Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Anti-Government Protests

A July 2023 country report on Iran by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicates that protests are "relatively common" in Iran and can be "violent" (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.105). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) [1] stated that, in general, the government does not tolerate "critics and opponents," and draws on a "range of tactics to suppress dissent" (HRANA 2024-03-01).

The Australian DFAT provides the following information regarding protests before September 2022:

Smaller protests continued to occur in 2021 and 2022. Most such protests … were in response to water and electricity shortages, cost of living pressures and rampant inflation. At times, authorities tolerated the protests, however on other occasions they have violently supressed protest activity. These protests began in Khuzestan … in July 2021 and have continued for many months. New protests can occur at any time over different issues and may be seen as a continuation of existing protests. For example, mass anti-government protests occurred in May 2022 in Khuzestan after a building collapsed, killing dozens. (2023-07-24, para. 2.113)

According to an August 2022 report by Amnesty International, protests against rising food prices emerged in Khuzestan province in May 2022, before spreading to Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province, in southwestern Iran; further "widespread" protests took place in the city of Abadan, in Khuzestan, from 23 to 31 May 2022, following "the deadly collapse of an unfinished building" (2022-08-03, 3). The same report notes that the "multiple rounds" of protests in Iran in May 2022

reflected deepening outrage among people in the country about state corruption, high inflation, high levels of unemployment, low or unpaid wages, food insecurity and loss of livelihood, as well as political repression and systemic impunity over protest killings and other crimes under international law. (Amnesty International 2022-08-03, 3)

Amnesty International adds that security forces responded with a "campaign of violent repression involving the use of live ammunition, birdshot, tear gas and water cannon," which "left at least four people dead and more injured," in addition to "localized internet shutdowns and mobile network disruptions" (2022-08-03, 3). The Australian DFAT report published in 2023 notes the following regarding protests:

Most protest action in recent years, including those driven by economic factors, has had an anti-government and anti-regime theme. Sources suggested environmental protests, including protests over water supply issues, also provoke a strong reaction from the regime. Protests can be met with lethal force. (2023-07-24, para. 2.105)

In its 2022-2023 report on the state of human rights in the world, Amnesty International notes that Iranian "authorities ramped up already suffocating levels of repression," and permitted "no space for peaceful dissent" (2023-03-27, 197). According to Freedom House's 2023 report on freedom in the world, labour protests in Iran have increased over "recent years due to growing economic hardship" (2023-03-09, Sec. E3).

In November 2022 remarks at the UN Human Rights Council's special session on Iran, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that Iran had experienced "waves of protests" over the preceding years, treated by authorities "with violence and repression" and the "disproportionate use of force"; since September 2022, however, Iran was "in a full-fledged human rights crisis" (UN 2022-11-24). Nationwide protests commenced following the 16 September 2022 death of Mahsa Amini, a woman who died while in the custody of Iran's morality police following her arrest for violating mandatory veiling laws (US 2023-03-20, 2; Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.56, 2.106). The DFAT report states that these protests constitute the "biggest and longest-running protests" in the Islamic Republic's history (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.109).

1.1 Treatment of Anti-Government Activists by Authorities

The information in the following paragraph was provided by the HRANA representative:

How authorities treat anti-government activists can vary "significantly" based on a number of different factors, including the scale of protests, the activist's geographical location, their gender and previous criminal record, the agency completing their arrest, and the specific charge laid against them. However, in general, the Iranian government employs a variety of different means to "suppress dissent," including "arrests, threats, targeting economic interests such as jobs and income, imprisonment, and various forms of harassment." When protests are widespread—such as the 2022 nationwide protests—security forces "tend" to respond in "more violent" ways, and those arrested "often face harsher treatment" during their arrest and detention, with the "use of physical force and coercion" "more pronounced" against individuals "involved in organizing or participating in mass demonstrations against the government." This response was observed in the "significant violence" used by security forces during the 2022 nationwide protests. The treatment of activists can also vary depending on the location of their arrest. Activists detained in Tehran "might experience different treatment" than those in "more remote" areas, as security forces in remote areas "may employ more severe methods," partly as a result of these regions experiencing "less scrutiny from international media and human rights organizations" (HRANA 2024-03-01).

The Australian DFAT report, citing allegations made by human rights groups, states that "arbitrary arrest is common," especially "against ethnic and religious minorities, activists, journalists and their lawyers and families" (2023-07-24, para. 2.186). Freedom House notes that freedom of movement is "restricted" for perceived opponents of the regime, adding that "[m]any journalists and activists" have been denied exit from the country (2023-03-09, Sec. G1). According to a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, "[t]hreats, including in some cases death threats, harassment, detention and violence against journalists and media workers continued" (2023-02-07, para. 48). The same source adds that women journalists were "disproportionately targeted" through tactics including "threats of sexual violence" (UN 2023-02-07, para. 48).

