Significantly increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including Omani nationals and recruitment agencies, for labor trafficking crimes, specifically of migrant workers, including domestic servitude by thoroughly investigating reports of abuse and trafficking indicators, including debt bondage through arbitrary “release fees.” * Identify and refer potential labor trafficking victims to care instead of returning workers to alleged traffickers. * Implement Ministerial Decision 189/2004 to allow domestic workers – in cases of abuse – to terminate a contract without notice and do not solicit arbitrary payments from workers as a condition for termination. * Penalize employers and recruitment agencies for demanding arbitrary “release fees” from workers who seek to leave a job prior to contract expiration regardless of working conditions. * Prohibit officials from facilitating such payments on behalf of employers, and proactively raise awareness among migrant workers that such fees are arbitrary and not official requirements. * Operationalize the NRM and train officials on procedures to proactively identify and refer to care both male and female trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, such as migrant workers, including domestic workers, persons in commercial sex, and those who flee abusive employers and situations of labor trafficking. * Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Expand and enforce legal protections for domestic workers and increase efforts to hold noncompliant employers criminally accountable with deterrent penalties. * Continue to expand trainings for officials involved in criminal investigations and for hotline operators to ensure accurate identification of trafficking crimes and ensure hotlines and other grievance mechanisms are accessible for workers to submit complaints. * Hold non-compliant recruitment offices criminally accountable for potential trafficking crimes, including domestic worker mistreatment or violations of the labor law, by increasing inspections and enforcing adequate penalties. * Investigate officials allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes and pursue criminal prosecutions if trafficking indicators are present. * Ensure officials do not pressure or require victims to participate in law enforcement proceedings as a condition to receive care. * Impose dissuasive penalties on employers and recruitment agents who withhold foreign workers’ passports and criminalize passport confiscation for domestic worker employers. * Increase use of specialized trafficking units within the Ministry of Labor (MOL), the Royal Oman Police (ROP), and Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) to investigate indicators of potential trafficking crimes, specifically those that originate as labor violations. * Disseminate to stakeholders the decision that allows potential victims to self-refer to protective services and amend the provision that stipulates they can only reside in the shelter long-term if they file charges against, or there is a corresponding prosecution of, an alleged trafficker. * Fully implement the NAP for 2024-2026. * Continue to conduct country-wide public awareness campaigns on all forms of trafficking, specifically targeted to vulnerable populations, including domestic workers and their employers. * Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services, in a manner consistent with obligations under UN Security Council resolution 2397.

The government maintained inadequate anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, continuing to solely focus on sex trafficking. Oman’s 2008 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of three to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine between 5,000 and 100,000 Omani rial (OMR) ($12,990-$259,740) for offenses involving adult victims and seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 OMR ($25,970) for offenses involving child victims. These punishments were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. In 2021, the government reported drafting new anti-trafficking legislation in consultation with an international organization focused on increasing penalties for traffickers and greater protections for victims; the legislation remained pending for the second consecutive reporting period.
The ROP and PPO continued to maintain specialized anti-trafficking units in their respective organizations, and the government maintained a court presided by specialized anti-trafficking judges dedicated to trafficking cases at certain times, but it also could be used to handle other types of cases – including labor exploitation. In 2023, the government investigated 18 trafficking cases involving 55 alleged traffickers; this included 53 individuals for sex trafficking and two individuals for forced begging; three alleged traffickers were Omani nationals. This was an increase compared with 10 investigations involving 21 alleged traffickers (18 for sex trafficking and three for labor trafficking, of which one involved forced begging) in 2022. Authorities prosecuted 38 individuals under the anti-trafficking law for sex trafficking, including one Omani citizen. This was an increase compared with 11 prosecutions (nine sex trafficking and two labor trafficking, including one domestic servitude) in 2022. In 2023, courts convicted 10 sex traffickers under the anti-trafficking law, including an Omani national; courts convicted five sex traffickers in 2022. Judges sentenced all 10 traffickers to between seven and 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 OMR ($25,970). Despite reports indicating it is the most prevalent form of trafficking in Oman, the government did not investigate or prosecute any suspects for alleged labor trafficking involving migrant workers, including domestic servitude. For the sixth consecutive year, the government did not convict any perpetrators, including Omani nationals, for labor trafficking of migrant workers or domestic servitude.

