Amend the Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act (HTTCA) to criminalize all forms of sex trafficking and labor trafficking, in line with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, and remove a provision that allows the judiciary to fine victims if they fail to appear in court. * Increase investigations and prosecutions, including allegedly complicit officials, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Constitute Local Coordination Committees on Human Trafficking (LCCHTs) in all localities. * Establish SOPs for law enforcement to investigate human trafficking cases, including referrals between agencies. * Finalize SOPs for victim identification while training front-line responders to increase referrals of trafficking victims to services. * Increase the availability and quality of protection services, including shelter and repatriation, for all trafficking victims, especially men and boys and workers exploited abroad. * Consistently enforce strong regulations and oversight of labor recruitment companies, including by eliminating recruitment fees charged to migrant workers, full implementation and monitoring of the low-cost recruitment policy, and holding fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable. * Lift restrictions on female migration to discourage irregular migration and engage destination country governments to create rights-based, enforceable agreements that protect Nepali workers from human trafficking. * Train prosecutors and judges on restitution in criminal cases and victim compensation for trafficking survivors through civil proceedings. * Significantly increase monitoring of children’s homes and orphanages and hold accountable those that do not meet the government’s minimum standards of care. * Increase efforts to issue national identity documents to Haruwa-Charuwa and stateless individuals, internationally recognized refugees, and asylum-seekers to allow them to work, attend school, and access social services. * Adopt and implement a comprehensive national action plan and dedicate resources to its implementation.

The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The 2007 HTTCA criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The HTTCA’s definition of trafficking was inconsistent with the international definition of trafficking. It limited the definition of human trafficking to the purchase or selling of a person and to causing another person to go into “prostitution”; did not include a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the base offense; and did not explicitly address forced labor. The law separately defined “human transportation” as the taking of a person from their home or place of residence through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of “prostitution” or keeping a person as a slave or bonded laborer. The HTTCA prescribed penalties ranging from five to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The 2017 Labor Act, which is enforced by specialized labor courts, criminalized forced labor and prescribed penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 500,000 Nepali rupees (NPR) ($3,760), or both. Additionally, the 2002 Bonded Labor (Prohibition) Act abolished bonded labor and prescribed civil penalties of a fine between 15,000 NPR and 25,000 NPR ($110-$190). The 2000 Child Labor Act criminalized forced child labor and prescribed penalties of up to one year’s imprisonment, a fine of 50,000 NPR ($380), or both. None of these laws prescribed sufficiently stringent penalties. The 2007 Foreign Employment Act (FEA) criminalized fraudulent and deceptive labor recruitment of Nepali workers for employment abroad and was often utilized in labor trafficking cases in lieu of the HTTCA. For the ninth consecutive year, the government continued to work on revisions to the HTTCA. In April 2024, the government enacted a money laundering law which revised the definition of “human transportation” under the HTTCA to include smuggling crimes, thereby further obscuring the difference between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Although Nepal acceded to the UN TIP Protocol in 2020, the government has not modified its existing laws to more closely align with the definition of trafficking under the UN TIP Protocol. The Ministry of Women, Children, and Senior Citizens (MoWCSC) drafted a policy to address gaps in coordination between local and provincial governments and align anti-trafficking legislation with the UN TIP Protocol; the policy remained pending at the end of the reporting period.

The Nepal Police and Office of the Attorney General continued to lead anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. During the Nepali fiscal year from July 16, 2022, to July 15, 2023, the police conducted 131 investigations involving 321 suspects, and continued investigating at least 209 sex trafficking cases involving 116 suspects. This compared with 145 investigations involving 291 suspects in the previous fiscal year. Police also registered 75 child trafficking cases. The government initiated prosecution against 356 suspects in 175 cases, including 53 sex trafficking suspects in 24 cases and 303 suspects in 151 cases of unspecified forms of trafficking, and continued prosecuting 209 ongoing sex trafficking cases; this compared with initiating prosecution against 682 suspects in 386 cases in the previous reporting period. Courts convicted 176 traffickers; however, the government did not report the sentences prescribed to convicted traffickers or provide disaggregated data on these convictions, which may have included non-trafficking offenses. This compared with district courts convicting 162 traffickers in 82 cases under the HTTCA, the high courts upholding the convictions of traffickers in 49 cases, and the Nepali Supreme Court upholding the conviction of traffickers in 26 cases during the previous reporting period. The government did not provide any data on bonded labor cases and efforts to investigate or prosecute bonded labor crimes were unknown. Nepal Police did not report cooperating on investigations of trafficking-related crimes with other governments, although police worked with INTERPOL on some cases.