According to the UN's Special Rapporteurs on the independence of judges and lawyers and on the situation of human rights in Iran, Iranian lawyers "have been targeted with intimidation and harassment, including arbitrary arrest and disbarment for seeking to ensure that [protesters] arrested and charged have access to their right to legal defence" (2024-01-22). The Australian DFAT report notes that there exists "an ongoing risk of arbitrary arrest, detention and prosecution" for human rights defenders, a concern that is "particularly acute for prominent human rights lawyers and/or lawyers advocating for their clients in sensitive cases, a number of whom have recently been handed long prison sentences" (2023-07-24, para. 2.121). Freedom House indicates that "at least" 44 lawyers were arrested during the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, including defence attorneys who represented protest demonstrators (2023-03-09, Sec. F2).

Citing international sources, the Australian DFAT report states that "authorities have prevented some civil society activists and human rights defenders from travelling abroad," and "human rights activists have reported receiving intimidating phone calls, threats of blackmail, online hacking attempts and property damage from unidentified security officials" (2023-07-24, para. 2.123). The same report, citing media and human rights reports, indicates that civil society organizations have been "arbitrarily closed," and activists with a high-profile can "face arrest" if they are critical of the government or affiliated with organizations the government deems "sensitive" (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.120). Freedom House states that NGOs with a focus on "human rights violations" are "generally supressed" by authorities and adds that groups focusing on "apolitical issues also face crackdowns" (2023-03-09, Sec. E2). According to information derived from "local interlocutors in 2019," the Australian DFAT report notes that human rights NGOs are "severely restricted" in their operations and are "closely monitored" by authorities; it is also "not unusual" for them to face "official harassment" (2023-07-24, para. 2.119). The same source states that activists who are arrested usually face charges including "'propaganda against the regime', 'insulting the Supreme Leader' or 'disrupting national security'," each of which "is very serious" and can carry lengthy prison sentences or the death penalty (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.122).

According to Freedom House, Iran prohibits the creation of labour unions and "labor councils" are state-sponsored; workers engaging in strikes are at risk of "dismissal and arrest," including being imprisoned on national security charges (2023-03-09, Sec. E3). Amnesty International's 2022-2023 report indicates that authorities perpetrated "reprisals" against striking labourers and initiated a ban against all independent political parties, civil society organizations, and independent trade unions (2023-03-27, 197). The same source adds that hundreds of workers and teachers faced "arbitrary detention" following actions including striking, participating in International Workers' Day events, and/or expressing concerns about the rights of workers (Amnesty International 2023-03-27, 198).

According to Freedom House, Iran's judicial system is "regularly used as a tool to silence regime critics and opposition members" (2023-03-09, Sec. F1). The same source adds that due process is "routinely violate[d]," with activists "arrested without warrants, held indefinitely without formal charges, and denied access to legal counsel or any contact with the outside world," and with "[m]any" thereafter "convicted on vague security charges" (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. F2). Amnesty International's 2022-2023 report states that the judiciary

lacked independence and oversaw a repressive apparatus replete with systematic due process violations, including denial of access to a lawyer at the investigation stage, enforced disappearance, incommunicado detention, admission of torture-tainted 'confessions' as evidence, and summary and secret sham trials bearing no resemblance to judicial proceedings, resulting in imprisonment, flogging and death sentences. (2023-03-27, 198)

The same report states that authorities "covered up" statistical data of those "killed by security forces during protests," instead blaming these deaths on "'rioters'" or "claiming" that they occurred by accident or suicide (Amnesty International 2023-03-27, 200).

Freedom House indicates that newspapers and periodicals endure state censorship and "warnings" from authorities about their coverage of particular topics (2023-03-09, Sec. D1). The same source notes that state television has a history of "airing confessions extracted from political prisoners under duress," and regularly carries reports "aimed at discrediting dissidents and opposition activists" (Freedom House 2023-03-09, Sec. D1). Amnesty International's 2022-2023 report indicates that authorities "repeatedly shut off or disrupted" telecommunications networks during protests in an effort to hinder mobilization and conceal "the scale of violations" committed by security forces (2023-03-27, 197). According to Freedom House, authorities "impos[ed] severe restrictions on internet services, including curbs on access to the social media platforms Instagram and WhatsApp" (2023-03-09, Sec. D1). The Australian DFAT report provides the following information regarding state surveillance of online activities:

The authorities monitor online content, including social media. Individuals repeatedly posting content that is openly critical of the government, its institutions and policies or deemed to be pushing moral boundaries may attract adverse attention, especially if the content goes viral. This includes individuals based abroad. In 2019, sources told DFAT that Iranians with links to Iran-based foreigners are more likely to have their social media accounts monitored. To avoid detection, persons critical of the Islamic Republic on permitted social media platforms may use aliases to conceal their identity.