As in the previous reporting period, media, NGOs, international organizations, and labor-source governments continued to report labor recruiters deceived workers – mostly from Africa and Asia – either by forcing them to pay illegal recruitment and visa fees and work in a job different than agreed upon or to work as a domestic worker, where workers experienced conditions different from those agreed upon. Once in Oman, workers experienced non-payment of wages; restriction of movement; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; contract switching; excessive work hours; denial of medical care, food, and rest days; passport confiscation; threats of use of force, arrest, and detention by police; and debt bondage through arbitrary “release fees” – all trafficking indicators – at the hands of their employers. Despite these trafficking indicators, the government did not report criminally investigating or prosecuting any labor trafficking cases, including domestic servitude. Instead, because officials considered such cases as worker-employer disputes or contract disputes, NGOs, labor-source governments and observers reported upon workers attempts to seek assistance, officials supported employers’ demands for “release fees” to reimburse an employer or sponsor for recruitment fees previously paid to hire the worker, despite these being arbitrary and not contractually required by the government or recruitment agencies. Despite Omani law stating domestic workers were not responsible for any fees required to facilitate the termination of a contract – including recruitment fees – and return to their home country, employers demanded such fees because the worker sought to leave Oman prior to the conclusion of the employment contract. Officials suggested payment of such fees was the quickest resolution to enable workers to return home and did not acknowledge allegations of abuse and exploitation, including trafficking indicators, reported by workers. Officials frequently returned workers to their employers’ homes until such fees could be paid, potentially facilitating re-trafficking. Labor-source country governments and workers’ families paid Omani employers up to $3,900 per worker to enable their return home; other diplomats reported negotiating such fees directly with sponsors or employers to enable their citizens to return home. As many workers already paid illegal recruitment fees to agents and experienced wage theft from their employers, observers noted requiring arbitrary payments further exploited workers in debt bondage. An international organization reported instances where both employers and recruitment agencies – in cases where a victim of domestic servitude left an employer and returned to the agency – also demanded “release fees” to enable the worker to leave Oman without government intervention, illustrating the demand for such fees was a widespread exploitative cultural practice, despite having no legal basis.

Observers reported deficiencies in officials’ understanding of trafficking and preference to handle such crimes through arbitration contributed to weak investigatory and prosecutorial capacity to address labor trafficking, particularly domestic servitude. While the government reported it interviewed alleged victims and employers in separate rooms, observers noted – based on interviews with domestic workers in Oman – police lacked a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach and often spoke to both employers and workers alleging abuse in the same room. In situations where police investigated an employer’s home following a complaint of abuse, civil society and labor-source governments reported Omani police solely spoke to the employer. Experts reported prosecutors did not consider labor trafficking cases, including domestic servitude, as criminal matters. As a result, experts further reported law enforcement officials did not consistently consider trafficking indicators such as physical abuse, deceptive recruitment, worker-paid recruitment fees, contract switching, or receiving wages less than promised, when investigating or bringing charges against alleged perpetrators. Concerns of official complicity in trafficking crimes remained during the year – including officials facilitating “release fees,” which furthered situations of debt bondage, and subjecting workers to potential re-trafficking by returning a worker alleging abuse to their employer. However, the government did not report any criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking crimes.

In 2023, the government conducted and participated in 37 anti-trafficking trainings for officials of ROP, PPO, Ministry of Social Development (MOSD), Ministry of Labor (MOL), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Health (MOH), Supreme Judicial Council, Ministry of Information, Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, General Federation of Workers, and the Omani Human Rights Commission; hotline staff and airport security personnel also participated in trainings. The National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) signed an agreement with Oman’s Higher Judicial Institute to provide anti-trafficking training to judicial personnel.

The government maintained victim protection efforts, with efforts to protect victims of labor trafficking crimes, including domestic servitude, remaining inadequate. The government identified 36 victims (34 female sex trafficking victims, and two boys exploited in forced begging; all were foreign nationals), compared with 34 victims identified in 2022. The government referred all 36 victims identified to care at the MOSD shelter. The government did not identify any victims of labor trafficking among migrant workers, compared with the identification of 17 labor trafficking victims in 2022 (16 males and one female). Given widely reported allegations of domestic workers subjected to labor trafficking during the year, government efforts to identify victims of labor trafficking, including domestic servitude, remained negligible compared to the scale of the problem.