The Nepal Police and its Anti-Human Trafficking Bureau (AHTB), a specialized police unit dedicated to anti-trafficking, investigated trafficking crimes. The Nepal Police Women’s Cells had female officers in all 77 districts to investigate crimes against women and girls, including trafficking, but not all district offices had fully operational units. While investigative capacity was improving, Nepali law enforcement did not proactively identify trafficking cases and often relied on referrals from NGOs, thereby undermining evidence collection and prosecution efforts. Some police and prosecutors previously investigated and prosecuted suspected traffickers for non-trafficking offenses such as rape, fraud, or labor exploitation. Law enforcement continued to rely on victim testimony and regularly dropped cases or acquitted defendants due to a lack of evidence, as victims often chose not to participate in court proceedings against perpetrators who were friends or relatives and given social stigma, threats or bribes from traffickers to drop cases, and a lack of available victim-witness assistance. The delegation of powers to local offices under federalism continued to confuse officials and posed challenges for anti-trafficking coordination. Additionally, traffickers often operated in other countries beyond the reach of law enforcement. The government continued to misidentify the majority of transnational labor trafficking cases as labor violations and resolved most cases administratively through the Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security (MoLESS) in lieu of criminal investigation, with inadequate sentences for perpetrators. The Foreign Employment Board (FEB) had responsibility for monitoring and reporting labor violations, but the agency could not conduct enforcement operations and referred cases to the Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) and the Foreign Employment Tribunal, often resulting in adjudication of migrant labor complaints. Prosecutors could pursue a case under both the HTTCA and the 2007 FEA for transnational labor trafficking and foreign employment fraud, respectively; however, prosecutors typically declined to do so. Many district courts did not comply with the 2013 Supreme Court directive to adopt a “fast-track” system to complete trafficking cases within 90 days; the government previously reported most trafficking cases heard at district courts took one year.

In partnership with NGOs, the government continued to conduct standard trainings on human trafficking for law enforcement and prosecutors. The government, in partnership with international partners, also trained police and prosecutors on techniques to combat online crimes, including trafficking. Most police lacked specialized training and resources to interact with trafficking survivors using a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach. The AHTB had a training manual on investigating trafficking crimes, and the National Judiciary Academy had SOPs on investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases; however, implementation of the SOPs varied.

The government did not report any prosecutions or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained a concern, inhibiting law enforcement action. The government did not report the status of cases involving allegedly complicit officials previously investigated or charged with trafficking crimes, and some officials previously accused of human trafficking remained in office. Traffickers reportedly bribed government officials to include false information in Nepali passports and provide fraudulent documents to prospective labor migrants or foreign employment agents; in addition, some government officials, including parliamentarians, maintained close ties to foreign employment agencies, resulting in potential conflicts of interest. Operators of unregistered children’s homes, which sometimes exploited children in forced begging, were often politically connected and viewed favorably within their community; observers stated even when arrested, such operators were almost never prosecuted. Some police and political leaders were allegedly complicit in sex trafficking through financial involvement in the adult entertainment sector.

