov was an example of arbitrary arrest. See: “Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person: D. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention,” in US Department of State, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2022), https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-prac….
  • 10The choice of words is a matter of political branding between parties that were once bitter political foes and that occasionally would display animosity toward each other to gain political leverage, especially as the local elections were approaching. See: “Кирил Петков: Няма коалиция между ПП/ДБ и ГЕРБ” [Kiril Petkov: There is no coalition between PP/DB and GERB], News.bg, May 23, 2023, https://news.bg/politics/kiril-petkov-nyama-koalitsiya-mezhdu-pp-db-i-g….
  • 11Rosen Saramov, “Акад. Денков: Трябва да изчистим службите ни от чуждо влияние” [Acad. Denkov: We must clear our services of foreign influence], Marica.bg, May 22, 2023, https://www.marica.bg/balgariq/vlast/akad-denkov-trqbva-da-izchistim-sl….
  • 12“Министрите от кабинета „Денков - Габриел” встъпиха в длъжност” [Ministers from the Denkov-Gabriel cabinet assumed office], Darik News, June 6, 2023, https://dariknews.bg/novini/bylgariia/ministrite-ot-kabineta-denkov-gab….
  • 13“„Службите са наши“: Радостин Василев пусна запис от съвет на „Продължаваме промяната“” [“The services are ours”: Radostin Vasilev released a recording from a meeting of PP], bTV News, May 26, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/sluzhbite-sa-nashi-radostin-vasilev-pus….
  • 14“„Възраждане“ внасят сигнал до главния прокурор за държавна измяна след записите на Василев [Revival alerted the chief prosecutor on high treason after Vasilev's recordings], Bulgarian National Radio (BNR), May 26, 2023, https://bnr.bg/varna/post/101829053/vazrajdane-vnasat-signal-do-glavnia…; Silviya Velikova, “Прокуратурата започва проверка за записите, огласени от Радостин Василев” [The prosecution began looking into the recordings published by Radostin Vasilev], BNR, May 29, 2023, https://bnr.bg/horizont/post/101830266/prokuraturata-zapochva-proverka-….
  • 15In 2013, Peevski was appointed to head the counter-intelligence State Agency for National Security (DANS), sparking large-scale protests as there had been numerous reports of his involvement in shady dealings that were not subjected to investigations.
  • 16“Принципно съгласие за конституционните промени. Пеевски се отказва от мястото си в комисия” [Agreement in principle on the constitutional changes. Peevski is giving up his committee role], Mediapool.bg, June 28, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/printsipno-saglasie-za-konstitutsionnite-prome….
  • 17Peevski and other DPS legislators began adding their signatures to a number of draft laws filed in the National Assembly. These range from hate-speech regulations to environmental rules, as well as legislation removing an exemption from EU sanctions on Russia imposed over the war in Ukraine that allows Bulgaria to use Russian oil imports by the end of 2024. See: Antoniya Simova, “ПП-ДБ, ГЕРБ и ДПС форсират отпадане на дерогацията за руски нефт” [PP-DB, GERB and the DPS push for an end to the exemption on Russian oil import bans], Economic.bg, September 13, 2023, https://www.economic.bg/bg/a/view/pp-db-gerb-i-dps-forsirat-otpadane-na…. PP-DB described the shift as good news as it resulted in increased support for vital reforms. Critics warned that it risked watering down judicial reforms.
  • 18Ralitsa Ficheva, “Парламентът отхвърли референдума за еврото, въпросът ще се реши от Конституционния съд” [Parliament rejected the referendum on the euro, the issue will be addressed by the Constitutional Court], Dnevnik, July 7, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/07/07/4504728_parlamentut_othvurli….
  • 19Nikolay Minkov, “Темата за смяната на националния празник предизвика дебати в парламента” [The national holiday change issue sparked debate in parliament], Bulgarian National Television (BNT), July 26, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/temata-za-smyanata-na-nacionalniya-praznik-pred….
  • 20After days of heated exchanges among politicians and other public figures, much of the monument was removed in December. While the BSP’s promise to hold massive demonstrations and “protect” the monument failed to materialize as the area was sealed off by police, the issue drew attention from politicians at the highest level for several days. President Radev sided with pro-Russian parties calling the developments a crime against “statehood, history, and memory.” Prime Minister Denkov insisted the monument was propagandistic and should be in a museum and not in Sofia’s city center. See: Mikhail Stoyanov, “Демонтажът на Паметника на съветската армия: президентът зае страната на проруските партии (обобщение)” [Dismantling the Soviet Army Monument: the president sided with pro-Russian parties (roundup)], Dnevnik, December 13, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/12/13/4565139_demontajut_na_pametn….
  • 21“„Възраждане“ и БСП се надпреварват за вот на недоверие” [Revival and the BSP are competing over a no-confidence motion], Burgasnews, November 8, 2023, https://perma.cc/8J97-AFDR.
  • 22One example is GERB’s clash with PP (and effort to co-opt DB) over a decision to keep Lukoil Bulgaria’s exemption from the ban on Russian oil imports that is in place until October 24, as voted in the National Assembly in September and in line with a EU-level agreement announced in May 2022 as more sanctions on Russia were announced over the war in Ukraine. Three weeks after the September vote, GERB said the exemption should be removed as it harmed Bulgaria’s interests. GERB legislator Delyan Dobrev claimed that Prime Minister Denkov had told him he would resign if the exemption were removed. The DPS later said it backed GERB’s proposal. See: Georgi Paunovski, “ДПС подкрепя искането на ГЕРБ за дерогацията за „Лукойл“, Василев обяви, че ще има обсъждане” [DPS backed GERB’s demand on Lukoil’s exemption], Dnevnik, October 21, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/10/21/4542326_dps_shte_podkrepi_is….
  • 23These points of friction multiplied after the vote, a notable example being a dispute about whether to end the exemption on oil imports ban into Bulgaria. The country had been granted an exemption from EU sanctions, which was to be in force until end of 2024 to avoid market and industry disruptions. Under pressure from GERB and DPS, the government unilaterally brought that endpoint forward by three months, to October 2024. Subsequently, in mid-November, the deadline was again brought forward to March 2024, with GERB and DPS accusing Denkov’s government of serving Russian interest and existing the derogation could end immediately. See: Zlatina Zehirova, “ГЕРБ, ДПС и Асен Василев се разбраха и за бюджета, и за отказа от руски петрол (допълнена)” [GERB, DPS and Asen Vasilev reached agreement on both the budget and on abandoning Russian oil (updated)], Dnevnik, November 17, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/11/17/4554700_gerb_dps_i_asen_vasi….
  • 24For example, as elections were in sight, Radev made harsh statements against both PP-DB and GERB, labeling them “the war parties” (referring to the war in Ukraine) and calling on them to win the elections if they want to send more weapons to the Ukrainian military. See: “Радев: Партиите на войната нека спечелят изборите и да поемат отговорност за решението за оръжия в Украйна (ВИДЕО)” [Radev: Parties of war should in the elections and assume responsibility over the decision to send arms to Ukraine (video)], Trud, February 14, 2023, https://perma.cc/2X9Y-J9GX. In December 2022, the National Assembly approved a motion to provide military assistance to Ukraine, but after its dissolution, Radev was adamant in rejecting the possibility of a second batch, which GERB, PP and DB had been calling for.
  • 25In May, Radev initially delayed the government formation process (which the president triggers by handing a mandate to the winning party to form a government) to give parties more time to negotiate. However, Petkov alleged that Radev might have waited for the recording of the meeting in which PP coleader Asen Vasilev was heard speaking about seizing control of security and intelligence services to leak in order to discredit PP and discourage GERB from forming the alliance. The recording was leaked by Radostin Vasilev, who was a PP member at the time but had previously been part of ITN, a party which had recently been aligned with Radev on numerous issues. Mihaela Dimitrova, “Петков: Радев бави втория мандат, има ли общо с пресконференцията на Радостин Василев?” [Petkov: Radev is delaying the second mandate, does it have anything to do with Radostin Vasilev’s press conference?], Bulgaria On Air, May 26, 2023, https://www.bgonair.bg/a/2-bulgaria/307108-petkov-radev-bavi-vtoriya-ma…; Zlatina Zekhirova, “Кирил Петков заподозря връзка между забавения втори мандат и записа на Радостин Василев” [Kiril Petkov suspected there was a link between the delayed second mandate and Radostin Vasilev’s recording], Dnevnik, May 26, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/05/26/4488120_petkov_se_pita_dali_….