The government reported it continued to utilize a formal screening questionnaire for officials – particularly law enforcement and labor inspectors – to identify potential trafficking victims among those arrested for commercial sex, labor violations, and fleeing their employer who was also their visa sponsor. The government remained without formal referral procedures, and officials continued to refer identified victims to the MOSD shelter on an hoc basis through ROP, PPO, hospital staff, or MOL officials. The government drafted an NRM in the previous reporting period; however, officials did not finalize or implement the NRM for the second consecutive reporting period. Officials referred victims identified as part of ongoing police investigations to MOSD for shelter placement and medical and psychological services. Observers continued to report officials largely relied on victims to self-identify by reporting abuses to authorities, while other officials often referred self-identified victims to police rather than directly to the MOSD for shelter placement. Referrals to the MOSD shelter required a court order or approval by the shelter manager in emergency cases. While potential victims could self-refer to the shelter per a 2020 policy change, shelter staff reported self-referrals were rare. Officials reported in situations where a potential victim approached the shelter, staff admitted the victim and immediately notified ROP and PPO for an official court order. Shelter staff reported the ability to accept self-referred victims on an emergency basis enabled immediate care, as court orders were sometimes delayed. Experts reported notification to law enforcement for a court order upon admission suggested the government expected victims at the shelter to participate in criminal justice proceedings, which was not a trauma-informed or victim-centered practice. The shelter accepted all potential victims who self-referred, except for those facing criminal charges such as theft. The shelter accepted potential victims with “absconding” charges if the individual had previously submitted a complaint against their employer with authorities; if no competing complaint was submitted, shelter staff did not admit the potential victims and instead referred them to MOL. Given the frequency in which employers file “absconding” charges against workers to avoid paying workers or counter workers’ complaints, this policy likely limited access to shelter for some potential victims who had not been able to file a competing complaint against their employer. NGOs continued to report challenges in assisting potential trafficking victims to self-refer to the shelter due to lack of available information on shelter procedures online or via phone with MOSD.

The government allocated 43,100 OMR ($111,950) for shelter operations, compared with 33,220 OMR ($86,290) in the previous reporting period. The government’s shelter provided room and board, counseling, legal support, monetary stipends, recreational opportunities, recovery activities, resiliency training, and medical care to victims and could accommodate up to 50 female, male, and child victims of trafficking or other types of abuse. The MOSD shelter continued to cooperate with a quasi-governmental local charity through an MOU to assist vulnerable individuals residing at the government shelter, including trafficking victims; among other services, assistance included providing airline tickets home for victims when court proceedings ended and facilitating training workshops for victims to learn new skills. In 2023, through this agreement, 12 victims received airline tickets to return home after completion of court proceedings. Shelter administrators interfaced with judicial officials to keep victims informed of the status of their legal cases. The shelter did not allow victims to freely leave and re-enter the shelter following admission; shelter policy dictated victims could depart the premises only with a chaperone, including to participate in law enforcement proceedings. Victims were able to work during their stay at the shelter, with the employer acting as a chaperone during working hours after vetting, training, and signing an agreement of expectations; three foreign national victims worked during their stay at the shelter in 2023. The government offered complimentary repatriation services to victims who did not want to remain in the country or could facilitate new sponsorship if they chose to stay in Oman to work after departing the shelter; in 2023, the government repatriated at least 12 of the 36 identified victims but did not report whether the other 24 victims remained in Oman or returned home. Some source-country embassies also offered victim services for their nationals. However, labor-source country representatives reported some potential trafficking victims or vulnerable foreign workers chose to go to their embassies for shelter during the year. In May 2023, media reported the Indian Embassy in Muscat provided shelter to 35 Indian women at the embassy after the women fled abusive employers and sought assistance; these women were recruited as domestic workers and were subjected to passport confiscation, excessive hours, nonpayment of wages, physical abuse, lack of food and debt bondage through employers’ and agents’ demand for “release fees” – all trafficking indicators.