The government maintained inadequate efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. The government reported identifying 766 potential trafficking victims. Unlike in prior years, the government did not disaggregate victim identification data by type of trafficking and did not provide the number of confirmed victims; given the government’s tendency to conflate trafficking with other crimes, this figure may have included victims of crimes not involving forced labor or sex trafficking. This compared with 207 victims identified (120 for sex trafficking and 78 for labor trafficking) in the previous reporting period. The government allocated 8,250,310 NPR ($62,010) for victim services, including repatriation assistance for Sri Lankan victims abroad, a decrease from 10 million NPR ($75,160), during fiscal year 2022 to 2023. The government allocated approximately 4 percent of its social protection budget for children.

The government had a national minimum standard for the care of trafficking survivors, which defined basic services and procedures to refer victims to shelters, and had a shelter operation guideline on providing integrated services for trafficking victims. The government’s procedures for victim identification and referral to services were insufficient and applied in an inconsistent and ad hoc basis, impeding proactive identification and referral efforts. The government did not adopt or approve several pending SOPs prepared by various ministries, including the MoWCSC, to formalize procedures to guide referrals to shelter services, for the fifth consecutive year. The AHTB had internal guidelines on victim identification, including treatment of victims, and typically referred trafficking victims to government-established, one-stop crisis management centers or civil society organizations, both of which could provide shelter, medical, and legal services. Government services included counseling, health care, food, legal services, shelter, and vocational training; however, observers noted overall care was insufficient. The MoWCSC expanded its resources for child protection, including establishing new child rights committees (CRCs) in 66 Gaun palikas and appointing new child welfare officers (CWOs) in 26 Gaun palikas to help increase coordination across the government; nonetheless, more than half of Gaun palikas did not have a CWO or CRC despite a 2018 law mandating their creation to protect children from abuse, including child trafficking. Observers noted the CRC and CWO members often required training in how to adequately assist vulnerable children and depended on civil society partners for support. The government struggled to provide equal access to services to underserved communities located outside urban areas, particularly rural communities. Although the government declared the emancipation of the Haruwa-Charuwa from agricultural bonded labor in 2022, the government did not implement social services outlined in federal guidelines.

The MoWCSC provided funding to 10 shelter homes for victims of GBV and human trafficking, although civil society organizations led operations of most shelters and covered other administrative and staff costs. The government also operated two long-term shelters that could assist trafficking victims, offering counselling, health services, legal support, and employment programs. The MoWCSC could refer trafficking victims to services and shelters, and the National Child Rights Council (NCRC) referred children to shelters. The government reported it referred and provided services to 2,733 individuals, which may have included trafficking victims, in these shelters. In the previous reporting period, the government did not report how many victims it referred to care but reported these shelters provided services to 2,260 individuals. In addition, MoWCSC supported 22 short-term service centers, a long-term shelter for women, and 123 community centers where trafficking victims could receive services. There were no dedicated shelters for child trafficking victims and children were placed in 10 government-funded shelters or long-term homes. Although most shelters served women and children, the government reported male trafficking victims were eligible for placement in government-funded shelters or hotels, and the National Committee for Controlling Human Trafficking (NCCHT) could reallocate funds if male victims sought services. Observers reported the overall condition of shelters was sufficient, although shelters for individuals with disabilities remained inadequate. The government sometimes imposed restrictions on the movement of trafficking victims residing at shelters and did not allow survivors to enter or leave shelters at will due to security concerns. The NCCHT monitored the 10 shelters and required its partner civil society organizations to periodically submit details of their operations; similarly, district anti-trafficking committees were required to conduct at least one monitoring visit to government-funded shelters every six months, and the NCCHT could conduct additional inspections as needed. The National Child Rights Council, which monitored childcare homes remotely and with the assistance of civil society organizations, removed 41 children from exploitation in abusive and unregistered children’s homes and closed an additional 50 childcare homes, compared with 72 children removed during the previous year. The government, which maintained an SOP for operating childcare homes, sought to reduce the overall number of children’s institutions; however, many positions to monitor children’s homes remained unfilled, hindering overall efforts. The government, in partnership with civil society, organized a conference for the management and operation of service centers dedicated to assisting trafficking victims.

