Consider labor violations and complaints with trafficking indicators as potential labor trafficking crimes and investigate labor violations accordingly, including cases of non-payment or delayed salaries, passport confiscation, requiring excessive hours, and worker-paid recruitment fees. * Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, including immigration offenses. * Proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including those arrested for immigration or “prostitution” violations, those who flee abusive employers and face counter-charges – such as “absconding” – those seeking remedy for labor abuses, especially in cases of severe wage theft, Cuban government-affiliated workers, including medical professionals, and People’s Republic of China (PRC) overseas workers. * Develop and implement formal SOPs for victim identification and referral and train stakeholders on their use. * Allow other government and non-government entities outside the NCCHT to refer victims to care. * Equip the specialized trafficking shelter with long-term care options, enhance legal support for victims and other vulnerable workers residing at the shelter, and allow victims freedom of movement and the opportunity to work while in the shelter. * Ensure the Wage Protection System (WPS) covers all companies and individuals, including domestic workers, and holds accountable violators with deterrent penalties and ensure officials screen all wage theft cases for other trafficking indicators. * Increase efforts to prosecute trafficking offenses, particularly labor trafficking crimes, and to convict and sentence traffickers under the 2011 anti-trafficking law, rather than other criminal laws, when applicable. * Continue to implement reforms to the sponsorship system by explicitly prohibiting No Objection Certificates (NOC), streamlining transfer procedures, and disseminating clear guidance on the legal requirements to change jobs, including providing applicants detailed reasons for job transfer, to mitigate the burden on workers. * Prohibit employers from filing “absconding” charges or cancelling residency permits in retaliation for workers utilizing these reforms and hold non-compliant employers accountable with adequate penalties. * Remove policy that requires domestic workers to notify employers 72 hours before departing the country to prevent employer retaliation. * Increase capacity of Labor Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs) to refer suspected trafficking cases for criminal investigative proceedings and ensure verdicts rendered by the committee can be enforced. * Establish Qatar Visa Centers (QVC) in additional labor-sending countries and ensure ethical recruitment by adequately vetting local staff and management of centers.

The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The 2011 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 250,000 Qatari riyals (QR) ($68,587) for offenses involving adult male victims, and up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 300,000 QR ($82,304) for offenses involving adult female or child victims. Managers of recruiting agencies found guilty of trafficking faced up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 200,000 QR ($54,870). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

The government continued to utilize its specialized trafficking units in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO); the PPO had 11 dedicated prosecutors to handle trafficking cases. In 2023, the government established a specialized trafficking circuit in the judiciary to handle such cases. The government investigated 19 cases, including seven labor trafficking cases and three cases of sex trafficking. Officials reported five cases were dismissed by the PPO for insufficient evidence while an additional four remained under investigation; the government did not report what form of trafficking these cases involved. This was an increase compared with the investigation of 10 cases (eight labor trafficking and two sex trafficking) in 2022. The PPO prosecuted two alleged traffickers in two sex trafficking cases and an alleged labor trafficker in one case; this was a significant decrease compared with the prosecution of two sex trafficking cases involving three defendants and seven labor trafficking cases involving 19 defendants in 2022. The government convicted seven traffickers (six for labor trafficking in one case and one for sex trafficking in one case), compared with eight convictions (six for labor trafficking and two for sex trafficking) in 2022. The 2023 labor trafficking case also involved a company that was fined 200,000 QR ($54,870) and ordered to close as part of the verdict; this was the first labor trafficking conviction involving a company. Courts convicted all traffickers under the anti-trafficking law and the penal code and sentenced the traffickers to imprisonment ranging from one to five years.

While the government convicted some labor traffickers, including a company, officials did not consistently consider labor complaints or violations where trafficking indicators were present as potential trafficking crimes – including reported allegations of labor trafficking involving companies contracted to support the World Cup. Instead, authorities continued to resolve most labor violations through transfer of the employee to a different employer, mandated back payment of wages, fines, and blacklisting of companies without investigating such cases as potential trafficking crimes. In many cases, the government did not hold noncompliant employers or companies criminally or civilly accountable for labor abuses, including those that involved trafficking indicators. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained concerns during the year, which may have inhibited law enforcement action. In the previous reporting period, officials investigated and referred to court a case involving a foreign national police officer who allegedly coerced individuals to work for the company he owned and used his authority as a law enforcement official to intimidate them from reporting exploitation. The officer was charged with visa fraud and labor trafficking and was ultimately convicted of visa fraud but acquitted of trafficking charges. The officer was sentenced to six months imprisonment and deportation upon completion of his sentence.