The government provided foreign victims with legal alternatives to removal to countries in which they may face retribution or hardship, to include alternate employment under another sponsor; however, during the reporting period, the government did not report whether it assisted any victims in obtaining new jobs in Oman. Officials permitted and encouraged some victims to stay in Oman for the duration of court proceedings, but the government reported ROP officers could also take victims’ statements to pursue criminal charges in their absence if the victim chose to be repatriated. The government reported provision of services was not dependent on a victim’s cooperation in criminal justice proceedings; however, as notification to law enforcement and a court order was required for admission into shelter, observers reported officials likely pressured victims to participate in investigations and court proceedings. Moreover, the government continued to stipulate a victim had to have an active trafficking investigation to remain at the shelter long-term; this policy may have limited care for victims who chose not to participate in law enforcement proceedings. The government reported all 36 victims participated in criminal cases during the reporting period. Some officials reportedly encouraged other victims, including unidentified and potential victims, to reach extrajudicial settlements for the sake of expediency. Observers reported some cases ended with aggrieved workers unable to switch employers, reaching administrative settlements with their former employers, and subsequently returning to their home countries. The NCCHT upheld the tenets of its MOU with a local association to provide pro bono legal assistance to trafficking victims involved in court proceedings, to include seeking damages on behalf of victims and pursuing labor claims via MOL mediation. Officials permitted victims to obtain restitution directly from the government and/or compensation by filing civil suits against traffickers; in 2023, courts awarded at least one victim compensation.

Although the government had formal victim identification and screening procedures, some officials did not systemically or consistently employ such procedures among vulnerable groups, specifically domestic workers reporting abuse or those that had left their employer’s home after experiencing poor work conditions, including indicators of labor trafficking. Observers continued to report in cases where domestic workers experienced abuse or conditions indicative of labor trafficking and approached police, official did not investigate the workers’ claims and instead returned them to abusive employers or arrested them because their employer filed “absconding” charges. This likely rendered some potential victims of labor trafficking without care and at risk of re-trafficking in their employer’s home. In other cases, police reportedly facilitated requests to pay sponsors or employers arbitrary “release fees” from exploited domestic workers who sought to terminate their contracts early, further exploiting the worker in debt bondage. Separately, the government reported it screened other crimes – including 69 “prostitution” cases for trafficking indicators and did not identify any potential sex trafficking victims. In June 2023, the government reported it deported 774 migrant workers in one month for violating Omani labor law; it did not report screening these individuals for trafficking indicators prior to deportation. Because the government did not generally identify domestic workers who experienced indicators of labor trafficking as potential trafficking victims or adequately screen other vulnerable populations – including individuals in commercial sex – authorities likely arrested and detained some unidentified victims or facilitated their re-trafficking by returning unidentified victims of domestic servitude to their employer’s home.

The government increased overall efforts to prevent trafficking, but efforts to prevent trafficking among domestic workers remained minimal. The NCCHT was composed of members from the MFA, PPO, ROP, Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs, MOH, Ministry of Education, MOSD, MOL, Ministry of Information, the Council of Administrative Affairs for the Judiciary, Oman Human Rights Commission, Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the General Federation of Oman Workers. The NCCHT met twice as a full committee, and relevant members met regularly. The NCCHT drafted and implemented its 2024-2026 NAP and allocated 100,000 OMR ($259,740) to implement the NAP and other prevention activities. The NCCHT conducted a two-month national public awareness campaign from September-October 2023 with a focus on legal penalties, reporting trafficking crimes, and trafficking trends. The government also continued to raise awareness via social media, lectures, and workshops, targeting private sector recruitment agencies, hotel staff, and children in local schools. The ROP maintained the government’s central trafficking hotline and displayed its phone number on social media posts, in news articles pertaining to trafficking, and on the NCCHT website. The NCCHT was able to receive complaints through its website, which was available in 14 languages. Separately, MOL operated a labor violation hotline, which it promoted in its video on workers’ rights and responsibilities, and the MOSD operated an all-purpose helpline that also assisted potential victims to access the government shelter. All hotlines reportedly remained active year-round, 24 hours per day, and staffed with Arabic and English interpreters; Urdu, Hindi, and Bengali-speaking contractors were available. The ROP’s hotline received 95 trafficking-related calls but officials did not report identifying any of the calls as potential trafficking crimes; the government did not report the number of calls or complaints received via the other grievance mechanisms. Observers continued to report concerns with available hotlines and grievance mechanisms for workers, including unresponsiveness to calls, language barriers, and unclear guidance on submitting complaints online. Moreover, when submitting a complaint in person, observers reported police often returned workers to their employer without investigating and MOL officials were unsupportive to their complaint.