The government had some victim-witness assistance available to support victims participating in investigations and prosecutions, but lacked a formal victim-witness assistance program. The government could provide a daily allowance, shelter, transportation, and police security if needed; however, the government did not report how many victims received assistance. In civil suits, most victims remained unaware of the HTTCA provision granting the right to private representation; even in cases where victims had private representation, the attorneys often struggled to build strong cases due to obstacles in obtaining critical information from law enforcement. The DoFE and police utilized a 2020 MOU which allowed labor trafficking victims to file complaints at local police stations, rather than traveling to Kathmandu, to increase victim participation in cases. Victims could provide testimony via video or written statement; however, most courts did not have facilities for video conferences, and officials often did not make victims aware of the option. Victims continued to report challenges in providing testimony, including threats from perpetrators. Notably, resource limitations impeded authorities’ provision of a victim’s right to police protection, and observers stated victims were reluctant to file criminal complaints under HTTCA. In addition, the HTTCA authorized the judiciary to fine victims who failed to appear in court and hold victims criminally liable for providing testimony contradicting their previous statements. Due to a lack of formal identification procedures, authorities may have arrested, detained, and fined some unidentified trafficking victims, including some adult and child sex trafficking victims. Police did not always recognize child sex trafficking victims as such and sometimes removed girls from trafficking situations, sent them home, and did not refer them to services or file criminal charges against the buyer or trafficker. The government provided shelter to foreign national victims, but officials did not have legal alternatives to the deportation of foreign victims. The government reported screening for trafficking among foreign nationals prior to deportation but did not state whether officials identified any trafficking victims.

Victims could obtain restitution from traffickers through criminal proceedings; the government could also provide back wages from an HTTCA rehabilitation fund if the government was unable to collect fines imposed on traffickers. However, the government seldom initiated victim compensation and few victims knew how to successfully access HTTCA funds. The government stated courts should order restitution in all trafficking cases resulting in convictions, but officials did not report whether any victims received restitution or victim compensation from the HTTCA fund. DoFE settled most labor complaints of migrant workers administratively and did not refer violators to the FET for civil penalties nor to police for criminal investigation. Many trafficking victims, especially men, preferred to submit claims for compensation through the 2007 FEA in lieu of lengthy criminal prosecutions under the HTTCA to avoid the stigma associated with trafficking, the significantly higher potential for compensation through the 2007 FEA than HTTCA, and the lack of time and funding to access the centralized institutions charged with providing redress.

The 2007 FEA required the government appoint labor attachés in countries with more than 5,000 registered Nepali migrant workers to address claims of abuse or exploitation and facilitate worker repatriation. The government continued to have seven labor attachés and five labor counselors deployed in eight countries. Although MoLESS assigned labor attachés and counselors to diplomatic missions with a high volume of migrant workers, the number of labor attachés was insufficient to the worker population and limited resources prevented assigning attachés to all required countries. While some embassies could provide temporary shelter and repatriate trafficking victims, officials acknowledged inadequate staffing, coordination, and resources to meet the high demand for services created delays in assistance, most shelters provided space only for women, and the quality of the government-run shelters abroad was inadequate. Nepali embassies in most Gulf countries, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) could each provide emergency shelter for approximately 25 female migrant workers, including trafficking victims, although host country policies often restricted missions from independently managing shelters and most embassies lacked shelters for migrant workers. Embassies did not report the number of migrant workers assisted.

The FEB, which is responsible for protecting migrant workers and maintains a welfare fund to support labor migrants registered with the DoFE, collected fees from registered migrant workers prior to departure for a welfare fund to provide repatriation and one year of financial support to families of injured or deceased workers, which could include trafficking victims. The government repatriated 167 migrant workers and 312 Nepalis who died while employed abroad, compared with repatriating 215 migrant workers and 213 deceased Nepali migrant workers the previous year. Although the government medically certified migrants prior to departure, many overseas deaths likely resulted from working conditions such as severe weather exposure leading to organ failure. MoWCSC funded some Nepali embassies to repatriate Nepali trafficking victims; however, the welfare fund was not available to repatriate unregistered workers. FEB could repatriate undocumented migrants, including trafficking victims, by requesting funds through the finance ministry on an ad hoc basis, or referring victims to the non-resident Nepali association, but it could not provide any other financial support or services. Nepal lacked formal agreements with neighboring countries, including India, to repatriate trafficking victims, often resulting in excessively long repatriation processes. DoFE maintained an online portal that allowed migrant workers, or someone on the worker’s behalf, to file a request for repatriation assistance; the government did not report the percentage of successful repatriations.

