Vigorously investigate and prosecute cases of human trafficking, including hereditary slavery, and cases of unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers. * Seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. * Amend the anti-trafficking law to allow for effective investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes involving hereditary slavery. * Cease the unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers, including in support roles, and investigate reports of recruitment or use of child soldiers by military personnel. * Proactively screen vulnerable populations, including children associated with armed groups, communities historically exploited in hereditary slavery, IDPs, and individuals in commercial sex for trafficking indicators, and refer all trafficking victims to care. * Train front-line actors, including law enforcement, security forces, judicial officials, social workers, and civil society, on the NRM and standard procedures to refer trafficking victims to services. * Expand and strengthen reintegration programs for former child soldiers to include psycho-social care, family reintegration, education, and vocational training; fully implement the 2013 inter-ministerial protocol to refer all children associated with armed groups to care and cease inappropriately detaining children for alleged association with armed groups. * Institutionalize training for law enforcement and judicial actors on investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes under the 2012 anti-trafficking law and on victim-centered investigative and prosecutorial techniques. * Increase the quantity and quality of services available to all trafficking victims, including adults and victims outside of the capital, in coordination with civil society. * Empower the anti-trafficking inter-ministerial committee (CNCTLPA) to coordinate the transition government’s anti-trafficking response and implementation of the 2023-2027 NAP.

The transition government decreased law enforcement efforts. Law 2012-023 Relating to the Combat against Trafficking in Persons and Similar Practices, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for trafficking crimes, except forced begging for which it prescribed lesser penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 2 million West African CFA francs (FCFA) ($850-$3,400). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other grave crimes, such as rape. Transition government officials and NGOs reported the law did not precisely define hereditary slavery and therefore could not be effectively implemented to prosecute trafficking cases involving hereditary slavery. Draft legislation revising the anti-trafficking law and penal code to explicitly define hereditary slavery as a form of human trafficking remained pending before the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).

The transition government reported investigating 48 trafficking cases, including eight hereditary slavery cases, compared with investigating 14 cases during the previous reporting period. The transition government prosecuted 84 alleged traffickers, including 24 for hereditary slavery crimes, and convicted four traffickers. The courts sentenced one trafficker to three years’ imprisonment and issued fully suspended sentences to three traffickers (including two traffickers convicted of hereditary slavery crimes). This was a decrease compared with the transition government prosecuting 110 alleged traffickers, including 79 defendants for hereditary slavery, and convicting 47 traffickers (with 32 traffickers sentenced to prison terms and 15 receiving fully suspended sentences) during the previous reporting period. The transition government prosecuted some hereditary slavery crimes as misdemeanors under discrimination, destruction of crops, or burglary statutes, which prescribed significantly lower penalties than those available under the anti-trafficking law. In August 2022, an investigative judge ordered the arrest of 22 suspects, including the village chief and religious leader, for the alleged killing of a hereditary slavery survivor who won her court case rejecting her status as a “slave”; all 22 suspects were provisionally released and remained pending trial at the end of the reporting period.

The Specialized Judiciary Brigade (PJS) and Specialized Investigative Brigade investigated and prosecuted transnational trafficking cases. The Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking Brigade investigated irregular migration and migrant smuggling, including potential trafficking cases, and referred cases to the PJS for further investigation. The Morals Brigade investigated crimes related to morality, including sex trafficking and cases involving children. These units lacked adequate resources and training and could not access portions of the country due to insecurity. The transition government, in collaboration with international organizations and foreign donors, trained more than 400 judicial and law enforcement officials, community leaders, and journalists on the 2012 anti-trafficking law. Despite more trainings, observers reported continued lack of awareness of the 2012 anti-trafficking law and frequent turnover and transfer of officials stymied law enforcement action. In addition, law enforcement’s system-wide lack of training, funding, and resources, including a lack of vehicles and equipment to investigate crimes, impeded anti-trafficking efforts. Insufficient funding and personnel limited the justice sector’s capacity and caused significant judicial delays, and insecurity limited court sessions to Bamako and some regional capitals. The transition government did not report cooperating with foreign counterparts on law enforcement activities.

The transition government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of transition government officials complicit in human trafficking crimes, including hereditary slavery, or unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. For the second consecutive year, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers in unspecified roles, including children younger than the age of 15; the Gendarmerie and police also unlawfully recruited and used child soldiers, including children younger than the age of 15.  Officials reportedly issued fraudulent documentation and accepted bribes to facilitate migrant smuggling; some officials reportedly sexually exploited refugees and migrants as “payment” of bribes. During the previous reporting period, observers reported corrupt law enforcement agents reportedly returned victims to trafficking situations or alerted traffickers to law enforcement operations.