In July 2023, the government enacted a new labor law for private sector workers through Royal Decree no. 53 of 2023, replacing the 2003 labor law. The law introduced new protections, including decreasing the maximum number of weekly working hours, increasing sick leave, allowing workers to terminate a contract in case of two consecutive months of non-payment of wages by the employer, and notably, the ability for workers to remain in Oman upon filing a labor complaint until their claim is resolved. Although the law included a specific prohibition again passport confiscation for the first time, it allowed employers to hold worker’s passports with written consent of the worker and did not specify penalties or enforcement mechanisms. Observers reported the new law lacked clarity regarding job transfers and regulations for employers to file “absconding” reports; in cases where a worker could terminate a contract following two consecutive months of non-payment of wages, the law did not explicitly describe the parameters for changing jobs, including a grace period to enable to the worker to search for alternative employment.

It was unclear whether the new labor law applied to domestic workers, who remained highly vulnerable to trafficking. Observers noted that a provision in the new labor law limited its application to work that was not already regulated by special laws or regulations, and therefore, domestic workers’ employment remained solely regulated by the Ministerial Regulation No. 189 of 2004 that did not provide effective rights protections or adequate complaint mechanisms for this population. While the 2004 decision established broad regulations related to monthly wages; adequate room, board, and medical care; return airfare when the employer terminates the contract; and airfare to and from the worker’s home country during approved vacation days, it did not provide standards on working hours, weekly rest days, annual vacation, or overtime compensation. An international organization reported the regulation did not include penalties for employer breaches or noncompliance, asserting it served as guidance rather than offering enforceable protections under the law for this population. The government’s 2011 standard employment contract for domestic workers included provisions from the 2004 decision, and required one weekly rest day, 30 days of leave, and return flights every two years, but had no limit on working hours, provisions for overtime pay or explicitly prohibited passport confiscation. Many domestic workers experienced non-payment of wages, excessive work hours, passport confiscation, restriction of movement, denial of food, debt bondage and physical and sexual abuse during the reporting period. Observers reported domestic workers worked between 16 and 20 hours daily, on average, without receiving compensation and did not receive a legally mandated rest day. Although the government did not report data on passport retention complaints in 2023, passport confiscation remained a pervasive practice, particularly as a method for employers to control workers and restrict their movement. Many workers reported as soon as they were picked up at the airport, either the employer or recruitment agency representative confiscated their passport.

Article 31 of the new labor law prohibited “to charge any amounts from the worker who is licensed to be recruited in return for his employment.” However, many workers – particularly domestic workers – continued to pay recruitment fees to agents in their home countries who also operated agencies in Oman, were informal sub-agents of agencies in Oman, or connected the worker with the Omani recruitment agency. Observers noted although the government – through MOL officials and inspectors – was responsible for issuing licenses and regulation of recruitment agencies through inspections and monitoring agencies for employment and immigration violations, it did not adequately address illegal worker-paid recruitment fees or consistently hold non-compliant recruitment agencies accountable for mistreatment of domestic workers, violations of the labor law, or demanding arbitrary “release fees” that further exploited workers in debt bondage. In 2023, the MOL signed an agreement with the Security and Safety Corporation to establish an inspection unit aimed to expand the number of inspections, identify non-complaint companies, and streamline procedures prior to inspections; the government did not report if the inspection unit was operational at the close of the reporting period. MOL inspected 998 recruitment offices and agencies to identify potential violations and identified 424 for non-compliance with the labor law. Officials referred the agencies to civil prosecution but did not report referring any agencies for potential trafficking crimes to law enforcement. MOL continued to employ its dedicated counter-trafficking unit within its Inspection Department, which conducted an unknown number of workplace and recruitment agency inspections but did not report identifying any potential trafficking cases. MOL did not report the number of complaints it received against recruitment agencies during the year or whether it identified any potential trafficking cases from these complaints. Officials reporting receiving an unknown number of labor complaints from workers and referred 7,527 of those complaints to labor courts but did not identify any trafficking indicators in such cases. In July 2023, the government issued Ministerial Order no. 299 of 2023 and MOL Circular No. 7 of 2023 to implement the Wage Protection System (WPS) for private sector workers and private companies with more than 50 employees; the orders mandated companies with less employes be compliant by March 2024. The WPS aimed to monitor the disbursement of wages to employees and penalize employes if payment was more than a week late. MOL’s Inspection Department established a Wage Protection Section responsible for monitoring payments and implementing penalties, including issuing warnings, suspending the ability for employers to obtain work permits, and fines. The government did not report data on wage theft or compliance within the WPS in 2023. Observers expressed significant concern the WPS did not include domestic workers, despite this population’s vulnerability to wage theft.