The NCCHT – directly and in partnership with an international organization and other government entities – financed and conducted trainings on trafficking issues. The Ministry of Labor (MOL), in coordination with an international organization, a foreign embassy, and the International Domestic Worker’s Federation (IDWF) provided several training sessions for representatives of private recruitment agencies on the rights of domestic workers and agencies’ roles in preventing their exploitation through the recruitment process and managing employer-employee disputes. The government continued to include a human trafficking course focused on methods of investigation, supporting potential victims, and transnational trafficking cases in the mandatory training curriculum for all prosecutors. Observers noted Qatari officials would benefit from additional targeted training on effective implementation of the anti-trafficking law, victim-centered approaches to law enforcement efforts, screening procedures to identify potential trafficking victims from those arrested for immigration violations, commercial sex or those seeking remedy for labor abuses, shelter management and service provision, distinguishing potential labor trafficking cases from labor violations – particularly during labor inspections and upon receiving worker complaints and criminally investigating potential labor trafficking crimes.

The government maintained limited protection efforts. The government reported identifying 17 trafficking victims, compared with 33 victims identified and referred to care in 2022. Of the 17 victims identified, traffickers exploited 11 women in sex trafficking and six men in labor trafficking; all identified victims were foreign nationals from Ghana, Tunisia, Morocco and the Philippines. The government referred the six adult male labor trafficking victims to care; the government reported the 11 adult female sex trafficking victims did not accept shelter and preferred to stay at their embassy accommodations or with other support groups. The MOI’s specialized unit reported it used written procedures to identify potential victims, but the government remained without standardized formal procedures for whole-of-government use. The PPO continued to use an electronic program to monitor all reports received by PPO departments across the country and flag cases with trafficking indicators from existing criminal cases; flagged cases were shared with the PPO’s anti-trafficking unit and referred to MOI for further investigation as a trafficking case if warranted, including identifying the potential victims involved and referring them to care. Experts noted while the system could identify trafficking victims from existing criminal cases, labor complaints such as wage theft, passport confiscation, excessive working hours – all labor trafficking indicators – were not considered as criminal cases on their own, and therefore would not be seen in the system or subsequently screened for other trafficking indicators. The NCCHT remained responsible for referring identified victims and potential victims to protection services, which included the provision of shelter, health care, and legal assistance. The NCCHT received referrals for potential cases from MOL, an international organization, MOI, and PPO as well as through its own complaint mechanism; upon receiving a complaint, the committee worked to verify trafficking indicators existed, and if so, referred the case to law enforcement for further investigation. After verification of trafficking indicators, the NCCHT reported it referred identified and potential victims to care immediately while law enforcement investigated the relevant case. However, the NCCHT took between one and three days to assess credibility of a complaint before referring a potential victim to shelter; this process, coupled with the committee being the only government entity that could formally refer a potential victim to shelter, may have delayed some victims from receiving adequate care.