  • 26One notable example of the latter was a dispute over whether the Interior Ministry’s chief secretary, who oversees day-to-day affairs at the institution, should be dismissed. Radev initially refused, citing the leaked recording of Asen Vasilev and the ruling majority’s supposed desire to purge the administration, although he subsequently agreed to have the chief secretary replaced. See: “Радев отказа да освободи главния секретар на МВР” [Radev refused to dismiss the Interior Ministry’s Chief Secretary], Svobodna Evropa (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] Bulgarian Service), August 24, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/radev-otkaz-glaven-sekretar-mvr-/325631….
  • 27“Делян Пеевски стана съпредседател на ПГ на ДПС” [Delyan Peevski became cochair of the DPS], Liberta.bg, October 16, 2023. https://liberta.bg/delyan-peevski-stana-spredsedatel-na-pg-na-dps.
  • 28“Мустафа Карадайъ подаде оставка като лидер на ДПС” [Mustafa Karadayi resigned as DPS leader], Deutsche Welle (DW), November 7, 2023, https://www.dw.com/bg/mustafa-karadaj-podade-ostavka-kato-lider-na-dps/….
  • 29Dogan had been in charge of the DPS from its founding in 1990 until 2013. After an assassination attempt against him on stage during a party conference in January 2013, Dogan resigned, becoming honorary chair, while allegedly retaining wide influence on decision-making. He is often pointed to as a symbol of corruption and other flaws of the Bulgarian postdemocratic transition. In one of his most widely publicized remarks, he tells a campaign meeting in Southwestern Bulgaria before the 2009 parliamentary election, “I am the instrument in power that allocates funding batches in the country.” At the time, the DPS was part of the government. Karadayi had led the party since 2016. See: “Ахмед Доган: Аз разпределям финансирането в държавата” [Ahmed Dogan: I allocated funding across the country], Mediapool.bg, June 25, 2009, https://www.mediapool.bg/ahmed-dogan-az-razpredelyam-finansiraneto-v-da….
  • 30“Пеевски ще се кандидатира за председател на ДПС. Доган с грип: Той е феномен в политиката” [Peevski will run for DPS chairman. Dogan, having the flu: He is a phenomenon in politics], bTV News, November 17, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/peevski-shte-se-kandidatira-za-predseda….
  • 31Katerina Vasileva, „Голяма революция“. Ще застане ли Делян Пеевски начело на ДПС [“A big revolution”: Will Peevski head DPS], Svobodna Evropa, Novembers 13, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/dps-predsedatel-peevski-dogan/32677747….
  • 32Apart from GERB increasing its lead on PP and DB, the pro-Kremlin Revival became Bulgaria’s third-largest political party. ITN, which had triggered the fall of prime minister Kiril Petkov’s government by withdrawing from his coalition in June 2022 and then subsequently failed to surpass the 4-percent threshold in the October elections necessary to be represented in parliament, hovered just above the threshold in April 2023. The vote results were as follows: the GERB–Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) coalition won 26.49 percent; PP-DB won 24.56 percent; Revival won 14.16 percent; the DPS won 13.75 percent; the BSP won 8.93 percent; and the ITN won 4.11 percent. See: Central Election Commission, Republic of Bulgaria, “Обобщени данни от избор на народни представители” [Summarized data from the election of people’s representatives], April 2, 2023, https://results.cik.bg/ns2023/rezultati/index.html.
  • 33The CEC decision passed with votes from representatives of GERB, the DPS, and the BSP, as well as from some ITN representatives. See: Zlatina Zehirova, “„Огромен риск“: ГЕРБ, ДПС и БСП ограничиха и контролното засичане на резултатите от машинния вот” [“A huge risk”: GERB, DPS and the BSP curbed the double-check of results of machine voting], Dnevnik, February 20, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/izbori-2023/2023/02/20/4450895_ogromen_risk_gerb….
  • 34Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Bulgaria, Early Parliamentary Elections, 2 April 2023; Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (Sofia: ODIHR, April 3, 2023), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/d/540674.pdf.
  • 35ODIHR, Republic of Bulgaria: Early Parliamentary Elections: 2 April 2023, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report (Warsaw: ODIHR, July 27, 2023), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/7/549292_0.pdf.
  • 36ODIHR, International Election Observation Mission: Republic of Bulgaria, Early Parliamentary Elections, 2 April 2023; Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.
  • 37ODIHR, Republic of Bulgaria: Early Parliamentary Elections: 2 April 2023, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report.
  • 38Arrests were made in several regions, from Burgas in the east and Sliven in the southeast to Pleven to the north. See: Elena Gelovska, “Изборният ден: Вече има задържани за купуване на гласове” [Voting day: There are already arrests over vote selling], Dnevnik, April 2, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/izbori-2023/2023/04/02/4467044_izborniiat_den/.
  • 39“Общинар в Несебър е в ареста за търговия с гласове за 400 000 лв. [A municipal employee in Nesebar is under arrest for a BGN 400,000 worth peddling in votes], Sega, September 21, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/obshtinar-nesebur-e-aresta….
  • 40Sofia’s electoral weight increased prior to the parliamentary elections, as the election watchdog had updated constituencies’ seat allocations in February based on the results of a census conducted in 2022. Accordingly, two of the three constituencies in Sofia saw their allocations increased by a total of four seats each, while the other two big cities, Plovdiv and Varna, had their total seats increased by one each. Of the National Assembly’s 240 total seats, Sofia accounts for 46 seats after the reallocation, up from 42. See: Ralitsa Ficheva, “Четири избирателни района вече ще излъчват повече депутати (карта)” [Four constituencies will now elect more MPs (map)], Dnevnik, February 2, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/izbori-2023/2023/02/02/4445473_izbornata_komisii….
  • 41“Антон Хекимян е кандидатът на ГЕРБ-СДС за кмет на София” [Anton Hekimyan is GERB-SDS’s Sofia mayor candidate], bTV News, September 25, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/anton-hekimjan-e-kandidatat-na-gerb-sds…; “Борисов: Хекимян може да победи на първи тур в София, той е ведър, умен и отворен” [Borisov: Hekimyan can win in the first round in Sofia, he is cheerful, smart and open], Dnevnik, September 26, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/09/26/4532305_borisov_hekimian_moj….
  • 42Vasil Hadzhiyski and Ralitsa Ficheva, “Изборната комисия отмени машинното гласуване в неделя по волята на ГЕРБ, „Има такъв народ“ ДПС и БСП” [The election commission revoked machine voting on Sunday through a decision backed by GERB, ITN, DPS and BSP], Dnevnik, October 27, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/mestni-izbori-2023/2023/10/27/4544692_gerb_dps_i….
  • 43“Какво е хеш код: Божанов с разяснения за „анализаторите“” [What is a hash code: Bozhanov clarified it to “analysts”], OFFNews, October 28, 2023, https://offnews.bg/politika/kakvo-e-hesh-kod-bozhanov-s-raziasnenia-za-…; Yuriy Yakovlev, “Какво е хеш код и защо не е опасно да е публичен” [What is hash code and why isn't it dangerous to make it public], Darik Radio, October 30, 2023, https://darik.bg/kakvo-e-hesh-kod-i-zasto-ne-e-opasno-da-e-publichen.
  • 44Central Election Commission, “Местни избори | 29 октомври 2023 | Първи тур: Обобщена активност на гласуване за страната” [Local elections | October 29, 2023 | First round: Total voting activity for the country], October 29, 2023, https://results.cik.bg/mi2023/tur1/aktivnost/index.html.
