Vigorously investigate and prosecute cases of forced labor and sex trafficking under Articles 181 and 181-1. * Cease the use of forced labor in “labor therapy centers.” * Increase resources devoted to trafficking victim assistance and protection within Belarus in such a manner that improves effectiveness, including for state-owned centers and for NGOs. * Cease the facilitated transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus and take all necessary steps to prevent trafficking among this population, including by safely returning these children to their parents or guardians. * Screen all vulnerable groups, including migrants and refugees, People’s Republic of China (PRC) nationals, and individuals in commercial sex, for indicators of trafficking. * Raise awareness about the voluntary nature of “subbotniks” and increase training to government officials at both the national and regional level to ensure coercive measures are not used to elicit participation. * Increase the number of labor inspectors to identify internal forced labor and investigate illegal recruitment practices. * Continue to expand training for all relevant officials on the NRM and allocate sufficient resources for its full implementation. * Increase funding for services that provide child sex trafficking victims with services specialized to their needs, continue to refer all identified victims to care facilities, and ensure criminal justice actors use a trauma-informed approach in child trafficking cases. * Increase victims’ access to free legal aid and ensure defense attorneys receive training on trafficking and a trauma-informed approach. * Train judges on restitution in criminal cases, establish procedures to seize assets from traffickers, and create effective methods to allocate restitution to ensure victims receive restitution in a timely manner. * Amend or repeal the penal provisions in sections 193(1), 339, 342, 367, 368, and 369(2) of the criminal code to clarify that no penalties involving compulsory labor may be imposed for the peaceful expression of political views and ensure that children are not subjected to compulsory labor as punishment.

The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Article 181 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from three to seven years’ imprisonment and forfeiture of assets for offenses involving adult victims and seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and forfeiture of assets for those involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

The government reported it conducted 79 trafficking-related investigations, continuing a multi-year decline from 91 in 2022 and 111 in 2021; however, the government did not conduct any of these under Article 181 or Article 181-1, which criminalized the use of forced labor. Authorities investigated all 79 trafficking-related cases under Article 171, which prohibited the “use of prostitution or creation of conditions for prostitution” and Article 171-1, which prohibited the “recruitment into prostitution or coercing someone to continue in prostitution.” The government reported 76 percent of the investigations were for trafficking-related crimes that occurred within Belarus, a decrease from 95 percent in 2022. The government reported prosecuting 38 suspected traffickers, compared with 40 in 2022, but for the third consecutive year did not report if it conducted any of these prosecutions under Articles 181 or 181-1 (one in 2020 and four in 2019). For the third consecutive year, the government did not report convicting any traffickers under Articles 181 or 181-1. The government attributed the decrease in trafficking-related investigations and prosecutions to a shift in focus on child sexual abuse and pornography crimes.