The government maintained inadequate efforts to prevent human trafficking. The NCCHT, headed by the MoWCSC, met quarterly and continued to lead interagency anti-trafficking efforts. Observers noted the need for improved coordination between the NCCHT, the District Coordination Committees on Human Trafficking, and LCCHTs as anti-trafficking efforts faltered due to uncertainty over responsibilities across all levels of the government. LCCHTs were not mandated by law and did not receive national-level funding, thereby limiting sub-national anti-trafficking efforts, and no new LCCHTs were formed. An office within the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) focused on trafficking of women and children; however, the office remained understaffed and less active than the NCCHT. The MoWCSC prepared a 10-year NAP which remained pending formal approval for the second consecutive year. The government reported allocating Rs. 9,131,000 ($68,630) to prevention efforts, including activities to raise awareness, build capacity of officials, and coordinate efforts. The government, in collaboration with an international partner, continued implementation of a central trafficking database to address information gaps. The government conducted few anti-trafficking trainings for officials beyond several trainings for police. The government continued to conduct public awareness campaigns, sometimes in partnership with civil society or international organizations, although officials acknowledged the need to increase these programs, particularly for vulnerable groups. The government provided awareness-raising materials in Nepali. The government operated hotlines for victims of crime, including human trafficking, and the Metropolitan Police Crime Division in Kathmandu continued to operate an anti-trafficking hotline. The Department of Labor (DOL), in partnership with civil society, operated a hotline to report allegations of child labor; however, the response time was frequently slow due to limited police resources. The FEB also operated a hotline to receive complaints concerning migrant workers, including human trafficking incidents.

The Department of Immigration lacked effective processes for detecting potential trafficking victims as well as a mechanism for coordinating victim identification among intergovernmental agencies and civil society organizations. Police lacked the staff, resources, and training required to patrol Nepal’s nearly 1,100-mile border with India, which Nepalis and Indians could cross without visas or passports. Significant transnational trafficking reportedly occurred along the border; however, border officials did not conduct screenings and most cases were not proactively identified. Police relied on civil society organizations to conduct screenings along the border, but these efforts focused almost entirely on intercepting female travelers. In January 2024, the Department of Immigration issued a travel advisory cautioning potential migrant workers traveling on tourist visas, particularly to Gulf countries, about the risks of informal migration.

The DoFE, which regulates and monitors recruitment agencies and pre-departure orientation centers, maintained offices in all seven provinces to increase prospective migrant workers’ access to foreign employment-related services. The FEB also operated approximately 72 migrant resource and information centers at the district level, which provided information on authorized recruitment agencies, maximum fees the agencies could charge workers, and information on the risks and challenges of working abroad. The FEB continued to provide a two-day pre-departure orientation for migrant workers; however, the course was not mandatory and the quality varied. The government offered free certifications for skills obtained abroad for migrant workers; it did not report how many workers utilized these services. The government struggled to implement and monitor regulations for foreign employment, and the government’s labor migration policies remained lengthy, costly, and sometimes discriminatory against women. The government maintained strict pre-conditions for female migrants that destination countries could often not fulfill, thereby restricting female migration, particularly for foreign domestic work in the Middle East, and increasing the likelihood of migration outside regular migration channels and trafficking risks. The government encouraged returned migrants to use their skills and experience abroad to develop businesses in Nepal. The government previously introduced a policy allowing unregistered domestic workers who traveled abroad outside of regular migration channels to formally register for legal employment abroad; the government did not report how many people applied for this program. The government announced plans to authorize foreign employment in 71 new countries, including previously prohibited destinations; the government did not explain how it would provide assistance to migrant workers in these new destinations.