The government continued to implement a 2021 reform which allowed migrant workers to change employers upon completion or termination of their employment contract without employer approval. However, the government still required workers who fled allegedly abusive employers to obtain employer approval if their contract had not expired or been terminated. Additionally, the MOL had to approve the contract with the new employer, at times delaying transfer. Anecdotal reporting suggested the government and recruitment agencies did not adequately raise awareness of the 2021 reform among migrant workers, as many workers attempted to change employers prior to the completion or termination of their employment contract; in those instances, employers could prohibit employees from leaving until their contract ended. The government did not report the number of workers who were approved to transfer jobs in 2023 without employer permission. If a worker desired to terminate their contract prior to its expiration, the worker could do so after providing a 30-day notice to their employer, per article 38 of the new labor law no. 53 of 2023.

Separately, domestic workers reportedly could also terminate a contract with a 30-day notice period at the end of the contract period without employer approval; otherwise, domestic workers could terminate a contract anytime with employer approval. Per article 8 of the 2004 decision regulating domestic workers, in the case of abuse by the employer or a member of the employer’s family, domestic workers allegedly could terminate their contract without notice; the decision did not specify any fees the abused worker would be responsible for in such circumstances. However, because the government did not consistently acknowledge cases of domestic worker exploitation or abuse, including domestic servitude, it did not implement this decision; rather, it allowed employers to demand arbitrary “release fees” from domestic workers to pay employers or sponsors as reimbursement for recruitment fees, regardless of working conditions, further exploiting the worker in debt bondage. The government reported all workers could depart the country without permission at any time, but a worker’s ability to do so was contingent on physically possessing a passport, having sufficient travel funds to return home, and not facing any charges, including “absconding” charges. Reports of domestic workers unable to leave Oman because they were subjected to arbitrary “release fees” remained common. Observers noted workers who were subjected to arbitrary “release fees” by their employers could leave the country if they had their passport and no criminal charges filed against them, such as “absconding.” However, given the pervasiveness of passport confiscation and non-payment of wages as well as the frequency in which employers file malicious “absconding” charges against workers, this practice allowed employers to continue to exert control over a worker’s movements, ultimately restricting a worker’s ability to depart the country freely.

In October 2023, the ROP implemented a decision to prohibit the conversion of tourist visas to work visas for all nationals in an effort to decrease prospective foreign workers’ vulnerability to deceptive recruitment practices and legal penalties from overstaying a tourist visa. Prior to this decision, foreign nationals could enter Oman on a tourist visa with the goal of finding employment and converting to a work visa. In some cases, recruiters made false promises and abandoned prospective workers once their tourist visas expired. In other cases, prospective workers failed to find a work visa sponsor and sought unregulated work, heightening their vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking without legal protections under the labor law. Labor-source country embassy representatives noted this decision reduced the number of workers exploited through such methods who sought embassy assistance in Oman. The government reported having bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) regarding migrant workers with Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Vietnam; some reportedly included articles prohibiting unlawful labor recruitment and trafficking. The government reported it negotiated BLAs with Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania, but did not finalize any new agreements during the reporting period. Labor-source country embassy representatives that had BLAs with the government reported they experienced good cooperation with MOL and ROP on labor issues involving their respective nationals. In December 2023, the NCCHT held a meeting with representatives of major labor-source country embassies and the ROP and MOL to discuss human trafficking trends, protection available for victims in Oman and documenting trafficking cases and identifying victims. Following reports of African and Asian domestic workers being subjected to indicators of labor trafficking by their employers in Oman in 2022, the government continued to suspend the issuance of visas for citizens of 15 countries. Experts noted suspension and bans of visas may increase use of irregular migration pathways by deceptive recruitment agents, heightening migrant worker’s vulnerability to exploitation. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government provided anti-trafficking training to diplomatic personnel.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign victims in Oman. Oman’s migrant worker community comes primarily from Southeast and South Asia and a small fraction more recently, from African countries, including Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In 2023, media, NGOs, international organizations, and labor-source governments continued to report increasing instances of migrant workers, specifically domestic workers, subjected to conditions indicative of labor trafficking by Omani employers. Labor recruiters deceive workers, mostly from Africa and Asia, either by paying illegal recruitment and visa fees and/or working in a job different than agreed upon and experience conditions different from agreed upon in Oman, including non-payment of wages; restriction of movement; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse; contract switching; excessive hours; denial of medical care, food, and rest days; passport confiscation; threats of use of force, arrest and detention by police and debt bondage through arbitrary “release fees” – all trafficking indicators. Migrant workers seeking low-wage jobs continue to be at risk for trafficking under the employer-based visa system in Oman, which grants recruitment agencies and/or Omani visa sponsors significant control over workers’ residency and work visas and, therefore, their legal status in the country.

