• Throughout the year, the relationship between the ruling GD and its Western partners remained strained. In May, Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili delivered a speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Hungary, which provoked the ire of the Party of European Socialists (PES).16 The PES considered terminating the GD’s observer status.17 This ongoing tension between the PES and the GD culminated in the GD’s May announcement that it would relinquish its observer status. Irakli Kobakhidze, chairman of the GD, defended the party’s decision to depart from the PES, attributing it to the PES’s “ideological transformation” from classic democratic socialism to a “pseudo-liberal platform.”18
• In 2023, the schism between President Salome Zurabishvili and the ruling GD party deepened. Zurabishvili opposed the controversial foreign agents’ law, embarked on her own diplomatic mission to vouch for Georgia’s EU candidate status in European capitals,19 pardoned the head of the pro-opposition television network Mtavari, 20 and vetoed a number of the ruling party’s bills.21 The government responded by filing a complaint with the Constitutional Court in September to impeach the president.22 In October, the court ruled that the president’s visits to Europe were unconstitutional because she exercised “her powers of representation in foreign relations” without the approval of the government.23 The decision paved the way for the parliament to begin impeachment proceedings. Unsurprisingly, Parliament voted against the impeachment.24 The EU criticized the impeachment effort as polarizing and damaging to Georgia’s EU accession prospects. Some observers argued that the impeachment was “an attempt to divert the public’s attention from other problems.”25 While the legality of the impeachment case was debatable, the political rationale in attempting to impeach the president for visits that were intended to gather support for Georgia’s EU candidacy was questionable.26
• In September, another institutional conflict arose between the government and the National Bank after the latter upheld the financial sanctions imposed on Otar Partskhaladze, a former prosecutor general, by the US State Department. After facing mounting criticism from the ruling party, the bank reversed its stance and ruled that a guilty verdict from a Georgian court was necessary to impose international sanctions on a citizen of Georgia.27 This led to a political crisis. Many high-ranking officials, including three vice presidents of the National Bank, resigned in protest.28 In response, the IMF delayed its stand-by arrangement29 in Georgia.30 President Zurabishvili temporarily defused the crisis when she revoked Partskhaladze’s Georgian citizenship in October. However, according to some reports, he had already managed to transfer many of his financial assets to his family members.31
• Throughout the year, opposition parties faced numerous challenges, including an uneven playing field with the ruling party. Opposition parties also struggled to attract undecided voters due to their failure to present a clear vision and concrete policies that would make them an appealing alternative to the GD, as well as occasional intraparty struggles and defections. In January, during leadership elections within the largest opposition party, UNM, Nika Melia was replaced by Levan Khabeishvili.32 Many observers viewed the outcome as an indication of former party members’ continued influence,33 including former defense minister David Kezerashvili, who owns shares in the opposition TV network Formula and was allegedly involved in a billion-dollar scamming network, according to a BBC investigation.34 In a TV interview shortly before the interim elections, Nika Melia himself alleged that former Interior Minister Ivane Merabishvili and ex-Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili were secretly conspiring against him, including in the upcoming party leadership race.35 Melia asserted that the November 9 demand for internal party elections, which the party accepted, was completely orchestrated by Merabishvili and Kezerashvili, long-time allies of the party's founder and former president Mikheil Saakashvili, in an effort to ensure Melia's competitor Levan Khabeishvili secured the leadership position.36
• Political polarization has been a major problem in recent years and persisted in 2023. The GD’s decision not to lower the 5 percent threshold for representation in Parliament ahead of the 2024 elections could deepen polarization and benefit both the GD and the UNM—the two parties most often accused of deepening political divisions in Georgia.37 These parties, along with their splinter groups and media allies, exacerbate polarization by demonizing their political opponents and refusing to cooperate with each other. Consequently, societal polarization and bipartisan political radicalization are intertwined in Georgia. Smaller parties struggle to survive due to the intense polarization, as well as the 5 percent threshold. But aside from a few mergers, the opposition appeared to lack a cohesive strategy to win the 2024 elections.