…

Users with a public profile (including with large social media followings, particularly on Instagram) or who are politically active and post about politically sensitive topics (such as minority rights or about topics that are critical of the government) are more likely to be monitored. (2023-07-24, para. 2.127-2.128)

1.2 Treatment of Anti-Government Activists Upon Return to Iran

For information on the treatment of failed refugee claimants by Iranian authorities, see Response to Information Request IRN200133 of March 2020.

In an interview with the Research Directorate, a retired professor from York University, who has published books and articles in English and Persian on the leftist movement in Iran, religious fundamentalism, secularism, multiculturalism, and the diaspora, stated that anti-government activists would "definitely" be detained when they return to Iran, and that "in most cases," this would happen "immediately" upon their arrival (Retired Professor 2024-02-26). When asked the same question about the treatment of anti-government activists who return to Iran, the HRANA representative indicated that regardless of whether they were political activists, students, or former refugees, an individual's treatment upon their return is "determined by their perceived threat to the regime," and this assessment is "influenced by a variety of factors," such as their activities abroad, their citizenship status, and which countries they are returning from (2024-03-01). The same source added that "particular scrutiny" occurs for those with dual citizenship, individuals returning from "Sunni countries with connections to religious groups," and those returning from "Western countries due to political activities" (HRANA 2024-03-01).

The retired Professor further noted that there have been some cases where Turkish authorities have deported an anti-government protester back to Iran (2024-02-26). According to an article by the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) [2], Iranian "civil and political activists" who were "forced to flee political persecution" in Iran and resettle in Türkiye, now "face expulsion" and "extradition back to Iran" (2023-12-21). The same source quotes CHRI's Executive Director who stated that "'[t]hese activists face arbitrary detention, possible torture, sham convictions on national security charges, and years of prison if they are extradited back to Iran'" (2023-12-21). The CHRI article describes the case of one activist—whose online comments on a variety of social issues in Iran were quoted in the media—who was "detained in Istanbul" in June 2023, "handed over to Iranian border guards" that August, and "deported to Iran" (2023-12-21). The same article notes that after this, the activist was "first taken to the Ministry of Intelligence's detention center in the city of Khoy, West Azerbaijan province, where [they were] interrogated by state intelligence agents without access to a lawyer," before being "transferred to Evin Prison in Tehran and placed in solitary confinement…again under the control of the Ministry of Intelligence"; as of December 2023, they remained in a "general ward for prisoners" in Evin Prison (CHRI 2023-12-21). The CHRI article adds that there are "at least" 11 other Iranian activists "at risk" of deportation from Türkiye and "persecution" in Iran (2023-12-21). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), a news organization funded by the US Congress (RFE/RL n.d.), published an article about the disappearance of an Iranian dissident journalist who had fled to Türkiye in 2014, after facing charges of "collusion against the state" in Iran (RFE/RL 2022-11-29). The journalist's lawyer, who was interviewed for the article, indicated that their client had been granted asylum in Türkiye; however, in May 2022, they were nevertheless "kidnapped by Turkish intelligence officers and kept in an unknown location" where they were "interrogated and tortured" during five months of "'illegal' detention," before being deported to Iran in November of that year (RFE/RL 2022-11-29). Citing "sources with knowledge of the case," RFE/RL further reports that the journalist "is now in the custody of Iran's powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)" (2022-11-29). For information on the IRGC and other branches of the Iranian army, see Response IRN200614 of December 2022.

In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, who studies authoritarian regimes with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa and has written about Iran, stated that people who attended protests and then went abroad and were not politically active while abroad will not face "consequences" when they return unless there are "open files" and charges or sentences; if there are "open files" and charges or sentences, though, the person will be arrested (2021-01-23). The same source indicated that a person who was politically active abroad but stayed anonymous can return; however, "there is no way" for a person who was politically active under their real name to return (Assistant Professor 2021-01-23).

2. Mahsa Amini Protests

The Australian DFAT report notes that following the death of Mahsa Amini, weeks of protest ensued, which "garnered broad support"—especially "among young people and students, and a range of celebrities and public figures"—before evolving into "broader protests against the regime," including an "overt call for social change and the overthrow" of the current regime (2023-07-24, para. 2.106, 2.109). This protest movement came to be known by its slogan "Woman Life Freedom" (Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 21) or "Women, Life, Freedom" (UN 2023-02-07, para. 6). Sources note that young people were particularly prominent in the protest movement (Retired Professor 2024-02-26; Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 22; UN 2023-02-07, para. 6), and Amnesty International adds that the "protests were marked by visibly increased involvement of schoolchildren and university students," with women and girls "at the forefront" (2023-12-06, 21-22).