Although the government previously instituted initial reforms of its employer-based visa system, this system continues to give employers the power to dictate the status of residence permits. Some unscrupulous recruitment agencies in Oman and their sub-agents in labor-source countries mislead migrant workers by providing fraudulent contracts with fictitious wages and charging exorbitant recruitment fees. Some victims face working conditions significantly worse than recruiting agencies promised. Reports of employers, sponsors, and recruitment offices seeking arbitrary “release fees” from exploited workers and potential trafficking victims for them to freely leave Oman prior to the expiration of their contract remain common; such fees are generally to reimburse employers or recruitment offices for recruitment fees paid to hire the worker. As many workers already pay high illegal recruitment fees to agents and experience wage theft from their employers, requiring such payments to terminate a contract early and freely leave Oman increases workers’ vulnerability to debt bondage and further trafficking. During the reporting period, labor-source governments and workers’ families paid Omani employers up to $3,900 per worker for the worker to return home; the government actively condones this practice and in one example, officials suggested to a foreign government payment of such fees was the quickest resolution to allow abused and exploited domestic workers to return home. Despite no legal basis for requiring these “release fees,” labor-source embassy representatives continue to report negotiating such fees with employers to enable their citizens to return home.

Foreign workers typically migrate to Oman willingly and legally. Men generally seek employment in construction, agricultural, and service sectors, while women often seek domestic worker jobs. Male migrant workers are typically from South Asia and are vulnerable to labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit female victims, predominantly from South, Southeast, and East Asia and Africa, in labor trafficking, particularly domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Domestic workers who flee their employers are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. Some employers reportedly “kick out” their domestic employees who are consequently forced into commercial sex. Some workers enter Oman with full knowledge of their work obligations but sponsors ultimately coerce them to work for little or no pay or in exploitative conditions under the credible threat of deportation. Some workers arrive in Oman on tourist visas or by first traveling to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) while willing employers secured their Omani work visas, thereby circumventing oversight of some workers’ home governments. Additionally, some victims originally intend to travel to the UAE but are subsequently compelled to accept work in Oman, or vice-versa. Traffickers often began recruitment in labor-source countries with some promising retail jobs in well-known areas, such as Dubai. After arriving in the UAE, traffickers transport migrant workers to Oman and force them to work for lower wages and in austere conditions in the absence of legal contracts or in commercial sex. Media previously reported several Sri Lankan women were deceptively recruited for domestic work in the UAE and Oman; most recruited women ultimately reached UAE on tourist visas and were transferred to Oman. Once in Oman, traffickers exploited the women in domestic servitude and sex trafficking. Following the government’s October policy change to prohibit the conversion of tourist visas to work visas, this trafficking pattern reportedly reduced during the year. Informal labor intermediaries operate legally but without regulation in Oman, communicating anonymously via social media platforms to promise Omani sponsors inexpensive domestic labor at a fraction of the cost stipulated by the formal, well-established recruitment agencies; this increases the vulnerability to labor trafficking among domestic workers placed in such households. North Korean nationals working in Oman may be operating under exploitative working conditions and display multiple indicators of forced labor.