The Main Department for Drug Control and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings led anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The government did not report if it provided anti-trafficking training to law enforcement; however, law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges participated in trafficking seminars organized by an international organization. In July 2023, the government reported it coordinated with Israeli law enforcement to investigate a suspected human trafficking ring accused of exploiting Belarusian and Ukrainian women in Israel in sex trafficking; media reported the investigation led to the arrest of 15 suspected traffickers.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking crimes; however, corruption and complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns. Multiple observers reported the government exploited individuals with drug or alcohol addiction, as well as political prisoners and persons leading an “asocial lifestyle,” in forced labor at “labor therapy centers;” media reported the government sent as many as 7,320 individuals to these centers in 2022. Observers reported the government planned to increase the number of labor therapy centers in 2024, providing space for up to 10,000 individuals. Observers reported authorities forced individuals at these centers to perform a wide range of labor, including woodworking, charcoal production, agricultural work, and metal fabrication. The law allowed authorities to send persons with drug or alcohol addiction to these centers by court order for 12-18 months if they committed three or more (within one year) administrative violations while under the influence of drugs or alcohol; in 2020, the government amended the law to allow authorities to also send persons leading an “asocial lifestyle” to these centers if they were warned about being sent to the centers and committed an administrative offense while under the influence of drugs or alcohol within a year of being warned. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus previously expressed concern the term “asocial lifestyle” was extremely vague and could lead to arbitrary detention and abuse. Observers reported the centers were de facto detention centers, and authorities often did not provide – or only minimally provided – treatment. Observers also reported authorities sent 4,494 persons to “labor therapy centers” in 2020, but approximately one third did not have a substance addiction. Separately, observers expressed concern that some provisions of the Belarusian criminal code, which included forced labor as possible punishment, were worded broadly enough to lend themselves to application as a means of punishment for the expression of views opposed to the government. A March 2024 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report covering the period from May 2020 to December 2023 stated the government subjected political prisoners (imprisoned and sentenced based on the peaceful exercise of fundamental freedoms) to forced labor at penal colonies. Belarusian authorities facilitated the transfer of more than 2,400 children from Ukraine to Belarus since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; authorities placed the children in various facilities, including sanatoriums, “health” or recreational camps, and hospitals. Authorities targeted children from vulnerable communities, including children in institutional care, orphans, children with disabilities, and children from low-income families, for relocation. Authorities subjected many of these children to “re-education,” military training, and/or medical procedures; military training included firearms handling, combat demonstrations, and wearing body armor and military uniforms. Ukrainian children transferred to Belarus were highly vulnerable to trafficking. In response to a July 2023 grain shortage, the government announced it would prohibit all agricultural workers from leaving their jobs without the explicit permission of the chairmen of each district executive committee, who were also banned from leaving their posts; the government did not report the extent to which this policy was implemented.

The government maintained minimal protection efforts. The government reported identifying 381 trafficking victims, an increase from 210 in 2022; however, it did not specify how many were trafficking victims and noted this figure also included victims of other crimes, such as child sexual abuse. For the fourth year in a row, the government did not report how many potential victims applied for official status; in 2019, the government reported 251 potential victims applied for official victim status. Of the 381 victims, 269 were children and at least 41 victims were exploited abroad. NGOs and an international organization indicated they identified and assisted 85 victims, compared with 97 in 2022; 48 were sex trafficking victims, and 37 were forced labor victims. Neither the government nor NGOs identified any victims among Ukrainian refugees in the country; however, the government did not screen Ukrainian refugees and other migrants for potential trafficking. Authorities and civil society followed an NRM to identify and refer victims to services. NGOs reported a variance in the degree of cooperation with regional law enforcement. The government reported it referred only 25 percent of victims (97 victims, including 77 children) to services; in 2022, the government reported it referred 39 child victims, and in 2021 it referred 113 adult and child victims.

NGOs and an international organization provided the majority of victim assistance; the government did not provide direct financial support to NGOs. The government offered a range of victim services, including shelter, legal assistance, medical and psychological aid, and assistance finding employment. However, while free, these services continued to be underutilized and had burdensome bureaucratic requirements, delays in service delivery, and inconsistent quality of service, often leading victims to choose to pay for necessary services elsewhere or find support through NGOs. The government did not have trafficking-specific facilities available to care for victims, but local authorities operated approximately 136 “crisis rooms” that offered temporary shelter, including beds, meals, and personal hygiene products, to vulnerable adults, including victims of trafficking, regardless of nationality; the government did not report if trafficking victims used these facilities in 2023. Although some crisis centers remained inaccessible to persons with physical disabilities, observers reported the government increased the accessibility of shelters and provided sign language interpreters free of charge to persons with hearing impairments. However, observers continued to report most victims sought assistance at private shelters because the government’s centers were poorly equipped and lacked qualified staff trained in trafficking. According to the law, victims’ access to services was not dependent on their willingness to participate in the criminal process. Observers reported some victims were required to participate in investigations conducted under Articles 171 and 171-1 to access protection services. The law entitled foreign victims to the same benefits as Belarusian victims; however, in cases where victims were undocumented or believed to be in violation of immigration law, the government only offered access to emergency services. Moreover, observers noted children and persons with disabilities often lacked access to government services, and the government did not provide some services, including medical assistance and legal aid, in remote areas. The government took politically motivated steps to widely restrict the activities and foreign funding of nearly all civil society groups, including those dedicated to anti-trafficking activities.