2.1 Treatment of Mahsa Amini Protesters by Authorities

Amnesty International, citing a September 2022 "leaked official document" it obtained, notes that Iran's General Headquarters of Armed Forces, which oversees the conduct of law enforcement agencies, "issued an order to the commanders of armed forces in all provinces instructing them to 'severely confront' protesters who were described as 'troublemakers and anti-revolutionaries'" (2022-09-30, 1). The Australian DFAT report states that the government response to the protests has been "harsh," and that the response by "security forces" has been "particularly harsh" in regions that are majority Kurdish and Baluch (2023-07-24, para. 2.107). Citing another September 2022 "leaked document," Amnesty International indicates that "the commander of armed forces in Mazandaran province ordered security forces stationed in central areas to 'confront mercilessly and while going as far as causing deaths any unrest by rioters and anti-Revolutionaries'" (2022-09-30, 1).

According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022, security forces deployed "lethal force" against protesters (2023-03-20, 2). Amnesty International reports that security forces "fired live ammunition, metal pellets and teargas and resorted to severe beatings" (2023-12-06, 22). According to Australia's DFAT, "reports indicate that the vast majority of deaths have been at the hands of security forces either by firearms or beatings" (2023-07-24, para. 2.107).

A report by Amnesty International on sexual violence perpetrated against detained protesters indicates that in their efforts to "crush the protests," authorities "extensive[ly]" deployed the "Revolutionary Guards, the Basij paramilitary force, and the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (known by its Persian acronym FARAJA) and its various bodies, including the Special Forces of the police (yegan-e vijeh) and Public Security Police" (2023-12-06, 22). Sources note that "plainclothes security agents" (Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 22) or "plainclothes" "paid hooligans" (Retired Professor 2024-02-26) were also tasked with responding to protesters (Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 22; Retired Professor 2024-02-26).

An April 2023 report by Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO)—a Norway-based non-profit organization which monitors human rights issues in Iran and maintains a network of members inside the country (IHRNGO n.d.)—indicated that according to cases reported both "officially" and by the family of the victims, "at least 537 people," including 48 women and 68 children, have been "killed by security forces" since the start of the "nationwide protests," the "majority" of whom were killed over the first months of protest (IHRNGO 2023-04-04). US Country Reports 2022, drawing on data from HRANA, indicates that by the end of 2022, security forces had "killed" over 500 people—69 of whom were children—and arrested over 19,000 protesters (2023-03-20, 40). According to "reliable sources" consulted for the DFAT report, roughly 20,000 people had been arrested between 16 September 2022 and 10 January 2023, many of whom have since been released, either pending court hearings or without charge (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.109).

Amnesty International notes that the use of force by authorities inflicted "life-changing injuries," including "blinding, loss of limbs and impaired mobility" (2023-12-06, 22). The retired Professor stated that authorities "openly fired on people," "intentionally target[ing] the eyes of protestors" in an effort to "blind them" (2024-02-26). The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation notes that "[h]undreds have reportedly suffered severe eye injuries or lost their eyesight due to the use of metal pellets and rubber bullets by the security forces" (2023-02-07, para. 32). Amnesty International indicates that many of the injured protesters and bystanders, fearing arrest, avoided seeking immediate medical treatment (2023-12-06, 22). Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation states that many injured protesters avoided seeking medical treatment at government facilities, out of fear of "reprisals, torture and detention" (2023-02-07, para. 33).

2.2 Arrests and Treatment of Detained Protesters

Amnesty International reports that arrested individuals have endured "enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment" by authorities, while facing "bogus national security charges, including 'spreading propaganda against the system', 'gathering and colluding to commit crimes against national security', 'disrupting public order', 'enmity against God' (moharebeh) and 'spreading corruption on earth'" (2023-12-06, 23). The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation notes an "exponential increase in death sentences issued and indictments on vague and broadly formulated criminal offences that carry the death penalty, including moharebeh (taking up arms to take lives or property or to create fear in the public), efsad-e fil-arz (spreading corruption on earth) and baghy (armed rebellion)" (2023-02-07, para. 53). Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that as of 14 November 2022, "at least" nine individuals had been charged with "moharabeh ('enmity against God') or isfad fil arz ('corruption on earth')" —each charge holds the possibility of a death sentence—in connection with the September and November 2022 protests (2023-01-12).