• Georgia took some key steps towards EU accession in 2023. After receiving a recommendation from the European Commission in November, the European Council awarded Georgia EU candidate status in December.38 However, the government only partially fulfilled the 12 priorities set by the European Commission and its progress in most areas was assessed as limited. The EU will likely intensify its pressure on Georgia to make democratic reforms as it advances in the accession process. Consequently, the government will need to demonstrate more substantial progress in reforming the judiciary and the electoral framework, as well as combating disinformation and polarization and conducting credible parliamentary elections in 2024.39

• Georgia’s electoral system largely meets international standards. However, the electoral landscape is marked by the ruling party’s dominance, an asymmetric playing field between the government and opposition, and party-driven polarization and political radicalization. Holding fair, credible parliamentary elections in 2024 will be essential to maintaining Georgia’s democratic trajectory and progressing in its EU accession efforts. Ensuring “a free, fair, and competitive electoral process, especially in 2024,” thoroughly addressing the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations from December 15, 2022,40 and finalizing electoral reforms were key 2023 recommendations from the European Commission to help qualify Georgia for EU accession.41 These recommendations involve delineating electoral constituencies, adjusting regulations for media campaigns, and adopting measures to deter voter intimidation.42 These reforms, if implemented properly, will increase the transparency and democratic quality of the elections and make the playing field more competitive.
• In February, Parliament passed revisions to the Electoral Code that extended gender quotas for both parliamentary and municipal elections by an additional four years, through the 2032 elections.43 The revised regulations mandate that for the October 2024 elections, and any subsequent parliamentary elections before 2028, a woman must occupy every fourth slot on the proportional representation lists of political parties.44 For elections after 2028, parties must place women in every third spot on their candidate lists.45 The authors of the bill from the GD argued that the initiative would increase gender representation and promote women’s political participation. Supporters from the GD parliamentary group said the measure would enhance women’s representation and encourage their political involvement.46 Women’s advocacy groups welcomed the amendments and called for a greater expansion of quotas, citing the persistently low representation of women in Parliament.47
• In June, Parliament passed significant changes to the electoral code that shifted the power to appoint the chairperson and seven members of the Central Elections Commission (CEC) from the president to the speaker of Parliament.48 The bill also reduced the number of parliamentary votes needed to elect the CEC head from 100 to 76 (representing half of all votes).49 Notably, these modifications conflict with the principles of the five-point plan brokered by European Council President Charles Michel and signed by the GD and a number of opposition parties in 2021.50 The plan had recommended requiring a two-thirds majority to elect the CEC chairperson.51 President Zurabishvili vetoed the amendments in June, arguing that the “election of the chair and members with 76 votes instead of 100 eliminates the need for consensus-based decisions and increases the risk of polarization.”52 However, the ruling party overrode the veto and the amendments became law. The law faced criticism from the European Commission, which said it was not “in line with the Commission’s opinion” and in conflict with “numerous recommendations.”53
• There were no nationwide elections in 2023. In April, the CEC conducted by-elections for a seat in the Poti-Senaki-Khobi single-mandate constituency, as well as five city council and two mayoral elections.54 GD candidates dominated in all races, while most major opposition parties decided not to field candidates for various reasons.55 These included a lack of confidence in the electoral system and a focus on seemingly more important issues, such as implementing the EC’s 12 reform recommendations and conserving their resources for the parliamentary elections in 2024.56 Notably, the CEC introduced electronic voter registration and electronic voting for these elections.57 The new technologies made the voter registration process faster, although malfunctioning new devices slowed the process on election day in some areas.58 Local election observers said the absence of opposition candidates made the elections “almost non-competitive,” but the group reported that polling was peaceful and conducted “without significant violations of electoral regulations.”59 Only one opposition party, Free Georgia, fielded a candidate for the parliamentary seat in Poti, Senaki, and Khobi, while no opposition candidates ran for mayor in Terjola and Tsageri.60

• The annual EU enlargement progress report released in November characterized Georgian civil society as “well developed, diverse, vibrant and continu[ing] to enjoy the freedom to operate, albeit in an increasingly hostile environment.”61 The legal framework, including light registration and reporting requirements, a special tax regime, and strong freedom of association, creates an environment conducive to robust civic activity.62 However, civil society organizations (CSOs) struggle to remain financially viable, , and often lack grassroots support, which contributes to low public trust towards them.63
• The “foreign agents” bill introduced in March by the People’s Power party, part of the ruling coalition, sparked a major crisis for civil society. The draft law envisioned the creation of an “agents of foreign influence” registry with the Justice Ministry, which would include media outlets and NGOs that receive 20 percent or more of their annual revenues from “foreign powers.”64 This could include revenues from “foreign government agencies, foreign citizens, legal entities not established under Georgian legislation, and foundations, associations, companies, unions, and other organizations or associations under international law.”65 The bill caused outrage at home and abroad and sparked large-scale protests. Georgia’s international partners warned that the bill’s passage would undermine democracy, jeopardize Georgia’s EU accession, and damage Tbilisi’s ties with the West.