The transition government decreased efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. Unlike in previous years, the transition government did not report comprehensive victim identification data for the reporting period. However, officials reported identifying and referring to services 15 Sierra Leonean child trafficking victims during one law enforcement operation. An international organization reported the transition government identified and referred an additional six trafficking victims to services. Officials also identified and referred 17 children recruited and used by armed groups, including potential trafficking victims, to care. This compared with identifying 245 trafficking victims and referring at least 110 victims to care during the previous reporting period. As in past years, the transition government did not report proactively identifying any victims of hereditary slavery. NGOs identified and provided services to at least 618 trafficking victims, and a foreign consulate identified and provided services to 71 trafficking victims; victims were from Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Nigeria. In partnership with an international organization, the transition government continued developing a pilot database to track trafficking victim statistics and improve victim identification and referral to care.

The transition government continued implementing and training front-line officials on the NRM with standard procedures to identify and refer trafficking victims, including hereditary slavery victims, to care. The transition government worked closely with the Fodé and Yeguine Network for Action (RAFY), a national network comprising NGOs, international organizations, and transition government ministries, including the Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the Family (MFFE), to refer trafficking victims to service providers. The transition government relied on NGOs to provide the majority of services for victims, largely funded by private and international donors, but provided some financial and in-kind government support. NGOs provided shelter, psycho-social support, medical care, repatriation support, and reintegration assistance. NGOs operated 10 transit centers for adult and child victims of crime, including one specialized shelter for female adult trafficking victims in Bamako. Officials could refer victims to the MFFE’s general care facilities for services. An international organization-operated transit center provided voluntary return and reintegration services to migrants in the capital. Local NGOs, with in-kind support from the transition government, screened and provided shelter services to victims of hereditary slavery. Shelters and services for victims, especially outside the capital, remained inadequate, and rising insecurity limited NGOs’ ability to provide services in northern and central Mali. While some facilities offered specialized services for female victims, there were no such services for male victims. The transition government provided some assistance to NGOs and an international organization to repatriate Malians exploited abroad and foreign victims exploited in Mali. The transition government did not offer legal alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship; however, most identified victims were from member states of ECOWAS and did not require special status to remain in Mali.

Access to victim services was not conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. The transition government did not have a victim-witness assistance program to support participation in investigations and prosecutions. Officials reported law enforcement lacked facilities to conduct interviews that allowed for separation between victims and alleged perpetrators; however, victims could provide written testimony as an alternative to speaking with law enforcement. NGOs provided legal assistance to trafficking victims without transition government support. Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; however, no victims reportedly used this provision, and many victims were not aware of this option. The law allowed victims to obtain restitution, but the transition government did not report pursuing restitution in any cases. Authorities previously arrested 13 activists and charged two others on spurious child trafficking charges; an investigative judge dismissed charges against 12 of the activists and charged the remaining three with trafficking. All 13 arrested activists were released, and the case remained pending before the appeals court.

Due to inconsistent use of formal victim identification procedures, authorities may have detained some unidentified trafficking victims. Authorities continued following the government’s 2013 inter-ministerial protocol requiring them to refer former child soldiers to reintegration programs, and the transition government worked with an international organization to train security forces on referral procedures. The handover protocol required authorities to immediately transfer children identified within Bamako; outside the capital, authorities must notify child protection actors within 24 hours and transfer the children within 48 hours. However, observers reported authorities continued to inappropriately detain some children for alleged affiliation with armed groups for longer periods in violation of the protocol.

The transition government maintained mixed efforts to prevent trafficking. The CNCTLPA, chaired by the MOJ, led the transition governments’ anti-trafficking response and convened regularly. The transition government launched a new 2023-2027 NAP to combat trafficking in persons. However, it maintained limited dedicated staff to work on trafficking, which impeded its efforts to consistently coordinate anti-trafficking activities. The transition government allocated 260 million FCFA ($441,430) for anti-trafficking activities, including the NAP’s implementation, anti-trafficking trainings, and support for NGOs. This compared with allocating 271 million FCFA ($460,100) the previous year; however, as in past years, stakeholders reported the CNCLTPA only mobilized 145 million FCFA ($246,180) of its 2023 funding. The CNCTLPA released an annual report in October 2023 detailing the transition government’s anti-trafficking activities in 2022. The transition government, in partnership with NGOs, held awareness-raising campaigns and trainings for civil society, community leaders, and other local stakeholders, and it distributed materials for World Day Against Trafficking in Persons in collaboration with international organizations. However, it did not report taking measures to raise public awareness of child forced begging or hereditary slavery, nor did it regulate Quranic schools to prevent child forced begging or abuse.

The Ministry of Defense had an edict banning children from all deployed military camps and a designated child soldier focal point to coordinate with international organizations when allegations of child soldiering arose; the transition government did not report efforts to enforce the policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously completed a draft child soldiers prevention plan with international actors; the draft plan included measures to sensitize transition government officials and signatory armed group members on child soldier issues and increase coordination when cases are identified. However, the plan remained pending validation by the Council of Ministers for the third consecutive year.

