Kim Jong-un became the country’s supreme leader in 2011 after the death of his father, Kim Jong-il, who had led North Korea since his father’s death in 1994. In 2016, the State Affairs Commission (SAC) became the country’s top ruling organ, and Kim Jong-un was named its chairman.

In 2019, Kim was reelected as SAC chairman by the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), the unicameral legislature, and given the new title of “supreme representative of all the Korean people and the supreme leader of the Republic.”

Members of the 687-seat SPA are elected to five-year terms. The Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF), a coalition dominated by the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) alongside a handful of subordinate parties and organizations, preselects all candidates, who then run unopposed. Voting is compulsory for citizens who are at least 17 years old, and turnout commonly approaches 100 percent. Preselected candidates won every seat in the 2019 SPA elections.

Although there is a clear framework for conducting and monitoring elections, the system’s structure denies voters any choice and precludes opposition to the incumbent leadership. The government uses the mandatory elections as an unofficial census, tracking whether and how people voted, and interpreting any rejection of the preselected candidates as treason.

North Korea is effectively a one-party state. The small number of minor groups that legally exist are all are members of the DFRF.

Political dissent and opposition are prohibited and harshly punished. The country has been ruled by the KWP, which the Kim family has always controlled, since its founding. Kim Jong-un was promoted from KWP chairman to secretary general in 2021. His late father, Kim Jong-il, was dubbed the KWP’s “eternal general secretary” after his death.

There is no opportunity for public political participation, and even KWP elites operate under the threat of extreme penalties for perceived dissent or disloyalty. The party is subject to regular purges aimed at reinforcing Kim Jong-un’s personal authority. The regime has executed senior officials who have fallen out of favor.

North Korea is ethnically homogeneous, with only a small Chinese population and a few non-Chinese foreign residents. With few exceptions, foreigners cannot join the KWP or serve in the military or government. Religious groups are harshly suppressed and unable to organize politically. Women hold few leadership positions in ruling bodies and occupy only 121 of the SPA’s 687 seats; the system does not allow these representatives to independently address the interests of women. The government typically denies the existence of LGBT+ people in North Korea.

North Korea has no freely elected officials. Kim Jong-un and his inner circle determine policy, and the SPA gathers periodically to unanimously approve all decisions. High-level officials are subject to constant churn based on their performance and their perceived loyalty to Kim Jong-un.

Corruption is believed to be endemic at every level of the state and economy, and government officials commonly engage in bribery. No independent or impartial anticorruption mechanisms exist.

Small-scale local markets have become prime targets of corrupt police officers, who solicit bribes from operators and detain those who cannot pay. Market participants also pay bribes to supervisors at their official workplaces to avoid discipline or imprisonment for abandoning state-assigned roles.

The government operates opaquely and without accountability. Information about the functioning of state institutions is tightly controlled for both domestic and external audiences.

Authorities restricted COVID-19-related information, disclosing only fragmentary public-health data, including the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths according to official figures, which outside experts called unreliable. Little information about vaccination rollouts was provided.

The state runs all domestic media outlets. Televisions and radios are permanently fixed to state channels. All publications and broadcasts are strictly supervised and censored. The regime rarely allows a small number of foreign books, films, and television programs to be distributed and aired in the country.

Several foreign news agencies have established bureau offices in Pyongyang. However, their access is tightly controlled, and media crews have been expelled in retaliation for their work. Select foreign media services are often invited to cover key political events and holidays, although authorities strictly manage their visits.

Several US and South Korean outlets broadcast shortwave and medium-wave Korean-language radio programming into North Korea, though the regime works to jam their stations.

Campaigns to send information into the country via external storage devices and leaflets are common, and North Koreans often modify their radios to receive foreign broadcasts. A South Korean law banning the transmission of leaflets and other information across the border without government permission took effect in 2021, but was struck down by the South Korean Constitutional Court in September 2023. The consumption of foreign radio broadcasts and possession of contraband devices in North Korea is illegal, as are the facilitation and nonreporting of such activity; all are subject to severe punishment under an “anti-reactionary thought” law, up to and including the death penalty.