• Although traditional CSOs have been active in Georgia for some time, a growing culture of grassroots mobilization and civic activism—especially among young people—reached a new peak in 2023, as Generation Z entered the political arena and led protests against the “foreign agents law.”66 Traditional CSOs supplemented the protests through coordination and awareness-raising activities. 400 CSOs united to sign a petition in protest of the foreign agents bill. 67 The GD withdrew its support for the bill to defuse internal and external pressure and the parliament voted against it with 35-1 in the second reading. 68
• One of 12 reform priorities set out by the EC required to get the candidacy statusencouraged closer government consultation with civil society.69 The EC noted in its progress reports that the government invited civil society representatives to participate in the implementation process for the 12 priorities, including two conferences on implementation that brought together CSO representatives and government officials.70 In October, the Georgian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF)71 signed a memorandum of cooperation with Parliament.72 However, CSOs still had little policy impact in 2023, as the government largely disregarded their views on legislation and appointments.73 Moreover, the government’s inflammatory and derogatory rhetoric against CSOs worsened in 2023 and undermined them, as evidenced by the “foreign agents” bill controversy.74
• While Georgia has relatively progressive antidiscrimination laws, they are unevenly implemented. Minority groups remain subject to occasional physical and verbal harassment. In July, the Tbilisi Pride Festival was abruptly cancelled and participants had to be evacuated due to an attack by a violent mob of several thousand far-right protesters and the authorities’ failure to ensure the safety of festival participants.75 The mob stormed the event, destroying and stealing equipment. The police were unable or unwilling to stop the mob’s onslaught. The climate worsened when members of the ruling party and government escalated their use of anti-LGBT+ rhetoric throughout the year. They emphasized traditional values and criticized what they described as “violence by the minority against the majority.”76
• Throughout the year, there were reports of violence against students, civil society activists, opposition politicians, and intellectuals critical of the government.77 The ruling party allegedly encouraged some of this violence against its critics.78 In September, foreign-agents- law protester Lazare Grigoriadis was sentenced to 18 months in prison for assaulting his father in 2021.79 Critics believe the case was politically motivated and a government effort to tarnish the image of young grassroots protesters and silence dissent by reviving old charges against Grigoriadis.80 In March, GD leader Irakli Kobakhidze said Grigoriadis had a “confused orientation,” which was widely interpreted as a veiled antigay slur.81
• In October, Parliament passed a law that restricts the use of tents and other temporary structures at public demonstrations.82 The legislation gives law enforcement extensive authority to break up protests or apprehend demonstrators that violate the law, who could face fines of 500 lari ($190) or up to 15 days in jail.83 Since encampments have played a key role in antigovernment protests in recent decades, the so-called “tent law” could diminish the effectiveness of future protests.

• Press freedom continued to be an important issue, considering Georgia's EU accession process. The EU’s annual enlargement report published in November commended the availability of “critical media reporting” in Georgia and acknowledged the country's commitment to upholding freedom of expression and freedom of speech.84 However, the report also highlighted concerns about a “hostile environment” for the press, which has been perpetuated by “continued public attacks and discrediting rhetoric against journalists and media professionals.” 85 Between January and November, Transparency International Georgia (TI Georgia) recorded approximately 45 incidents of “violence, harassment, and intimidation attempts” against journalists, as well as 14 criminal cases against perpetrators.86 Journalists face harassment from both the government and opposition parties. These dynamics reveal a complex media environment where the solid legal framework and media pluralism are undermined by political polarization that feeds hostility towards journalists.