The government had a trafficking-specific shelter, designated for male and female victims and consisting of six refurbished villas with a maximum capacity of 180 residents. The government maintained an agreement with the Qatari Red Crescent Society to manage the shelter and provided an annual budget of one million QR ($274,348) for the shelter’s operations. The shelter provided victims food, basic health services, legal services, Internet access, and repatriation support; the shelter did not provide counseling services but referred victims to other service providers as needed. The government reported it did not allow victims to work during their stay at the shelter or leave the shelter unescorted. Although victims could not work during their time as shelter residents, the NCCHT reported amending the legal status of an unknown number of identified victims to allow them to remain in Qatar and seek new work opportunities during legal proceedings after their temporary stay at the shelter. If victims chose to remain in the shelter instead of seeking work opportunities, the government provided them funds to purchase personal items outside what was provided in the shelter. Officials noted the maximum stay for victims was two weeks; if needed, victims’ stay could be extended to cover any pending judicial issues. However, the government shelter did not provide long-term care options to victims. While potential victims of trafficking could not formally self-refer to the shelter, officials reported, in practice, the shelter accepted individuals who sought assistance; however, shelter staff were required to notify law enforcement upon accepting an individual into care for “security” reasons. Experts reported notification to law enforcement upon admission suggested the government expected potential victims at the shelter to cooperate or engage with law enforcement, which was not a trauma-informed or victim-centered practice. As many victims desired to return to work during their legal proceedings, they chose to leave the shelter and find a new sponsor after their temporary stay; this policy may have limited the long-term care victims received – specifically related to recovery services and counseling. Observers reported the government shelter hosted individuals that experienced labor abuse, including trafficking indicators, but were not officially identified as trafficking victims, while the workers awaited resolution of their labor cases. For example, three foreign nationals resided at the shelter after being prematurely terminated from a security company after the conclusion of the World Cup while they pursued cases against their employer for wage theft and denial of end of service benefits; the workers also paid significant recruitment fees to obtain employment in Qatar.
The government-funded Aman Protection and Social Rehabilitation Center continued to provide basic medical care, social services, counseling, housing, repatriation assistance, and reintegration for female and child victims of domestic abuse, including female workers who fled abusive employers. The Aman Center could host child trafficking victims in coordination with the NCCHT but the government did not report identifying or referring child victims to care. Aman provided repatriation assistance to those who wished to return to their home countries. Residents had the right to leave of their own volition without supervision, although chaperones were on-call in the event security was needed; residents also could access the shelter even if their employers’ filed charges against them. Several foreign diplomatic missions ran shelters for their female nationals, including Indonesia, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. The NCCHT reported victims could work directly with their respective embassies instead of the government to receive care if they so choose; although such diplomatic missions did not report if they assisted any trafficking victims.

The government maintained victim-witness assistance for victims who chose to participate in criminal proceedings, including by providing legal counseling, ensuring their safety, and allowing them to pursue financial compensation; the NCCHT reported it recommended victims remain in Qatar until the closure of their legal case, but would provide airline tickets to victims who desired to repatriate prior to a verdict. However, authorities did not offer such protections in all cases, and many workers still opted to return home rather than remain in the country to assist in legal proceedings against traffickers. Civil society reported vulnerable workers – including potential trafficking victims – residing at the shelter while their complaints remained in the labor courts did not receive adequate legal support, including those who sought new jobs and remained in Qatar after their labor case closed. The government reported all 17 victims identified chose to participate in legal proceedings. The law stated the complaining party could reside in Qatar pending resolution of legal proceedings. The government reported it did not deport those who faced retaliation or retribution in their country of origin; the government repatriated an unknown number of victims in coordination with foreign embassies. The government reported victims could obtain restitution from defendants in criminal cases but did not report if any victims did so during the year.

Although some officials used victim identification guidelines, the government remained without standardized victim identification procedures and some government entities did not proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including domestic workers, as well as migrant workers who fled abusive employers or sought remedy for labor abuses such as wage theft. Generally, government agencies did not categorize the abuse of a domestic worker as a potential trafficking indicator because of a lack of evidence or witnesses and therefore sometimes failed to identify victims; in other cases, some domestic workers voluntarily left the country in lieu of filing complaints or pursuing charges against traffickers. Because officials did not have standardized identification procedures and did not screen for trafficking indicators, authorities likely detained or deported some unidentified trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, including immigration offenses. Some officials also detained and deported migrant workers, including potential victims, after attempting to report labor abuses indicative of labor trafficking, such as wage theft, excessive work hours, denial of end-of-service benefits, threats of salary reduction and ill treatment. Employers often lodged counter-charges against potential victims who reported labor abuses, which resulted in administrative deportation proceedings. Officials reported they did not consider “absconding” charges until after the resolution of existing labor disputes or criminal proceedings, including trafficking crimes, although labor attachés and worker advocates noted that in practice it was often difficult for workers to overcome the burden of such charges. Police often detained workers without legal status for immigration violations and fleeing their employers or sponsors, including potential trafficking victims. Police sometimes detained workers for their sponsors’ failure to register them or renew their residency documents as required by Qatari law. Diplomats reported the government did not screen many of their nationals for trafficking indicators before deportation for immigration or labor violations, including “absconding,” while others noted, in some cases, the government did not alert foreign embassies their citizens were facing deportation unless they required travel documentation. In other instances, authorities deported workers before their labor cases were resolved. The PPO’s specialized trafficking unit reported it continued to receive requests to remove individuals from MOI’s “absconding watchlist” who were identified as potential victims of trafficking or trafficking-related crimes and therefore advocated to legalize such individuals’ residency status. MOL and MOI previously linked their systems tracking “absconding” charges to address false “absconding” charges used as a form of reprisal from employers and required additional documentation from employers before they could submit such a charge. However, observers reported workers charged with “absconding” were required to go to law enforcement in-person to dispute the allegations, while employers were able to file such charges on an electronic application, placing the burden of proof on the worker. Although the government reported it could reactivate Qatari IDs (QID) for workers if “absconding” charges were spurious, workers were required to find a new job and sponsor while dealing with court proceedings.