Although freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed, it does not exist in practice. State-sanctioned churches maintain a token presence in Pyongyang, and some North Koreans are known to practice their faith furtively. However, intense state indoctrination and repression preclude free and open exercise of religion. Crackdowns are common, and those caught—including foreigners—are arrested and subjected to harsh punishments, including imprisonment in labor camps. In 2021, nongovernmental organization (NGO) Open Doors US estimated that 50,000 to 70,000 Christians were being held in prison camps. A 2022 report by the International Bar Association and the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) found that Christians are singled out for especially harsh treatment in North Korean prisons.

There is no academic freedom. The state must approve all curriculums, including those of educational programs led by foreigners. Although some North Koreans are permitted to study abroad at both universities and short-term educational training programs, they are subject to monitoring and reprisals for perceived disloyalty.

Nearly all forms of private communication are monitored by a huge network of informants. Domestic third-generation (3G) mobile service, available since 2008, may serve at least 6.5 million subscribers. Ordinary mobile users can connect to a state-run intranet but not the global internet. Mobile phones operating on this network function as state surveillance tools, which can review individuals’ application usage and browsing history and take screenshots of activity. Newer mobile phones include measures to prevent the consumption of contraband media, with some resorting to hacking to circumvent them.

Only a few elites have internet access, reaching it through their own service. Domestic and international mobile services are kept strictly separate. Individuals using Chinese-origin phones have faced crackdowns, while officials sent to China must install surveillance software on their devices. People returning from foreign postings or trips abroad are heavily monitored.

Freedom of assembly is not recognized. Participants in unauthorized gatherings are subject to severe punishment, including imprisonment.

There are no legal associations or organizations other than those created by the state and ruling party.

Strikes, collective bargaining, and other organized labor activities are illegal and can draw severe punishment for participants, including imprisonment.

North Korea’s judiciary is subordinate to the political leadership in law and in practice. According to the constitution, the Central Court, the country’s highest court, is accountable to the SPA, and its duties include protecting “state power and the socialist system.”

Fundamental due process rights, including freedom from arbitrary detention and the right to a fair trial, are systematically denied. Credible reports estimate that as many as 120,000 people may be held in political prison camps as of March 2023. Foreign visitors are also at risk of arbitrary detention. As of November, six South Korean citizens were being detained in North Korea. The six had been in North Korean custody for several years after being accused of crimes such as espionage and kidnapping.

In July, US Army private Travis King illegally entered North Korea by crossing the DMZ at its border with South Korea. King was then taken into custody by North Korean security forces. The North Korean government expelled King in September, releasing him into US custody after he was convicted of “illegally intruding” into the country.

The regime sometimes grants amnesty to or otherwise releases prisoners. In 2022, thousands were released to celebrate the late Kim Jong-il’s birthday via sentence reductions, though many were in poor physical condition. No dissidents were released.

Documented human rights violations include widespread torture, public executions, forced labor by detainees, and death sentences for political offenses. A 2021 UN report noted that forced labor and torture are rampant in the prison system, and that citizens often pay bribes to avoid arrest, mitigate treatment in detention, and secure family visits.

Defectors who seek safety in neighboring third countries are sometimes returned to North Korea, where they face torture and disproportionate punishment. China’s government considers North Korean escapees to be irregular economic migrants and regularly turns them back, violating international law.

The unresolved conflict with South Korea around North Korea’s nuclear weapons program poses a threat to physical security, and negotiations with Seoul and Washington remained stalled in 2023. The North Korean government launched numerous missile tests during the year, and successfully launched a reconnaissance military satellite in November. In August, the regime conducted a tactical nuclear-strike drill simulating an attack on South Korea in response to US–South Korean joint military exercises. In September, the legislature unanimously voted to enshrine North Korea’s nuclear program in the constitution. Kim Jong-un said that the changes, which make the policy of growing the country’s nuclear capacity a permanent law of the state, will “accelerate the modernization of nuclear weapons” and strengthen “national defense capabilities.”