• The government and the ruling party continued to attack critics in the media throughout the year. In March, GD Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze accused former defense minister and controversial businessman David Kezerashvili of funding the independent media conglomerate Palitra Media.87 Palitra Media denied the accusations and CSOs issued a statement in support of the company that said the accusations were “an open and undisguised campaign to discredit independent media outlets and civil society organizations, as well as any groups that are not directly dependent on Georgian Dream.”88
• In June, President Zurabishvili pardoned Nika Gvaramia, the director general of the pro-opposition television network Mtavari. Gvaramia had been in prison since 2022, serving a three-and-a-half year sentence for abuse of power that many international observers said was politically motivated.89 Shortly before he was pardoned, the Supreme Court upheld Gvaramia’s prison sentence, a decision that domestic and international observers said was also politically motivated.90 Several members of the European Parliament91 and international human rights and press freedom organizations92 appealed to President Zurabishvili to pardon Gvaramia. The EU hailed the president’s pardon as “an essential step towards depolarization in Georgia.”93
• In October, Parliament adopted a new law that allows the government to block content that it considers obscene, hateful, vulgar, or supportive of terrorism.94 Broadcasters previously blocked such content themselves, without government involvement.95 The law also expands the National Communications Commission’s powers to impose penalties on broadcasters for a wider range of infractions. Opponents of the new law have expressed concerns that it could limit free speech, threaten the independence critical media outlets, put media professionals in legal jeopardy, and lead to censorship.96 TI Georgia soon after published its Annual TV Advertising Market Report for 2022, which highlighted media outlets’ tendency towards self-censorship due to the growing financial challenges they face and decreased revenues resulting from changes in the Broadcasting Law.97 The report also highlighted how progovernment television networks received twice as much advertising revenue as critical TV media outlets in 2022.98 The disparity was evident in 2023, as well: the main progovernment television network Imedi earned 33 million lari ($12.5 million) from advertising in 2023, an increase of 8.6 million lari ($3.3 million) from 2022.99 Pro-opposition networks reported more modest advertising earnings: TV Mtavari earned 7.9 million lari ($3 million), a decrease of 2.2 million lari ($800,000) from the previous year; Formula TV received 5.3 million lari ($2 million), a decrease of 400,000 lari ($150,000); and TV Pirveli also made 5.3 million lari ($2 million), which was 500,000 lari ($190,000) less than in 2022.100

• In November, the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) published the 2023 Local Self-Government Index for Georgia, which assesses the transparency and accountability of local government.101 According to the report, while scores have improved slightly since 2021 overall, the improvements were uneven across indicators. The scores for “proactive publication and public information” and “e-governance” improved, but the “promotion of citizen participation and accountability” score declined.102
• As several studies published in 2023 indicate, transparency and accountability of public spending in municipalities remain concerns. .103 TI Georgia has identified suspicious procurements in 2023 between city councils and limited liability companies (LLCs) in several regions (including Adjara, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kakheti, and Samegrelo-Zemo-Svaneti regions).104
• Local self-governance faced other challenges due to growing political polarization. In September, Irakli Edzgveradze, a UNM Tbilisi City Council member, was assaulted near his home.105 Edzgveradze linked the incident to a dispute with GD council member Kote Zarnadze during a meeting earlier in the day.106 The police arrested six individuals in connection with the assault, including one employee of the Tbilisi City Hall.107 Additionally, three UNM party members were temporarily detained for their involvement in the incident. They were charged with petty hooliganism and each fined 2,000 lari ($750).108
• Other incidents were reported at the Tbilisi City Council and other city councils across the country in 2023. The UNM faction boycotted several sessions of the Tbilisi City Council as a form of protest.109 In August, for example, the UNM withdrew from a City Council session that discussed proposed construction projects that the party opposed and accused Mayor Kakha Kaladze of prioritizing the agenda of GD council members, as well as “Russian oligarch” Bidzina Ivanishvili.110
• UNM politicians also reported that their party members and activists were assaulted in the regions of Kaspi,111 Chokhatauri112 and Sagarejo.113 The UNM claimed that, during a community meeting in Kaspi, GD City Council members and activists verbally harassed UNM Chairman Levan Khabeishvili and damaged his car.114 Similarly, in Chokhatauri, UNM members said GD activists assaulted them while they distributed brochures protesting the sale of Dumbadze square. UNM official Davit Khavanadze was hospitalized as a result of the attack.115 Khavanadze said the GD mobilizes criminal elements to intimidate and silence the opposition.116 The UNM also reported that GD allies verbally and physically harassed UNM leaders during an event in Sagarejo.117 Mtavari Arkhi, a broadcaster affiliated with the UNM, said several assailants were identified as municipal officials, including city council members and the chief of Sagarejo City Hall’s property management division.118

• Corruption and political and corporate interference in the judiciary threatened Georgian democracy in 2023. Throughout the year, numerous scandals, a lack of comprehensive reforms, and US sanctions against some key judges marred the judicial system.