The government maintained prevention efforts. The NCCHT met twice. The NCCHT reported it continued to draft an updated NAP, after the previous NAP expired in 2022; however, the draft NAP was not finalized for the second consecutive year. The government and an international organization extended a technical cooperation program to a third phase, spanning 2024-2028; the program continued to focus on sustainable labor reform implementation efforts to prevent labor exploitation, including trafficking. The NCCHT, in coordination with an international organization, organized an exchange visit with the Government of France to discuss best practices in labor inspections. The government continued to raise awareness of trafficking, including indicators and reporting mechanisms, through the publication of brochures and signage in airports. In addition, MOL collaborated with an international organization and the IDWF to raise awareness of the domestic worker law, standard employment contract, complaint mechanisms, processes for changing jobs, and occupational safety and health through a series of information sessions and workshops provided to domestic workers, including those from Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Kenya, the Philippines and Uganda. MOL, in partnership with an NGO, continued to publish two informational booklets aimed at raising awareness of domestic worker rights; the booklet aimed at workers was disseminated in 12 languages while the booklet targeting employers was disseminated in two languages. The government, including MOI’s anti-trafficking section, the NCCHT, and MOL, continued to operate hotlines to receive notifications of trafficking cases. The government reported the hotlines received 119 total calls during the year but did not identify any potential trafficking cases.

Article 33 of Qatari Labor Law No. 14 of 2004, the 2018 Domestic Worker Law, and the standard unified contract prohibited recruitment agencies from receiving recruitment or placement fees from workers. While companies under the Supreme Council for Delivery and Legacy – the lead Qatari agency for the November 2022 World Cup – were required to reimburse their workers for recruitment fees paid in their home country, media, NGOs, rights groups, and international organizations continued to report many migrant workers in Qatar frequently paid illegal recruitment fees to unregulated agents in labor-source countries; observers reported workers paid up to $4,500 in such fees to secure jobs in Qatar. An international human rights group previously found Qatar-based businesses sometimes imposed costs on recruitment agencies that were subsequently passed down to workers; in 2023, some domestic workers reported paying recruitment agents “placement fees”, which were deducted from the worker’s salary once they began working for a private family. Migrant workers who incurred debt to pay recruitment fees remained vulnerable to labor trafficking, as they may have been forced to remain in exploitive situations to pay off debt; further, as many workers also experienced wage theft, delayed payment or denied overtime pay, they were unable to pay their debts for more extended periods, further exploiting them in debt bondage. The government continued to utilize 14 QVCs in six critical labor source countries (providing 80 percent of the total workforce in Qatar) including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka to address fraudulent recruitment practices. The centers were responsible for finalizing all procedural elements pertaining to labor recruitment for private-sector workers and domestic workers, including fingerprinting, medical examinations, verifying educational certificates, signing contracts in local languages, issuing Qatari residency permits prior to source country departure, opening bank accounts for workers, and attempting to ensure Qatari employers paid all recruitment fees. Although QVCs aimed to reduce instances of contract-switching, observers noted QVCs did not address workers who paid recruitment fees to brokers prior to visiting the centers as QVCs handled only the end of the recruitment process. Diplomats also noted some QVCs experienced backlogs in medical examinations, sometimes delaying the process for workers; other observers alleged corruption and conflict of interest in the centers, noting in some cases, local recruitment agencies in source countries reportedly managed QVCs.