The DFAT report states that those arrested have faced "severe sentences," including "significant" time in jail and, in some cases, the death penalty; as of July 2023, 15 death sentences have been issued, including 2 cases enforced in December 2022, 2 carried out in January 2023, and 3 enforced in May 2023 (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.107, 2.108). According to the two UN Special Rapporteurs, "at least" eight protesters have been executed following "summary, arbitrary and sham trials" (2024-01-22). Amnesty International indicates that,

[b]etween December 2022 and November 2023, the authorities arbitrarily executed eight men…in relation to the uprising following…trials in the provinces of Alborz, Esfahan, Hamedan, Khorasan-e Razavi, and Tehran. Following their arrests, the eight men were denied access to lawyers during the investigation phase of their cases. … Amnesty International obtained information indicating that intelligence and security forces subjected [seven of the men] to torture and other ill-treatment in detention to extract forced 'confessions' that formed the basis for their convictions in court. Documented methods of torture and other ill-treatment against them included severe beatings, electric shocks, suspension upside down, mock executions, and threats to kill their family members. (2023-12-06, 25, footnote omitted)

Australia's DFAT report states that as of 19 December 2022, 400 arrested protesters had been "sentenced to jail," including 160 people sentenced to a term of between 5 and 10 years in prison, 80 who received terms of 2 to 5 years, and 160 sentenced to terms up to two years in length (2023-07-24, para. 2.109). The same source adds that the protesters' trials have "occurred quickly without due process and in secret"; "many" prosecuted protesters have gone without legal representation or received "ineffective court-appointed lawyers" (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.109). The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation states that the Islamic revolutionary courts "have been relying on forced confessions extracted through torture and other forms of duress in convicting protesters" (2023-02-07, para. 43). Freedom House notes that lawyers who assume cases for protest detainees "have been jailed and banned from practicing" (2023-03-09, Sec. F2).

According to HRW, in February 2023 Iran declared a "broad amnesty" extended to individuals "arrested, charged, or detained" during the protests; Iran's head of the judiciary stated that these amnesty orders would include 22,000 people (2024-01-11). The same source notes, however, that "many human rights defenders with lengthy sentences and protesters facing capital charges" were excluded from this amnesty and, since April 2023, some of the activists granted amnesty and released have again been "arrested, sentenced, or summoned" alongside (HRW 2024-01-11.

Amnesty International's report on sexual violence committed by authorities against protesters—based on 45 testimonies of "rape and other forms of sexual violence" against those detained between September and December 2022—indicates that "Iranian intelligence and security forces committed horrific acts of rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence…against women, men and children" arrested (2023-12-06, 17, 33). The same source adds that acts of "[r]ape and other forms of sexual violence" were committed against detainees by agents representing the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij force, the Ministry of Intelligence, "and various bodies of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, … including the Public Security Police (police amniat-e omoumi), the investigation unit of Iran's police (Agahi), and the Special Forces of the police (yegan-e vijeh)" (Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 34).

2.3 Profiles of Individuals Targeted

The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation indicates that ethnic and religious minorities have been "disproportionately affected in the current wave of repression" (2023-02-07, para. 28). According to Amnesty International, ethnic minorities "bore the brunt of the crackdown," with over half of those killed belonging to either the Baluchi minority in Sistan and Baluchestan province, or the Kurdish minority in the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan (2023-12-06, 22). The same source reports that the profiles of individuals "targeted for arrest included protesters, university students, schoolchildren, as well as women and girls who had removed their headscarves in public" (Amnesty International 2023-12-06, 23). In the same report, Amnesty International adds that authorities "opportunistically" arrested "hundreds" of journalists and members of the media, political dissidents, ethnic minority members, LGBTI people, and "human rights defenders including lawyers, women's rights activists, labour rights activists, and civil society activists" (2023-12-06, 23). The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran's human rights situation, citing information derived from two civil society organizations, states that amongst those arrested by Iranian authorities were dozens of human rights defenders, at least 600 students, 45 lawyers, 576 civil society activists, and a minimum of 62 journalists (2023-02-07, para. 34).

Freedom House notes that authorities arrested "thousands" of individuals who had publicly supported the protest movement by posting on social media applications, or by publicly ignoring hijab requirements; the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps asked the judiciary to "prosecute anyone spreading 'false news and rumors'" (2023-03-09, Sec. D4). According to Amnesty International, citing information derived from former detainees and "others with direct information," individuals arrested amidst the protests had their mobile phones searched, with criminal investigations opened "based on protest-related text messages or other 'incriminating' content found on their phones, such as criticism of the authorities or, in the case of women, pictures of them not wearing headscarves in public and/or on social media posts" (2023-12-06, 23).