  • 45Central Election Commission, “Местни избори | 29 октомври 2023 | Втори тур: Обобщена активност на гласуване за страната” [ Local elections | 6 ноември, 2023 | Second round: Total voting activity for the country], November 6, 2023, https://results.cik.bg/mi2023/tur2/aktivnost/index.html.
  • 46Members of the National Assembly were forced to amend legislation on domestic violence passed in January by the previous parliament. In January, the parliamentary Legal Affairs Committee adopted draft laws containing measures against domestic violence, but the committee was dissolved before the elections. The new legislation was slowly being adopted, with the BSP and Revival obstructing the debate to discuss LGBT+ issues and “gender ideology.” See: Lora Fileva, “Парламентът почти прие закона за защита от домашното насилие, създаде регистър на педофилите” [Parliament almost passed the law against domestic violence and created a register of pedophiles], Dnevnik, July 19, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/07/19/4509360_parlamentut_pochti_p….
  • 47Violeta Rusenova, “400 шева и все още ненаказан насилник—зловещата история на едно брутално нападение” [400 stitches and an unpunished perpetrator—the sinister story of a brutal attack], BNT, July 31, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/400-sheva-i-vse-oshte-nenakazan-nasilnik-zloves….
  • 48Katerina Vasileva, “„Ние сме Дебора.“ Как хиляди хора в страната се разбунтуваха срещу насилието в Стара Загора” [“We are Debora.” How thousands of people in the country rebelled against violence in Stara Zagora], Svobodna Evropa, July 31, 2003, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32528068.html.
  • 49For example, a celebrity musician lost an ad contract after downplaying the case of violence, and an employee of a mining company was fired after defending the perpetrator online.
  • 50Rashidov was caught on a hot microphone saying, during the recess of a parliamentary session on the anti–domestic violence measures, “There are laws already. Why are we babbling? All whores woke up remembering they had been raped 15 years ago.” See: “Вежди Рашидов напуска парламента и политиката” [Vezhdi Rashidov quit Parliament and politics], DW, August 9, 2023, https://www.dw.com/bg/vezdi-rasidov-napuska-parlamenta-i-politikata/a-6….
  • 51Lora Fileva, “Корнелия Нинова: Когато искате трети пол, ще срещнете страшен отпор” [Korneliya Ninova: When you wish for a “third sex,” you will meet formidable resistance], Dnevnik, August 7, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/08/07/4515020_parlamentut_pravi_po….
  • 52Time and again, the BSP and Revival used crucial issues to make the case about a so-called gender ideology allegedly creeping into Bulgarian life. For instance, Revival sought to score political points from the Stara Zagora case, alleging that the antiviolence protests were not spontaneous. See: Eva-Mariya Raykova, “НС сътвори абсурд със Закона срещу домашното насилие” [The National Assembly created an absurd through the Law against Domestic Violence], Sega, August 7, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/ns-sutvori-absurd-zakona-s….
  • 53The word “gender” refers, in the Bulgarian public space, to LGBT+, and mostly homosexual, rights, and can also be used as a derogatory word for “gay.” That derived from a misinterpretation of the Istanbul Convention (formally the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence) as a result of a 2018 campaign by Bulgarian politicians alleging that the document, which had been signed by Bulgaria, contained provisions supporting legalized same-sex marriage. Another talking point, widely accepted by both Revival and the BSP, was that proponents of "gender ideology" would introduce “a third sex” that is “neither man nor woman” and a society where everyone could choose how to identify. Rights issues were instrumentalized throughout the 2023 election campaign as it was in parliament, as the ODIHR mission reported about the “misleading and harmful narratives spread by political actors in relation to the use of the term ‘gender.’” See: ODIHR, Republic of Bulgaria: Early Parliamentary Elections: 2 April 2023, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report.
  • 54“Симпатизанти на „Възраждане“ спряха прожекция на „София Прайд“” [Revival sympathizers stopped a screening during Sofia Pride], Club Z, June 11, 2023, https://clubz.bg/137791.
  • 55Plovdiv’s regional prosecution began a probe, but concluded in November there was not enough evidence to open an official investigation against Revival supporters for hooliganism. See: Doroteya Dachkova, “Агитката на „Възраждане“ е оневинена за атаката срещу филма „Близо“” [Revival supporters were not assigned blame for the attack against the movie Close], Sega, November 14, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/agitkata-na-vuzrazhdane-e-….
  • 56“Привърженици на „Възраждане“ в Пловдив опитаха да саботират прожекция на филм” [Revival supporters in Plovdiv tried to sabotage a film screening], Plovdiv24.bg, June 15, 2023, https://www.plovdiv24.bg/novini/plovdiv/Privurzhenici-na-Vuzrazhdane-v-…; “Агитки на „Възраждане“ пак спряха прожекция—във Варна” [Revival campaigners foiled a screening again—in Varna], Club Z, June 24, 2023, https://clubz.bg/138307.
  • 57“Паралелно със „София прайд“: „Шествие за семейството“ се обяви срещу неолибералния ред (СНИМКИ) [In parallel with Sofia Pride: A “profamily rally” issued a stance against the neoliberal order (photos)], bTV News, June 17, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/paralelno-sas-sofija-prajd-shestvie-za-….
  • 58Evgeniya Marinova and Elena Ilieva, “Зърнопроизводителите излязоха на национален протест” [Grain producers launched a nationwide protest], Investor.bg, September 18, 2023, https://www.investor.bg/a/520-zemedelie/381318-zarnoproizvoditelite-izl….
  • 59Maksim Karadzhov, “Протестиращите край Долни Богров изгониха лидера на „Възраждане“ [Revival’s leader was kicked out by protesters near Dolni Bogrov], Dnevnik, September 20, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/09/20/4530382_zurnoproizvoditelite….
  • 60“Денков за зърнопроизводителите: Аз с терористи не преговарям (ВИДЕО)” [Denkov on the grain producers: I do not negotiate with terrorists (video)], bTV News, September 16, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/denkov-za-zarnoproizvoditelite-az-s-ter….
  • 61“Земеделците и кабинетът подписаха официално споразумение. Денков се извини за „терористи“ [Farmers and the cabinet signed an official agreement. Denkov apologized for calling them “terrorists”], Svobodna Evropa, September 20, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/protest-zemedeltsi-dolni-bogrov/3260082….
  • 62“Акад. Денков: Въпреки протестите плановете ще бъдат приети” [Acad. Denkov: Despite protests, the plans will be adopted], BNR, September 29, 2023. https://bnr.bg/varna/post/101884456/akad-denkov-vapreki-protestite-plan….
  • 63“Ранени и арестувани на протеста срещу БФС, полицията използва водно оръдие (ВИДЕО)” [There are injured and arrested people at the protest against the Bulgarian Football Union, police used water cannons (video)], BNT, November 16, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/raneni-i-arestuvani-na-protesta-sreshtu-bfs-pol….
  • 64Reporters Without Borders (RSF), “Unprecedented Police Violence against Journalists in Bulgaria: RSF Will Monitor that Systemic Measures Are Implemented,” November 23, 2023. https://rsf.org/en/unprecedented-police-violence-against-journalists-bu…; Association of European Journalists (AEJ), “RSF: Безпрецедентно полицейско насилие над журналисти в България, необходими са системни мерки” [RSF: Unprecedented police violence against journalists in Bulgaria, systemic measures are needed], November 24, 2023, https://aej-bulgaria.org/unprecedented-police-violence-against-journali….
  • 65“Трима полицаи са отстранени, а двама се разследват за превишени права (обзор)” [Three police officers were removed, while two are being investigated over abuse], Trud, November 21, 2023, https://perma.cc/HD2Q-TQRP; “Четирима служители на МВР са уволнени заради насилие на протеста срещу БФС” [Four Interior Ministry employees have been dismissed over violence at the protest against the Bulgarian Football Union], OFFNews, December 20, 2023. https://offnews.bg/politika/chetirima-sluzhiteli-na-mvr-sa-uvolneni-zar….