The DoFE continued regular monitoring and inspection of recruitment agencies and pre-departure orientation centers for migrant workers; however, officials did not report if the government identified or referred any civil or criminal cases of fraudulent recruitment agents or agencies. The government required employment agencies to obtain an operating license by paying fees based on the number of migrant workers sent abroad. Among the 972 manpower agencies currently licensed in Nepal, only 15 had authorization to recruit domestic workers, likely due to the government’s strict pre-conditions on female migrant domestic workers. Observers reported government monitoring of employment agencies was ineffective to address non-compliance; agencies regularly charged migrant workers fees higher than the 10,000 NPR ($75) government-set limit. The government’s 2015 labor migration guidelines included a policy requiring foreign employers to pay visa and transportation costs for Nepali migrant workers bound for Malaysia and the Gulf and restricted agency-charged recruitment fees to 10,000 NPR ($75). Despite the government’s 2015 low-cost recruitment policy, the government did not strictly monitor recruitment agencies and employment agencies continued to charge Nepali workers for visas, airplane tickets, and service fees above the official cap. The government maintained 10 bilateral labor agreements or MOUs with destination countries in an effort to control costs for migrant workers. In October 2023, the government signed bilateral agreements with Germany and Romania to regulate labor migration and prevent exploitation, and a separate bilateral consultation mechanism with the Government of Malaysia. In addition, the National Human Rights Commission signed an MOU with Qatar to cooperate on protecting the rights of migrant workers.

The Department of Labor (DOL) maintained primary responsibility for enforcing labor laws, but the government employed an inadequate number of labor inspectors who often lacked sufficient training and dismissed the prevalence of trafficking. The government continued to fund and conduct inspections focused specifically on child labor; however, the DOL did not report referring any employers for criminal investigation or issuing any administrative penalties following 2,544 inspections conducted. Action against child labor continued to be primarily reactive and the DOL did not undertake many unannounced inspections. Although more than 15 percent of Nepali children aged 5 to 17 were involved in child labor, DOL did not report how many child laborers it identified or removed from exploitative conditions, and it typically only removed children whom employers physically or sexually abused. DOL reportedly encouraged mediation over prosecution, including in cases of forced child labor. While the informal sector employed more than 70 percent of workers in the country, including nearly all child laborers, labor inspectors did not regularly inspect the informal sector for violations, including forced labor. The government did not report progress toward its target to declare at least 25 municipalities child labor-free. Although the government established a national land commission in 2021 to assist landless Dalit and marginalized communities, the program has been slow to grant land that would reduce financial insecurity. The government approved a citizenship amendment bill to create a path to citizenship to approximately 400,000 stateless people in Nepal; more than 50,000 people reportedly received citizenship. DOL launched and operated an online platform to grant foreign workers labor permits and licenses to work in Nepal. The government did not monitor its domestic or global supply chains for forced labor.

The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government had special committees led by chief district officers to monitor the AES; however, committees remained highly dependent on individual officers and did not have a comprehensive regulatory framework for monitoring such establishments. Existing laws did not permit labor inspectors to monitor AES establishments for labor violations, which allowed some establishments to use children and adult trafficking victims with impunity. Observers estimated only half of AES establishments had valid registration. Some municipalities, in partnership with an international organization, developed minimum standard monitoring guidelines for the AES. The government did not make efforts to prevent extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse despite previous concerns, although public awareness activities reportedly included the issue. The government provided training on labor issues to its diplomatic personnel, and peacekeepers from Nepal – one of the largest troop contributing countries – reportedly received training that included human trafficking prior to deployment overseas.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Nepal, and traffickers exploit Nepali victims abroad. Men, women, and children are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking, including child trafficking, debt bondage, and the worst forms of child labor.  In 2019, the NHRC estimated 1.5 million Nepalis are vulnerable to human trafficking. Observers report caste-based discrimination, child sexual abuse, GBV, and the absence of economic opportunities increase the vulnerability of many Nepalis, particularly women and girls, to trafficking. Traffickers continue to target young, uneducated Nepalis from traditionally marginalized castes and ethnic minority communities with limited economic opportunities, and then lure victims with promises of work or education. Unregistered migrant workers – including Nepalis who travel via the open border with India to third country destinations – are particularly vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. Traffickers increasingly use social media and mobile technologies to lure and deceive victims, often with false employment promises. The impact of climate change, particularly in the Himalayan region, increases vulnerability to trafficking following disasters and population displacement.