3. Treatment of the Family Members of Anti-Government Activists

The HRANA representative indicated that authorities "targe[t]" the families of anti-government activists for several purposes, such as to place "pressure" on the activists, or to "retaliat[e]" against family members who are "advocating [for] and publicizing the cases of their detained relatives," or are "involved in efforts to mobilize and unify opposition against the regime" by leveraging "connections with other families or groups" (2024-03-01). According to Amnesty International, amidst the "Woman Life Freedom" protests, family members who made inquires about relatives who had been detained or killed during the protests "were also targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention" (2023-12-06, 23). Another report by Amnesty International documents the "harassment and intimidation" of the families of 33 victims, 30 of whom were "unlawfully killed" during the protests, 2 who were "arbitrarily executed," and 1 who "suffered torture and other ill-treatment while in custody and committed suicide upon her release" (2023-08-21, 2). This report provides the following:

…authorities have subjected victims' families to increasing harassment and intimidation to instill fear among them and to silence their calls for truth and justice. In particular, victims' families have been subjected to harassment and intimidation for publicly condemning the killing of their loved ones by security forces, challenging official state narratives about their deaths, calling for accountability, holding memorials and other gatherings bringing together bereaved families, writing social media posts deemed critical of the authorities, and lodging official complaints about the killings of their loves one.

The violations against victims' families include arbitrary arrest and detention; prosecution on vaguely worded national security charges, in some cases leading to prison and flogging sentences; summoning them for coercive interrogations by prosecutors or intelligence and security bodies; subjecting them to unlawful surveillance; threating to kill or otherwise harm them and their surviving family members; denying them the right to hold peaceful gatherings; destroying or damaging the graves of their loved ones; and threatening to exhume victims' bodies and reburying them in unidentified locations.

The authorities have pressured many families who sought criminal investigations into the unlawful killing of their loved ones to accept 'blood money' (diyah) from government funds pursuant to laws which provide for state-funded financial compensation in cases where the perpetrator may not be identified and apprehended. The authorities have threatened family members with reprisals if they refuse the 'blood money' and instead continue to seek justice and accountability, and have indicated the futility of their efforts in achieving anything other than 'blood money'.

The authorities have also tried to cruelly bar victims' families from holding ceremonies at the gravesites of their loved ones, including on the occasion of their birthdays, and have subjected family members to unlawful surveillance, threats, summons and/or arbitrary detention ahead of planned events. Those families who have defiantly held gatherings have reported the heavy presence of security forces cracking down on ceremonies, subjecting people to physical surveillance by observing and taking pictures, violently beating and/or arresting family members and supporters. (Amnesty International 2023-08-21, 2)

In its report on sexual violence committed against detained protesters, Amnesty International notes that authorities have "pressured relatives of those unlawfully killed to appear in propaganda videos or to sign written statements propagating official narratives and publicly absolving authorities of responsibility in the deaths of their loved ones" (2023-12-06, 26). In November 2022 remarks at the UN Human Rights Council's special session on Iran, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran cited reports that the families of individuals killed in the protests were "being pressured to declare that their children had died as a result of suicide and making false confessions, and were threatened that their other children would be killed if they did not make such false public statements on State television" (2022-11-24).

A joint letter signed by 15 human rights organizations—including Amnesty International, CHRI, IHRNGO, Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), and Justice for Iran (JFI)—stated that the International People's Tribunal on Iran's Atrocities [3] held two sets of public hearings in the UK in November 2021 and February 2022, and reviewed evidence from "protesters, torture survivors, relatives of protesters and bystanders killed, healthcare workers, and former security and judicial officials," concerning Iran's nationwide November 2019 protests against increased fuel prices (Amnesty International, et al., 2022-04-07). According to that joint letter, authorities "carried out reprisals" against the witnesses testifying to the Tribunal and their families; these "reprisals" included "subjecting them to arbitrary arrest and detention, violence, unjust prosecution, summoning for coercive interrogations, death threats, and other forms of harassment" (Amnesty International, et al., 2022-04-07).

4. Treatment of Individuals Who Criticize the UIA Flight PS752 Downing

Recent information on the treatment of individuals who criticized the 2020 UIA Flight PS752 incident was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources report that on 11 January 2020, Iran acknowledged that it shot down PS752 due to "'human error'" after initially denying doing so (Al Jazeera 2020-01-11; The Guardian with Reuters and AP 2020-01-11). A May 2020 HRW article indicates that protests broke out across Iran after the government's admission (2020-05-08). A January 2020 BBC article states that the protests "mainly" involved university students and other people from the middle class and were concentrated in Tehran and other cities such as Isfahan (2020-01-16). A May 2020 report by CHRI notes that the protests were "[c]entered largely but not exclusively in several universities" (2020-05, 43).