The transition government did not make efforts to address fraudulent recruitment of Malians abroad, nor did it prohibit worker-paid recruitment fees. Labor inspectors lacked sufficient capacity and resources to regulate the informal sector, where most cases of forced labor occurred. The National Unit to Fight Against Child Labor, chaired by the Ministry of Labor, coordinated transition government efforts to combat child labor and had dedicated child labor inspectors; it did not report if inspectors identified any children engaged in child labor. The police operated a hotline for crimes against women and children, including human trafficking; however, it did not report receiving any trafficking calls. The transition government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The transition government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Mali, and traffickers exploit victims from Mali abroad. Traffickers exploit boys from Mali and neighboring West African countries in forced labor in agriculture – especially rice, cotton, dry cereal, and corn cultivation – domestic work, transportation, begging, and the informal commercial sector. Traffickers exploit boys in forced labor in informal gold mines, particularly in Gao and Kidal; third parties sometimes “financed” transportation to mining sites, requiring them to work for an unspecified time to pay off the debt. In 2020, the government estimated more than 45,000 children worked in artisanal gold mines in Mali. Criminal networks exploit migrants in forced labor in gold mining. Corrupt Quranic teachers exploit boys from Mali and neighboring countries, including Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal, in forced begging or other forms of forced labor, and corrupt Quranic teachers exploit Malian boys in forced begging in neighboring countries. Traffickers exploit Malian children in forced labor on cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire. Some parents and relatives coerce girls into forced marriages, with younger girls receiving a higher “bride price“ (money paid to the girl’s family by the husband‘s family). These girls may subsequently be subjected to domestic servitude or sex trafficking; fifty-four percent of girls in Mali are married before the age of 18 and 16 percent are married before the age of 15.

Perpetrators exploit some members of Mali’s Black Tuareg community to slavery practices rooted in traditional relationships of hereditary servitude. An NGO noted hereditary slavery practices in Mali differ from surrounding countries, as communities – rather than individuals or families – exploit victims of hereditary slavery. An international organization report estimated there are 300,000 victims of hereditary slavery in Mali. Former “slaveholders” and community members frequently tortured and attacked victims of hereditary slavery and formerly enslaved persons. In previous years, complicit local officials reportedly interfered in hereditary slavery cases. Traffickers exploit men and boys, primarily of Songhai ethnicity, in a long-standing practice of debt bondage in the salt mines of Taoudeni in northern Mali. Traffickers exploit adult victims in forced labor in the agricultural sector, artisanal gold mining, and domestic work. Traffickers recruit women and girls from other West African countries, particularly Nigeria, with promises of jobs as waitresses in Bamako or beauty parlors in Europe or the United States but instead exploit them in sex trafficking throughout Mali, especially in small mining communities. An NGO report attributed some of the increased demand for sex trafficking in mining communities to cultural and religious beliefs, correlating sex with increased chances of finding gold, and it also noted corruption schemes involving complicit officials and community authorities perpetuating trafficking. Migrants transiting Mali to Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and sometimes Europe are vulnerable to trafficking.

An estimated 8.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, most of whom were children, and there were more than 350,000 IDPs. Terrorist organizations and armed groups continue to recruit or use children, mostly boys, as combatants, spies, laborers, and in other capacities. Some of these groups use girls in combat, support roles, and for sexual exploitation, including sexual slavery through forced marriages to members of these armed groups. Armed groups and terrorist groups purportedly coerce some families into selling or giving up their children to the groups for protection or to earn an income. According to an international organization, insecurity, school closures, and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions are leading to a rise in child trafficking, forced labor, and forced recruitment by armed groups in Mali. “Talibes” (children in informal Quranic schools) are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. International observers reported artisanal gold mines controlled by armed groups remain a concern for trafficking, child labor, and child soldiering. An international organization reported armed groups exploit children in forced labor in gold mines and extort adults operating in the mines via a “tax” to finance their activities. Unaccompanied children among IDPs are at heightened risk of recruitment by armed groups in Mali.

In past years, Malian security forces cooperated with signatory armed groups, including the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a pro-Malian state militia, that recruited and used children, sometimes through force, fraud, or coercion. Both factions of the armed group Platform, of which GATIA is a member, and Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) have UN action plans to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers. However, both GATIA and CMA reportedly continue to recruit or use children. FAMa, the Gendarmerie, and the police unlawfully recruited and used children, including children younger than the age of 15. In past years, the government had a program in partnership with a foreign government to strengthen the capacity of local actors, including signatory armed groups, CMA and Platform, to manage irregular migration flows and intercept migrants.