Labor traffickers exploit Nepali men, women, and children in Nepal, India, the Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia in the adult entertainment sector, begging, construction, domestic work, factories, mines, and other industries. The government estimates approximately 1.5 million Nepalis work in the Middle East, with most men in construction in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In 2023, the Government of Nepal estimated more than 800,000 Nepalis left the country on work permits; this did not include the many undocumented Nepalis traveling abroad outside regular migration channels. Foreign employment is often regarded as a respectable way to earn money to support families and remittances constitute an important part of Nepal’s economy, but many migrant workers are not well informed about their rights or applicable laws, and ongoing reports indicate employers retain worker passports and sometimes withhold pay for months at a time. Many Nepalis lack access to the formal banking sector and take out high-interest loans through a “meter byaj” system, resulting in debts. Nepalis work under oppressive conditions, which include forced labor, sometimes resulting in death. In the Gulf states, exploitative working conditions in severe weather often lead to health complications, including organ failure, resulting in Nepali families taking loans and more debts for dialysis or other procedures. Many Nepalis migrate outside regular migration channels and work without valid permits, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Traffickers target unregistered migrant workers, including the large number of young Nepali women who transit India, or men and women who rely on unregistered recruitment agents. Many prospective migrants from poor, often low-caste communities, including Haruwa-Charuwa adults and children, cross Nepal’s nearly 1,100-mile border with India in search of employment. Traffickers lure women with the promise of domestic work or the entertainment sector in Malaysia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Traffickers also bring Nepali victims to Australia and European countries on tourist, student, marriage, and work visas. Some recruitment agencies and agents engage in fraudulent recruitment practices and impose fees to facilitate forced labor. Recruitment agencies sometimes provide inaccurate information about foreign employment, and migrants discover they will be required to work in jobs differing from what they had been promised. Some Nepali migrants reported indicators of fraudulent recruitment while traveling to Russia to enlist as foreign fighters in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Nepali companies facilitate arranged marriages for Nepali women in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the ROK, and are subjected to domestic servitude. Traffickers exploit some foreign migrants who transit Nepal en route to the Middle East, including Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans who use falsified Nepali travel documents. The lack of a birth registration system in Nepal further contributed to the production of fraudulent identification documents. Traffickers reportedly take advantage of more relaxed pre-departure screenings in Indian airports, including Agra, Chennai, New Delhi, Kolkata, and Mumbai, or bribe Indian officials to fly Nepali migrant workers to third countries without proper documentation, which increases the workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. Traffickers fraudulently recruit Nepali victims with job offers and coerce them into online scam operations, including in Southeast Asia and the Philippines.