  • 66GERB’s leader Borisov retorted that, if the interior minister resigns, so should the prime minister, since the latter holds ultimate responsibility. See: Ralitsa Ficheva, “Борисов: Ако министърът на вътрешните работи подаде оставка, и премиерът трябва да го направи” [Borisov: If the Interior Minister resigns, the Prime Minister should do it too], Dnevnik, November 26, 2023. https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/11/20/4555576_borisov_ako_ministur….
  • 67“„От днес този министър е техен“. Кирил Петков каза, че Калин Стоянов е предложение на ГЕРБ” [“Starting from today, this minister is theirs.” Kiril Petkov said Kalin Stoyanov was a GERB proposal], Svobodna Evropa, November 21, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/kalin-stoyanov-gerb/32693599.html.
  • 68Simeon Yanev, “Временна комисия ще нищи полицейското насилие по време на футболния протест” [An interim committee will delve into the police violence issue during the football protests], Dnes.bg, November 24, 2023. https://news.bg/politics/vremenna-komisiya-shte-nishti-politseyskoto-na…
  • 69“Службите проверяват антисемитски колаж с лика на Соломон Паси, споделен в група на "Възраждане” [Security services are looking into a collage bearing the face of Solomon Passy shared in a Revival group], Svodna Evropa, July 14, 2023. https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32503975.html
  • 70A local Jewish rights organization labelled the post antisemitic, while World Jewish Congress executive director Maram Stern reportedly sent a letter to Prime Minister Denkov voicing concerns over increasingly frequent hate speech and downplaying of the Holocaust in Bulgaria and called on politicians not to use such language for political purposes. See: Markaryan, Aleksandar Markaryan, “Световният еврейски конгрес с остра реакция срещу Костадинов в писмо до Денков” [The World Jewish Congress reacted harshly against Kostadinov in a letter to Denkov], OFFNews, June 27, 2023, https://offnews.bg/obshtestvo/svetovniat-evrejski-kongres-s-ostra-reakt…
  • 71Vasil Hadzhiyski, “Правителството прие първи план за борба с антисемитизма” [The government adopted a first plan to fight anti-Semitism], Dnevnik, October 18, 2023. https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/10/18/4540840_kratki_novini_18_okt…
  • 72“Прокуратурата не вижда престъпление в изказването на Костадинов за ‘уродливата измет’” [The prosecution sees no offense in Kostadinov's remarks on "the ugly scum", Dnevnik, December 28, 2023. https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/12/01/4560635_prokuraturata_ne_vij…
  • 73“’Сплашване’. Застрахователят ‘Лев инс’ съди Медиапул за 1 млн. лева за цитиране на стенограма” ["Intimidation". Lev Ins insurer suing Mediapool.bg for BGN 1M], Svobodna Evropa, March 8, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32308146.html
  • 74“‘Лев инс’: Поведението на министъра на финансите легитимира корупционна схема” [Lev Ins: The Finance Minister's behavior legitimizes a corruption scheme], Mediapool.bg, April 4, 2023. https://www.mediapool.bg/lev-ins-povedenieto-na-ministara-na-finansite-…
  • 75Insurance-code amendments is part of EU's post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Plan under which Bulgaria is due to receive billions in funding to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on economies across the bloc, but in exchange for reform. See: Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. “План за възстановяване и устойчивост на Република България” [Resilience and Recovery Plan of the Republic of Bulgaria], April 2021, https://nextgeneration.bg/14
  • 76“Започна делото на "Лев инс" срещу Mediapool за 1 млн. лв.” [Lev Ins' lawsuit against Mediapool for BGN 1M has begun], Mediapool.bg, November 3, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/zapochna-deloto-na-lev-ins-sreshtu-mediapool-z…
  • 77“„Еврохолд България“ АД съди „Биволъ“ за рекордните 1 млн. лв.” [Evrohold Bulgaria AD is suing Bivol for the record BGN 1M], Bivol.bg, December 9, 2021, https://bivol.bg/%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B4-%D0%B…
  • 78Minister Zarkov: Bulgaria is working to limit "SLAPP cases" against journalists, Ministry of Justice, https://www.justice.government.bg/home/index/b17fb569-e606-4ab8-9104-06…
  • 79СЕМ ще прегласува последния конкурс за шеф на БНТ [The Council on Electronic Media will re-run the vote in the last competition for BNT Director General], OFFNews, June 8, 2023, https://offnews.bg/medii/sem-shte-preglasuva-poslednia-konkurs-za-shef-…
  • 80Koshlukov shunned from controversy to a larger extent than previous years, trying to balance between different worldviews in Bulgaria's public space. In June, he announced the BNT would soon run news bulletins in Russian, given the vast number of public speakers, but that followed the announcement by the Ukrainian embassy of an agreement - which he had not announced earlier - to air news in Ukrainian in order to assist people who had fled here. News bulletins were launched online in June. See: Emil Koshlukov, Facebook Feed, June 21, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/emil.koshloukov/posts/10224129192839408?ref=em…
  • 81The court forced it to vote only by a "yes" or "no", without abstentions (one abstention vote created the impasse as no candidate won). See: “СЕМ ще повтори избора за смяна на Кошлуков от шефското място в БНТ” [CEM will repeat the vote to replace Koshlukov at the helm of BNT], Mediapool.bg, June 8, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/sem-shte-povtori-izbora-za-smyana-na-koshlukov…
  • 82There was no massive backlash against her over her comments, but they were criticized by some media outlets, activists and public figures, while the Bulgarian branch of the Association of European Journalists called on her to resign. See: “Отричането или неглижирането на масови убийства като това в Буча не е свободно изразяване” [Denial or downplaying of mass killings such as the one in Bucha is not a matter of free speech], Association of European Journalists, June 23, 2023, https://aej-bulgaria.org/2306/
  • 83Momchilova has a history of controversial remarks, but does not necessarily represent opinions across CEM. The CEM announced it March it had found propagandistic claims in journalist Petar Volgin's radio show on Sundays. Volgin is known for him questioning support for Ukraine, Bulgaria's Euro-Atlantic allegiance, the adoption of the euro, judicial reform, pro-environment measures, among others. The CEM's findings come despite Momchilova, occasional stances defending Volgin. See: Lora Fileva, “Соня Момчилова: Регулаторът трябва да позволи на медиите да не са докрай политически коректни” [Sonya Momchilova: The watchdog should allow the media not to be entirely politically correct], Dnevnik, April 27, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/04/27/4477006_sonia_momchilova_reg…
  • 84Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Bulgaria, 2o23 Rule of Law Repoer, European Commission, July 5, 2023. https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/10_1_52568_coun_chap_…
  • 85“След номинацията на Хекимян. бТВ въвежда мерки с цел да ‘защити името и репутацията’” си [After Hekimyan's nomination. bTV introduces measures aimed to "protect its name and reputation"], Svobodna Evropa, September 25, 2023. https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/btv-pozitsiya-anton-hekimyan/32608086.h…
  • 86bTV has access to government officials and interviews at least one minister per week (in a Sunday evening show). However, it is one of the most viewed TV stations, and the Sunday arrangement has now lasted over three different governments, GERB being part only of the last one.