The DFAT report notes that protesters calling for the resignation of the Supreme Leader over the incident were met with "security forces using tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition to disperse protesters in Tehran" (Australia 2023-07-24, para. 2.112). Sources report that Iranian security forces used live ammunition on protesters in Tehran on 12 January 2020 (CHRI 2020-01-14; The Guardian 2020-01-13; The Washington Post 2020-01-13). Amnesty International reports that video footage, photographs, and testimonies from victims and eyewitnesses indicate that on 11 and 12 January, security forces "fired pointed pellets from airguns, usually used for hunting, at peaceful protesters[,] causing bleeding and painful injuries" (2020-01-15). The same source states that "[s]ecurity forces also used rubber bullets, tear gas and pepper spray to disperse protesters as well as kicking and punching them, beating them with batons and carrying out arbitrary arrests" (Amnesty International 2020-01-15). The May 2020 CHRI report states that "direct threats were made by state security and intelligence agents against students participating in peaceful sit-ins, hospitalized protesters who had been injured by security forces, and against their families" (2020-05, 46).

Australia's DFAT indicates that dozens of arrests were reported (2023-07-24, para. 2.112). According to sources, Iran's judiciary stated on 14 January 2020 that 30 people had been arrested in the protests (AP 2020-01-14; Reuters 2020-01-14). The May 2020 CHRI report indicates that arrests made during the protests included "significant numbers of students at universities engaged in peaceful sit-ins" (2020-05, 45). The May 2020 HRW article reports that since late April 2020, courts in Iran "have sentenced at least 13 people to prison terms, apparently solely for peacefully protesting" the downing of the Ukrainian airlines flight (2020-05-08).

The HRANA representative noted that in response to the various forms of protest in Iran concerning the incident—from rallies to criticism on social media applications, to memorial ceremonies for victims—authorities have "engaged in a series of repressive measures aimed at silencing dissent and controlling the narrative" of the incident (2024-03-01). In a 2021 telephone interview with the Research Directorate, the retired Professor indicated that the government has threatened individuals who have publicly criticized the PS752 incident, including one of the "leading" organizers of a memorial ceremony for the victims (2021-01-25). The Assistant Professor reported that two individuals who attended a ceremony for the victims of PS752 were arrested and sentenced, with one person being sentenced to five years and the other to two years (2021-01-23). The same source further stated that both individuals were activists and observed that when someone is sentenced for one crime, the data the authorities already have on the person is used to charge them with other crimes as well (Assistant Professor 2021-01-23).

For information on Iranian authorities' monitoring of Iranian citizens in Canada, including family members of victims of the UIA Flight PS752 incident, see Response to Information Request IRN201321 of March 2023.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) is a non-profit news organization established by a group of Iranian human rights activists that reports "daily news of human rights violations in Iran," and which receives funding from various non "political" sources, including "donations" from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (HRANA n.d.). The NED is a US nongovernmental "nonprofit foundation" that is "largely" funded by the US Congress (NED n.d.).

[2] The Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI), formerly the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, is a non-profit organization headquartered in New York aiming to "protect and promote human rights in Iran" (CHRI n.d.).

[3] The International People's Tribunal on Iran's Atrocities—launched by the three NGOs, Justice for Iran (JFI), Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), and Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM)—is a tribunal without any legal standing, which seeks to "hold Iran responsible" for Iranian authorities' "crackdown" of the November 2019 gasoline protests (RFE/RL 2021-11-11).

References

Al Jazeera. 2020-01-11. "Iran Says It 'Unintentionally' Shot Down Plane: Latest Updates." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Amnesty International. 2023-12-06. "They Violently Raped Me": Sexual Violence Weaponized to Crush Iran's "Woman Life Freedom" Uprising. (MDE 13/7480/2023) [Accessed 2024-02-19]

Amnesty International. 2023-08-21. Iran: Harassment of Families of Victims Unlawfully Killed During Protests Must End. (MDE 13/7084/2023) [Accessed 2024-02-19]

Amnesty International. 2023-03-27. "Iran." Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World's Human Rights. (POL 10/5670/2023) [Accessed 2024-02-07]

Amnesty International. 2022-09-30. Iran: Leaked Official Documents Ordering Deadly Crackdown Highlight Need for International Action. (MDE 13/6070/2022) [Accessed 2024-02-19]

Amnesty International. 2022-08-03. "They Are Shooting Brazenly": Iran's Militarized Response to May 2022 Protests. (MDE 13/5789/2022) [Accessed 2024-02-19]

Amnesty International, et al. 2022-04-07. "Iran: Authorities Violating Absolute Prohibition of Torture Through Harassment of Witnesses Involved in Iran Atrocities Tribunal." (MDE 13/5441/2022) [Accessed 2024-02-19]