MOL continued to oversee issuance of licensing and regulation of recruitment agencies and companies through inspections and monitoring for employment and immigration violations; it also continued to use its hotline and dedicated email address to receive public complaints related to non-compliant conduct of recruitment agencies. In July 2023, MOL and an international organization conducted an assessment of current SOPs, policies, and mechanisms used by the government to license and monitor agencies and enforce compliance as well as the inspection process; the assessment resulted in several recommendations, including developing licensing standards and auditable requirements to issue new and renew licenses. The government did not report implementing the assessment’s recommendations. In 2023, an international organization reported MOL revoked the licenses of at least 23 recruitment agencies for violating the labor law; the government named four agencies publicly in local media. This was a decrease compared with the revocation of licenses from 56 agencies in 2022. The government also shut down five agencies for violating the labor law. Between January and September 2023, the government also conducted 40,058 workplace and accommodations visits and company inspections (an increase compared with 23,384 inspections in 2022); the government identified 4,595 violations via the inspections but did not report referring any for further investigation by law enforcement for potential trafficking crimes, despite worker-paid recruitment fees remaining a well-known trafficking indicator and NGOs documenting such cases. In 2022, labor inspectors identified 8,816 violations.

MOL maintained its responsibility to respond to worker complaints; between January 2023 and October 2023, MOL received 24,862 complaints from workers in-person and online (most were submitted online); around 60 percent of these complaints were settled amicably, while the remainder were referred to the LDRCs to be handled in court. One NGO noted in some cases, “settled complaints” also included instances of employers coercing workers to drop financial claims during mediation or settle for less than they were owed, including promising to return their QID or provide a NOC to change jobs, which was no longer a legal requirement for job transfer. MOL only referred worker complaints to the LDRC that remained unresolved after one week. An international organization reported the number of complaints referred to the LDRCs increased in 2023 for private workers; most complaints included non-payment of wages, denied end of service benefits, and annual leave denied or not being paid. The law mandated the LDRCs reach resolution within three weeks for any contract or labor dispute; however, NGOs, media and observers consistently reported cases took significantly longer to resolve, noting some cases remained unresolved for several months up to a year. In many instances of wage theft or delayed payment of wages, the worker did not receive the wages they were owed because no timeframe existed for final sentencing or enforcement – even if a verdict was rendered by the committee. While the government added additional committees (from three to five) in the previous reporting period to expedite resolution of complaints, implement verdicts, and increase accessibility for workers, observers reported only two committees were operational for several months in 2023. Observers reported access to justice through the LDRCs remained challenging, noting court processes were opaque and all court documents were in Arabic, limiting worker’s understanding of hearings and ability to seek legal recourse, including in potential trafficking cases. Further, the government acknowledged LDRCs were not able to refer cases with trafficking indicators to the MOI or PPO for investigation despite the committees almost exclusively handling cases of non- or delayed-payment of wages, a significant trafficking indicator.

NGOs reported several examples where LDRCs rendered verdicts in favor of workers for wage theft, but employers refused or were unable to provide the worker overdue salaries; this often left workers without the ability to support themselves while they awaited payment, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. The government continued to use its Worker’s Support Fund – funded through mandatory employer contributions of 120 QR ($33) per worker per year – to provide compensation to workers in such cases. As of August 2023, the fund had provided approximately 2.3 billion QR ($631 million), a significant increase compared with 1.17 billion QR ($321 million) at the end of September 2022. An international organization reported around half of the total disbursed funds went to more than 70,000 workers; the other half was provided to entities and companies to pay salaries and wages, noting the majority of payments coming from or through the fund was to companies with limited liquidity, with the aim of supporting completion of relevant projects or operations, versus providing workers their due salaries. Observers noted such large amounts disbursed through the fund demonstrated the scale of wage theft in Qatar and suggested a reliance by companies and employers to use the fund to avoid bankruptcy, rather than face accountability in court for wage theft. Despite the goal of the fund, NGOs and rights groups also reported concerns regarding unclear guidance on a worker’s eligibility, an opaque decision making process, and fear among workers of employer retaliation for seeking to use the fund. In addition, neither the LDRCs nor Workers Support Fund covered expenses workers incurred while attempting to retrieve unpaid wages, including transportation to and from the LDRCs and documentation costs; such costs coupled with missing wages rendered the worker vulnerable to further exploitation, including trafficking. The government issued procedures for disbursing worker’s entitlements through the fund in 2022, including parameters for eligible cases and caps on amounts paid to workers; observers reported capping disbursements was problematic as most workers file complaints after several months of non-payment (meaning the allocated amount paid within the cap would not cover the total missing wages) and such caps did not account for end-of-service benefits. Caps for domestic workers were significantly lower than private-sector workers despite the application of minimum wage. Per the 2022 decision, the government developed an electronic platform to receive applications and track follow-up payments in 2023; however, the platform was not fully operational as workers remained unable to use it to apply for fund coverage or follow up on their cases electronically during the year.