  • 87“След номинацията на Хекимян. бТВ въвежда мерки с цел да ‘защити името и репутацията’ си” [After Hekimyan's nomination. bTV introduces measures aimed to "protect its name and reputation"], Svobodna Evropa, September 25, 2023. https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/btv-pozitsiya-anton-hekimyan/32608086.h…
  • 88“Bulgarie : le nouveau gouvernement risque de rater son rendez-vous avec la liberté de la presse,” [Freedom of information fumble a missed opportunity for Bulgaria’s new government], RSF, June 21, 2023, https://rsf.org/fr/bulgarie-le-nouveau-gouvernement-risque-de-rater-son…
  • 89Doroteya Dachkova, “ГЕРБ даде заден и обеща да не ограничава достъпа до информация” [GERB backtracked and promised not to restrict access to information], Sega, June 20, 2023. https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/gerb-dade-zaden-i-obeshta-…
  • 90Revival maintained police had come and deleted the pictures on her phone and wrote up a "protocol" to warn her. The latter claim was refuted by Deutsche Welle, where Milcheva works. See: “Защо "Възраждане" нападна Дойче Веле. Ето фактите:” [Why Revival attacked Deutsche Welle. Here are the facts:], DW, February 9, 2023. https://www.dw.com/bg/zaso-vzrazdane-napadna-korespondentka-na-dv-eto-f…
  • 91“Журналистка от БНТ е била изгонена със заплахи от събитие на ‘Възраждане’ съобщи АЕЖ” [A BNT journalist was told to leave a Revival event and was threatened], Svobodna Evropa, April 1, 2023 https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32345196.html; Despite his subsequent apology, the case echoed last year's attempt by Kostadinov at expelling a journalist from Dnevnik.bg, among others prom a press conference, calling them "wastepipes of the American embassy.” See: Nations in Transit 2022 Bulgaria. https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-transit/2022
  • 92Emiliya Milcheva, “Волгин попитал Митрофанова... Проблемът с интервюто и БНР.” [Volgin asked Mitrofanova... The problem with the interview and the BNR]. DW, December 18, 2023. https://www.dw.com/bg/volgin-popital-mitrofanova-problemt-s-intervuto-i… ; “Пеевски: Недопустимо е БНР да стане съучастник в руската хибридна война” [Peevski: it is unacceptable for the BNR to be a participant in the Russian hybrid war], OFFNews, December 15, 2023, https://offnews.bg/politika/peevski-nedopustimo-e-bnr-da-stane-sauchast…; “СЕМ за случая с интервюто с руския посланик” [The CEM on the case of the Russian Ambassador], BNR, December 16, 2023, https://bnr.bg/post/101923113/sem-za-sluchaa-s-intervuto-s-ruskia-posla…
  • 93Vesela Bacheva, “ПП-ДБ предлагат мандатност на кметовете и 24 май национален празник (Видео)” [PP-DB proposes a term limit for mayors and May 24 as the national holiday (video)], 24 Chasa, July 23, 2023, https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/14959828.
  • 94Violeta Ashikova, “ГЕРБ против идеята за ограничаване на мандатите на кметовете” [GERB is against the idea of limiting mayoral terms], BNR, July 26, 2023. https://bnr.bg/post/101856498/gerb-protiv-ideata-za-ogranichavane-na-ma…
  • 95Others ask whether the limit would address feudalization in municipalities and whether it can be applied amidst a demographic crisis as smaller municipalities are suffering a shortage in administrative capacity and people with enough knowledge and skills. See: Irina Tsoneva, “‘За" и "против’ ограничаването на кметските мандати” [Pros and cons of limiting mayoral terms], BNT, July 27, 2023 https://bntnews.bg/news/za-i-protiv-ogranichavaneto-na-kmetskite-mandat…
  • 96Mariya Georgieva, “Професия кмет: Делчо Митев 47 г. управлява с. Брягово” [Profession: Mayor: Delcho Mitev has served in Bryagovo for 47 years], bTV News, August 14, 2023. https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/profesija-kmet-delcho-mitev-47-g-upravl…
  • 97“Правителството подкрепя финансовата децентрализация на общините” [The government backs financial decentralization of municipalities], Council of Minsters of the Republic of Bulgaria, August 24, 2023. https://www.gov.bg/bg/prestsentar/novini/pravitelstvoto-podkrepya-finan…
  • 98As noted in the 2022 report: “Municipalities have maintained for years the current centralized model hampers their ability to solve local crises and issues. The topic has divided politicians for decades, with some have arguing that decentralization would be detrimental to smaller, less developed regions, while kickstarting growth in more advanced ones. Others believe the move would allow local authorities to finance their own projects and compete to draw potential investors, according to their own needs.” See: Nations in Transit 2022 Bulgaria. https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-transit/2022
  • 99Kameliya Tsvetanova, “Асен Василев настоява за функционална децентрализация” [Asen Vasilev insists on funcional decentralization], Dnes.bg, November 10, 2023. https://www.dnes.bg/politika/2023/11/10/asen-vasilev-nastoiava-za-funkc… ; Zlatina Zehirova, “Три критерия за финансиране на общински проекти обяви пред депутатите Асен Василев” [Asen Vasilev announced three criteria for funding municipal projects speaking before lawmakers], Dnevnik.bg, November 24, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/11/24/4557761_tri_kriteriia_za_fin…
  • 100“Три критерия за финансиране на общински проекти обяви пред депутатите Асен Василев” [Asen Vasilev announced three criteria for funding municipal projects speaking before lawmakers], Dnevnik, November 24, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/politika/2023/11/24/4557761_tri_kriteriia_za_fin…; Vasilev also made clear in November that he rejected a long-discussed plan, backed by some municipalities, under which local authorities would receive a certain share of income and other taxes on private persons collected by the state. In his words, given current economic disparities between municipalities across Bulgaria, such a move would only entrench and even deepen the socioeconomic gaps. See: Nikolay Minkov, “Финансовата децентрализация и неравенствата при общините обсъдиха правителство и местна власт” [The government and local authorities discussed financial decentralization and inequalities among municipalities], BNT, November 23, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/finansovata-decentralizaciya-i-neravenstvata-pr…
  • 101This section focuses on the floods in southeast Bulgaria as they inflicted significant damage and claimed human lives, but throughout the year, there were flood events from Vratsa and Etropole in the northwest to the southeastern Black Sea coast. The public reaction was similar to that in Southeast Bulgaria in raising questions about local- and national-level disaster prevention and management, the division of labor between government and municipalities (for example, in cleaning riverbeds), etc. See: Iva Antonova and Yordanka Petrova, “Наводнения и разрушени пътища в Северозападна България” [Floods and destroyed roads in Northwest Bulgaria], June 17, 2023, https://bnr.bg/horizont/post/101839347/navodnenia-i-razrusheni-patishta…; “Частично бедствено положение е обявено в Етрополе (видео)” [Partial state of emergency was announced in Etropole], June 15, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/chastichno-bedstveno-polozhenie-e-obyaveno-v-e…
  • 102“Ден на траур в Царево, четири са вече жертвите на потопа (обновена)” [Mourning in Tsarevo, the flood's victims are already four], October 21, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/den-na-traur-v-tsarevo-chetiri-sa-veche-zhertv…
  • 103Mia Dimitrova, “Динкова: Около 4000 души са засегнати от бедствието по Южното Черноморие” [Dinkova: Some 4000 people were affected by the disaster by the Southern Black Sea coast], September 6, 2023. https://nova.bg/news/view/2023/09/06/424780/%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0…
  • 104Slavi Nedelchev, “Държавна комисия: Валежите са причината за бедствието по Южното Черноморие” [A state commission: The disaster by the Southern Black Sea coast was caused by the rain], Dunavmost, October 18, 2023, https://www.dunavmost.com/novini/darzhavna-komisiya-valezhite-sa-prichi…
  • 105Lilyana Klisurova, “360 речни участъка в страната са затлачени, 7 от тях в Царево, обяви Денков” [360 river sections have been clogged across the country, 7 of them in Tsarevo, Denkov announced], 24 Chasa, September 8, 2023, https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/15431803
  • 106In August, one year on from the 2022 floods in Karlovo, the town's mayor Emil Kabaivanov said the central government had not disbursed the funding required for riverbeds and other repair of infrastructure to explain why activities were running behind schedule. In his words, some BGN 16M in disaster response and prevention money, out of BGN 70M needed to repair local infrastructure, had been disbursed. “Кметът на Карлово година след потопа: И финансирането, и възстановяването стават поетапно” [Karlovo's Mayor, a year after the flood: both funding and reconstruction are taking place gradually], bTV, September 2, 2023, https://www.btv.bg/shows/tazi-nedelia/video-sabota/kmetat-na-karlovo-go…
  • 107“Равносметката: ГЕРБ печели в 98 общини, ПП-ДБ - в 5, вижте пълна справка за цялата страна” [The recap: GERB wins in 98 municipalities, PP-DB in 5, see a complete summary for the entire country], Flagman.bg, November 8, 2023, https://www.flagman.bg/article/306764
  • 108“Опит за атентат срещу Иван Гешев: Взривното устройство е с еквивалента на 3 кг тротил (ОБЗОР)” [An attempted attack at Ivan Geshev: The explosive material was the equivalent of 3 kg of TNT], bTV News, May 1, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/opit-za-atentat-sreshtu-glavnija-prokur…
  • 109“Убийството на Къро, атентатът срещу Гешев и смъртта на Ангел Христов са свързани, подозира Демерджиев” [Karo's murder, the attempt against Geshev and the death of Angel Hristov are interconnected, Demerdzhiev suspects], 24 Chasa, June 15, 2023, https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/14694443
  • 110The prosecution had alleged in March Kamenov and his associates were plotting to murder magistrates, including Geshev himself. Kamenov was indicted in April over inciting the murder of a former police officer. The prosecution alleges he was behind 8 counts of murder. No evidence following up on Dermendzhiev’s claim about links between the attack on Geshev and Karo’s killing has been presented as of December 31, 2023. See: Vasil Hadzhiyski, “БНТ: Прокуратурата има данни, че Красимир Каменов - Къро е поръчал oсем убийства (обновена)” [BNT: The prosecution has data that Krasimir "Karo" Kamenov ordered eight killings (updated)], Dnevnik, April 8, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/04/08/4470353_bnt_prokuraturata_im…; “Прокуратурата обвини Красимир Каменов-Къро за подбудител на убийство на бивш полицай” [The prosecution charged Krasimir "Karo" Kamenov of incitement to the murder of a former police officer], Svobodna Evropa, March 27, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32336422.html
  • 111Sarafov said Geshev had illegally recorded a conversation with a magistrate, abused public resources for private needs, and interfering unlawfully in the Barcelonagate investigation. See: Doroteya Dachkova, “Зам. главният прокурор даде главния прокурор на прокурор” [The Deputy Chief Prosecutor Referred the Chief Prosecutor to the Prosecution], Sega, May 16, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/zam-glavniyat-prokuror-dad…
  • 112The procedure was not triggered exclusively by the government, as four members of the council had extended the same request earlier that month.