Vulnerable children between the ages of three and 18 could receive shelter and basic provisions at centers run by the Ministry of Education; children could stay at these centers for a maximum of six months, after which they were returned to their family, assigned to a foster family, or transferred to an orphanage or boarding institution. The government could provide child-friendly rooms for interviews, the provision of assistance, and reintegration services at a select number of these centers. The government did not report if any child trafficking victims received services at these facilities. In August 2023, the government reported it approved new regulations governing child-friendly interview rooms and instructed each district to create at least one such room – in Minsk at least two – by January 2025; the government did not report if these regulations included any recommended changes issued by an NGO in 2020 to improve the use of the rooms and interviewing techniques. Although the criminal code required the recording of testimony of victims and witnesses younger than the age of 14 during pre-trial investigation for later use in court, observers reported child sex trafficking victims continued to be subjected to multiple questionings, including in court hearings, and in a non-friendly environment. Observers noted in previous years authorities penalized some sex trafficking victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Observers also reported authorities did not consistently screen individuals in commercial sex for trafficking indicators and authorities dismissed claims by Belarusians who stated they had been subjected to forced labor in Russia. Media and NGO reports indicated authorities returned many third-country migrants and asylum-seekers who arrived in the country as part of the ongoing state-sponsored migration crisis to their countries of origin without screening them for trafficking. Victims were entitled to free legal assistance, and victims could request protection measures to include the non-disclosure of information, exemption from attending hearings, delivering testimony remotely, and closed court sessions. However, observers noted the legal aid provided to victims was inadequate; defense attorneys able to represent victims were in short supply and many attorneys providing free legal aid were not familiar with trafficking and a victim-centered approach. Courts could grant restitution from traffickers in criminal cases, but the government did not report if victims were granted restitution in 2023.

The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. The Minister of Interior served as the national coordinator on trafficking issues and led implementation of the 2023-2025 State Program on Combating Crime and Corruption, which included anti-trafficking activities, although there have been no reports on the effectiveness of its implementation. All regional interdisciplinary bodies, composed of representatives from the law enforcement, education, healthcare, labor, and social welfare sectors, as well as judiciary, media, clergy, and civil society, conducted annual meetings to discuss implementation of the NRM.

The government provided limited funds for awareness campaigns or other prevention activities. Observers reported the government screened an international organization-produced video in cinemas across the country to raise awareness about child sex trafficking. The government promoted an NGO-run national trafficking hotline; calls to this hotline led to the identification and referral of six victims. The Ministry of Interior continued to operate a hotline for safe travel abroad to inform potential Belarusian labor migrants, identify illegal recruitment practices, and route calls reporting potential incidents of trafficking to specialized NGOs. The government coordinated with an international organization to conduct an awareness raising campaign on safe labor migration that included information on the Ministry of Interior’s labor migration hotline. For the seventh consecutive year, the government did not report if it investigated or filed charges against companies related to illegal recruitment; comparatively, it charged 50 companies in 2016, the last year for which data was available. The government did not report if labor inspectors conducted inspections in 2023; efforts remained inadequate to enforce and deter violations.