The government monitored instances of wage abuse through its WPS, which required employers to pay workers electronically on a timely basis in accordance with the labor law and automatically alerted officials to instances of non-payment or delayed payment of wages. The WPS continued to exclude workers not covered by the labor law, including domestic workers, sea and agricultural workers, government employees, casual workers, and workers in the petroleum sector; however, MOL and the Qatar Central Bank continued to facilitate domestic workers’ access to bank accounts, thereby enhancing their wage protection and reducing their risk to exploitation. MOL’s WPS unit worked to detect non-compliance in the system and subsequently penalize companies and employers; however, MOL’s enforcement efforts depended on the PPO as it lacked the formal authority to issue fines or other stringent penalties. Instead, MOL “blocked” companies for non-compliance, which barred the companies from placing public bids, applying for bank loans, seeking new projects, or recruiting new employees and transferring employees. MOL blocked 29,053 companies between January and August 2023, compared with 28,266 companies in 2022. An international organization reported an amendment to the WPS was under consideration to automatically issue fines in cases of wage theft, but the amendment remained pending. An international organization noted the WPS only flagged cases of wage theft when they amounted to more than half of the workers’ monthly salary. In addition, the WPS could only detect wages less than the minimum wage, rather than accounting for the wage agreed upon in an employment contract. Given this limitation, one rights group asserted arbitrary and unfair penalties against a worker’s salary went undetected in the system. Although MOL could refer companies to the PPO for criminal proceedings, referrals to the PPO were rare, as wage abuse cases could be lengthy in court.  Furthermore, observers noted officials were likely to issue several warnings before taking legal action to hold companies accountable for wage abuse, and in some cases, did not take action at all. Despite measures to monitor payments and assist workers who experienced wage theft, observers reported non-payment or delayed payment of wages continued to be one of the most prominent abuses perpetrated against migrant workers.

The government continued to implement its January 2020 decision to extend the abolishment of the exit permit requirement to additionally allow workers not protected under the labor law, including domestic workers, workers of ministries and other government entities, public institutions, sea and agriculture workers, and workers employed in casual work, to depart Qatar without employer approval at any time during the course of an employment contract. Employers still had the right to designate as critical 5 percent of their workforce, who required employer approval prior to exiting the country; domestic workers could not be deemed critical. Since the reforms’ inception, worker’s rights organizations and labor-source embassy representatives continued to report that migrant workers who desired to leave Qatar generally did so successfully without employer approval. However, observers continued to express concern domestic workers were still required to inform their employer in person 72 hours prior to their departure, as this requirement could give time to an abusive employer to use retaliatory measures against a worker to stop them from leaving Qatar.

The government continued to implement the removal of the NOC – through amendments to law No. 18 and law No. 19 of 2020 – which allowed all workers, including domestic workers, to change jobs without permission of their employers after fulfilling certain conditions including completing a probationary period and serving notice. The government included a provision in these amendments to ensure all workers could change jobs without the notice period if the employer did not fulfill their legal obligations to the worker, such as endangering the worker’s health, assaulting the worker, or misrepresenting contract terms. Despite these legal measures, migrant workers continued to experience significant obstacles in the job transfer process, ultimately restricting their movement. Observers reported companies still required prospective employees to have an NOC or equivalent, such as a resignation letter signed and stamped by the former employee; in addition, reports continued MOL officials sometimes advised workers to obtain an NOC from their current employer to facilitate a job transfer. Other employers illegally requested fees from workers to “release” them from their current job, even in cases where the worker had completed their contract, before the worker was able to find new employment. Reports continued of employers retaliating against an employee who initiated a transfer by canceling their visa or filing an “absconding” charge prior to the transfer being completed or during the required notice period – rendering the worker illegal and at increased risk of trafficking, detention, or deportation. Domestic workers faced the greatest obstacles when attempting to change jobs as most workers’ new employers still required an NOC or “release paper”; because most former employers refused to provide this, domestic workers may have been forced to remain in exploitive situations in private homes. Some domestic workers did not seek transfers for fear of threats and retaliation from their employer.