• In March, Parliament elected Levan Isoleliani, a member of the Citizens party, as the new public defender. However, CSOs said Parliament “conducted [the election] without public involvement and participation” and “behind closed doors.”119 The transparent nomination of the public defender and ensuring “the Office’s effective institutional independence” were among the European Commission’s 12 priorities.120 In its annual progress report published in November, the EC said Georgia had fulfilled this priority, despite the objections from civil society.121
• In May and October, Parliament elected five non-judge members to the High Council of Justice (HCoJ). Nongovernmental actors formally nominated the candidates, but the selection and voting process was highly politicized due to the judicial corporatism in the HCoJ that remains a major unresolved issue. Four UNM members broke with the opposition, supported the first three candidates, and then left the party.122 Their votes were essential to reach the 90 votes needed to elect the candidates.123 The episode underscored the weakness and incoherence of opposition parties, including the UNM. One of the candidates elected in October is the son of a Constitutional Court judge who ruled that President Zurabishvili’s trips to Europe were unconstitutional.124 Some observers therefore viewed the election of the judge’s son as a reward for his role in the impeachment process.125
• In March and October, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) issued two opinions about the organic law on common courts.126 The amendments to the law focused on the transparency of judicial acts, the appointment and evaluation process of judges, and the election of the President of the Supreme Court, aiming to enhance the independence and accountability of the judiciary in Georgia. While the commission welcomed some improvements in its second opinion, it stressed that the government had not properly addressed several recommendations to reform the HCoJ,127 including “addressing effectively the persistent allegations of lack of integrity of the HCoJ; reconsidering its powers, functions, decision-making procedures, and the manner of election of members.”128 According to the Venice Commission and the EC, judicial corporatism remains the main challenge in the judicial system.129 CSOs are equally concerned with the influence of the “judicial clan,” an informal group in the justice system that is highly influential and connected to the government, in the HCoJ.130
• After the United States sanctioned Georgian judges in April, opposition parties attempted to establish a parliamentary commission to investigate the corruption allegations against the sanctioned judges.131 However, the ruling party boycotted the initiative, labelling it as “an act of political solidarity with the judges” and the commission was scrapped when legislators failed to achieve a quorum in the plenary session of Parliament.132 CSOs criticized the ruling party’s boycott of the commission as an attempt “to protect the interests of the [judicial] clan.”133
• Parliament implemented legislation to ensure that the courts “proactively take into account the judgments and decisions” of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) .134 The legislation aligned with one of the EC’s key priorities, which emphasizes that Georgian courts should consider ECtHR judgments.135 Throughout 2023, ECtHR registered 156 new cases filed against Georgia.136 When adjusted for population, this equates to a rate of 0.42 new applications per 10,000 people, which closely aligns with the European mean of 0.41.137 In 2020, the ECtHR decided 20 cases and delivered 17 judgments with regard to Georgia. Among these decisions, 12 found violations of the European Convention on Human Rights.138

• Although Georgia has largely eliminated low-level corruption, high-level corruption remains rampant, with prominent officials enjoying almost total impunity.139 As of November, TI Georgia had registered 151 “alleged cases of high-level corruption” over the last few years, involving at least “162 high-level public officials.”140 According to TI Georgia, more than 30 of these cases occurred in 2023.