Amnesty International. 2020-01-15. "Iran: Scores Injured as Security Forces Use Unlawful Force to Crush Protests." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Assistant Professor, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, United States. 2021-01-23. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Associated Press (AP). 2020-01-14. "Iran Says Some Arrests Made for Downing of Ukrainian Plane, but Gives No Details." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Australia. 2023-07-24. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Iran. [Accessed 2024-01-25]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2020-01-16. "Iran Protests: Who Are the Opposition in the Country?" [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). 2023-12-21. "Activists Seeking Refuge in Turkey Face Deportation, Severe Persecution in Iran." [Accessed 2024-03-19]

Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). 2020-05. Gunning Them Down: State Violence Against Protesters in Iran. [Accessed 2024-03-05]

Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). 2020-01-14. "'They Were Everywhere': Footage, Eyewitnesses Reveal Violence Against Ukraine Plane Crash Protesters." [Accessed 2024-03-05]

Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI). N.d. "What We Do." [Accessed 2024-03-05]

Freedom House. 2023-03-09. "Iran." Freedom in the World 2023. [Accessed 2024-02-07]

The Guardian. 2020-01-13. Michael Safi and a Guardian reporter in Tehran. "Iranian Police Fired Live Rounds to Disperse Protesters, Say Witnesses." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

The Guardian with Reuters & Associated Press (AP). 2020-01-11. Bethan McKernan. "Iran Admits Unintentionally Shooting Down Ukrainian Airliner." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). 2024-03-01. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2024-03-05]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2024-01-11. "Iran." World Report 2024: Events of 2023. [Accessed 2024-04-16]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2023-01-12. "Iran." World Report 2023: Events of 2022. [Accessed 2024-02-07]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2020-05-08. "Iran: Prosecutions for Protests About Plane-Downing." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO). 2023-04-04. "Report on 200 Days of Protest Repression/List of at Risk Protesters." [Accessed 2024-02-21]

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2024-02-21]

National Endowment for Democracy (NED). N.d. "About the National Endowment for Democracy." [Accessed 2024-03-14]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 2022-11-29. Golnaz Esfandiari. "Exclusive: Iranian Dissident Journalist Who Disappeared in Turkey Ends Up in Custody of Iran's Revolutionary Guards." [Accessed 2024-03-14]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 2021-11-11. "London Tribunal Hears from Victims of Iran's 2019 Deadly Crackdown on Gasoline Protests." [Accessed 2024-03-11]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2024-03-14]

Retired Professor, York University, Canada. 2024-02-26. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Retired Professor, York University, Canada. 2021-01-25. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Reuters. 2020-01-14. Parisa Hafezi. "Iran's Judiciary Says Around 30 Arrested over Plane Crash Protests." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

United Nations (UN). 2024-01-22. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). "UN Experts Urge Iran to Respect and Protect Lawyers." [Accessed 2024-02-07]

United Nations (UN). 2023-02-07. Human Rights Council. Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman. (A/HRC/52/67) [Accessed 2024-02-27]

United Nations (UN). 2022-11-24. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). "High Commissioner to Human Rights Council's Special Session: Iran Must Stop Violence Against Peaceful Protesters, Release All Those Arrested, and Impose a Moratorium on the Death Penalty." [Accessed 2024-02-07]

United States (US). 2023-03-20. Department of State. "Iran." Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2022. [Accessed 2024-02-07]

The Washington Post. 2020-01-13. Erin Cunningham, Kareem Fahim, & Adam Taylor. "Iranians Protest for Third Day over Downed Airliner Amid Reports of Gunfire by Security Forces." [Accessed 2021-02-05]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant professor of sociology and international studies at a university in the US who studies protest movements and democratization in Iran; associate professor of politics and international relations at a university in Ireland who has written on political participation in Iran; Center for Human Rights in Iran; Impact Iran; International Organisation to Preserve Human Rights in Iran; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center; Iran Human Rights Monitor; Mission for the Establishment of Human Rights in Iran; postdoctoral fellow at a university in the US who studies contentious politics in West Asia and has written on Iran; professor of history and Near and Middle East civilizations at a Canadian university who studies Iran.

Internet sites, including: Austrian Red Cross – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation, ecoi.net; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Bloomberg; Business Insider; CBC; Denmark – Danish Immigration Service; The Economist; EU – European Asylum Support Office; Factiva; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; Foreign Policy; Foundation for Democracy in Iran; Global News; The Hill; Impact Iran; The Independent; International Organisation to Preserve Human Rights; Iran Human Rights Documentation Center; IranWire; Mission for the Establishment of Human Rights in Iran; The New York Times; Norway – Landinfo; Swiss Refugee Council; UK – Home Office; UN – Refworld; US – Congressional Research Service.