An international organization reported out of the 669,198 approved applications to change jobs between September 2020 and October 2023, the MOL approved 10,827 applications for domestic workers. The government reported the approval process for a transfer request averaged around six days (down from 22 days in the previous two reporting periods), which may have allowed workers to leave abusive employment situations more quickly. However, NGOs noted the total number of approved transfers did not disaggregate how many workers managed to do so without securing the permission of their employer and did not account for workers who wished to change jobs but whose new company refused to start the transfer process without the consent of the current employer. Separately, during this same period, the MOL rejected 364,053 transfer applications; an international organization reported some rejections occurred when new employers were blocked from recruitment due to violating the law or not having the correct permits. A rights group reported workers were not routinely informed for the reasons behind rejections, which hindered workers from knowing how to remedy their application to receive approval and raised suspicions that their employers blocked the transfer. NGOs continued to report although the removal of the exit permit and the abolishment of the NOC were improvements, the employer-based visa system would continue to persist as long as the employee’s work and residence visas were tied to an employer and employers could continue to take retaliatory actions against a worker as a means of unilaterally controlling their workforce without being held accountable or penalized.

The 2018 domestic worker law stipulated domestic workers were required to have government-verified contracts; to receive adequate employer-provided food, accommodations, medical benefits, one day off per week, limited 10-hour workdays, sick leave, return flight tickets once each year, three weeks paid vacation per year, and full end-of-service payments; to be guaranteed access to the dispute resolution committees to resolve workplace grievances; and to be allowed to leave their employers in cases of exploitation or violation of contract terms. NGOs reported concerns the 2018 law left several provisions vague, including mechanisms to ensure employers actually paid workers or provided entitled annual leave; in addition, details on the allotted weekly day off and food and accommodation standards were limited. According to the law, employers who breached their obligations on key provisions related to working hours, living conditions, weekly rest day, annual leave, and end of service benefits should receive a fine, which could be doubled if the employer failed to pay the worker on time. The government continued to utilize its standard employment contract for domestic workers, which provided clarity on overtime payment, termination, and sick leave and aligned such protections with those of private-sector workers. The government reported both private recruitment agencies and QVCs used the revised domestic worker contract, and in 2023, MOL introduced an electronic service to verify and authenticate domestic worker contracts, requiring the domestic worker to approve or reject the contract in the system and print a copy if needed. MOL inspectors remained without authority to conduct inspections in private residences without written permission from the PPO, limiting its ability to enforce protections outlined in the law and identify key trafficking indicators or potential trafficking victims from inspections. Although domestic workers have been able to file grievances with the MOL and subsequently LDRCs since 2018, workers rarely filed complaints because of prolonged court proceedings, the uncertainty the employee would receive the wages they were owed even if the dispute ended in the employee’s favor, fear of retaliation from employers, and the limited scope in types of complaints the committees handled. Despite domestic workers making up a significant portion of the workforce, between January and October 2023, MOL only received 514 complaints from domestic workers and did not report holding any abusive employers accountable, including for potential trafficking crimes from those complaints. Nonetheless, NGOs and rights groups continued to report instances of domestic worker exploitation – including conditions indicative of labor trafficking such as passport confiscation, excessive working hours, physical, sexual and emotional abuse, non-payment of wages, threats of use of force and false accusations of theft or “absconding” as retaliation for seeking assistance.

The government maintained 50 bilateral agreements and 22 MOUs with labor-source countries that addressed recruitment issues and worker rights, and it coordinated with individual countries to certify vetted labor recruitment offices to reduce fraud or excessive debts that could facilitate labor trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government provided anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Qatar. Men and women from Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan, Uganda, and other countries voluntarily migrate to Qatar as unskilled laborers and domestic workers, often paying illegal and exorbitant fees to unscrupulous recruiters in their home countries, thereby increasing their vulnerability to debt bondage. Many migrant workers subsequently face conditions indicative of labor trafficking, including restricted movement, excessive hours, delayed salaries or payment withholding, denial of employment-associated benefits, passport confiscation, and threats of salary withholding and deportation; in some cases, migrant workers face physical, mental, and sexual abuse as well as threats of serious physical or financial harm. Anecdotally, sex traffickers force some women who migrate for legitimate employment offers to engage in commercial sex. There were approximately 400 Cuban nationals working at the Cuban Hospital in Dukhan who may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. An NGO reported Cuban workers employed in Qatar were vulnerable to abuses including sexual harassment, coerced enrollment into the medical mission program, surveillance, exploitation, restriction of movement, and passport confiscation. According to a former participant, officials confiscated the workers’ passports and confined them to a compound with prearranged activities and 24-hour surveillance. The bilateral agreement between the Cuban and Qatari governments stipulated that Cuban health workers receive wages from the Cuban government rather than directly from their Qatari employers. Cuban workers who arrived in 2020 to support Qatari hospitals during the pandemic reportedly returned to Cuba in August 2021. PRC nationals employed in Qatar at worksites affiliated with the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative experienced labor trafficking indicators such as deceptive recruitment, contract irregularities, passport retention, and arbitrary wage garnishing or nonpayment of wages.