Within Nepal, many people searching for work travel from rural to urban areas where they are vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers use forced labor and debt-based bondage to exploit adults and children in agriculture, brick kilns, domestic work, and the stone-breaking industry. Many bonded labor victims in brick kilns are members of underprivileged groups and migrate with their families from rural areas to work. The Haruwa-Charuwa, the Haliya, and the Kamaiya communities, most of whom are Dalits, are disproportionally affected by bonded labor, especially in agriculture and cattle grazing. High-interest loans, landlessness, discrimination, limited livelihood opportunities, and inadequate government policies contribute to intergenerational bonded labor. Households frequently take on high-interest loans for healthcare expenses, funeral costs, and other necessities while earning low wages, resulting in debts passed from one generation to the next. Thousands of children work in brick kilns, including carrying loads, preparing bricks, and performing other tasks at kilns for extended periods. Traffickers subject Nepali and Indian children to forced labor in agriculture, brick kilns, carpet weaving, domestic work, the embroidered textile (Zari) industry, and stone quarrying. A 2021 study estimated 1.1 million children are exploited in child labor – compared to 1.6 million children in 2008 – with 87 percent of cases occurring in the agriculture sector; approximately 74 percent of children engaged in the informal sector work in hazardous conditions. Traffickers also exploit debts to compel adults and children into labor in carpet factories. Traffickers use children to transport drugs across the Indian-Nepali border. Indian nationals work in construction and seasonal occupations where trafficking victims have previously been identified. Some Nepali brick kilns employ Indian migrant workers, including children, who take out large advances requiring working over subsequent seasons. Recruitment agents promise Bangladeshi workers well-paying jobs in Nepali carpet factories, but procure tourist visas instead of work visas and pay less than the agreed wages. A large proportion of licensed foreign workers in Nepal come from the PRC, and PRC workers previously faced risks of forced labor on infrastructure projects contracted to PRC companies.

Sex traffickers exploit Nepali women and girls in Nepal, India, Malaysia, the Middle East, and, to a lesser extent, other Asian countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. Traffickers exploit Nepal’s open border with India to draw Nepali women and children to India for sex trafficking, including using employment or online romance scams. Traffickers subject Nepali girls, boys, and transgender people to sex trafficking on the streets or the AES, including dance bars, massage parlors, and brothels. According to a study of the Kathmandu Valley, approximately 17 percent of workers in the AES are children and 62 percent of adult women in the AES started as children. The study estimated nearly 30 percent of child workers in AES establishments are victims of forced labor, usually as restaurant staff, and employers later subject many to sex trafficking. A study on commercial sexual exploitation of children found children living on the street were highly vulnerable to trafficking. Child marriages remain prevalent and girls in early and forced marriages, especially in the Terai region among Dalit and Madhesi communities, are vulnerable to sex traffickers.

Some orphanages and children’s homes force children into manual labor or begging, force them to entertain visitors for donations, and sexually abuse them. Under false promises of education and work opportunities, some Nepali parents give their children to brokers who take them to frequently unregistered children’s homes and force the children to pretend to be orphans to garner donations from tourists and volunteers. Approximately one-third of registered orphanages do not meet the government’s minimum standards, and some children’s home operators force children to beg or keep children destitute to attract donations. Observers estimate nearly 11,000 children remain in Nepal’s approximately 418 registered children’s homes and “orphanages” despite approximately 80 percent having at least one living parent. Seventy-five percent of registered Nepali orphanages and children’s homes are located in the country’s five main tourist districts, and police sometimes arrest tourists or international volunteers, mostly from Western countries, for sexual abuse of Nepali children, including child sex trafficking.

The government recognized Bhutanese and Tibetans as refugees but regarded refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities as undocumented migrants, even when recognized as refugees by international organizations. The government provided registered Bhutanese refugees an identification card, and provided cards to children 16 years and older, requiring renewal every five years.  The government has not issued new refugee cards for Tibetan refugees since 1995 nor recognized any Tibetans who arrived after 1989, leaving most of the government-estimated 12,540 Tibetan refugees in the country undocumented, which prevents them from legally working, studying, traveling, and accessing public services. According to some estimates, approximately 3.1 million individuals – 12.5 percent of Nepal’s population – lack citizenship documentation, rendering them de facto stateless. Legal requirements on transferring citizenship continue to impose hardships on children whose fathers are deceased, unknown, or departed the country to work abroad. The government amended the first citizenship act in 2023 which assisted tens of thousands of Nepalese to access citizenship certificates. Some women are also unable to obtain citizenship due to policies requiring formal attestation from a male family member. Lack of documentation precludes the participation of all these groups in the formal economy and increases their vulnerability to traffickers.