Discrimination is commonly based on perceived political and ideological nonconformity. All citizens are classified according to their family’s level of loyalty and proximity to the leadership under a semihereditary caste-like system known as songbun. Those who are classified as “wavering” or “hostile” instead of “loyal” face official discrimination in employment, live in poorer housing, and receive limited educational opportunities, though rules can be manipulated through bribery. Relatives of suspected political and ideological dissidents, including defectors, are also subject to punishment in what amounts to guilt by association.

The country’s ethnic Chinese population has limited educational and employment opportunities, but somewhat more freedom of travel and trade.

Women have legal equality but face rigid discrimination in practice and are poorly represented in public employment and the military. Despite fewer opportunities in the formal sector, women are economically active in markets, which can expose them to arbitrary state interference. A UN report published in March 2023 found that COVID-19 restrictions had disproportionately impacted women and girls, further exacerbating existing challenges in accessing “food, medicine, health care, and livelihoods.”

The law does not explicitly prohibit same-sex relations, but the regime maintains that the practice does not exist in the country.

North Korea has historically denied the rights of people living with disabilities. Defectors report that disabled people have been quarantined, exiled, forcibly sterilized, experimented on, and sometimes executed.

Citizens have no freedom of movement, and forced internal resettlement is routine. Emigration is illegal, and all foreign travel is strictly controlled by the regime. In recent years, authorities have employed stricter domestic controls to stem the flow of defectors, who have also been impeded by regional coronavirus-related travel restrictions. The Unification Ministry reported that while over 1,000 defectors entered the country in 2019, only 196 did so in 2023. Freedom of movement for foreigners is also limited and subject to arbitrary constraints.

The regime implemented strict pandemic-containment measures and border controls through August 2023, including lockdowns and restrictions near the Chinese border in 2022. Internal movement was proscribed for periods in 2022 and 2023 to limit the spread of “seasonal flu.” Increased trade traffic with China and Russia was observed during 2023.

A person’s songbun classification affects their place of residence as well as employment and educational opportunities, access to medical facilities, and even access to stores.

Most North Korean workers cannot freely choose their employment, with the government assigning men and unmarried women to their positions and often denying monetary compensation. Workers, especially women, seek informal employment to earn an income and pay official employers bribes to cover absences.

The formal, centrally planned economy is grossly mismanaged. A lack of infrastructure, scarcity of energy and raw materials, lingering foreign debt, and ideological isolation also hobble business activity in the country.

Informal and government-approved private markets and service industries have provided many North Koreans, especially women, a growing field of activity that is somewhat free from government control. However, the COVID-19 pandemic hampered access to goods to sell in those markets, limiting people’s ability to earn discretionary income and increasing dependence on domestic food production and distribution.

Local officials have had some discretion in the management of special economic zones and over small-scale experiments with market-oriented economic policies.

Men and women have formal equality in personal status matters such as marriage and divorce. However, sexual and physical violence against women is common, and victims have little legal recourse. There are no specific legal penalties for domestic violence. UN bodies have noted the use of forced abortions on pregnant women when forcibly repatriated from China and infanticide of half-Chinese children.

Forced labor is common in prison camps, mass mobilization programs, and state-run contracting arrangements in which North Korean workers are sent abroad. Human trafficking networks, sometimes operating with the assistance of government officials, target North Korean women; those ensnared are subject to sex slavery and forced marriages, often in China. Some women have also turned to prostitution to survive in recent years and are exploited by their employers and the police.

Economic opportunities are also hampered by international sanctions imposed in response to the regime’s continued nuclear pursuits. Since 2016, sanctions have targeted civilian industries including textiles and seafood. North Korea has also been cut off from the international banking system. While this has not deterred the regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it has created growing difficulties for those dependent on markets and quasi-private businesses.