• In its annual progress report published in November, the EU praised Georgia for making some progress in fighting corruption, particularly the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in 2022, which combines multiple anticorruption functions in a single agency.141 Its responsibilities encompass crafting anticorruption strategies, disclosing assets of public officials, and overseeing the financial transactions of political parties, electoral candidates, and individuals with electoral ambitions.142 Additionally, it manages a digital platform for whistleblowing and provides yearly reports to both Parliament and the Inter-Agency Anti-Corruption Council.143 Anti-Corruption Council as an independent body is supposed to facilitate the implementation of a unified anti-corruption policy by proposing recommendations “on a general anti-corruption policy, strategy and action plan” and asking for periodic reports.144 However, significant gaps remain. The Venice Commission’s December report said the ACB had “no investigative powers and no legal tools to address existing corruption cases.” The report also criticized the “inordinately strong influence of the Prime Minister over the selection of the head of the ACB,” which undermines “perceptions of its political neutrality as well as its ability to rigorously address high level corruption.”145 CSOs have echoed these concerns, contending that the effectiveness of the centralized approach hinges on the institution’s genuine autonomy and investigative authority.146 According to the report, Georgia must prioritize strengthening the ACB’s independence and capacity, addressing more high-level corruption cases, and streamlining the anticorruption legislation.147 Moreover, the government has not updated the National Action Plan since 2020148 and Georgia is the sole country to decline an anticorruption assessment by the OECD.149 Georgia has also failed to keep up with the Open Government Partnership’s (OGP) two-year action plan cycle.150
• Informal governance and the need for de-oligarchization remained key issues throughout 2023. In 2022, the ruling party introduced a law similar to Ukraine’s de-oligarchization law, which labeled political adversaries as “oligarchs” but excluded Bidzina Ivanishvili because he did not hold a government position.151 In June, The Venice Commission criticized the draft law for its personalized approach and warned that it could be misused to punish political rivals.152 The commission said the law should instead take a systemic approach and include more comprehensive reforms.153 Despite the commission’s negative evaluation and the EU’s support for its recommendations, Parliament initially passed the law before it was rejected in a later session. Instead, in November, the government formulated a new de-oligarchization plan. One of the key provisions in the plan pertains to the funding of political parties. Per the plan, legal entities will be prohibited from making campaign donations, expenditure caps for each party will be lowered, and parties will be required to disclose their expenditure reports.154 The plan covers seven areas: anticorruption measures, transparency and accountability in public procurement, the formulation and implementation of an effective competition policy, justice, policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, monitoring of political parties’ financial activities, and the strengthening of media pluralism and transparency.155 While some opposition politicians criticized the new action plan,156 the EU advised Georgia to implement it “efficiently through a multi-sectorial, systemic approach.”157 In December, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili returned to formal politics, assuming the role of GD’s “honorary chairman” and “main advisor.”158 He attributed his decision to the “complicated geopolitical situation” and the opposition’s perceived failure to hold the government accountable, which he believes has increased the risks of corruption and dissent within the ruling party due to a lack of competition.159 While the reasons for Ivanishvili’s return to formal politics remain a subject of debate, some observers view it as a positive step in informal influences on Georgia’s political processes.160
• In April, the US State Department sanctioned three current judges and one former judge for their “involvement in significant corruption,” including abuse “of their positions as court Chairmen and members of Georgia’s High Council of Justice (HCoJ), undermining the rule of law and the public’s faith in Georgia’s judicial system.”161 The sanctioned judges are considered members of the “judicial clan,” a powerful group of judiciary members that frequently influences the outcomes of significant legal cases.162 Analysts have observed that verdicts disproportionately favor the ruling GD party.163 While there are few detailed reports of how the clan operates, the clan members are assumed to have “a close behind-the-scenes relationship” with the government members and the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili,164 have significant impact on recruitment policy in the justice system and influence high-profile cases.165 Soon after the sanctions were issued, the US ambassador explained that the judges’ actions “undercut judicial and public processes by offering benefits to or coercing judges to decide cases in favor of political allies and manipulating judicial appointments to their benefit.”166 In response, Georgian officials asserted that the decision stemmed from “misinformation and corruption,” accused the United States of meddling in Georgia's independent judiciary, and threatened to disclose the details of conversations with US officials.167 Then-chairman of the GD Irakli Kobakhidze seemed to “threaten to leak information from calls with the US” that would presumably indicate how “misinformation and corruption” influenced the US State Department’s decision to impose sanctions.168
• In September, the US imposed sanctions on former prosecutor general Otar Partskhaladze, who was allegedly a member of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s inner circle. 169 In 2013, Partskhaladze briefly served as prosecutor general, having previously held various positions in the Ministries of Interior and Finance. However, he is predominantly known for his alleged involvement in several high-profile scandals, including the intimidation of an imprisoned former opposition leader during his tenure as prosecutor general, dubious business dealings, and the intimidation and assault of Georgian businessmen.170 Additionally, he is accused of assaulting former auditor general Lasha Tordia, who was later granted political asylum in the US.171 According to the US State Department, Partskhaladze was allegedly leveraged by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to “influence Georgian society and politics for the benefit of Russia” and “personally profited from his FSB connection.”172 Authorities responded by compelling the National Bank to amend its regulations to give Partskhaladze more time to evade the sanctions.173

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