  • 113“ВСС отстрани Иван Гешев от поста главен прокурор,” [SJC removed Geshev as Chief Prosecutor], DW, June 12, 2023, https://www.dw.com/bg/vss-otstrani-ivan-gesev-ot-posta-glaven-prokuror/…
  • 114Geshev’s current political activity has yet to gain interest from the media and other politicians. Geshev saw in his removal an attempt at thwarting efforts to expose wrongdoing by politicians such as Borisov himself. See: “Гешев влиза в политиката с консервативно-патриотично движение ‘Справедливост за България’” [Geshev enters politics through the conservative-patriotic movement Justice for Bulgaria], Epicenter.bg, July 4, 2023, https://epicenter.bg/article/Ivan-Geshev-otgovarya-na-zritelski-vaprosi… .
  • 115The issue was politicized as political actors GERB and the DPS, used the issue to attack DB along with Nexo, at a time government formation talks were underway among various parties. An ad hoc committee in Parliament found no irregularities. Subsequently, Serbia refused an extradition request for Trenchev and his associate Kosta Kanchev. In September, European Arrest Warrants for them were rescinded, with magistrates citing a number of procedural irregularities by the investigative service. Geshev's critics maintained his only motives for the Nexo case were political. See: Daniel Nikolov, “Прокуратурата повдигна обвинения на четирима души в разследването на Nexo,” [The prosecution charged four people in the Nexo probe], Bloomberg TV Bulgaria, January 13, 2023, https://www.bloombergtv.bg/a/9-bulgaria/114365-prokuraturata-povdigna-o…
  • 116More specifically, the prosecution said there was no evidence Nexo had been used for money-laundering or that its clients had been harmed. Cryptocurrency activities was not subject to regulation in the EU. See: “Прокуратурата: Няма престъпления в дейността на ‘Нексо’ – криптовалутите не се регулират в ЕС, а клиентите им не са ощетени (Обзор)” [The Prosecution: There is no crime in Nexo's activities - cryptocurrencies are not regulated in the EU, while clients have not been harmed], 24 Chasa, December 12, 2023, https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/16688943
  • 117Days later, Geshev filed in Parliament documents from Turkey allegedly linked to Barcelonagate, backing his request. See: “Гешев внесе в НС материали и от Турция срещу Борисов по ‘Барселонагейт’” [Geshev filed with Parliament material from Turkey as well against Borisov over Barcelonagate], Sega, June 6, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/geshev-vnese-ns-materiali-…; “Гешев внесе в парламента всички "относими доказателства" по ‘Барселонагейт’” [Geshev filed in Parliament all "relevant evidence" on "Barcelonagate], Svobodna Everopa, June 8, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32450132.html
  • 118“Иван Гешев поиска имунитета на Кирил Петков” [Ivan Geshev requested the immunity of Kiril Petkov], Mediapool.bg, June 12, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/ivan-geshev-poiska-imuniteta-na-kiril-petkov-n…
  • 119Petkov had become a minister in a previous caretaker government while being a double Canadian-Bulgarian citizen.
  • 120Doroteya Dachkova, “Сарафов няма да оттегля исканията за имунитетите на Борисов и Петков” [Sarafov will not withdraw the requests for Borisov and Petkov's immunity], Sega, June 23, 2023. https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/sarafov-nyama-da-otteglya-…
  • 121“Следствието остава в прокуратурата” [The investigative service remains under the prosecution], bTV News, August 28, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/sledstvieto-ostava-v-prokuraturata.html
  • 122Mihaela Dimitrova, “Депутатите отхвърлиха ветото на Радев за промените за главния прокурор” [MPs overturned Radev's veto on the changes related to the Chief Prosecutor], Bulgaria On Air, August 7, 2023, https://www.bgonair.bg/a/2-bulgaria/315145-deputatite-othvarliha-vetoto…
  • 123Radev said the changes did not contribute to effective reform in the judiciary and violate the principle of predictability and stability of lawmaking.
  • 124The Supreme Judicial Council could not fill the parliamentary quota as the first legislature elected in November 2021 had not launched the relevant procedure within the nine months before it was dissolved. Another one, elected in October 2022, was short-lived as elections were scheduled several months later. A virtually indefinite extension of the SJC’s term was made possible by a Constitutional Court ruling of September 2022, which allowed for the same move with regard to the judiciary’s Inspectorate, whose term had expired two years earlier. The ruling was applied as a reference the SJC.
  • 125The issue had been contentious as Geshev and some political parties argued that could lead to interference by the executive in the judiciary. See: “Гешев атакува пред Конституционния съд механизма за главния прокурор и по-лесното му уволнение” [Geshev attacked the mechanism on the Chief Prosecutor and his easier removal before the Constitutional Court], Svobodna Evropa, June 5, 2023. https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32445523.html
  • 126That proposal was put forward by Hristo Ivanov, DB co-chair, back in 2015 when he was justice minister in a GERB-led government. A judicial reform package proposed back then was watered down by Parliament, triggering his resignation. “ГЕРБ бламира съдебната реформа, Христо Иванов подаде оставка” [GERB watered down the judicial reform, Hristo Ivanov resigned], Mediapool.bg, December 9, 2015, https://www.mediapool.bg/gerb-blamira-sadebnata-reforma-hristo-ivanov-p…
  • 127These are the Parliament Speaker or the heads of the Constitutional Court or the central bank, or a deputy of his/hers, the head or deputy head of the National Audit Office and the National Ombudsman or a deputy of his/hers . The initial list was shorter, but the third and final reading expanded the list from which the head of state can pick the Prime Minister; Under the current constitution, the President appoints a caretaker Prime Minister of his or her own choice. Bulgaria has had five caretaker governments under President Radev due to government resignations or incapacity to form a new executive after an election. Radev’s critics point to these governments’ track record as an example of why presidential powers in the designation of a caretaker government must be limited.