In a politically motivated act of retaliation for European Union policy, starting in May 2021 the government orchestrated and continued actively to support a migration crisis along its borders with Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; this significantly increased these migrants’ vulnerabilities to trafficking as law enforcement did not screen migrants for trafficking indicators, and in some instances, authorities forced migrants to attempt irregular border crossings. This activity continued in 2023; authorities in Poland and Lithuania recorded a significant increase in irregular border crossings from Belarus. Authorities in some cases either did not approve or delayed approval for requests made by UNHCR to provide assistance to migrants in Belarus. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not report providing anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to their deployment as peacekeepers.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Belarus, and traffickers exploit victims from Belarus abroad. Data collected by NGOs suggests the majority of trafficking victims are Belarusian men subjected to forced labor, primarily in Russia. Traffickers exploit Belarusian victims primarily in Belarus and Russia, as well as in Poland, Türkiye, and other countries in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. Traffickers subject some Belarusian women traveling for foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries to sex trafficking. The government has identified Belarusian, Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, Vietnamese, and Ghanaian victims exploited in Belarus. The majority of traffickers are Belarusian citizens. The percentage of children among identified victims has risen steadily since 2020. Traffickers increasingly use online methods, including instant messaging applications, to coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking, and children are especially vulnerable to online forms of exploitation. Traffickers increasingly exploit victims for forced labor in online scam operations and for livestreamed commercial sex acts. NGOs report an increased risk of trafficking, especially labor trafficking, as a result of the continued flow of migrants and refugees into Belarus, including those fleeing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The government also allows workers from the PRC to engage in government-affiliated construction and other projects in Belarus; this population is vulnerable to trafficking.

The government exploits thousands of Belarusian citizens in forced labor at “labor therapy centers,” where authorities force them to perform a wide range of labor. Authorities send individuals with drug and alcohol addictions, political prisoners, and persons leading an “asocial lifestyle” to these centers; there were as many as 7,320 individuals in these centers in 2022. Separately, observers report authorities subject political prisoners to forced labor at penal colonies. Belarusian authorities have facilitated the transfer of more than 2,400 children from Ukraine to Belarus since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022; authorities have subjected these children to “re-education,” military training, and medical procedures for which it is unclear if parents or guardians provided meaningful consent. Ukrainian children transferred to Belarus are highly vulnerable to trafficking. The government-orchestrated migration crisis, initiated in May 2021 along its borders with Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, continues.  Belarusian authorities facilitate the entry into Belarus of thousands of migrants and asylum-seekers, mostly from Iraq but also from other Middle Eastern countries and countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Belarusian authorities facilitate their onward travel to the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; authorities encourage and, in some instances, force migrants to attempt irregular border crossings. These migrants remain vulnerable to trafficking.

The government continues the practice of subbotniks, or voluntary service days (held on Saturdays). One national-level subbotnik, announced by government decree was held, as were several regional, district, and local-level subbotniks organized by regional, district, and local authorities. As an alternative form of participation, participants can allocate a portion of a single day’s salary toward government projects announced by the authorities prior to the subbotnik. Historically, individuals have been subjected to government reprisals for failure to participate in subbotniks. In past years, observers reported authorities threatened individuals who refused to work with fines or unpaid premium compensation. However, contrary to previous years, approximately 500,000 citizens abstained from participating in the national subbotnik in 2020. Observers did not report any retaliation for nonparticipation in 2023, 2022 or 2021. Government decrees announcing subbotniks are required to state their voluntary nature. The authorities have previously corrected subbotnik announcements that fell afoul of the law and rebuked implicated officials. In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus reported authorities obligated – disguised as strong encouragement – some factory workers, civil servants, and school children to participate in harvesting on state-owned farms or in street cleaning. However, the UN Special Rapporteur did not report on subbotniks in its 2019-2023 reports to the Human Rights Council. Historically, sources alleged authorities sometimes required university and high school students to participate in public works projects without compensation, but no known cases were identified in the reporting period. In 2019, media reported some university students in a rural area in the Vitsebsk region claimed they were forced to participate in apple picking during the harvest season, but no similar cases were identified in the reporting period. In previous years, reports indicated some state university students who failed to participate in harvesting risked the loss of housing in subsidized dormitories or penalization during exams, but no known cases were identified. The UN Special Rapporteur noted in 2020 its continued concern about the practice of forced labor in places of detention, especially with regards to children and youth; the report generally does not provide time frames during which specific incidents of concern occurred.