Unskilled migrant workers are the largest group at risk of trafficking in Qatar. Those employed as domestic workers remain the most vulnerable, although men in the construction, food delivery and security sector who were employed at higher rates prior to and during the November 2022 World Cup frequently experienced exploitative conditions indicative of labor trafficking, such as wage theft, requiring excessive hours, denial of overtime fees, and threats of salary withholding and deportation. Many businesses reportedly fail to pay their expatriate employees in a timely manner or at all, forcing workers to choose between leaving the country with heavy debts or staying in Qatar with the hope of eventually being paid without employment, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Unethical recruitment agencies in labor-source countries extract inflated fees from aspiring migrant workers or lure them to Qatar with fraudulent employment contracts, rendering workers vulnerable to labor trafficking. Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to trafficking as they work in isolation in private residences and awareness and enforcement of the labor law remains limited. Systemic hurdles continue to limit victim protection and access to justice, especially for domestic workers who remained highly vulnerable to labor trafficking.

In September 2021, the government notified all companies supporting infrastructure projects related to the World Cup to complete their work and “reduce inessential expatriate workforce” by September 2022, prior to the tournament’s November 20 start date, and lasting until January 2023. NGO and rights groups reported that, despite the announcement’s instructions that companies’ strategic plans “should not adversely impact the migrant workers’ well-being,” many companies terminated workers supporting such projects prior to their contract ending without proper notice and without providing employee’s their full wages or end-of service benefits. As many workers were not paid regularly and experienced wage theft, they were sent home without the salaries owed to them while others were placed on “long-term leave,” which left them without end-of-service benefits. Prior to termination, rights groups asserted worker’s conditions deteriorated as companies rushed to complete tournament infrastructure; workers experienced extended work hours without overtime compensation, misuse of short-term visas, and withholding of end-of-service benefits. As many workers also continued to pay illegal recruitment fees, terminated workers remained severely in debt and vulnerable to exploitation, including trafficking, because of their undocumented status as they sought unregulated employment in Qatar. After the end of the tournament, an international organization reported the increased use of “free visas,” where recruitment agencies sold workers visas to work for employers other than their sponsor, an illegal practice in Qatar. This practice leaves migrant workers without legal recourse against their respective sponsors who sometimes seek regular payments from workers to continue to sponsor them. In 2023, the government also extended the use of the “Hayya” card, a version of a tourist visa that was used for World Cup visitors; observers report increasing use of “Hayya” cards to facilitate illegal recruitment of foreign workers seeking work in Qatar. Due to the slowdown of the economy and subsequent fewer available job opportunities after the World Cup, many workers who arrive on “Hayya” cards do not find work, rendering them vulnerable to trafficking and without legal protections because of their status.

Qatar’s employer-based visa system, while undergoing significant reform, continues to place control disproportionately in the hands of employers, who have unilateral power to cancel residence permits or file countercharges against workers to prevent them from exercising their rights under the most recent reforms. Until August 2020, employers were able to prevent workers from changing employers and deny permission for them to leave the country. Debt-laden migrants who face abuse or are misled often avoid reporting their exploitation because of a fear of reprisal or deportation, the protracted recourse process, or lack of knowledge of their legal rights, thereby exacerbating or prolonging their labor trafficking situation. Many migrant workers often live in confined, unsanitary conditions, and many complain of excessive working hours and hazardous working conditions. Reports allege the vast majority of expatriate workers’ passports were in their employers’ possession, despite laws against passport confiscation.