  • 128The final version, after the final reading, kept the original proposal to shorten the Chief Prosecutor's term to 5 years, down from 7, but top courts' heads will still have a seven-year term. See: Lora Fileva, “Промените: Нов съдебен съвет, нов начин за избор на служебните правителства и други” [The changes: A new judicial council, a new way to appoint caretaker governments, among others], Dnevnik, December 20, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/12/20/4568223_promenite_v_konstitu…
  • 129As the proposals garnered 161 out of 240 votes, or more than two-thirds, the amendments can be put to a vote, but not before two months have passed, i.e. at the beginning of December. See: Ina Drumeva, “Поправките в конституцията събраха 161 гласа ‘за’ на първо четене” [The constitutional amendments gathered 161 "yes" votes in the first reading], Dnevnik, October 6, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/10/06/4536198_deputatite_glasuvat_…
  • 130For example, it called into question the reduction of terms of judicial officials and intentions to increase Parliament's role in the Supreme Judicial Council's prosecutors college. See: “Bulgaria - Opinion on the draft amendments to the Constitution, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 136th Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 October 2023),” Council of Europe - European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), October 9, 2023, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)039-e
  • 131Subsequently, beyond the period covered in this report, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also welcomed the changes, calling them a significant progress in Bulgaria's delivering of its commitments. "The authorities have been able to assemble the parliamentary majority required for constitutional changes indispensable for the establishment of an independent judiciary and safeguarding sustainability of the reform", reads the committee's statement after a meeting in March of this year where the PACE monitoring committee suggested closing post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria due to improvement with the rule-of-law situation; The European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affaris (LIBE) also welcomed in January the constitutional changes at a meeting, while noting progress should be followed closely they will not end up empowering certain figures or lead to political interference in the judiciary. See: “PACE committee proposes closing post-monitoring dialogue with Bulgaria,” Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, March 6, 2024, https://pace.coe.int/en/news/9384/pace-committee-proposes-closing-post-…; “Овластяване и политическо вмешателство? ЕП гледа с едно наум конституционните промени у нас” [Empowering and political interference?], Actualno. com, January 22, 2024, https://www.actualno.com/politics/ovlastjavane-i-politichesko-vmeshatel…
  • 132Lora Fileva, “Промените: Нов съдебен съвет, нов начин за избор на служебните правителства и други” [The changes: A new judicial council, a new way to appoint caretaker governments, among others], Dnevnik, December 20, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/12/20/4568223_promenite_v_konstitu…
  • 133After the period covered by this report, Radev followed up on his pledge, saying he would challenge the provisions allowing for dual nationals to be lawmakers and ministers, the new rules to appoint caretaker prime ministers, chairs of courts and chief prosecutors, among others. See: “Румен Радев обяви мотивите, с които оспорва промените в Конституцията” [Rumen Radev announced the motives to challenge the constitutional changes], bTV, December 12, 2023. https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/rumen-radev-objavi-motivite-s-koito-osp…; “Румен Радев ще сезира Конституционния съд за промените в Конституцията” [Rumen Radev will file the Constitutional Court over the changes to the Constitution], BNT, December 20, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/rumen-radev-shte-sezira-konstitucionniya-sad-za…
  • 134Under the plan, Bulgaria pursues reform to unlock billions in recovery funding, but required reform is tied to a timeframe. See: “План за възстановяване и устойчивост на Република България” [Resilience and Recovery Plan of the Republic of Bulgaria], Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, April 2021, https://nextgeneration.bg/14
  • 135“Парламентът прие задължителна медиация по 6 вида дела” [Parliament adopted mandatory mediation in 6 types of cases], Nova TV, January 30, 2023, https://nova.bg/news/view/2023/01/30/399518/%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0…
  • 136“Парламентът прие на първо четене закона за личния фалит” [Parliament adopted in a first reading the personal bankruptcy act], 24 Chasa, June 15, 2023, https://www.24chasa.bg/bulgaria/article/14696422; Svetla Stoykova, “Защо е нужен законът за личния фалит, който пак е на дневен ред” [Why the personal bankruptcy law necessary and is again on the agenda], Capital.bg, March 29, 2023. https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/pravo/2023/03/29/4465810_za…
  • 137Bulgaria was behind schedule as of the end of 2022, by when it should have voted on 22 legislative changes needed for the reform, but only three had been carried through. Dilyana Teoharova, “‘Да лишим България от милиардите.’ Кой бави парите от Плана за възстановяване” [Let's deprive Bulgaria of the billions: Who is delaying the recovery money], Svobodna Evropa, January 5, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32185128.html
  • 138“Bulgarian Citizen on Interpol Red Notice Killed in South Africa,” Radio Bulgaria, May 25, 2023, https://bnr.bg/en/post/101828542/bulgarian-citizen-on-int verpol-red-notice-killed-in-south-africa; Svetoslav Todorov, “Murder of Alleged Crime Figure Shocks Bulgaria,” Balkan Insight, August 17, 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/08/17/murder-of-alleged-crime-figure-sho….
  • 139Tony Wesolowsky and Svobodna Evropa, “Did the Bulgarian Mobster Gunned Down in South Africa Know Too Much?,” RFE/RL, June 4, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-mafia-killings-corruption-state/324440….
  • 140Nikolay Zabov and Diana Dukovska, “Updated: Convicted Fugitive Angel Hristov, Half of Galev Brothers, Dies in Villa in Bulgaria,” Bulgarian News Agency (BTA), April 6, 2023, https://www.bta.bg/en/news/bulgaria/468085-convicted-fugitive-angel-hri….
  • 141Plamen Galev and Angel Hristov fled in 2012 after receiving jail terms for setting up an organized criminal gang. See: “‘Братя’ Галеви са обявени за международно издирване” [An international warrant has been declared for the "Galevi Brothers], Capital.bg, May 15, 2012, https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2012/05/15/1827585…
  • 142“Аутопсията на Ангел Христов от Братя Галеви показва, че е починал от остър инфаркт” [Angel Hristov's post-mortem examination shows he died from an acute heart attack], Svobodna Evropa, June 5, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32445255.html
  • 143“Посред бял ден, на разходка, с охрана: Алексей Петров бе застрелян” [In broad daylight, taking a walk with security guards: Alexey Petrov was shot dead], Mediapool, August 16, 2023, https://www.mediapool.bg/posred-byal-den-na-razhodka-s-ohrana-aleksei-p…
  • 144“Борисов призна, че Алексей Петров е имал участие в съставянето на управлението” [Borisov acknowledged Alexey Petrov was involved in forming the government], Webcafe, September 1, 2022, https://webcafe.bg/politika/borisov-prizna-che-aleksey-petrov-uchastval…
  • 145Kameliya Koleva, “Приеха окончателно антикорупционния закон - разделя КПКОНПИ на две комисии” [A final reading adoption of the anticorruption bill - it divides KPKONPI into two commissions], Euronews, September 21, 2023, https://euronewsbulgaria.com/news/19501/prieha-okonchatelno-antikorupts…
  • 146Critics note lawmakers lowered the experience requirement that had been envisaged in the draft (from 10 to 5 years) and that all nominations will be made by Parliament (the draft foresaw one spot for the President). Doroteya Dachkova and Lyudmil Iliev, “Новият антикорупционен закон се обезсмисли, преди да бъде приет” [The new anticorruption law lost its purpose before being adopted], Sega, September 18, 2023, https://www.segabg.com/hot/category-bulgaria/noviyat-antikorupcionen-za…; “И граждански организации ще могат да предлагат членове на антикорупционната комисия” [Civic organizations will also be able to propose members for the anticorruption commission], Svobodna Evropa, September 20, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/antikoruptsionna-shefove/32601574.html
  • 147Global Magnitsky Designations, “Specially designated national list update,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, February 10, 2023, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230210?fbclid=IwAR2FwGjIy_-f…
  • 148Malinov in particular, it was noted, had given a bribe to a judge in order to travel to Russia and receive a state decoration despite being charged with espionage. Mitalov was placed under sanctions in 2020 for having allowed this travel. See: Global Magnitsky Designations, “Specially designated national list update,” Office of Foreign Assets Control, February 10, 2023, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230210?fbclid=IwAR2FwGjIy_-f…
  • 149Lora Fileva, “Прокуратурата отдавна била предприела действия срещу санкционираните по ‘Магнитски’” [The prosecution [claimed it] had taken action against those sactioned under Magnitsky], Dnevnik, February 15, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/02/15/4450281_prokuraturata_otdavn…
  • 150Geshev added in March cases were already pending and nothing else could be done at the moment. See: Elena Gelovska, “Гешев за ‘Магнитски 2’: Има дела, какво повече да направим” [Geshev on Magnitsky 2: There are cases, what else could we do], Dnevnik, March 5, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/03/05/4456513_geshev_za_magnitski_…; The anticorruption watchdog said it had not found any violations in the activities at Kozloduy NPP. See: “АЕЦ ‘Козлодуй’: КПКОНПИ не е открила корупция при санкционираните по "Магнитски” [Kozloduy NPP: KPKONPI has not found corruption in the case of those sanctioned under Magnitsky], Actualno.com, February 14, 2023, https://www.actualno.com/society/aec-kozloduj-kpkonpi-ne-e-otkrila-koru…
  • 151“UK sanctions high profile Bulgarian figures involved in corruption,” Government of the United Kingdom, February 10, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-high-profile-bulgarian-…
  • 152Peevski, after becoming the co-chair of DPS's parliamentary faction, was tipped by some observers as a pretender to head the party after Mustafa Karadayi's resignation. See: “Делян Пеевски стана съпредседател на ПГ на ДПС” [Delyan Peevski became co-chair of the DPS], Liberta.bg, October 16, 2023, https://liberta.bg/category/%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%81%D1%8A%D0%BA; Katerina Vasileva, “‘Голяма революция’. Ще застане ли Делян Пеевски начело на ДПС” ["A big revolution": Will Peevski head DPS], Svobodna Evropa, November 13, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/dps-predsedatel-peevski-dogan/32677747…
  • 153Andriyan Georgiev, “’Хидрострой’ се оказа фаворит за обществени поръчки и на тази власт [Hidrostroy turned out to be the favourite company for public tenders of this govermnent, too], Dnevnik, September 11, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/09/11/4527432_hidrostroi_se_okaza_…
  • 154“Иван Демерджиев иска прокуратурата да търси връзка между ‘Хемус’ и Велико Желев” [Ivan Demerdhizev wants the Prosecutor's Office to look for links between Hemus motorway and Veliko Zhelev], bTV News, March 7, 2023, https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/ivan-demerdzhiev-iska-prokuraturata-da-…
  • 155Gloria Hristova, “Кабинетът спря всички мегапоръчки за пътни ремонти, освен свързаната с Велико Желев” [The cabinet stopped all road-repair megatenders, except for the one linked to Velizho Zhelev], Economic.bg, July 18, 2023, https://www.economic.bg/bg/a/view/kabinetyt-sprja-vsichki-megaporychki-…
  • 156These include fashion model Ivayla Bakalova, Insa Oil fuels company owner Georgi Samuilov, former Lukoil Bulgaria director Valentin Zlatev, and businessman Aleksandar Staliyski, considered to be a close friend of Boyko Borisov.
  • 157“Поради липса на данни за престъпление СГП прекрати разследването за организирана престъпна група за покупка на имот в гр. Барселона, Кралство Испания” [Due to lack of data a crime has been committed, the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office has closed the investigation into an organized criminal gang over a property purchase in Barcelona, the Kingdom of Spain], Prosecution of the Republic of Bulgaria, October 17, 2023, https://prb.bg/bg/news/66981-poradi-lipsa-na-danni-za-prestaplenie-sgp-…
  • 158“Прокурор от ‘Осемте джуджета’ стана обвиняем. Петьо Еврото и бившата му жена са с нови обвинения” [A prosecutor from the Eight Dwarves case became a defendant. Petyo Evroto and his former wife have been slapped new charges], Svobodna Evropa, August 15, 2023, https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/petio-evroto-izdirvane-zad-granica-prek…
  • 159Amidst the prosecution’s action against her, Pavlova told the Anti-Corruption Fund NGO - whose documentaries had exposed the affair in 2020 - judges, prosecutors, investigators and police officers had been on Petrov's “payroll.” See: “Любена Павлова: Съдии, прокурори, следователи, полицаи бяха на "заплата" при Петьо Еврото” [Lyubena Pavlova: Judges, prosecutors, investigators, policemen were on Petyo Evroto's Payroll], Club Z, June 2, 2023, https://clubz.bg/137454; Pavlova’s interview with the Anti-Corruption Fund can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewgtOpALRz4
  • 160Sarafov had earlier ordered a full review of the investigation citing a number of irregularities and blaming Geshev for trying to "frame" him. See: “След интервю в ‘Дневник’ Сарафов се видя на снимка в ‘Осемте джуджета’, където често ходел Гешев” [After an interview with Dnevnik, Sarafov saw himself in a photo at the Eight Dwarves, which Geshev supposedly frequented himself], Dnevnik, May 28, 2023. https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/05/28/4488571_sled_intervju_v_dnev…
  • 161In October, the prosecution announced it was investigating a claim from him suggesting he had bribed a European delegated prosecutor from Bulgaria repeatedly between 2019 and 2023 in order to influence certain investigations. See: “Петьо Еврото подаде сигнал за корупция до Лаура Кьовеши” [Petyo Evroto lodged a corruption claim wtih Laura Kövesi], News.bg, October 17, 2023, https://news.bg/crime/petyo-evroto-podade-signal-za-koruptsiya-do-laura…; According to the European Public Prosecutor's Office's website: The European delegated prosecutors in the 22 participating EU countries are responsible for conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions. They operate with complete independence from their national authorities. The permanent chambers monitor and direct the investigations and take operational decisions. See: European Public Prosecutor’s Office, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eppo/
  • 162“Бизнесменът Васил Божков се върна в София, задържаха го” [Businessman Vasil Bozhkov returned to Sofia and was detained], BNR, August 8, 2023, https://bnr.bg/radiobulgaria/post/101869514/biznesmenat-vasil-bojkov-se…
  • 163What prompted Bozhkov to return from the UAE, three months after the removal of Geshev. The prosecution claimed in August it had received a letter confirming Bozhkov's extradition, while he described his return as voluntary and published a document allegedly proving he had demanded to leave the UAE of his own will. The document is still available in Arabic, among others, on his Facebook timeline. See: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=844641283928620&set=pcb.8446420039…
  • 164Petya Vladimirova, “‘Имейли от Пригожин и връзки с политици’: Съдът остави в ареста Васил Божков” [Emails from Prigozhin and ties to politicians: the court left Vasil Bozhkov in custody], Dnevnik, August 26, 2023, https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2023/08/26/4522127_sudut_gleda_miarkata…
  • 165Ivo Nikodimov, “Съдът пусна Васил Божков под домашен арест, ще го следи с електронна гривна” [The court released Vasil Bozhkov under house arrest, he will be tracked through an electronic bracelet], BNT, September 5, 2023, https://bntnews.bg/news/sadat-pusna-vasil-bozhkov-pod-domashen-arest-sh…; “Васил Божков се обяви за защитен свидетел, прокуратурата отрече” [Bozhkov declared himself a protected witness, the prosecution denied], Lex News, September 9, 2023, https://news.lex.bg/%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B2%D…
ecoi.net-Beschreibung:
Bericht über Demokratisierung (Wahlen, Zivilgesellschaft, Medien, Staatsführung) und Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Korruption) im Jahr 2023
Land:
Bulgarien
Quelle:
Freedom House (Autor)
Veröffentlicht:
2024
Originallink:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-transit/2024
Dokumentart:
Periodischer Bericht
Sprache:
Englisch
Verfügbar auf ecoi.net seit:
24. September 2024
Dokument-ID:
2115564

ecoi.net wird vom Österreichischen Roten Kreuz (Abteilung ACCORD) in Kooperation mit dem Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration betrieben. ecoi.net wird durch den Asyl-, Migrations- und Integrationsfonds, das Bundesministerium für Inneres und die Caritas Österreich kofinanziert. ecoi.net wird von ECRE und UNHCR ideell unterstützt.